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5 December 2010. Three related cables, latter two from Qatar and Sweden in response to the first.


Critical Infrastructure - Key Resources Located Abroad Spy

Released by Wikileaks 5 December 2010 (929 cables)

Cryptome mirror: (929 cables, 2.9MB)


INFO  LOG-00   MFA-00   EEB-00   AF-00    AGRE-00  AIT-00   AMAD-00  
      AOP-00   AEX-00   AS-00    A-00     ACQ-00   CIAE-00  CIP-00   
      COME-00  CCOE-00  CPR-00   INL-00   DNI-00   DIM-00   DODE-00  
      DOEE-00  WHA-00   PERC-00  DS-00    EAP-00   DHSE-00  EUR-00   
      FBIE-00  VCI-00   FSI-00   OBO-00   TEDE-00  INR-00   IO-00    
      CAC-00   MED-07   MFLO-00  MMP-00   MOFM-00  MOF-00   M-00     
      CDC-00   VCIE-00  NEA-00   DCP-00   NRC-00   NSAE-00  ISN-00   
      OES-00   OIG-00   NIMA-00  PM-00    P-00     ISNE-00  DOHS-00  
      FMPC-00  IRM-00   SSO-00   SS-00    MR-00    TRSE-00  CBP-00   
      EPAE-00  SCRS-00  PMB-00   DSCC-00  PRM-00   DRL-00   G-00     
      ALM-00   SCA-00   SAS-00   FA-00    PMA-00   SWCI-00    /007R

P 182318Z FEB 09
TO PAGE 02 STATE 015113 182333Z

S E C R E T STATE 015113


E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/29/2019



REF: STATE 6461 PLEASE PASS TO RSO, POLOFF, ECON, and MANAGEMENT (GSO and IT). Classified by S/CT DAS, Susan F. Burk, Reason: 1/4 (B), (D), (E), and (G)

¶1. (U//FOUO) This is an action request; see Para. 13.

¶2. (U//FOUO) Under the direction of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) was written to provide the unifying structure for the integration of critical infrastructure and key resources (CI/KR) protection into a single national program. The overarching goal of the NIPP is to build a safer, more secure, and more resilient America by enhancing protection of the nation's CI/KR to prevent, deter, neutralize or mitigate the effects of deliberate efforts by terrorists to destroy, incapacitate or exploit them; and to strengthen national preparedness, timely response, and rapid recovery in the event of an attack, natural disaster or other emergency.

¶3. (U//FOUO) In addition to a list of critical domestic CI/KR, the NIPP requires compilation and annual update of a comprehensive inventory of CI/KR that are located outside U.S. borders and whose loss could critically impact the public health, economic security, and/or national and homeland security of the United States. DHS in collaboration with State developed the Critical Foreign Dependencies Initiative (CFDI) to identify these critical U.S. foreign dependencies -- foreign CI/KR that may affect systems within the U.S. directly or indirectly. State is coordinating with DHS to develop the 2009 inventory, and the action request in Para. 13 represents the initial step in this process.

¶4. (U//FOUO) The NIPP does not define CI/KR. Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD 7) references definitions in two separate statutes. In the USA Patriot Act of 2001 (42 U.S.C. 5195(e)) "critical infrastructure" is defined as systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States the incapacitation or destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination of those matters. In the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 101(9)) "key resources" are defined as publicly or privately controlled resources essential to the minimal operations of the economy and government.

¶5. (U//FOUO) The NIPP identifies 18 CI/KR sectors: agriculture and food; defense industrial base; energy; healthcare and public health; national monuments and icons; banking and finance; drinking water and water treatment systems; chemical; commercial facilities; dams; emergency services; commercial nuclear reactors, materials, and waste; information technology; communications; postal and shipping; transportation and systems; government facilities; and critical manufacturing. Obviously some of these sectors are more likely to have international components than other sectors.

¶6. (U//FOUO) Department is surveying posts for their input on critical infrastructure and key resources within their host country which, if destroyed, disrupted or exploited, would likely have an immediate and deleterious effect on the United States. We expect posts, after consultation among all sections and agencies, will in many instances immediately recognize whether such CI/KR exist in their host country. Posts are not/not being asked to consult with host governments with respect to this request.

¶7. (U//FOUO) Building upon the initial survey completed in 2008, Department requests each post reassess and update information about infrastructure and resources in each host country whose loss could immediately affect the public health, economic security, and/or national and homeland security of the United States. This reassessment may include suggestions from posts for removing, modifying, or adding CI/KR to the list developed in 2008 (see the list of CI/KR identified in 2008 in Para. 15 below).

¶8. (U//FOUO) The following three categories should be considered when determining whether critical foreign dependencies exist in the host country: 1) direct physical linkages (e.g., pipelines, undersea telecommunications cables, and assets located in close enough proximity to the U.S. border their destruction could cause cross-border consequences, such as damage to dams and chemical facilities); 2) sole or predominantly foreign/host-country sourced goods and services (e.g., minerals or chemicals critical to U.S. industry, a critical finished product manufactured in one or only a small number of countries, or a telecom hub whose destruction might seriously disrupt global communications); and 3) critical supply chain nodes (e.g., the Strait of Hormuz and Panama Canal, as well as any ports or shipping lanes in the host-country critical to the functioning of the global supply chain).

