

[Redacted]

Memorandum for the Record

Event: William Crumm, NSA, NCEUR (DIRNSA's representative to EUCOM); former Chief, Data Acquisition (Collection), Signals Intelligence Directorate.

Type of Event: Interview

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Special Access Issues: None

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Team Number: 2

Location: NSA, Ft Meade

Participants – non-Commission: William Crumm, [Redacted] (GC).

Participants – Commission: Col. Lorry Fenner

(U) BACKGROUND.

[Redacted] Mr. Crumm is career NSA, and started as a data systems intern 1982-85. He served as an integree in the [Redacted] until 1988. He worked 3d party software support until 1993 when he got to be [Redacted] Director for 3 months. Then he was made the executive officer for the Deputy Director of Technology. He was Deputy Chief of [Redacted] collection and then became the division chief, 1995-1996. From 1996-1999 he was the technical director for [Redacted]. In 1999 he became the NSA Deputy Chief of [Redacted] Collection. In 2000 he was made the Chief of [Redacted]

[Redacted] and served on the Strategy Study for the NSA Reorganization, and then became the SID Deputy Director for Data Acquisition (Collection), February 2001.

[Redacted] Mr. Crumm is the DIRNSA representative (for both SIGINT and Information Assurance) in the European Theater. His office provides all SIGINT technical support [Redacted]. He is also the representative to EUCOM as well as NATO and SHAPE.

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[Redacted] He has about 4 EUCOM/J2 (intelligence) integreees as well. All these people are OPCON (operational control) to NSA but he provides ADCON (care and feeding)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

in theater. He provides education on requirements and [Redacted] to respond. He sets customers expectations.

(U) His office does not provide collection, analysis or reporting (dissemination). They do have some integrated analysts and [Redacted] people. He considers himself the forward deployed element/extension for [Redacted] (Chief of Collection (Data Acquisition) at NSA). In the all-source arena he can test hypotheses with the customer for [Redacted] and Inglis (Chief of Analysis formerly, now UK). He does integrated [Redacted] with the customer. His predecessor was [Redacted]

[Redacted] They switched to a functional organization rather than geographic, as opposed to how NSA was organized about 2 years ago. They work with the J2 (Intel), J3 (Ops), J6 (Comms) and J5 (Strategy/Plans) and they have 2 people with General Zaner who is the Deputy J2 working GWOT. Mr. Crumm talks with the CINC directly. He has 3 people in J39 doing direct support for [Redacted] which has increased. He has six with Information Assurance, and he has 5 with the consumers. They need more active participation on requirements and they are working it hard. A lot of issues are dependent on personality. Zaner used to be there so he knows. The Deputy Commander in Stuttgart is Gen Wald who gives a lot of feedback and steering with phone calls. But Crumm has little interaction with Gen Jones the SACEUR. [Redacted]

(U) Signals Intelligence Directorate/Data Acquisition.

[Redacted] Data Acquisition (collection) was a group of sacred cows that needed an unbiased analysis. [Redacted] 9/11 Classified Information [Redacted] They don't have the best technical analysis but they have great PR and they are well-funded which is driving resource allocations. Plus there are military platforms. [Redacted] did the Pentagon studies to baseline SIGINT Capabilities for a resource base. He held Saturday meetings with the Agency Directors and the Deputies. They tried to make resource trades. [Redacted] also did a [Redacted] study and subsequent studies. There was crosstalk and the baseline, but no decisions were made. No one was in charge and the stovepipes remained. Charlie Allen can get some things done. But he can't crosswalk all the collection. [Redacted] he needs staff and time. In one case someone wanted a technology and the Agency with lead non-concurred and it still went forward. NSA is trying to holistically manage collection with the [Redacted]

[Redacted] Data Acquisition. But the DIRNSA needs to be in charge. Planning for future capabilities against requirements is harder. Crumm likes the idea of a DNI with the authority and responsibility for a more holistic, community approach to issues.

