8 June 2003
Source:
http://www.dnotice.org.uk/index.htm
Record of meeting on 15 May 2003 last updated 3 June 2003
Last Updated: 24th May 2000
1. Public discussion of the United Kingdom's defence and counter-terrorist
policy and overall strategy does not impose a threat to national security
and is welcomed by Government. It is important however that such discussion
should not disclose details which could damage national security.
The DA-Notice System is a means of providing advice
and guidance to the media about defence and counter-terrorist information
the publication of which would be damaging to national security. The system
is voluntary, it has no legal authority and the final responsibility for
deciding whether or not to publish rests solely with the editor or publisher
concerned.
2. DA-Notices are issued by the Defence, Press and Broadcasting Advisory
Committee (DPBAC), an advisory body composed of
senior civil servants and editors from national and regional newspapers,
periodicals, news agencies, television and radio. It operates on the shared
belief that there is a continuing need for a system of guidance and advice
such as the DA-Notice System, and that a voluntary, advisory basis is best
for such a system.
3. When these notices were first published under their new title of Defence
Advisory Notices in 1993, they reflected the changed circumstances following
the break-up of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. The 2000 revision has
allowed an overall reduction of the scope of the notices while retaining
those parts that are appropriate for the current level of threat that involves
grave danger to the State and/or individuals. Compliance with the DA-Notice
system does not relieve the editor of responsibilities under the Official
Secrets Act.
4. The Secretary DPBAC (the DA-Notice Secretary)
is the servant of the Government and the Press and Broadcasting sides of
the Committee. He is available at all times to Government departments and
the media to give advice on the system and, after consultation with Government
departments as appropriate, to help in assessing the relevance of a DA-Notice
to particular circumstances. Within this system, all discussions with editors,
publishers and programme makers are conducted in confidence.
DA-Notices: Covering Note
1. These DA-Notices are issued by the Defence, Press and Broadcasting Advisory
Committee. Any questions about the DA-Notices, their application or
interpretation should be addressed to the Secretary, Defence, Press and
Broadcasting Advisory Committee, (the "DA-Notice Secretary"). He is available
at any time and details of how to contact him are given on the
DA-Notice Secretary page.
2. The revised DA-Notices replace those which were issued in 1993, and are
unclassified. They are addressed to editors, producers, publishers and officials,
and additional copies are freely available from the Secretary if holders
wish to circulate them more widely within their own organisations.
3. Copies will be made available on request to other organisations and
individuals.
The 5 standing DA-Notices are as follows.
| DA-Notice No. 1 | Military Operations, Plans and Capabilities |
| DA-Notice No. 2 | Nuclear and Non-Nuclear Weapons and Equipment |
| DA-Notice No. 3 | Ciphers and Secure Communications |
| DA-Notice No. 4 | Sensitive Installations and Home Addresses |
| DA-Notice No. 5 | United Kingdom Security and Intelligence Services and Special Forces |
Military Operations, Plans and Capabilities
DATE OF DA-NOTICE : 24th May 2000
1. It is requested that disclosure or publication of highly classified information within the categories listed below should not be made without first seeking advice:
(a) details of present or future operations, methods, tactics and contingency planning, to meet particular hostile situations and to counter threats of terrorist attacks;(b) details of the state of readiness and operational capability of individual units or formations whose involvement in such operations is current or may be imminent;
(c) operational movements of such individual units or formations (as distinct from routine movements unconnected with operations);
(d) particulars of current or projected tactics, trials, techniques and training (including anti-interrogation training and operational techniques and tactics used to counter terrorism);
(e) details of defensive or counter-terrorist measures taken by individual installations, units or formations;
2. Rationale. In general it is important not to publish highly
classified information which could be damaging to national security by giving
a potential enemy important strategic or operational advantages; which could
be exploited by terrorists to devise counter-measures with the consequence
that attacks which might otherwise have been frustrated could prove successful;
or which could compromise counter-terrorist operations, endanger lives or
put sources at risk.
See also DA Notice No 5 concerning Special Forces.
Nuclear and Non-Nuclear Weapons and Equipment
DATE OF DA-NOTICE : 24th May 2000
1. It is requested that disclosure or publication of highly classified information about nuclear and non-nuclear defence equipment or equipment used to counter threats of terrorist attacks of the kind listed below should not be made without first seeking advice:
(a) nuclear weapons, highly classified information on:
(1) the detailed design of nuclear weapons and the technologies for producing them;
(2) operational details;
(3) detailed security arrangements for the storage, transport and development of nuclear weapons and associated fissile materials;
(b) non-nuclear defence and counter-terrorist equipment, highly classified information on:
(1) design details, technical specifications and materials;
(2) performance figures and operational capabilities;
(3) areas of vulnerability to counter-measures.
2. Rationale
Nuclear. The release of highly classified British technical information on nuclear weapons could enable others to develop such weapons which would be in breach of the British Government’s non-proliferation obligations and ultimate disarmament objectives. Release of highly classified operational plans and security arrangements could potentially jeopardise the safety and security of our nuclear forces and reduce their deterrent value.
Non-Nuclear and Counter-Terrorist. The disclosure of highly classified information about equipment used for defence and counter-terrorism purposes could enable potential enemies or terrorists to devise effective counter-measures more quickly, to speed up the development of their own weapons and equipment and to alter their operating methods so that attacks which might otherwise have been frustrated could prove successful.
Ciphers and Secure Communications
DATE OF DA-NOTICE : 24th May 2000
1. It is requested that no details be published, without prior consultation, of the British Government's highly classified codes and ciphers, related data protection measures and communication facilities, or those of NATO or other allies.
2. It is also requested that advice be sought before disclosing, or elaboration on, information published at home or overseas about UK official codes and ciphers or their potential vulnerability.
3. Rationale. Disclosures that could compromise codes and ciphers put at risk the classified information protected by them and, indirectly, people’s lives. Revealing details of associated data protection measures and communications facilities, whether obtained, for example, from documents or by techniques such as computer hacking, could assist potential enemies to penetrate these elements of national security.
Sensitive Installations and Home Addresses
DATE OF DA-NOTICE : 24th May 2000
1. It is requested that disclosure or publication of security details of the following facilities should not be made without first seeking advice:
(a) defence and related sites associated with the nuclear weapons programme;
(b) high security MOD and military sites associated with intelligence and other sensitive activities;
(c) sites of headquarters or communications facilities for use by government or NATO in time of crisis.
2. It is also requested that where individuals are likely targets for attacks by terrorists, care should be taken not to publish details of their homes or addresses without first seeking advice. People who are assessed as being at risk are those with security and counter-terrorist duties or backgrounds.
3. Rationale. Information about key facilities and installations could be of value to persons or governments whose interests might be harmful to those of the UK and NATO.
United Kingdom Security and Intelligence Services and Special Forces
DATE OF DA-NOTICE : 24th May 2000
1. Information falling within the following categories is normally regarded as being highly classified. It is requested that such information, unless it has been the subject of an official announcement or has been widely disclosed or discussed, should not be published without first seeking advice:
(a) specific covert operations, sources and methods of the Security Service, SIS and GCHQ, and those involved with them, including the Special Forces, the application of those methods, including the interception of communications, and their targets; the same applies to those engaged on counter-terrorist operations;
(b) the identities, whereabouts and tasks of people who are or have been employed by these services or engaged on such work, including details of their families and home addresses, and any other information, including photographs, which could assist terrorist or other hostile organisations to identify a target;
(c) addresses and telephone numbers used by these services, except those now made public.
2. Rationale. Identified staff from the intelligence and security services, others engaged on sensitive counter-terrorist operations, including the Special Forces, and those who are likely targets for attack are at real risk from terrorists. Security and intelligence operations, contacts and techniques are easily compromised, and therefore need to be pursued in conditions of secrecy. Publicity about an operation which is in train finishes it. Publicity given even to an operation which has been completed, whether successfully or not, may well deny the opportunity for further exploitation of a capability, which may be unique against other hostile and illegal activity. The disclosure of identities can prejudice past, present and future operations. Even inaccurate speculation about the source of information on a given issue can put intelligence operations (and, in the worst cases, lives) at risk and/or lead to the loss of information which is important in the interests of national security. Material which has been the subject of an official announcement is not covered by this notice.
Last Updated : 24th June 2000
Purpose
1. The Defence, Press and Broadcasting Advisory Committee oversees a voluntary code which operates between those Government departments which have responsibilities for national security and the media; using as its vehicle the DA-Notice system.
Composition
2. The Committee is chaired by the Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Defence.
3. Membership may be varied from time to time by agreement. At present there are three members representing Government departments, one each from the Home Office, the Ministry of Defence and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.
4. At present there are thirteen members nominated by the media; three by the Newspaper Publishers Association, two by the Newspaper Society, two by the Periodical Publishers Association and one each by the Scottish Daily Newspaper Society, the Press Association, the BBC, ITN, ITV, and Sky TV. The Publishers Association was invited in 1993 and in 2000 to nominate a representative but declined.
5. The press and broadcasting members select one of their number as Chairman of their side and Vice Chairman of the Committee. He leads for their side at Committee meetings and provides a point of day-to-day contact for them and for the Secretary.
6. The Committee is served by a full-time Secretary and part-time Deputy Secretary who substitutes in the Secretary's absence on leave etc. (Click here to see the full list of present committee members).
Responsibility of Membership
7. The Press and Broadcasting members respond to proposals from the government departments concerned and advise the Committee on those areas of information in which it may be reasonable to invite guidance reflecting the interests of national security. Official proposals may not be issued in DA-Notice form without the consent of the Press and Broadcasting members.