¶9. (U//FOUO) Although they are important issues, Department is not/not seeking information at this time on second-order effects (e.g., public morale and confidence, and interdependency effects that might cascade from a disruption).

¶10. (U//FOUO) Posts do not need to report government facilities overseas managed by State or war fighting facilities managed by other departments or agencies.

¶11. (U//FOUO) The following general information should be addressed when nominating elements for inclusion, removal, or modification:

-- (U//FOUO) Name and physical location of the asset, system, or supply chain node.

-- (U//FOUO) Post's rationale for including, modifying, or removing an asset, system, or supply chain node.

-- (U//FOUO) Any information Post has regarding conditions in country causing Post to believe the CI/KR is an active target or especially vulnerable due to natural circumstances.

-- (U//FOUO) Any information Post has regarding CIP activities in country and who/what agency is responsible for those activities.

¶12. (U//FOUO) Questions can be directed to Sharri R. Clark in S/CT:;; 202-647-1514. Alternatively, questions can be directed to S. Gail Robertson in S/CT:;, 202-647-3769.

¶13. (U//FOUO) ACTION REQUEST: Posts are requested to report by March 20, 2009 on CI/KR in their host country meeting the criteria outlined above and a brief explanation of why posts believes the asset meets the criteria. Due to the potential sensitivity of assets identified, posts are asked to consider the necessity of classifying their responses appropriately. Please note the list in its entirety is classified S/NF. If post determines there are no such CI/KR in its host country, a negative report is requested. Please send replies to the attention of Sharri R. Clark in S/CT and use the subject line "CI/KR Response for S/CT".

¶14. (U//FOUO) Posts' assistance with providing input to the first list created in 2008 was invaluable, and Department appreciates Posts' continuing cooperation.

¶15. (S//NF) Following is the 2008 Critical Foreign Dependencies Initiative (CFDI) list (CI/KR organized by region):



Congo (Kinshasa): Cobalt (Mine and Plant)

Gabon: Manganese - Battery grade, natural; battery grade, synthetic; chemical grade; ferro; metallurgical grade

Guinea: Bauxite (Mine)

South Africa:

BAE Land System OMC, Benoni, South Africa

Brown David Gear Industries LTD, Benoni, South Africa

Bushveld Complex (chromite mine) Ferrochromium Manganese - Battery grade, natural; battery grade, synthetic; chemical grade; ferro; metallurgical grade Palladium Mine and Plant Platinum Mines Rhodium



Southern Cross undersea cable landing, Brookvale, Australia

Southern Cross undersea cable landing, Sydney, Australia

Manganese - Battery grade, natural; battery grade, synthetic; chemical grade; ferro; metallurgical grade Nickel Mines Maybe Faulding Mulgrave Victoria, Australia:

Manufacturing facility for Midazolam injection. Mayne Pharma (fill/finish), Melbourne, Australia: Sole suppliers of Crotalid Polyvalent Antivenin (CroFab).


C2C Cable Network undersea cable landing, Chom Hom Kok, Hong Kong

C2C Cable Network undersea cable landing Shanghai, China

China-US undersea cable landing, Chongming, China

China-US undersea cable landing Shantou, China

EAC undersea cable landing Tseung Kwan O, Hong Kong

FLAG/REACH North Asia Loop undersea cable landing Tong Fuk, Hong Kong

Hydroelectric Dam Turbines and Generators Fluorspar (Mine) Germanium Mine Graphite Mine Rare Earth Minerals/Elements Tin Mine and Plant Tungsten - Mine and Plant Polypropylene Filter Material for N-95 Masks

Shanghai Port

Guangzhou Port

Hong Kong Port

Ningbo Port

Tianjin Port

Fiji: Southern Cross undersea cable landing, Suva, Fiji

Indonesia: Tin Mine and Plant Straits of Malacca


C2C Cable Network undersea cable landing, Chikura, Japan

C2C Cable Network undersea cable landing, Shima, Japan

China-US undersea cable, Okinawa, Japan

EAC undersea cable landing Ajigaura, Japan

EAC undersea cable landing Shima, Japan

FLAG/REACH North Asia Loop undersea cable landing Wada, Japan

FLAG/REACH North Asia Loop undersea cable landing Wada, Japan

Japan-US undersea cable landing, Maruyama, Japan

Japan-US undersea cable landing Kitaibaraki, Japan

KJCN undersea cable landing Fukuoka, Japan

KJCN undersea cable landing Kita-Kyushu, Japan

Pacific Crossing-1 (PC-1) undersea cable landing Ajigaura, Japan

Pacific Crossing-1 (PC-1) undersea cable landing Shima, Japan

Tyco Transpacific undersea cable landing, Toyohashi, Japan

Tyco Transpacific undersea cable landing Emi, Japan

Hitachi, Hydroelectric Dam Turbines and Generators

Port of Chiba

Port of Kobe

Port of Nagoya

Port of Yokohama

Iodine Mine Metal Fabrication Machines Titanium Metal (Processed) Biken, Kanonji City, Japan

Hitachi Electrical Power Generators and Components Large AC Generators above 40 MVA

Malaysia: Straits of Malacca

New Zealand:

