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The Ratcatcher Syllogism: Notes for a Philosophy of Private Security

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All chiefs of security are, inevitably and by profession, bastards.

Geoffrey Household¹

PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS ON THE WHYS AND WHEREFORES

By philosophy,² is meant here a critical, reasoned examination of the underlying concepts and principles of a particular, familiar activity and the way in which this sociopolitical undertaking is perceived by its practitioners and others. It is necessary for a better understanding of an increasingly important feature of modern life in developed and developing societies.³ It is no longer just supplemental. In economic terms alone it has become necessary to supplant public policing in the realms of safeguarding of lives and property, tangible and intangible. The task of protecting the stability of modern societies has simply become too big and too complex for the public sector alone, the burden has of necessity shifted so as to provide against an otherwise inevitable deterioration in those areas felt to be essential for social cohesion and harmonious existence. The need for what is essayed here is a recognition of developmental trends. Social harmony was historically guaranteed internally and externally by the exercise of powers of the nation state, once these had come fully into Existence. 4 The individual, at all levels of society, was required to surrender in large measure, his or her personal rights of self-defense on the implied promise of the requisite protection, through laws and their practical implementation by an executive power supposedly better equipped to undertake, fairly, the tasks of protecting the interests of

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all in the appropriate measure. This was probably illusory even from the earliest of times and those who enjoyed the means and the power to supplement the supposed obligations of "the state" organized themselves to secure the proper protection they felt their own interests required. However it is expressed, this is the true genesis of what, nowadays, we understand by the concept of private security: The ancient continues to coexist with the modern in what we would regard as "war lord" societies⁵ and those held in thrall by private militias. Seen in this way, it has always had a kind of spillover effect; the protection of the interests of the rich and powerful not only created a useful source of employment for those ready and able to serve and protect by way of supplementing the services furnished by the nascent "nation state," but the resultant structure began to have a more generalized aura of protection for those in subordinate association with it. This phenomenon is observable to the present day,6 whether these indirect beneficiaries are required to make a contribution or not. Thus, what we call "private security" provides an extra enhancement of security generally for the communities affected by its presence and performance.

By a syllogism we mean a logical, subtle argument of a philosophical nature designed to highlight a particular social or cultural meaning affecting attitudes toward the employment and operations of what we understand by these aforesaid developments in the area of promoting harmonious living free from the threats of harm posed by those who, for their own purposes, would want to seek wantonly to interrupt it. Every society generates its own rebels, its own class of predators. Their proposed depredations have to be appropriately countered if society generally is to remain intact and stable. The exercise of the obligations to serve and protect call for great delicacy and tact if they are to achieve useful, majority acceptance. It is here that any philosophy, namely how and in what manner those responsibilities are to be employed for the common good as opposed to the more selfish, individual interest necessarily faces some difficult issues if power struggles, in the larger sense, are to be avoided. In the larger, more critical cases, these issues are matters of contention in the political sphere; this is the stuff of revolution.⁷ In the main, what we are dealing with here is regulated to a substantial degree by perception rather than an entanglement with weightier issues of the fundamental powers and its exercise. These principles have been recognized and debated since time immemorial, 8 yet they cannot be ignored or overlooked for they constantly manifest themselves down to our own times.

RATCATCHERS AND THEIR ILK

So, what do ratcatchers have to do with all this? Ratcatching, however necessary in urban societies from an aesthetic as well as a public health perspective

(the Great Plague, the Black Death of medieval times, was blamed rightly or wrongly on a variety of these rodents.) The literature is full of references to the task of controlling these pests—and is rarely flattering; a hint of fearfulness pervades it. There are those who display a particular aptitude for the task. In most developed societies, it is seen as a needed job, along with others involving different forms of pest control, but hardly conferring desirable status on those who undertake it. Over the centuries, ratcatching has acquired certain, unpleasant connotations. Somebody has to do the job (at least until it can, like bomb detection and disposal, be reliably entrusted to robots, 10 but those who undertake it can hardly be expected to be liked or even wholeheartedly respected on that account. The unlikable features of what is involved tend to color perceptions of those who perforce are engaged in it. The nature of what is involved in ratcatching, as a job, hardly engenders what is likely to generate respect or envy for those however successfully engaged in it. Mothers, all too ready to boast to others of "my son (or daughter) the lawyer, the surgeon, the architect," are hardly to be found in the uncommon ranks of those delighting and acclaiming the exploits of "my progeny the Ratcatcher." Here, we find ourselves in the not uncommon territory of prejudice; what do you do for a living? Undoubtedly, this plays an important role in how you are perceived by others and thus the degree of respect you are accorded for what you do and how you appear to do it. 11 We hesitate to associate ourselves favorably with those who do certain kinds of tasks for fear, somehow, of contagion. Status has grown ever more important in modern society. The new "social media" is hardly the place to boast of being a ratcatcher, if you are interested in attracting the "right" kind of friends on Facebook, or the "right" partner on Match.com. 12

From the foregoing, the ratcatcher proposition can be synthesized as follows: In our culture, ratcatching is perceived as a nasty, undesirable job (it is immaterial, here, that there are others much worse). However, necessary, only nasty, undesirable persons are thought of as peculiarly fitted for the job. Ergo, ratcatching, for a living is a nasty, undesirable job done by nasty, undesirable people, not the sort you would wish to associate with as friends or social equals.

DEALING WITH OTHER KINDS OF RATS

Comparatively recently, we have begun to expend a good deal of time and effort in trying to professionalize the practice of private security by asserting, boldly, its scientific characteristics. ¹³ Indeed, it might be said that this very Journal owes existence, in great part, to those endeavors. Unfortunately, much of this effort has resulted merely in a proliferation of writings of all kinds largely incomprehensible to the average security practitioner, and often enough, to those relevant areas of academia at whom much of this

production has been aimed. Far be it for this author to decry these otherwise worthy efforts, ¹⁴ but a careful review of them must call in question their real utility for the original intended purpose; the excesses, illuminating in other respects, have long departed from the premises it was hoped would motivate them, namely to establish something in the nature of a "science of private security" on a par, recognizably with, say, police science, or scientific policing, and perhaps more ambitiously as an equivalent of political science in its many dimensions. Science, as a discipline, must be distinguished from its practical applications, ¹⁵ whether they are in the fields of business, technology, or other engagements. What has been largely lacking, then, as a consequence has been some kind of critical study that would validate the thesis.

This emphasis on the scientific is less of a self-aggrandizing exercise than a practical necessity. It is an exploration of meaning:¹⁶ What are we in private security and why do we do what we do? Are we simply filling a vacuum? These questions do not readily produce obvious answers so as to render the whole exercise nugatory. Suppose we offer in response the true but simplistic answers; we strive to *serve and protect* so as to save from harm life and property interests under threat. How is that then to be distinguished from the functions of the public police? Where do we seek the distinctions; in the market we serve; in the business considerations, which make private security possible and sustainable; or by reference to the powers legally conferred upon or withheld from us so as to allow us to function in what is, in a more ample sense, although substantial, something of a niche market?

These considerations have been brought to the fore by the pressures generated by two conventional wars and the threats to life and property worldwide posed by the ill-named War on Terror. Functions, previously almost casually assumed to be in the ambit of the public sector, whether law enforcement or the armed forces, have, as an economic necessity among other functions, been hived off to private enterprise and this has given rise to some interesting questions, in various disciplines, of a philosophical as well as a practical nature. For example, much of the logistical support for conventional warfare has passed into the hands of private businesses. The most controversial of these aspects is that of providing security for the various other functions involved. Merely to serve and protect in a lawless, warlike environment is fraught with difficulties and dilemmas of a philosophical nature, but when these duties stray, as so often they must, into the areas of offense rather than defense pure and simple, we find ourselves in deeper waters, Black waters. And yet another science¹⁷ comes into play here, namely that of the law; rights and duties; the exercise of powers and obligations, bringing private security into conflict with differences in sharp contrast with those of a similar nature facing members of the armed forces in wartime. These problems have to be faced forthrightly for it is difficult to envisage,

in our day and age, any future conflict being engaged in by the nation's armed forces without the active assistance of the private sector, in the war zone itself. In economic terms alone there is much cause for reflection here. The provision of private security is withal a business. 18 It must ever be economically viable for those it serves as well as for those who engage in the provision of the services necessary to confer the requisite measure of protection. There is a finely developed symbiosis in this. Once more, the solutions sought are a practical consequence of the problems addressed. Private security is not and never will be a purely altruistic activity. Like the practice of law and medicine, perhaps the senior and most respected of professions, it is a business. 19 That is why it is suggested, here, that we must look to philosophy rather than science for our defining of what we are and what we do, and how we do it. We would not insult lawyers or medical practitioners by requiring them, even metaphorically, to go round to the tradesmen's entrance. Why should we expect that of those who provide private security? That basically is what we are seeking to explore, here. The real issue, surely, is respect.²⁰

An analogous development is to be observed in a cognate area, namely that in the field of intelligence. Good decision making depends on the quality and relevance of the information obtainable with regard to the matters in issue. Some political leaders, dissatisfied with the quality and volume of intelligence provided to them by official sources have perforce created their own private intelligence resources to provide them with alternative material to aid in their decision making. 21 The early days of the Iraq War furnish an instructive study of the process and its pitfalls though the matter has other relevant references throughout American politics, especially in the business sector. Hence, like private intelligence, private security is more than merely supplemental; it is the bedrock upon which reliance is placed, the more trusted solution, rather like private medical services, for those who can afford the luxury. It is not necessarily better, but rather in the realm of trust, of confidence, something resting on perception. In our society, privatization may be said to be the preferred situation, ²² where there is a viable choice, however illusionary; hence, private schools, even, as an extreme, private prisons. War or indeed any similar kind of extended crisis provides a stimulus for these transfers of function, which, in turn generates innovation, enterprise opportunities, especially in new, technological areas of engagement. It also tests the capacity of official responses and the confidence reposed in them by the community at large. An interesting example is provided by developments in the field of unmanned flight, 23 drones. As they have become ever smaller, cheaper, and easier to handle and use, they are becoming an increasingly useful addition to the private security armamentarium. Their engagement and real value as a private security tool is hedged about by a variety of legal and practical questions, many of which in the United States have yet to be resolved. But, philosophically in the abstract, the matter can be reduced to

the conflict between the demands of private and public security, and individual and collective expectations of *privacy*. ²⁴ These questions permeate, to a greater or lesser degree all aspects of the private security function. Where are the frontiers, here? Can security of life, liberty, property, and the pursuit of happiness²⁵ be obtained through the employment of ever more powerful, intrusive technological devices without infringing upon the rights and expectations of others necessarily affected by the use of such means? In simple terms do you have to trespass upon the property of others, conceived in a general sense, in order to protect your own? These are not questions that can be answered by an appeal to science.²⁶ Technology is becoming alarmingly intrusive in real terms. Is it within the ambit of private security to erect barriers so as to protect against such intrusions unwarranted by the unquestioned, permissible exercise of public authority? Is this not already being done in the protections afforded by business intelligence.²⁷ computer security, risks of all kinds, and the protection of privacy generally? The erection of terrestrial barriers is a comparatively easy matter compared with the task of erecting security enhancements in the other, yet as technology advances further and further, the protection of the contents of virtual reality will become more and more demanding.²⁸ Even this raises practical issues for private security. Traditionally we have seen an inconvenient division of responsibilities between those who provide physical security, personal or tangible property related, and those whose expertise lies in the realm of information security: Sometimes within the same business the right hand is blissfully unaware of what the left hand is doing, even when the case requires that both entities are engaged in tandem.²⁹ This has the potential for serious managerial problems. It is as much of a philosophical bent as any of its kind; how are the different components of what we call private security perceived by those who operate the system? Are they seen as a coherent whole, with similar goals and objectives? Does this really matter in relation to the big picture? Every entity needs a critical picture of itself in order to attain optimal functioning. If, as in the Blackwater case, a private security company sees itself as an extension of the military entity, an emerging fighting force, trouble ensues. A working philosophy is necessary to better understand the world in which one is required to operate and the limitations imposed thereby.

WHAT DEFINES OR MEANINGFULLY DESCRIBES PRIVATE SECURITY?

Is private security fundamentally defined by who pays the bills? Is its very being shaped by the well-known aphorism,³⁰ "If you have to ask how much it costs, you can't afford it." Or is it, rather a recognition of the inevitable limits, not only economic, of public policing just not enough to go around

24/7? In a real sense it is an extension of the underlying principles of selfdefense at law,³¹ a residual power in the individual to protect his or her own interests when the public police are simply not available to serve and to protect. In the case of private security someone else is being paid to exercise that right which those threatened might not have the resources to exercise on their own. It has, in the early Common Law an "ancestor," The Champion, 32 out of which grew the legal profession as one standing in your stead to defend you, in actual combat, before the judges. So is the quality of the service thus rendered by private security and its extent, that is, what is covered, determined by the price which is to be paid for it. A working test, propounded by this author, of a superior private security entity³³ is one giving at least the same level of service to the humble "Mom and Pop" grocery store as it does to its largest, most affluent, or prestigious clients? What is its probable response in times of greatest need? How is it rated in terms of client satisfaction? Few, indeed, consistently meet these exemplary standards, but it is rather how sincerely you aspire to them, how you see yourself and how others perceive you in the somewhat esoteric firmament in which you operate. What, after all, is a mission statement other than a working philosophy reduced to a short comprehensive code for the guidance of those for whom it is designed?

Lawyers and doctors of medicine everywhere have so much professionally in common that ethnic and even systemic differences are of little significance in shaping and defining vital characteristics. These professionals do much the same things, in much the same ways, wherever they practice. They tend to understand each other readily despite linguistic limitations—peculiarities, and are largely defined by what they do and how they do it. From a client's perspective what is important is "are they up-todate in their field?" Can the same be said about those engaged in private security and, if not, why is this? Suppose the powers presently occupying Afghanistan³⁴ eventually recognize the futility of trying, militarily, to impose their will on a country that has resisted the best efforts of Alexander the Great, the British Empire, and the mighty Soviet Union—security problems of the order now plaguing the country will remain long after 2014. How will any indigenous government, Karzaied³⁵ or otherwise, cope? Will it try to handle matters by its own devices-warlords-or will it seek out the assistance of some private security vendors regardless of nationality, American, Russian, Pakistani, Chinese, North Korean, whatever? Of course, money will be a prime consideration, as in any outsourcing, but whose interests would such entities serve and how would they go about the business? How would such a private security agency (and its employees) define its role?³⁶ Would it merely be the bodyguards of the (for the time being) rich and powerful, a kind of private militia? The job of such militias, the world over, is to defend an oft unpopular regime against its enemies by the threat or use of what to our way of thinking would be an unacceptable level of force. This is,

essentially, no more nor less that the usurpation of the public police powers for private ends. Is this, nevertheless, something we cannot separate from the notion of private security, when we are seeking defining characteristics? This is, acknowledgedly, the extreme case, but it does serve to pull away the blinkers. How much of this, again is a matter of perception, colored by one's viewpoint at the time.

Clearly, the fundamental characteristics of private security as it is practiced in different corners of the world lack the commonalities enjoyed, sensed even by the older professions. Yet certain functions are observably conducted in common by reason of their purpose. Aviation security whether undertaken by governmental agencies, by private vendors, in a strict sense, or by mixed engagement, does very much the same kind of things, in much the same ways, everywhere.³⁷ Screeners check IDs, search persons and baggage, look for suspicious signs, and carry out aircraft searches for anything that might harm the operation of commercial aviation. These tasks are carried out more diligently by some carriers and at some airports than others. For a variety of reasons some airports are considered more vulnerable than others.³⁸ Some international commercial carriers have standardized their security arrangements while employing local personnel.³⁹ Whatever the nature and type of those arrangements and the equipment utilized at each station, the system has its indispensable elements in common, hiring criteria, ethnic origins, training, supervision, pay, and incentives. The basic objectives are essentially the same; the differences reside mainly in the way the various tasks are conducted. A United/Continental screener at Houston International would not feel out of place at Schipol, Amsterdam, Manchester, UK, 40 or Aarland, Stockholm. Over the years since the late 1960s, passengers have become resigned to submitting to these procedures; 9/11 did little more than effect a transfer of responsibilities for them at U.S. airports. Yet, impressionistically there is little love lost between passengers and those whom the late Christopher Hitchens acerbically called, 41 "the frisking community." At times the search procedures have been conducted rather less than sympathetically and have, as a purely policy matter, verged upon the absurd. Some passengers since 9/11 have been subjected to major inconveniences due to database errors and failure to correct those after they have been spotted. Those responsible for aviation security rarely deserved the ill-concealed opprobrium with which they are viewed. What is of significance, in the present context is that it is of a different order from that which they are viewed. They are a nuisance, a necessary inconvenience, but for the ordinary passenger hardly ever a cause for fear or even embarrassment. The general public rarely, if ever, sees behind the scenes. The public face of private security is the aviation screener, the guard at the court house, the security officer at the shopping mall. None of this looks very scientific. And science per se is hardly likely there to make that public face a highly respected discipline. Are we simply looking for love in all the wrong places?

