15 November 2003. Additional police files:
http://cryptome.org/billy-wright2.htm
13 September 2003.
The documents below appear to show that security deficiencies at HMP Maze (aerial photo) by which the killers gained access to Billy Wright, and the killers' intentions, were known beforehand by government authorities. The "smoking gun" document is Page 5. Images of the 9 pages in a Zipped file:
http://cryptome.org/billy-wright-9.zip (1.9 MB)
UK parliamentary debate 19 June 2003 on the Billy Wright murder. The first statement appears to refer to some of the documents below:
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200203/cmhansrd/cm030619/debtext/30619-32.htmhttp://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200203/cmhansrd/cm030619/debtext/30619-33.htm
Reports on the murder:
http://www.sundaylife.co.uk/news/story.jsp?story=426011
20 July 2003NIO told Wright 'to be taken out'
By Sunday Life reporter
A STORMONT minister was warned that INLA prisoners were threatening to murder LVF inmates at the Maze - five months before top loyalist, Billy Wright, was shot inside the jail. Sunday Life can reveal that representatives of the Prison Officers Association gave the warning, during a meeting with Northern Ireland Office Minister, Adam Ingram, on July 7, 1997. An agenda of the meeting reveals that the POA said INLA inmates had told staff "they intend, given a chance, to take out the LVF". The POA said precautions had been put in place to ensure inmates from the two terror groups did not come into contact with each other. But POA sources said Mr Ingram was also told prison officers had grave concerns over security measures in H Block 6, where Wright and the LVF were housed. Five months later, LVF leader Wright was ambushed by an INLA team, led by Christopher 'Crip' McWilliams, inside the top security jail.
But it has now emerged that the prison authorities were also aware of warders' concerns that McWilliams - who was behind bars for killing a Catholic bar manager - was plotting an attack. We have information the prison authorities had possession of written reports, known as 'half-sheets', from experienced prison officers, which stated that INLA prisoners, including McWilliams, were making preparations for an attack within the Maze, in the summer of 1997. It is understood governors were first warned about concerns that McWilliams was planning an operation, in May 1997. McWilliams and another high profile INLA prisoner were spotted examining the security fence, in the exercise yard at H Block 6. Prison sources also revealed that, on one occasion, prisoners had managed to break the lock on a metal grille in H Block 6, and were openly walking about the exercise yard unsupervised, during the night.
DUP deputy leader, Peter Robinson, recently accused the Government of covering up the murder of Wright. The East Belfast MP told the House of Commons he had been sent a copy of the police file into Wright's death. He said the contents of the file strengthened the call for a full public inquiry into the murder. Mr Robinson said the file gave rise to a number of very serious questions about the failure of the authorities to heed any of a number of warnings, from prison staff, before the murder of Billy Wright.
High Court boost for father's campaign
THE High Court has ruled that Wright's father is entitled to see the statements of two witnesses, listed but not called, to give evidence, at the 1999 inquest into the death of the LVF leader. Mr Justice Brian Kerr said the Chief Constable's opposition to the release of the statements was "not well founded". The Coroner for Greater Belfast, John Leckey, had agreed to hand over the statements to David Wright, but the Chief Constable objected on the grounds that the papers remained confidential to the PSNI. David Wright said he was delighted with the ruling.
http://www.rte.ie/news/2003/0307/wright.html
Wright's father fails in police files bid(19:53) The father of the murdered Loyalist paramilitary leader, Billy Wright, has failed in an attempt to gain access to police files on the investigation into the killing. The High Court in Belfast ruled that David Wright did not have to see the papers at this stage. Mr Justice Kerr said he should wait until an inquiry into the killing, being carried out by retired Canadian judge, Peter Corry, was completed. Billy Wright, who led the Loyalist Volunteer Force, was fatally shot inside the Maze Prison by the INLA just after Christmas, 1997.
Mr Justice Kerr told David Wright that none of the inquiries to date into his son's murder had provided satisfactory answers to key questions such as whether there was any evidence of collusion on the part of members of the prison service in Billy Wright's murder. In his ruling said he was satisfied that an investigation compatible with human rights legislation had not yet taken place. Such an investigation he said: "would have to address directly such issues as to how the murderers were able to penetrate the forecourt area unobserved, how they were able to obtain the materials to manufacture the weapons used, how they knew Mr Wright would be in the prison van at the time the murder took place and whether there was any evidence of collusion on the part of members of prison staff."
