

UNCLASSIFIED

Draft

1
2
3
4 **National Military Strategy to Combat**
5 **Weapons of Mass Destruction**
6 **(NMS-CbtWMD)**
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22 +
23
24
25
26
27
28



29 **WORKING DRAFT**
30
31
32

Version: 091800 Mar 05

UNCLASSIFIED

Contents

33		
34		
35		
36	Chapter 1 – The Strategic Challenge.....	3
37		
38	Chapter 2 – Military Strategic Framework.....	9
39		
40	Chapter 3 – General Planning Guidance	14
41		
42	Chapter 4 – Implementation Guidance.....	18
43		
44	Section 1—Treaties and Agreement Support.....	19
45	Section 2—Threat Reduction Cooperation.....	20
46	Section 3—WMD Elimination.....	21
47	Section 4—WMD Interdiction.....	23
48	Section 5—Offensive Operations.....	25
49	Section 6—WMD Active Defensive Operations.....	26
50	Section 7—WMD Passive Defensive Operations.....	27
51	Section 8—WMD Consequence Management.....	29
52		
53		
54	Chapter 5 – Key Enabling Capabilities	31
55		
56	Chapter 6 – Conclusion.....	35

Chapter 1

The Strategic Challenge

"The gravest danger our nation faces lies at the crossroads of radicalism and technology. Our enemies have openly declared that they are seeking weapons of mass destruction, and evidence indicates that they are doing so with determination. The United States will not allow these efforts to succeed. ...History will judge harshly those who saw this coming danger but failed to act. In the new world we have entered, the only path to peace and security is the path of action."¹

- President George W. Bush

We are a nation at war and face a diverse set of challenges.² Today, the greatest threats facing the United States, our allies and our vital interests are no longer posed by conventional forces. Rather, asymmetric methods may be employed to counter our traditional military superiority. The National Defense Strategy states, "The U.S. military predominates in the world in traditional forms of warfare. Potential adversaries accordingly shift away from challenging the U.S. through *traditional* military action and adopt asymmetric capabilities and methods. While *traditional* challenges remain, an array of *traditional, irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive* capabilities and methods threaten U.S. interests."³ Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) may be used to counter our traditional military power and influence our behavior by instilling fear and attacking our political will.⁴ The challenges posed by WMD are categorized in the National Defense Strategy as *catastrophic*, but WMD in fact cut across all four challenge areas. Weapons of mass destruction could pose a variety of operational and tactical threats, and our armed forces must be prepared to fight and win under a wide range of WMD conditions.

Another challenge we face comes from a new breed of terrorists, whose goals may include removing U.S. influence in specific regions or reinventing the world in their own image. Many terrorist organizations consider WMD to be weapons of choice, and are actively attempting to acquire them weapons of mass destruction.⁵ When terrorists obtain WMD, terrorism becomes a truly catastrophic threat. Terrorist acquisition and use of weapons of mass destruction must be prevented.

This is not an American conflict. WMD possession within a theater may affect the balance or power and lead to an increased arms race with in that region. It is a challenge to global order that requires a coordinated international response. Success will only be achieved by marshalling all the instruments of national and international power. International partnerships

¹ National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, December 2002, p. 1.

² The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, March 2005, p. 2.

³ Ibid, p. 2

⁴ Weapons of mass destruction are weapons that are capable of a high order of destruction and/or of being used in such a manner as to destroy large numbers of people. For the purpose of this strategy weapons of mass destruction are nuclear, biological, chemical, and radiological weapons, and their means of delivery.

⁵ Weapons of mass destruction are weapons that are capable of a high order of destruction and/or of being used in such a manner as to destroy large numbers of people. For the purpose of this strategy weapons of mass destruction are nuclear, biological, chemical, and radiological weapons, and their means of delivery.

95 will be crucial to achieving our goals and maintaining a stable world order. Without meaningful
96 cooperation, the prospects for a truly devastating WMD attack against the United States, our
97 friends, allies or interests are magnified.

98

99 **Intent of the Strategy**

100

101 The National Military Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction (NMS-CbtWMD) is
102 an extension of the National Military Strategy (NMS) and supplements National level guidance
103 to focus the Department of Defense's efforts to combat WMD. The NMS-CbtWMD is an ends,
104 ways, means-based global strategy providing specific military insight to senior commanders
105 executing combating WMD missions and developing combating WMD capabilities.

106

107 The NMS-CbtWMD supports the
108 development of the Combating WMD
109 CONPLAN and subsequent COCOM
110 supporting plans, as directed by the
111 Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG) and
112 the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP).
113 COCOMs will embed the concepts, goals and
114 frameworks of the strategy in their corresponding plans.

115

116 The NMS-CbtWMD provides overarching strategic guidance to organize and synchronize the
117 military's combating WMD capabilities while leveraging other USG and allied capabilities to
118 reach the strategic goal of ensuring the U.S. and its interests are neither threatened nor attacked
119 by WMD. *Achieving this strategic goal rests on our combined ability to combat the*
120 *proliferation and the use of WMD.* Our strategy is based on developing, operationalizing, and
121 sustaining capabilities to *prevent, defeat and reverse* the acquisition of these weapons, related
122 material and their means of employment. The Secretary of Defense has assigned responsibility
123 for integrating and synchronizing the Department's efforts to combat WMD to US Strategic
124 Command (USSTRATCOM). USSTRATCOM will play an integral role in assessing current
125 combating WMD capabilities, integrating and synchronizing applicable DoD-wide combating
126 WMD efforts and will serve as a principal advocate for the rapid development and
127 implementation of future capabilities.

128

129

130 **Threat Considerations**

131

132 The WMD threat to the United States has grown more complex and diverse over time.
133 Today, both hostile state and non-state actors possessing WMD pose a significant challenge to
134 the United States and its interests. Evidence indicates that some non-state actors are intent on
135 obtaining and using WMD. Non-state actors of greatest concern include highly organized and
136 networked terror organizations. Their WMD efforts may be facilitated by terrorist support
137 entities, organized criminal organizations and illicit business enterprises that supply WMD
138 materials, technology, and expertise – such as the international nuclear procurement network led
139 by A.Q. Khan. In addition, some non-state actors may receive direct or indirect assistance from
140 hostile WMD-capable states.

141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156

Although terrorist organizations pose the most likely threat of WMD use, we must be capable of defeating all WMD challenges posed by both state and non-state actors. State actors of greatest concern are “rogue” nations whose WMD activities threaten regional security and the global status quo. However, we must also consider potential challenges from “near-peer” nations with WMD – states with friendly regional and global interests whose stability is precarious. Furthermore, we need to engage states participating (knowingly or not) in illicit WMD or related materials trafficking. Both state and non-state actors are taking advantage of the continuing spread of technical know-how, materials, and sophisticated dual-use technology.

- DoD Combating WMD Priorities**
- Prevent terrorists from acquiring and/or employing WMD
 - Rollback and protect against WMD possessed by antagonistic States
 - Prevent WMD proliferation to nations that do not currently possess them
 - Manage all other challenges posed by WMD.

157
158
159
160

Our top priority must be to prevent terrorists from obtaining and employing WMD. Protecting against the convergence of WMD and terrorism (see figure 1 below) requires, in part, aligning combating WMD objectives with the Global War on Terror. We must also reinforce technical and logistical barriers to WMD acquisition and use and increase the risks associated

with such activities. Finally, we must ensure that nation states do not actively support or facilitate WMD acquisition or use.

Preventing the Convergence of Terrorists & WMD




Figure 1

195
196
197

an example of WMD elimination operations conducted in a hostile or uncertain environment. The security environment will determine the level of military involvement for these predominantly civilian-led efforts.