Meetings
8. The Committee normally has a Spring and an Autumn meeting each year. It reviews the Secretary's report of guidance sought and advice offered over the previous six months. It also reviews the content of the DA-Notices as necessary to ensure that amendments are made to meet the changing needs of national security. (Click here to view details of future meetings or here to view records of past meetings)
DA-Notices
9. The DA-Notices are intended to provide to national and provincial newspaper editors, to periodicals editors, to radio and television organisations and to relevant book publishers, general guidance on those areas of national security which the Government considers it has a duty to protect. The Notices, together with a General Introduction, details of the Committee and how to contact the Secretary, are widely distributed to editors, producers and publishers and also to officials in Government departments, military commanders, chief constables and some institutions. The Notices have no legal standing and advice offered within their framework may be accepted or rejected partly or wholly.
10. Although the system is normally applied through the standing DA-Notices, should it be found necessary to issue a DA-Notice on a specific matter, the Government department concerned will agree a draft of the proposed Notice with the Secretary who, from his experience, can advise upon the form and content which are likely to make it acceptable to the press and broadcasting members. The Secretary will then seek the agreement of both sides of the DPBAC to the draft and, if it is obtained, issue the text as a DA-Notice. (Click here to see the five standing DA-Notices).
Secretary DPBAC
11. The Secretary is normally a retired two-star officer from the Armed Forces, employed as a Civil Servant on the budget of the Ministry of Defence. He is the servant of the Government and Press and Broadcasting sides of the Committee, a fact which is recognised by the Vice Chairman being involved in the process of his selection. Similar arrangements apply for the Deputy Secretary who is also normally a retired service officer.
12. The Secretary (or Deputy Secretary) is available at all times to Government departments and the media to give advice on the system, taking into account the general guidance given to him by the Committee. DA-Notices are necessarily drafted in somewhat general terms and it is the application of a DA-Notice to a particular set of circumstances on which the Secretary is expected to give guidance, consulting as necessary with appropriate departmental officials. He is not invested with the authority to give rulings nor to advise on considerations other than national security.
13. If the Secretary agrees that a Government Department may quote the DA-Notices in a release of information to the media, he should ensure that the Department makes it clear that it is doing so on his authority and therefore that of the Committee. (Click here to find out about the role and contact details of the DA-Notice Secretary).
Last Updated : 06 December 2002
The current membership of the Defence, Press and Broadcasting Advisory Committee is as follows:
| Name | Organisation | Nominated By | |
| Chairman
|
Sir Kevin Tebbit KCB CMG | Permanent Under Secretary of State Ministry of Defence |
|
| Vice-Chairman, Press and Broadcasting Side |
R Hutchinson Esq. | Editorial Policy Adviser to Jane's Information Group | PPA |
| Government Members |
I C F Andrews Esq. CBE TD |
2nd Permanent Under Secretary of State Ministry of Defence |
|
| W Ehrman Esq. CMG |
DG Defence & Intelligence Foreign & Commonwealth Office |
||
| J Gieve Esq. CB |
Permanent Under Secretary of State Home Office |
||
| Sir David Ormand KCB | Permanent Secretary and Security Intelligence Co-ordinator Cabinet Office |
||
| Press and Broadcast Members |
S Anderson Esq. | Controller News & Current Affairs ITV |
ITV |
| J D Bishop Esq. | Editor-in-Chief Illustrated London News Group |
PPA | |
| G Brock Esq. | Managing Editor The Times |
NPA | |
| S Buck Esq. | Executive Producer Sky News |
BSkyB | |
| R Esser Esq. | Executive Managing Editor Daily Mail |
NPA | |
| A Goode Esq. | Chief Executive Bristol Evening Post & Press Ltd |
NS | |
| J Grun Esq. | Editor Press Association |
PA | |
| J McLellan Esq. | Editor Scotland on Sunday |
SDNS | |
| S Purvis Esq. | Chief Executive & Editor-in-Chief Independent Television News Ltd |
ITN | |
| C Roycroft-Davis Esq. | Managing Editor The Sun |
NPA | |
| S Whittle Esq. | Controller, Editorial Policy BBC |
BBC | |
| W Wilson Esq. | Managing Director Shropshire Star |
NS |
Secretary
Rear Admiral Nick Wilkinson CB
Deputy Secretary
Captain N R Hodgson, RN
Last Updated : 6th November 2000
The DA-Notice Secretary
Nick Wilkinson has been the Secretary of the Defence, Press and Broadcasting Advisory Committee ('the D-Notice Secretary') since November 1999.
Prior to that he spent 39 years in the Royal Navy, much of that time in Whitehall. He ended his naval career as the Commandant of the Joint Service Defence College, and as the last admiral to serve in the old Royal Naval College at Greenwich.
Contacting the Secretary
The DA-Notice Secretary (or the Deputy Secretary) can be contacted in the following ways:
- The Secretary
The office of Nick Wilkinson, the Secretary of the Defence, Press and Broadcasting Advisory Committee can be reached at:
Telephone |
Address |
Fax |
The office is normally open Mondays to Fridays from 0900 to 1700. The telephone is fitted with an Ansaphone which, out of office hours, gives information on how the Secretary can be contacted.
The Secretary will normally be available OUT OF OFFICE HOURS at:
Telephone |
Mobile |
Fax |
These telephones are also fitted with Ansaphones and, if the Secretary is
temporarily unavailable, a message can be left and he will phone back as
soon as he returns.
Non-urgent messages can also be sent by email to dnotice@hotmail.com |
- Deputy Secretary
During the Secretary's longer absence on holiday or for other reasons, the Deputy Secretary will handle enquiries. The current Deputy Secretary is Captain Norman Hodgson. He can be contacted on the following numbers:
Telephone
(office hours)
020-7218-2206
(out of hours)
01428-654727
- MOD Press Office
In the event of any difficulty the Ministry of Defence Press Office will try to establish the whereabouts of the Secretary:
Telephone
(office hours)
020-7218-2629
(out of hours)
020-7218-7907
Last Updated : 18 October 2002
Summary of Questions
Why do editors, etc. follow a voluntary code, surely they want to publish their story in full?
Does the Government do anything if an editor decides to publish something possibly damaging?
Why does the Government not always do this, rather than rely on a voluntary system?
Surely there are no real secrets needed now that the Cold War is over?
How does the DA-Notice Secretary know when his advice is needed?
May not ‘damage’ just be official embarrassment when something has gone wrong?
Does the Secretary not have to accept the officials’ version of events, and support their line?
Doesn’t that mean that the DA-Notice system is now inoperable?
Are all articles, books, etc, on DA-Notice subjects dealt with through the DA-Notice system?
What about when a government department initiates police/legal action against an editor or author?
Does any other country have a system similar to the D-Notices?
Why does the UK have a system like this if no other country does?
How are the thirteen media representatives on the Committee chosen?
Is the DA-Notice Secretary not really just another official?
What qualifications are required in selecting the Secretary?
About the System
What are the benefits of the DA-Notice
system?
- It provides a set of guidelines, agreed by representatives of both
government departments and of the media, which inform editors, broadcasters,
authors, publishers and others about what needs to be protected, and provide
the basis for prior negotiation when there is disagreement about what should
be published;
- It also provides a negotiator (the DA-Notice
Secretary) who is available to both sides 365 days a year;
- Negotiation normally provides a solution acceptable to both sides,
ie. the story goes out with only a few genuinely secret details removed;
- It is much quicker, cheaper and more satisfactory than going to
litigation, which also tends to block a whole story or source rather than
just a few details.
Do all editors, etc. have to use
the system?
No, it is voluntary, and even when they do use the system, they
do not have to accept the advice of the DA-Notice Secretary nor accede to
his requests; the final decision as to whether to publish something is the
editor's.
What powers does the DA-Notice
Secretary/Committee have?
None, except those of persuasion.
Why do editors, etc. follow a voluntary
code, surely they want to publish their story in
full?
All editors do indeed want to publish their story, but most do not want to
publish something which really would be damaging to operations or to lives,
and if therefore they are persuaded that some detail would do damage, they
usually do not publish such detail.
Does the Government do anything if
an editor decides to publish something possibly
damaging?
In serious cases, the government department concerned can initiate police
and/or legal action, including seeking a court injunction to stop something
being published.
Why does the government not always
do this, rather than rely on a voluntary system?
It is costly and time-consuming, and often creates adverse publicity, and
there is no guarantee that the judge will uphold the government's case. It
can also be taking a sledgehammer to crack a nut, when the government is
usually concerned to protect some detail, eg agents' names, rather than stop
a story completely, which injunctions tend to do.
What is meant by ‘slapping a
D-Notice on’ something?
This phrase is still used by people, and sounds dramatic, but it is no longer
what actually happens! DA-Notices are not issued for particular incidents.
The 5 standing Notices cover various eventualities,
and, if necessary, the editor's’ attention is just drawn by the DA-Notice
Secretary to the advice in the appropriate Notice.
Is the DA-Notice system not a form
of censorship?
A voluntary system cannot be censorship. It does sometimes provide reasons
for self-censorship by editors and others, in the same way that they are
faced with self-censorship for all kinds of other reasons – legal, moral,
financial, public taste, etc.
Surely there are no real secrets
needed now that the Cold War is over?
There are certainly far fewer, and that is why the DA-Notices have been revised
twice in the past decade (in 1993 and 2000), reduced in number, and made
significantly less restrictive. Nevertheless, the public still has an interest
that some matters are kept secret for the time being, for example measures
to protect the public against terrorism, and some operations to gain intelligence
about activities secretly carried out by others against British national
and allied interests – economic and industrial, as well as military.
How does the DA-Notice Secretary
know when his advice is needed?
- A request to get involved may come from the media, for example a news room
ringing to say they intend to publish a particular story which they realise
may contain matters covered by the DA-Notices;
- Or a request may come from officials, for example The Secret Intelligence
Service being aware that a TV company has been filming activities that might
reveal the identities of some of their agents;
- Or the DA-Notice Secretary himself might learn from his own contacts or
reading, for example that a book about the SAS is to be published.