THE IMPORTANCE OF THE HUMAN ELEMENT

In reflecting upon any philosophy of security, what has to be recognized is that the protection of the lives and the safety of billions of dollars' worth of property, real and personal, often rests squarely on the shoulders of the humblest, poorly paid, under-appreciated security officer as surely as it does upon the captain of the Boeing 787. The abilities, the aptitude, the self-image, the training, and integrity of the former are all essential features in the system designed to give useful, practical effect to the maxim Serve and Protect. That, in its simplest terms, is the reality of the business of private security. Those entrusted with these responsibilities, regardless of rank or experience, are truly at the "sharp end," where the critical action takes place. Hiring practices, supervision, pay, and prospects all have their role in the end product, but only an entity imbued with the right spirit can carry out the proper mission of security. That spirit cannot grow spontaneously of its own accord; it has to be expertly fostered and promoted. This is the philosophy of the matter, however it is articulated. Therein lies the road to respect for a job well done.

Consider the events of September 11, 2001. There is obviously on the evidence enough blame to go round from the higher echelons of the policy makers and the intelligence community on downwards. When it comes down to the wire, the only obstacle of real material significance between the box cutters and those who would use them for their felonious purposes aboard the planes were ordinary, private security screeners whose orders at that time did not comprehend recognition and seizure of precisely those implements. What was not precluded was prudent, appropriate enquiry. 42 It is necessary to inculcate in every security officer a proper suspicious mind and its appropriate seemingly innocent exercise. The bad guys' intentions cannot be expected to be manifest, 43 they will be disguised, and those of security personnel designed to ferret them out should be exercised with equal, if not greater guile. It is hardly conceivable that these suspicious, primitive tools of destruction could have gone aboard an El Al aircraft in this overt way.⁴⁴ It must be understood that this is both a people and a policy problem. What it highlights and what ought not to escape our notice is the crucial role of the lowliest element of the system. So in the case of 9/11/2001 some 3,000 lives approximately were lost; countless families and loved ones bereaved; Americans attitudes towards terrorism irrevocably altered; too lengthy, incalculably expensive military interventions initiated; billions of dollars of loss occasioned⁴⁵ that could have been otherwise better spent, as a consequence of a lack of appreciation and misapplication of the critical human element where it counted most, namely the very last opportunity to prevent the tragedy. This is a lot more than 20/20 hindsight. A similar tragedy or worse can occur any hour of the day or night—for the same reasons—anywhere private security is likewise engaged. Yet rarely is the proper attention paid to this vital fact or given the remedial attention it deserves. In this and similar

cases resides a generalized indifferent attitude towards private security and its role in the overall scheme of things. 46 We cannot expect uninformed public perceptions of private security to correct this state of affairs unaided. It is a job for private security itself with the appropriate expert assistance. Private security has, here as elsewhere, a real, acute public relations problem.⁴⁷ The public at large needs to be educated as to the role of private security and its limitations so as to encourage a proper appreciation of those who perform even the apparently most mundane tasks comprehended within the notion of To Serve and Protect. "Bank guard" is hardly a high profile or glamorous job yet he or she may be all that stands between the latter day Dillingers, Barkers, and Pretty Boy Floyd, facing the real prospect of death, injury, or being taken hostage while waiting to make a modest withdrawal from their own account. This point cannot be too strongly emphasized; they hardly need their own Dog Day Afternoon⁴⁸ to bring the point home more emphatically. They are the guardians of the public image of private security, how the profession, the industry is perceived and judged. Pride, self-esteem should govern private security at all levels. Ideally, private security should, like public policing, be seen as a vocation⁴⁹ rather than it is by many, as a convenient, but not always agreeable form of employment in hard economic times. This should sensitively govern selection processes at the hiring level. One bad apple can adversely affect a whole barrel of good ones.

Security, in the most real sense, begins and ends with the confrontation between the security officer and the bad guy, and how it is handled. That confrontation may or may not have the potential for erupting in violence. The good security officer has a special sensitivity to these possibilities and conducts him or herself accordingly. Once past this final barrier, the bad guy, the thief, the rapist, the potential killer, the skyjacker, and so forth, is truly embarked on the last stage of his mission. This awesome responsibility cannot be pressed too earnestly on those who seek to enter this profession: only you stand in the way of the person intent on harming what you are protecting. Every evasion of the security system, however else it might be categorized is essentially the result of human error, a failure of will, of knowledge, or judgment. The finest of technology is of little value if it is misused, ignored, or misread. The most deadly, sophisticated computer virus has a human author, ⁵⁰ and another human who detects it and seeks to frustrate its malevolent activities. Even the finest guard dog needs a human handler.⁵¹ All too often in the dead of night, the lone security guard stands by him or herself largely bereft of all technological assistance, reliant only on his or her innate abilities, integrity, training, and resolve to prevent the bad guy(s) from getting past the "last barrier." This is no time to be finding out whether the officer has got what it takes to get the job done. There can be layers of security, involving many "last barriers," 52 but there is necessarily always one final human barrier to overcome; will it, can it hold? Barring random factors of luck, the outcome of this final encounter is largely determined by

how well the security officer is able to cope, whether he or she is truly up to the demands of the job; can he or she do what in the circumstances is necessary to frustrate the designs of those seeking to breach the security system? In the gravest of cases, is the security officer prepared to risk death or serious injury on that account? This is where careful, properly skilled hiring criteria comes into the picture. There are many in these times of high unemployment and consequent economic hardship who would consider working private security yet would eschew the very notion in more normal times. After all, how difficult—looking around—can it be? Lamentably, one does see officers whose physical condition, appearance, and intellect lend little to the desired image of private security and its deterrent qualities. If matters go wrong, there is a heavy responsibility on those who have occasioned this state of affairs. It is up to the hiring officer to determine whether the applicant is of the "right stuff." A worst case scenario should always be borne in mind. If in the course of training any unfavorable characteristics should present themselves, the individual should be terminated as being unsuited for the position of security officer. It is safer to be sure than sorry and, in the end, less expensive for all those involved. This, too, at its heart is a philosophical issue driving policy.

HOW DOES A PHILOSOPHY OF THIS KIND COME INTO BEING?

How is an underpinning philosophy of a system such as private security created? Mostly, it would appear, subconsciously; like Topsy, it just grew. It is really the product of many fine minds in action with little thought—through method and almost as little awareness of the process in the course of its manufacture; a sort of "memo to self": these are the principles we hold dear. There is, undoubtedly, a useful philosophy in all this waiting to be articulated so as to be critically examined and evaluated. A philosophy of this kind is a template of aspirations, inchoate yet recognizable to the informed eye. How, we may ask, can we aspire to do better if we do not already have a clear mental picture of what we actually do and how and why we do it? Perhaps with regard to private security it is ambitious to paint on so large a canvass. The ratcatcher (remember that devil?) at least has no such problems. He does, essentially, one thing, either well or badly. By way of contrast we may consider who are the architects of the philosophy of private security, the guiding spirits who give it tone and substance? Here, the Interview pages of this very Journal are a useful source of such material. Under the gentle probing of the Editor, these luminaries give voice to their thoughts on the profession, the business of private security in ways that invite useful further study. These interviewees hardly think of themselves as philosophers, those who spend their lives pondering the deep-seated meaning of what they do and how others perceive their labors, but these interviews do constitute just

such an activity, that is, the raw material out of which those with more leisure and a bent for such tasks can fashion and frame the basic postulates of such an essential doctrine. Whatever other name we might give these useful musings, they are certainly on analysis, evidence of an awareness of a philosophy full of deep meaning for all concerned with what private security is and what it is not. These leaders in the field have come to or been chosen for the task because of their experience and recognition of their contributions to the evolution of private security, what it has become or is in course of becoming. Small wonder that many of these are, or have been successful directors of security. Whatever else we may aver about the philosophy of private security, its creation through the exercise of the powers of the head of security and his daily interaction with those he or she serves proclaim it as a top-down process. The philosophy reflects the personality and ethos of those with the power to shape it. Here, in a real sense, lies the sentiment which informs the prescient Household apothegm that serves to introduce this article.

A BRIEF EXCURSUS

Earlier, we essayed in brief, a ratcatcher syllogism. It seems appropriate, at this juncture, to offer a similar proposition with respect to those architects of a philosophy of private security of which we have spoken, namely chiefs⁵³ or directors of security. Here, the underlying materiality of the Household quotation comes into sharper focus. The police function of the executive power of the state so far as it is exercised to the end of promoting social harmony and peaceable stability, is entrusted to those in whom are vested certain coercive obligations, both public and private. This is what gives real meaning to the ancient expression, keeping the King's Peace. It is the cement that holds social order together and, in our PC age is more usually referenced as the Rule of Law. The practical exercise of these formidable powers ranges widely from the most benign, barely noticeable to the most tyrannical imaginable; that is in the very nature of all political power backed by the force necessary to implement it.

In developed societies, the exercise of police powers falls somewhere in the middle yet even the most law abiding of those potentially affected by its reign have at times cause to reflect upon its impact on their lives and fortunes as well as the sagacity and probity of those to whom these great responsibilities are entrusted. There is, whether given active expression or not, a latent undercurrent of fear,⁵⁴ of varying intensity, that colors the attitudes towards those in whom a considerable measure of police powers is invested. Respect and fear can, if not always felicitously coexist. Love and fear do not make for such happy intimates. Dog bites man it is said, is hardly newsworthy; man bites dog, on the other hand, catches the attention and is

thought worthy of broadcasting. The great work done regularly by directors of security, and others differently denominated, but carrying out much the same functions, rarely makes headlines; the occasional lapses and mishaps are quick to excite more than their share of publicity. Public and private police are so often tarred with the same brush despite the great differences in their respective powers. The Household aphorism unquestionably has its origins in a common enough Anglo-Saxon saying, "All coppers⁵⁵ are bastards," a harsh and undiscriminating indictment. No distinction is drawn, here, between those who exercise public police powers and those operating under delimitations imposed on private security. Neither the justice for this nor the extension of the calumny is a matter of discussion. What is to be observed is the range of this, impressionistically, and its effect of this upon the status and social standing of those to whom this is so cavalierly applied. Hence, its relevance to the ratcatcher syllogism by way of comparison. We may essay our own comparison in the following terms so as to take into account its effects upon any philosophy of private security that may emerge as a result of the efforts of those we regard as the authors of any philosophy of private security worthy of analysis and appraisal.

THE RELEVANCE OF THE FEAR FACTOR

All those we have denominated chiefs of security, directors of security, public or private, proprietary or contractual, regardless of their actual titles, are invested with considerable authority and real power in some measure to affect the lives and fortunes of others. That fact, however exaggerated by the perception of others, law abiding or otherwise, is capable of inducing, justifiably or not, real fear. It is in the nature of the job. Such fear, articulated or not, can be contagious, and at times, especially among colleagues, less than helpful.

The primary task of the director of security and hence of his or her subordinates is to *prevent* harm to people and property through the prudent exercise of the considerable powers invested in them. Because of the fear-inducing nature of these responsibilities, this "job," however necessary it is perceived to be, is not regarded in the scheme of things benevolently; indeed, by certain elements, sometimes influential, it is considered as something rather less than desirable.

Therefore, those who undertake this kind of work and *especially by* those who excel at it are tarnished by the impression of its impact on others supposedly by the overall effect of what is comprehended in the term "security" and the performance of those engaged in securing compliance with its dictates.

Ergo, however pleasant a human being might be, as a director of security he or she cannot realistically aspire to be loved. The most that can be hoped for is approval and understanding among close colleagues. What has to be understood by this is the impression left on others of the wide impact of the implications of private security. There are many managers, not only in the field of policing whose commanding ethos is, "I would rather be feared than loved." Realistically, from the perspective of getting the job done the most that can be hoped for is to earn the tacit respect of those who are served and protected thereby.

HOW AUTHORITY IS EXERCISED HAS A MARKED AFFECT UPON ACCEPTANCE

How things are done is very important for the results desired and achieved. Consider here aviation security. Commercial airline passengers manifestly could, and did bring things aboard unchecked that might have affected the security of equipment on the ground or in flight.⁵⁶ Certain assumptions have to be made in constructing any system designed to frustrate those unwelcome intentions. Obviously, some kind of search of the passenger and his or her belongings, at a particular point in space and time, is called for to prevent dangerous materials being carried aboard aircraft by passengers. Any such proceeding is necessarily intrusive in some degree or another, and potentially an unwelcome invasion of personal privacy. Philosophical as well as practical considerations are immediately in play. All good law abiding passengers may be presumed to be interested in the safety of the flight they anticipate boarding; they want to get to their intended destination safe and sound and in one piece. Question: how much inconvenience will they put up with to attain this sensible objective? The manner in which the search is conducted and what items are to be prevented from being carried aboard the aircraft are fundamental to the satisfaction or otherwise of the traveling public.⁵⁷ Experience, of which there was little enough in the late 1960s when this security problem began to manifest itself, dictated what was done. Empirically, a multitude of things might be used as a weapon, but sensibly passenger convenience had an important role in limiting what might be prohibited from being carried by the passenger on his or her person or in carry-on baggage. From a business perspective, a shrewd estimation of passenger reactions had to be essayed. Considerable latitude reigned for many years and much was allowed aboard that was theoretically risky from a security point of view.⁵⁸ Commercial aviation is a highly competitive business. In the early days, say pre-1968, the principal threat that concerned those responsible for aviation security was skyjacking, or hijacking, the seizure of command and control of an aircraft on the ground or in the air. Until the events of 9/11/2001 impinged upon security thinking, penknives and similar could without objection be carried aboard aircraft on the person or in carry-on baggage provided they were displayed for inspection in sight of the screeners.⁵⁹ The security focus began

to shift in the late 1980s to explosive materials.⁶⁰ Many procedures adopted in the early days were predicated upon a belief, perhaps overly sanguine, in the "reasonableness" of the skyjackers that he or she, too, desired to arrive safe and sound at the destination to which the aircraft was by this means diverted. Security programs were designed and implemented on the basis of compliance with the skyjackers' demands. This was felt to be the safest course to guarantee the survival of the aircraft; its passengers, and crew. This, although long anticipated ere 9/11/2001, changed radically with the emergence of the suicide bomber or one intending to use the aircraft as a missile.⁶¹ Clearly, the skyjackers of 9/11/2001 could not have been talked out of their mission.

Hence, the importance of trying to ensure that these "Perfect Soldiers" did not board. 62

Permit us an imaginary, illustrative indulgence at this point. Imagine a reworking of history in a not over-fanciful fashion. It is, on these pages, September 11, 2001. Although it is material to recall what we had written previously about there being enough blame to go around, we have no intention here of revisiting that whole enquiry; 63 our interest here is at what we called "the sharp end" and what might quite easily have happened with but the slightest change of the facts. We are revisiting here the skyjacking of American Airlines flight 11, out of Boston, Logan to LAX. Mohammed Atta approaches the metal detector. He has in his possession certain items that could have aroused suspicion and clearly could have been used as weapons. In our scenario a female screener observes him closely. AA's own security program⁶⁴ was based with certain modifications dictated by U.S. laws and cultural considerations on the Israeli model developed and purveyed by former El Al and other government employees. There is something suspicious about Atta's demeanor and attitude, but she can't put a name to it. The "good" private security officer should have or should have acquired a highly developed sense of these matters, whether at the airport, the court house, or the shopping mall. They may not be spelled out explicitly in any protocol, but they are cause for extra vigilance and enquiry. She, accordingly, alerts her supervisor to her suspicions.

She says: "He seems very nervous, doesn't look you in the eye. He says he's a student; he couldn't tell me what he is studying or where. Maybe he just doesn't like being questioned by a woman."

Supervisor: "You haven't got a thing about A-rabs, have you?"

She says: "No. And it isn't just feminine intuition either. In his carry on he's got some sprays, utility knives and a couple of those funny blade things, what do you call'em?"

Supervisor: "Box cutters."65

She says: "Whatever. He couldn't tell me what he uses them for, or why he is carrying them with him on the plane. There's something wrong here."

Supervisor: "Okay. Pull him over. I'll have to talk with him."

Mohammed Atta accordingly misses his flight to WTC. Only he of "*The Perfect Soldiers*" could pilot that plane.

Supervisor, really on the job, enquires whether other screeners may have noticed any other passengers with box cutters, not then a prohibited carry-on item. This degree of vigilance, though not in any protocol could have prevented the tragedy of 9/11. A final observation with no chauvinistic overtones: Can you imagine any El Al security officer "overlooking" these suspicious signs?

The moral of this cautionary tale? It all happens—or it doesn't, at "the sharp end." That is the critical point at which private security functions effectively—or it doesn't. Unfortunately, there is a wider, distinctively American philosophy at work here, which is dramatically illuminated by the 9/11 experience. When problems arise, the solution? Throw lots of money at it! That reduced to simplicity is how we got the TSA.

