1 December 2010

Palestinian National HUMINT Collection Directive S/NF

Released by Wikileaks 1 December 2010 among package of 553 cables

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R 311525Z OCT 08
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN 
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 
AMEMBASSY CAIRO 
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 
AMEMBASSY RIYADH 
DIA WASHINGTON DC//DHI-1B/CLM//DP//
CIA WASHINGTON DC//NHTC// 0000

S E C R E T STATE 116392 
 
 
NOFORN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/18/2033 
TAGS: PINR KSPR ECON KPAL PREL PTER XF
SUBJECT: (S) REPORTING AND COLLECTION NEEDS: PALESTINIAN 
ISSUES 
 
REF: A. 08 STATE 001379 
     ¶B. 08 STATE 64936 
 
 
Classified By: CATHERINE BROWN, DAS, INR/IPC. REASON: 1.4(C). 
 
¶1. (S/NF) SUMMARY:  This cable provides the full text of the 
new National HUMINT Collection Directive (NHCD) on 
Palestinian Issues (paragraph 3-end) and encourages 
Department personnel at post to assist in compiling 
Palestinian biographic information (paragraph 2). 
 
¶A. (S/NF) The NHCD results from a recent Washington review of 
reporting and collection needs for Palestinian Issues and 
sets forth a list of priorities intended to guide 
participating USG agencies as they allocate resources and 
update plans to collect information on Palestinian Issues. 
The priorities may also help the Embassy manage reporting and 
collection, including formulation of Mission Strategic Plans 
(MSPs). 
 
¶B. (S/NF) This NHCD is compliant with the National 
Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF), which was 
established in response to NSPD-26 of February 24, 2003.  If 
needed, GRPO can provide further background on the NIPF and 
the use of NIPF abbreviations (shown in parentheses following 
each sub-issue below) in NHCDs. 
 
¶C. (S/NF) Important information responsive to the NHCD often 
is available to non-State members of the Country Team whose 
agencies participated in the review leading to the NHCD's 
issuance.  COMs, DCMs, and State reporting officers can 
assist by coordinating with other Country Team members to 
encourage relevant reporting through their own or State 
Department channels. 
 
¶2. (S/NF) State biographic reporting - including on 
Palestinians: 
 
¶A.  (S/NF) The intelligence community relies on State 
reporting officers for much of the biographical information 
collected worldwide.  Informal biographic reporting via email 
and other means is vital to the community's collection 
efforts and can be sent to the INR/B (Biographic) office for 
dissemination to the IC.  State reporting officers are 
encouraged to report on noteworthy Palestinians as 
information becomes available. 
 
¶B.  (S/NF) When it is available, reporting officers should 
include as much of the following information as possible: 
office and organizational titles; names, position titles and 
other information on business cards; numbers of telephones, 
cell phones, pagers and faxes; compendia of contact 
information, such as telephone directories (in compact disc 
or electronic format if available) and e-mail listings; 
internet and intranet "handles", internet e-mail addresses, 
web site identification-URLs; credit card account numbers; 
frequent flyer account numbers; work schedules, and other 
relevant biographical information. 
 
¶3. (S/NF) Palestinian NHCD outline - priority issues: 
 
      ¶A. Palestinian-Israeli Peace Process 
            1) Conflict Resolution and Palestinian Relations 
            with Israel (SRCC-1) 
            2) Final Status Issues (SRCC-1) 
            3) Perceptions of US Role in the Peace Process 
            (SRCC-1) 
            4) Role of Regional Neighbors (SRCC-1) 
            5) Role of International Community in the Peace 
            Process (SRCC-1) 
 
      ¶B. Palestinian Leadership and Governance 
            1) Governance Issues (DEPS-1) 
            2) Security Forces' Capabilities (DEPS-1) 
            3) Palestinian Leadership (LEAD-1) 
            4) Fatah-HAMAS Relationship (LEAD-1) 
            5) Economic and Financial Stability (ECFS-2) 
            6) Civil Society and the Rule of Law (DEPS-1) 
            7) US, Regional, and International Foreign 
            Policy (FPOL-4) 
 
      ¶C. Palestinian Internal Security and Control 
            1) Palestinian Counterterrorism Capabilities and 
            Response (TERR-2) 
            2) Role of Palestinian Authority Security 
            Organs/Individuals in Terrorism (TERR-2) 
            3) Intelligence Services and Security Forces 
            (CINT-5) 
      4) Illegal Activities (MONY-4) 
 
      ¶D. Terrorism and Islamic Activism 
            1) International and Indigenous Terrorist 
            Activities (TERR-2) 
            2) Internal and External Support for Palestinian 
            Terrorists (TERR-2) 
            3) Islamic Activism (DEPS-1) 
            4) Threats Against American Citizens (TERR-2) 
 
