14 November 2000. Thanks to the National Security Archive for obtaining these documents.

See 14 related documents: http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/news/20001113/

For 16,000 declassified documents on Chile released November 13, 2000: http://foia.state.gov/search2.htm

The Church Report on Covert Action in Chile, 1963-1973: http://foia.state.gov/ChurchReport.htm

The Hinchey Report on CIA Activities in Chile: http://foia.state.gov/HincheyReport.htm

Source: http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/news/20001113/700917.pdf

[2 pages.]


                         THE WHITE HOUSE                     (non-log)

SECRET/SENSITIVE                                              ACTION    
                                                          September 17, 1970


FROM:    Henry A. Kissinger HK


Unless we establish tight control and professional guidance, the covert action
program approved by the 40 Committee for Chile will not work.  It is going to
be a long-shot as it is; if we have to face the additional handicaps of well-
meaning but unprofessional activism, of lack of coordination and of bureaucratic
resistance, we will be dangerously exposed.

The situation is as follows:

    -- State is timid and unsympathetic to a covert action program; it will
       not be able to provide either the imaginative leadership or the tight
       coordinated overview we need.

    -- Ambassador Korry is imaginative, but he is an "unguided missile."
       He is acting now as his own project chief and is trying to construct
       an operation all by himself.  This is dangerous from a professional
       intelligence-operations point of view, and inefficient because there
       are so many inhibitions on his capacity to operate.  He is too exposed
       and visible to do this kind of thing, and it may even affect his objectivity
       and analysis.

    -- But Korry does not trust his staff and will not use it; most of his key
       officers, including the CIA Station Chief, have been cut out of the

    -- Only Korry is doing any real reporting, and while it is voluminous,
       it is inconsistent and contradictory.  We cannot be sure of what the
       situation really is and how much Korry is justifying or camaflouging [sic].

    -- CIA is unhappy at the modus operandi, but does not feel that it can impose
       discipline on Korry; it certainly cannot do it through its present Station

    -- There is no consensus among agencies here concerning the full scope
       of operations and some lack of enthusiasm for overall planning.  Hence,
       the bureaucracy is simply reacting to what happens in Santiago.

    -- The 40 Committee does not have the time for this kind of close, de-
       tailed supervision, and the time-lag would make it impossible anyway.


Authority State, CIA, NSA, NSC
By Initials NARA Date 8/28/00


SECRET/SENSITIVE                      - 2 -

Thus, in effect, although no one particularly wants him to, Korry has the opera-
tional ball and is running, with everyone just hoping there are no leaks or ex-
posures.  We are not really sure if what is happening is professionally sound as 
possible or what more we might do technica1ly to improve the effectiveness of 
our actions.  Thus our risks of being "found out" are maximized, and our effi-
ciency is cut.
To rectify this situation, I recommend the following:
    1. Establish an action task force here in Washington to run the program.
       This would meet daily, make decisions, send out directives, keep
       tabs on things.  It would coordinate activities, and plan implementing
       actions. It would work fast and in secrecy--not through normal bureau-
       cratic procedures.  It will need your authority to do this, and to be able
       to instruct the Ambassador.
    2. Send to Santiago an expert professional to take over the operational
       program under the Ambassador's and the task force's broad guidance. 
       This would enable the Ambassador to draw back from personal opera-
       tions and involvement.  In addition, it will help with the time-lag
       problem.  In fast-moving situations some operational decisions may 
       have to be made on the spot.

   That you authorize the establishment of this kind of mechanism.
     Approve   RN  


Source: http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/news/20001113/701106.pdf

[5 pages.]