[Redacted] He feels more empowered now. He thinks the leadership is more decisive. There is a bit of blind trust. There are capabilities needed for the future but these are not the best funded. [Redacted]

[Redacted] CMS is trying to restack but no one knows on what basis they are making decisions.

[Redacted]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] When the ADCI/C manages across INTs at the microlevel the larger things he should be spending time on suffer. They need quality control, customer focus, and sound business practices. The SIGINT Director should be the community manager rather than the ADCI/C.

[REDACTED] CT. [REDACTED] Before 9/11 as Chief of Data Acquisition, he was working on a particular system but not putting much money or effort into it because it was such a difficult problem. [REDACTED]

9/11 Classified Information

[REDACTED] In 45 days they had a capability that has continued to increase and the metrics are really good. Charlie Allen was a huge supporter of the effort. Charlie mostly worked SIGINT managed outside NSA and had only a minor influence on major NSA programs. This project was well-resourced and it was managed within program so tradeoffs could be made internally. They made these trade-offs with the customers' concurrence. And the NSA leadership agreed.

(U) REQUIREMENTS.

[REDACTED] Mr. Crumm feels that the all-source analytic community over-emphasizes what's being produced today rather than what will be needed for the future. Instead we need to ask where are the telecommunications investments going? Where are those systems and [REDACTED] On the other hand we can't make too many decisions with a bias towards technology. We need to find the middle ground.

(U) Sometimes Oversight (House Appropriations and the HPSCI) tries to use more metrics rather than looking at where the technology is going. That is like using the rear-view mirror and side-view mirrors rather than looking out the windshield. We must balance quality and quantity and that is best done internally. The ADCI/C has difficulty handling requirements. The NSRL is still not right. We're fixing priorities but we need a better methodology. This is needed at the national level and is currently a work in progress.

(U) COUNTERTERRORISM.

[REDACTED]

[redacted]

[redacted] The successes after 9/11 were based on programs that were started earlier. The core expertise was there. It was fungible and could be shifted to new and different problems. They took a multi-disciplinary approach (he had lots of experience working [redacted] just didn't happen overnight. NSA made the investment in 1992-1994 to look for [redacted] Customers are easier to move after 9/11 but NSA already had agility in its own portfolio or it couldn't have surged after 9/11. The best chance to manage like this centrally is with the ADCI/C but that office is not staffed to do it and does not have the SIGINT technical expertise.

(U) NCEUR.

(U) Mr. Crumm said he is still learning his role. He has seen the power of the CINC. [redacted]

[redacted] Still there is a good flow of information. He spent [redacted] and was treated like a [redacted] officer. He knows the issues are cultural and he has to fight them daily. His relations with NIMA and DIA are good and he thinks that Clapper and Hayden are doing well to integrate giving the [redacted] examples. He meets with the J2 regularly and he feels SIGINT is well integrated with them. He attends the standing J2 weekly meetings. He also goes to the EUCOM morning meeting. The GO meeting includes the national agencies. Crumm has influence with the DIA representative, who manages the Defense Attaches [redacted] and with ADM Jacoby. [redacted] NIMA has [redacted] people and their presence is growing at [redacted] FBI and DEA is one level lower. (There are about [redacted] total). Crumm does not miss out on any communications.

9/11 Classified Information

(U) Crumm has an informal role with the Senior US Liaisons (London, [redacted] SUSLA [redacted] etc.). He calls it the Executive Leadership Team and they discuss strategic issues, economies of scale, shared resources, divisions of labor. His predecessor started this and he has continued to host these meetings and do the staff work. He brings out HQ people to brief them on changes at NSA (which has happened so rapidly they can't keep up). And he brings out people from the Education and Training Directorate to help them with issues in the field and to work [redacted] to increase the quality of their collection and analysis and help with processing.

(U) He always courtesy copies Gary Grantham, NSA Chief of Foreign Affairs Division (FAD), his work with the [redacted] is especially relevant to FAD. He has 4-5 masters/bosses at NSA: FAD, SID, IAD, the Chief of Staff, and the Director.