      ¶E. Palestinian Social Development and Infrastructure 
            1) Human Rights (HRWC-3) 
            2) Demographics (DEMG-3) 
            3) Water Management (ENVR-4) 
            4) Infectious Disease and Health (HLTH-5) 
            5) Civilian Infrastructure (INFR-3) 
 
      ¶F. Government of Israel Plans, Policies, and Actions 
            1) Israeli Leadership Plans and Intentions on 
            the Peace Process (LEAD-1) 
            2) Conflict Resolution (SRCC-1) 
            3) Government of Israel Security Issues (SRCC-1) 
            4) Military Response to Palestinians and 
            Terrorism (FMCC-2) 
            5) Settlements (SRCC-1) 
            6) US and International Community (FPOL-3) 
 
      ¶G. Information Infrastructure and Telecommunications 
      Systems (INFR-3) 
 
¶4. (S/NF) Palestinian NHCD - Full text  -- reporting and 
collection needs under priority areas listed in paragraph 3 
above: 
 
¶A. Palestinian-Israeli Peace Process 
 
      1) Conflict Resolution and Palestinian Relations with 
Israel (SRCC-1). 
--Key positions, negotiating strategies, red lines, and 
points of flexibility of Fatah-affiliated Palestinian 
Authority elements, HAMAS, and other Palestinian parties 
concerned with the peace process, conflict resolution, and 
future dealings with Israel. 
--Negotiating positions for Palestinian talks with Israel on 
bilateral issues, particularly the extent of Palestinian 
Authority control in Jerusalem, right of return of 
Palestinian refugees to Israel, Israeli settlements in the 
West Bank, and East Jerusalem, exchanges of territory, 
borders and security, and "end of claims". 
--Attitudes of the general public toward Palestinian-Israeli 
talks. 
--Attitudes of Palestinian security forces toward peace 
negotiations with and attacks on Israel inside Israel and the 
Palestinian territories. 
--Details of all formal and informal channels, used by the 
Palestinian leaders to discuss peace steps with Israel. 
--Palestinian perceptions of and relations with Israeli 
leaders and negotiating counterparts. 
--Palestinian positions on negotiations with Israel regarding 
water, transportation and energy infrastructure issues, 
access to the Israeli economy, and safe passage between areas 
of Israeli and Palestinian control. 
 
      2) Final Status Issues (SRCC-1). 
--Details regarding final-status arrangements on issues of 
security, borders and border crossings, and refugees. 
--Information regarding final-status agreements on water, 
economics, legal matters and prisoners, infrastructure and 
environment, and Jerusalem (including sovereignty, 
governance, and access to/control of the "Holy Basin"). 
 
      3) Perceptions of US Role in the Peace Process 
(SRCC-1). 
--Palestinian leadership and citizen perceptions regarding 
the US role and efforts to influence the Israeli-Palestinian 
peace process. 
--Palestinian plans, intentions and efforts to influence US 
positions on the Palestinian-Israeli negotiations. 
Palestinian  efforts to galvanize regional and international 
support to influence US positions on the Palestinian-Israeli 
peace negotiations. 
--Palestinian plans, intentions, objectives and activities 
related to US policies and programs on the peace process 
including extent of support for US and other counterterrorism 
efforts. 
 
      4) Role of Regional Neighbors (SRCC-1). 
--Palestinian perceptions of the policies of regional 
neighbors (Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Lebanon, Libya 
and other Arab states and Iran) regarding a 
Palestinian-Israeli peace settlement. 
--Views and perceptions of regional neighbors on the impact a 
Palestinian-Israeli peace settlement would have on 
neighboring Palestinian populations. 
--Palestinian views of other countries' plans and efforts to 
support or oppose the Palestinian-Israeli peace process. 
--Palestinian perceptions of plans and efforts by individual 
regional neighbors to facilitate or hinder the development of 
institutions needed for a free and democratic Palestinian 
state. 
--Palestinian views about plans and efforts of Syria or 
Lebanon to resolve border disputes with Israel. 
 
      5) Role of International Community in the Peace Process 
(SRCC-1). 
--Palestinian perceptions about policies, plans, efforts and 
support for strategies and positions on Palestinian-Israeli 
issues from European Union members, especially France, 
Germany, the United Kingdom, and Russia and multilateral 
bodies, including the Quartet (United States, European Union, 
United Nations, and Russia), the Organization of the Islamic 
Conference, the Arab League, and the United Nations. 
--Palestinian views on amounts and uses of international 
assistance provided to the Palestinian Authority as part of 
bilateral or multilateral negotiations. 
 