Southern Cross undersea cable landing, Whenuapai, New Zealand

Southern Cross undersea cable landing, Takapuna, New Zealand


C2C Cable Network undersea cable landing, Batangas, Philippines

EAC undersea cable landing Cavite, Philippines

Republic of Korea:

C2C Cable Network undersea cable landing, Pusan, Republic of Korea

EAC undersea cable landing Shindu-Ri, Republic of Korea

FLAG/REACH North Asia Loop undersea cable landing Pusan, Republic of Korea

KJCN undersea cable landing Pusan, Republic of Korea

Hitachi Large Electric Power Transformers 230 - 500 kV

Busan Port


C2C Cable Network undersea cable landing, Changi, Singapore

EAC undersea cable landing Changi North, Singapore

Port of Singapore

Straits of Malacca


C2C Cable Network undersea cable landing, Fangshan, Taiwan

C2C Cable Network undersea cable landing, Tanshui, Taiwan

China-US undersea cable landing Fangshan, Taiwan

EAC undersea cable landing Pa Li, Taiwan

FLAG/REACH North Asia Loop undersea cable landing Toucheng, Taiwan

Kaohsiung Port


Europe (Unspecified): Metal Fabrication Machines: Small number of Turkish companies (Durma, Baykal, Ermaksan)


Baxter AG, Vienna, Austria: Immune Globulin Intravenous (IGIV) Octapharma Pharmazeutika, Vienna, Austria:

Immune Globulin Intravenous (IGIV)

Azerbaijan: Sangachal Terminal Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline

Belarus: Druzhba Oil Pipeline


Germanium Mine Baxter SA, Lessines, Belgium:

Immune Globulin Intravenous (IGIV) Glaxo Smith Kline, Rixensart, Belgium:

Acellular Pertussis Vaccine Component GlaxoSmithKline Biologicals SA, Wavre, Belgium:

Acellular Pertussis Vaccine Component

Port of Antwerp


TAT-14 undersea cable landing, Blaabjerg, Denmark Bavarian Nordic (BN), Hejreskovvej, Kvistgard, Denmark:

Smallpox Vaccine Novo Nordisk Pharmaceuticals, Inc. Bagsvaerd, Denmark:

Numerous formulations of insulin Novo Nordisk Insulin Manufacturer:

Global insulin supplies Statens Serum Institut, Copenhagen, Denmark:

DTaP (including D and T components) pediatric version


APOLLO undersea cable, Lannion, France

FA-1 undersea cable, Plerin, France

TAT-14 undersea cable landing St. Valery, France

Sanofi-Aventis Insulin Manufacturer: Global insulin supplies Foot and Mouth Disease Vaccine finishing

Alstrom, Hydroelectric Dam Turbines and Generators

Alstrom Electrical Power Generators and Components

EMD Pharms Semoy, France:

Cyanokit Injection GlaxoSmithKline, Inc. Evreux, France:

Influenza neurominidase inhibitor RELENZA (Zanamivir) Diagast, Cedex, France:

Olympus (impacts blood typing ability) Genzyme Polyclonals SAS (bulk), Lyon, France:

Thymoglobulin Sanofi Pasteur SA, Lyon, France:

Rabies virus vaccine

Georgia: Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline


TAT-14 undersea cable landing, Nodren, Germany.

Atlantic Crossing-1 (AC-1) undersea cable landing Sylt, Germany

BASF Ludwigshafen: World's largest integrated chemical complex Siemens Erlangen: Essentially irreplaceable production of key chemicals

Siemens, GE, Hydroelectric Dam Turbines and Generators Draeger Safety AG & Co., Luebeck, Germany:

Critical to gas detection capability Junghans Fienwerktechnik Schramberg, Germany:

Critical to the production of mortars TDW-Gasellschaft Wirksysteme, Schroebenhausen, Germany:

Critical to the production of the Patriot Advanced Capability Lethality Enhancement Assembly

Siemens, Large Electric Power Transformers 230 - 500 kV

Siemens, GE Electrical Power Generators and Components

Druzhba Oil Pipeline

Sanofi Aventis Frankfurt am Main, Germany:

Lantus Injection (insulin) Heyl Chemish-pharmazeutische Fabrik GmbH: Radiogardase (Prussian blue)

Hameln Pharmaceuticals, Hameln, Germany:

Pentetate Calcium Trisodium (Ca DTPA) and Pentetate Zinc Trisodium (Zn DTPA) for contamination with plutonium, americium, and curium IDT Biologika GmbH, Dessau Rossiau, Germany:

BN Small Pox Vaccine. Biotest AG, Dreiech, Germany:

Supplier for TANGO (impacts automated blood typing ability) CSL Behring GmbH, Marburg, Germany:

Antihemophilic factor/von Willebrand factor Novartis Vaccines and Diagnostics GmbH, Marburg, Germany:

Rabies virus vaccine

Vetter Pharma Fertigung GmbH & Co KG, Ravensburg, Germany (filling):


Port of Hamburg


Hibernia Atlantic undersea cable landing, Dublin Ireland

Genzyme Ireland Ltd. (filling), Waterford, Ireland: Thymoglobulin


Glaxo Smith Kline SpA (fill/finish), Parma, Italy:

Digibind (used to treat snake bites)

Trans-Med gas pipeline


Atlantic Crossing-1 (AC-1) undersea cable landing Beverwijk, Netherlands

TAT-14 undersea cable landing, Katwijk, Netherlands

Rotterdam Port

Norway: Cobalt Nickel Mine

Poland: Druzhba Oil Pipeline


Novorossiysk Export Terminal Primorsk Export Terminal.