SCIENCE AND WHAT IT REALLY MEANS FOR PRIVATE SECURITY

Although we may overall justify our preoccupation with demonstrating that modern private security, like its public counterpart, has its scientific aspects, are we in error in thinking of science as a panacea for the problems of image? Does science as a basis for organizational and operational methodology really do much for how private security is practiced, even by those employed in it? Could we envisage a science of ratcatching? Without going into detail, we obviously could. The elements of the system can be cogently stated and their workings analyzed. Are the most modern methods being efficiently employed? Are traps or poison humanely used? Are any processes employed potentially harmful to humans, pets, or the ecological system? Can we measure the results with scientific rigor? But ... why would we bother? Does the job get done to the satisfaction of those who contracted for it?66 Would the most favorable report serve to enhance the social status of the ratcatcher or increase the esteem in which he or she is held in our culture? It would be difficult and perhaps self-deluding to come up with an affirmative answer. The ratcatcher is under no illusions about his image; he or she is resigned to the unfavorable impression of their work registered by others. The literature down the ages is replete with images of how the ratcatcher is perceived. As long as it pays, he or she is content to get on with the job; someone has to do it. The most exacting and sophisticated of analytical models lend credence only to the validity of the model used so as to understand the system being studied; the results good or bad do little to shape perception of the institution or entity under scrutiny.⁶⁷ This holds true for any entity under examination; importing the familiar processes of social science analysis through these proceedings does little to confer thereby the soubriquet of science on that which is being studied. The fact that we can use these methods to study what we do and how we do it, does not mean that what we do and how we do it are ipso facto scientific. Any system or process can be studied by scientific method even though there is little science, social or otherwise, in what is under scrutiny. A Broadway play having no scientific content or scientific pretensions can be analyzed using the most rigorous of methodologies. Interesting though such an exercise might be to some, it does nothing to establish the play as a scientific undertaking of any kind, though it might call in question its artistic merits. What those in private security are concerned with in this flirtation with scientific method is whether what they do and how they do it can be indisputably demonstrated as scientifically based per se. Even a cursory glance at what is involved in public policing indicates that much of what is done routinely has as little to do with scientific method as a basis for its performance as the above Broadway play. There is, however, at a glance, a great deal that betokens a scientific basis, even if meanings derived from it can be shown to be disputable. Even the most rigorously based scientific endeavor can be sloppily conducted and rejected as invalid without destroying its fundamental scientific premises. 68 One has only to look at the handling of the evidence in the first O. J. Simpson criminal trial for confirmation of this contention! Clearly, private security is subject to many of the same strictures. Nevertheless, there is much that is done by private security that is as scientifically based as that which is recognized as such in public policing.⁶⁹

Wherein, then, lie the distinctions? Various explanations suggest themselves. Private security dearly wishes to be recognized, unequivocally, as a *profession*⁷⁰ rather than simply as a business enterprise. As we have seen with medicine and the law, the two notions can compatibly coexist in the one entity. Even among undisputed professionals there are marked differences in levels of service yet all are endowed basically with a similar level of respect attaching to the profession to which they belong. One may argue that a true profession establishes standards and a mechanism for ensuring adherence to them. 71 Yet even public policing does not always automatically reach the high standards expected of it and it is the law rather than the mechanism of a professional association that investigates and punishes where there are inappropriate deviations from these expectations. What then does private security hope to get by this flirtation with the scientific method? What is the industry (another stereotypical term) hope to gain thereby? In a few words, unequivocal professional recognition. Private security, by comparison with other cognate entities, feels it does not get the respect it deserves. Why has this proven so difficult? Respect has to be earned, but merit does not always gain automatic recognition. Here we refer again to what we alluded to earlier in another connection. What is the public face of private security? What does the average person think of when asked: What do you know about private security? At the time of the events of 9/11/2001, U.S. airlines were carrying more than two million passengers daily.⁷² That is two

million persons whose impressions of private security will have been colored by this brief contact, in Hitchen's words, "Your fitness to fly is determined by America's least handpicked and least qualified profession: the frisking community." At least he recognized it (with probably the barest of thought) as a "profession." Think further of the impressions generated by the myriad daily contacts in banks, supermarkets, shopping malls, courts, etc. And what do those impressions add up to for those who register them? Hardly an aura of respect. Quite simply, private security is rarely seen as a desirable career; it is all too often seen as something to do—and get paid for doing—while waiting for something better to happen. For many, properly qualified, the acme of that ambition is to become a regular police officer. Those thus experiencing this desired change of career have little difficulty in appreciating the real distinctions between the two committed to Serve and Protect.

A WORD OR SO ON BODYGUARDS

Perhaps that to which the most ambitious might, alternatively aspire in the private sector is the function of the personal protection specialist, or bodyguard to use the earlier more evocative term. In the face of it, for those whose research or experience in this area has not been very deep or extensive, this seems to offer not only a real career, but exciting prospects of travel and adventure beyond the dreams of the average Joe contemplating a life in private security. Some are accordingly, prepared to expend considerable amounts of their own resources to acquire what they hope is the requisite training and job opportunities offered by those operating these services. In truth, body guarding is a very specialized and demanding task. Again, like so many other aspects of higher education, this is a business. Even having been a government agent requires some adjustment in endeavoring to do much the same kind of work, with markedly lessened authority and guaranteed assistance from the public sector. Many grossly overestimate their own capacity for what is involved and are disappointed in consequence. Attitude and integrity, as well as considerable tact are the key to success here; little of this is susceptible of being formally taught. These usually innate qualities can only be massaged and encouraged through skilled, sensitive, experienced instruction.⁷⁵

Body guarding as it comes across to the lay observer (usually from afar) gives an impression of offering a most Hollywood-like career a la Kevin Costner (in real life Larry Wansley). The reality is, all too often, far different. It has its moments, but there is also much boredom and drudgery attached to this kind of work. In terms of service, this is not for the envious; *you* are the bodyguard, not the principal. Aspirants to this branch of private security would do well to heed the words of the old barrack room dirge: "It's the rich

wot gets the pleasure, it's the poor wot gets the blame." High profile figures in all walks of life can be very demanding. Before expending a lot of time and money to fit oneself as a career bodyguard, some honest introspection is needed. This kind of career really calls for a certain attitude in the face of much ungratefulness and all too little of its genuine opposite. Let's face it honestly. Many principals are not very pleasant or sympathetic employees. Consider in this context the real meaning of to serve and protect. You really have to care for your principal, after the proper, professional criteria, to be prepared to take a bullet for him or her. There are certainly easier ways of earning a living even in these hard times.

THE REALITIES OF TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION

Much of what passes for science in private security is little more than technological innovation, sensible enough in its application on its own account. Certain areas of private security like those of their public counterpart lend themselves more readily to rapid technological development than others. The modern cell phone, with all its enhancements, still very much a work in progress, has largely displaced radio communications. It has become, too, the instant photographic instrument of choice for many, but this versatile instrument does have its drawbacks from a security perspective. Probably one of its more controversial is its texting capability;⁷⁹ is this an unmitigated blessing or a potential security curse? Its sensible employment makes for improved command and control, but the cell phone on account of its range and portability also has considerable potential for that worst of security problems—distraction. This is now already so much more than just an instrument of person to person communication. Lack of strict attention to the business in hand is always one of the greatest hazards for private security and imposes additional burdens of a supervisory nature. These devices now offer so many new and fascinating things to do, besides staying in touch with friends; the Internet; music; news of the day, especially the stock market. The strictest controls and supervision are needed here principally during the night watches; many crimes are committed during the hours of darkness. This is when the human spirit of those supposedly on guard is often at its lowest ebb. It is all too easy for the attention to stray. Remember, this is "the sharp end," where the action is likely to take place. The so-called social media is very persuasive and insidious; age is no longer the barrier it used to be a decade or so ago. 80 It is not only the younger set who is captivated by this ever changing panorama. For many it is highly addictive and an insulation against loneliness. Much vital physical security is of a boring character; excitement most often means trouble.⁸¹ Always ask: Who is watching the watchers to make sure they are watching properly? Apart from the bad guys!

Private security encompasses a great many different functions all concerned largely with the same overall objectives, namely the protection of physical integrity, of life and limb, as well as individual liberty, 82 and the safety and security of property interests of all kinds. Yet the public perception is almost always fixated on the guard services, for that is the most visible and likely to produce interaction of some kind or another. Much that goes on behind the scenes is not observable by the general public or ordinarily of much immediate concern to them. Hence, the guard service, however it is described, is the public face of private security. Our abiding impressions of private security are thus greatly influenced by how one is received and treated in the course of an encounter with private security officers exercising in comprehensive fashion their respective guardian functions.⁸³ It is all too easy to mistake a uniformed private security officer for a police officer and care must be taken not to foster such an erroneous impression in the course of any encounter. The private security officer must have the clearest understanding of the limitations of his or her powers in this regard. This is of special importance with respect to any powers of arrest or restriction of liberty of any person in the course of an encounter. Indeed, any overbearing attitude should be avoided and all enquiries should be attended to with the utmost courtesy. 84 This is especially important where the officer is an employee of a proprietary force. Such an employee is truly the face of the business he or she represents; a truly bad encounter can mean a loss of business-or worse. Once more, this comes down, in essence, to career prospects. A proprietary force obviously offers a different, more stable perspective on this. So often, contract security comes down to this: the reasonably active senior citizen in supplementing his or her social security check, preferable to bagging groceries. The impecunious law student, nodding off at midnight while trying to brush up on the law of evidence for tomorrow's oral; the shopwalker in plain clothes in the big department store hoping to hit the headlines with a Winona Ryder-like pinch. So, what's to respect? Yet many private security contractors do make herculean efforts to offer a real career with commensurate benefits and real career prospects and incentives. This is a very hard business in which to thrive as an independent vendor of security services: the record of mergers and acquisitions is mute testimony to this. Margins are unrealistically low in the main; people don't like paying for private security any more than they relish paying their taxes.⁸⁵ Private security is very much a dog-eat-dog business. Some of the most innovative, worthy businesses have fallen by the wayside or been gobbled up by companies less interested in abstract improvements than the pressures of the bottom line. All these things reflect markedly in hiring, training, supervision and, naturally, career prospects. These are the realities of the much sought after respect, which manifest themselves in the public perception of private security. Private security has a serious image problem of its own making. Hence once more the comparison with the ratcatcher.

SO ... WHO BUYS PRIVATE SECURITY?

Those who purchase private security services rarely do so with a view to obtaining the highest standards of performance. Many, many times, the prize goes to the lowest bidder. Moreover, contracts are rarely of an extended duration; many are renewable on a year-to-year basis at most. Even in the field of personal protection, bodyguarding, where the relationship between the protector and the protected are the most sensitive and crucial, there is a good deal of movement.⁸⁶ The reluctance of many seeking private security services to go the proprietary route is invariably a matter of cost rather than efficiency. A really first-class contractor offers much in the way of service that might be expected of a well-managed proprietary force, but usually it is an apples and oranges comparison that is essayed. Good, superior, even, service is costly whatever the route taken. A really good contractor has to offer something in the nature of a true career path to attract the right capable officers; they will also have to furnish what is comprehended in the industry by way of fringe benefits, vacations, etc. Management costs will also reflect strongly in the bidding process. Many procurement departments mistakenly focus upon the lowest bidder and the quality of service purchased is bound to be affected adversely by these considerations. Again, overall impressions of the profession are governed by the economics of the matter. This is a truism that rarely penetrates the consciousness of those in the market for these services. You cannot realistically expect to acquire top-notch services at rock-bottom prices. Moreover, those entrusted with procurement functions in this area rarely have the requisite knowledge or experience of private security so as to understand what they are purchasing and are often enough divorced from their own client base, those actually requiring the services. In an industry where performance standards are driven down by pricing considerations disappointments are inevitable and threaten those whose desire is to enhance the perceptions of what is on offer. Unrealistic expectations are inevitably met with cost cutting to keep within the contracted boundaries. You cannot realistically expect Mercedes service, and consequently, image at Ford Pinto prices. There are, obviously, many advantages to establishing a proprietary service, provided the right degree of expertise is employed in the process, control, responsiveness, stability, and confidentiality among them. But, again, if expectations are put unrealistically high, they will not be met. The private security industry is capable of meeting the most demanding requirements, but it cannot be expected to do so on the cheap.

SETTING THE STANDARDS: PROPRIETARY VERSUS CONTRACT SECURITY

Does the proprietary segment of the private security industry really set the tone for all? Does it determine what we have called the philosophy of the

profession that we spend so much time and energy trying to elucidate? It is not unfair to assert that it does, as a whole, believe in its own superiority in terms of its capacity to serve and protect. Proprietary services see themselves as an elite within the overall framework of private security. Perhaps the most significant element in any evaluation of a private security provider, be it proprietary or an independent contractor is management. But there is a significant difference to be noted between the two. The manager of a contract security company is greatly occupied with selling his company's services. The chief of a proprietary force is, if he is interested at all in this aspect, an occasional consumer, for special needs and events. Security management is a very special skill, not found in ordinary managers, who might be perfectly competent in other, less exotic fields of activity. A good, private security manager leaves his or her impress, at all levels, on the work force for which they are responsible. The director of security in the case of a proprietary force or the branch manager, or whatever may be the title by which he is designated by the private contractor has the responsibility of translating into operational terms, the philosophy or work ethic of the company he or she serves. Invariably a security service provider enjoying a highly favorable reputation at all levels will be found to be headed by a superior manager with a distinctive, well-merited personal style and a verifiable standing in the profession. Any evaluation of this kind requires an expert personal interview with the prospective supplier of the security services sought. The person undertaking the evaluation needs the requisite skills and experience for the purpose. In the case of an independent contractor it must be borne in mind that those providing these services are working in a very competitive environment and to make a sale, on which one's very livelihood depends, requires putting the best possible face on what is being offered. The experienced seeker after security services will be directing attention to a central issue: What makes you or your organization different from your competition? A good manager anticipates this line of enquiry, the superior manager will never promise that which he or she cannot deliver. Each manager tends to develop his or her own distinctive responses to this line of enquiry. The answer will usually be determined by the nature of the services sought. Some private security vendors are, or claim to be, full service providers. Others furnish a range of specialized services or are restricted in the kinds of service they offer. Very few of those seeking the services of a private security vendor have a clear idea of the services they need, or which they are seeking—unless they already have a satisfactory proprietary security department and are seeking to supplement it in general or in particular. Ideally, the process should begin with a needs assessment study by an in-house expert, the chief of security if there is one. Some directors of security find themselves in difficulty in this regard. They feel reluctant to suggest the engagement of outside private security vendors lest upper management feels that it is something their own security department ought to be providing. Directors of security feel more comfortable bringing in specialists when this is necessary to supplement their own skills or personnel requirements. Many directors of security run a very lean operation bringing in extra personnel only for special events, stockholders' meetings, and company extravagances. There is no sure way of establishing an optimum security level. The system is only truly tested in times of failure. It is probably the case that many entities purchase private security services in excess of what is needed, on expert appraisal, while others skimp on their requirements and are fortunate to avoid tragic consequences as a result. Only a thorough postmortem can determine the cause of failure, which in most cases is attributable to a complexity of factors rather than a single, simple cause. Once more, look to "the sharp end." In most cases, the failure will be seen in the *quality* of the service rather than the quantity bestowed on the apprehended problem. This is where the losses of 9/11, as lessons, are so important and so often misread.

SO, WHAT HAPPENS WHEN THINGS GO SERIOUSLY WRONG?

When tragedy does strike, a radical reappraisal of needs is often the immediate aftermath; the assumption by the Federal government of overall operational responsibility for aviation security in the United States was probably a necessary political gesture more to reassure traveling public and others but it was, on a cost benefit basis alone, hardly the most desirable course or the one likely in the long run to lead to enhanced security. These are hard lessons learned over time. Time works wonders for the development of thought. If you are around long enough you have the privilege of understanding this at first hand. It still takes time for reflection on what has been witnessed before its meaning can become apparent. All too frequently, changes in security policies are dictated by overly hasty reactions to events; the rapid response in such incidents is not always the wisest solution to the problem. You can, with seeming expedience, abolish the office of ratcatcher (for which, substitute security department) but the problem of dealing with the pesky rodents remains. Pretending to ignore the menace presented, or trying cosmetic remedies only exacerbates the problem. Businesses that find themselves in financial difficulties of their own making (think American Airlines, that once proud flagship carrier)⁸⁷ naturally look to cut costs wherever they can. The shortsighted (or the woefully ignorant) so often fasten upon security as a disposable luxury; after all, they are rarely, if ever, a profit center, are they? This comes close to a fraud on the traveling public, especially when a specific fee for security is included in the fare price. 88 The problems addressed by a good security department do not vanish with its dissolution. Indeed, the real cost of dealing with these threats to life and property by other means are often far greater than before, especially taking account the loss of "institutional memory." Outsourcing of any kind in this realm is never as easy as sending your IT department to Karachi or Taipei, and generates its own security problems. Moreover, there are none of the supposed "old boy" advantages here such as engaging your former CEO as a "consultant" so as to on board his "uniquely valuable knowledge." We know of no Jack Welches in the security industry.⁸⁹

SCIENCE OR TECHNOLOGY: ANOTHER GLIMPSE THROUGH A LENS DARKLY

We are living through an age of technological marvels. So much so that we are inclined at times to minimize or ignore the human factor. Some people are not merely comfortable with this state of affairs but are so enamored of it that their ordinary lives, which they cannot sensibly forsake, are played out daily in the shadow of their virtual existence. The frontiers where one begins and the other ends are from clear in many cases. Most people, however, are somewhat behind the curve when it comes to these "great leaps" in technology and this is as true of private security as it is of many other businesses. Technology is in reality only as useful and reliable as the human element behind it. When we seek to inject "science" into the workings of the system we call private security, we are for the most part not talking of some rigorous methodological model, but rather of a technological adaptation of some science or another. Pure science has really very little to do with the practice or organization of private security; it is hardly a significant element in its definition. Why then, as we have said before, the current fascination with "scientific" thought in relation to the private security field? Is the search for technological solutions to security problems, exotic ID equipment, allencompassing surveillance, data mining, a real "product enhancement" or merely a cosmetic illusion intended to convey a business-like impression of being ahead of the curve? For some tasks the digital computer is an indispensable piece of equipment, say in the field of data management. What, however, does it really do for the majority of private security tasks to be accomplished? So you can trawl the Internet; big deal. And what is its impact on the human element in the private security field? It has done little or nothing for human relations or the image problem. Scientific method finds its true value introspectively, especially in the arena of research. Scientific analysis can show us what we do and what we might do to improve our performance. Scientific methodology is an aid to understanding. Its employment does not serve to make the business of private security a science. It is, as indicated earlier, especially in the field of communications that these developments show their true worth and expose the lacunae resulting from the theoretical possibilities and the human failure to realize them to their fullest extent. How, it may be asked do these technological marvels aid, practically

in reducing response times and the effectiveness of those responses in what is so often a matter of life or death? Whatever remains so far unknown and perhaps unknowable in the Traynor/Zimmerman⁹⁰ self-defense case, it is evident that a more effective deployment of the available technology ought to have resulted in a better understanding of what was happening and hence a more sensible resolution of the incident so as to have averted a waste of human life. Is the now commonplace diffusion of technology "a la Rodney King" something of a control mechanism on how well or poorly its employment in the private security field is taking place? Again, by reference to the incident, examine the human factor. How did technology fail us here?