Another priority is to rollback and protect against WMD possessed by antagonistic states. For example, North Korea appears determined to field a nuclear capability so we must be prepared to rollback that program using a cooperative threat reduction model or an “uncooperative” elimination model. The cooperative eradication of the Libyan WMD program is an ideal example of rollback using a cooperative threat reduction model. Elimination operations

198
199
200
201
202
203

An additional priority is to prevent proliferation of WMD to nations that do not currently possess them. This priority is exemplified by Iran, which seems intent on developing the capability to produce nuclear weapons. While diplomatic solutions may be preferred in these cases, more active measures may need to be considered.

executed in Operation Iraqi Freedom are

204 A final priority is to manage all other political and security challenges posed by WMD.
205 The possession of WMD can destabilize key regions, even when not openly brandished or used.
206 We must work to preclude the possibility of a regional WMD conflict between states friendly to
207 the United States (e.g., India and Pakistan).
208

209 Each aspect of the WMD challenge merits appropriate strategic emphasis to ensure a
210 response that remains effective over time. Different aspects of the threat will require different
211 types and levels of resources and effort. A durable strategy to combat WMD will be grounded in
212 a continuous, robust process that evaluates known WMD programs and emerging capabilities to
213 produce WMD. This strategy must promote a common understanding of the WMD threat
214 throughout the US government, and among our friends and allies.
215

216 **National and Defense Guidance**

217
218 The NMS-CbtWMD integrates the objectives and intent of National level guidance and
219 provides military focus for the Department of Defense. Core guidance documents include:
220 National Security Strategy, National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, National
221 Policy for Biodefense, National Response Plan, National Defense Strategy, and National Military
222 Strategy, and the Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support. These documents highlight
223 the unique challenges associated with WMD, and undergird DoD's strategic goal of ensuring that
224 the U.S. and our forces, friends, allies and its interests are neither threatened nor attacked by
225 WMD.
226

227 *The National Security Strategy of the United States*⁶ directs an active strategy to
228 counter transnational terror networks, rogue nations and aggressive states that possess or
229 are working to acquire WMD. It notes that the United States must advance this strategy
230 through strengthened alliances, the establishment of new partnerships with former
231 adversaries, innovation in the use of military forces, modern technologies, and increased
232 emphasis on intelligence collection and analysis.⁷
233

234 *The National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction*⁸ articulates a
235 proactive, comprehensive strategy to counter the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and
236 biological weapons and their means of delivery. The three pillars around which specific
237 strategy elements are organized are Counterproliferation, Strengthened Nonproliferation,
238 and Consequence Management.⁹ Additionally, the strategy highlights several critical
239 enablers: improved intelligence, research and development, strengthened international
240 cooperation, and targeted strategies against proliferants.¹⁰
241

⁶ White House, September 2002.

⁷ Ibid., p. 14.

⁸ White House, December 2002. This document is an unclassified version of National Strategy to Combat WMD.

⁹ Ibid., p 2.

¹⁰ Ibid., pp. 5-6.

242 *National Policy for Biodefense*¹¹ is a tailored policy that integrates the sustained
243 and combined efforts of the U.S. government to expand the nation's response to
244 biological threats. It supplements and complements the National Strategy for Combating
245 WMD. It outlines the catastrophic nature of the BW threat and the framework to combat
246 that threat. For combatant commanders it emphasizes the need to improve and build
247 capabilities to detect, interdict and eliminate an adversary's BW assets and enabling
248 technologies and materials before they can be used.

249
250 The *National Response Plan*¹² is designed to prevent terrorist attacks in the United States;
251 reduce America's vulnerability to terrorism, major disasters, and other emergencies; and
252 minimize the damage and recover from attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies. It
253 establishes a comprehensive, national, all-hazards approach to domestic incident management
254 across a spectrum of activities including prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery. DoD
255 assets play key support roles across the range of responsibilities laid out in the plan. Combatant
256 commanders need to be aware of the potential resource impacts this plan may have on regional
257 plans.

258
259 *The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America*¹³ outlines an
260 active, layered approach to the defense of the nation and its interests. It describes "our
261 highest priority" as dissuading, deterring, and defeating those who seek to harm the
262 United States directly, especially extremist enemies with WMD.¹⁴ It highlights the
263 troubling nexus of terrorism, WMD proliferation, and problem states that possess or seek
264 WMD.¹⁵

265
266 *The National Military Strategy of the United States of America*¹⁶ provides focus
267 for military activities by defining a set of interrelated military objectives and joint-
268 operating concepts from which the Service Chiefs and combatant commanders identify
269 desired capabilities and against which the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff assesses
270 risk. Noting the high risks associated with WMD threats, the strategy states that the
271 United States must adopt a global posture and take action to prevent conflict and surprise
272 attack. It calls for a joint force capable of protecting against and defeating WMD-armed
273 adversaries.

274
275 *The Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support* outlines the active, layered,
276 defense-in depth that integrates the forward regions with the approaches with domestic activities
277 to protect the homeland. The key objectives of this strategy include achieving the maximum
278 awareness of potential threats, interdicting and defeating those threats at a safe distance,
279 providing mission assurance, support to civil authorities to deal with the consequences of a
280 CBRNE mass casualty attack and improving national and international capabilities for homeland
281 defense and homeland security.

¹¹ *National Policy for Biodefense*, 21 April 2004 and *Biodefense for the 21st Century*, 28 April 2004. The latter document is the unclassified version of the national policy.

¹² *National Response Plan*, December 2004.

¹³ Draft, March 2005.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. iv.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

¹⁶ Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2004.

282
283
284
285
286
287
288

289
290
291
292
293
294
295
296
297
298
299
300
301
302
303
304

Chapter 2


Military Strategic Framework

The military strategic framework to combat WMD is an ends-ways-means approach built on a foundation of deterrence. It defines the role of the armed forces in combating WMD. Successfully executing the military missions outlined below will enable us to meet the strategic military objectives and achieve the desired end state.

Strategic Goal

Through prevention, deterrence and decisive operational capability, the United States, its forces, allies, and interests are neither threatened nor attacked with WMD.

Military Framework for Combating WMD



305
306
307

Figure 2

Supporting Military Objectives

Supporting military objectives define the ways in which the armed forces work toward the strategic goal. Objectives focus on countering the potential or actual *proliferation* of WMD and the potential or actual *use* of WMD.

Prevent, dissuade or deny the proliferation of WMD. This is the first line of defense. This objective is achieved through political and diplomatic means, security cooperation and alliance activities, creation and/or enforcement of effective treaties and agreements, and interdiction of WMD and related materials trafficking.

Reverse, reduce or eliminate existing WMD. This objective is achieved through cooperative efforts to reduce or eliminate WMD and associated activities, targeted rollback of WMD programs and capabilities, elimination of WMD programs and related materials in uncertain environments, and enhancements to the safety and security of WMD. The ultimate goal is that nations will take ownership and destroy their own but the U.S. remains committed to assist where appropriate to reduce these stockpiles.

Defeat WMD use. This objective is achieved through offensive operations and a robust active defense. Offensive operations leverage all means of delivering effects. Active defense is directed at all means of adversary attack in all operating environments.

Protect, respond and recover from WMD attack. This objective is achieved through passive defense and consequence management capabilities. With respect to passive defense, the principal military objective is to sustain combat operations in chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear environments while protecting the force. With respect to consequence management, the goal is to minimize and manage the impact of an attack. The armed forces must also be prepared to support civil authorities in CONUS and overseas.

Military Missions

The National Military Strategy is operationalized through eight military missions. These missions encompass the spectrum of military tasks that support the national combating WMD effort. For planning and execution, they are mutually reinforcing and in some respects overlapping. Specific considerations and operational insights to support planning, execution, and resource allocation for the missions are discussed in Chapter 4.

- **Treaties and Agreement Support** – Activities that support U.S. and international efforts to prevent, dissuade or deny state and non-state actors from acquiring or proliferating WMD and to deny them access to WMD-relevant capabilities.
- **Threat Reduction Cooperation** – Activities undertaken with the consent and cooperation of host nation authorities to enhance physical security, emplace detection

Combating WMD Military Objectives

- **Prevent, dissuade or deny WMD and related material proliferation**
- **Reverse or eliminate existing WMD**
- **Defeat WMD use**
- **Protect, respond and recover from WMD attack**

354 equipment, reduce, eliminate, redirect and/or protect a state's WMD program and
355 capabilities.

356
357 • **Interdiction** – Operations to stop WMD, delivery systems, and associated
358 technologies and material from transiting between state and non-state actors of
359 concern.

360
361 • **Elimination** – Operations to systematically locate, characterize, secure, disable,
362 and/or destroy a state or non-states actor's WMD programs and related capabilities
363 (weapons, production key personnel, knowledge, and delivery means) in uncertain
364 environments.

365
366 • **Offensive Operations** – Operations using kinetic and/or non-kinetic means to
367 neutralize a WMD threat and, when necessary, respond to the use of WMD.

368
369 • **Active Defense** - Measures to prevent or defeat the conventional and unconventional
370 delivery of WMD.

371
372 • **Passive Defense** - Measures to minimize the vulnerabilities and minimize the effects
373 of WMD employed against forces, installations, and key infrastructure.

374
375 • **Consequence Management** – Activities to mitigate the effects of WMD use and
376 restore essential operations and services.

377
378 **Key Enablers**

379
380 A number of cross-cutting capabilities and activities facilitate the military strategy and
381 corresponding mission planning and execution. The National Strategy to Combat WMD
382 highlights the following enablers: improved intelligence collection and analysis, research and
383 development to create required capabilities and countermeasures, strengthened international
384 cooperation, and targeted strategies against proliferants.¹⁷ Other important enablers include
385 strategic communication and force projection.

386
387 **Military Means**

388
389 Resources used to execute this strategy are all the resources available to the Department
390 through its geographic combatant commands, functional combatant commands, Services, and
391 defense agencies. The level of military success in combating WMD is increasingly dependent on
392 effectively leveraging interagency and host nation capabilities to prevent, reverse, and defeat
393 WMD proliferation and use.