Nadym Gas Pipeline Junction: The most critical gas facility in the world

Uranium Nickel Mine: Used in certain types of stainless steel and superalloys

Palladium Mine and Plant Rhodium


Strait of Gibraltar Instituto Grifols, SA, Barcelona, Spain:

Immune Globulin Intravenous (IGIV)

Maghreb-Europe (GME) gas pipeline, Algeria

Sweden: Recip AB Sweden: Thyrosafe (potassium iodine)


Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc. Basel, Switzerland:

Tamiflu (oseltamivir) Berna Biotech, Berne, Switzerland:

Typhoid vaccine CSL Behring AG, Berne, Switzerland:

Immune Globulin Intravenous (IGIV)


Metal Fabrication Machines: Small number of Turkish companies (Durma, Baykal, Ermaksan)

Bosporus Strait

Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline

Ukraine: Manganese - Battery grade, natural; battery grade, synthetic; chemical grade; ferro; metallurgical grade

United Kingdom:

Goonhilly Teleport, Goonhilly Downs, United Kingdom

Madley Teleport, Stone Street, Madley, United Kingdom

Martelsham Teleport, Ipswich, United Kingdom

APOLLO undersea cable landing Bude, Cornwall Station, United Kingdom

Atlantic Crossing-1 (AC-1) undersea cable landing Whitesands Bay

FA-1 undersea cable landing Skewjack, Cornwall Station

Hibernia Atlantic undersea cable landing, Southport, United Kingdom

TAT-14 undersea cable landing Bude, Cornwall Station, United Kingdom

Tyco Transatlantic undersea cable landing, Highbridge, United Kingdom

Tyco Transatlantic undersea cable landing, Pottington, United Kingdom.

Yellow/Atlantic Crossing-2 (AC-2) undersea cable landing Bude, United Kingdom

Foot and Mouth Disease Vaccine finishing BAE Systems (Operations) Ltd., Presont, Lancashire, United Kingdom:

Critical to the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter BAE Systems Operations Ltd., Southway, Plymouth Devon, United Kingdom:

Critical to extended range guided munitions BAE Systems RO Defense, Chorley, United Kingdom:

Critical to the Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW)

AGM-154C (Unitary Variant) MacTaggart Scott, Loanhead, Edinburgh, Lothian, Scotland, United Kingdom:

Critical to the Ship Submersible Nuclear (SSN)


Djibouti: Bab al-Mendeb: Shipping lane is a critical supply chain node


'Ayn Sukhnah-SuMEd Receiving Import Terminal

'Sidi Kurayr-SuMed Offloading Export Terminal

Suez Canal


Strait of Hormuz

Khark (Kharg) Island

Sea Island Export Terminal Khark Island


Iraq: Al-Basrah Oil Terminal


Rafael Ordnance Systems Division, Haifa, Israel:

Critical to Sensor Fused Weapons (SFW), Wind Corrected Munitions Dispensers (WCMD), Tail Kits, and batteries

Kuwait: Mina' al Ahmadi Export Terminal


Strait of Gibraltar

Maghreb-Europe (GME) gas pipeline, Morocco

Oman: Strait of Hormuz Qatar: Ras Laffan Industrial Center: By 2012 Qatar will be the largest source of imported LNG to U.S.

Saudi Arabia:

Abqaiq Processing Center: Largest crude oil processing and stabilization plant in the world

Al Ju'aymah Export Terminal: Part of the Ras Tanura complex

As Saffaniyah Processing Center

Qatif Pipeline Junction

Ras at Tanaqib Processing Center

Ras Tanura Export Terminal

Shaybah Central Gas-oil Separation Plant

Tunisia: Trans-Med Gas Pipeline

United Arab Emirates (UAE):

Das Island Export Terminal

Jabal Zannah Export Terminal

Strait of Hormuz

Yemen: Bab al-Mendeb: Shipping lane is a critical supply chain node


Kazakhstan: Ferrochromium Khromtau Complex, Kempersai, (Chromite Mine)


Orissa (chromite mines) and Karnataka (chromite mines) Generamedix Gujurat, India:

Chemotherapy agents, including florouracil and methotrexate


Argentina: Foot and Mouth Disease Vaccine finishing

Bermuda: GlobeNet (formerly Bermuda US-1 (BUS-1) undersea cable landing Devonshire, Bermuda


Americas-II undersea cable landing Fortaleza, Brazil

GlobeNet undersea cable landing Fortaleza, Brazil

GlobeNet undersea cable landing Rio de Janeiro, Brazil

Iron Ore from Rio Tinto Mine Manganese - Battery grade, natural; battery grade, synthetic; chemical grade; ferro; metallurgical grade Niobium (Columbium), Araxa, Minas Gerais State (mine) Ouvidor and Catalao I, Goias State: Niobium

