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26 December 2012

US Military Influence Operations

influence operations

It is a fundamental mistake to see the enemy as a set of targets. The enemy in war is a group of people. Some of them will have to be killed. Others will have to be captured or driven into hiding. The overwhelming majority, however, have to be persuaded.
--- Frederick Kagan, "War and Aftermath," Policy Review, Aug 03

Trying to get people to reason in a way that is not natural for them is like trying to teach a pig to sing. You don't accomplish anything and you annoy the pig.
--- E. Jeffrey Conklin & William Weil

Public sentiment is everything. With public sentiment nothing can fail; without it nothing can succeed. He who molds public sentiment goes deeper than he who enacts statutes or pronounces decisions. He makes statutes or decisions possible or impossible to execute.
--- President Abraham Lincoln

One cannot wage war under present conditions without the support of public opinion, which is tremendously molded by the press and other forms of propaganda.
--- General Douglas MacArthur

The real target in war is the mind of the enemy commander, not the bodies of his troops.
--- Captain Sir Basil Liddell Hart, Thoughts on War, 1944

The printing press is the greatest weapon in the armoury of the modern commander.... In Asia we were so weak physically that we could not let the metaphysical weapon rust unused.
--- T.E. Lawrence

All truth passes through three stages. First, it is ridiculed. Second, it is violently opposed. Third, it is accepted as being self-evident.
--- Arthur Schopenhauer

If a man will begin with certainties, he shall end in doubts. But if he will be content to begin with doubts he shall end in certainties.
--- Francis Bacon

DefinitionsBack to Top

  • from AFDD 2-5

    • Influence operations are focused on affecting the perceptions and behaviors of leaders, groups, or entire populations. Influence operations employ capabilities to affect behaviors, protect operations, communicate commander’s intent, and project accurate information to achieve desired effects across the cognitive domain. These effects should result in differing behavior or a change in the adversary’s decision cycle, which aligns with the commander’s objectives. The military capabilities of influence operations are psychological operations (PSYOP), military deception (MILDEC), operations security (OPSEC), counterintelligence (CI) operations, counterpropaganda operations and public affairs (PA) operations. Public affairs, while a component of influence operations, is predicated on its ability to project truthful information to a variety of audiences.

      These activities of influence operations allow the commander to prepare and shape the operational battlespace by conveying selected information and indicators to target audiences, shaping the perceptions of decision-makers, securing critical friendly information, defending against sabotage, protecting against espionage, gathering intelligence, and communicating selected information about military activities to the global audience.

  • Comprehensive Assessment of Department of Defense Human Factors Analysis (HFA) Methodologies - Statement of Work
    • Director of Central Intelligence Directive (DCID) 7/3 defines HFA as, “The psychological, cultural, behavioral, and other human attributes that influence decision-making, the flow of information, and the interpretation of information by individuals and groups at any level in any state or organization.”

Federal resourcesBack to Top

Joint ResourcesBack to Top

  • see also gov/mil cultural awareness resources, at the Center for Regional and Cultural Studies

  • see also media as an instrument of war - especially the transcript of the 17 Feb 06 speech by Sec Rumsfeld pointing out how good the terrorists have gotten at using the media

  • JP 3-13.4, Joint Doctrine for Military Deception - formerly JP 3-58

  • Joint Information Operations Warfare Command (JIOWC)
    • STRATCOM JIOWC fact sheet
      • The JIOWC plans, integrates, and synchronizes information operations in direct support of Joint Force Commanders' and serves as the USSTRATCOM lead for enhancing information operations across the Department of Defense.
    • Precision Influence Cell

  • Joint Warfare Analysis Center (JWAC) - with social scientists and engineers to develop models and methodologies

  • Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)
    • Human Factors Analysis Center (HFAC)

  • Human Factors Full-Spectrum Project - Statement of Work, for DIA and USSTRATCOM
    • The Defense Intelligence Agency’s Human Factors Analysis Center (HFAC) is performing an initial, short-term program designed to fill the existing analytic gap between the analysis of key national leaders and the analysis of key systems operators. USSTRATCOM has CoCom requirements for increased fidelity on individuals and small groups as it moves forward into the realm of IO influence campaigns and Time Sensitive Targeting (TSP).

  • Comprehensive Assessment of Department of Defense Human Factors Analysis Methodologies - Statement of Work
    • Additionally, the information that supports IO HF analysis can be derived largely from open sources. Open source information exploitation has been identified as severely deficient by various sources, including Commissions on Intelligence Reform, the 2005 Intelligence Reform Act, and the Defense Open Source Council. Development of a repeatable exploitation model in support of IO activities using open source can have immediate and far-reaching positive implications both to IO and other areas of Intelligence Community (IC) interest.