 
¶B. Palestinian Leadership and Governance 
 
      1) Governance Issues (DEPS-1). 
--Status and relative strength of factions within the 
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and internal 
decision-making processes of these factions. 
--Relations between the Palestinian Authority and the PLO and 
its factions. 
--PLO and HAMAS finances and sources of funding. 
--Evidence regarding the effectiveness of the Palestinian 
Authority in governing areas under Palestinian Authority 
control; status of political reform and influence of 
President. 
--Indications of challenges to Palestinian Authority rule. 
Extent of popular loyalty to Palestinian Authority 
leadership. 
--Information on municipal government structures, independent 
local power bases, and relationships between the Palestinian 
leadership and local leaders. 
--Plans and intentions of the Palestinian Authority to 
consider or reject the formation of a new Palestinian 
National Unity Government. 
--Details on efforts of HAMAS to exert influence over 
Palestinians to consolidate their support. 
--Attitudes, plans, and tactics of Islamist and secular 
groups to determine or affect the choice of a successor to 
the current Palestinian Authority President. 
--Level of Palestinian support for HAMAS elected officials. 
--Palestinian perceptions of the Palestinian legislative 
council and its ability to exercise power. 
 
 
      2) Security Forces' Capabilities (DEPS-1). 
--Plans, intentions, and willingness to sustain efforts to 
reform the security forces. 
--Relations between the security forces and foreign security 
services, especially for cooperation, training, information 
sharing, and funding including efforts to target terrorist or 
extremist threats to the peace process. 
--Changes in the senior leadership of the Palestinian 
Authority security forces, including the general intelligence 
organization (Mukhabarat) and the Preventive Security 
Organization (PSO). 
--Leadership dynamics and power relationships among the 
Palestinian Authority security forces; relations between 
civilian leaders and security forces commanders. 
--Level of responsiveness of security forces to civilian 
control. 
--Decision-making processes and rules of engagement of the 
security forces in specific security situations. 
--Organizational structure of the Palestinian Authority 
security forces. 
--Command, control, communications, and intelligence 
infrastructure of Palestinian Authority security forces. 
--Information on personnel strength, budget, weapons, 
training, force readiness, targeting, tactics, 
transportation, and logistics of the Palestinian Authority 
security forces. 
 
 
      3) Palestinian Leadership (LEAD-1). 
--Goals and strategies of Palestinian officials in the West 
Bank and Gaza to insure/undermine the viability of a 
democratic Palestinian state. 
--Plans and intentions of Palestinian President to call 
elections. 
--Role of the Prime Minister. 
--Identification of key advisers to the Palestinian Authority 
President and Prime Minister and their respective areas of 
influence. 
--Decision making processes within the Palestinian Authority 
leadership, including the roles of key ministries and the 
views of their leaders on priority issues for the government. 
 
--Palestinian leadership attitudes toward and perceptions of 
the US. 
--Status of the current Palestinian Authority president's and 
prime minister's health. 
--Identification of possible successors to the current 
Palestinian Authority president, views of these possible 
successors, and those of other Palestinian leaders outside 
the government, on Palestinian-Israeli issues and information 
on the relationships of these possible successors with key 
Palestinian groups and Israel. 
 
      4) Fatah-HAMAS Relationship (LEAD-1). 
--Fatah-affiliated Palestinian Authority leadership and HAMAS 
efforts to resolve issues related to reconciliation or to 
continue competition. 
--HAMAS reaction to peace negotiation efforts.  Relationship 
between the Palestinian leadership, to include the 
Presidency, and HAMAS officials in Gaza and rejectionist 
elements. 
--Leadership plans and efforts in Gaza and the West Bank to 
unify or maintain the division between the two territories. 
--Efforts by the Palestinian Authority leadership to involve 
HAMAS elected officials in negotiating strategies for the 
peace process. 
--Details of travel plans such as routes and vehicles used by 
Palestinian Authority leaders and HAMAS members. 
--Biographical, financial and biometric information on key PA 
and HAMAS leaders and representatives, to include the young 
guard inside Gaza, the West Bank and outside. 
 