Chile: Iodine Mine


Hibernia Atlantic undersea cable landing Halifax , Nova Scotia, Canada

James Bay Power Project, Quebec: monumental hydroelectric power development Mica Dam, British Columbia:

Failure would impact the Columbia River Basin. Hydro Quebec, Quebec:

Critical irreplaceable source of power to portions of Northeast

U. S. Robert Moses/Robert H. Saunders Power, Ontario: Part of the St. Lawrence Power Project, between Barnhart Island, New York, and Cornwall, Ontario

Seven Mile Dam, British Columbia: Concrete gravity dam between two other hydropower dams along the Pend d'Oreille River

Pickering Nuclear Power Plant, Ontario, Canada

Chalk River Nuclear Facility, Ontario: Largest supplier of medical radioisotopes in the world

Hydrofluoric Acid Production Facility, Allied Signal, Amherstburg, Ontario

Enbridge Pipeline Alliance Pipeline: Natural gas transmission from Canada Maritime and Northeast Pipeline:

Natural gas transmission from Canada Transcanada Gas:

Natural gas transmission from Canada Alexandria Bay POE, Ontario:

Northern border crossing Ambassador Bridge POE, Ontario:

Northern border crossing Blaine POE, British Columbia:

Northern border crossing Blaine

Washington Rail Crossing, British Columbia

Blue Water Bridge POE, Ontario:

Northern border crossing Champlain POE, Quebec:

Northern border crossing CPR Tunnel Rail Crossing, Ontario (Michigan Central Rail Crossing)

International Bridge Rail Crossing, Ontario

International Railway Bridge Rail Crossing Lewiston-Queenstown POE, Ontario:

Northern border crossing Peace Bridge POE, Ontario:

Northern border crossing Pembina POE, Manitoba:

Northern border crossing North Portal Rail Crossing, Saskatchewan

St. Claire Tunnel Rail Crossing, Ontario

Waneta Dam, British Columbia: Earthfill/concrete hydropower dam Darlington Nuclear Power Plant, Ontario, Canada.

E-ONE Moli Energy, Maple Ridge, Canada:

Critical to production of various military application electronics General Dynamics Land Systems - Canada, London Ontario, Canada:

Critical to the production of the Stryker/USMC LAV Vehicle Integration Raytheon Systems Canada Ltd.

ELCAN Optical Technologies Division, Midland, Ontario, Canada:

Critical to the production of the AGM-130 Missile Thales Optronique Canada, Inc., Montreal, Quebec:

Critical optical systems for ground combat vehicles

Germanium Mine

Graphite Mine

Iron Ore Mine

Nickel Mine

Niobec Mine, Quebec, Canada:

Niobium Cangene, Winnipeg, Manitoba:

Plasma Sanofi Pasteur Ltd., Toronto, Canada:

Polio virus vaccine GlaxoSmithKile Biologicals, North America, Quebec, Canada:

Pre-pandemic influenza vaccines

French Guiana: Americas-II undersea cable landing Cayenne, French Guiana

Martinique: Americas-II undersea cable landing Le Lamentin, Martinique


FLAG/REACH North Asia Loop undersea cable landing Tijuana, Mexico

Pan-American Crossing (PAC) undersea cable landing Mazatlan, Mexico

Amistad International Dam: On the Rio Grande near Del Rio, Texas and Ciudad Acuna, Coahuila, Mexico

Anzalduas Dam: Diversion dam south of Mission, Texas, operated jointly by the U.S. and Mexico for flood control Falcon International Dam: Upstream of Roma, Texas and Miguel Aleman, Tamaulipas, Mexico

Retamal Dam: Diversion dam south of Weslaco, Texas, operated jointly by the U.S. and Mexico for flood control

GE Hydroelectric Dam Turbines and Generators: Main source for a large portion of larger components Bridge of the Americas:

Southern border crossing Brownsville POE:

Southern border crossing Calexico East POE:

Southern border crossing Columbia Solidarity Bridge:

Southern border crossing Kansas City Southern de Mexico (KCSM) Rail Line, (Mexico)

Nogales POE: Southern border crossing

Laredo Rail Crossing

Eagle Pass Rail Crossing

Otay Mesa Crossing:

Southern border crossing

Pharr International Bridge:

Southern border crossing

World Trade Bridge:

Southern border crossing

Ysleta Zaragosa Bridge:

Southern border crossing

Hydrofluoric Acid Production Facility

Graphite Mine

GE Electrical Power Generators and Components

General Electric, Large Electric Power Transformers 230 - 500 kV

Netherlands Antilles: Americas-II undersea cable landing Willemstad, Netherlands Antilles.


FLAG/REACH North Asia Loop undersea cable landing Fort Amador, Panama

Panama Canal

Peru: Tin Mine and Plant

Trinidad and Tobago:

Americas-II undersea cable landing

Port of Spain

Atlantic LNG: Provides 70% of U.S. natural gas import needs


Americas-II undersea cable landing Camuri, Venezuela

GlobeNet undersea cable landing, Punta Gorda, Venezuela

GlobeNet undersea cable landing Catia La Mar, Venezuela

GlobeNet undersea cable landing Manonga, Venezuela


¶16. (U//FOUO) Minimize considered.



