27 February 2012
Security of Aircraft Lavatory Oxygen Systems
[Federal Register Volume 77, Number 38 (Monday, February 27, 2012)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 11385-11387]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2012-4571]
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Parts 21, 25, 121, and 129
[Docket No. FAA-2011-0186; Amdt. Nos. 21-94, 25-133, 121-354, 129-50;
SFAR 111]
RIN 2120-AJ92
Security Considerations for Lavatory Oxygen Systems
AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.
ACTION: Interim final rule; disposition of comments.
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SUMMARY: On March 8, 2011, the FAA published an interim final rule,
request
[[Page 11386]]
for comments (Amendment Nos. 21-94, 25-133, 121-354, 129-50; SFAR 111)
on security considerations for lavatory oxygen systems (77 FR 12550).
The interim final rule addresses a security vulnerability and is needed
so the affected airplanes can continue operating until the non-
compliance to airworthiness standards and operating rules is resolved.
We sought public comment on the interim final rule even though it
became effective upon publication. This action responds to the public
comments the FAA received.
ADDRESSES: You may review the public docket for this rulemaking (Docket
No. FAA-2011-0186) at the Docket Management Facility in Room W12-140 of
the West Building Ground Floor at 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE.,
Washington, DC, 20590-0001 between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through
Friday, except Federal holidays. You may also review the public docket
on the Internet at http://www.regulations.gov.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For technical questions concerning
this action, contact Jeff Gardlin, Airframe and Cabin Safety Branch,
ANM-115, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification
Service, Federal Aviation Administration, Northwest Mountain Region,
1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, WA 98057-3356; telephone: (425) 227-2136;
email: jeff.gardlin@faa.gov.
For legal questions concerning this action, contact Douglas
Anderson, Federal Aviation Administration, Office of the Regional
Counsel, ANM-7, Northwest Mountain Region, 1601 Lind Avenue SW.,
Renton, WA 98057-3356; telephone: (425) 227-2166; email:
douglas.anderson@faa.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background
The FAA became aware of a security vulnerability with certain types
of oxygen systems installed inside the lavatories of most transport
category airplanes. As a result, the FAA issued Airworthiness Directive
(AD) 2011-04-09, which mandated that these oxygen systems be rendered
inoperative until the vulnerability could be eliminated. However, by
completing the mandated actions in AD 2011-04-09, operators were no
longer in compliance with the requirements of Title 14, Code of Federal
Regulations (14 CFR) 25.1447, 121.329, and 121.333, and could not
legally continue flight operations. AD 2011-04-09 also affects newly
manufactured airplanes and airplanes undergoing other modification. The
Special Federal Aviation Regulation (SFAR) is needed to address the
security vulnerability and allow the affected operators to continue
flight operations until the non-compliance to airworthiness standards
and operating rules created by the AD is resolved.
The FAA chartered an Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC) primarily
comprised of industry representatives in March 2011. The ARC's purpose
was to recommend regulatory changes and guidance that could be used to
restore oxygen in affected lavatories while addressing the security
vulnerability. The ARC submitted its recommendations to the FAA on
August 3, 2011. The FAA is reviewing the recommendations and will
initiate additional rulemaking as necessary. The recommendations will
facilitate developing future rulemaking to address existing and new
certifications of aircraft. As stated in SFAR 111, we envision a two-
to four-year regulatory process to restore the affected oxygen systems
to their full operational capability. Complete restoration includes any
new regulatory changes, as well as incorporating any new oxygen system
designs into airplanes currently in service.
Discussion of Comments
The FAA received comments from ten commenters: Aerox Aviation
Oxygen Systems, Inc., The Boeing Company, and eight private citizens.
Boeing and three citizens supported the SFAR with the overall assertion
that removing chemical oxygen generators from the lavatories poses a
risk to a small number of passengers compared to putting all of the
passengers on the airplane at risk by keeping the chemical oxygen
generators installed.
Five citizens opposed the SFAR, asserting that the safety benefit
gained by removing the chemical oxygen system from lavatories to
preclude the unlikely event of a terrorist attack does not outweigh the
potential risk of individual passengers experiencing hypoxia in the
event of a decompression. These commenters also suggested that the FAA
consider other options, such as installing an alternative oxygen system
in the lavatories, rather than simply removing the chemical oxygen
system.
We disagree with the commenters' assertion that the potential risk
of a security breach is outweighed by the potential individual risk of
hypoxia for a passenger in the lavatory during cabin decompression. We
continue to believe that the approach taken by the FAA--to temporarily
allow a non-compliance with existing regulations until a solution is
found to the problem identified in the underlying AD--appropriately
addresses risk. While there is some risk of hypoxia, the emergency
descent procedures initiated by the flightcrew are the primary
protection against hypoxia provided to passengers.