 
      5) Economic and Financial Stability (ECFS-2). 
--Economic decision-making processes within the Palestinian 
Authority government and plans and actions to implement 
economic reform, liberalization, and development. 
--Palestinian Authority budget allocations and funding 
streams. 
--Details about employment data and government plans and 
efforts to increase employment. 
--Plans by Palestinian officials and Palestinian businessmen 
in the West Bank and Gaza for coping with economic downturns 
caused by political problems. 
--Data on Palestinian trade with Israel and Jordan. 
--Data on the impact of border closures and 
Palestinian-Israeli violence on economic development, 
including on the livelihoods of Palestinians with jobs in 
Israel or Jordan. 
--Information on levels of financial savings by Palestinians 
and their ability to withstand prolonged economic hardship. 
--Palestinian efforts to develop trading relationships with 
non-Israeli buyers and attract foreign investment. 
--Plans and efforts to seek funding from international relief 
organizations. 
--Palestinian plans and efforts to develop and exploit 
natural gas reserves off the coast of Gaza. 
--Plans to develop or expand energy infrastructure, including 
petroleum and natural gas storage/distribution facilities and 
electric utilities. 
--Financial flows from Diaspora Palestinians and the 
motivations for such investment. 
--Information on close ties between business families and 
politicians. 
--Corrupt practices by businessmen and politicians. 
--Trends in the business practices of local Palestinian 
businessmen, such as changes in enterprise ownership and 
control mechanisms and shifts in contract bidding methods. 
--Plans and efforts to counteract Israeli closure policies. 
--Palestinian perceptions regarding fulfillment of aid 
pledges from Donors' Conference. 
 
       6) Civil Society and the Rule of Law (DEPS-1). 
--Plans and intentions of leaders of the Palestinian 
Authority to encourage political openness, protect civil 
liberties, and promote fiscal transparency. 
--Plans and actions of Palestinian Authority to implement 
judicial and financial reforms. 
--Details about the Palestinian justice system and 
Palestinian attitudes towards the Palestinian Basic Law and 
Sharia/Islamic law. 
--Capability and commitment of Palestinian officials and 
organizations to maintain order and confront threats posed by 
extremist and terrorist groups, clans, and criminal 
organizations. 
--Details of plans and programs intended to promote and 
maintain public order. 
--Attitudes and influence of key Palestinian interest groups 
on Palestinian plans, policies and actions aimed at promoting 
the rule of law and public order. 
--HAMAS and other Palestinian efforts to apply Sharia and 
promote Islamic alternatives in civil society. 
--Details on HAMAS' social welfare network to include 
hospitals, education systems, textbooks, libraries and social 
services in the Palestinian territories and their funding 
sources in the region and worldwide; efforts by PIJ and other 
Palestinian organizations to provide similar services and 
details of their sources of funding. 
--Financial systems used by HAMAS charities in Europe to move 
funds to the Middle East. 
--Popular attitudes towards HAMAS and other organizations 
that provide social services. 
--Views and attitudes of the younger generation on HAMAS and 
their control of municipalities as well as their social 
service programs. 
--Evidence of control of the media by Fatah-affiliated 
Palestinian Authority or HAMAS to influence the Palestinian 
population. 
--Details on development of political parties, labor unions, 
and/or worker groups. 
 
      7) US, Regional, and International Foreign Policy 
(FPOL-4). 
--Efforts by the Palestinian Authority to gain support for 
its strategies and positions on Palestinian-Israeli issues 
from the US. 
--Palestinian Authority's objectives and strategies on key 
issues in US-Palestinian relationship and views on future of 
US relations. 
--Information on Palestinian Authority negotiating positions 
before discussions with the US and views of Palestinian 
officials after discussions with the US. 
--Popular attitudes toward and perceptions of the US. 
 
¶C. Palestinian Internal Security and Control 
 
      1) Palestinian Counterterrorism Capabilities and 
Response (TERR-2). 
--Palestinian counterterrorism and internal security 
policies, plans, attitudes, commitment and actions in dealing 
with extremists and terrorist groups, and clans. 
--Actions, ability and willingness of the Palestinian 
security services in the West Bank and Gaza to thwart 
terrorist attacks and maintain public order. 
--Palestinian plans, intentions, objectives and activities 
regarding support to and cooperation with US counterterrorism 
efforts. 
--Cooperation between Palestinian security and intelligence 
services and Israeli counterparts on terrorism, including 
targeting efforts, technical operations, surveillance, 
interrogation, capture and prosecution of known terrorists. 
--Attitudes and influence of key Palestinian interest groups 
on Palestinian counterterrorism plans, policies and actions. 
--Views of Palestinian Authority President, his advisers, 
Palestinian Authority security chiefs and senior Palestinian 
officials toward the US and its counterterrorism policies; 
perceptions of US expectations for Palestinian cooperation in 
counterterrorism campaign. 
 
      2) Role of Palestinian Authority Security 
Organs/Individuals in Terrorism (TERR-2). 
--Ties between the security forces and Palestinian Authority 
leaders and other groups, including Palestinian political 
parties, militias, and rejectionist and terrorist groups. 
--Participation by Palestinian Authority security forces 
personnel in attacks against Israeli targets outside Israel 
and the Palestinian Territories. 
--Links between intelligence services and terrorist groups. 
--Locations of neighborhoods controlled by rejectionist and 
terrorist groups. 
--Indications of cooperation between Palestinian intelligence 
services and terrorist groups. 
 
