11 September 2011
FBI Notice of Potential al-Qaida NYC DC Threat
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UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
(U//FOUO) Potential Al-Qaida Threat to New York City and Washington,
DC During 9/11 Anniversary Period
8 September 2011
(U) Scope
(U//FOUO) This Joint Intelligence Bulletin (JIB) is intended to provide warning
and perspective regarding potential attack plotting by al-Qa?ida against
US interests. This product is intended to support the activities of FBI and
DHS and to assist federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial government
counterterrorism and law enforcement officials and the private sector in
effectively deterring, preventing, preempting, or responding to terrorist
attacks against the United States.
IA-0???-11
(U) Warning: This joint FBI/DHS document is UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE
ONLY (U//FOUO). It is subject to release restrictions as detailed in the
Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 482) and the Freedom of Information
Acts (5 U.S.C. 552). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted,
distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS and FBI policy for FOUO
information and is not to be released to the public, media, or other personnel
who do not have an authorized need-to-know without appropriate prior
authorization.
(U) Warning: This product may contain US person information that has been
deemed necessary for the intended recipient to understand, assess, or act
on the information provided. US person information is highlighted with the
label USPER and should be protected in accordance with constitutional
requirements and all federal and state privacy and civil liberties laws.
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
(U) Key Findings
(U//FOUO) According to recently obtained information, al-Qaida may
be planning attacks inside the United States, targeting either New York City
or Washington, DC around the time of the 9/11 anniversary.
(U//FOUO) We remain concerned that terrorists and violent extremists may
view the symbolism of the 10th anniversary of 9/11 as a potentially attractive
date to conduct an attackparticularly in major US cities.
(U//FOUO) Al-Qaida Possibly Planning Homeland Attack around 9/11
Anniversary Timeframe
(U//FOUO) As of early September 2011, al-Qaida possibly planned to
carry out attacks in either New York City or Washington, DCincluding
a possible car bomb attack around the timeframe of the 9/11 anniversary;
such attacks may involve operatives carrying US documentation.
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(U//FOUO) The attacks would be intended to cause panic within the public
and disarray among first responders.
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(U//FOUO) We have no further information on the specific timing, targets,
locations, or methods of any of the potential attacks.
(U//FOUO) We assess that al-Qaida has likely maintained an interest
since at least February 2010 in conducting large attacks in the Homeland
timed to coincide with symbolic dates, to include the 10-year anniversary
of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. We also remain concerned that the May 2011
death of Usama bin Ladin (UBL), coupled with the subsequent removal of several
key al-Qaida figures, could further contribute to al-Qaidas
desire to stage an attack on a symbolic datesuch as the 10-year anniversary
of 9/11as a way to avenge UBLs death and reassert the groups
relevance, although operational readiness likely remains the primary driving
factor behind the timing of al-Qaida attacks.
(U) Possible Attack Methods and Targets
(U//FOUO) While this specific threat reporting indicates al-Qaida may
be considering an attack using vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices
(VBIEDs)likely similar to the tactic used by Faisal Shahzad USPER in
his attempted attack on Times Square on 1 May 2010we assess that
al-Qaida and its affiliates have also considered attacks with small-arms,
homemade explosive devices, and poisons, and probably provide their operatives
with enough autonomy to select the particular target and method of attack.
(U//FOUO) Although we have no specific information on targets other than
these two cities for this particular threat stream, we assess that
al-Qaida in general has traditionally viewed aviation, mass transit
systems, and US Government and military sites as particularly attractive.
We further assess that targets with large gatherings of people and that are
of economic, symbolic, or political significance offer the opportunity for
al-Qaida and its adherents to inflict mass casualties, with the added
objectives of causing economic and psychological damage on the United States.
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(U) Indicators of Pre-Operational Surveillance and Preparations for an Attack
(U//FOUO) We strongly encourage federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial
counterterrorism officials and the private sector to remain alert and immediately
report potential indicators of preoperational surveillance and planning
activities at any commercial retail establishment, transportation venue,
national monument or icon, or other public gathering place. Although a single
indicator may constitute constitutionally protected activity, one or more
might indicate pre-operational surveillance or preparation for an attack.