LEARNING TO LIVE WITH TECHNOLOGY

Obviously, in private security as in other contemporary fields of endeavor, technology is here to stay though particular applications are often all too rapidly rendered obsolete; how could the original Land Polaroid concept have hoped to survive in a world where the mobile telephone has become an instant camera of choice—and shrunk exponentially in size? None of this will go unaided to addressing the differences between potential and the real effectiveness of its employment, which is dependent on the exercise or otherwise of a range of human competence.

The question in every case is what could this or that application do, or could have done in the right hands, or as is so often the case in the field of security, in the wrong hands. Technology is a two-edged weapon. Never, perhaps, has it been more true that it takes one to catch one!⁹¹ See, for example, the drug cartels' employment of the most advanced innovations. In this context, what does this topic tell us about any philosophy of private security? Does philosophy assist in suggesting answers other disciplines have difficulty in addressing? Technology, by itself, is clearly not the answer to all life's problems; it is merely an adjunct, properly employed. The appropriately trained and deployed human element is the indispensible foundation of all that is comprehended within the term, private security. Technology is available to all—good and bad—with the skills and the resources to employ it. Human agency is what gives vitality to the concept, Serve and Protect, how it is perceived and implemented as a strategy. However it is expressed, the guiding principles are laid down and daily reinforced by those entrusted to give substantive effect to them. A philosophy is not some abstraction evolving spontaneously out of the workings of some artificial intelligence project. 92 Rather it provides a baseline for the setting of real standards and goods, the rules by which we are intended to operate. A philosophy is a work in progress, a product of visionaries; its implementation calls for different skills, more practical, managerial to transform it into a template for conduct. Serve and protect is a strikingly evocative concept yet it first needs

a great deal of practical, detailed refinement if it is to be employed as a business model. It has to be shaped and fleshed out so as to give it meaning for those desirous of being served and protected according to their supposed needs. Its content is not self-evident. There is no one model fits all, but each has a common unifying thread. What the prudent, informed client is looking for are the distinctions. What are you offering that we cannot expect to get elsewhere? How is your way of doing what we want different from that of your competitors? In particular, how does your service differ from what we can expect from public law enforcement, which as good taxpayers, we are inclined to look upon as an entitlement?

THE SEARCH FOR THE DISTINCTIONS

Here, surely, we come to the heart of the task of setting forth any philosophy of private security. What is the primary defining characteristic of private security in the realm of providing protective services? What is it that distinguishes private security from all other forms of protection, and especially that supposedly provided as of right by what is comprehended by our understanding of regular public policing and its limitations. Is it more than just the familiar cri de coeur, "where's a police officer when you really need one?" Clearly, much of what is actually done by a public law enforcement agency is shared both materially and in spirit by its private counterpart. In seeking the distinctions, the focus most commonly falls upon the powers conferred upon those who serve to keep the peace in public law enforcement. In the 1930s a perceptive English Prime Minister, in a different context, put his finger firmly upon the point in issue, defining a police officer as "A good citizen doing his duty." This, it may be recalled was at a time of burgeoning totalitarian states around the globe, where a very different philosophy of policing was in the course of development.⁹³ Much of our own philosophy of serve and protect derives from the notions borne over the centuries of the Common Law, the Anglo legacy to the New World, and of the creation at quite a late stage of a professional police force for bringing those who would violate public order and the integrity of person and property before the courts of justice. The good citizens' inherent, limited powers of arrest, for example, had necessarily to be greatly expanded in the interests of giving the police, and the police only, the power to do that civic duty in conformity with the needs of the modern nation state: We cannot simply allow private citizens the right to hand out speeding tickets to even the most egregious offenders, though every good, law-abiding driver is daily aware of how many egregious offenders go unpunished. Put simply, there are just not enough sworn officers to cope in reality with a very real need to serve as a deterrent and to protect the innocent, in the instant case, from those capable of doing them harm. The situation, theoretically, has an attractive solution, namely private policing to fill the lacunae. It is not difficult to comprehend why this cannot be translated into, full-scale, general practice. But this is where, in a democracy, the distinctions between public and private policing in the concept of serve and protect have to be sought and delineated. The distinctions are both theoretical and practical and the two are deeply embedded in a nation's philosophy of maintaining social harmony through the way in which the powers invested in those who serve and protect are exercised.

PROTECTION OF WHAT?

At the epicenter of any philosophy of protection lies an inchoate notion of entitlement. For there to be a right to protection of some interest, and all that is thereby involved, there has to be an understanding of something entitled to protection, a recognition in a social sense of belonging, of something due to someone to be kept from harm by others. Inherent in this recognition of belonging is what we denominate, in its fullest sense, ownership, and in lesser degree, possession. That perfected meaning of belonging according to the precepts of any particular legal system is characterized by the term property, the right inhering in those entitled at law not only to the benefits of its use and value to them but also to its protection in a real fashion against all others who can show no superior claim of right to it. When there is the fullest recognition of ownership, the property can be bought, sold, gifted, transmitted by way of the law of succession to others, partially or in its entirety. Private ownership, that inhering in the individual or one recognized for such purposes as enjoying the rights of an individual through by way of what we would term a legal fiction, 94 gives rise to the exercise of those capacities we embrace under the concept of private security. Private security is thus seen as embraced, according to the sociopolitical system according it recognition as something protected, in a primary sense by the public powers guaranteeing its existence and enjoyment by the individual. Here we perceive again, the realities of the matter. There can, in strict reality, be no perfect security⁹⁵ for anything under even the most comprehensive system capable of being envisaged. This is a human limitation; even the forces of nature at times conspire against the concept of total protection. Something, some residual is *always* left to the owner, within his or her own capacity. And for the unable, on their own to supply what is needed in this regard, yet who can, nevertheless avail themselves of it, there is yet at a price, dear reader—private security, to attempt to take up the slack, to supply that which neither they nor the public powers can in extremis provide. There, in a nutshell, is the kernel of the philosophy of private security, with all its hopes, fears, fact, and fiction. Make of it what you will.

Some things can be possessed, lawfully held and utilized for a while, but are not susceptible of being *owned* in the fullest sense. They may,

nevertheless, be entitled to a certain measure of protection against others seeking to interfere with the state of possession. How property is recognized and hence protected is, in the larger sense, a sociopolitical matter, from a philosophical perspective, differing from one organized society to another, but despite the apparent differences, the commonalities of humankind place emphasis on *boundaries*, whether physical or intangible. Your rights to protect your property interests, subject to any permission having the force of law, end where the boundaries of my property rights begin. John Stuart Mill put the philosophical point succinctly "The liberty of the individual must be thus far limited; he must not make himself a nuisance to other people." Within my boundaries, I have extensive rights to protect what is mine but I may therein owe a legal obligation to strangers to keep them free from harm, for the extent to which boundaries are legally sacrosanct under our own system has its limits. We cannot, for example, set up clandestine, harmful protection devices, (secret traps) even against potential trespassers.

Protection, in any civilized society, in a practical sense, comes down to a question of power and its sensible assertion. Property to the extent allowed by law, must perforce look to capable others to supply what is required or resign oneself to the enforced illicit deprivation of one's rights. The implications of this for the concept of social harmony as a whole hardly needs further extended treatment here. Whatever the social or political theory behind it, what is at stake is the Rule of Law as opposed to societal chaos.

PROTECTION AS A CONSTITUENT PART OF PROTECTION

The old adage has it that prevention is better than cure. 99 In matters of life and death, in the absence of effective prevention, there may be no cure, only compensation for the loss occasioned. Any failure of prevention of harm, however good the mechanisms for putting things as right as possible causes a social imbalance as well as individual damage that has inevitably subsidiary effects on the whole system. Protection comprehends both prevention, and in the case of failure, methods of redress seeking to right the wrong that has taken place. It is necessary to interpose here the matter of private insurance, something not ordinarily voiced in the same breath as private security. Nevertheless, its direct connection and relevance to what has been written here on the subject is brought into high relief by what is known as kidnap and ransom insurance. 100 Policies are taken out on high risk targets of kidnappers, whether terrorists or common criminals. Such insurance is expensive and subject to onerous conditions, but it has become an additional burden on businesses and others faced with this very real menace. What cannot be prevented despite the best efforts of all those involved gives rise to civil liability for compensation according to the degree of harm

suffered by the instant victim. There is considerable material for study in this area, all of which is of relevance to the central topic dealt with in this article. Handling kidnap cases calls for very special skills, vital, informed connections, and an unusual degree of free rein in dealing with those in possession of the "merchandise," that is, the victim. This is one of the instances in which even the sagest and most experienced directors of security will have little difficulty in engaging the necessary expert assistance at the earliest possible moment.

PREVENTION: THE REAL DEFINING ELEMENT OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF PRIVATE SECURITY

This is where the real divergence between the powers and responsibilities of the public policing authorities and those vested in private security are most acutely observable. The boundaries of the interests protected in the instant case serve in great part to define the distinctions between the powers at law of the public policing authority and those of private security. The latter exercises only the residual powers at law of the offended party that might properly have been employed in the case had that party both the presence and the necessary capacity to employ them. Hence, in the case of private security the notion of protection is largely limited to such preventive measures as are permitted by law in defense of the threatened interest. And, of course, the security agent at "the sharp end" has his or her own powers and responsibilities in the case of being a witness to a felony in progress so as to cause this "good citizen to do his or her own duty" as called for in the case.

Thus the key defining element of private security is assured by prevention and every aspect of its exercise should be geared to that fundamental premise. All security measures embraced by the concept "To Serve and Protect," whether undertaken by public or private agency, rest upon an assumed balance of interests. The aggressor, he or she who initiates an action with the potential to harm unlawfully the legitimate interests of another, surrenders thereby the legal right to defend his or her own interests. Thus, in a theoretical sense, private security in terms of response is limited to what are manifestly defensive measures. Yet, in reality, any response calling for the use of force to repel or contain aggression is bound to restrain its efforts so as to avoid even the suggestion of stepping beyond the permitted limitations. Thus anything in the nature of vengeance or an overly aggressive, offensive response is to be avoided. The underlying philosophy of self-defense at law should be the golden metewand and of those entrusted with these responsibilities. In our own system, what is found by a jury, or a judge acting alone, to be objectively reasonable will probably govern the matter. Unless, of course, a contrary opinion may be taken on any appeal. Any philosophy

of private security must accordingly base its notions of response not only on what the law permits, but also by reference to a sensible appreciation of the effects of the reaction to the anticipated harm from the action of the aggressor.

LIMITATIONS ON THE CONCEPT OF PREVENTION

Prevention in action is calculated to save the threatened interest from harm not to punish, pursue, or apprehend the offenders. This latter is incidental to the primary purpose of the intervention. Thus a personal protection specialist's primary duty to his principal is to take all such measures to prevent, sensibly, the harm from occurring so as to guard against what might eventuate from the assault of the aggressor. Save with that basic consideration in mind, apprehension of the aggressor, pursuit, punishment or any other kind of vengeful reaction is *ultra-vires* and beyond what is contemplated by prevention. All philosophies of private security and policies emanating from them are constrained by these boundaries. Pursuit of the aggressor is a distraction for private security and strictly a matter for the competent law enforcement agency, save only that in the course of the engagement it is strictly necessary so as to prevent, or minimize harm to those being protected. These constraints must be properly respected in any practical implementation of policies developed to prevent the reasonably anticipated harm that might occur. That which goes over and beyond what is necessary to preserve from harm the person or property protected is excessive and may, itself, be regarded as an aggressive response resulting in liability regardless of who initiated the encounter. These are difficult cases; much turns upon impressions. These matters of self-defense at law and the protection of third parties are situationally governed. Some state laws require the party threatened to retreat, that is, pursue an inactive policy of avoidance. Others permit the theoretical party to "stand fast" to repel the anticipated harm. This so-called "castle doctrine" is a cleaner more definitive application of what is essentially based on property rights, and has ancient roots.

To be able to prevent the occurrence of harm, there must be, from the outset a reasonable apprehension of its eventuality in order that suitable measures to frustrate it or mitigate its consequences can be designed and put in place. It is not possible with our current state of knowledge to *prevent* an earthquake from occurring. Even with greater exactitude and reliability, we lack the means to counter, halt or divert these destructive forces of nature; much the same can be said of tornados and hurricanes. It is possible, however, even within the limits of our current understanding of those phenomena and the likelihood of their occurrence in a particular location to minimize some of the more catastrophic effects of these and other unpleasant happenings in nature with which we might expect to have to contend.

We can prevent or reduce the harm in many instances by practicing policies of avoidance. Thus we can avoid or limit construction of high density urban centers, with all their necessary appurtenances, on known earthquake prone areas (say, the San Andreas Fault), or low-lying flood plains, or if this is, for some reason difficult or impossible we can modify our regimen of construction to increase resistance to the devastating shock when it occurs. 101 Similar principles apply to any regimen of precaution on man-made disasters in the security field. Again, a pertinent illustration from the field of aviation security. It had long been envisaged that an aircraft might be seized by malevolents, skyjackers, so as to be employed as a missile against some sensitive target, for example, the White House, the Pentagon, or the World Trade Center in New York City. Once such a dastardly scheme is underway, moving the buildings or reducing their allure as targets in some way borders on the absurd; the only mitigating action, short of shooting the missile out of the sky is the efficient evacuating of the buildings so as to reduce casualties. Serious prevention has to be directed precisely against the authors of the mischief. It is only possible to thwart such man-made disasters before they reach an operational stage with exact knowledge of the plot, preventive intelligence of a kind that is never easy to obtain or to obtain in time to institute countermeasures. Only those invested with the requisite authority can, given the level of intelligence available, order and execute the appropriate measures to frustrate what is in prospect once such an operation is under way. Intelligence of the level necessary is hard to come by and put to good effective use; so many targets, so many possible undertakings of a like nature. The bifurcated nature of our security system works against us. Critical information in the hands of the authorities is, for prudent reasons, withheld from private security; all too often, private security, at "the sharp end" is kept out of the loop. For those truly at "the sharp end" ignorance is not bliss, but a recipe for disaster. From an intelligence perspective, those who serve and protect are, in a crisis situation, one and indivisible, nothing can be more dangerous response wise than that the right hand is deliberately kept from knowing what the left is doing. In reality, U.S. intelligence at all levels is like a leaky sieve; we did not need Wikileaks to fill out the picture. Intelligence can not function effectively where there is, justifiably or otherwise, a lack of trust. Those who know, or pretend to know, are most usually a long way from "the sharp end." The real need can only be essayed in originality.