      3) Intelligence Services and Security Forces (CINT-5). 
--Plans, intentions, key focus and rivalries of senior PA 
security force officials, including the General Intelligence 
Organization (Mukhabarat), the Preventive Security 
Organization (PSO), Military Intelligence (Istikhbarat), the 
National Security Force (NSF), and the Civil Police, as well 
as HAMAS's Security Support Force in the Gaza strip. 
--Command, control, communications, and intelligence 
infrastructure of Palestinian Authority security forces. 
--Indications of counterintelligence operations conducted by 
the security forces against foreign intelligence services 
operating in or through Palestinian Authority areas. 
--Information on signals intercept capabilities and targets, 
decryption capabilities, intercept sites and collection 
hardware, and intercept operation successes. 
--Plans and efforts to illicitly collect classified, 
sensitive, commercial proprietary, or protected technology 
information from US companies or government agencies. 
--Counterintelligence organization plans, efforts, and 
abilities, and warning of their use against US personnel. 
Details on security forces' penetrations of Palestinian 
rejectionist groups including electronic penetrations. 
--Technological capabilities, targets, and activities of 
Palestinian security forces. 
--Unit deployments and locations, infrastructure and 
facilities of Palestinian Authority security forces. 
--Details on processes used by Palestinian Authority security 
forces to acquire weapons and equipment, either legally or 
illegally. 
--Intentions by Palestinian security force leaders or rogue 
elements to use new capabilities against Israel or the US. 
 
      4) Illegal Activities (MONY-4). 
--Indications of levels of corruption among Fatah-affiliated 
Palestinian Authority and/or HAMAS leaders. 
--Individuals, governments, organizations, routes, and 
methods involved in arms smuggling, human 
trafficking/smuggling, money laundering and corruption in 
financial transactions in support of illegal activities. 
--Information on illegal weapons transactions with Israelis. 
--Activities of Palestinian gangs and irregular militia 
forces' involvement in crime and terrorism. 
 
¶D. Terrorism and Islamic Activism 
 
      1) International and Indigenous Terrorist Activities 
(TERR-2). 
--Structure and internal dynamics of HAMAS militant wing (Izz 
al-Din al-Qassam Battalions), the Palestinian Islamic Jihad 
(PIJ), al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, the Popular Front for the 
Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC), and 
Popular Resistance Committees, Army of Islam, and other 
terrorist groups with a presence in the Gaza Strip or the 
West Bank, including leadership, membership, decision making 
processes, command and control, and factions. 
--Popular support for rejectionist groups. 
--Tactics, techniques, and operating methods of Palestinian 
terrorist groups, including tradecraft, counterintelligence 
measures, recruitment activities, underground facilities, 
operational tasking, and travel, infiltrations into Israel, 
disinformation, denial and deception techniques, and 
training. 
--Plans and intentions for, and extent and details of 
Lebanese Hizballah activities in Palestinian areas or within 
Israel, including retaliation for the deaths of Hizballah 
senior military leaders. 
--Relationship between Palestinian terrorist groups and 
al-Qa'ida, and indications of interest by Palestinian 
terrorist groups to work with global jihadists. 
--Indications of interest by Palestinian terrorist groups in 
the acquisition or use of chemical, biological, or nuclear 
weapons, longer range missiles, or unmanned aerial vehicles 
(UAVs). 
--Communications systems used by senior leaders of 
Palestinian terrorist groups to direct and control 
subordinates and field operatives. 
--Use of Inmarsat, fax machines, cellular telephones, and 
computer communications, including the Internet, to conduct 
terrorist activities. 
 