394
395
396

¹⁷ National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, pp. 5-6.

397 **Deterrence**

398
399 Deterrence is a strategic effect to which all the mission areas contribute. The National
400 Military Strategy to Combat WMD highlights deterrence as an important element of strategy,
401 emphasizing the importance of a strong declaratory policy and effective military forces.
402

403 *The United States will continue to make clear it reserves the right*
404 *to respond with overwhelming force – including through resort to*
405 *all of our options – to the use of WMD against the United States,*
406 *our forces abroad, and friends and allies.*¹⁸
407

408 The strategy further notes that the diverse and less predictable threats we face today
409 require new methods of deterrence. Deterrence principles and concepts tailored to today's
410 security environment are established in the Strategic Deterrence Joint Operating Concept (SD-
411 JOC).¹⁹
412

- 413 • Strategic Deterrence is the prevention of adversary aggression or coercion threatening
414 vital interests of the United States and/or our national survival. Deterrence convinces
415 adversaries not to take grievous courses of action by means of decisive influence over
416 their decision-making.²⁰
- 417 • The “center of gravity” for strategic deterrence is influencing decisively an adversary’s
418 decision calculus. There are three critical variables in this calculus: the perception of the
419 *benefits* of a course of action, the perception of the *costs* of a course of action, and the
420 perception of the *consequences of restraint* or inaction. Understanding how these factors
421 interrelate to shape an adversary’s thinking is vitally important to determining how best
422 to influence his decisions and behaviors.²¹
- 423 • There are three ways to exercise such influence: by credibly threatening to deny the
424 expected benefits sought; by credibly threatening to impose costs that are viewed as too
425 painful to incur; and by inducing restraint by creating a positive incentive to refrain from
426 certain actions. These are closely linked in practice and often overlap in application.²²
- 427 • Because the perceptions and capabilities of potential adversaries vary, the specific
428 military means required to deter successfully may vary significantly from adversary to
429 adversary, situation to situation.²³
- 430 • Reliance on overwhelming U.S. conventional force superiority (specifically, the ability to
431 defeat adversaries through major combat operations) may not by itself provide effective
432 strategic deterrence. Likewise, a deterrence posture that relies solely on the threat of
433 counterstrike may artificially constrain the range of available deterrent options. There is
434 a wide range of U.S. military actions and capabilities that can contribute to decisive
435 influence over an adversary’s decision making.²⁴

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 3

¹⁹ September 2004 (?)

²⁰ SD-JOC, p. 4.

²¹ Ibid., p. 10.

²² Ibid., p. 20.

²³ Ibid., p. 10.

²⁴ Ibid., pp. 10-11.

436
437
438
439
440
441
442
443
444
445
446
447
448
449
450
451
452
453
454
455
456
457
458
459
460
461
462
463
464
465
466
467
468
469
470
471
472
473
474
475
476
477
478
479
480

All combatant commands must take account of deterrence objectives in their plans and activities, to include Theater Security Cooperation Plans, CONPLANS, OPLANS, exercises and Flexible Deterrent Options. Combatant commands are further required to identify capabilities needed to deter adversaries from obtaining and employing WMD. These include all-source strategic and operational intelligence; survivable collaborative decision making and decision support environments; strategic communications and information operations; force projection capabilities; kinetic (conventional and nuclear) and non-kinetic strike systems; active defenses; passive defenses; adaptive planning capabilities (e.g., to support Global Strike); and unique capabilities to support WMD interdiction and elimination.²⁵

Additionally, deterrence depends greatly on a capability to attribute the source of WMD attacks reliably and in a timely fashion. Deterrence is likely to be weakened if adversaries believe they can execute or threaten an attack without leaving “fingerprints.” Attribution of a WMD attack is likely to be a judgment or an inference based on forensic evidence and intelligence. While DoD does not lead interagency activities related to WMD forensics and attribution, it does support these efforts through technical expertise and capabilities.

²⁵ See SD-JOC for a more detailed discussion of these and related capabilities.

Chapter 3

General Planning Guidance

Guiding Principles

The following principles underpin the military strategy and provide general guidance for planning activities. Integration of these principles into plans should be informed by operational judgment.

Active, Layered Defense-in-Depth. As the National Defense Strategy states, “the United States is committed to an active defense of the nation and its interests...allowing opponents to strike first – particularly in an era of proliferation – is unacceptable.”²⁶ Military strategy must be proactive in order to seize the initiative from adversaries and counter emerging dangers before they become major threats. Layered defense-in-depth requires bringing to bear all military capabilities and activities to support WMD proliferation prevention, deterrence, defeat and response; defending the homeland and our overseas interests; and working with international partners to establish and enforce an integrated set of barriers and responses to WMD proliferation and use (e.g., the Proliferation Security Initiative).

Parallel Operational Approaches. The WMD challenges we face are diverse and dynamic. In some cases it is unlikely that any single operational strategy will be sufficient to fully achieve combating WMD objectives. Instead, the armed forces will be required to execute a number of ‘parallel’ military strategies within and across the combating WMD mission areas. These parallel strategies will need to be fully integrated and synchronized with one another, and in some cases may need to be executed simultaneously.

Global Situational Awareness. There is an acute need for all senior leaders and all levels of command to maintain accurate, timely, global situational awareness to ensure that appropriate courses of action can be developed and executed. Particularly important is the improvement and integration of strategic, operational and tactical intelligence to provide early warning, anticipate adversary behavior, support the development of joint solutions and the execution of net-centric operations, assess the consequences of military action, and support resource planning.

Command and Control. All capabilities supporting the military strategy rely on robust, reliable, secure and survivable DoD-wide command and control that enables real-time collaboration and decision-making. This is particularly true for rapidly unfolding WMD

Guiding Principles

- **Active, Layered Defense-in-Depth**
- **Parallel Operational Approaches**
- **Global Situational Awareness**
- **Command and Control**
- **Enabling Other Nations**
- **Integration**

²⁶ National Defense Strategy ... p. 1, p. 9.

525 contingencies that may require time urgent planning, tasking, and dynamic control. Any further
526 developed combating WMD strategies and plans must include command and control
527 considerations, to include metrics for assessing progress, methods to address the temporal
528 challenges of combating WMD operations, and architectures responsive to the transformation of
529 Service capabilities from larger to smaller, more deployable, matrixed units.
530

531 **Enabling other Nations.** Assistance from the international community is a force
532 multiplier in the US effort to combat WMD. In many instances, significant improvements in
533 global CbtWMD capability by providing relatively modest assistance or resources to other
534 nations and international organizations. As much as possible, we must enable others to combat
535 WMD.
536

537 **Integration.** Unity of effort is essential to success in combating WMD. Within the
538 DoD, military and civilian organization must work together closely to support strategy and
539 policy formulation, plans integration, requirements definition, resource allocation, and mission
540 execution. The DoD must also leverage the full capabilities and expertise of the interagency
541 community to combat WMD to ensure that all elements of national power are effectively
542 deployed.
543

544 **Military Assumptions**

545 For planning purposes, commanders should assume the following:
546

- 547 • In the near-term, eliminating WMD proliferation entirely is not a realistic goal.
- 548 • Current international non-proliferation agreements will remain in place and could be
549 strengthened, but hostile state and terror organizations will continue to pursue WMD and
550 will exploit illicit procurement networks to acquire materials, technology, and expertise.
551 The Proliferation Security Initiative will remain a critical means to interdict WMD
552 trafficking.
553
- 554 • Some adversaries who acquire WMD may not easily be deterred from using them.
555 Terrorist organizations are most likely to use WMD, and will seek to target the United
556 States.
557
- 558 • Success in combating WMD on a global and regional scale requires strong partnerships
559 with friends and allies the active support of other nations. Partner nations are critical
560 because they provide unique access, information, and capabilities. They may also
561 require U.S. material and other support. It will be difficult for some governments openly
562 to acknowledge support from and cooperation with the United States.
563
- 564 • In some circumstances, the United States may be required to act alone or in conjunction
565 with a limited number of partners. Partners may require U.S. material and other support.
566
- 567 • Long-term stability operations in states previously engaged in WMD proliferation may
568 require specialized DoD expertise and units.
569
570

571

572 **Capability Development**

573 In determining and developing resources to support execution, this is a *capabilities-based*
574 *strategy*. We must first understand our current WMD mission capability and our ability to
575 accomplish our desired effects. It is essential to identify shortfalls and develop specific
576 capabilities we need. Due to limited resources, we do not have the ability to fund every
577 capability we might desire. We must also identify areas to assume risk, and prioritize resources
578 accordingly. While some capability will be distributed to regional combatant commands, other
579 resources will be based within CONUS and deployed as required.