PRIVATE SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE

An oft remarked intelligence truism is that we don't know what we don't know. It is also true, as *Ecclesiastes*¹⁰³ teaches us, that there is nothing new under the sun; there are only variations, some less innovative than others, are familiar themes. A good title for a piece devoted to this topic

might be the Enigma Variations. The subject is not really as different or complex as it might appear at first sight. In the absence of hard relevant information, a resort to speculation is a perfectly, and indeed a sensible preliminary step to any decision making. We are not talking guess work here. An intelligence analyst has to put him or herself into the mind frame of the adversary. 104 For simplicity's sake let us assume that malefactor to be a potential skyjacker. What in bare-bones terms is the problem confronting that individual? Answer: how to get aboard the aircraft with a weapon or suitable device at hand for taking control of the aircraft and those entrusted with flying it (anything representing a creditable threat to human life will do). Hence, a comprehensive knowledge of the security measures in force with respect to passenger boarding at the chosen airport, at the time of the contemplated seizure is vital to the operation. The only alternative open to the adversary is the subornation of some airport or aviation employee with unlimited or little supervised access to the airside area so as to convey the device to the skyjacker. The analyst must speculate whether such collaboration offers a viable opportunity or method of passing the security checkpoints in such a way as to evade detection, for example, hiding or disguising the weapon. Having thus considered all the reasonable possibilities, it has to be pondered what needs to be done to take the extra precautions necessary to close the available loopholes in the security arrangements in place? The same speculative methodology, with suitable variations can be used for any other similar apprehended breach of security requiring supplementation so as to frustrate the wrongdoer's purpose. We are not struggling against the forces of nature or space aliens here. Our speculations are focused upon buman minds not very different from our own that might go about finding solutions to these problems. There is plenty of experiential material available for useful "scientific" study here. Those assigned to serve and protect must learn to think like the adversary. Whenever life and property are at risk those assigned to protecting them must engage in similar introspection if they are to do their job effectively. Any philosophy of security that downplays or ignores this is clearly lacking. Excellence pays off in this realm as in any other. The superior security officer, at any level, is one who takes his or her job very seriously. Private security, as a discipline, demands much study for success. Our recommendation? Read, read, and read, 105

SERVICE. THE OTHER PILLAR OF THE CONCEPT, TO SERVE AND PROTECT

We have necessarily spent so much time and effort on the topic of protection for, as we have argued, it is at the heart of any philosophy of private security or indeed that afforded by the proper workings of public policing. It is what serves to give meaning to the profession and the work and standing of those who engage in it. The dissection we have performed is what is necessary to distinguish private security in its functions from those that pertain strictly to the realms of public law enforcement. Some equally necessary attention must also now be rendered to what is meant by the other equally vital component of To Serve and Protect, namely the idea of what is comprehended by service. Service is a much maligned topic. How it is regarded is often developed from personal experience, a perspective depending on whether you are on the giving or receiving end. This is particularly the case when you are trying to accord a status to those Who Only Stand and Waite (pace John Milton). For some, service is one of the highest, noblest attainments of mankind. It represents a sort of altruism, of selflessness. Any philosophy of private security should lay special emphasis on the honorable aspects of service. How you are perceived by others is very important for the general public perception of private security as a whole. Often, the lowest ranking security officer is the first person in attendance upon the visit—or, whatever his or her purpose may be. The impression left by the first contact has a considerable influence upon the way those who have engaged the services of the security officer are perceived; the way the servant behaves toward you reflects upon the master. 106 This is especially significant in the case of proprietary private security. The security officer is literally the face of those he or she has been selected and engaged to protect. It is not too strong that, especially in the case of the proprietary security officer, the impression left by an unfavorable encounter with that person, "the sharp end," in another form again, is bad for business and very hard to correct. It is definitely the case here that prevention is better than cure for, as the Head and Shoulders commercial has it, you have only *one* chance to make a good *first* impression. None of this comes along naturally with the uniform. It must be carefully nurtured through training and supervision. Manners, it is said, maketh the man; after comportment, the first thing a visitor notices about a security officer, on duty, is attitude, responsiveness. Are you aware of how you present yourself to others? Remember: the bad guys (and gals) may have you under surveillance so as to exploit your weakness.

A good security officer, whatever his or her assignment and at whatever level he or she serves, needs to develop and control a properly suspicious mind. It is, in many ways, his or her most important *defensive weapon*. It alerts the officer, in timely fashion to danger and readies the faculties that must be called into action to meet the challenge presented. Suspicion, in action, must be properly tempered with caution and civility. It is the failure to achieve the appropriate blend that is so often irritating to others and the cause of friction in the encounter. It is all too easy to allow a little authority to go to one's head. ¹⁰⁷ Even a small dose of power can be intoxicating, especially for those to whom its exercise in their ordinary lives is an unaccustomed, unfamiliar activity. The unfortunate consequences are exacerbated when the person offended by this exhibition is provoked to react in kind. ¹⁰⁸ This calls

for a great deal of tactful self-control, which does not come naturally; these tendencies need careful monitoring and gentle correction where necessary. Once more, "the sharp end;" it is generally the security officer at the lowest level, thus the one having the most frequent—and varied—contact with the public who may be in most need of the proper corrective influences. When we advocate the encouragement and exercise of a proper sense of suspicion on the part of those exercising security functions, we are far from promoting the kind of mind bordering on paranoia, where threats are perceived subjectively that would give little concern to one with a more balanced view of life. A properly attuned sense of suspicion translates into a heightened sense of vigilance that ought not to be too readily apparent to the person under scrutiny. All this contributes to the formation of the "right" qualities in those exercising these truly vital functions at "the sharp end." The good security officer is constantly observing others, their conduct and comportment for suspicious signs (thanks, Israel!); unusual, inappropriate behavior; nervousness; unusual gestures; shifty demeanor; any conduct out of the ordinary given the context of the situation, especially anything difficult to explain; any comparisons, particularly any covert communication with others. Sometimes, unusual, bizarre behavior is deliberately designed to distract the attention of the security officer from some other, or others. Noticing these things is very important. Using one's skills and experience to give them their proper meaning is necessary to complete the picture. The good security officer should always think of him or herself as the final barrier between the adversary and the objective threatened. No reasonable suspicion should ever be allowed to pass unresolved.

Every security officer has something to contribute towards the image of the service as a whole. Bad behavior is corrosive and contagious; it is also highly provocative and invites escalation on the part of those exposed to it. The offended member of the public may feel and exhibit a good deal of righteous anger on account of a bad experience with a security officer, but he or she is not necessarily representative of others, who might thereby be tainted by the unpleasantness of the encounter. By way of contrast, each and every security officer acts as an example for the profession as a whole. This is all part of that pervasive ratcatcher syllogism; you are, unfortunately, all too prone to be judged by the example of the worst of your kind. Yet, service is a very personal obligation; you are being paid to offer the best service possible under the circumstances. It is not something discretionary on your part. It is a duty owed to those you are paid to represent as well as an expectation on the part of the public. If you do not have a proper sense of this, private security is not a career for you however good you might fancy yourself at the "protection" side of things. It may usefully be asked whether private security can ever rid itself of the unpleasant taint, some would say the unjustified effects, of these comparisons with the ratcatcher syllogism, for example, it's a rotten job and someone has to do it, but we can never

bring ourselves to think highly of those who do. Perhaps the worst insult that can be leveled at an aspirant to political office is, "I wouldn't even vote for you as ratcatcher!" From the day of its inception, ASET (Academy of Security Educators and Trainers) has pursued, arduously, the objective of professionalizing private security 109 after such a fashion that those who serve in this business might by their efforts earn a true appreciation and respect for what they do rather than that element of fear and distaste that, unhappily in so many instances is attendant upon them. The instruction in the Certified Security Trainer (CST) course, though the underlying philosophy was not spelled out at great length, has always been designed to promote and solidify these objectives. A subtle appeal has even been made to the student's own psyche. At the interview (an important, integral component of the program), the student is gently pressed to articulate his or her own feelings about the job of private security; how they perceive it; what it means to them; what they hope to get out of it and the course of instruction to which they have been subjected. They are being asked, in effect, much the same kind of questions that might be posed to an interested individual involved with private security. A great deal is learned in this process by the instructors themselves engaged in it. Consequently, each interview proceeds differently, informed by what has been learned from those who have gone before. The process has unfortunately, not been memorialized in any useful, permanent form. It simply remains, hopefully, in the minds of those who have gone through the program over the years. It would be the greatest of pities, from a philosophical standpoint, if this were lost in the fullness of time and this opportunity to recall it has been taken with that consideration in mind. Great credit is also due ASIS (American Society for Industrial Security for its efforts to professionalize private security through its arduous educational programs and its publications. Its premier credential, the Certified Protection Professional (CPP) has achieved widespread approval and acceptance.

A BRIEF CONSUMER ORIENTATION

Some things are necessary, costly and not, for the most part, like national defense expenditures, great objects of affection. As with death and taxes, private security is a fixture as long as our notions of life, liberty, property and the need for their protection exist. Common sense alone tells us that there will always be a real gap between the protective coverage that can feasibly be provided by public law enforcement and what must otherwise remain at risk. If *you* cannot protect what is yours, you must pay others to do it for you—if you can and are willing, and if you feel it is worth the expense. You ignore the risks at your peril. Sometimes you owe a duty to others to protect them from the harm the use of *your* property might occasion, for example, compulsory car insurance. It is inevitable, given our socioeconomic system that some will benefit more than others; they simply have more at risk

than others and must pay accordingly. You don't like it? So, grumble. You are stuck with it. Vilification of those who do the work is not merely unkind and unwarranted in the main. It serves no useful purpose, even as a stress reliever. We would argue, cogently, that society is better off overall for the efforts of private security than without them. We would go as far as to say that if private security were unnecessary, it wouldn't exist. It fills a vacuum in modern society for which it is hard to envisage a more acceptable alternative. Those who must actually bear the burden, the expenses occasioned, need to know how to get the best deal, namely the highest levels of service and protection, the real value for the necessary expenditure, whether they can pass it on to others or not. If you purchase the product or the services of a business *you* help to pay for the CEOs bodyguards.¹¹⁰

What even the most exacting of philosophical exercises does little to elucidate is the distinction, in practical terms, that might assist a keen consumer of private security services in making the choice between the proprietary route and its counterparts usually described under the rubric of contract services. This is an important, primary election for the consumer of private security, especially in difficult economic times. There is more involved here than money, simple cost-cutting measures. You are either buying needed services or wasting time and money to no good effect. The thoughtful consumer should be looking for real value, especially with regard to service, the guiding principle. Private security cannot usefully be purchased off the peg; it will almost always need some kind of adaptation to fit particular needs. Which of the available alternatives is the best suited to meet the assumed needs in each case? This can only be usefully determined by a prior, independent, expert evaluation. 111 Many consumers buy much that, objectively, they do not need, while others, thoughtlessly, divest themselves of much that they ought not, sensibly, to dispense with in such cavalier fashion. Only when tragedy strikes is the foolishness revealed in all its stark reality. Business entities in difficulties are all too prone to treat security as a frangible disposable to be eliminated altogether, or to be exchanged for appearances sake for something merely cosmetic. Bankruptcy judges please note. 112 They are all too easily fooled by those who know the tricks of the trade. A proprietary service, with its entire manifest, seeming advantages is a long-term commitment. Only the most stable and prospectively affluent businesses can confidently look that far down the road. The ideal situation, value-wise, is perhaps a blend comprising a very lean proprietary security department headed by an experienced, dedicated, up-to-date director, confident in his or her own abilities and sensitive to their limitations, professionally and budget wise, and consequently, able to secure appropriate contractual assistance, if and when needed. Contract security varies widely, value-wise and needs the most careful appraisal for the purposes for which it is obtained: Can it be relied upon to do the job? Does it have the resources it claims to command, especially trained reliable personnel? This is a business with traditionally high

rates of turnover. 113 Without contracts long-term, it cannot keep personnel on the books and available at a moment's notice. A key question for any potential purchaser of services is: What is your client retention rate? Don't let the numbers fool you! Every age brings its changes. Even businesses that have been around for a long time cannot afford to rest on their laurels. In selecting contract security an exacting degree of due diligence is required. Nothing should be taken for granted. Beware of the glib responses of the branch manager who tells you in response to questions about hiring criteria, "We all fish in the same pool—but our catch is better!" Reply? "So what bait are you using?" If possible, inspect all claims in action. A company unwilling to allow you, in all confidence to do this, generally has something to hide. But you have to know that for which you are looking.

You are really looking for the private security contractor who will best serve your needs. You must be the best judge of what they are in order to match the service required to them. For the profession of private security, service isn't everything: it is the ONLY thing. The notion of service does not merely permeate the philosophy of private security: It is its very essence. Those evaluating security services need to put aside all false prejudices, especially those generated by the comparisons we have suggested with the ratcatcher syllogism. The impression left on those who have had a bad encounter with a low-level security officer is indelible. It runs something like this: "What a terrible person, how can he or she treat people like that? Only a power-hungry person would want a job like that." Thus, the job defines the person and that individual who may be quite unrepresentative of his or her class in every respect creates a view of the profession as a whole in that unfavorable light. This is the source of much unfortunate distortion, for it is very contagious. Service is inevitably bound up with status. Service is comprised of duties, whether for compensation or not, owed by one party to another, or others. How you see yourself in relation to these matters has a considerable influence on the kind of service you can be expected to render. 114 Service involves the rendering of aid or assistance to those in need of or in search of same. It is all too easy, given what is required, to think of those who serve, in some capacity or another as inferior, lower down the social scale from those entitled in some sense to what is thought of as "service": "Watch how you speak to me, I'm paying your wages!" In the present context, how easy was it for you to see the branch manager? How were you received? Were you quickly shunted off to some account manager, or did you get the full attention you felt entitled to receive as a prospective customer?

This infects even those who render service voluntarily without thought of recompense of any kind. This kind of attitude, almost inbred, can give rise to a host of misunderstandings and altercations, all bad for the business at hand. There is a tendency for he or she who is served to acquire, often enough a feeling of privilege, of superiority for the moment over those doing the serving. Again, in the present context, beware of the distortion factor. There is something real but irrational about this. By way of analogy, sometimes we are motorists and sometimes pedestrians. With whom do we identify? These feelings can color, generally, what we feel about those who serve and those who are served. From day to day we live in a service economy. This is an inescapable fact of modern life. Sometimes we are on one side of the counter and sometimes on the other. So is payment for what you feel entitled to receive the defining factor in this status issue, even perceptually? So he or she who pays at the cash register for his or her burger is somehow transformed into what we might term a "higher standing" from the one who flips it? Clearly, we are for the sake of the principle concentrating upon the pawns here, but such simplistic ideas can, at times, be grossly misleading. Many New York City doormen render excellent, if at times, menial service, yet they may well be, in fact, as rich as Croesus. By what they do, they clearly serve, and consequently, may all be regarded by their less affluent tenants thereby as "inferiors"; "I couldn't do that sort of thing for a living." (Yet woe betides him or her who is forgetful or tardy at Yuletide!). Service, does, however, also demand a certain disposition on the part of those who serve towards those who are served and this is never more so than in the labor entailed by private security. Success at all levels requires it be seen as a vocation, something in life especially worthwhile; it should never be felt to be demeaning unless you make it so.

There are those who can give service so graciously that those in receipt of it feel truly honored by the experience. And there are those who can acknowledge it with such kindly assurance as to make those who render it feel suitably rewarded. In a true democracy (as Professor Bernard Lewis reminds us, that word can bear a host of different meanings) the highest honor attaches to those chosen to serve in the governance of their nation. It is an honor sought by many but attained by few. Nevertheless, there remain those for whom the very notion of service is anathema. It is respectfully suggested here that those in whom, for whatever reason, such resentments are ingrained, should not consider any position in private security or law enforcement generally. Such are to be found in the ranks of those who, Dogbert-like (thank you, Scott Adams) take the position that it is not power unless you abuse it. A proper, respectful philosophy of private security should, rather, adhere to the view that it is not legitimate power if you have to abuse it. Abuse can take many forms, but the sad misfortunes of Penn State should serve as a warning to all. 115 Any philosophy of private security is obligated to stress the worthy aspects of service. Training, before and on the job, should instill a real sense of pride in those whose labors focus upon helping people feel safe and secure as they go about their business or during their hours of leisure. Try explaining the concept of To Serve and Protect without this element in the fullest sense of its meaning. We may

on occasion have the privilege and luxury of serving ourselves, but life is not a buffet. We should never forget those behind the scenes who, by *their* efforts make this possible.

CONCLUSION

So ... what does this lengthy disquisition say to the veracity or otherwise of the indictment contained in the much cited Household headnote with which we began? Do you have to do, or be what is implied by the derogatory word "bastard" to be able to perform recognizably well as a senior security administrator with minions serving under you reflecting your formidable ethos? Remember, we are not speaking here of the likes of Lavrenti Beria, Reinhard Heydrich, or Quday Hussein, but rather, that familiar guy whose office is a few doors down the corridor from your own. While clearly not a term of affection or even sneaking admiration, is it to be worn with pride as a badge of respect denoting a job well done, or eschewed as a foolish slur derived from mistaken premises? Those who delight in obeying the law and avoiding harassment and molestation of others by the undesirable conduct presaged by J. S. Mill have nothing to fear from the work of their colleagues in security. Indeed, the very reverse is the truth; a calm uneventful working life is of benefit to all. Cooperation in law enforcement is always, in the long run, more productive than adversarial engagement. Chiefs of security need the whole-hearted collaboration of their colleagues at all levels to develop and maintain an environment free from the stresses of incipient wrongful behavior from outside or within. To take but one relevant, poignant example, workplace violence¹¹⁶ protagonized by an employee or former employee who feels mortally wronged in some fashion. Cooperation among Human Resources, the line manager, the security department is more likely to avert tragedy than hostile power plays among these parties. As we have seen, private security owes its existence to attempts to bridge the gap between overly extended law enforcement and the realities of the situation when some interest is put at risk. Similarly, those who would disturb the peace within must not be allowed to exploit the fissures that open up in any organization when others, who should know better, seek to shut out the security department from its proper functions. This is as foolish as the abused spouse siding with her abuser against the well-meaning endeavors of law enforcement to protect her, on the grounds that "I can handle it. I'm the only one who really can." The facts, of course, show the case to be quite different, but in all these issues we are dealing with human beings and all their foibles for which we must make much allowance.