Pressure loss events have not resulted in a cabin pressure altitude
that was instantaneously equal to the airplane altitude. Even when
decompressions have occurred when the airplane is at a high altitude,
such as 40,000 feet, cabin occupants have not been exposed to those
altitudes because it takes time for the cabin pressure to leak from the
fuselage. Flightcrews initiate an emergency descent shortly after they
receive notification that the cabin pressure cannot be maintained. The
airplane is already descending by the time the internal cabin pressure
is equal to the airplane altitude.
We carefully considered all of the variables and determined that
the risk to all of the passengers due to the security vulnerability was
significantly greater than the potential individual risk of hypoxia in
the event of cabin decompression. AD 2011-04-09 and SFAR 111 are only
interim measures, and we are actively pursuing regulatory changes
intended to restore supplemental oxygen in the affected lavatories,
while considering the security issues.
We partially agree with the commenters' suggestions to consider
other rulemaking alternatives because other alternatives could be used
to restore oxygen in the affected lavatories. We disagree with the
commenters' suggestions to accomplish longer-term rulemaking actions
while leaving the chemical oxygen generators installed in the
lavatories. The security vulnerability would remain until final
corrective actions were identified and completed. Accomplishing the
actions in AD 2011-04-09 eliminates the security vulnerability until
additional actions can be identified and taken to restore the oxygen
system with a design that would consider the security risk.
Boeing stated that in and of itself, the SFAR does not require
removing or expending the contents of the chemical oxygen generators.
This will likely cause confusion and is not consistent with the actions
in AD 2011-04-09. Boeing recommended that the SFAR be revised to
require the oxygen generators to be either removed or expended and that
the wording be the same as that in the AD; we disagree. The affected
chemical oxygen generators have already been removed or expended in
accordance with AD 2011-04-09, and the SFAR does not supersede AD 2011-
04-09. The SFAR provides interim relief
[[Page 11387]]
to operators from type design requirements that the operators would
have been out of compliance with once the actions mandated in AD 2011-
04-09 were completed. No changes to SFAR 111 were made as a result of
this comment.
Boeing also suggested that the SFAR be clarified to allow the
applicant for a type certificate to receive a production certificate
and an airworthiness approval for domestic operators affected by AD
2011-04-09 (14 CFR part 121 operators) or for foreign operators (14 CFR
part 129) in countries where the local civil aviation authority has
issued a mandatory action equivalent to AD 2011-04-09. We infer that
Boeing is requesting we clarify SFAR 111 for airplanes registered
outside the United States because only foreign registered airplanes
could be subject to a mandatory action similar to AD 2011-04-09. We
disagree because SFAR 111 does not apply to airplanes registered
outside the United States. We cannot provide relief from airworthiness
standards issued by civil aviation authorities in other countries. The
responsible civil aviation authority must grant relief from an
airworthiness standard. Furthermore, SFAR 111, paragraph (b)(2) already
provides this relief for airplanes registered in the United States but
operated by foreign carriers. No changes were made to the SFAR as a
result of this comment.
Boeing suggested paragraph (c) of the SFAR be revised to indicate
that it is the operators' responsibility to provide flightcrew training
procedures for airplanes with a disabled lavatory oxygen system. We
disagree that this clarification is necessary because the SFAR does not
include a requirement to revise existing flightcrew training
procedures. Operators currently have the option to add or revise
existing training for the cabin or flightcrew as they deem necessary.
No changes were made to the SFAR as a result of this comment.
Aerox Aviation provided information pertaining to the availability
of a small portable, gaseous oxygen supply and stated that such
equipment could provide an emergency oxygen supply. We are familiar
with the Aerox portable oxygen equipment as well as other portable
oxygen equipment from other suppliers. It is possible for operators to
incorporate installation of portable gaseous oxygen equipment for use
in the lavatory under existing regulations. If such equipment were to
be installed, it would need to be approved by the FAA in accordance
with existing procedures applicable to type design changes. Neither AD
2011-04-09 nor SFAR 111 would prevent installation of portable gaseous
oxygen equipment for use in the lavatory. No changes were made to the
SFAR as a result of this comment.
Conclusion
After analyzing the comments submitted in response to SFAR 111, the
FAA has determined that no further revisions to the SFAR are necessary
at this time. The FAA determined this interim rule remains necessary
because it addresses an emergency safety situation that made it
imperative to immediately implement the rulemaking's provisions. While
the chemical oxygen supply is intended to provide passengers with
supplemental oxygen when necessary, lavatories become privately
enclosed areas when in use. Possible tampering with that chemical
oxygen supply presented a security vulnerability that this rulemaking
addresses. Therefore, Amendments 21-94, 25-133, 121-354, and 129-50
remain in effect.
The FAA is currently assessing the recommendations of the ARC
discussed above. We are using these recommendations to develop
additional rulemaking actions that will restore the affected oxygen
systems to their full operational capability in existing and new
certifications of affected aircraft, while eliminating the potential
security threat posed by the previous systems.
Issued in Washington, DC, on February 15, 2012.
Frank P. Paskiewicz,
Deputy Director, Aircraft Certification Service.
[FR Doc. 2012-4571 Filed 2-24-12; 8:45 am]
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