580 After assessing their WMD missions, Combatant Commanders and the Services should
581 identify capability requirements and communicate them through JCIDS, the Doctrine,
582 Organization, Training, Material, Leadership, Personnel and Facilities (DOTMLPF) Program
583 and Integrated Priority Lists (IPL). At the same time, Combatant Commanders should identify
584 those areas where they might take risk and reduce resources. Due to limited resources, areas to
585 take risk must be identified. If the decision where to take risk is not suggested by the WMD
586 strategist or planner, there is a chance the best-informed decision will not be made.

587

588 **COCOM Guidance**

589

590 The Joint Staff will prepare a CONPLAN (to be delegated to STRATCOM at a later date)
591 which guides the development of responsive supporting plans by Geographic Combatant
592 Commands (GCC) and Functional Combatant Commands (FCC). These plans will address
593 operations and coordination efforts required to combat WMD.

594 While GCCs are the primary organizations to execute military combating WMD
595 operations, FCCs have critical responsibilities as well. SOCOM will conduct specific Special
596 Forces operations as directed. STRATCOM is the lead combatant commander for integrating
597 and synchronizing DoD-wide combating WMD efforts across the doctrine, organization,
598 training, material, leadership, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) spectrum and serves as a
599 focal point for integrating and synchronizing capabilities in support of GCCs. Additionally,
600 STRATCOM is responsible for strategic communications and information operations, global
601 intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, nuclear deterrence, and global strike.²⁷
602 TRANSCOM will provide responsive lift and JFCOM will lead combating WMD capability
603 development. In certain circumstances, FCCs will coordinate their efforts with the GCCs.

604

605 Regional plans should:

606

- 607 • Identify requirements to ensure a high degree of WMD situational awareness in the area
608 of responsibility (AOR).
- 609 • Assess the WMD threat in the AOR and associated strategic and operational risks.
- 610 • Integrate all elements of national and military power to create an environment hostile to
611 WMD in the AOR.
- 612 • Ensure effective mechanisms for interagency coordination across the combating WMD
613 mission areas. Coordination with the Department of State is particularly important for

²⁷ These four mission areas were assigned to STRATCOM in Unified Command Plan – Change 2.

614 certain activities (e.g., consequence management and enabling functions for military
615 operations).

- 616 • Identify the unique requirements for WMD deterrence in the AOR.
- 617 • Define the range of military operations to combat WMD proliferation and use.
- 618 • Develop and implement an exercise program to support planning and preparations for
619 these operations.
- 620 • Integrate regional partners into combating WMD activities and operations.

621
622 All combatant commands should identify required Combating WMD capabilities through
623 the Joint Capability Integration and Development System (JCIDS) and DOTMLPF processes.
624 The Integrated Priority List (IPL) should be used to identify the most important operational
625 capability needs. In assessing and prioritizing these needs, combatant commands are required to
626 identify areas where the United States should either reduce or assume greater risk.

Chapter 4

Implementation Guidance

Success in combating WMD requires adopting a complete system perspective, one that takes account of the entire proliferation life cycle from acquisition of equipment to production of materials to achievement of weapons capability. We must understand the interconnected elements of WMD programs in order to target the critical nodes with the right tools to achieve the greatest effect on the WMD system as a whole.

Planning approaches should focus on accomplishing the desired strategic goal through courses of action that will change enemy behaviors and encourage or compel them to comply with our will and that of the international community. Changes in adversary behavior will be the result of effects generated by the military capabilities and other instruments of power and influence represented in the eight combating WMD mission areas. At the operational level, the coherent application of national and coalition elements of power—diplomacy through application of decisive force—should be planned using the Joint Forces Command effects-based processes.

To ensure sustained focus on the WMD challenge the Joint Staff will support the Office of the Secretary of Defense OSD in developing a strategic plan to combat WMD and a global information operations campaign aimed at further de-legitimizing WMD proliferation and use.

The strategic objective, supporting tasks and performance measures for each mission area are outlined below. Tasks and capabilities required for one mission area may overlap or mutually reinforce those for other mission areas.

Treaties and Agreement Support

Prevention is the first line of defense and is achieved through active proliferation diplomacy, security cooperation and alliance activities, and international treaties and agreements. National strategy emphasizes the importance of policies, concepts and capabilities that can address WMD challenges before they mature into serious threats. The investment of resources, expertise, and political capital into proliferation prevention can have a significant payoff for national and international security.

Treaties and Agreement Support
Activities that support U.S. and international efforts to dissuade or prevent state and non-state actors from acquiring or proliferating WMD and to deny them access to WMD-relevant capabilities.

Prevention efforts must be global, regional, and country-specific, directed at shaping international opinion on WMD, stigmatizing proliferation, influencing the decisions of those seeking, possessing, or supplying WMD, and closing off proliferation pathways. Military activities must be closely integrated with and supportive of interagency efforts. Security cooperation is often vitally important in shaping proliferation incentives and fostering cooperation in prevention efforts. Treaties, agreements, and international resolutions establish

672 norms of international behavior and can provide a legal basis for military action (e.g., sanctions
673 enforcement) to enforce compliance or punish non-compliance. Treaties also often provide for
674 intrusive inspection regimes in which DoD plays a significant role.
675

676 **Strategic Objective.** Ensure that WMD and WMD components are not produced by or
677 transferred to proliferating states or terrorists. Encourage cooperative rollback or elimination
678 and non-transfer in those instances where is already are being produced and/or stockpiled.
679

680 **Supporting Military Tasks**

- 681 • Provide military support to assist in the enforcement of agreements, resolutions, treaties,
682 and export control regimes.
- 683 • Cooperate with international organizations charged with implementing and verifying
684 multilateral nonproliferation agreements.
- 685 • Conduct information operations to support prevention as well as other mission areas.
- 686 • Identify allied strengths and capabilities in this arena and seek to incorporate them into
687 WMD plans, exercises and operations.
- 688 • Increase security cooperation with allies in areas that will strengthen our ability to
689 prevent or deny proliferation.
- 690 • Ensure the ability to conduct interdiction operations, to include support of joint and
691 combined PSI activities.
- 692 • Ensure planning for interdiction activities includes command and control planning for
693 cross-COCOM operations
- 694 • Incorporate regional country boarding agreements into interdiction planning, to include
695 planning for PSI missions.
- 696 • When tasked, support the enforcement of UN Security Council Resolution 1540.²⁸
- 697 • Through robust, fully coordinated Theater Security Cooperation plans, actively influence
698 nations to forego WMD and to support prevention and other combating WMD objectives.
- 699 • Ensure the ability to assist or lead elimination operations in each COCOM AOR when
700 tasked.
701

702
703 **Performance Measures.** Success will be measured by:

- 704 • Emergence of a strong global alliance against the pursuit, possession, and use of WMD.
- 705 • Containment of proliferation pressures in key regions. Countries with WMD programs
706 elect to terminate and eliminate those programs.
- 707 • Rollback of nuclear programs in North Korea and Iran.
- 708 • Strengthened non-proliferation treaties and international controls on WMD materials,
709 technology, and expertise.
- 710 • Enhanced regional partner capabilities and willingness to assume responsibility for non-
711 proliferation enforcement.
- 712 • Terrorists are denied access to WMD materials, technology, and knowledge.
713

²⁸ United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, adopted on 28 April 2004, requires all states to take measures to prevent non-state actors from acquiring or developing nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, and to prevent the proliferation of such weapons generally.

714
715
716
717
718
719
720
721
722
723
724
725
726
727
728
729
730
731
732
733
734
735
736
737
738
739
740
741
742
743
744
745
746
747
748
749
750
751
752
753
754
755
756
757

Threat Reduction Cooperation

Threat Reduction Cooperation addresses a number of proliferation challenges. One is the physical security of weapons, supporting materials, and critical technologies, and the expertise of a highly skilled scientific and engineering cadre. When these are poorly secured, there is a significant proliferation risk that must be mitigated proactively. This type of proliferation challenge is best exemplified by the post-Cold War situation in the Russian Federation and other former Soviet republics. There are several major programs in place designed to assist Russia and other states to dismantle the industrial scale WMD programs developed in the last century, enhance the physical security and accountability of weapons and related materials, find productive non-military work for scientists, and help prevent trafficking of WMD materials. These programs span the Departments of Defense, State and Energy. The principle purpose of these programs is to deny rogue states and terrorists access to weapons, material, and expertise. Other states may need assistance for more discrete requirements to dismantle or destroy WMD in excess of defense needs, to comply with international treaty obligations (e.g., the Chemical Weapons Convention), or to improve export control, border control, law enforcement, and anti-smuggling capabilities.

Threat Reduction Cooperation
Activities undertaken with the consent and cooperation of host nation authorities to enhance physical security, emplace detection equipment, reduce, eliminate, redirect and/or protect a state's WMD program and capabilities.