  • Information Operations, STRATCOM, and Public Affairs (local copy), by Keeton and McCann, in Military Review, Nov-Dec 2005

  • Transforming Military Diplomacy (local copy), by Shea, in Joint Force Quarterly, July 2005

  • "Pentagon Funds Diplomacy Effort Contracts Aim to Improve Foreign Opinion of United States," by Merle, Washington Post, 11 June 2005
    • The Pentagon awarded three contracts this week, potentially worth up to $300 million over five years, to companies it hopes will inject more creativity into its psychological operations efforts to improve foreign public opinion about the United States, particularly the military.
    • "We would like to be able to use cutting-edge types of media," said Col. James A. Treadwell, director of the Joint Psychological Operations Support Element, a part of Tampa-based U.S. Special Operations Command. "If you want to influence someone, you have to touch their emotions."
    • He said SYColeman Inc. of Arlington, Lincoln Group of the District, and Science Applications International Corp. will help develop ideas and prototypes for radio and television spots, documentaries, or even text messages, pop-up ads on the Internet, podcasting, billboards or novelty items.
    • "What's changing is the realization that in this so-called war on terrorism, this is not a force multiplier; this might be the thing that wins the whole thing for you," said Dan Kuehl, a specialist in information warfare at the National Defense University. "This gets to the importance of the war of ideas. There are a billion-plus Muslims that are undecided. How do we move them over to being more supportive of us? If we can do that, we can make progress and improve security."

Army ResourcesBack to Top

Navy & Marine ResourcesBack to Top

Air Force resourcesBack to Top

Influence OperationsBack to Top

Influence TheoryBack to Top

NLM abstract of "Attitude change: persuasion and social influence", by Wood, in Annual Review of Psychology, 2000

  • This chapter reviews empirical and theoretical developments in research on social influence and message-based persuasion. The review emphasizes research published during the period from 1996-1998. Across these literatures, three central motives have been identified that generate attitude change and resistance. These involve concerns with the self, with others and the rewards/punishments they can provide, and with a valid understanding of reality. The motives have implications for information processing and for attitude change in public and private contexts. Motives in persuasion also have been investigated in research on attitude functions and cognitive dissonance theory. In addition, the chapter reviews the relatively unique aspects of each literature: In persuasion, it considers the cognitive and affective mechanisms underlying attitude change, especially dual-mode processing models, recipients' affective reactions, and biased processing. In social influence, the chapter considers how attitudes are embedded in social relations, including social identity theory and majority/minority group influence.
  • click on "Related Articles" link in upper right hand corner of above abstract at NLM to view list of many influence-related articles

What is Information Warfare?, by Borden, Air & Space Power Chronicles, 1999 - with formulas

see also Bayesian inference net

Influence HistoryBack to Top

  • The Evolution of Strategic Influence (local copy), by Gough, strategic research project for US Army War College, 2003
    • "This paper will examine the evolution of how the U.S. Government and the Department of Defense have organized to conduct strategic influence as an instrument of national power, from the Psychological Warfare Division of World War II, through the Psychological Strategy Board and Operations Coordinating Board of the early Cold War, through the Vietnam years to today. Are they organized effectively today to meet the asymmetric threats of the 21st Century?"

  • spiffy
    • - with a great deal of history articles/resources relating to psychological operations and influence efforts in particular
      - look in both the History section AND the Links section
      - Links section has leaflets used in several wars, as well as articles such as Joseph Goebbels' Principles of Propaganda

  • Powers of Persuasion: Poster Art from WW II, National Archives

  • German Propaganda Archive, Nazi and East German Propaganda

  • How to Win Friends and Influence People, by Dale Carnegie, 1936

  • The Prince, by Niccolo Machiavelli, 1515

Influence ToolsBack to Top

Marketing and AdvertisingBack to Top

  • Enlisting Madison Avenue: The Marketing Approach to Earning Popular Support in Theaters of Operation, by Helmus et al, RAND monograph, 2007
    • Virtually every action, message, and decision of a military force shapes the opinions of an indigenous population: strategic communication, treatment of civilians at vehicle checkpoints, and the accuracy or inaccuracy of aerial bombardment. Themes of U.S. goodwill mean little if its actions convey otherwise. Consequently, a unified message in both word and deed is fundamental to success. Business marketing practices provide a useful framework for improving U.S. military efforts to shape the attitudes and behaviors of local populations in a theater of operations as well as those of a broader, international audience.

  • Undercover marketing - Wikipedia entry - "also known as buzz marketing, stealth marketing, or -- by its detractors -- roach baiting"

  • guerrilla marketing - at SourceWatch
  • buzz - at SourceWatch

  • "buzz" marketing search results

  • Improving Information Operations with a Military Cultural Analyst (local copy), by Rogers, SAMS paper, Jan 2005 - includes chapter focused on the marketing model
    • The process developed in the marketing industry has been tested and proven to work in achieving the very effect that information operations attempt to produce – changing relative perceptions to influence a target audience and elicit specific behavior. Therefore, it would be irresponsible not to study the marketing model within the context of understanding its characteristics, and which, if any, of those characteristics might be transferable to a military information operations setting.