      2) Internal and External Support for Palestinian 
Terrorists (TERR-2). 
--Evidence of Palestinian popular support for Palestinian and 
other terrorist groups; Palestinian public perceptions of 
rocket attacks against Israel. 
--Contacts and relations between Palestinian terrorist groups 
and other terrorist or rejectionist groups, especially 
Lebanese Hizballah, al-Qa'ida, and elements of the Arab 
population in Israel; influence of Islamic militants. 
--Extent and nature of control, sponsorship, and financial 
support of Palestinian terrorist groups by Iran, Syria, Saudi 
Arabia, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Egypt, or other 
countries. 
--Plans and intentions, capabilities and motivations of 
Palestinian terrorist groups and/or their state sponsors to 
conduct attacks against US, Israeli, Jordanian, Palestinian, 
or other western or allied targets. 
--Encouragement from state sponsors to conduct attacks 
against US, Israeli, Jordanian, Palestinian, or other western 
or allied targets. 
--Support mechanisms for Palestinian terrorist or 
rejectionist groups, including identities of key individuals 
and mechanisms for procuring and moving funds and weapons. 
--Smuggling between Gaza and the outside world, including 
routes and methodologies; information on weapons shipments 
into territories via tunnels, and maritime means for 
terrorist use. 
--Contacts and relations between HAMAS militants, the 
Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Popular Resistance Committees, 
Popular Front  for the Liberation of Palestine-General 
Command (PFLP-GC), Lebanese Hizballah, Fatah al-Islam (FAI), 
and other known or emergent terrorist or rejectionist groups 
in the region, and elements of the Palestinian Authority. 
--Attitudes and motivations of the Palestinian Authority 
leadership regarding the activities of HAMAS, al-Aqsa Martyrs 
Brigades and other terrorist or rejectionist groups. 
--Evidence of Palestinian Authority's, or PA senior 
officials' prior knowledge of, funding of, authorization of, 
or participation in popular unrest, violent outbreaks, or 
terrorist acts. 
--Financial support to NGO's from foreign governments, to 
include Venezuela and Turkey. 
--Contacts and cooperation between NGOs and terrorist groups, 
especially HAMAS charities and any political/humanitarian 
entities suspected of passing funds to militants. 
 
      3) Islamic Activism (DEPS-1). 
--Details about Islamic reformer, oppositionist and militant 
(activist) leaders, organizations, adherents, and supporters, 
including objectives, plans and strategies, tactics, and 
efforts to achieve goals. 
--Plans and efforts of internal or external Islamic activists 
to affect governance in Palestinian areas. 
--Islamic activist plans and efforts to develop political 
parties or organize opposition to the governing authorities. 
--Relations and cooperation among internal and external 
Islamic activists. 
--Cohesion and divisions within and among Islamic activist 
groups. 
--Influence of religious leaders on Islamic activist leaders, 
adherents, and supporters. 
--Islamic activist influence on national leadership, military 
and security services, educational institutions, government 
agencies, and NGOs. 
--Islamic activist use of public media, including the use of 
internet web forums, to achieve strategic, tactical and/or 
operational objectives. 
--HAMAS ownership of broadcasting stations.  Government plans 
and efforts to support or defeat Islamic activist efforts. 
--HAMAS contacts or connections with Muslim Brotherhood in 
other countries. 
--Details of HAMAS connections to HAMAS external leadership 
in Damascus; HAMAS financial ties to external funding offices 
such as Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. 
 
      4) Threats Against American Citizens (TERR-2). 
--Indications of Americans (officials, tourists, or 
residents) becoming targets of any terrorist groups operating 
in or near Israel, West Bank, and the Gaza Strip. 
--Palestinian terrorist groups' perceptions of US 
vulnerabilities and their perceptions of how the United 
States would respond to attacks against the homeland or US 
interests overseas. 
--Palestinian authorities' response to terrorist threats and 
attacks against the US interests, persons or facilities. 
--Policies, plans, and efforts regarding cooperation by 
Palestinian or Israeli officials with the US and regional 
neighbors concerning US POW/MIA accounting and recovery 
efforts and capabilities to assist or cooperate in recovery 
efforts. 
 
¶E. Palestinian Social Development and Infrastructure 
 
      1) Human Rights (HRWC-3). 
--Palestinian data and perception of the humanitarian impact 
of Israel's closure of Gaza and lack of freedom of movement 
in the West Bank due to security checkpoints, the barrier, 
and other obstacles to free movement. 
--Details about HAMAS and the Palestinian Authority's 
facilitation of humanitarian operations in the West Bank and 
Gaza. 
--Information on treatment of prisoners or detainees from 
opposition groups. 
--Palestinian intelligence and security forces' attitudes 
toward and participation in torture, and other human rights 
violations. 
 
      2) Demographics (DEMG-3). 
--Population data for Palestinian areas and Palestinian 
Diaspora. 
--Details about, and changes to, key demographic indicators, 
such as birth rate, fertility rate, mortality rate, and 
internal migration. 
--Palestinian leadership's view of demographic trends; use of 
data in consideration of two-state solution. 
--Palestinian officials' efforts to deal with the 'youth 
bulge' and resultant educational, training, and employment 
challenges. 
--Efforts by Palestinian Authority or HAMAS officials or 
institutions to co-opt the youth. 
 