Threat Reduction Cooperation also responds to opportunities to rollback or eliminate a state's WMD programs and capabilities on cooperative terms. A good example is Libya's decision to voluntarily dismantle its WMD programs, which will be implemented under the auspices of the United States, the United Kingdom and relevant international nonproliferation bodies. Another challenge for Threat Reduction Cooperation concerns the safety and security of WMD inventories of friendly or non-hostile states. Security arrangements in some states may be viewed as inadequate to prevent theft, sabotage, or accidental release. While we may prefer to see these inventories eliminated, we have a strong interest in ensuring that weapons are as secure from theft and diversion as possible given terrorist interest in acquiring WMD.

Threat reduction cooperation occurs in a permissive environment, and while not primarily a Combatant Commander responsibility, COCOMs must maintain visibility into these efforts to ensure theater security cooperation plans and security measures are consistent with threat reduction initiatives.

Strategic Objective. Dismantle and eliminate WMD programs and capabilities on cooperative terms. Assist states to enhance protective measures to prevent theft, diversion, unintentional or inadvertent discharge, unlawful export or smuggling of WMD or related materials and technology.

758
759
760
761
762
763
764
765
766
767
768
769
770
771
772
773
774
775
776
777
778
779
780
781
782
783
784
785
786
787
788
789
790
791
792
793
794
795
796
797
798
799
800
801
802

Supporting Military Tasks.

- Support initiatives that secure current WMD, related materials, and delivery systems from theft, sabotage or unauthorized use, and that improve accountability. Provide specialized expertise as appropriate.
- Support efforts to promote the safety of WMD and delivery systems from accidental or inadvertent release. Provide specialized expertise as appropriate.
- Maintain global situational awareness of WMD safety and security issues, including the identification of intelligence indicators. Assess associated risks. Communicate concerns to senior leaders.
- Integrate regional COCOM safety/security concerns and threat prioritization with national level guidance.
- Assign component responsibilities for Threat Reduction Cooperation and coordinate efforts with other commands.
- Be prepared to provide short-notice support to cooperative WMD threat reduction efforts.

Performance Measures. Success will be measured by:

- Terrorists do not acquire WMD or associated materials once in the custody of existing WMD states.
- Continued progress in dismantling and securing WMD and associated materials in the former Soviet Union.
- Opportunities to reduce or eliminate state WMD capabilities on cooperative terms are successfully exploited.
- States develop effective programs to secure WMD and prevent unauthorized export or smuggling.
- No theft or loss of accountability for WMD, WMD components or materials.
- No successful export of unauthorized WMD, WMD components or materials.
- No significant unintentional or inadvertent discharges of weapons of mass destruction.

Elimination

Cooperative WMD threat reduction models are not applicable to the urgent requirements of an uncertain political and military environment. The United States may conduct military operations within the territory of a WMD possessor state or against terrorist programs operating within a state. Conventional air or artillery campaigns against WMD targets may be viewed as carrying unacceptable humanitarian and operational risks. Expedient elimination operations may be required to ensure the safety of troops, secure freedom of action for combat operations, or to protect non-combatants. These operations must focus initially on the immediate tasks of (i)

Elimination
Operations to systematically locate, characterize, secure, disable, and/or destroy a state or non-states actor's WMD programs and related capabilities (key personnel, weapons, production and delivery means) in uncertain environments.

803 security (i.e., securing sites and preventing the looting or capture of WMD and related materials)
804 and (ii) disablement or destruction of weapons, materials, agents and delivery systems that pose
805 an immediate or direct threat to forces and the civilian population. The next priority is to begin
806 exploitation (for intelligence purposes) of program experts and previously secured weapons and
807 material; secure, exploit, and disable WMD production capabilities to advance the elimination
808 process prior to transitioning elimination operations to an international or host-nation body. The
809 armed forces must be prepared to conduct elimination operations until senior leaders determine
810 that such a transfer of authority is warranted.

811
812 The Department must begin to develop and institutionalize a uniformed capability to
813 eliminate WMD in uncertain environments. This will require integrating the elimination mission
814 into strategy, intelligence, planning, doctrine, training, and programming processes, supported by
815 standardized definitions and terms of reference. Additional considerations for uncertain
816 environments include site and hazard identification, chain of custody and other legal
817 considerations, and procedures for elimination during combined operations.

818
819 **Strategic Objective.** Seize, secure, remove, disable or destroy a hostile state or non-state actor's
820 WMD capability, to include weapons, facilities, delivery systems, infrastructure and key
821 personnel.

822
823 **Supporting Military Tasks.**

- 824
- 825 • Plan for joint, combined WMD elimination operations in each AOR.
 - 826 • Identify intelligence needs that will allow planners to anticipate elimination requirements
827 and maximize operational readiness for elimination operations.
 - 828 • Ensure plans address capabilities to secure, render safe, exploit (characterize weapons,
829 sites, personnel, and documentation), and dispose (disable, destroy, neutralize and/or
830 transfer).
 - 831 • Ensure plans address early arrival of elimination assets and associated HQs into theater
832 and provide for supporting assets.
 - 833 • Maintain continuity of WMD elimination command and control and ensure unity of
834 command throughout the spectrum of conflict.
 - 835 • Develop information operations to encourage key personnel to come forward with
836 WMD-related information prior to or during the initial stages of conflict.
 - 837 • Identify and integrate allied capabilities (military and civilian) to support elimination
838 operations.
 - 839 • Conduct joint-combined WMD elimination exercises to include reach back procedures
840 with supporting civilian and military expertise.
 - 841 • Based on lessons learned from exercises and operations, advocate the refinement of
842 doctrine, tactics, techniques and procedures, and the acquisition of required capabilities
843 (equipment, technology, specialized personnel).
 - 844 • Focus research and development in this area on detection, exploitation, neutralization and
845 security technologies that can decrease elimination timelines and reduce manpower
846 requirements.
 - 847 • Ensure planning and R&D efforts maximize benefit to other mission areas.
- 848

849 **Performance Measures.** Success will be measured by:

- 850
- 851 • The establishment of adequate forces trained, organized and equipped to support
- 852 COCOM WMD elimination operations.
- 853 • The integration of WMD elimination operations in all applicable war plans.
- 854 • The integration of WMD elimination in military concept development, doctrine, training,
- 855 tactics, techniques and procedures.
- 856 • The integration of allied and civilian capabilities into plans, exercises and operations.
- 857 • Acquisition of needed capabilities to improve WMD elimination operations.

858

859 **Interdiction**

860

861 WMD interdiction has emerged as a
862 significant element of national combating WMD
863 strategy, so much so that it is now codified in a
864 separate Presidential guidance document.²⁹ A
865 more systematic approach to interdiction is a
866 response to the growing volume and complexity
867 of the trade in WMD materials and technologies. Without a sustained effort to track and disrupt
868 this trade, the U.S. and its security partners will miss critical opportunities to reduce the threat and
869 call to account proliferant nations and their suppliers. A comprehensive approach to interdiction
870 has a strong interagency dimension that reflects the intelligence, diplomatic, legal, military, and
871 technology considerations shaping policy and action. There are new interagency structures to review
872 intelligence assessments, develop courses of action, and assess political, legal and operational issues.
873 The goal is to develop a capability to quickly prepare recommendations to decision makers in
874 response to unfolding interdiction opportunities. Clearly, this enterprise is critically dependent on
875 timely and credible intelligence. The Intelligence Community has been tasked to develop a strategy
876 to focus its collection and analysis efforts to better support interdiction.

877

878 The new approach to interdiction has taken shape through a number of initiatives, most
879 prominent of which is the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). Under the PSI, a growing coalition
880 of like-minded nations is now planning, exercising and executing interdiction operations aimed at
881 disrupting WMD related dual-use technology proliferation. The PSI has developed in a coordinated
882 fashion based on routine interaction with participating states, but has not yet been the focus of
883 deliberate planning or concept development in DoD. Equally important, planning is not yet
884 informed by a comprehensive review of the full range of activities that comprise the interdiction
885 mission area.

886

887 Interdiction may occur at sea, on land, or in the air. Military commanders must be prepared
888 to coordinate with other agencies and international partners to execute and support interdiction
889 operations in their AORs. Commanders must also assess the range of capabilities required to
890 conduct interdiction operations in all operating environments.

891

Interdiction
Operations to stop WMD, delivery systems,
and associated technologies and material
from transiting between state and non-state
actors of concern.

²⁹ National Security Presidential Directive.