                         THE WHITE HOUSE



                The President
PARTICIPANTS    The Vice President
                Secretary of State William P. Rogers
                Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird
                Director of Emergency Preparedness George A. Lincoln
                Attorney General John N. Mitchell
                General William Westmoreland, Acting Chairman,
                 Joint Chiefs of Staff
                Director of Central Intelligence Richard Helms
                Under Secretary of State John N. Irwin II
                Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Robert A. Hurwitch
                Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
                 Henry A. Kissinger
                General Alexander M. Haig, NSC Staff
                Mr. Arnold Nachmanoff, NSC Staff
                Col. Richard T. Kennedy, NSC Staff

PLACE:          The Cabinet Room

DATE & TIME:    Friday - November 6, 1970
                9:40 a.m.
The President opened the meeting by asking Director Helms to brief.
Director Helms read from the briefing paper which is attached at Tab A. The
President interrupted to review what Director Helms said about the makeup of
the Allende Cabinet. [See page 9] He wished to emphasize the degree to which
the Cabinet ministries were controlled by Marxists.
The President then asked Dr. Kissinger to brief.
Dr. Kissinger: All of the agencies are agreed that Allende will try to create a
socialist State. As for our response to this, the SRG came up with four options.
But really basically it amounts to two choices: (1) seek a modus vivendi with
the Allende Government, or (2) adopt a posture of overt and frank hostility. In
between is a third possibility: adopt what is in fact a hostile posture but not
from an overt stance, that is, to move in hostility from a low-key posture.


Authority State, CIA, NSA, NSC
By Initials NARA Date 8/14/00


SECRET/NODIS/XGDS                       - 2 -

A modus vivendi has the risk that he will consolidate his position and then move
ahead against us. A posture of overt hostility gives strength to his appeal of
nationalism and may not work anyway. As for in between -- the problem is
that he will know we are working against him and he can expose us anyway even
though we maintain a correct and cool posture.
All of these options have advantages and disadvantages. There is no clear
Secretary Rogers: Dr. Kissinger has spelled it out well. There is general
agreement thathe will move quickly to bring his program into effect and con-
solidate his position. We are also in agreement that it is not necessary to make
a final decision now.

Private business and the Latin American countries believe that we have done
the right things up to now. If we have to be hostile, we want to do it right and
bring him down. A stance of public hostility would give us trouble in Latin
America. We can put an economic squeeze on him. He has requested a debt
rescheduling soon -- we can be tough. We can bring his downfall perhaps
without being counterproductive. [Underline emphasis by hand.]
The Christian Democratic Foreign Minister thinks we are doing the right
thing. He sees two possibilities: that his economic troubles will generate
significant public dissatisfaction, or second, that his difficulties will become
so great that there will be military moves agaihst him. I think the U.S. military
should keep in contact with their Chilean colleagues and try to strengthen our
position in Chile.
We have severe limitations on what we can do. A strong public posture will
only strengthen his hand. We must make each decision in the future carefully
in a way that harms him most but without too much of a public posture which
would only be counterproductive.
Secretary Laird: I agree,with Bill Rogers. We have to do everything we can
to hurt him and bring him down, but we must retain an outward posture that is
correct. We must take hard actions but not publicize them. We must increase
our military Vontacts. We must put pressure on him economically.  He is in
the weakest position now that he will be in; we want to prevent his consolidation.
[Underline emphasis by hand.]
Moorer [to Rogers]: What is the reaction of the Congress?
Secretary Rogers: There is very little, but if he consolidates his position the
criticism will build Up. Attitudes are therefore favorable to our policy.



SECRET/NODIS/XGDS                       - 3 -

Moorer: What would be the reaction if he resorts to expropriation later, after
we have given more aid?
Secretary Rogers: We shouldn't give any more credit guarantees. We should do
everything we can to show hostility without publicizing it.
Vice President: China and USSR are watching our approach to Argentina. If
we show undue interest before anything happens; for example if we sell F-4s to
Argentina, it could trigger massive support to Chile from the USSR and China.
We should act principally inside Chile.
Director Lincoln: Copper accounts for 80% of Chile's exports. They are
expanding production rapidly. Other producers (Zambia, Australia, etc.) are
also going up in production. So there could be a price decline in the future,
with an adverse economic impact in Chile. They blame us. We have a stock-
pile. If we are adopting a hostile posture, maybe we have to increase the stock-
pile or alternatively to sell if the market eases in the future.
The President: I want something in a week on how we can sell from the stockpile.
Now we can do it. Cutting the stockpile  would hurt Chile and also save on the budget.
Director Lincoln: We'll do this. We've been studying this on a priority basis.
The President: This is very important -- will it hurt anyone else? I want State
and Defense and everyone to study it. It could be the most important thing we
can do.
Director Lincoln: The law says we can't sell from the stockpile unless we do it
to stabilize the price. The copper price is down in the world market. We've
already sold 50 million tons before the prices dropped.
Secretary Rogers: Can we help others build up their production, to help our
The President: We should do this if we can.