What does the Secretary do in such
cases?
- He advises the media, if necessary after himself taking expert advice from
the government department concerned, on what details would be damaging, for
example something that would ‘blow’ a current or planned operation,
or would endanger the life or effectiveness of an agent;
- He suggests how identities might be concealed, for example in photographs
or film by pixelation;
- He negotiates if necessary between the media and the department concerned
so that as much as possible can be published without genuine damage being
done.
May not ‘damage’ just
be official embarrassment when something has gone
wrong?
Not as far as the DA-Notices are concerned; political and official embarrassment
are not reasons for excluding material.
Does the Secretary not have to accept
the officials’ version of events, and support their
line?
No, the Secretary has to be convinced by officials of the need for secrecy,
and to advise them if he believes either that their rationale is not in accord
with the DA-Notices or that their view is unsustainable, for example because
the facts are already widely in the public domain.
If a book or article or programme
has been cleared through the DA-Notice system, does that mean that everything
in it is true?
No, only that there is nothing which is seriously damaging in DA-Notice terms.
If a fact has been published somewhere,
does that mean that it can then be republished even if it is damaging to
national security?
It depends how and where it has been published. The DA-Notice
5 guidance specifies, for example, that something must be ‘been
widely disclosed or discussed’ for it to be not covered. That said,
there is an element of subjective judgement about what is ‘in the public
domain’. A statement by a writer with no authority in an obscure
publication, or even on a hard-to-find website, does not have the wide disclosure
of a major British newspaper, or the authority of a reputable author of a
book. Each case therefore has to be assessed on its merits.
Does the DA-Notice system apply
to the Internet?
It does, but, because of the international nature of the net, matters published
on foreign websites, like matters published in foreign newspapers, are beyond
the influence of the DA-Notice system. How the law (on libel, copyright,
commerce, etc, quite apart from that on secrecy) is being applied to the
Internet varies from country to country, and there is therefore considerable
confusion at present. The position of UK Internet Service Providers as
‘publishers’ is also still unclear.
Doesn’t that mean that the
DA-Notice system is now inoperable?
The DA-Notice system has never been a watertight, 100% system. Not only its
voluntary nature, but also the enormous diversity of the British media (including
some small outlets that have never followed the DA-Notice guidance), mean
that it has always been a ‘damage limitation’ system. The internet
has produced some new considerations, and many unanswered questions about
the future, but the very size and diversity of the net means that, just because
something is on a foreign website, it does not necessarily mean that it has
immediately been widely seen.
What is ‘National
Security’?
It is a phrase widely used in legislation, but there is in fact no definition.
It is what lawyers call ‘an ambulatory concept’, to be interpreted
by the courts or others in the light of particular circumstances that cannot
be predicted. As far as the DA-Notices are concerned, although no definition
of National Security is given, the Committee has provided instead a context
of scale, that the threat must involve ‘grave danger to the State and/or
individuals’, and it is in this context that areas of National Security
covered with some precision in the Notices should be read.
Are all articles, books, etc, on
DA-Notice subjects dealt with through the DA-Notice
system?
No. Books etc by ex-insiders (eg members of the Special Forces) have to be
submitted to the parent department (in this case the Ministry of Defence),
because of Official Secrets Act requirements and departmental confidentiality
contracts. The DA-Notice Secretary only gets involved occasionally in these
cases, if the Department concerned and the publisher/author ask for his help
as an impartial negotiator in resolving differences.
What about when a government department
initiates police/legal action against an editor or
author?
This usually happens when the DA-Notice system has not be used by the media
for some reason, or when a government department is so concerned that serious
damage is imminent that they wish to take immediate preventative action.
The DA-Notice Secretary is not involved in police/legal action.
What happens if information provided
by the media to the Secretary, when they are using the DA-Notice system,
reveals a possible breach of, for example, the Official Secrets
Act?
All discussion between the media and the Secretary is carried out in confidence,
and government departments do not subsequently initiate police/legal action
unless they have information from some other source (possibly the published
article or book, of course). The Secretary therefore makes every effort to
point out to the media any material which he thinks might be in breach of
an injunction or which might be an offence under some Act, but he is not
himself a legal expert and therefore sometimes advises consulting the Treasury
Solicitor for expert legal advice, in order to head off possible police/legal
action.
Does any other country have a system
similar to the D-Notices?
No. Australia apparently did, but no longer does.
Why does the UK have a system
like this if no other country does?
Partly historical (see History), but we have it mainly
because it seems to work for us, in a culture where voluntary systems are
often preferred to mandatory ones, and where both media and government
departments often find it useful to have a system of informal mediation between
them over sensitive national security matters.
About the Defence, Press and Broadcasting System
How are the four officials on the
Committee chosen?
They are ex-officio posts. The Chairman, for mainly
historical reasons, is the Permanent Under Secretary of the Ministry of Defence.
His deputy covers Ministry of Defence interests, in particular Special Forces
and Defence Intelligence. The Permanent Under Secretary of the Home Office
covers Security Service and legislative matters, and a Deputy Under Secretary
from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office covers Secret Intelligence Service
and Government Communications Headquarters matters.
How are the thirteen media
representatives on the Committee chosen?
They are nominated by the various media organisations, namely BBC, ITV, ITN,
Sky TV, Periodical Publishers Association (2), Newspaper Publishers Association
(3), Newspaper Society (2), Press Association, and Scottish Daily Newspaper
Society. The media representatives choose one of their number as the
Vice-Chairman of the Committee. The Vice-Chairman also maintains informal
links with the Society of Editors. The Publishers Association have so far
chosen not to be represented on the Committee, but their members nevertheless
use the DA-Notice system. It is hoped that in due course Internet authorities
will be represented on the Committee too. (Click here to see
a full listing of the present Committee members).
Is the occasional description in
the media of the media representatives as ‘token journalists’ on
an official committee accurate?
Obviously not! Quite apart from the media representatives being in a substantial
majority, the Committee itself is independent, and is not responsible to
any political or departmental organisation. The media representatives do
not just respond to official initiatives, but also put forward their own,
for example suggesting the recent revision of the DA-Notices. Discussion
by both media and official representatives is ‘full and frank’,
and agreements are arrived at mutually.
About the DA-Notice Secretary
Is the DA-Notice Secretary not really
just another official?
He is indeed paid as a temporary civil servant, and accommodated and
administratively supported by the Ministry of Defence. This, however, is
for convenience only. In practice, he does not belong to the Ministry of
Defence nor to any other department. He works for the
Committee, and is similarly independent. He must work equally for the
media and for officials. His high security clearances enable him to be privy
to as many secret matters as is necessary for him to be able to make judgements
in his work, in impartially interpreting the DA-Notices for the benefit of
media and officials alike. He is also privy to as much unpublished media
information as is thought necessary to enable him to represent media views
to officials.
How is the Secretary
selected?
The post is advertised amongst recently retired public servants, and the
Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Committee make the final selection.
What qualifications are required
in selecting the Secretary?
Experience and a good knowledge of the workings of the governmental system,
some knowledge of the secret intelligence and security agencies, some knowledge
of the media, high security clearances, sufficient stature to deal easily
with all levels of officials and media, good negotiating skills, no past
or present conflicts of interest with the areas of DA-Notice interest. In
practice, this has so far meant a retired 2-star officer from one of the
armed services. (Click here to find out about the present
(DA-Notice Secretary).
Why has that armed service been
the Royal Navy for so long?
There must be a DA-Notice covering that question! There is no particular
reason why the DA-Notice Secretary has been a succession of retired admirals.
That is just how the volunteers and the selections have turned out.
Does the DA-Notice Secretary work
alone?
He is supported by a full-time PA, and has a part-time Deputy who works only
when he himself is on leave.
How is the DA-Notice system
funded?
Through the Central Staff budget of the Ministry of Defence. The salaries
and running costs amount to approximately £105K per annum.
Does the DPBAC deal with
complaints about media activity?
Only if directly relevant to endangering National Security. Otherwise, complaints
should be addressed to The Press Complaints Commission
(http://www.pcc.org.uk).
Last Updated : 24th June 2000
The Start
In 1912, the Admiralty and the War Office concluded that they needed some means of preventing the press from publishing information which might be of value to a future enemy. After some informal discussion with the press, the then Secretary of the Admiralty met on 13 August 1912 with representatives of the War Office and various Press Associations to discuss the problem. It was agreed that an organisation should be set up to deal with the matter, on which the Press would be represented. The Press representatives sought, and got, assurance that only matters that really did affect the National interest would be concerned.
The Early Members
An Assistant Secretary of the War Office and a Mr. Robbins, the representative of the Press Association, were appointed as joint Secretaries and the arrangement was that if the Admiralty or the War Office wished to inform the Press of something which should not be published the War Office would get in touch with Mr. Robbins, a meeting of the Committee would be convened or the members would be consulted, their agreement would be obtained and thereafter Robbins would send, by hand to the London Editors and by letter or telegram if necessary to provincial Editors, the agreed notice. Telegrams for provincial Editors were to be sent to the local Post Master whose duty it would be to hand them personally to the Editor concerned. These telegrams came to be known as "Parkers" after a Mr. Parker who was at that time the representative of the Newspaper Proprietors' Association on the Committee.
News From Non-Government Sources
But before the end of 1912 it became apparent that there was another problem and a meeting was held to discuss this. To use the words of a letter which was sent to convene the meeting: "So far we have considered on the Committee, and are using the organisation of the Committee, for the purpose of the suppression of the publication of news which, until we have given it ourselves to the Press, is not known beyond Whitehall; but there are cases at times of important information supplied from entirely outside sources to the Press which they publish without question, though on the face of it the information is of a Confidential or Secret nature and is such that its publication is clearly against the public interest."