892 **Strategic Objective.** Shipments of WMD, delivery systems, related material, technologies and
893 knowledge are detected and interdicted. States and non-state actors of proliferation concern are
894 denied access to these materials and expertise. Proliferation networks are disrupted and
895 disbanded. Access to WMD related material, technologies and expertise is more difficult and/or
896 costly.
897

898 **Supporting Military Tasks.**
899

- 900 • Develop requirements for improved intelligence collection and analysis to maximize
901 visibility into suspect proliferation trafficking, including dual-use items.
- 902 • Develop means to disseminate intelligence in a timely way at appropriate operational
903 levels to support planning and execution of interdiction operations.
- 904 • Ensure an effective degree of coordination through military-to-military and interagency
905 contacts. Interagency considerations include intelligence, diplomatic, law enforcement
906 and financial/economic.
- 907 • Develop and execute robust information operations conveying U.S. and international
908 interdiction capabilities as a means to influence the behavior of those trafficking in WMD
909 materials.
- 910 • Maintain a robust joint-combined interdiction exercise program.
- 911 • Develop courses of action that encompass WMD interdiction across the spectrum of
912 conflict using both conventional and non-conventional forces, to include support of joint
913 and combined PSI operations. Plans should provide maximum effect to other mission
914 areas.
- 915 • Ensure planning for interdiction activities includes command and control planning for
916 cross-COCOM operations.
- 917 • Incorporate regional boarding agreements into interdiction planning, to include planning
918 for PSI missions.
- 919 • When tasked, support the enforcement of United Nations Security Council Resolution
920 1540.
921

922 **Performance Measures.** Success will be measured by:
923

- 924 • Forces are trained, organized and equipped for WMD interdiction operations.
- 925 • Intelligence supports timely operations and targeting of key proliferators networks,
926 materials and WMD.
- 927 • Illicit trafficking in WMD materials becomes less frequent as successful interdiction
928 operations increases both the costs and risks to proliferators and suppliers.
- 929 • WMD interdiction concepts are embedded in doctrine, CONOPS, TSC plans, tactics,
930 techniques and procedures, and requirements planning.
- 931 • Research, development and acquisition programs yield capabilities that improve the
932 ability to successfully execute WMD interdiction operations.
- 933 • Interdiction activities positively affect other mission area objectives.
934
935

936
937
938
939

Offensive Operations

940 Offensive operations serve as a deterrent
941 by demonstrating the capability to deliver
942 strategic effects using kinetic (conventional and
943 nuclear) and non-kinetic means. Offensive
944 operations encompass the detection,
945 identification, disruption and/or destruction of an
946 adversary's WMD assets, means of delivery and associated facilities. This mission area also
947 requires maintaining a capability to locate, secure and recover/destroy stolen WMD. Offensive
948 operations against adversary WMD may be conducted at any time across the spectrum of conflict
949 – from pre-emptive strikes to neutralize WMD before they can be used, to strikes concurrent
950 with major combat operations, to punitive strikes in response to WMD use.

Offensive Operations
Operations using kinetic and/or non-kinetic
means to neutralize a WMD threat and,
when necessary, respond to the use of
WMD.

951 High confidence in offensive operations requires possessing a portfolio of strike
952 capabilities that can achieve desired effects against the range of adversary WMD anywhere,
953 anytime. The hallmarks of future strike forces to combat WMD must be full-spectrum lethality,
954 standoff access, and prompt response, supported by effects-based planning tools and adaptive
955 planning methodologies. Strike systems must be capable of imposing a wide range of predictable
956 effects from overwhelming to surgical throughout the depth of the adversary's territory, at distances
957 ranging from close-in to global, in all weather conditions, and in some cases will need to do so very
958 rapidly (i.e., in minutes). Strike systems must also provide national leaders with options to "change
959 the character" of a conflict, especially in response to adversary attacks that escalate the level of
960 violence, such as WMD use. Defeating WMD targets requires specialized capabilities and
961 operational concepts that rely heavily on precise, persistent, and timely intelligence – to locate and
962 identify targets, understand the characteristics of structures, optimize munitions delivery to minimize
963 collateral effects, and assess combat effectiveness.

964
965 **Strategic Objective.** Disable or destroy an adversary's WMD and related capabilities prior to or
966 after use. Deliver a decisive response to an adversary's use of WMD.

Supporting Military Tasks

- 969
- 970 • Develop plans and capabilities to prevent adversary employment of WMD through kinetic
971 and non-kinetic strikes.
 - 972 • Develop plans and capabilities to respond with an appropriate level of force in response to
973 the use of WMD.
 - 974 • Maintain and exercise appropriate forces.
 - 975 • Where appropriate synchronize plans for offensive operations with those being developed
976 to support the Global Strike mission.
 - 977 • Identify and integrate allied capabilities into plans and exercises.
 - 978 • Advocate for capabilities to fill recognized gaps in capability with respect to intelligence,
979 lethality, long-range prompt strike, and effects-based planning tools.
- 980

981 **Performance Measures.** Success will be measured by:

- 982
- 983 • Adversary WMD targets at all ranges can be attacked quickly and effectively using
- 984 regional or CONUS controlled capabilities.
- 985 • Collateral effects resulting from such strikes are minimal or non-existent.
- 986 • Initial or follow-on WMD attacks are deterred.
- 987 • Progress is achieved in addressing capability shortfalls.

988

989 WMD Active Defense

990

991 Active defense operations include but are
992 not limited to missile defense (ballistic and cruise),
993 air defense, special operations, and security
994 operations to defend against conventionally and
995 unconventionally delivered WMD. The goal is to

<p style="text-align: center;">WMD Active Defense Measures to prevent or defeat the conventional and unconventional delivery of WMD.</p>

996 achieve a layered capability to defeat the full scope of delivery means in defense of the
997 homeland, expeditionary forces, and other assets and interests in forward regions. A layered,
998 networked defensive capability will incorporate land, sea, air, and space-based systems, and will
999 employ both kinetic and non-kinetic (e.g., directed energy) means of defeat. Systems in forward
1000 regions and those defending the homeland, enabled by robust command and control and battle
1001 management, should provide a seamless, mutually supportive network of global protection.
1002

1003 Active defense is an essential component of DoD transformation, and also contributes
1004 importantly to achieving defense policy goals. Active defenses are a potentially powerful means
1005 to reassure friends and strengthen alliance relationships. Active defenses support dissuasion
1006 efforts by neutralizing the investment adversaries make in advanced delivery means and
1007 demonstrating U.S. ability to prevail in strategic competition. Active defenses strengthen
1008 deterrence by denying adversaries the expected benefits of strategic threats and attacks. A
1009 growing number of nations are developing, acquiring, or expressing interest in active defense
1010 capabilities. Combatant command must integrate emerging concepts for global protection into
1011 their plans.
1012

1013 **Strategic Objective.** Successfully intercept, neutralize or destroy WMD being employed
1014 against the United States, its forces, interests or allies.
1015

1016 **Supporting Military Tasks.**

1017

- 1018 • Develop intelligence requirements for tracking and identifying all systems capable of
- 1019 delivering WMD.
- 1020 • Disseminate intelligence in real-time to appropriate operational levels to ensure timely
- 1021 assessment of attacks in progress and initiation of active defense operations.
- 1022 • Assess threats in the AOR that require the maintenance of active defense capabilities.
- 1023 Threat assessment should address comprehensively the range of possible delivery means.

1024

1025

- 1026
- 1027
- 1028
- 1029
- 1030
- 1031
- 1032
- 1033
- 1034
- 1035
- 1036
- 1037
- 1038
- 1039
- 1040
- 1041
- Integrate applicable active defense programs and capabilities into plans, exercises, and operational activities. Determine how various systems and capabilities are to be networked. Consider the potentially unique command and control issues associated with a distributed network of active defense systems.
 - Assess the active defense requirements of host nations. Address these requirements in security assistance planning.
 - Assess the active defense capabilities of regional partners and their potential contribution to common security objectives, future operations. Where appropriate, work to integrate partner active defense capabilities into U.S. concepts for global protection and associated cooperative activities.
 - Develop plans to address unconventional delivery by state and non-state actors. Coordinate these plans with USSOCOM efforts to combat terrorist activities.
 - Consider how certain active defenses (i.e., ballistic missile defense) can be integrated with other strategic missions.
 - Enhance conventional force security operations to counter a WMD attack in progress.

1042 **Performance Measures.** Success will be measured by:

- 1043
- 1044
- 1045
- 1046
- 1047
- 1048
- 1049
- 1050
- 1051
- 1052
- 1053
- 1054
- 1055
- Deployment of a layered networked active defense capable of neutralizing all adversary means of delivering WMD.
 - Adequate forces are trained, organized and equipped to support the WMD active defense mission.
 - WMD active defense is integrated into all applicable war plans and operational planning systems.
 - The active defense capabilities of regional partners are integrated into plans and operations, as appropriate.
 - WMD active defense concepts are integrated into military doctrine, CONOPS, tactics, techniques and procedures.
 - Development and acquisition activities yield capabilities to address the full range of WMD active defense requirements.

1056

1057

1058 **WMD Passive Defense**

1059

1060

1061

1062

1063

1064

1065

1066

1067

Passive defense measures protect the force and other essential personnel, operations and facilities from WMD, allowing operations to continue at the required tempo. Passive defense operations are addressed extensively in joint and service doctrine, and are organized around four key operational functions:

Passive Defense
Measures to minimize the vulnerabilities and minimize the effects of WMD employed against forces, installations, and key infrastructure.