Stephen H Rogerson 12/02/2009 11:08:08 AM From DB/Inbox: Search



S E C R E T DOHA 00214




DE RUEHDO #0214/01 0851341
R 261341Z MAR 09

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 DOHA 000214



E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/29/2019



REF: A. SECSTATE 15113 B. DOHA 152 (08) C. DOHA 75 (08) D. DOHA 311 (07)

Classified By: Amb. LeBaron for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).




-- Post assesses that U.S. investments in Qatar's energy industry, coupled with the onset of regular liquefied natural gas (LNG) exports to the U.S. 2009-12, constitute the main critical infrastructure and key resources in Qatar, which if destroyed, disrupted or exploited might have an immediate and deleterious effect on the United States.

-- Embassy Doha continues to engage Government of Qatar entities across the spectrum to increase awareness and implement increased security procedures to identify and protect critical infrastructure. These entities include Qatar Petroleum and its Industrial Security Directorate, the Ministry of Interior, and the Qatar Armed Forces.

-- Key Qatari officials have recently made overtures of their willingness to embrace USG offers for assistance or requests for information/transparency on their current vulnerabilities and infrastructure protection programs. Embassy Doha assesses that there is considerable scope for cooperation with the GOQ on this issue, considerably more than at any time over the past three years.

-- Embassy Doha is currently preparing an interagency plan to engage GOQ entities in a synchronized fashion on this issue. End Key Points.




¶1. (C) Qatar shares with Iran the largest non-associated gas field in the world. Qatar's portion contains an estimated 900 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, giving it the third-largest reserves of natural gas in the world. Qatar is believed to have an agreement with Iran providing a set extraction limit in the field; however, the details of this arrangement are not known to us. By 2009, Qatar's share of hydrocarbon revenue from natural gas and derivatives was about equal to that derived from oil. At 30 metric tons per annum (mta), Qatar is already the world leader in LNG exports. Current estimates are that by 2012 Qatar will produce 77 million tons of LNG annually, roughly a third of which Qatar hopes to export to the U.S. market. About half of the new global LNG capacity coming online in the next four years will be in Qatar. (Note: Per British Petroleum calculations, 1 million metric tons of LNG equals 48.7 billion cubic feet of natural gas.)




¶2. (C) There are three main industrial facilities of interest that if destroyed, or if their production is disrupted, could have an immediate effect on U.S. national economic security. In order of priority, these are Ras Laffan Industrial City (RLIC), Mesaieed Industrial City (MIC) and port complex, and Dukhan Industrial City. All three industrial centers are under the control and supervision of Qatar Petroleum (QP), a semi-autonomous government organization whose Chairman, Abdullah bin Hamad Al-Attiyah, is also the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Energy and Industry. Natural gas production is primarily centered around the coast and offshore areas in the northeast of Qatar, in and round Ras Laffan; while, oil production is concentrated on the western coast near Dukhan as well as offshore platforms.

¶3. (C) Ras Laffan is Qatar's flag-ship industrial center, predominantly focused on the production of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) and derivative petrochemicals obtained during the natural gas extraction process. Destruction or an attack disrupting production at RLIC would cause exceptionally grave damage to the world market and U.S. national economic security interests. As of 2008, Qatar LNG production for export to Japan and South Korean represented over 60 percent of those respective countries internal natural gas consumption; by 2012 a third of Qatari LNG produced could be destined for the U.S. market, at which time it is estimated that Qatar will be the largest source of imported LNG to the U.S. market. The current drop in global demand for gas will also result in more LNG being sent to the U.S. as the flexible market and storage capacity give the U.S. the ability to soak up excess global supply in the short-term.

¶4. (C) QP operating units QatarGas and RasGas are responsible for LNG production in Ras Laffan. QatarGas production trains three and four will produce LNG equivalent to 2.8 billion cubic feet of gas per day, and RasGas is currently building two trains at Ras Laffan with 7.8 million tons of annual capacity each. ("Trains" are the liquefaction plants which draw gas pumped at offshore platforms, liquefy it, and load it onto LNG tankers.) These four trains will be among the largest in the world, and their production will be allocated in part to U.S. markets. In addition, major U.S. energy companies such as ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips partner with Qatar and currently have over $13 billion invested in Qatar's natural gas industry. Therefore, Ras Laffan's importance as a critical facility will continue to grow as production and exports to the U.S. increase.

¶5. (S/NF) As of early 2009, Qatar Petroleum Industrial Security Directorate has continued security infrastructure improvements at RLIC and the expansive Ras Laffan Industrial City Port complex, after a series of security assessments conducted since 2005 by several western security firms. These improvements have included redesign and construction of a new main entry control point for RLIC, plans for redesign of existing port boundaries under the International Maritime Organization (IMO) International Shipping and Port Security (ISPS) code, construction of a new port entry control point equipped with radiological and nuclear material detection monitors and container screening portals, and incorporation of ground-based radar, overlapping CCTV coverage and biometric enabled identification.