Speaking outside the court, Mr Wright said he was delighted the judge had highlighted the shortcomings into all the circumstances surrounding his son's death.
http://www.niprisonservice.gov.uk/maze.htm
[Excerpt]The killing of prisoner Billy Wright
On 27 December 1997 Prisoner Billy Wright, the leader of the LVF faction at the Maze, was shot and killed in the forecourt of an H Block while being transported to the visits complex. Three members of the Irish National Liberation Army faction surrendered themselves and their weapons and were subsequently convicted of the murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. They were later released under the Northern Ireland (Sentences) Act resulting from the Good Friday Agreement.
[Hardcopy, 9 pages]
[Seal and letterhead]
H.M.P. Maze
Halftown Road
Maze
LISBURN
Co. Atrim
BT27 5RF
Tel: 01846 683111 x 2412
[Following two pages handwritten]
11th September 1997
Mr. W. Gribben
Health and Safety Officer
HMP Maze
Governor S. Davis
i/c Security Department
HMP Maze
Staff Concerns for Personal Safety
Sir,
I wish to report for your information that on Wednesday 10th September 97 Officer J. Blundell and myself were requested to attend H Block 6 as staff wished to bring to our attention their concern for their personal safety.
When we arrived Principal Officer D. Loyal asked us to come into his office and assembled his spare staff who highlighted their concerns which I have listed below:
1. Their Fear of Smoke.
Many staff have vivid memories of the LVF incident on 13-8-97. Therefore due to no contingency plans being evident, this Association again formally request supply of PPV units into each block.
I attach a copy of a report for PPV testing of 'H' Block in HMP Maze which took place on Tuesday 13 February 1996.
It is apparrent [sic] that few lessons from similar incidents in December 93 and March 95 have been learnt, where staff are trapped in blocks.
2. Failure of Electric Locks and Override System.
This is a major cause of concern. We formally request a full investigation and provision of report on this technology to ascertain why the electric power was lost to the whole block on 13-8-97 and why the ECR override did not work.
Trades officers who were in the block at the time of the incident with override keys for the establishment. None of them worked.
The whole system also broke down on 13-2-97 when H3 suffered a power loss after a power surge. Staff were trapped within the block for 20-30 minutes before power was restored.
As far as we are aware the reason for this has not been assertained [sic]. Health and safety legislation and the Governor's safety policy states that the employer must provide a safe place and system of work. These recorded incidents prove that is not the case and must be addressed.
3. Access to Roof from A + B Side.
Due to recent threats from the INLA that they will burn H6 if LVF are returned, leaves staff extremely concerned about the ease of access to H6 roof from A + B side of the block.
[Page 2.]
2 of 2
The same seranic [?] now exists which allowed H Block 3 to gain access to their roof.
I.E., only one coil of concertina wire above the inspection area at the rear of the block.
H6 A + B has rear sterile gates in place -- but left in the open position. We therefore formally request that these gates be locked so as to slow down action by the INLA of gaining access to the block roof. Thus allowing staff to vacate the block if an incident occurs.
4. Lack of Alarms.
Concern was raised by all H6 staff who highlighted how vulnerable they felt at having no alarms in place.
Recently there had been requests via security for a 'silent alarm' to be installed until block alarms were back on stream.
We were concerned to find that this matter had not been addressed. As pointed out earlier, management have a responsibility under health and safety legislation to provide a safe place and system of work.
A risk assessment on procedures must have been carried out after the H6 incident and alarms must have been considered. Therefore this Association formally requests that urgent consideration be given to rectify this oversight.
5. Wash Up.
This Association formally request a post incident wash up meeting be arranged for all concerned to promote an open and frank exchange of observations and comments on the events throughout the incident and suggest recommendations that would assist in the future management of prison incidents.
6. Key Boxes.
Concern was highlighted over the way block control room key boxes and keys in smash glass housing are marked and laid out. Staff who had worked in Mourne House, HMP Maghaberry said valuable lessons could be learnt by Maze if they organised a visit to see their set up.
I am sir,
Jim Duffy
Branch Secretary
c.c. Mr. J. Smyth
Vice Chairman
POA (N.I.)