[redacted] What is EUCOM's role in CT especially relative to [redacted]? EUCOM includes Europe and Africa as well as Israel, Lebanon, and Syria. There has been some

[redacted]

[Redacted]

progress. The military component is lead [Redacted] is the action arm in some places. Everyone needs to get their lanes in the road right. The military is more open and includes the other agencies. Can they move faster? Under the new military leaders Wald, Jones and [Redacted] they have weekly meetings. You can tell how important CT is because none of the senior leaders ever miss a meeting or send a second in their place. CT is a focus.

(U) The bosses are consulted. Crumm has continued [Redacted] course. He fosters teamwork across the theater and works the Service Cryptologic Element partnership (he has been working CT since 1998 in various jobs). He has regular interaction with the Director and the CINC. They are working CT [Redacted] He informs them on a regular set of issues. These are the 4 star "care abouts" and he tells them how NSA is performing on these. The 4 stars have direct lines to NSA W for these as does Crumm.

(U) For example, [Redacted] He measured success in how quickly they did PIRs? He had 24 hour turn around based on the prior year's efforts. He has notes of meetings with analysts. He is a probing and demanding customer of SIGINT. He helps to anticipate their needs. He had [Redacted] as a customer before so he knows how to handle this.

(U) He has established Communities of Interest and works with the SEAMS - Senior Executive Account Managers (NSA Issue managers - customer relations). He worked for CENTCOM staying attuned with the other NSA CINC representatives. He used [Redacted] PACOM [Redacted] example and applied that for his CINC. They could use a little tighter coordination but he wouldn't want it to devolve to group think. He wanted to input CENTCOM initiatives and make those systemic. He has studied the NSA representatives' jobs over the last few years [Redacted] did an analysis) and wanted to point the way to the future.

(U) Chris Inglis (now SUSLOL) was the Chief of Analysis and Production and started new analysis tools, techniques and technologies and targets on terrorists. We can apply these to other targets as well. For instance they applied CT lessons to [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted] Mr. Crumm thinks NSA and the IC are learning organizations. [Redacted]

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They have gotten a lot of evidence from other disciplines and agencies.

[Redacted]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The [REDACTED] leak was very significant and he feels strongly about punishing leakers.

[REDACTED] CT - [REDACTED] Talk to them [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(U) Mr. Crumm commented that "you get what you pay for" and the nation was choosing to take the risk on CT because the Hill's emphasis was on [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] What about the war on terrorism? Mr. Crumm said that Charlie Allen gave the collectors a "boot in the ass" in 1998-1999 once a day from George Tenet. They had extensive efforts on [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] (and he went to [REDACTED] Mr. Crumm attended Charlie Allen's collectors meetings. He doesn't remember if the [REDACTED] was there. Crumm worked [REDACTED] There had been issues over sharing [REDACTED] but the policy changed well before 9-11. There was a [REDACTED] It was good and he helped build it. NSA had industrial strength SIGINT. They wanted full time collection. M. Baginski was in SID policy. It was countercultural for NSA. Crumm wanted one solution once to save the taxpayer the costs and he wanted to share the take. Baginski endorsed his suggestion. But the corporation was a little reluctant.

(U) MANAGEMENT

- (U) Mr. Crumm thinks the DCI needs to be the DCI not the CIA Director. The other agencies perceive that the CIA always wins in debates. The CMS staff is perceived to be CIA as well. There is not a healthy process. Tenet has strong biases. CIA can just walk in the office and have the DCI make a decision and NSA only finds out about it later - they are not part of the decision process. ADM Studeman had credibility as the DDCI. The DCI should do the job as it was designed.
- (U) As the threats increase, resources have not kept pace. CT really got too much while [REDACTED] continue to be problems.
- (U) There is little accountability. There is a naïve belief that if there's a decline in resources there is no degradation of capabilities and coverage. Chambliss testimony was introspective but it's very easy to Monday Morning Quarterback.