¶6. (S/NF) Mesaieed Industrial City (MIC) and port complex, located approximately 40 km south of Doha, was officially established in 1996 and is the main shipping point for oil from Dukhan to the international market. Destruction or disruption of port services would effectively shut down oil shipments from Qatar, potentially affecting half of Qatar's petroleum revenue. In addition, the port complex is a key choke point for U.S. and coalition military equipment, munitions and bulk aviation fuel delivery to Al-Udeid Air Base and Camp As Sayliyah, the two Qatari military installations hosting U.S. Coalition forces. Any disruption to port operations would severely limit U.S. military operations throughout the U.S. Central Command AOR. As an example, in September-October 2007, strategic fuel reserves at Al Udeid Airbase were depleted because unscheduled, uncoordinated road construction caused increased transit time for fuel tankers. The situation continued for 30 days until resolved. Had the situation not been resolved, there would have been an impact on theater-wide combat and airlift operations.

¶7. (C/NF) Mesaieed is also the location of most of Qatar's light, medium and support petrochemical facilities; producing fertilizer, fuel additives, lubricants, plastics and vinyl for domestic consumption and export. The facility comprises four major treatment plants as well as a specialized holding area to store and export products. Natural Gas Liquids Plants 1 and 2 are designed to separate and fractionate LNG extracted from various production areas into a number of fractionated final products. Natural Gas Liquids Plant 3 is composed of separate units to treat gas and condensates, and plant 4 is an expansion and development of QP,s gas treatment capacity alongside the fractionation and treatment facilities in Mesaieed. All of these plants are directly adjacent to the port facilities, and a major incident at any of them could effectively shut down port operations.

¶8. (S/NF) The QP subsidiary Qatar Aluminum Company (QATALUM) plant currently under construction at Mesaieed is planned as the world,s largest aluminum production facility once completed and operational (circa 2011). In addition, subsidiary Qatar Chemical Company (QChem) plans to begin construction on the world,s largest chemical derivatives plant, and there are plans for a construction of a new Qatar Petroleum oil refinery, the Al Shaheen refinery, to fully satisfy internal consumption needs and begin export of refined product at a greater price than traditional crude export. Construction on both of these projects at Mesaieed was slated to begin in 2009, but has since been delayed due to the current economic downturn and high costs of building materials.

¶9. (C) Dukhan industrial city currently accounts for the majority of Qatar,s oil production. The destruction or disruption of production at Dukhan would have a severe impact on the Qatari economy and may affect global and U.S. economies.




¶10. (C/NF) Embassy Doha and the State Department have continued to identify Qatar's increasingly important role as a world producer in the oil and LNG sectors and its inherent high value as a potential terrorism target as points of concern. Qatar's expectation of becoming the world's LNG and gas-to-liquids (GTL) leader by 2012 necessitates a comprehensive energy infrastructure security program. Post assesses that Qatar's attention to energy infrastructure has improved since the previous CI/KR report, but is far from complete. While the Qataris have adequately planned a production and shipping infrastructure for the booming business, it appears they are still in the beginning stages to consider how to protect it. However, recent overtures made by the Director of Qatar Petroleum,s Industrial Security Directorate, Ministry of Interior Brigadier Abdulaziz Al-Ansari, to increased dialogue and cooperation have renewed Post,s efforts to engage GOQ officials on critical energy infrastructure security.

¶11. (C) Post has a DCM-led working group comprising Pol/Econ, DAO, GRPO, OMC, FCS, and RSO to lay the ground work for, and synchronize, engagement with the GOQ on critical infrastructure protection. This group met most recently to discuss results of the mid-March 2009 U.S. Coast Guard International Shipping and Port Security (ISPS) team visit to Ras Laffan, Mesaieed and Doha ports. The team recommended a reciprocal Qatari visit to a U.S. port in June 2009, as well as the possible establishment of a bilateral security agreement with Qatar specifically addressing dedicated LNG shipments between the two countries. Post also wishes to restart the engagement process with the Qataris on the DOS/DOE Critical Energy Infrastructure program (CEIP) based on recent, positive signals from the host government.

¶12. (C) In addition, Post through the Department of Energy,s National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), Second Line of Defense Office, has been working with the Qatari Ministry of Environment,s Department of Nuclear Energy and Radiological Protection to provide training and equipment selection for Qatar's nascent radiological detection and response program since April 2008. In July 2008, Qatar sent 10 mid- to senior level personnel from the Ministry of Interior, Qatar State Security, Internal Security Force and Qatar Petroleum Security to a workshop on nuclear detection and monitoring at the HAMMER facility at the Pacific Northwest National Lab (PNNL) in Washington state. Qatar intends to place vehicle and pedestrian radiological and nuclear material detection monitors at ports in Ras Laffan, Mesaieed and Doha, as well as Doha International Airport and the land border crossing with Saudi Arabia at Abu Samra.

¶13. (S/NF) Post is formatting a detailed multifaceted response on a way forward in our efforts to engage Qatar that would leverage the various agencies of the country team (septel). This response will address a three-prong approach to various Qatari governmental and energy-related organizations featuring political/economic engagement, military to military training and assistance with the Qatari Armed Forces and Ministry of Interior, and the leveraging of commercial contacts with Qatar Petroleum and the Ministry of Energy. Post will be preparing a plan bringing together each of the various threads of this engagement.