      3) Water Management (ENVR-4). 
--Plans and intentions of Palestinian officials in West Bank 
and Gaza to confront environmental issues, particularly 
problems with water and waste management. 
--Palestinian perceptions of efforts to mitigate the impact 
of power shortages on sewer treatment and other civil 
services. 
--Palestinian strategies and efforts regarding water 
management and protection of infrastructure against attack. 
--Details about annual water use, and renewable surface and 
groundwater reserves. 
--Cooperation and disputes with other states regarding 
regional water resources to include the aquifers. 
--Details about plans and efforts to augment supplies from 
non-conventional sources, such as desalination plants. 
 
      4) Infectious Disease and Health (HLTH-5). 
--Information on the effects of Palestinian-Israeli violence 
on public health conditions in Palestinian-controlled areas. 
--Details about prevalence, and outbreaks of infectious 
disease to include HIV and avian flu H5N1. 
--Palestinian Authority plans and efforts to prevent and 
manage outbreaks. 
--Statistical information on the incidence of chronic and 
infectious disease among various population groups (Gaza, 
West Bank, Bedouin, urban, agricultural areas, and so forth). 
 
--Details about location and level of contaminants in air, 
water, food, and soil, including threat to health from 
accidental or intentional release of toxic industrial 
chemicals. 
--Military and civilian medical capabilities and 
infrastructure. 
--Details about HAMAS and other Palestinian groups' medical 
assistance to Palestinians. 
 
      5) Civilian Infrastructure (INFR-3). 
--Information on location and condition of power plants, 
roads, hospitals, waste treatment facilities and financial 
institutions in the Palestinian areas. 
--Information on Palestinian access to fuel for power plants. 
 
--Palestinian perceptions of efforts to deal with impact of 
power shortages and efforts to mitigate power shortages on 
sewer treatment and other civil services. 
 
¶F. Government of Israel Plans, Policies, and Actions 
 
      1) Israeli Leadership Plans and Intentions on the Peace 
Process (LEAD-1). 
--Government of Israel (GOI) leadership's negotiating 
positions, strategies, and goals in interactions with the 
Fatah-affiliated Palestinian Authority officials, with 
supporters or elements affiliated with HAMAS, and with other 
Palestinian parties concerned with the peace process. 
--Israeli leaders' perceptions of and relations with 
Palestinian leaders and negotiating counterparts.  Evidence 
of informal channels, either sanctioned or unsanctioned by 
the Israeli leadership, to discuss peace steps with 
Palestinian leaders. 
--Israeli leadership views and intentions regarding the 
impact of their negotiations with Syria on their negotiations 
with the Palestinians. 
--Israel's decision-making process for launching military 
operations and determining retaliation for terrorist attacks. 
 
--Israeli leaders' involvement in decisions on response to 
terrorist attacks. 
--Israeli leadership intentions and strategy toward managing 
the US relationship; views of prime minister and advisors 
toward the US and its counterterrorism policies.  Israeli 
thoughts and views on impact of Israeli domestic politics, 
including changes in GOI leadership, on GOI approach to and 
conduct of the peace process and negotiations. 
 
      2) Conflict Resolution (SRCC-1). 
--Negotiating positions for Israeli talks with Palestinians 
on bilateral issues, particularly the extent of Israeli 
control of Jerusalem, right of return of Palestinian refugees 
to Israel, Israeli settlements in the West Bank and east 
Jerusalem, exchanges of territory, and "end of claims". 
--GOI views and positions on final-status issues; water 
rights, transportation and energy infrastructure issues, 
access to the Israeli economy, security, and safe passage 
between areas of Israeli and Palestinian control, legal 
matters and prisoners, and Jerusalem (including sovereignty, 
governance, and access to/control of the "Holy Basin"). 
--Attitudes of the Israeli public, including Israeli Arabs, 
toward Israeli-Palestinian talks.  Efforts by opposition 
parties or members of the ruling coalition to influence 
government positions on the peace process. 
--Attitudes of Israeli security forces toward peace 
negotiations with Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank. 
Current plans and intentions regarding Palestinian access and 
movement, in particular, access and movement with economic 
consequences, e.g. movement of produce, access to fields, and 
movement of commercial goods between Palestinian villages. 
 
      3) Government of Israel Security Issues (SRCC-1). 
--Government of Israel (GOI) views and assessments of 
military strengths and vulnerabilities. 
--Perceptions of threats posed by Palestinian rejectionists, 
including the potential for conflict with their state 
sponsors, Syria and Iran, and Lebanon. 
--GOI negotiating positions, strategies, and goals in 
interactions with Syria, and Lebanon, especially on final 
status issues. 
--Israeli views of an Egyptian or Jordanian role in the 
context of final status issues. 
--Israeli views on a future regional security pact. 
--GOI plans, intentions and reactions to Palestinian 
intentions to develop Gaza off-shore natural gas reserves. 
GOI plans and actions to continue construction of security 
fence including views on boundaries, funding constraints, and 
external influences on decision-making. 
--GOI plans and actions to implement agreements with 
Palestinians on bilateral security measures and to implement 
unilateral security measures over Israeli- and 
Palestinian-controlled areas. 
--Views and actions on prisoner swaps/releases; information 
on Israel's treatment of Palestinian prisoners or detainees, 
including interrogation methods. 
--Information on and motivations for any increased Israeli 
population emigration from Israel. 
 