Hammering Out The Early Policy
In accepting an expansion of the system to deal with this particular problem the Press representatives made two stipulations; one was that there should be someone in each of the two departments who should be appointed as a referee and his name, or title, should be communicated to all concerned, and secondly, that the Press ought to receive a clear undertaking that papers should only be asked to refrain from publishing news when it was really of a Secret nature and the liberty must not be denied to Editors to criticise their policy. This too was agreed by the Official representatives who pointed out that the object of the arrangement was to prevent disclosure of information as the facts and not to stifle comments on policy. Editors seeking advice were invited to address their queries to the Clerk-in-Waiting at the Admiralty or War Office, as appropriate, by letter, or by telephone if necessary (though this was advised against for fear of misunderstandings) and Editors were asked to avoid, if possible, asking questions out of office hours; which seems to indicate that life was a bit slower in 1912 than it is nowadays.
Between The World Wars
When war started in 1914 the functions of the Committee were assumed by the Press Bureau, although the organisation of the Committee for distributing information to the Press was used. After the war, once again the original Committee came into being, with again the same method of distribution of orders and again, a representative of the Press Association acting as Secretary of the Committee. This seems to have gone on in years of peace, although in 1937 an interdepartmental Committee - representatives of the three Services (because the Air Ministry had joined on the formation of the RAF) - did discuss whether some improvement might be made in the system and whether it might be possible to provide the Press with a standing guide to the sort of things which might cause difficulty in the security field.
World War II
Nothing seems to have happened however before the outbreak of war in 1939 when the D-Notice system was disbanded and replaced by Press Censorship under the Ministry of Information. During this period Admiral George Thompson was the Chief Press Censor and he it was who at the end of the war took on the duties of Secretary of what was then called the Admiralty, War Office, Air Ministry and Press Committee, the press having insisted that the Government should provide a Secretary and should arrange and pay for the distribution of D-Notices.
The Early Post-War Years
During his time as Chief Press Censor, Admiral Thompson had of course become well known to the Press and it is evident from the many letters which were written to him at the end of the war that he had earned their universal respect, and indeed admiration. Under him the system proceeded happily until he retired in the early sixties. In 1967 however the unfortunate MI5 Cable Vetting affair and the intemperate reaction, as he himself subsequently admitted, of the then PM (Mr. Wilson) almost resulted in the system's demise, but it survived and recovered its breath under the wise Secretaryship of Vice Admiral Sir Norman Denning and the guidance of the Committee which had in the meantime been retitled the Services, Press and Broadcasting Committee.
From D-Notice to DA-Notices
In 1971 a major change was made by cancelling all existing D-Notices and replacing them with standing D-Notices to give recipients sufficient guidance on subjects in which considerations of national security could be involved, to enable an editor to decide whether to publish, spike or seek advice from the Secretary. There were eleven such notices covering Defence, Civil Service, Nuclear, Radio and Radar, Intelligence, Security and Communications matters and a twelfth included at the specific request of the Australian Government. These twelve were later further refined and reduced where specific items where concerned, eg in the case of military aircraft and aero engines. The Committee's title was changed first to the Defence, Press and Broadcasting Committee, and in 1993 to the Defence, Press and Broadcasting Advisory Committee, when the 6 standing D-Notices were renamed DA-Notices (Defence Advisory Notices). In May 2000, these were further updated and reduced to the present 5 notices.
Last Updated : 3 June 2003
Date of Next Meeting
A date in November will be notified in due course.
Agenda of Next Meeting
To be issued prior to November 2003 meeting.
Last Updated : 03 June 2003
1. Present
| Sir Kevin Tebbit, Chairman
Mr I C F Andrews |
Mr R Hutchinson, Vice-Chairman Mr S Anderson Mr G Brock Mr S Bucks Mr R Esser Mr J Grun Mr S Purvis Mr S Whittle |
Rear Admiral N J Wilkinson Captain N R Hodgson |
- Secretary - Deputy Secretary |
2. Apologies
Apologies: Mr J Bishop, Mr W Ehrman, Mr J Gieve, Mr A Goode, Mr J McLellan, Mr C Roycroft-Davis, Mr W Wilson.
3. Welcome
The Chairman welcomed Sir David Omand (Permanent Secretary & Security
Intelligence Co-ordinator, Cabinet Office) back to the Committee.
Agenda Item 1 - Minutes of Meeting held 12 November 2002
4. There were no amendments.
Agenda Item 2 - Matters Arising from Previous Meeting
5. SF Confidentiality Agreement/NZ Case. The Secretary reported that the Privy Council’s written majority judgement on the ‘Soldier Five’ appeal had been delivered in March. It had confirmed that the confidentiality contract remained valid and enforceable. The Privy Council also made clear its view that no contractual provision was to be implied into the contract that MOD consent to publication would not be unreasonably withheld, that the contract was intended to prevent disclosures that would not necessarily be damaging to the public interest (special damage) and which might even be in the public domain, and that the contract had the broader object of preventing public controversy which might be damaging to the efficiency of the armed forces (general damage – the ‘morale’ and ‘suspicion’ effects). The dissenting judgement concerned the lack of availability to initial contract-signers of independent legal advice, but the other four members of the Privy Council disagreed and held that this lack would not have made a difference to the validity or enforceability of the contract. The Secretary reminded the Committee that the author would still be able if he wished to publish his manuscript in due course, but that the MOD would be entitled to his consequent profits..
6. Reporting on SF. Discussed later in the meeting.
7. DPBAC Annual Reception. The intention was confirmed to hold an evening reception in 2003, with similar attendance, venue and funding to last year’s. The current planning date is Wednesday 15 October
8. Threat Advice. It was agreed that follow-up action taken beyond the DPBAC auspices after the last meeting had been generally satisfactory, and that the current arrangements (exemplified by the 15 May warning on East Africa) did not require further DPBAC discussion.
9. Award Announcements. The Secretary
confirmed that the MOD Press Office and secretariats had indeed generally
kept him informed as necessary of events since the last meeting.
Agenda Item 3 - Secretary's Report
10. Advice Given. The Secretary reported examples of advice on publication given to the media and to officials, and accepted. These included technical details of new weapons systems (general story published but not some technical performance limitations), the private home address of a Minister on the High Threat List (burglary story published but not address details), FCO documents leaked on internet (story published, but without details of intelligence officers’ names or web address), GCHQ leak of alleged US request for assistance (story published but without certain details of employee’s department). The Secretary also gave an example of post-hoc action concerning a published report of pre-conflict SBS operations in Iraq, fortunately untrue.
11. Parliamentary Questions/DPA. The Secretary reported PQs covering DA-Notice involvement in reporting on Operation ORE (untrue), and on website visits (visits to www.dnotice.org.uk average about 1000 a month, almost double in February/March 2003, 60% from USA, 35% from UK, recently more visits from journalists and schools of journalism). There had been one request for DPA information (nil). The Secretary had given written evidence to the current Review of Government Communications.
12. Visits/Seminars. The Secretary reported on his discussions with undergraduates and post-graduates at Schools of Journalism (Goldsmiths, Sheffield, London School of Printing, Cardiff). All wished him to return for next year’s courses, and meanwhile he had three planned visits to other Schools. These sessions were productive, both in spreading the word about the role of the DPBAC, and in discussing the reporting of National Security matters generally. The Secretary had also given an interview about the DPBAC to the Manchester Evening News, lectured to the media studies group of the US Industrial College of the Armed Forces, been a panellist in debates on security at the Soho Festival and with the Index on Censorship, and participated in a legal training group discussing National Security.
13. Official Representation in Seminars, etc. The Secretary reported that he was invited to participate in discussions on security because he came from a quasi-official background, and because there were very few or usually no speakers available with secret intelligence and security backgrounds to take part in such public discussions; this led to a lack of balance which was undesirable for the organisers, for the media, for officials and for the public. The Chairman suggested that official members of the Committee should consider if there were ways of filling this lacuna.
14.Books. The Secretary reported that he had been asked for comment on six books in the past six months. One concerned potential official use of satellite receiving stations, three were Special Forces books, one was a crime novel by an ex-SF author, and one was the DPBAC Vice-Chairman’s book about Weapons of Mass Destruction. There were no changes advised to any of the books.
15. 'Stakeknife’. The Secretary explained his role in the recent media reporting on the alleged agent known in the media as ‘Stakeknife’. In addition to his normal role in advising the media in order to protect the life of alleged agents and agent-handlers, and of members of the public, he had on occasions been used, because of his public accessibility, as the conduit of information from alleged agents and from journalists about matters about to be put in the public domain. When asked to do so, and in particular when a life appeared to be potentially at risk, he passed such information on to the authorities. His letter to editors the previous day, although partly overtaken by events, had been sent out to remind that certain identities and other details needed to be protected, where the individuals concerned had not themselves authorised disclosure, at least until any legal or administrative measures had removed this need.
16. The Iraq Campaign. The Secretary reported that, in the run-up to the military operations, he had briefed many journalists collectively and individually about the kind of matters that might endanger operational and personal security. During the high intensity operations, journalists in UK had continued to consult him, and despite the hundreds of embedded journalists and unilaterals in theatre, there had not been a single serious breach of security by any part of the UK media. The system and the advice in the five standing DA-Notices had proved entirely adequate, and as able to fulfil their role in such operations as in other conflicts and in peace.
17. SF Matters Pre/During Campaign. The Secretary reported that there had been far fewer SF/media problems than during the Afghanistan campaign. The Chairman commented that he suspected this was only because in Iraq SF had been operating in less visible roles. The Secretary added that there had also been one innovation, in that, both before and during the Iraq campaign, MOD had on several occasions agreed to his telling the media when he knew that a report on which he was consulted was fundamentally untrue; the newspapers concerned had been grateful for this clarification, and had with one exception spiked that story.