Director Lincoln: If we sell anything too fast it will destabilize the price. Most
things don't sell fast.
Mr. Irwin: The problem is how to bring about his downfall. I would question
our capability to do it. Internal forces in Chile are the only way. The question
is how best to influence the internal forces to create the conditions for change.
He will need to consolidate his position and probably he will move slowly for
the sake of respectability as he moves. It will be soon that dissatisfaction



SECRET/NODIS/XGDS                       - 4 -

begins. As he tries to consolidate he will inevitably have strains. If we move
too quickly in opposition to him we will help him consolidate quickly. As we
move to consider specific issues either overt or covert, we should be hostile
only if we can be sure it will have a significant effect on the internal forces
there in a way that will hurt Allende and prevent his consolidation. This may
mean we may have to do things we would not want to do -- it depends on the
effects on the internal situation in Chile. Graham Martin would like to see us
move along as we have. [Underline emphasis by hand.]
The President: It is all a matter of degree. If Chile moves as we expect and
is able to get away with it -- our public posture is important here -- it gives
courage to others who are sitting on the fence in Latin America. Let's not
think about what the really democratic countries in Latin America say -- the
game is in Brazil and Argentina. We could have moves under the surface which
bring over time the same thing.
I will never agree with the policy of downgrading the military in Latin America.
They are power centers subject to our influence. The others (the intellectuals)
are not subject to our influence. We want to give them some help. Brazil and
Argentina particularly. Build them up with consultation. I want Defense to move
on this. We'll go for more in the budget if necessary.
Our main concern in Chile is the prospect that he can consolidate himself and
the picture projected to the world will be his success. A publicly correct approach
is right. Privately we rnust get the message to Allende and others that we oppose
him. I want to see more of them; Brazil has more people than France or England
combined. If we let the potential leaders in South America think they can move
like Chile and have it both ways, we will be in trouble. I want to work on this
and on the military relations put in more money. On the economic side we want to
give him cold Turkey. Make sure that EXIM and the international organizations
toughen up. If Allende can make it with Russian and Chinese help, so be it but
we do not want it to be with our help, either real or apparent.
We'll be very cool and very correct, but doing those things which will be a real
message to Allende and others.
This is not the same as Europe -- with Tito and Ceaucescu -- where we have to
get along and no change is possible. Latin America is not gone, and we want to
keep it. Our Cuban policy must not be changed. It costs the Russians a lot; we
want it to continue to cost. Chile is gone too -- he isn't going to mellow. Don't
have any illusions -- he won't change. If there is any way we can hurt him whether
by government or private business -- I want them to know our policy is negative.
There should be no guarantees. Cut back existing guarantees if it's possible.



SECRET/NODIS/XGDS                       - 5 -

No impression should be permitted in Latin America that they can get away
with this, that it's safe to go this way. All over the world it's too much the
fashion to kick us around. We are not sensitive but our reactions must be
coldly proper. We cannot fail to show our displeasure. We can't put up with
"Give Americans hell but pray they don't go away." There must be times when
we should and must react, not because we want to hurt them but to show we can't
be kicked around,
The new Latin politicians are a new breed. They use anti-Americanism to get
power and then they try to cozy up. Maybe it would be different if they thought
we wouldn't be there.
We must be proper on the surface with Allende, but otherwise we will be tough.
He is not going to change; only self-interest will affect him.


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