      4) Military Response to Palestinians and Terrorism 
(FMCC-2). 
--Details on Israel Defense Forces (IDF) operations underway 
or planned against the HAMAS-controlled Palestinian militants 
in Gaza, terrorists, or terrorist infrastructure, including 
targeted assassinations and tactics/techniques used by ground 
and air units. 
--Israeli efforts to counter short-range rockets and mortars. 
 
--IDF preparations to conduct increased operations against 
Palestinian targets in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and 
Lebanon. 
--Impact of Israeli efforts against rocket attacks on Israeli 
views of security. 
--IDF preparations to conduct combat operations against 
Hizballah or Syrian targets along Israel's northern border or 
inside Lebanon or Syria. 
--IDF units, equipment, maintenance levels, training, morale, 
and operational readiness. 
--IDF tactics, techniques and procedures for conducting 
conventional and unconventional counterinsurgency and 
counterterrorist operations. 
--Israeli assessment of the impact of reserve duty in the 
territories on IDF readiness. 
 
      5) Settlements (SRCC-1). 
--Evidence of Government of Israel support for or opposition 
to actions to limit and/or reduce settlement and outpost 
growth and construction. 
--Information on leaders of the Israeli settlement 
establishment, including Golan settlers, their ideology, 
motivations and who they claim to represent. 
--Divisions among the various settlement groups. 
--Details on settlement-related budgets and subsidies. 
Settlers' relationship with the Israeli political and 
military establishment including their lobbying and 
settlement methods. 
--Golan settlers' views of any potential peace agreement with 
Syria. 
--Support for settlers within Israeli society. 
--Indications of Israeli extremist groups becoming more 
active. 
--Perceptions of US demands or requirements of Israeli 
government regarding, security fences and settlements. 
 
      6) US and International Community (FPOL-3). 
--Israeli perceptions of US peace process approach; 
indications of critical or hostile reaction to US policies 
and views of Israeli leadership after discussions with the 
US. 
--Attitudes of key political and military officials 
concerning the state of the relationship with the US. 
--Plans to influence views and positions of academics, 
journalists, and business, religious and professional 
organizations towards the US and the US-Israeli relationship. 
 
--Views of and responses to role of the Quartet. 
--Israeli plans and intentions to support US positions in the 
UN and other international fora. 
--Israeli support for US Iraq/Iran policies and US policies 
and attitudes toward other Middle Eastern countries, and 
European Union countries; relations with Russia, China, 
Turkey, Pakistan and India. 
 
¶G. Information Infrastructure and Telecommunications Systems 
(INFR-3). 
--Current specifications, vulnerabilities, capabilities, and 
planned upgrades to national telecommunications 
infrastructure, networks, and technologies used by government 
and military authorities, intelligence and security services, 
and the public sector. 
--Details about command, control, and communications systems 
and facilities. 
--National leadership use of and dependencies on a dedicated 
telecommunications infrastructure. 
--Details about national and regional telecommunications 
policies, programs, regulations, and training. 
--Information about current and planned upgrades to public 
sector communications systems and technologies used by 
government, military personnel, and the civil sector, 
including cellular phone networks, mobile satellite phones, 
very small aperture terminals (VSAT), trunked and mobile 
radios, pagers, prepaid calling cards, firewalls, encryption, 
international connectivity, use of electronic data 
interchange, and cable and fiber networks. 
--Information about wireless infrastructure, cellular 
communications capabilities and makes and models of cellular 
phones and their operating systems, to include second 
generation and third generation systems. 
--Details about the use of satellites for telecommunication 
purposes, including planned system upgrades. 
--Details about internet and intranet use and infrastructure, 
including government oversight. 
--Details about foreign and domestic telecommunications 
service providers and vendors. 
--Plans and efforts to acquire US export-controlled 
telecommunications equipment and technology. 
--Plans and efforts to export or transfer state-of-the art 
telecommunications equipment and technology. 
--Details about information repositories associated with 
radio frequency identification (RFID)-enabled systems used 
for passports, government badges, and transportation systems. 
 
--Official and personal phone numbers, fax numbers, and 
e-mail addresses of principal civilian and military leaders. 
 
RICE