  • Marketing: An Overlooked Aspect of Information Operations (local copy), by Trent and Doty, in Military Review, Jul-Aug 2005
    • "Defeating enemy formations on the field of battle is merely the first, and often the easiest, phase of a military operation. Ultimate success (accomplishing the political goals of the National Command Authority) hinges on a successful post-high-intensity conflict occupation in which the population comes to accept the new state of affairs. In all phases, understanding and influencing the people is critical to reducing the cost of victory in terms of lives, dollars, and time."

  • Advertising Primer, from SBA

  • MIT Marketing Courses
  • Wharton Marketing, U. of Penn.

  • marketing theory - internet search
  • advertising theory - internet search

Propaganda and CounterpropagandaBack to Top

DeceptionBack to Top

  • All warfare is based on deception.
    --- Sun Tzu

  • see also Deception Detection on AWC Gateway to Internet

  • see also Conflict of Perception or Peception Warfare

  • Definitions
    • deception - (DOD dictionary) Those measures designed to mislead the enemy by manipulation, distortion, or falsification of evidence to induce the enemy to react in a manner prejudicial to the enemy's interests. See also counterdeception; military deception.
    • counterdeception - (DOD dictionary) Efforts to negate, neutralize, diminish the effects of, or gain advantage from a foreign deception operation. Counterdeception does not include the intelligence function of identifying foreign deception operations. See also deception.
    • military deception - (DOD dictionary) Actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary military decision makers as to friendly military capabilities, intentions, and operations, thereby causing the adversary to take specific actions (or inactions) that will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly mission. Also called MILDEC. See also deception.
    • deception action - (DOD dictionary) A collection of related deception events that form a major component of a deception operation.
    • deception concept - (DOD dictionary) The deception course of action forwarded to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for review as part of the combatant commander's strategic concept.
    • deception course of action - (DOD dictionary) A deception scheme developed during the estimate process in sufficient detail to permit decisionmaking. At a minimum, a deception course of action will identify the deception objective, the deception target, the desired perception, the deception story, and tentative deception means.
    • deception event - (DOD dictionary) A deception means executed at a specific time and location in support of a deception operation.
    • deception means - (DOD dictionary) Methods, resources, and techniques that can be used to convey information to the deception target. There are three categories of deception means: a. physical means. Activities and resources used to convey or deny selected information to a foreign power. b. technical means. Military material resources and their associated operating techniques used to convey or deny selected information to a foreign power. c. administrative means. Resources, methods, and techniques to convey or deny oral, pictorial, documentary, or other physical evidence to a foreign power.
    • deception objective - (DOD dictionary) The desired result of a deception operation expressed in terms of what the adversary is to do or not to do at the critical time and/or location.
    • deception story - (DOD dictionary) A scenario that outlines the friendly actions that will be portrayed to cause the deception target to adopt the desired perception.
    • deception target - (DOD dictionary) The adversary decisionmaker with the authority to make the decision that will achieve the deception objective.

  • The Truth is out there: Responding to Insurgent Disinformation and Deception Operations (local copy), by Dauber, in Military Review, Jan-Feb 2009

  • Hizballah: Deception in the 2006 Summer War, by Acosta, in IO Sphere, Winter 2008

  • The Tao of Deception: Unorthodox Warfare in Historic and Modern China, by Sawyer, pub. by Basic Books, Jan 2007

  • A Primer For Deception Analysis: Psychological Operations’ Target Audience Analysis, by Stroh and Wendell, in IO Sphere, Fall 2007

  • Chinese Strategic Power: Myths, Intent, and Projections, by Sawyer, in Journal of Military and Strategic Studies, Winter 2006/07, Vol. 9, Issue 2.

  • Creating a new Reality: Information Age Effects on the Deception Process, by Webb, SAASS paper, June 2006

  • Foreign Denial and Deception: Minimizing the Impact to Operational Intelligence (local copy), by Cyr, Naval War College paper, 2002

  • Formal Methods of Countering Deception and Misperception in Intelligence Analysis (local copy), by Pope et al, presented at the 11th International Command and Control Technology Symposium (ICCRTS), 2006 (slides)
    • The ability of these formal models to mitigate attempted deception by an adversary is affected by many factors, including the choice of analytical model, the type of formal representation used, and the ability to address issues of source reliability and information credibility. This paper discusses how the use of Subjective Logic and the modelling approach known as the Analysis of Competing Hypotheses using Subjective Logic (ACHSL) can provide a level of protection against attempted deception and misperception.