Possible indicators include:
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(U//FOUO) Unusual or prolonged interest in or attempts to gain sensitive
information about security measures of personnel, entry points, peak days
and hours of operation, and access controls such as alarms or locks;
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(U//FOUO) Observation of security reaction drills or procedures; multiple
false alarms or fictitious emergency calls to the same locations or similar
venues;
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(U//FOUO) Use of cameras or video recorders, sketching, or note-taking in
a manner that would arouse suspicion;
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(U//FOUO) Unusual interest in speaking with building maintenance personnel;
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(U//FOUO) Observation of or questions about facility security measures, to
include barriers, restricted areas, cameras, and intrusion detection
systems;
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(U//FOUO) Observations of or questions about facility air conditioning, heating,
and ventilation systems;
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(U//FOUO) Suspicious purchases of items that could be used to construct an
explosive device, including hydrogen peroxide, acetone, gasoline, propane,
or fertilizer;
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(U//FOUO) Suspicious activities in storage facilities or other areas that
could be used to construct an explosive device;
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(U//FOUO) Attempted or unauthorized access to rooftops or other potentially
sensitive areas.
(U) Recommended Protective Measures for VBIED Attacks
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(U//FOUO) Update personnel on escalating threat;
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(U//FOUO) Review and verify IED and VBIED tactics, techniques and procedures
(TTPs) and reporting procedures;
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(U//FOUO) Frequently test communications and notification procedures;
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(U//FOUO) Be aware of and report unattended vehicles;
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(U//FOUO) Identify security zones and establish standoff distances;
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(U//FOUO) Conduct refresher training for employees to understand basic procedures
and associated hazards from blast and fragmentation;
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(U//FOUO) Educate facility personnel on indicators of a VBIED attack TTPs
and to be on the lookout for suspicious behavior;
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(U//FOUO) Review and identify local use-of-force policies to challenge a
potential vehicle suicide attack should it be encountered;
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(U//FOUO) Review evacuation protocols for VBIED threats, and conduct evacuation
drills establishing primary and secondary evacuation routes and assembly
areas;
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(U//FOUO) Establish security presence at strategic locations within at-risk
venues, specifically at all entrances or vehicular choke points;
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(U//FOUO) Establish vehicle search protocols and identify vehicle screening
points or marshalling areas to check identification and manifests of approaching
service vehicles;
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(U//FOUO) Prohibit unauthorized vehicle access;
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(U//FOUO) Record tag numbers for all vehicles entering site;
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(U//FOUO) Establish protocols for executing serpentine vehicle access and
choke points to impede approach of a VBIED toward a possible target. Conduct
random vehicle explosive detection and canine searches;
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(U//FOUO) Stagger search times and patterns to impede potential surveillance.
(U) Outlook
(U//FOUO) The FBI and DHS continue to work with our federal and non-federal
partners to investigate this threat stream and will provide updates as
appropriate. We continue to operate under the assumption that terrorists
not yet identified by the Intelligence Community and law enforcement could
seek to advance or execute attacks with little or no warning and urge federal,
state, and local law enforcement and the private sector to maintain increased
vigilance for indications of pre-operational and suspicious activity.
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(U) Reporting Notice
(U) The FBI and DHS encourage recipients of this document to report information
concerning suspicious or criminal activity to the local FBI Joint Terrorism
Task Force and the State and Major Urban Area Fusion Center. The FBIs
24/7 Strategic Information and Operations Center can be reached by telephone
number 202-323-3300 or by email at SIOC[at]ic.fbi.gov. The DHS National
Operations Center (NOC) can be reached by telephone at (202) 282-9685 or
by email at NOC.Fusion[at]dhs.gov. FBI regional phone numbers can be found
online at
http://www.fbi.gov/contact/fo/fo.htm
and Fusion Center information may be obtained at
http://www.dhs.gov/files/resources/editorial_0306.shtm.
For information affecting the private sector and critical infrastructure,
contact the National Infrastructure Coordinating Center (NICC), a sub-element
of the NOC. The NICC can be reached by telephone at (202) 282-9201 or by
email at NICC[at]dhs.gov. When available, each report submitted should include
the date, time, location, type of activity, number of people and type of
equipment used for the activity, the name of the submitting company or
organization, and a designated point of contact.
(U) Administrative Note: Law Enforcement Response
(U//FOUO) Information contained in this intelligence bulletin is for official
use only. No portion of this bulletin should be released to the media, the
general public, or over nonsecure Internet servers. Release of this material
could adversely affect or jeopardize investigative activities.
(U) For comments or questions related to the content or dissemination of
this document, please contact the FBI Counterterrorism Analysis Section at
(202) 324-3000 or FBI_CTAS[at]ic.fbi.gov, or DHS/I&A Production Branch
staff at IA.PM[at]hq.dhs.gov.
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(U) Tracked by: HSEC-8.1, HSEC-8.2, HSEC-8.3.4
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