- 1068
- 1069
- 1070
- **Sense** – The capability to continually provide information about the CBRN situation.
 - **Shape** – The capability to characterize CBRN hazards to understand the current situation and predict future events.

- 1071 • **Shield** – The capability to protect from the hazard.
1072 • **Sustain** – The capability to continue to operate in a contaminated environment.
1073

1074 These capabilities are achieved through contamination avoidance (technical detection,
1075 surveillance, warning and reporting), individual protection (suits and masks), collective
1076 protection (shelters and filtration systems), decontamination/restoration, and medical
1077 countermeasures (vaccines, treatments, and diagnostics). Success in passive defense operations
1078 depends on the effective integration of equipment, trained personnel, and proven tactics,
1079 techniques and procedures. Training and exercising is essential. Passive defense capabilities are
1080 likely to be integral to the execution of other combating WMD mission areas, including
1081 interdiction, elimination, and consequence management. COCOM plans must reflect the cross-
1082 cutting nature of passive defense operations and the practical interconnections between these
1083 mission areas.
1084

1085 There are well documented shortfalls in passive defense systems and capabilities, and
1086 operational plans should demonstrate flexibility to work around possible capability gaps.
1087 Additionally, COCOMs must prioritize their needs to ensure effective advocacy and allocation of
1088 technology base and procurement resources. COCOMs should work through STRATCOM and,
1089 as needed, the established passive defense requirements generation and program execution
1090 process.
1091

1092 Cooperative activities with regional partners to improve their indigenous passive defense
1093 capabilities are an important contribution to common threat awareness, coalition building, and
1094 interoperability. Additionally, Combatant Commands must remain cognizant of relevant
1095 interagency activities, particularly in the area of medical defense.³⁰
1096

1097 **Strategic Objective.** Provide forces, key personnel and other assets with reliable warning and
1098 characterization of WMD attacks. Provide a range of protective measures to minimize the
1099 effects of WMD exposure and allow operations to continue with limited or no degradation.
1100

1101 **Supporting Military Tasks** 1102

- 1103 • Maintain continuous situational awareness of the operational threat from adversary WMD
1104 in AORs. Develop responsive passive defense plans to minimize vulnerabilities and
1105 operational degradation.
- 1106 • Field WMD detection, surveillance and warning systems using appropriate tactics,
1107 techniques and procedures. Integrate contamination avoidance systems into existing
1108 command and control networks.
- 1109 • Maintain a robust medical surveillance capability to supplement technical biological
1110 agent detectors.
- 1111 • Field individual and collective protection equipment, decontamination systems and
1112 medical countermeasures, supported by appropriate tactics, techniques, and procedures.

³⁰ For example, the Interagency Working Group on WMD Medical Countermeasures seeks to leverage the capabilities of several federal departments. It is co-chaired by Departments of Health and Human Services, Homeland Security, and Defense.

- 1113 • Identify the passive defense requirements associated with other combating WMD mission
1114 areas.
1115 • Assess the passive defense requirements of host nations and other existing or potential
1116 coalition partners. Address these requirements in security assistance planning and
1117 determine the degree to which these requirements could affect the execution of OPLANS
1118 if not met. Of particular importance are requirements for medical countermeasures to
1119 biological warfare threats.
1120 • Continue to work with regional partners to improve passive defense capabilities.
1121 Continually assess these capabilities and their potential contribution to common security
1122 objectives and future operations. As appropriate, integrate these capabilities into
1123 operational plans and exercises.
1124 • Identify passive defense programmatic requirements and advocate through
1125 USSTRATCOM.
1126

1127 **Performance Measures.** Success will be measured by:
1128

- 1129 • Forces, key personnel, and key facilities receive timely, reliable warning. Protective
1130 measures minimize the effects of WMD attacks. Operational degradation is minimal to
1131 non-existent.
1132 • Adequate forces are trained, organized and equipped to support the WMD passive
1133 defense mission area.
1134 • Passive defense operations are integrated into all applicable plans.
1135 • Passive defense doctrine, concepts, training, and equipment keep pace with evolving
1136 threats and advances in science and technology.
1137 • The passive defense requirements and capabilities of regional partners are assessed and
1138 factored into the plans and operations.
1139
1140

1141 WMD Consequence Management

1142 The Department of Defense provides
1143 consequence management (CM) support to the
1144 Lead Federal Agency (LFA). The Department of
1145 Homeland Security is LFA for a CONUS WMD
1146 event and the Department of State (DoS) is LFA
1147 on foreign territory for coordinating responses to host nation requests for support. The principal
1148 exception is when the armed forces are conducting major combat operations. In this
1149 circumstance, DoD is responsible for foreign consequence management operations in the battle
1150 space. U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) is the lead combatant command for a WMD
1151 event in the continental United States, and provides technical assistance to supported combatant
1152 commanders conducting foreign CM operations
1153

WMD Consequence Management
Activities to mitigate the effects of WMD
use and restore essential operations and
services.

1154
1155 Currently, U.S. forces may conduct CM operations in a designated joint operations area
1156 to minimize damage from incidents involving the deliberate or inadvertent release of CBRNE
1157 weapons or contaminants causing significant civilian casualties or damage to critical
1158 infrastructures. Foreign consequence management operations do not include operations

1159 conducted by U.S. forces to prepare for, respond to, or recover from events occurring on U.S.
1160 installations abroad or involving only U.S. forces abroad. These operations are considered
1161 normal U.S. military force protection or disaster response operations.
1162

1163 The Department of Defense does not maintain dedicated consequence management
1164 forces. Any DoD response will be comprised of task-organized forces. Combatant Commanders
1165 must define a command and control structure to support and exercise designated response forces,
1166 including rapid reaction contingencies. Foreign consequence management operations are likely
1167 to require a significant coordination effort in the interagency and with local authorities.
1168 Combatant Commands must have in place effective coordination mechanisms.
1169

1170 **Strategic Objective.** Mitigate the effects of WMD use against U.S. territory, deployed forces,
1171 and allies. Restore essential operations and services.
1172

1173 **Supporting Military Tasks**

1174

- 1175 • Develop plans and tailored force packages to execute foreign consequence management
1176 to include command and control, passive defense elements, sample collection and
1177 packaging, health services, casualty management, humanitarian assistance, public affairs,
1178 civil affairs, *et al.* Decontamination capabilities (individual and large area/equipment)
1179 may be particularly important.
- 1180 • Provide support to Lead Federal Agencies for consequence management operations in
1181 CONUS and overseas. Coordinate early with Department of State authorities to delineate
1182 roles and responsibilities for foreign consequence management.
- 1183 • Develop procedures for exchanging support request between COCOMs, Department of
1184 State officials, and subordinate commanders. Integrate procedures into theater plans and
1185 documents.
- 1186 • When assigned, support requests by affected COCOMs for consequence management
1187 forces and assets.
- 1188 • Develop a command and control structure to support and exercise consequence
1189 management response forces. Integrate this structure into plans, exercises, and operations.
- 1190 • Assess the contribution local militaries can make to foreign consequence management
1191 operations and integrate this into plans.
- 1192 • Where applicable, preposition materials to support consequence management operations.
1193

1194 **Performance Measures**

1195

- 1196 • Plans and capabilities to support consequence management operations in CONUS or
1197 overseas across the spectrum of conflict are planned and exercised.
- 1198 • Coordination mechanisms and procedures to support timely response to requests for
1199 consequence management support are in place and exercised.
- 1200 • To the degree feasible, consequence management support equipment and materials are
1201 pre-positioned.
- 1202 • WMD consequence management concepts are integrated into doctrine, training,
1203 exercises, and resource planning.
1204

Chapter 5

Key Enabling Capabilities

Key enablers are cross-cutting capabilities that facilitate execution of the military strategy. Their impact is strategic in that they enhance the effectiveness and integration of combating WMD mission capabilities across the board, to include interagency and international activities. Commanders must continually assess enabling capabilities and identify required improvements.

Critical enabling capabilities include, but are not limited to, the following:

Intelligence Collection, Analysis, and Exploitation. A high degree of global situational awareness is a foundation and a goal of the combating WMD strategy. A more accurate and complete understanding of the full range of WMD threats, proliferation activities, and trends is vital to developing effective near and long-term approaches to the proliferation challenge. Timely, actionable intelligence is indispensable to planning and executing all combating WMD missions, from political and diplomatic initiatives to offensive operations and recovery from WMD attack. Our goal is to establish a global common operating picture (COP) for combating WMD that will synthesize available knowledge and estimates for state and non-state actors and activities of interest, to include existing stockpiles, known and suspected WMD locations, operational capabilities, proliferation pathways, procurement networks, and key personnel.