This is not a sentimental plea for a kinder, gentler chief of security. It is, rather, that great power calls for the exercise of a commensurate degree of wisdom and restraint. It is easy enough to slip over into real tyranny,

wholly unacceptable to our culture. It is possible to study and understand the implications of the ratcatcher syllogism without having to ignore it for fear of contagion. According to Vladimir Ilych Lenin, "It is the business of the terrorist to terrorize." It is no part of the security administrator's function in our society to emulate the management style of the terrorist against his or her own staff or others who may be affected by the exercise of his or her authority. Tyranny should play no part in the running of a good security business. Leave that aspect of management to the secret police of Turkmenistan or Belarus. As long as it's only The Donald¹¹⁷ demanding to inspect your birth certificate you have really only the job to worry about!

A BRIEF PERSONAL POSTSCRIPT ON SERVICE

After eight odd years with the Colours (and four with the Reserve), the author entered H.M. Civil Service by examination at the Executive level. He ascended to a unique post with the UK equivalent of the IRS. He served the Chief Inspector of Taxes, Claims Branch, (Advisory Division), assisting inspectors of taxes around the nation on legal issues relative to certain dispositions designed to avoid tax consequences. Every letter sent to a taxpayer was signed, "I am, Sir (or Madam), your humble and obedient servant."

After leaving H.M. Civil Service, the author taught at the university level for some fifty odd years on three continents. He retired, after 27 years with the University of Texas at Dallas, in 2011. He remains active as president of Nuevevidas International, Inc., Dallas, Texas. He continues to serve as a sworn detective with the City of Gretna Police Department, Louisiana, and dedicates this article to his great colleagues at all levels, who serve and protect others for a living.

NOTES

Notes about Notes

The notes have been kept to a minimum necessary to display connections intended by the author that might otherwise escape notice. Brooks McClure, formerly of the U.S. Department of State and IMAR, once opined that this author's notes were often more informative and entertaining than his text. The original intent of foot/end notes is to establish the authenticity of the sources consulted and thus attest to the scholarship of the work. This is no longer essential; it's all up there in The Cloud! The great Samuel Johnson wrote that notes are often necessary but they are necessary evils (Introduction to Shakespeare). As an instructor, the author has always advised his

students never to cite works they have not read just to convey pretensions of scholarship.

- 1. Dance of the Dwarves, Boston, MA: Little Brown, 1968, p. 33. Cited "Thoughts on the Hiring (And Firing) of Security Directors," H. H. A. Cooper and Brook E. Penn, Journal of Security Education, Vol. 3, No. 3–4, 2008, pp. 297–323 at p. 320. Yes, dear, diligent readers, you have, indeed, seen this citation, in this very Journal. Had your research extended further, you would also have discovered it aptly cited in Catching Spies, H. H. A. Cooper and Lawrence J. Redlinger, New York, NY: Bantam Books, 1990, pp. 1–33, in a different yet still appropriate context. Sir Terry Pratchett, The Last Continent, London, England: Corgi Books, 1999, p. 127, "All bastards are bastards, but some bastards is bastards." We are sure Nicole Kidman, would have appreciated the subtle, cultural emphasis.
- 2. Philosophy is another of those plastic words that lends itself to promiscuous employment in a variety of contexts. Its employment here is encapsulated in a quote from an excellent *New Yorker* article "We are alive," by David Remnick on Bruce Springsteen, July 30, 2012, pp. 38–57 at p. 49:

He [Jon] Landau, got a call from Springsteen. We talked for hours about music, about philosophy. The core of him then was the same as it is now. And, you know, we've been having that conversation for the rest of our lives; about growth, about thinking big thoughts, about big things.

Certainly, this exchange was to have a big impact on both their lives. See, too, "France's Prophet Provocateur [B-HL], Joan Juliet Buck, *Vanity Fair*, January 2008, pp. 86 et seq., at p. 91." Philippe Sellers, "Can a philosopher have a direct effect on events? He can if he's Bernard Henri." Of course, even the most modest talent can shine like the Dog Star if you are obscenely wealthy, are married to a beautiful, talented celebrity and have a powerful politician as a mentor. I am indebted to an excellent former student, Samuel Wilkison III, for a delightful Descartes story. The distinguished, French philosopher (Cogito, ergo sum) called into a bar on his way home. He ordered a white wine. Seeing he had finished it, the barman called out to him to see if he would like another. "I think not," said Descartes. And disappeared forthwith.

- 3. "Security is not a subject that lends itself to introductory writings," *Target Terrorism*, Providing Protective Services, Richard W. Kobetz, and H. H. A. Cooper, International Association of Chiefs of Police, Gaithersburg, MD, 1978, p. 22. Indeed, the best book I have encountered is in Spanish, La Seguridad Moderna, Guia Completa Para el Oficial, Supervisor o Gerente de Seguridad, Candido Neris Mulero, Drupa Editores, Medellin, Columbia, 1996. This is a fine exposition of the philosophy of private security in Puerto Rico, which has much wider application.
- 4. Medieval, feudal society had much of the "Warlord" basis about it until the rise and supremacy of the nation state and the assumption of the responsibility for security internal and external by central government.
- 5. That this process is very far from complete can be seen from the example of Libya following the overthrow of the Gaddafi regime before any sensible alternative could be put in place.
- 6. This unfortunate situation in Afghanistan is being obscured by the unwillingness of the big powers to face up to the situation their well-intentioned meddling has helped create. Only a powerful, central authority can permit the growth of private, subordinate security services.
- 7. Uncontrolled by war and like circumstances, this struggle is all about power, who shall gain it, who shall exercise it. The demise of the Cold War did nothing to produce a resolution of the matter, which is really at the heart of the current Eurozone problems.
- 8. By a legal fiction, time immemorial for the purposes of the common law is expressed as the year 1089. The true philosophy of security as examined here "the thinking of big thoughts about big things" goes back a very great deal farther than that, at least to Sumer (the Biblical Shinar). Much of the Old Testament is permeated with such ideas of rights and duties, social harmony. From but a slightly later age, see the wonderful *Code of Hammurabi*, http://www.wsu.edu/~dee/MESO/CODE.HTM. Hammurabi, The exalted prince was elevated to bring about the rule of righteousness in the land, with the beautifully enunciated Philosophy in its Prologue, "so that the strong should not harm the weak." For all his power to guarantee the security of the inhabitants in their homes," the great King acknowledged his indebtedness to the Divine. [L.W. King translation, 1910].
- 9. Morris West, perhaps, articulated it better than anyone. He wrote: "Every city needs a ratcatcher to go down the sewers, but none of the citizens will invite him to dinner." *Proteus*, New York,

NY: William Morrow, 1979, p. 263. Even with a change of clothes! This article, on other evidence, accepts the premise. It merely seeks to explain it and relate it to those, equally needed, yet are just not the sort you invite to dinner, There is more than simple prejudice at work here, there is a real yet irrational fear of contamination. The late Christopher Hitchens, who could by all accounts be quite obnoxious at times, does not seem to have suffered from the ratcatcher syllogism; at least, he seems to have been a popular enough dinner guest. He was a great admirer of George Orwell (Eric Blair). He writes, in reference to Orwell's WW II service with the UK Ministry of Information:

One has to use a certain amount of decoding to identify literary transitions like this as they move from Orwell's private to his public writing, whereas other sources of inspiration and provocation are more blunt and obvious. In 1939 he takes a 'Miscellaneous' diary note from the agricultural journal <u>Smallholder</u>. 'Rat population of G. Britain estimated at 4–5 million.' Who knows in what part of his cortex he stored away <u>that</u> random finding against the day when it would help form one of the most arresting images of terror in all of his fiction.

The Importance of Being Orwell, *Vanity Fair*, August, 2012, pp. 66-69 at p. 69. A great friend of Hitchens, Salman Rushdie, who has just published a "must read" personal account of arresting interest to all concerned with protecting high risk targets from assassination, excerpted a portion titled *The Disappeared* for *The New Yorker*, September 17, 2012, pp. 50–65. Rushdie writes: "The worst thing in the world is different for every individual. For Winston Smith, in Orwell's '1984,' it was rats"

- 10. Even the best of robots has to have a human handler, somewhere. The robot is really little more than a remote, activated shield protecting its human master from potentially harmful contact with the device to be neutralized or disarmed.
- 11. A *New Yorker* cartoon, August 27, 2012, p. 71 captures this with an evocative drawing and a three word caption. An enthusiastic young cavewoman is introducing a somewhat unprepossessing young man to her "family," "Kip paints caves." Certain skills have been around since "time immemorial." "Most people define themselves in large part by their work. I am a shoemaker, I am a gardener, I am a writer, I am an engineer, I am a lawyer," David Burnham, The Rise of the Computer State, New York, NY: Random House, 1953, p. 222.
- 12. The "new" social media certainly lends itself to dangerous levels of deception. It can, of course, only go so far. Doctored images and highly exaggerated bios eventually come up against the hard facts of reality as many sexual predators caught by law enforcement "stings" have learned to their cost.
- 13. See, for example, the Proceedings of the 27th ASET Annual International Round Table Conference, "Thoughts on the Hiring (and Firing) of Security Directors, H. H. A. Cooper and Brooke E. Penn, *Journal of Security Education*, Vol. 3, No. 3–4, 2008 pp. 297–323, at pp. 299–300.
 - 14. Ibid. This author was President of ASET at that time.
- 15. What is called "pure Science" is characterized by its rigorous methodology. It is that adaptation and application of what is discovered by these means that, as in the case of security, give it relevance in solving the problems of real life. Computer programming offers the perfect example of what is meant here.
- 16. For an interesting slant on this, see "Words on Trial," Jack Hitt, *The New Yorker*, July 23, 2012, pp. 24–29 at p. 27. "Like all linguists, [Rob] Leonard starts from the position that meaning is delicately contingent and that the most common way we compensate for this frailty is redundancy. We say the same thing more than once, or in more than one way."
- 17. In the teaching of legal subjects, academically, the science of law tends to be bound up with its underpinning philosophy. This is somewhat obscured where the subject is treated of as legal theory or, in the UK, as Jurisprudence. Strictly speaking, what is brought into these necessary studies is a good deal of received learning from other, discrete disciplines. This is especially the case with respect to meaning. See Lies!Lies!Lies, *The Psychology of Deceit*, Charles V. Ford, Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Press (1996), especially Chapter 9 on memory. False memories, false accusations, and false confessions all have in common the alteration of objective reality. This is very important for the evaluation of evidence.
- 18. Whether we are talking about terrorism or health care, there is always a paymaster. We are constantly reminded, at every turn, "there is no free lunch." There is nothing inherently demeaning in getting paid for what you do; even the President of the United States receives a salary for his (or her [?]) labors. Business merely determines how you expect to be paid.

- 19. Business, as the term is employed here is essentially a matter of organization of transactions, of the provision of goods and services desired by one party in exchange for an agreed value placed upon them by the provider. It is in the nature of what passes from one to the other that the real appreciation of the transaction is founded. To be able to conduct a business in law or medicine takes many years of study and practice as well as capital investment. It is no less a business for all that. "Bezos is a businessman, but, like the founders of Google and Facebook he frames his business as a force for social good," Popes Trail, Ken Auletta, *The New Yorker*, June 25, 2012, pp. 36–41 at p. 38.
- 20. People may, in a broad sense, be said to be respected less for who or what they are than how difficult, expensive, worthy is that which they do. With no disrespect, how difficult is it for a relatively fit person to bag groceries in a supermarket? You don't need four years of college education to do that kind of a job. What we tend to respect, in terms of status, is the cost of the endeavor to acquire the recognition of the capability to do particular kinds of work. Someone, somewhere certifies you, and as a result, you enjoy an enhanced status, you are defined (a) by what you do, and (b) individually, by how well you do it. A cautionary tale, here. A distinguished professor of criminology (her books have gone into double digits in their editions) lived in a very upscale community, but being a somewhat private person, she was not widely known for such by those among whom she lived. One day she received a misdirected item by mail courtesy of USPS. She was wearing an unprepossessing garb, but without thinking and with the very best of intentions she hastened to take the package to its proper intended destination. At the front door of the premises to which she had gone to deliver the item, this person of considerable status was greeted by a "common" maid servant, who ordered her rudely to the rear entrance. Respect, like beauty is often in the eye of the beholder!
- 21. Whether we are talking Walsingham, Talleyrand, Thurloe, Trepper or a host of others, all are distinguished, and appreciated for the quality of their product. Institutions per se do not deliver unique, usable intelligence for decision-makers. The product is the work of singularly gifted (and devoted) human beings. Israeli politicians have long employed their own, private Mossad. Sometimes, as with medical conditions, you just feel it advisable to seek a second opinion.
- 22. Americans hold curious, but in the main, sustainable beliefs about the efficiency of private enterprise versus that which is run by government. Curious, because the whole edifice rests upon what one believes offers the greatest incentives to those engaged in the endeavor. Some institutions cannot, sensibly, be privatized, while others can and should be; USPS offers a prime example. Aviation security was not noticeably improved by being taken over at U.S. airports by a Federal government service. The objectives could by different methods have been more efficiently attained and in less costly fashion. But could you, sensibly, envisage a private IRS—yes, you_Mr. Paul? Corruption can affect any government service, given certain conditions, for example, Prohibition. You don't need to see Lawless to fathom why.
- 23. See, on this, the fascinating account by Nick Paumgarten, "The World of Surveillance: Here's Looking at You," *The New Yorker*, May 14, 2012, pp. 40–59. Another cute *New Yorker* cartoon shows two kids by a park lake; one is controlling a model yacht electronically and looking with shocked amazement at the other, controlling an overflying, huge drone, September 10, 2012, p. 84. You can't beat that for topicality.
- 24. An interesting security versus privacy issue arose out of the Monica Lewinsky–Bill Clinton "affair," the full implications of which have never been resolved or even explored in satisfactory depth. See, "... even Presidents have private lives," H. H. A. (Tony) Cooper, *Intersec*, Vol. 8, Issue 7, September 1998, pp. 354–355.
- 25. The unalienable rights emphatically spelled out in the Second Paragraph of the United States of America Declaration of Independence, July 4, 1776.
- 26. Technological applications of science are making it ever easier to steal information, some of it of great consequence for the regular workings of modern society. As in all forms of warfare, there is a constant struggle to devise more powerful and efficient weapons and the construction and emplacement of defensive devices to secure from harm that which is at risk. This would be a much more uneven struggle were it not for the efforts of private security from which even those who are not direct contributors benefit.
- 27. See, on this generally, *Business Intelligence: A Prime*r, H. H. A. Cooper, Executive Protection Institute, Berryville, VA, 1996.
- 28. For many years conventional private security agencies have been far too slow to get into the business of protecting the virtual environment. The "hacking community" was generationally and technologically far ahead. The gap is now closing, but the two cultures are still, on careful appraisal, far apart. Thus the protection of information has developed more as a separate discipline than as a

component of the old-line security industry. This is not healthy and gives distinct advantages to the "bad guys." See, on this "Machine Politics," *The New Yorker*, May 7, 2012, David Kushner, pp. 24–30 regarding the hacking of Sony, and its "thought to have been impregnable defenses."