18. Initial Thoughts on Iraq Operations. In discussion, the media side enquired whether the MOD’s Green Book on media matters during operations would now be amended to include the concept of embedding journalists. MOD replied that the analysis of the Iraq campaign was still under way, and that any changes to the Green Book would flow from that. The Chairman said that it was probable that, as after previous major operations, an Open Forum would be held in due course with media, academics and others, to discuss the lessons of the campaign. On the whole the embedding system seemed to have worked satisfactorily, despite some frustrations. He had been struck by how those in the media directing media coverage had often to make very rapid decisions about what to publish. The media had evidently had problems, particularly initially, of giving the public too narrow and tactical a view, and efforts had been made by the official side to give the wider and more strategic view. This was the first 7/24 live coverage war, and there were many lessons to be learned, including how MOD could better balance rapid reaction to media questions with the need to be sure of being accurate in its responses.
19. Initial Media Thoughts. The media
side commented that in particular there was a mismatch between what the embedded
journalists were reporting on the rolling news and what the authorities were
able to provide on the fuller picture at that moment. Media analysis and
reactions were also at an early stage of collation. It would be helpful for
MOD and media to complete their studies, and to consider the current and
future possibilities provided by new technologies, before MOD's intended
Open Forum.
SF PI Policy
20. The Media Side commented that, while it was welcomed that MOD had enabled the DPBAC Secretary occasionally to exceed his role and give the media additional information in response to SF enquiries, the media side was nevertheless much concerned that after 18 months MOD’s SF PI Policy Study had still not made progress. It was explained by the Official Side that, although the Privy Council had now ruled on the NZ case, the principles were still to be tested under English law in early July (the Cameron case), and the legal advice to MOD was that the outcome could be prejudiced by MOD conducting a prior review of its PI Policy on SF, and also that it might be harder in future to persuade courts to uphold contract cases. Furthermore, those in MOD who would need to look more closely at alternative systems, had all until recently been deeply involved in the campaign in Iraq.
21. The media side commented that the Iraq campaign had already highlighted once again the difficulties of the current policy, in that US and Australian SF were now prepared to discuss openly many aspects of even analogous SF operations there. The media had no intention of endangering SF operations or personnel, but almost all the disagreements which the Committee had addressed in recent years had concerned policy on SF, and this was still the situation. It appeared to be above all a MOD concern about perceptions.
22. After discussion, the Chairman summed up that there were good legal and organisational reasons for the differing views about any changes in the current policy. Nevertheless, he acknowledged the rationale behind the media concerns, and believed that some ground work could be undertaken in advance of the next court case. Accordingly, he would take action with a view to the MOD preparing a paper for discussion with the media side of the Committee.
23. Meanwhile the media side, assisted by the Secretary, should highlight
to MOD any areas in which they already foresaw problems with specific SF
stories, for example post-Iraq awards.
Item 4 - Any Other Business
24. There was none
Next Meeting
25. The Chairman asked the Secretary to arrange the next meeting in November.
Last Updated : 06th December 2002
19 Nov 02 - Secretary/DPBAC Opening Remarks, Soho Writers' Festival Civil Liberties Panel
01 Oct 02 - Pennant Magazine - Article by Rear Admiral Nick Wilkinson
25 Sept 01 - Reporting on Anti-Terrorist Operations
26 Feb 01 - Opening Remarks by Secretary/DPBAC to Campaign for Press and Broadcasting Freedom 22
Jan 01 - Statement by Secretary to BBC Newsnight
24 Nov 00 - Press Gazette - Article by Sec DPBAC
10 Nov 00 - Freedom Forum - Opening Remarks by Sec DPBAC
My job covers what should be just one small part of our subject this evening, namely National Security. But of course, National Security is a loosely used term that covers a multitude of circumstances, and sometimes a multitude of sins. But before I talk about National Security, and about the impact of 9/11 on my area, and about official secrecy generally, I will just remind you, very briefly, what the D-Notice system is and is not.
The purpose of the D-Notice Committee is simply to give advice on the publication of National Security matters. It has no statutory basis, and no powers whatsoever. The Committee consists of 13 media representatives, mostly editor or managing editor level, and four very senior civil servants. They are all responsible individually to their nominating organisation, but collectively the D-Notice Committee is responsible to nobody – not to any government department, and certainly not to any politicians.
About three years ago the Committee hammered out and eventually agreed 5 standing generic D-Notices, which are much shorter and more liberal than in the Cold War days. And week on week, as the only full time member of the system, I then apply the advice in these Notices, with those who consult me, in as independent, liberal and open a way as I can.
In practice, I am as likely to advise officials that something really is not that secret, as I am to advise a journalist that some detail really would endanger a life or an ongoing operation. But nobody on either side has to ask my advice, and, even if they do, they don’t have to follow it.
Now, National Security. It is mentioned, as either a justification or as an exemption, in many Acts – the Official Secrets Act, Terrorism Act, Freedom of Information Act, Data Protection Act, Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, to name several, and note how many of those are relatively new. But nowhere is National Security actually defined. It is what lawyers call ‘an ambulatory concept’, a phrase I love, to be interpreted on each occasion in the light of the allegedly unforeseeable circumstances. It is in fact quite hard to define National Security in a couple of lines – it is rather like the concept of consent in sex - we all know roughly what it means, but when it comes to precise definition and to real cases, people have strongly varying views.
In practice in Britain, the only agreed concept of National Security currently on the streets is, de facto, that enshrined in the 5 standing D-Notices. And the point I want to make about this concept is that it is a much more narrowly constrained and specific concept than that implied in all the Acts of Parliament that I have mentioned. The D-Notices do not, for example, consider even the most violent of the current Animal Liberation Front activists to be terrorists. Nor do we advise against publication of any detail unless it really does involve serious damage, that is grave danger to the country and/or to its people, and certainly not matters just politically or bureaucratically embarrassing. In these respects, our criteria are obviously very different to the loose catch-all nature of the Acts of Parliament that I have referred to.
How has September 11 last year changed the D-Notice system? The answer may be the only relatively good news you hear tonight. It is that September 11 has changed nothing – the standing D-Notices remain as before, and I have very consciously ensured that the way I interpret them has also remained unchanged. In my perception, although we live in an unstable and sometimes dangerous world, we also did so before 9/11. We are certainly now more aware of the threat from one particular direction, and that threat is possibly more directly focussed on us now because of our role since 9/11, but on the other hand the intelligence and security services are also now better organised to counter it, even if no measures against terrorists can ever be 100%, and an element of good luck is needed. So the situation is not so significantly more dangerous now that we need to go overboard on new security measures, especially any that greatly erode civil liberties.
So where does that leave official secrecy? Even before September 11 last year, we all saw how the Freedom of Information Act had been watered down behind the scenes, and implementation postponed. You may not have seen, but I can assure you it is so, that the way in which Ministries now treat Data Protection Act requests is also not as open-handed as when it first came into force. And to end with the oldest Act in question, the current version of Official Secrets Act is now effectively 14 years old. It was written in a vastly different world, still in the Cold War era, and for a public who then had rather different attitudes to many aspects of what can loosely be described as human rights. Many other aspects of British and international life have also changed in the intervening years, including the style of our government, the international legal framework, and the role of the media, and of course there is the impact of the internet on matters of secrecy. It seems logical therefore to me that, sooner rather than later, the Official Secrets Act will need to be looked at again.
However, this, and other aspects of greater openness, have no high political or bureaucratic priority, nor are the media themselves, individually or collectively, very consistent in pressing for greater openness. Nor, in the view of many in Westminster, Whitehall and Fleet Street, does anyone in the British public beyond the M25 have much interest in any of this. Personally I disagree strongly with such a cynical view. But I am not sure what it will be that will light the blue touch-paper of the rocket of reform.
There are very few people who can claim to have a job that is unique in the world, but I do, since no other country has anything like our Defence, Press and Broadcasting Advisory Committee. In October 2002, this peculiar and peculiarly British institution celebrates its 90th anniversary. It started as an ad hoc meeting of senior newspapermen and civil servants who shared then a mutual concern about giving away secrets useful to the German Naval build-up. It has continued ever since, through war and peace, independent of any government department, an informal and voluntary system, albeit one which has gathered a certain mythological status along the way.
The Committee’s role is to provide advice on the publication of National Security matters, and it currently has 13 media members (mostly managing editor level, nominated by their professional associations) and four ex-officio very senior civil servants from MoD, FCO and Home Office. In 2000, the Committee agreed the current Defence Advisory Notices, of which there are now just five, and they are standing Notices giving generic advice, and so, contrary to the popular misconception, a specific Notice is not ‘slapped on’ a particular story. The Committee meets twice a year to discuss any current matters of concern, and to listen to me, as the only permanent representative of the system, account to them for the advice I have given to media and officials in the previous six months, based on the standing Notices.
As simple as that. Well, not quite. The job has its interesting side, and I have the necessary high security clearances to poke around and find out what is really going on in the secret world before I give advice. The advice to the media is sometimes that some details really would endanger life and/or operations if published, and the advice to officials is, alternatively, occasionally that the story really does not contain anything very secret, because it is already in the public domain, or because it would not seriously endanger anything, or because it is merely just embarrassing to some department. And as I spend so much time talking to journalists, I am also of course the recipient of plenty of unpublished media intelligence and scuttlebutt. What I hear from either side is not passed on, unless the originator wishes it to be.
Because I am a one-man-band, the job also has its tedious side, for example being available to officials and journalists 24 hours a day, 365 days a year (and much of what is left of British investigative journalism seems to come to a head at weekends!). It is also a time-consuming chore to have to skim most newspapers and magazines daily, and to keep in touch as best I can with broadcast and internet happenings, and to read through some occasionally awful manuscripts of books.
