1 December 2010

Venezuela Counterintelligence Working Group Meeting S/NF

Released by Wikileaks 1 December 2010 among package of 553 cables

http://88.80.13.160/file/cablegate/cablegate-201012012301.7z

Mirror: http://cryptome.org/0003/cablegate-201012012301.7z (1.9MB)

../2010/01/10CARACAS107.html

VZCZCXYZ0001
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHCV #0107/01 0281832
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 281832Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY CARACAS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0378
INFO RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS

S E C R E T CARACAS 000107 

SIPDIS 
NOFORN 
DS/ICI/CI, DS/IP/WHA 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/01/28 
TAGS: ASEC
SUBJECT: January 2010 Caracas CIWG 

CLASSIFIED BY: Andres Barcenas, ARSO, Dept. of State, RSO Caracas; 
REASON: 1.4(G) 

(SBU) On January 5, 2010 Caracas held its bi-annual 
Counterintelligence Working Group (CIWG) meeting to review current 
threat levels and countermeasures, to discuss recent CI activity 
and establish post policy on use of FOBs and Opennet Blackberries. 
In attendance for the meeting were representatives from MSG, POL, 
MGT, RSO, DHS, LEGAT, DEA, CONS, ESO, ECON, DAO/Milgroup, ORA and 
IMO. The DCM chaired the meeting. 



(S/NF) RSO stated the current threat levels for post and stressed 
that Caracas is critical and high in 4 of the 6 threat categories. 
RSO and other sections confirmed that Venezuelan Intelligence 
Services (Directorate of Military Intelligence-DIM and the 
Bolivarian Intelligence Service-SEBIN formerly DISIP) are 
conducting HUMINT and TECH operations against Embassy staff, as 
well as political opposition leaders and are controlled by the 
Cuban Intelligence Service operating in Venezuela. While the 
collection priority appears to be for political opposition leaders, 
RSO reminded everyone that the VIS have the capability, means and 
desire to monitor and target Embassy staff. 



(SBU) During a review of the current threat levels RSO and SEO 
stressed the requirement that locally engaged staff without 
security clearances must be escorted at all times in the CAA. This 
includes the front entrance of the 5th floor area near the 
elevators. LE Staff must not be left unattended in that area. 



(SBU) RSO reminded Section heads when having staff meetings with 
local employees (non-cleared Americans) inside CAA locations the 
Section Head MUST compartmentalize all information and only discuss 
unclassified information in their presence. In addition SEO 
explained the standards for introducing electronic or new items 
into CAA locations and reiterated that no computers or other 
electronic items are allowed in CAA unless they have been sent 
securely to Post through the classified pouch system and controlled 
at all times. Personal items must be screened and tagged by the 
SEO before entering the CAA areas. This standard applies to all 
agencies and staff, PSC or TDY. SEO is working with MGT to send 
out a management notice to all staff reminding them of proper 
procurement procedures for CAA locations. 



(SBU) RSO reiterated to all Section heads the Department policy and 
guidelines for Foreign Contact Reporting and encouraged all Section 
Heads to review the contact reporting policy with all Cleared 
Americans in their sections. In addition RSO reminded staff that 
contact reporting is required for all personal social engagements 
with locally engaged staff from the Embassy. RSO will resubmit the 
Mission Security Notice on Foreign Contact Reporting next week as a 
reminder to all staff. 



(SBU) As part of Post Debriefing Program, RSO expects DS TDY 
support from Washington in March/April to assist with the Annual 
Security Briefings for all Embassy staff. RSO will hold another 
debriefing review this month for all cleared-American staff 
arriving at post over the last 90 to 120 days. 



(S) RSO stressed the need to establish a clear post policy on the 
issuance of FOBs and Opennet Blackberries. IMO stated that 
currently only cleared American staff have been issued FOBs and 
Blackberries, but a few sections have stated the need for a FSN to 
carry Blackberries. It was agreed that the CIWG will review all 
requests for FOBS and Blackberries and will determine if the need 
and stated justification should be approved or denied. The CIWG 
discussed the pros and cons of FOB use within Venezuela and on home 
computers. The CIWG affirmed that FOBs should remain issued only 
to cleared American staff (Further review of the Department 
guidelines and requirements states that based on Caracas' threat 
level cleared American staff must only use the FOBS on computers 
that meet all the Department required security guidelines.) The 
CIWG determined that individuals assigned FOBs should evaluate 
their need and use discretion of the FOB only when the work cannot 
be completed at the Embassy (perhaps only Unclass and not SBU). 
Cleared Americans issued FOBs should receive an additional briefing 
from the ISSO and the RSO to discourage frivolous use of the FOB, 
with a review of what constitutes SBU, especially for non-State 
Agencies. 

(SBU) Point of contact for this cable is ARSO Andres Barcenas and 
RSO Wendy Bashnan, telephone number 58-212-907-8403. Regards.