[Page 3.]
[Handwritten]
Extract from Gov/POA Meeting 9 Oct 1996
[Printed]
(5) Staff Levels in Blocks
Mr. Duffy said that at the present time staffing levels in Blocks are in critical situation. Staff are being redeployed to Visits and security posts in Blocks are not being manned.
Mr. Woods advised that initially Block posts as per agreement February 1996 will be fully manned and any spare staff will be fed back into the system. [Underline by hand.]
6. Main Stores
Mr. Duffy said the POA has written to Mr Gribben reference their concern for staff health & safety. Recently there were 2 new committals in H3 and there was insufficient bedding for them as the Main Stores couldn't provide any and they had to borrow bedding from other sources. An emergency incident could arise due to insufficient stores not being available. POA felt this was part of a cut-back due to budget delegation.
Mr Woods rang Stores who confirmed that duvets and other bedding items are now in stock and there has been no restriction on the amount they can order.
[Handwritten]
Saturday 27th December 97
* Gov McKee removed staff from yard observation towers to go to Visits.
* ECR have complained for last 3 weeks on a daily basis that overview camera's [sic] not working.
* Wright/Green first two LVF for Visits on 27-12-97 from H6.
[Page 4.]
[Form filled by hand.]
[cropped] SERVICE
NORTHERN IRELAND
Staff Communications Sheet
Establishment H.M.P. Maze Staff No. 9236
Name in CAPITAL letters GEOFFREY J. GILLIAM.
Subject Meeting with Governors
On Friday the 24th October 97, I was detailed Evening duty H6 control room. At 1400 hours the day staff returned on post, and I reported to Senior Officer Buchannan [sic]. S/O Buchanan asked myself and Officer Thompson to go to the governors office in phase 3.
Governor Eagleson, Ramsden along with the No. 2 Governor were present.
Officer Thompson and I were asked questions regarding the state of security in H6, and our views on what could be done to improve the working procedures to aid the health and safety of staff and prisoners, as H6 housed two opposing paramilitary factions (I.N.L.A. and L.V.F.). We were also asked of our opinion on where the most likely threat would be from and whether it would be toward staff or the other faction.
Officer Thompson and myself expressed great concern over the security of A + B side of H6, as both yards
Signed G.S. Gillam 9236 Date 30/12/97
[Page 5.]
[Handwritten.]
were open to the I.N.L.A. including the control sterile area. We highlighted the fact that there was only two rolls of '3' wire on the roof in the control area.
On several questions we both had raised the point with a number of senior staff, to no avail.
Regarding the recent incident of shooting of prisoner WRIGHT, we had made governors fully aware of our thoughts. We had named the prisoners involved, the way in which it could be carried out E.G. over the roof or through a window, we also told the governors of our gut feeling that prisoner McWILLIAMS was planning something along with prisoners GLENNON and KENNAWAY [sic].
All the named prisoners were housed in 'A' Wing Belfast and both myself and Officer Thompson had working experience with them and we knew their attitudes.
Several other points were raised at the meeting and we expressed our concern to the governors.
1/ Very poor camera cover to the yards. No camera cover to the control sterile area, and the cameras that are in use, that they only covered half of the yard.
2/ The dropping of the yard towers to cover visits. No supervision of prisoners in the yards after 2030 hours.
3/ The movement of prisoners through the forecourt area when going to visits, courts ETC. We suggested the use of the end of the wings to cut down on movement.
4/ The fitting of Makanton [?] to the wing grilles to protect staff and prisoners E.G. gun [?] threat ETC.
5/ To stop the access of 'B' Wing to 'A' wing prisoners as there is no camera cover to wing ('B' Wing is a cell [illegible]
6/ To stop the use of the classroom in the staff class area.
7/ The movement of prisoners through the circle area going to visits, Doctor, Gov requests ETC. Gov Eagleson issued an order to the block regarding this movement: It [?] was suggested by myself that a lockable grilled to the M. O. [?] room would help and that the circle man controlled the grille.
8/ The movement of large numbers of prisoners in the circle area gym ETC.
Myself and Officer Thompson both expressed our concern that McWilliams and Kenaway were housed with I.N.LA. following their transfer from Maghaberry.