But, although there are very serious and even dangerous matters at stake, even the more tedious duties can have their amusing side. The first time I was called away from a long Sunday lunch to give some fairly mundane telephone advice to a journalist, I omitted to keep a note of what I had said, so was relieved when I rang him later and found that he had obviously also been at a long Sunday lunch, and so we started again from scratch! Similarly, early in my tour, when first skimming the half-yearly ‘Bookseller’ tome for advance notice of books by or about spies, etc, I thought I could at least skip the culinary section, only to discover that the former Head of the East German Secret Service had once written a cookery book – but I have yet to discover whether his recipes were indeed life-endangering.
Being necessarily so accessible, and having also set up a much-visited website in the interests of openness (www.dnotice.org.uk), I also receive a number of requests for information and advice from the public, some of them eccentric. In this regard, let me state categorically that there is no DA-Notice on stories about UFOs! Nor is there anything in the DA-Notices that prevents any accused person, whether he or she has ever genuinely worked for the Secret or Security Services or MoD, from appearing in court! More sinister, however, during the foot and mouth crisis, were queries from people involved who were allegedly told (by nameless officials) that they should not talk about their experiences because ‘it was all covered by a D-Notice for reasons of National Security’ – which of course it was not.
National Security is a phrase often used, including in various Acts (eg those concerning Official Secrets, Data Protection, Freedom of Information, Regulation of Investigatory Powers, Terrorism, etc), but it is nowhere defined. It is what lawyers call ‘an ambulatory concept’, which to some is like Humpty Dumpty’s ‘It means just what I choose it to mean’, but in practice it is indeed quite hard to define concisely. For that reason, the concept of National Security contained in the five DA-Notices and their Introduction is the only agreed concept on the streets. It has no statutory status, but it is where officials administering the various Acts are encouraged at least to start. And it is what the media understand as where the line is drawn.
How do I get involved in cases? Usually when a journalist rings me with the germ of a sensitive National Security story, to seek advice about certain details. Or when someone from the Secret Intelligence or Security Services, or GCHQ, or MoD, rings me with a concern about some detected media interest. Or occasionally when I know of something sensitive going on which is likely to become public, and I pre-emptively advise editors why it would be dangerous to publish the story for the time being, for example when Special Forces operations were under way to rescue hostages in Sierra Leone.
In many of these cases I need to shuttle to and fro, informing, persuading and advising, until a solution acceptable to both sides is found. It is very rare, once my rationale has been explained, for an official or journalist totally to ignore my advice, and it has certainly never happened where a serious danger has been involved. This is not because I have any powers, or any special skill, but because the criteria in the Notices have been very carefully worked out to be acceptable to both sides in today’s security environment.
Being in the no-man’s land between two powerful armies, that of officialdom and that of the media, I try to see each through the eyes of the other. The media perceive officialdom generally (including, but to a lesser extent, the military) as being unjustifiably secretive about almost everything they do, even when National Security is not seriously at risk, and even when there is a clear Public Interest reason for publication. And officials (including most of the military) perceive the media generally as being interested only in bad news, careless about factuality and the security of others, and given to door-stepping people at a time of misfortune.
There are elements of truth in both perceptions, but the major reason for sometimes counter-productively poor relations is mutual ignorance. Serious financial pressures and fierce competition, within and between the different parts of the media, mean that there are fewer journalists these days who are National Security specialists, fewer layers of experienced editorial staff, and almost nobody there with personal military experience. So the implications for security of publication are not always understood. Similarly, there are very few officials or military who understand the organisation and pressures of modern journalism, and how to present a developing story, or who feel comfortable talking to the media. So there is unnecessary apprehension and secrecy. Part of my job involves bridging this gap of suspicion and poor communication about National Security matters, trying to persuade officials that one can trust most journalists if one treats them intelligently, and has an intelligent case, and trying to persuade journalists that officials and military sometimes have justifiable reasons of operational and personal security for being reticent.
That said, I am lucky in the calibre of those with whom I work on both sides, who are in many and amusing ways very similar to each other – intelligent, energetic, resourceful, witty, fiercely robust, gossipy, and full of testosterone (they are also mainly white, male and middle-class). Both sides have a top league reputation with their peers worldwide. There are things about both sides which have been surprises to me too, including: the absolute power of hire-and-fire which editors have over their staff, and proprietors have over editors, as ruthless as in any professional football club; ‘C’s’ dining room, which must have one of the best corporate views in Britain; the youth of most editors; the number of fingers in the MOD media handling pie.
Finally, what are the questions I am most often asked, apart from ‘what on earth do you do?’? The first is, ‘Why does UK have a D-Notice system if no other country does?’. The answer lies partly in history, but mainly it is because the system still serves a useful purpose to both media and officialdom, in being a quick, cheap and flexible bridge between the two, and an effective way of avoiding constant, costly and unpredictable litigation, which rarely reflects well on either side with the public. And the other common question is ‘Why is the D-Notice Secretary always an admiral?’. The truth is that that is a complete mystery. But some people do still prefer to believe that it is a secret on which a D-Notice has been slapped.
Nick Wilkinson
Rear Admiral
Secretary,
Defence, Press and Broadcasting Advisory Committee
Since the 11 September terrorist attacks, quite properly many articles have been published and broadcasts been made which have speculated about potential and imminent action against the terrorists, in particular by Special Forces. There has also been speculation about intelligence and security activities and intentions. What has gone out so far has included comparatively little not already in the public domain, and the spirit of the advice in the DA-Notices has largely been observed.
However, as the next phase of military and intelligence planning and action now gets under way, here and in other countries co-operating against this particular terrorism, informed speculation may become very close to the truth. It would be operationally very helpful therefore, and a reassurance to those who may be going into action in the coming days or months, if editors could now minimise such speculation, whether by their own journalists or by retired military people. And if even greater care could be exercised in considering information which could be of use to the terrorists and their supporters.
There will of course continue to be some military matters, and even very occasionally some security matters, which should be reported as events unfold. I am constantly available to advise whenever you or your staff feel that you may be getting into the sensitive areas outlined in the DA-Notices.
Nick Wilkinson
Rear Admiral
Secretary,
Defence, Press and Broadcasting Advisory Committee
I start with a principle, one which I am quite strongly attached to. That is that each of us as an individual is entitled not only to privacy, but to some secrets obviously as long as these secrets do no serious harm to any other being.
By extension, I believe that that principle applies to groups of individuals too – families, societies, associations, unions, etc, etc.
Ultimately this principle applies to the state too. But – there is of course a qualification where the secrets of any large organisation are concerned, and in particular the State. That is that the State’s secrets belong ultimately to the citizens of the State, to us, and any secrets which are kept from us by those we delegate as custodians of secrets – government and officials – these State secrets must be carefully constrained by publicly known rules, by circumstances, by place and by time. Having the time limit on a secret, in particular, is not only in the public interest, but it is also a very healthy check on unacceptable behaviour by those with state power.
Similarly, the decision as to when such secrets should be disclosed to the public, should not be left just to the government and official custodians, but should be influenced by others who do not have the same potential self-interest in maintaining secrecy. These others should include parliament, public interest groups, and of course the media.
There is inevitably therefore a grey zone in State secrecy, when something that has been a secret is faced with disclosure, and a decision has to be made whether such disclosure is now in the public interest.
It is in that grey zone that I spend my working life, and it is this that Barry White has asked me to come and discuss with you this evening. So I am going to start by talking about my own role, and then go on to make comments about some National Security matters, as I personally see them. I made similar comments to the Freedom Forum last Autumn, but some things have moved on since then.
I have a very strange job indeed. I work in the no-man’s land between 2 quite powerful, and normally battling, armies – the army of officials and the army of the media. My job is to offer advice to, or to offer to negotiate between, these 2 armies. I have an office inside the castle of officialdom, and I can therefore when necessary be privy to some of their kafkaesque dealings and secrets – but I am not responsible to any government department, and I do not therefore speak for them, and I spend just as much time with journalists as I do with officials. I am responsible to an independent committee – the Defence, Press and Broadcasting Advisory Committee, still known colloquially as the D-Notice Committee. 13 of the 17 members of the Committee are media representatives; they are mostly managing editor types, from across the spectrum of press and broadcasting; they are fiercely protective of the independent status of the Committee, and of my independent role as the Committee’s servant, and as a servant of the public. The system is of course voluntary, and I have no powers other than those of persuasion; the decision whether or not to use the system at all, and the final decision as to what is published, lie with the editor or publisher. The Committee meets twice a year, and is the only regular forum for senior officials and senior media people to discuss their potential and actual disagreements of principle. In between the meetings, I am left to get on with running things day-to-day, consulting individual members if necessary. I am a one-man band.
The standing Defence Advisory Notices (still colloquially known as the D-Notices) have now been reduced to just 5 in number, and were again revised, and made less restrictive, earlier this year. The details are all on our internet site, www.dnotice.org.uk. There is nothing mysterious about the system. And there is nothing surprising about the 5 standing notices which very briefly cover military operations, plans, and capabilities; nuclear and non-nuclear weapons and equipment; ciphers and secure communications; sensitive installations and home addresses; and the UK’s security and intelligence services and special forces.
How, in practice, do I get involved? Either I myself become aware of something of potential interest, for example in the booksellers’ guides, or in a breaking news story, and I offer my services. Or a journalist or author or publisher gets in touch with me about something which he or she intends to write or broadcast, and asks for my advice, or asks that I act as an intermediary with officials. Or an official learns of a potential story and asks for my advice, or asks that I act as an intermediary with the media. In the latter case I do not always agree to get involved, for example if I consider that an official is being unjustifiably secretive, or if it is a matter of embarrassment rather than of national security. Which brings me to National Security.