- 29. This was even the case with some proprietary security departments where security directors often enough lacked the technical expertise of their IT specialist counterparts. This was most pronounced in businesses specializing in, at one time, the arcane area of information technology. A professional made an interesting point in his time. "Crooks, just like people in finance and entertainment, transact their business via phone and Telex. They travel by jet and use computers to do their bookkeeping whereas most cops still have to count on their fingers." <u>Fric-Frac</u>, Albert Spaggiari, Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1979, p. 214. Only a slight change of wording is needed.
- 30. "Any man who has to ask about the upkeep of a yacht can't afford one," attributed to J. P. Morgan. There are many who could not, realistically, afford the expense of even a relatively small yacht who, nevertheless spend a great deal on private security, especially if they can shunt the cost on to someone else, the taxpayer. Security is a deductible, business expense if it is found at law to be necessary.
- 31. The author was responsible for the very carefully calibrated entry in the *Encyclopedia Americana*, Grolier, 1972 at "Self-Defense at Law." At her confirmation hearing, Justice Sotomayor was asked, point blank by Senator Coburn, R. OK, if there was a general right of self-defense. She gave what this author considered a rather unsatisfactory reply, thereby missing an excellent opportunity to confound her interrogator.
- 32. This officer maintains a symbolic presence, riding ahead of the Monarch at Coronation. The office has long been held and exercised by the Dymoke family on ceremonial occasions.
- 33. Much that has found its way into this article is the product of the author's many years of experience conducting evaluations and surveys of private security entities. Client confidentiality prevents the use of more specific identification, but there are still those around who may recognize themselves, and the service in question from the reference given.
- 34. Ostensibly, the NATO powers, though not all are participating, or doing so with particular enthusiasm. Future generations, left to bear the costs may well wonder whether from a security perspective the expense, as incurred, was worthwhile, or even necessary. See previous note 30.
- 35. Hamid Karzai was the puppet Pashtun, hand picked by the United States to serve as president during the long difficult years of the occupation. Corruption flourished under his rule, though it is difficult reviewing the choices to suggest anyone better suited to have served the interests of the United States and its allies.
- 36. It is to be devoutly hoped that the obvious business opportunity afforded by the hoped for 2014 exit will be firmly eschewed by any responsible U.S. private security entity. Rudyard Kipling, who knew that part of the world very well, wrote, "Let us admit it fairly, as a business people should, We have had no end of a lesson; it will do us no end of good." *Rudyard Kipling's Verse*, New York, NY: Doubleday, 1940, p. 297.
- 37. Modern aviation security methods were the brainchild of the Third Reich. On this, see "The Aviation Security Business, U.S. Style," H. H. A. (Tony) Cooper, *INTERSEC*, Vol. 8, Issue 11–12, November–December, 1998, pp. 457–460 at p. 459. The *Hindenburg* disaster, would certainly, after all these years, pay revisiting. It was the classic "inside job," though on whose orders has never been clarified. This author's suspicion falls heavily on Air Marshal Goering, who saw the Zeppelin as a threat to the Luftwaffe.
- 38. In some cases, the reason for this was geography, while in others political factors, having to do with problems in the Islamic world predominated. Athens, Greece became a notorious hot spot. Yet, it is significant, in measuring the threat to note that carriers, including the more vulnerable continued to use these airports.
- 39. This was usually at the insistence of the nation state involved. Both Belgium and the Netherlands may be singled out for mention in this regard. This had, however, little unfavorable impact on the programs introduced by the most concerned carriers.
- 40. On his last trip to this UK airport in 2010, this author found certain security aspects unsatisfactory and was not in the least surprised to find an 11-year-old boy, unaccompanied, and apparently without ticketing or identity documents had evaded Continental-United security and been conveyed to foreign parts. This was clearly a predictable failure of supervision. Moreover, this airport has more than "one" final barrier to overcome. This is very disturbing in terms of lessons not learned. Incidentally, no one encountered by the author, including the airport police, had ever read *INTERSEC*.

- 41. See "Airport Insecurity," *Vanity Fair*, June, 1997, referred to in "The Tale of the Little Grey Suitcase," H. H. A. (Tony) Cooper, *INTERSEC*, Vol. 7, Issue 10, October, 1997, pp. 336–338 at p. 336.
- 42. The very fine American Airlines International Security program, developed, in-house, from a basis of the Israeli ICTS training did, indeed, provide specifically for such enquiry. Unfortunately, following the departure of Robert Crandall, the program was shortsightedly (over the strenuous objections of the director of security) allowed to go into decline, a trend that has never since been reversed.
- 43. In his testimony before the subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States Senate 95th Congress, "The Terrorist and His Victim," July 21, 1977, p. 12, this author made the point: "Terrorism is a clandestine activity. In the preparation stage none of this is revealed." It is, accordingly, up to those engaged, at all levels, in the work of counter terrorism, to seek out in the most effective ways possible, those machinations that have not yet come to fruition.
- 44. For an amusing, revealing account by a professional journalist of just such an encounter, see *Bagbdad Without a Map and Other Misadventures in Arabia*, Tony Horwitz, New York, NY: Dutton, 1991, pp. 212–213. "Anyone who flies the Israeli carrier, El Al, is subjected to interrogation by a corps of fingernail pullers in training, a kind of farm team for Mossad." This is from a friend; heaven knows what someone less kindly disposed might write!
- 45. Or some three and a half trillion dollars if the far from exaggerated estimates of the distinguished economist, Joseph Stiglitz, are preferred.
- 46. The author is aware that he is, here, preaching to the choir. He does not expect to reach the indifferent general public through this Journal. It is the profession, the industry itself that must set about offering its correctives in the PR field.
- 47. See, on this, the charming *The ABCs of Public Relations*, Scriptographic Booklet by Channing L. Bete Co., South Deerfield, MA 01373, 1972–1982: "If you understand <u>yourself</u> better . . . it will help you understand others better," p. 11.
- 48. A classic film about a failed bank robbery, a negotiation, and the denouement, from the late 1970s when the United States was plagued with a number of such occurrences.
- 49. A vocation is a calling, a strong, irresistible almost, impulse to seek and follow out a special career path and to devote one's entire energies and aspirations to that end.
- 50. See, "A Code Explodes," Security, amid intense speculation over its source, the worm that has attacked Iran's nuclear facilities raises fears that we are in a dangerous new era of cyber-warfare, write James Blitz, Joseph Menn, and Daniel Domley, *Financial Times*, October 2–3, 2010, p. 7.
 - 51. See, "Beware of the Dogs," Burkhard Bilger, The New Yorker, February 27, 2012, pp. 47–57.
- 52. In the days and weeks following 9/11, a number of U.S. airports adopted this stratagem, the "final barrier" being the aircraft boarding door. It is difficult to judge how effective a deterrent this might have been, but it was most certainly a major passenger inconvenience.
- 53. The effective heads of departments of security are not uniformly titled. "Director" carries with it a certain prestige that is sometimes deliberately denied the office holder. Manager of security, as a title tells its own story. How people and entities are designated is important. In some states the police entity is called, simply, State Police, in others it is the Department of Public Safety, while in others the same functions are vested in the Highway Patrol. The Chief of Police of one department may well be the Superintendent or Commissioner of another.
- 54. "Getting pleasure from the fear of others is something most of us cannot relate to," *The Gift of Fear*, Gavin De Becker, Boston, MA, Little Brown, 1997, p. 81. A good friend served as director of security for a major North American bank during a very trying time. He was A VP and did sterling work on behalf of his colleagues at all levels. Yet, when he attended management meetings, his arrival was invariably greeted, *sotto voce* with, "Watch out, here comes the <u>Gestapo</u>." The efforts of the *Gestapo* saved many of those self-same executives from being kidnapped.
- 55. There is a divergence of opinions on the derivation of COP as referring to a police officer. For some it is thought to have derived from Chief of Police while others assert its provenance as Constable on Patrol. Others see a relationship, somewhat more removed, with the expression to cop a plea and its variants.
- 56. Before 9/11, this frequent traveler always carried a Damascus bladed knife that he employed during long hours aboard various aircraft doing surgery on many magazines and newspapers he would collect *en route*. His classes benefited from these exertions. Tearing out the materials with the bare hands and trimming them later did not give quite the same satisfaction.
- 57. Safety razors and nail clippers were among the items so often rudely seized (and purloined). These searches and seizures did little to enhance the image of private security for those exposed to them.

Most passengers were soon resigned to the indignities rather than risk missing their flights. Yet, for all this, dangerous items still got on board aircraft. First class passengers, that is, those closest to the cockpit were usually still served with metallic tableware even at the height of the 9/11 crisis.

- 58. Many years ago, this author, already deeply engaged in the "new" security problems posed by terrorism, frequently traveled the air ways, accompanied by his cat, Farley (until that feline went off to live at North Mountain Pines—there's a name to conjure up security memories for some). The author, being too "chintzy" to purchase a regular cat carrier, always availed himself of that furnished by the carrier. On the occasion to which this tale is germane, he (with his burden) was greeted by a charming, elderly lady screener who politely asked to be allowed to examine the package. She opened the box and faced down this rather fearsome feline, who was accustomed to being mistaken for Morris, of the then popular commercial. "May I move him to one side?" she enquired. She then repeated the maneuver. In an almost confidential whisper, she said, "I have to do this to make sure there isn't a weapon in there, he is lying on." I said to her, "You take your job very seriously, so permit me to show you something that may help you in the future." I removed Farley (who probably thought that was a very short flight!) and showed her the false bottom of the box (hygiene!) and demonstrated how easily a large handgun might have been concealed there. Make of this what you will, it is of universal application.
- 59. This author was always punctilious about placing his knife in the receptacle provided. Sometimes its manifest quality evoked admiring comment on the part of the screener, but there was never an inquiry as to the purpose of this sharp instrument being carried on board. The purpose (see note 56), was hardly so obvious that enquiry would have been otiose.
- 60. This focus was brought about, in the main, as a result of the downing of Pan Am 103, The Maid of the Seas. That disaster was simply a wake-up call and as the disaster was of the *Hindenburg* variety (see note 37), this redirection would not have caught the offending artifact. On Pan Am 103, see *Terrorism and Espionage in the Middle East. Deception, Displacement and Denial*, H. H. A. Cooper and Lawrence J. Redlinger, Lewiston, NY: The Edwin Mellen Press, 2005, p. 773, and pp. 479–597. See, too, "The Unasked Questions about Pan Am 103," H. H. A. Cooper, Vol. 5, *Tactical Response*, No. 2 Spring–Summer 1993, pp. 19–38.
- 61. See, on this *A Short Typology of Skyjackers*, H. H. A. Cooper, Gaithersburg, MD; International Association of Chiefs of Police, 1981, at p. 5 Dynamics: The Why of Skyjacking, "Thus aircraft are seized, in the air or on the ground ... (IV) for use as a missile." Active countermeasures were initiated by Israel as early as 1973, when a Libyan aircraft suspected of being used as a missile was shot down, as a precaution, over the Sinai. In 1974, also a scheme titled *Operation Pandora's Box* was hatched by a failed U.S. businessman, who had conceived a singular hatred for Richard M. Nixon. He seized an aircraft on the ground at BWI after killing an airport police office and wounding the copilot. He intended to crash the aircraft on the White House. See, *Murderpedia.org* and various other sources.
- 62. See, *Perfect Soldiers, the 9/11 Hijackers, Who They Were, Why They Did It,* Terry McDermott, New York, NY: Harper Collins, 2005.
- 63. Perhaps the most valuable account is by that versatile, talented scholar, Judge Richard A. Posner, *Preventing Surprise Attacks: Intelligence Reform in the Wake of 9/11*, New York, NY: Rowman and Littlefield, Inc., 2005.
- 64. The excellent, groundbreaking (for an American carrier) security program was initiated by Robert Crandall, when American Airlines began to expand internationally. Directed by Homer Boynton and managed by David Divan, the program was very expensive and was essentially restricted to international routes, for largely logistical reasons. This weakness was observed and exploited by those who conceived the 9/11 plot. It is for this reason that domestic, long-haul flights were targeted rather than the international with their more stringent security provisions. See, too, H. H. A. (Tony) Cooper, Aviation Security Post 9/11: Perceptions of the Frequent Flyer, *INTERSEC*, Vol. 13, Issue 4, 2003, pp. 132–133 at p. 132:

It is indisputable that aviation security in the USA before 9/11 left much to be desired. The terrible events of that day were not needed to demonstrate or underline the inadequacies; many of them had been pointed out, with anticipation, in the p.s of *INTERSEC*. That some of the deficiencies were taken advantage of by the protagonists of the assault upon the USA is equally obvious. There were gaping holes in the system through which the terrorists marched with impunity.

65. Box cutters, while not of passing rarity, are something of a niche implement. They would hardly spring to mind of security screeners bent on denying weaponry to potential skyjackers. Yet ... compared with nail clippers, or nail trimming scissors, or safety razors ...? What did cause something of

a shock was to find "box cutters" in an apposite reference on the pages of a comparatively recent *New Yorker*. See, "The Vegetarian," letter from Tel Aviv. A notorious spymaster becomes a dissident, David Remnick, *The New Yorker*, September 3, 2012, pp. 22–28 at p. 24. What is set down here needs to be carefully studied in its context. Meir Dagan, until comparatively recently, head of the Mossad, is a widely admired figure for his extraordinary ruthless exploits in defense of his country's national interests, indeed its very survival. Yet, inescapably, he has his detractors. In 2008, the columnist Gideon Levy criticized Channel 2 when it declared Dagan Israel's 'man of the year.' (Our man of the year is a declared killer, Levy wrote. "Whether by box-cutter [emphasis added here] or car bomb, his craft is killing. His killer instincts are our source of pride, the peak of our creativity?)." Of such small, oft unnoticed interjections, are conspiracy theories erected. Dagan, himself, is on record as declaring, "There is no joy in taking lives. Anyone who enjoys it is a psychopath" (p. 24).

- 66. Over the years, the author has become acquainted with a great many law enforcement and private security personnel. He has been able to form impressions of them and their work through direct observation as well as other methods of study. He must confess to having known only one professional ratcatcher after the same fashion. This goes back to the author's boyhood in Oxfordshire, England. Phil Chownes was, in many ways, a character, of a different world, of a different age. He lived, I suppose, on the edge of the law; the bane of Keeper Atwood's life, he made his living mainly by poaching. It was at threshing time that he came into his own with his remarkable talents; as the sheaves came down to ground zero, the rats had no hiding place. Phil could throw a rick peg like a dart and pick off a rat with consummate ease. His skills were a byword. Although the author never had dinner with this ratcatcher par excellence, he was privileged due to Phil's generosity to share his modest bread and cheese and the odd, clandestine sip of beer. So confessedly, the direct evidence of job satisfaction, and hence personally acknowledged status, the author at least has this to set beside the knowledge he has culled on the point from his readings. The midget ratcatcher in Sir Terry Pratchett's Feet of Clay, New York, NY: Corgi Books, 1997 was obsessed with payment for his services down to the last penny. Phil's tally always reflected the same meticulous calculations. Life was so much simpler when wealth could be measured by coinage of such small denominations.
- 67. Gilbert Ryle made the perceptive observation; relevant to the point advanced here that "... the ability to appreciate a performance does not involve the same degree of competence as the ability to execute it." *The Concept of Mind*, Hutchinson of London, 1949–1969, p. 56. Scientific method, and hence, its product is measured by the competence of those who employ it and advance it as replicable by others of similar competence. Thus you might be able to appreciate the competence of the fingerprint examiner yet be unable to emulate his or her performance.
- 68. There are good, bad, and indifferent practitioners to be found in all professions, and indeed, in the whole range of human activity. Forgery does not defeat the scientific process; it serves only to deceive by perverting, falsely, the results. "Why bother going through surgery to change your fingerprints if you can change the fingerprint records in the FBI files?" *The Forger's Spell*, Edward Dolnick, New York, NY: Harper Collins, 2008, p. 73.
- 69. In terms of scientific procedure, in many instances, public law enforcement and private security are mirror images of one another. The putative identification of a criminal by reference to his or her fingerprints rests on the same elucidated scientific principles as the employment of a fingerprint system to permit privileged access to property, namely the belief in the demonstrable uniqueness of an individual's fingerprints.
- 70. "The entry into a profession means the broad acceptance of that profession's major postulates and goals." "Fitness to proceed: A Brief Look at Some Aspects of the Medico-Legal Problem Under the New York Criminal Procedure Law," H. H. A. Cooper, *Nebraska Law Review*, Vol. 52, Fall 1972, No. 1.
- 71. Professional associations, depending upon the authority they are invested with, may establish and implement criteria for accreditation of those seeking to enter the profession and provide for exclusion, by due process of those who have transgressed. It is material, in each case, to enquire how and when and under what conditions such authority is conferred, and by whom. Compare, for example, the process in higher education and the consequential authority to bestow academic degrees.
 - 72. Op.cit supra at note 62, p. 235.
- 73. It is hard to believe that this least charitable of writers might have used this term so generously. The fact that he eventually came to so horrible an end ought not to blind us to the overall trajectory of the career of one who could be so patently unappreciative of the endeavors of Mother Teresa.
- 74. A poignant example is offered by what is reported in "Happy Landing, Mr. Baldwin," Todd S. Purdum, *Vanity Fair*, August, 2012, pp. 74 et seq at p. 76. Purdum was instructed to meet Alec

Baldwin at the stage door of Avery Fisher Hall, and duly attends as arranged. "Baldwin," my host says to a slightly befuddled security guard at the desk. "There should be two tickets for Alec Baldwin." "Alan Baldwin?" the guard inquires, showing no recognition of the man who has in recent years, become all but a New York icon thanks to the priceless Emmy-winning comic performance as the genially egomaniacal network executive Jack Donaghy on NBC's 30 Rock, and who is what's more, the official announcer of the institution we have come to visit, the New York Philharmonic itself." "No, Alec Baldwin," Baldwin says lightly "Alex Baldwin?" That guard can thank himself lucky not to have been dealing with Russell Crowe!