Signed G. J. Gillam Officer
[Full-size image of this page (411KB).]
[Page 6.]
[Handwritten.]
After the recent events, I feel that the meeting with the named governors and the suggestions put forward by Officer Thompson and myself were considered a waste time, and that nothing would happen!
G J Gillam
Officer 9236
[Page 7.]
[Printed letterhead with typed text.]
[Seal]
Health and Safety Division
83 Ladus Drive, Belfast [illegible]
Telephone (01232) 2513 [illegible]
Direct Line (01232)
Facsimile (01232) 346883
Our Ref: G398/89
4 July 1995
Northern Ireland Prison Service
H. M. Prison Maze
Halftown Road
Maze
LISBURN
Co Antrim
BT27 9RF
PAO: MR JOHN BAXTER (GOVERNOR 1)
Dear Sir
I refer to my visit to H. M. Prison Maze on 20th June 1995, at which time I spoke with yourself and members of your staff. I subsequently met with POA Safety Representatives, and in company with some N.I.O. Representatives, I viewed various area and activities within the complex.
I wish to draw your attention to the following matters:
Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations (Northern Ireland) 1992
Regulation 3 requires employers to make suitable and sufficient assessments of the risks to which their employees are exposed, for the purpose identifying the measures to be taken to comply with the requirements. Records of significant findings of the assessments have to be made.
As it appears that no written assessments are as yet available on site, it is requested that suitable steps be take to secure compliance with the requirements of the Regulations.
It is understood that equipment supplied for use by inmates has in the past been dismantled and used by the said inmates as weapons with which to attack and assault officers. The risks resulting from the misuse of such equipment must be considered as part of any overall "risk assessment" and addressed accordingly. Certain suggestions were made during group
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[Page 8.]
[Typed.]
discussions regarding the prevention of unauthorised dismantling of equipment in order that components might be used as weapons or missiles. It is recommended that these suggestions be pursued and implemented.
Examinations of the circle area in blocks H3 and H1 were carried out. I understand that both these blocks were subject to malicious fire damage in March 1995 resulting in prison staff being trapped within the circle locations and subject to violent attacks, leading to various injuries being sustained. Having spoken with officers who were involved in the incidents I can appreciate their concern of a repeat occurrence, which would again give rise to a risk to their health and safety.
Northern Ireland Prison Service as employers, in order to comply with statutory duties, should take reasonably practicable steps to prevent similar exposures of employees to risk.
In order to secure a "safe system of work" as required by Article 4(2)(a) of the Health and Safety at Work (Northern Ireland) Order 1978, and to ensure "procedures for serious and imminent danger" as addressed by Regulation 7 of the Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations (Northern Ireland) 1992, cognizance must be taken of the material events which gave rise to the officers being subject to risks to their safety. Matters which would appear to have a bearing and which were discussed during the inspections include:
(1) Prevention of inmates gaining access to roofs and subsequently to sterile areas.
(2) Use of secure protective covers on roof lights in the circle area.
(3) Implementation of planned and practised procedures to ensure that officers may readily evacuate to a place of safety when such situations demand.
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[Page 9.]
[Typed.]
(4) Supply of hose reel fire-fighting equipment within the circle in addition to pressurised fire extinguishers.
(5) Consideration as to erection of suitable screening to prevent missiles being thrown from wings, through grilles, into circle areas.
(6) The possible use of some type of smoke screen should be considered, with the aim of preventing smoke and fumes reaching the circle areas.
(7) In order to deal with the foreseeable risk of officers being exposed to smoke and fumes, suitable respiratory protective equipment should be available at strategic locations within the circle. It is, of course, necessary to ensure that persons who may be required to use such equipment have received adequate theoretical and practical training in its correct uses.
| [Handwritten over text.]
(7) H + S committee meeting on
4:11.(A) "There are no plans to |
[Text cropped by note at left] |
I apologise for not writing to you immediately after my visit. Unfortunately I have had to deal with fatal accident investigations.
Yours faithfully,
[Signature]
WILLIAM EDGAR
Principal Inspector of Health and Safety
(Disciplined Services)
cc: Mr J Duffy, P.O.A.
Mr S McCready, N.I.O. Services Division
Mr R Lavery, N.I.O. Safety Adviser
Mr W Gribben, Management Support Services
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