National Security is a term which is frequently used, for example as a justification, or as an exemption in an act or bill – some well known to you include the Terrorism Act, the Data Protection Act, the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, and the Freedom of Information Act and the OSA. But National Security is not actually defined anywhere, for 2 main reasons, as far as I can see.
The first is that Government lawyers believe that National Security should be what is called an ‘ambulatory concept’, a general idea to be interpreted, if necessary by the Courts, in the light of the particular and unforeseeable circumstances.
The other main reason that National Security is not defined anywhere is that it is extremely difficulty to do so precisely and concisely, as the 13 experienced journalists and four senior civil servants on my Committee found last year, when they tried to draft a short definition of National Security, to go with the revised Defence Advisory Notices. In the end they fell back on the detailed areas described in the Notices themselves, and they put these Notices in a context of scale, namely ‘involving grave danger to the State and/or individuals’. That deliberately excludes, for example, many matters now covered by the Terrorism Act.
Well, that is all very well, but this closely circumscribed concept of National Security applies only to the work of the D-Notice Committee, and has no legal status; nor is National Security defined anywhere even in the 1989 Official Secrets Act. And here, whereas the D-Notice criterion is that there must actually be damage to National Security, and that applies to all my interventions, that is rather different from the wider criteria in the Official Secrets Act.
So, what can be done to reduce the strife over National Security between officials and media?
You would expect me to believe that resolving disagreements between officialdom and the media is best done using the D-Notice system – cheap, quick and precise – rather than going to law and risking blanket injunctions on stories, police investigations, and prosecutions. Failure by officials, or by the media, to use the D-Notice system usually ends in unnecessary unpleasantness and/or litigation. Of course, one could do without the D-Notice system, but all that would do, in the current climate, is lead to more injunctions and more recourse to the legal system. And I believe that in any area of media activity, a voluntary system is preferable to litigation That is if the voluntary system is applied impartially, and in a liberal-minded way, which is my aim.
But of course the D-Notice system is anyway not itself the problem. Last year we heard much of the general governmental and official culture of secrecy, in particular over BSE. The OSA culture of secrecy is of even longer standing, the Cold War habit of attempting to keep everything secret, rather than just the very few things which really do need to be kept secret, for the time being, to prevent genuine damage, in particular danger to lives, or to current or future operations.
I have to say too that there are faults on the media side, sometimes of sensational inaccuracy, which just makes officials bloody-minded, but more seriously the fault is of a very patchy approach by most of the media to secrecy and freedom of information matters. In the same way that there are allegedly some in Westminster and Whitehall, who believe that nobody outside the M25 cares about trial by jury, there are certainly some in Westminster and Whitehall, who have quite sincerely concluded, that nobody outside the Guardian readership cares much about freedom of information, or reform of the Official Secrets Act.
However, both the media and officialdom, and their associated lawyers, are well aware that the culture of secrecy is now being challenged by a number of court decisions and further cases through this Spring and Summer. We are also now it seems in the run up to the next general election, and, simultaneously, the Government and Parliament and officials have been trying to cope with an existing, unusually heavy, legislative load. This is not the ideal scenario for calm, rational and open debate.
But de facto that debate is under way, if not yet by government, certainly in the media and the courts. Last November, a court in New Zealand ruled against the Ministry of Defence here in what is effectively a test case on the lifelong duty of confidentiality of ex-government servants, in that case an ex-SAS soldier. An appeal against that has been made by the MOD, and a decision is awaited.
Last month, the Court of Appeal ruled in favour of the Sunday Times, albeit with some slight qualifications, in the case of the Richard Tomlinson book. The principle at stake there was fundamentally about when something can be considered to be sufficiently in the public domain to be republished legitimately. I am glad to say that the liberal advice that I had given previously in this respect was consistent with the subsequent Appeal Court ruling.
And this month, in a preliminary hearing in the David Shayler case, the Court ruled that the media should be able to report the court proceedings, and that sensitive official documents should be made available to the defence. And then waiting in the wings are the memoirs of Dame Stella Rimington. So there is a lot going on which is likely to affect how the OSA is handled in future.
One other point, concerning the D-Notice system, but in a wider field. I mentioned the number of places where National Security is quoted, but not defined. Indeed the only concept of National Security currently on any table is that in the 5 standing DA Notices and their Introduction.
At the most recent D-Notice Committee meeting, last November, the media representatives therefore highlighted the potential for confusion, in the minds of the media, if officials involved in enforcing all the Acts which mention National Security interpreted it differently from the D-Notice way. The official representatives on the Committee took the point. They decided that, while the courts must be the ultimate arbiters, the attention of all officials would be drawn to the DA-Notice concept of National Security, at least as the starting point for their decision-making. This in itself will be a mind-shift for officials. Of course, official mind-shifts take time!
Nevertheless, from where I sit, as the servant of the Committee and of the public, it is clear that some change is needed. We need to deal with matters of official secrecy, freedom of information and national security, in a more mature and modern way. I therefore welcome discussions like today’s, and I look forward to continuing to help push things along, both in open debate with the media and lawyers, and behind the scenes with officials.
The Defence, Press and Broadcasting Advisory Committee is concerned only with matters which gravely endanger National Security, especially where this concerns lives and operations. The Official Secrets Act is applicable more widely, and is not my direct responsibility, and it is not for me to comment publicly on it.
So far as the Defence Advisory Notices are concerned, anything which is put on the internet is ipso facto in the public domain. However, there might be very occasional circumstances in which I would nevertheless ask the media to consider not immediately publishing something which was on the net.
For example, if I learned that someone had just put, on a little-known website, the identity of an active MI5 or MI6 officer, or that of one of their agents, and that this identification endangered his or her life, then I might ask the media not to broadcast further the information, or the web address, at least until the officer or agent had been moved rapidly to a safe place.
Such a short term delay might literally be the difference between life and death, especially taking into consideration, firstly, how difficult it can be to find something on the net unless one knows what one is looking for, and roughly where to find it; secondly, that not all foreign and terrorist intelligence organisations are always very quick and efficient, nor comprehensive in their cover.
But I emphasise that such a request to the media would only be made by me in such unusual, temporary and dangerous circumstances."
National Security
The media do get something in return for the D-Notice System, argues Nick Wilkinson
D for disclosure
Richard Ayre clearly felt out of place when he was a member of the Defence, Press and Broadcasting Advisory Committee (Press Gazette, 10.11.00), but he is now four years out of date. The environment in which I operate as the Secretary is changing, and some of what he writes is no longer completely accurate, if it ever was.
The number of standing D Notices (strictly speaking now Defence Advisory Notices) was reduced in May to five, covering in essence present and future military operations, weapon systems performance, cryptography, sensitive sites, and the Secret and Security Services. Nothing unexpected about that, and the list of matters under those headings which are still considered sensitive is also now more limited. Weapon stockpiles and aerial photography of security establishments, for example, are no longer included. For the D-Notice Secretary to be interested, the criterion of damage to national security (not political or official embarrassment) also has to be met. This damage is most commonly danger to ongoing operations and/or to the lives of agents or of the public.
In redrafting the D-Notices, an attempt was made to define national security in a few words, but even the combined skills of this independent Committee’s 13 experienced media representatives and 4 senior civil servants could not produce a form of words any more concise and precise than the D Notices themselves. However, they put the Notices in a context of grave danger to the State and/or individuals. This upper level of threat excludes, for example, many activities now potentially covered by the Terrorism Act.
These changes to the Notices were inspired not by the security services, as alleged by Richard Ayre, but by the media representatives, and they give journalists, broadcasters, editors, authors, publishers and others (and, of course, officials) much clearer guidance than before on the precise areas where they should consider taking advice. Of course, some very experienced writers and broadcasters need very little advice. They know their specialist subjects well, and know (often better than officials) what is already in the public domain. And very few in the media want genuinely and knowingly to endanger operations or lives. But even the most experienced do not always know everything which at that moment is current, and the D-Notice system provides the media with a quick, easy and free way of checking.
Another benefit which the system provides to the media is a way of avoiding litigation, which is the only alternative, and one which officials have shown they are ready to use when alarmed that national security is (in their view) about to be breached. In my year in office, I have already seen several examples of where use of the D-Notice system has either headed off, or could have headed off, injunctions. And when injunctions are granted by the Courts, they tend to have a blanket effect on stopping a story, whereas the D-Notice system is concerned usually only with detail, for example a name or a current technique.
There is nothing ‘mysterious’ about the way the system operates. Sometimes I take the initiative myself, prompted for example by a publisher’s advertisement or a breaking news story, or I am asked for advice or to act as a mediator by a journalist/writer or an official. The media reveal to me as much or as little as they want, and I check with them how much I can reveal to officials. Often I know enough to make a judgement myself on whether something would actually damage national security, but, if not, I have the necessary high security clearances to investigate. I am just as likely to tell an official he is being unjustifiably secretive, as to tell a journalist he is being inadvisably revelatory (it is almost always ‘he’ in both cases).
Richard Ayre says that ‘alerting the admiral’ – almost always an admiral – ‘to your scoop story, and then following his advice and editing bits out, won’t even earn you a promise that you won’t be prosecuted under the Official Secrets Act’. In fact, your scoop remains your scoop, it does not go to a rival; and nor can anything which the D-Notice Secretary, with your agreement, tells officials in confidence about the story, be used against you subsequently. I do advise journalists if I suspect that something they intend to write may be in breach of the OSA or injunctions (although I am not privy to the latter) – not my job strictly speaking, and not foolproof, but I hope it is also helpful to the media. But the decision as to whether to publish remains with the editor or publisher, and the decision whether to go to litigation is entirely a decision for the relevant Ministry, based either on what has been published or on other sources they may have, not on what may be known to the D-Notice Secretary.