¶14. (C/NF) As a result of an S/CT and DS/ATA June 2007 visit, Post drafted a joint working group framework to continue dialogue on energy infrastructure security. To date, the GOQ has been slow in embracing the framework agreement; however, Post, Department and USG concerns have not fallen on deaf ears. GOQ officials have expressed their own concerns, identifying a risk associated with critical infrastructure, during meetings with Post officials and USG visitors since early 2007. In January 2009 meetings with Qatar Petroleum Security,s Brigadier Al-Ansari and Poloff Zebley, Al-Ansari indicated he had received a read-out of the November 2007 USG-GOQ sponsored Gulf Security Dialogue from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and wanted to discuss further cooperation with the USG. Al-Ansari, who concurrently serves as the number three uniformed member of the Ministry of Interior as MOI Director of Logistics, appears to be the key decision maker on all critical industrial infrastructure issues at our identified key facilities ) Ras Laffan Industrial City and Mesaieed Industrial City.

¶15. (C) The Qatari government's appreciation of U.S. training and technology presents numerous prospects for U.S. engagement. We know that Qatar will need trainers, assistance on selection of physical security equipment (such as delta pop-up barriers, fences and anti-vehicle berms), nonlethal weapons and tactics, and other technological equipment (CCTV, etc). Offshore protection is an area with the greatest potential; Qatar will need additional and more advanced offshore patrol vessels, plus enhanced maritime surveillance and communications equipment, weapons and trained crews. There is currently a lack of standardized security practices; however, the Qatari government has identified gaps in security infrastructure and has worked with U.S. and European commercial firms to begin acquisition and training in the use of technical security equipment.




¶16. (S/NF) In 2005, the GOQ contracted with a U.S. security and safety company to perform a top-down, zero-based review of critical infrastructure protection; the study encompassed organizational lines of command and control for the security services and industrial facility security at the three facilities identified previously. The resultant report finished by the U.S. company in 2007, which has not been shared with the USG and remains highly classified by the GOQ, reportedly identified and prioritized deficient areas and provided recommendations in each. Subsequent to the report, Qatar Petroleum Security Directorate placed a tender for a detailed security infrastructure assessment in March 2009. The assessment will identify needed technical and security equipment and related facilities (security control buildings, barricades, etc).


Qatari Strategic Security Initiatives


¶17. (S) As detailed in the Ref C January 2008 meeting between Department of Energy Assistant Secretary Kevin Kolevar and Minister of State for Energy and Industry Mohammed Saleh Al-Sada, the Heir Apparent had established an Industrial Security Steering Committee, under the Ministry of Interior and headed by Brigadier Al-Ansari, charged with managing the current nationwide industrial security apparatus and improving overall security capacity. The creation of the steering committee was part of the Heir Apparent's strategic security initiatives, which include the planned establishment of an integrated National Command Center (NCC) and development of the National Security Shield (NSS). The NCC would provide coordinated command and control of security and civil defense units in response to national emergencies, while the NSS would create a series of interconnected fixed and mobile radar platforms to identify threats by sea, air and land.

¶18. (S/NF) As of mid-March 2009, the NCC was under the operational control of the MOI and co-located at Camp Duheil with the MOI,s Police Training Center. The center was staffed 24/7 by various Qatari civil defense, heath and security organizations and maintained direct contact with Qatar Petroleum Security officials.

¶19. (S/NF) In February 2009, the NSS placed a tender for the construction of the first-phase of the NSS, which consisted of the construction of 18 80-meter metal lattice towers for placement of integrated European Aeronautics, Defense, and Space Corporation (EADS) radars for interlocking coverage along the land border with Saudi Arabia and coasts. However, Post has been unable to ascertain specifics on the radar system and/or the ultimate Qatari organization responsible for management of the program, even though, select coverage provided by the NSS would be shared with Qatar Petroleum Security and integrated within the NCC.

¶20. (S/NF) The Qatar Armed Forces have for several years been considering adopting an integrated air defense system that could include the Patriot PAC-3 missile system. The Qatar Armed Forces have made clear that a major purpose of an air defense system would be the protection of their critical energy infrastructure. To that end, the Qataris have asked us to explore ways in which the coverage area for U.S. military-controlled Patriots currently in Qatar could be expanded to include the LNG facilities at Ras Laffan. Qatar's interest in an air defense system presents another opportunity for U.S.-Qatar engagement on critical infrastructure protection.




DE RUEHSM #0194 0791327
P 201327Z MAR 09



E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/20/2019 TAG PTER, PGOV, ASEC, EFIN, ENRG, KCIP, SW



Classified By: CDA Robert Silverman for reasons: 1/4 (B), (D), (E), and (G)

¶1. (S) In response to reftel, post would like to add Sweden's communications infrastructure to the CI/KR list. Although Sweden does not posses a direct undersea cable from the U.S., Sweden is a central European communications hub. For example, Swedish company TeliaSonera is an international carrier that owns and manages 43,000 km of fiber optic cable linking Russia and the Baltics to the rest of Europe and the U.S. If these lines of communications were to be destroyed, disrupted, or exploited, it may compromise global communications.

¶2. (S) Post recommends keeping Swedish pharmaceutical manufacturing company Recip AB on the CI/KR list for its production of ThyroSafe (potassium iodide). This resource provides protection in the aftermath of a nuclear emergency. ThyroSafe is the only FDA approved 65 mg potassium iodide tablet used to protect the thyroid gland against radioactive iodine released during a nuclear emergency.