- 75. See, on this, "A Rose by Any Other Name," H. H. A. Cooper, *Journal of Security Education*, Vol. 1, 2005, pp. 15–27 at p. 16.
- 76. The failure to attend to the ethnic aspects of this unfortunate casting only adds insult to injury to those who know the truth of the matter. This distinguished ex-FBI agent and Director of Security for American Airlines and the Dallas Cowboys, despite his dedicated professionalism, was unable to save his principal from her ordained fate.
- 77. We know someone who was a personal protection specialist for the unspeakable Leona Helmsley. Now there's someone who might (on account of taxes alone) have voted for Mitt Romney. We might have accounted this an odd, forgivable aberration, yet he went on to other equally unsympathetic assignments. None of those principals ever came to any harm from their enemies, which might tell something about misplaced loyalties—or whatever.
- 78. Or is this true professionalism? Per contra, consider the case of the late Anastasio Somoza. Begrudging your hard-working bodyguards the few, much needed cups of coffee to ensure their wakefulness and integrity can result in your ending up on the wrong end of a bazooka shell, or whatever. Putting "Former bodyguard to General Somoza" on your resume is rather like MA (Calcutta), failed. *Somoza*, Bernard Diederich, New York, NY: E.P. Dutton, 1981, p. 332.
- 79. On this, generally, see "New Age Communication: Style; Substance; and Possibilities," H. H. A. Cooper and Sarn Freiner, Journal of Applied Security Research, Vol. 5, No. 4, October–December 2010, pp. 438-459. An especially egregious example of the oft-criticized, by this author, of "shoddy" research in this field of study is "The Use of Text Messages Within a Crisis Negotiation: Help or Hindrance," Journal of Police Crisis Negotiations, Vol. 12-1, pp. 1-27, 2012. See note 31, "New Age Communications" cited in full here, which explicitly extolled the pioneering work of Chief Tim Cristol; "Note 31, at pp. 456–457": All due honor and credit must go to Chief Tim Cristol, Fletcher, NC for his splendid pioneering work in this field. See "Negotiating Through Text Messaging," Tactical Response, Vol. 7, No. 3, May-June 2009, pp. 53-64. Like us, Chief Cristol seems, wisely, to have availed himself of the counsel of his youngers and betters regarding the cultural aspects of this phenomenon. Egregious? Shoddy? Too strong? "New Age," like the present article is the work of a scholar who has been training law enforcement in hostage negotiation and crisis since the early 1970s. He does not rate a mention in the Almond/Budden article; Chief Cristol has a one-liner in the biblio. The Journal of Police Crisis Negotiations has carried many articles by this author and is a sister publication of Taylor and Francis. Shoddy? A more diligent researcher might have learned that this author earned a higher degree in law from the University Dr. Almond is said to serve
- 80. Texting, at least temporarily, confers a useful degree of anonymity on those for whom it is important. "No one knows you are a dog when you are on the Internet!" The expert can detect the age (and comfort level) of the texter by studying the contractions employed. Are they current? This is very important in detecting elderly predators. The dinosaurs, that is, those who eschew any contact with computers, ipads, and so forth are rapidly dying out.
- 81. "Encounters with death and danger are only adventures to the survivors." *Masks of the Illuminati*, Robert Anton Wilson, New York, NY: Pocket Books, 1981, p. 195. "Towsik did not like his work. When it was dull he was bored, and when it was exciting he was frightened." *Triple*, Ken Follett, New York, NY: Arbor House, 1974, p. 25.
- 82. On crimes involving the deprivation of liberty generally, see *Kidnapping: How to Avoid it, How to Survive it,* H. H. A. Cooper, Gaithersburg, MD: International Association of Chiefs of Police, 1979. See, also, "Special Report: Kidnapping, A Form of Financing," H. H. A. Cooper, *Security Intelligence Report*, October 17, 1994, pp. 4–5.
- 83. The best contract security companies have excellent proprietary training materials. They constitute a solid working philosophy for those aspiring to serve and protect. Thus APS, The Notebook Lesson Series for APS Security Officers, "Human Relations for Security," Lesson Two, "Seeing ourselves as others see us" is a worthy example. In the first lesson of this series we learned that human relations

can be thought of as dealings between people. "These dealings can be formal and clearly stated like a legal contract, or informal and 'understood.' Every day through appearance, words, and actions, we communicate information to others about what they can expect from us." *American Protective Services, Inc.*, Oakland, CA, 1980. It is rarely necessary for intimates to pursue conversation with anything approaching "scientific" rigor. The allusion is sufficient to provide a satisfactory basis of meaning to sustain the relationship. An excellently drawn and captioned *New Yorker* cartoon by Darbysh expresses this perfectly: two women are conversing. "He thinks I'm a good cook in the same way I think he is good in bed."

- 84. Every action generates a reaction. A hostile approach produces a response in kind. As a security officer, your presence and the way you react to others suggest the exercise of authority. *The Vanguard Handbook for Security Officers* asserts "But you have no right to talk down to people, to insult them or provoke them. Try to be polite but firm, even in the face of verbal abuse. It may be difficult, but that ability is the mark of a professional security officer," p. 10. In 1979, Vanguard joined American Protective Services, Inc. (APS).
- 85. On this see, *The Rich are Different*, Ed Jon Winokur, New York, NY: Pantheon Books, 1996, "They don't pay taxes," pp. 69–76. Accepting the lowest bid is tantamount to lowering standards.
- 86. The provision of personal protection services demands very special qualities of devotion and integrity. Many in the fields of sports and entertainment select those for their "body-guarding" positions on the basis of friendship rather than professional skills. See, for example, "Limited Release–a Former Gang Leader's New Life in Movies," Tad Friend, *The New Yorker*, September 3, 2012, pp. 32–37. FSU provided security for many of Boston's night clubs, but its satrapy extended into the streets, where policy was often made *ad hoc*.
- 87. American Airlines under Robert Crandall had the best security program (and the most expensive) of any U.S. carrier. It would have stood comparison with that of any foreign company. Sadly, under subsequent, unsympathetic CEOs, the security functions were allowed to go into decline, until in 2012 they had become virtually nonexistent. It is not too harsh to assert that what was practiced amounted to a deceit upon the traveling public which was required to pay a security charge on every ticket as though the former standards were still being upheld.
- 88. Pan Am was responsible for the introduction of the additional security fee, for which the traveling public, gulled into a naïve belief of enhanced security received, instead, the debacle of Pan Am 103. The issue disappeared off the charts with the demise of Pan Am.
- 89. Perhaps an exception might not unfairly be suggested in the person of Jules Kroll. See, *Security Directors Digest*, Vol. 5, No. 1, January 13, 1999, p. 6.
- 90. At the time of writing, this matter has yet to be resolved. What is clear is that the case turns upon the facts: Who did what to whom first. For all its availability, technology was far from determinative, or even greatly helpful in establishing the facts. See, "Respect for Life and Regard for Rights in the Criminal Law," Sanford H. Kadish, 64 *California Law Review*, No. 4, July 1976, pp. 871–901 at p. 881. "When the choice is between the life of the victim and the life of his assailant, the answer is unambiguous in every legal system: the victim may kill to save his own life."
- 91. The classic text on this is still *Catch Me If You Can,* Frank W. Abagnale with Stan Redding, New York, NY: Grosset and Dunlap, 1990, "Actually, I haven't changed. All the needs that made me a criminal are still there. I have simply found a legal and socially acceptable way to fulfill those needs." This book contains much guidance for those in Law Enforcement and Private Security engaged in recruiting those with ever more up-to-date skills. Per contra, Johnny Roselli "... you know Jimmy, the guy's right. I couldn't be a cop or a private dick. They deal with the scum of the earth." *The Last Mafioso,* Ovid Demaris, New York, NY: Times Books, 1981, p. 190.
- 92. A fascinating and relevant work, demanding close attention, is *Artificial Paranoia*, an NIMH Program Report, U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, 1978, p. 22, "The question is not whether the computer is here today but, rather how we can best use its tremendous potential without allowing it to interfere with our personal freedom." Dr. Colby: "We wouldn't even need a computer on our project if we had 500 secretaries taking notes and a lot of paper but we don't have the time ... you can't go through a million IRS records in 4 minutes by hand; a computer can."
- 93. It is worth recounting that the Head of Interpol, the International Police Organization, so important in our day and age as a bulwark against the ever-growing threat of transnational crime was, in 1938, Reinhard Heydrich, the Chief of the Nazi security services, better known to some as the Butcher of Prague.

- 94. The creation of Capitalism, as it is understood in the West relies on the artificial screen furnished by the corporation to shield the humans who supply its necessary dynamic behind its protection. This legal separation of functions and responsibilities has yet to be worked out with any degree of finality. See, "Making the Punishment Fit the Corporation. The problem of finding an Optimal Corporation Criminal Sanction, John C. Coffee, Jr., Northern Illinois University Law Review, No. 1, 1980, pp. 3–55 at p. 13." "Juries and judges have a distressing habit of acquitting flesh and blood defendants whereas they would convict a bloodless corporation."
- 95. "We all wish for complete or utopian security but we must accept that this is only fantasy. We live in a world of uncertainty where the most difficult puzzle is man himself. This shall always be because man studying man can never be completely objective." *The Peter Prescription,* Laurence J. Peter, New York, NY: William Morrow, 1972, pp. 167–168.
- 96. On this, see that remarkable, insightful book, *Harlequin*, Morris West, New York, NY: William Morrow, 1974, which deserves to be on every criminologists reading list. It is an excellent study of the philosophy of violence and the limits of law and justice.
- 97. On Liberty, Chapter 3, "Liberty is the right to do everything that the law allows," L'Espirit de lois, Charles, Baron de Montesquieu (1689–1755). The limit of the law is fluid and determined by the realities of political power. Hence the weakness of what we recognize as international law
- 98. See, *Power! How to Get It, How to Use It,* Michael Korda, New York, NY: Random House, 1975 "All life is a game of power. The object of the game is simple enough: to know what you want and get it." *The Clowns of God,* Morris West, New York, NY: William Morrow, 1981, p. 316, "Power implies that we can accomplish what we plan. Authority signifies only that we may order it to be accomplished." See, too, *Wild Justice,* Susan Jacoby, New York, NY: Harper and Row, 1983, p. 337, "The success of non-violent resistance presupposes not only enormous discipline on the side of those who practice it but a point beyond which the other side is not willing to go to maintain its power." These sage observations have special relevance in the context of the so-called Arab Spring and, in particular, the case of Syria.
 - 99. Prevention is always better than cure and in a matter in which the stakes are now being substantially raised, the relative price of overall civil liberties must be cautiously weighed against the costs to society of mass destruction resulting from undetected yet reasonable preventable terrorist activity.

"Terrorism: New Dimensions of Violent Criminality," H. H. A. Cooper, *Cumberland Law Review*, Vol. 9, No. 2, Fall, pp. 369–390, 1978, at p. 385.

- 100. See on this, generally, *Kidnap and Ransom*, Richard Clutterbuck, London, England: Faber and Faber, 1978. Small wonder that those offering such services have seen the need to create their own private security services to protect their investment, inter alia, Control Risks.
 - 101. The Teaching of Buddha, Bukkyo Dendo Kyokai: Tokyo, Japan, 1978, p. 230,

People should learn to see and to avoid all danger. Just as a wise man keeps away from wild horses and mad dogs, so we should not make friends with evil men, nor should we go to places that wise men avoid.

- 102. Scarcely had the deadly haze drifted from ground zero than Richard Clarke offered a *mea culpa* to the nation for failing to give due warning about what he claimed to have known about the 9/11 plot that might have foiled what occurred. No comment is offered here on this beyond pointing out that whatever may or may not have been the truth of the matter, he was a very long way indeed from "The Sharp End."
- 103. "... the wise strategist starts at the goal and thinks his way back to the starting point." *Without Cloak or Dagger*, Miles Copeland, New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 1974, p. 122. For an extensive review of the process, see Outthinking the Terrorist: An International Challenge; Proceedings of the 10th Annual Symposium on the Role of Behavioral Science in Physical Security, Defense Nuclear Agency 23–24 April 1985.
- 104. On this, see the innovative programs of the International Association of Chiefs of Police designed to teach those with counter-terrorism responsibilities how to think like the adversary. See, especially, "Hostage Rescue Operations: Teaching the Unteachable," Richard W. Kobetz and H. H. A. Cooper, *The Police Chief*, June 1979, pp. 24–27, at p. 25. A very poor, bowdlerized translation of this

fine article was published in <u>Revista Seguridad Publica</u> Ano 4, No. 18, Mayo-Junio 1882, which misses the point made here. See also, *Russian Mafia in America Immigration, Culture, and Crime,* James O. Finkenauer, Elvin J. Waring, Boston, MA: Northeastern University Press, 1998. This is a very fine textbook, helping to promote a better understanding of organized crime. It does, incidentally, demonstrate how difficult, with even the most rigorous and relevant methodology, it is for academic criminologists and even the most privileged law enforcement professionals to penetrate and understand the minds of the criminal classes. See especially, pp. 199–203 and the following chapter 9.

105. See, *Business Intelligence, A Primer, H. H. A. Cooper, Berryville, VA., Executive Protection Institute, 1996, especially pp. 22–25.*

106. The terminology here, has been selected deliberately from a less sensitive age, namely that of the common law in its developmental phase. If this offends you, in its implications, it is respectfully suggested that private security may not be an appropriate vocation for you. On "vocation" as employed here, see *Ways of Escape*, Graham Greene, New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 1980, p. 154.

107. Even some from who better might have been expected occasionally disappoint. Jon Ronson, an experienced journalist became sufficiently intrigued with "psychopathy" to attend a three-day course on the topic given by Dr. Robert Hare, a world renowned specialist on the topic. A book resulted, *The Psychopath Test*, reviewed by this author in the *Journal of Applied Security Research*, Vol. 07, October–December, 2012, pp. 489–523. Ronson had a number of subsequent meetings with Dr. Hare, one of which, of particular interest here, took place in a hotel at London's Heathrow Airport. The diligent reader (see previous note 1!) is referred to chapter 9 of *The Psychopath Test*. Apparently Ronson became involved in an altercation with the concierge, which, understandably got out of hand, he reported somewhat heatedly to Dr. Hare, who, on the basis of a quick glance by Ronson pronounced him, without more "a psychopath." In justification, he opined, "A lot of psychopaths become gatekeepers, concierges, security guards masters of their own domains. 'You should put *that* in your book,' said Bob. 'I will, I said'." And he did just that, of such canned diagnoses are whole professions traduced. No wonder more serious endeavors are held suspect by others with special reason to impugn them.

108. See previous note 74. It surely speaks a great deal to the true strength of Mr. Baldwin's personality, and his appreciation of his public persona, as well as his self-control that he did not react in more unkindly fashion to this unfortunate encounter. It does him great credit that, perhaps, Maureen Dowd might find herself able, appropriately, to acknowledge.

109. On ASET, see *Journal of Applied Security Research*, Vol. 3, No. 3–4, 2008, Dr. Richard W. Kobetz, pp. 283–290.

110. Executive Protection is an allowable business expense provided certain clearly stated IRS criteria are met. Every case is different, often in some quite minor particular. This is rarely taken into consideration by those who perforce deal with the purveyors of goods and services on a different level altogether. It follows the old, well-established practice, only flouted by villains and saints that "generals do not shoot at generals in battle!"

111. Many consumers of products and services of all kinds take far more trouble, (and spend a great deal more in the process) on evaluating what is involved in the acquisition of much of far lesser import than private security services. Private security is dealing, night and day, at "The Sharp End" with matters of life and death. It is not something to be purchased on a whim or under duress, without considerable thought to the consequences. Yet careful study of how private security vendors are actually chosen shows how little expert engagement in the process is actually undertaken.

112. More is involved in this than merely money. Security cannot be measured by numbers alone. In practice, the task of evaluation is left, all too often, to cadres with axes of their own to grind; company executives with little or no knowledge of security, CFAs and the like, or even those having some personal inclination or bias against security. Any evaluation should not only have the appropriate level of expertise, but most importantly, an unimpeachable level of impartiality. The matter comes into especially sharp focus in bankruptcy proceedings where cost cutting is of the essence. A more than usual rigorous enquiry is demanded here in the interests of protecting all those involved, in the case of aviation security, especially the traveling public. Focus should be on those who are to be dispensed with. How has this been decided?

113. Private security is, by its nature, peculiarly at the mercy of general economic factors over which it has no control. Even some of the best run and most reputable security service vendors experience turnover rates of up to 80%. This has a marked effect on what can be prudently invested in labor, which, in turn affects every other facet of the business, and the way it is seen and evaluated.

- 114. A security service vendor is selling *service* at least as much as security. A fuel service vendor may offer the vehicle owner an option; pay less for your gas and pump your own. The absurdity of this as a business model with respect to security needs no further emphasis here. Again, how much is *service* worth to you as a consumer?
- 115. Security, or the lack of it, can affect every department of any organization. Security should never be marginalized or its functions subordinated to the dictates of others. This is of particular importance, organizationally, in determining in the scheme of things, to whom should security, whether proprietary or contractual, report. See, on this, note 8 previously, with respect to the Code of Hammurabi. To whom, it may be enquired, in the case of Penn State might the weak have looked to for protection against the strong? Against human frailty only the Divine can provide the necessary safeguards.
- 116. On this, see the excellent article in the *Harvard Business Review*, July 2003, Do Something–He's About to Snap, Eileen Roche, pp. 23–31. It would have greatly benefited from input of an experienced security expert, and the absence of such should be noted by professionals alert to such things. Work-place violence is not something to be casually brushed off, as witness the recent events in New York City: Nine innocent civilians wounded by New York's Finest; embarrassment for the Mayor, and Police Commissioner Kelly. It could have happened anywhere, for the same reasons, with a far higher casualty rate. Let's not wait, folks. *Do Something! The New Yorker*, September 3, 2012, Lizzie Widdicombe, The Talk of the Town, pp. 18–19.
- 117. Note for posterity. The Donald was a 20–21st century American businessman with a hilarious hairstyle, who sought to create a constituency for himself as a presidential candidate 2012 by challenging the authenticity of the incumbent's birth certificate.