  • JP 3-13.4, Joint Doctrine for Military Deception - formerly JP 3-58

  • FM 90-2, Battlefield Deception as posted by FAS
  • OPNAVINST S3433.1 Military Deception (MILDEC)

  • Deception 101 - Primer on Deception (local copy), by Caddell, Strategic Studies Institute, Dec 2004

  • Strategic Deception in Modern Democracies: Ethical, Legal, and Policy Challenges (local copy), by Pumphrey and Echevarria, briefing at SSI conference

  • Unweaving the Web: Deception and Adaptation in Future Urban Operations, by Gerwehr and Glenn, RAND report, 2003

  • Deception - Magic! (local copy), by Davis, in Military Review, Sep-Oct 2002

  • 24 Oct 2001 DoD Background Briefing on Enemy Denial and Deception

  • Deception, Newsletter No. 3-88, Army CALL

  • Maintaining Credibility Within Military Public Affairs While Preserving and Participating in Military Deception, DoD Joint Course in Communication

  • Detecting Online Deception and Responding to It (local copy), by Rowe, Naval Postgraduate School

  • Military Deception: Hiding the Real - Showing the Fake (local copy), by Johnson and Meyeraan, Joint Forces Staff College, Mar 2003
    • But even a technologically advanced nation like the United States is susceptible to deception. Analysis of friendly and enemy deception techniques in Operations DESERT STORM and ALLIED FORCE shows the main U.S.vulnerabilities to include its insatiable appetite for “news,” the lack of deception-detection expertise in the military, and the tendency to believe that technological advancements make a nation deception-proof. Therefore, the key to mitigating the U.S. vulnerabilities to deception lies in educating the media about the military and common deception practices, giving the military intensive deception-detection training, and abandoning the notion that technological advancement inoculates against deception.

  • A Short Course on Software-Based Deception and Counter Deception (local copy), Aug 2003 presentation by Michael, Naval Postgraduate School
    • Principles of Deception
      • Aimed at the mind of the opponent
      • Aim is to make the opponent act
      • Coordination and centralized control
      • Preparation and timing
      • Security
      • Credibility and confirmation
      • Flexibility

  • Confronting Cyberterrorism with Cyber Deception (local copy), thesis by Tan, Naval Postgraduate School, Dec 2003

  • Two Taxonomies of Deception for Attacks on Information Systems (local copy), Rowe and Rothstein, Naval Postgraduate School

  • Deception for Defense of Information Systems:Analogies from Conventional Warfare (local copy), Rowe and Rothstein, Naval Postgraduate School
    • six general principles for effective tactical deception (Fowler and Nesbitt, 1995)
      1. Deception should reinforce enemy expectations
      2. Deception should have realistic timing and duration
      3. Deception should be integrated with operations
      4. Deception should be coordinated with concealment of true intentions
      5. Deception realism should be tailored to needs of the setting
      6. Deception should be imaginative and creative

    • taxonomy of kinds of deception (Dunnigan and Nofi, 2001)
      1. Concealment (“hiding your forces from the enemy”)
      2. Camouflage (“hiding your troops and movements from the enemy by artificial means”)
      3. False and planted information (disinformation, “letting the enemy get his hands on information that will hurt him and help you”)
      4. Lies (“when communicating with the enemy”)
      5. Displays (“techniques to make the enemy see what isn't there”)
      6. Ruses (“tricks, such as displays that use enemy equipment and procedures”)
      7. Demonstrations (“making a move with your forces that implies imminent action, but is not followed through”)
      8. Feints (“like a demonstration, but you actually make an attack”)
      9. Insight (“deceive the opponent by outthinking him”)
  • Designing Good Deceptions in Defense of Information Systems, by Rowe, Naval Postgraduate School

  • Command Dysfunction: Minding the Cognitive War, by Dahl, SAAS paper
    • chapters include - OODA Loop, Normandy Invasion, Battle of the Bulge, and October 1973 War
    • appendices include
      • Janis Vigilant Problem-Solving Approach
      • Bias-Deception Relationships
      • Whaley’s Structure of Deception
      • Dewar’s Principles and Techniques of Deception

  • Deception in Warfare bibliography, Air University Library
  • Second World War Deception - Lessons Learned for Today’s Joint Planner - analysis of six Allied deception operationsjccd.html">Joint Camouflage, Concealment, and Deception Program (JCCD) -->
  • Denial and Deception Course, Fort Huachuca

  • Say Not to Say - New Perspectives on Miscommunication, including chapter on "Deceptive Miscommunication Theory (DeMiT): a New Model for the Analysis of Deceptive Communication"

  • A Cognitive Model for Exposition of Human Deception and Counterdeception (local copy), Technical Report 1076, Oct 1987, SPAWAR Systems Center (SSC), U.S. Navy

  • Sissela Bok. Lying: Moral Choice in Public and Private Life (New York: Vintage Books, Second ed., 1999)

Books & MonographsBack to Top

LinksBack to Top


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