The common operating picture must promote a comprehensive understanding of state and non-state actor WMD programs – not simply the individual program elements, but how they are linked internally as well as externally to the activities of other actors. Because WMD proliferation is a trans-regional phenomenon, the COP must provide meaningful links between Combatant Commands and the basis for collaborative assessments, plans, and operations. Further, because successful execution of the combating WMD strategy relies heavily on other U.S. government agencies and the support of allies, the means to fully integrate knowledge from non-DoD sources must be developed. Establishing protocols and methodologies for rapid information exchange is an urgent requirement.

WMD intelligence must not be simply a static input to plans. Rather, it must be tightly tied to active combating WMD operations, and intelligence personnel should be closely and continuously aligned with personnel engaged in such operations. One reason is that combating WMD operations are likely to yield new intelligence, and this must purposefully be captured and integrated into ongoing assessments and plans. Interdiction and elimination are good examples of combating WMD operations that can yield new intelligence. Robust real time connectivity between mission executors and the intelligence community is essential to mission success.

Intelligence must keep pace with the changing nature of the threat, national strategy, and the combating WMD mission space. Many intelligence techniques for monitoring WMD are well known to adversaries or not well suited to discovering hidden WMD activities. Fixing this problem requires developing new sources and methods, including those enabled by cost-effective improvements to data processing capabilities. New standoff and close-in surveillance

1250 technologies are needed for persistent intrusive sensing that can offer a degree of visibility into
1251 WMD activities to support not only interdiction, elimination, and strike operations, but
1252 diplomacy and deterrence as well.

1253
1254 WMD intelligence must be responsive to the emphasis in national strategy on proactive
1255 measures and engaging proliferation challenges before they fully manifest as threats to vital
1256 interests. This will require improvements across a number of intelligence disciplines, to include
1257 enhanced exploitation of open and commercial information sources and improved means to track
1258 people and things of interest. Collection and analysis strategies that focus on key individuals, the
1259 finances of WMD programs, commercial transactions, and key transport means and nodes are
1260 particularly important. New missions such as interdiction and elimination may require new
1261 approaches and technologies for collection and analysis.

1262
1263 To address these and related issues, it is imperative that there be close and continuing
1264 interaction and strong working relationships between the intelligence and combating WMD
1265 communities.

1266
1267 **Strategic Communications.** The goal of our strategic communications effort is to create
1268 a global environment hostile to WMD proliferation and use. In this environment, there is a
1269 strong global alliance against WMD, reinforced global norms that further delegitimize WMD,
1270 and demonstrable will to act against those who violate accepted norms. Those engaged in
1271 proliferation must be led to conclude that WMD acquisition, possession, and use are detrimental
1272 to their interests and security. Making progress toward these ends requires the effective
1273 execution of the overall military strategy, but also sustained and sophisticated integration of
1274 diplomacy, public affairs, and information operations in DoD, across the interagency
1275 community, and internationally. Efforts under the International Activities mission will focus on
1276 this challenge.

1277
1278 A comprehensive combating WMD strategic communications strategy will have global,
1279 regional, and country-specific elements. It will seek to shape perceptions regarding the WMD
1280 challenge among governments, publics, and opinion leaders. It will be directed at both friendly
1281 states in order to strengthen international consensus, as well as hostile states in order to reinforce
1282 the costs and risks associated with WMD acquisition and use. It will leverage the full range of
1283 communications means available today and in the future and develop an integrated set of
1284 messages and media for consumption in a variety of languages.

1285
1286 **Research and Development.** The National Strategy to Combat WMD identifies
1287 research and development (R&D) as a critical integrating function.³¹ There is indeed a pressing
1288 need for leading-edge technology solutions across the combating WMD missions – to support
1289 enhanced remote sensing, detection and characterization; WMD safety and security; the unique
1290 requirements of interdiction and elimination; new strike capabilities; countermeasures
1291 development; recovery operations; attribution; data processing and analysis; strategic
1292 communications, and other analytic and operational requirements. All DoD components must
1293 work closely with the science and technology, acquisition, and requirements communities, OSD

³¹ National Strategy to Combat WMD, p. 6.

1294 AT&L and J8 Joint Requirements office to identify high priority R&D initiatives and ensure
1295 appropriate investments are being made.
1296

1297 Beyond this, DoD requires a comprehensive R&D strategy to sustain the combating
1298 WMD mission over the mid- and long-term. The threat will not remain static, and in some
1299 important respects (e.g., biological weapons) the WMD offense will continue to dominate the
1300 defense. DoD's R&D strategy must consider both likely threat trends as well as non-linear,
1301 alternative, or counter-intuitive directions adversaries may take. It must facilitate a speedier
1302 "lab-to-field" transition for new technologies. Today, the process for bringing new products to
1303 the field is too slow. Finally, a DoD R&D strategy must support and complement a five-year
1304 comprehensive, national-level combating WMD investment strategy under consideration.
1305

1306 **Strengthened International Cooperation.** The National Strategy to Combat WMD
1307 highlights this critical enabler as well.³² As previously noted, cooperation from overseas partners
1308 and the international community is a force multiplier in the battle against WMD. International
1309 partners provide knowledge, information, access, political and material support, and operational
1310 capability. Combatant command Theater Security Cooperation plans provide a principal means
1311 to establish and sustain critical working relationships that can be leveraged to support the
1312 combating WMD mission. Likewise, intelligence-sharing arrangements are an important aspect
1313 of building a common front against WMD proliferation. And combatant commands must be
1314 prepared to develop, support, and participate in combating WMD activities by "coalitions of the
1315 willing." The Proliferation Security Initiative is a good example of such a coalition – like-
1316 minded nations working together to enhance collective combating WMD capabilities, prepared
1317 to act opportunistically against threats when they emerge.
1318

1319 **Targeted Strategies Against Proliferators and Terrorists.** The national military
1320 strategy recognizes that while the WMD threat represents a global danger, each WMD challenge
1321 is different and requires a tailored approach. As an example, focused diplomacy enabled by
1322 sound intelligence and political, military, and economic leverage has yielded the promise of a
1323 comprehensive rollback of Libya's WMD and missile programs. Whether this provides a model
1324 for disarmament in other states of concern remains to be seen.³³ And just as the National
1325 Strategy to Combat WMD provides the President with an expanded set of responses to complex
1326 strategic challenges, the National Military Strategy to Combat WMD provides guidance to the
1327 armed forces for operational and resource planning. Neither document provides ready-made
1328 solutions for specific problems. Senior leaders and commanders, as well as planners and
1329 operators, must demonstrate flexibility in developing and executing situation-specific plans and
1330 options.
1331

1332 With regard to targeted strategies against WMD terrorism, the mechanisms, methods and
1333 lines of authority for dealing with terrorist organizations differ in nature from those used to deal
1334 with state actors. Clearly, if we are successful in reducing the terror threat, the prospects for
1335 WMD terrorism decline as well. At the same time, the potential linkages between state
1336 proliferators and terrorists interested in acquiring WMD carry such high risk that every effort

³² Ibid.

³³ See "Combating WMD: Challenges for the Next 10 Years," A Report of the Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction, National Defense University, February 2005, p. 7.

1337 must be made to make the Global War on Terror and the combating WMD mission as mutually
1338 supportive as possible.

1339
1340 **Force Projection.** The ability of the armed forces to project power globally,
1341 deploy and sustain forces, and conduct effective operations is a key to success in combating
1342 WMD. This includes the capability to rapidly task organize required capabilities to project force
1343 and to deploy to multiple locations simultaneously. Some combating WMD contingencies will
1344 require rapid response to an unfolding situation. Combating WMD-specific capabilities must be
1345 part of our global force presence and our rapid response capability. Although combating WMD
1346 forces will generally make use of existing mobility force support, there may be unique mobility
1347 capabilities that need to be acquired.

1348
1349
1350
1351
1352
1353
1354
1355
1356
1357
1358
1359
1360
1361
1362
1363
1364
1365
1366
1367
1368

Chapter 6

Conclusion

The United States faces adversaries whose techniques are shifting away from challenging the U.S. through *traditional* military action to adopting asymmetric capabilities and methods. The threshold for WMD use has been lowered through world events over the past decade. Our adversaries may resort to using WMD to counter our military dominance or produce the mass casualties to support their ends. The Department of Defense must remain prepared to prevent and deny the proliferation of WMD and related material, reverse and eliminate existing WMD stockpiles, defeat WMD use and protect, respond and recover from a WMD attack. Should our adversaries choose to employ WMD then we will respond with overwhelming force to deter future use. The implementation of this strategy requires a DoD-wide effort to integrate and synchronize the eight combating WMD mission areas resulting in focused doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership, personnel and facilities for combating WMD. The effectiveness of this strategy is dependent on those charged with its implementation. In order to defeat our adversaries we must transform our capabilities and methods of employment. The nation depends on the successful implementation of this strategy – In that regard we cannot fail.