The pamphlet which Richard Ayre’s article plugs has a specific recommendation which I will plug for him:
"Recommendation 12: The DA Notice system should be dismantled
The system as presently constituted should be dismantled. Any future security advisory system must be strictly voluntary and not a response to oppressive secrecy or other security laws. Where the press makes use of this system and receives an indication that no damage to national security is threatened by a given story, this outcome should be able to guarantee that there will be no subsequent adverse consequences as a result of publication."
The present system could of course easily be dismantled if the media side so wished, but, at present and as now revised, it still does have benefits to disclosure by them, as outlined by me above. It is already ‘strictly voluntary’. Many foreign journalists acknowledge that they have no such buffer against the draconian use of legislation. If the D-Notice system were used in every case, with its tightly drawn concept of national security, there would be far less danger of ‘adverse consequences’.
I am sorry that Richard Ayre was turned off by his time as a member of the D-Notice Committee. He clearly equates ‘grim men in dark suits …… wearing a poppy’ with establishment power, whereas I suspect it was no more than the image which Managing Editors felt they should project in the early 1990s. As it happened, five minutes after I read his article, I found myself sitting as a panellist at a Freedom Forum conference, part sponsored by his own Article 19. Alongside me was David Shayler. He was wearing a dark suit and a poppy.
Rear Admiral Nick Wilkinson has been D-Notice Secretary since November 1999. Full details of the system on http://www.dnotice.org.uk.
I have been asked to start by talking very briefly about my job as the D-Notice Secretary, and I will then go on to make comments about some National Security matters, as I personally see them.
I have a very strange job indeed. I work in the no-man’s land between 2 quite powerful, and normally battling, armies – the army of officials and the army of the media. My job is to offer advice to, or to offer to negotiate between, these 2 armies. I have an office inside the castle of officialdom, and I can therefore when necessary be privy to some of their kafkaesque dealings and secrets – but I am not responsible to any government department, and I do not therefore speak for them, and I spend just as much time with journalists as I do with officials. I am responsible to an independent committee, 13 of whose 17 members are media representatives; they are fiercely protective of the independent status of the Committee, and of my independent role as the Committee’s servant, and as a servant of the public. The system is of course voluntary, and I have no powers other than those of persuasion; the decision whether or not to use the system at all, and the final decision as to what is published, lie with the editor or publisher.
The standing Defence Advisory Notices have now been reduced to just 5 in number, and were again revised, and made less restrictive, earlier this year. The details are all on our internet site. There is nothing mysterious about the system.
How, in practice, do I get involved? Either I myself become aware of something of potential interest, for example in the bookseller’s guides, or in a breaking news story, and I offer my services. Or a journalist or author or publisher gets in touch with me about something which he or she intends to write or broadcast, and asks for my advice, or asks that I act as an intermediary with officials. Or an official learns of a potential story and asks for my advice, or asks that I act as an intermediary with the media. In the latter case I do not always agree to get involved, for example if I consider that an official is being unjustifiably secretive, or if it is a matter of embarrassment rather than of national security. Which brings me to National Security.
National Security is a term which is frequently used, for example as a justification, or as an exemption in an act or bill – some well known to you include the Terrorism Act, the Data Protection Act, the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, and the Freedom of Information Bill. But National Security is not actually defined anywhere, for 2 main reasons, as far as I can see.
The first is that Government lawyers believe that National Security should be what is called an ‘ambulatory concept’, a general idea to be interpreted if necessary by the Courts, in the light of the particular and unforeseeable circumstances.
The other main reason that National Security is not defined anywhere is that it is extremely difficulty to do so precisely and concisely, as the 13 experienced journalists and four senior civil servants on my Committee found earlier this year, when they tried to draft a definition of National Security, to go with the revised Defence Advisory Notices. In the end they fell back on the detailed areas described in the Notices themselves, and they put these Notices in a context of scale, namely ‘involving grave danger to the State and/or individuals’. That deliberately excludes, for example, many matters now covered by the Terrorism Act.
Well, that is all very well, but this closely circumscribed concept of National Security applies only to the work of the D-Notice Committee, and has no legal status; nor is National Security defined anywhere in the 1989 Official Secrets Act. And whereas the D-Notice criterion is that there must actually be damage to National Security, and that applies to all my interventions, that is rather different from the criteria in the Official Secrets Act.
So, what can be done to reduce the strife between officials and media?
You would expect me to believe that resolving disagreements between officialdom and the media is best done using the D-Notice system – cheap, quick and precise – rather than going to law and risking blanket injunctions on stories, police investigations, and prosecutions. Failure by officials, or by the media, to use the D-Notice system usually ends in unnecessary unpleasantness. Of course, one could do without the D-Notice system, but all that would do, in the current climate, is lead to more injunctions and more recourse to the legal system. And I believe that in any area of media activity, a voluntary system is preferable t litigation That is if the voluntary system is applied impartially, and in a liberal-minded way, which is my aim.
But the D-Notice system is anyway not the problem. In recent weeks we have heard much of the BSE culture of secrecy. The OSA culture of secrecy is of even longer standing, the Cold War habit of attempting to keep everything secret, rather than just the very few things which really do need to be kept secret, for the time being, to prevent genuine damage, in particular danger to lives, or to current or future operations.
I have to say that there are faults on the media side too, sometimes of sensational inaccuracy, which just makes officials bloody-minded, but more seriously the fault is of a very patchy approach by most of the media to secrecy and freedom of information matters. In the same way that there are allegedly some in Westminster and Whitehall, who believe that nobody outside the M25 cares about trial by jury, there are certainly some in Westminster and Whitehall, who have quite sincerely concluded, that nobody outside the Guardian readership cares much about freedom of information, or reform of the Official Secrets Act.
However, both the media and officialdom, and their associated lawyers, are well aware that the culture of secrecy is now being challenged by a number of court cases and other events this Autumn through to Spring. During this same period, we shall all possibly be in the run up to the next general election, and, simultaneously, the Government and Parliament and officials are trying to cope with an existing, unusually heavy, legislative load. This is not the ideal scenario for calm, rational and open debate.
Nevertheless, from where I sit, as the servant of the Committee and of the public, it is clear that some change is needed. We need to deal with matters of official secrecy, freedom of information and national security, in a more mature and modern way. I therefore welcome discussions like today’s, and I look forward to helping push things along, both in open debate with the media and lawyers, and behind the scenes with officials.
My part of the Public Interest jigsaw concerns just National Security, and, as National Security is one of the broad exemptions in the draft Freedom of Information Bill, perhaps I should not be on this platform discussing something which I am not part of. However, National Security is a term which is often used, but rarely defined - and it is certainly not defined in a way which is acceptable, both to the most paranoid civil servant, and at the same time to the most libertarian journalist. Even defining national security for a middle of the road consensus is very difficult, but that in fact is what the Defence, Press and Broadcasting Advisory Committee is currently trying to do, for the purposes of the DA-Notice system. The Committee, I remind you, consists on the official side of 4 very senior civil servants from the Home Office, Foreign Office, and Ministry of Defence, and on the media side of 13 senior representatives from diverse organisations. I hope that, at our next 6-monthly meeting, in 12 days' time, we will achieve a definition of National Security which is acceptable all round. The system being voluntary, this definition will have no legal status per se, but it will certainly be relevant to perceptions of national security across the board. More of that relevance in a moment.
In my area of work, there are two main elements of public interest - the right to know what is going on, and the occasionally conflicting right that some public activities should be kept secret for the time being, for example, some of the measures to protect the public against terrorists.
Few people disagree with those two aspects of public interest at the extremes, but they certainly do disagree in interpretations in the grey area in between. This grey area has been enlarged in recent years by the Secret Intelligence Service and Security Service being given some degree of new responsibilities for activities outside their traditional National Security roles, and the grey area is potentially now being enlarged further by much of the new information and security legislation currently being pushed through.
As I have said, National Security is one of the categories of exemption mentioned in the Freedom of Information Bill, but, in this context, what is National Security? - and what is anyway covered by the Official Secrets Act? Without going on the record with my views on the current state of the Freedom of Information Bill, it is clear that there are still such divergent views on Freedom of Information, that there is plenty of room for disagreement between officials and media in the coming years on National Security matters. I expect, therefore, that the new Information Commissioner and I will have to talk from time to time, to ensure that officials in my area are not being unnecessarily secretive, and that where exemptions are upheld, they are properly justified.
The new Terrorism Bill is another where there is controversial change. It widens the definition of terrorism potentially to include groups and activities which do not normally threaten National Security in the commonly and traditionally understood sense. I can tell you, however, that as far as the activities of my Committee and myself are concerned, we will be sticking with "Old Terrorism", ie matters which affect the public security in a macro sense.
The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Bill is another in which undefined National Security is specifically mentioned, for example as a justification for issuing warrants. Here again I see plenty of room for disagreement in interpretation between officials, activists and the media. I can imagine the occasional situation in which the media reveal some use of the surveillance powers in the Bill, surveillance which allegedly has a National Security justification, but which does not, however, match up to the more narrow criteria in the Defence Advisory Notices. Maybe I will, therefore, also occasionally be having conversations with the Chairman of the proposed Investigatory Powers Complaints Tribunal.
The new Data Protection Act does not make National Security an absolute exemption, but it too does provide a special Tribunal, to consider refusals by Agencies to disclose, for reasons of national security.
And then there is the old favourite, the Official Secrets Act. Again without going on the record with my views about the Official Secrets Act, I can tell you that there are officials who think the current Act is creaking, and who would like to see changes to it - not always, needless to say, the same changes as the media would like to see. What does seem likely, however, is that Section 1 of the Act at least (which deals with the Secret Intelligence and Security Services) may be one of many areas of English and Welsh activity which will see change, through the Courts or through Legislation, when the Human Rights Act comes into force on 2 October, and when it may become necessary in any litigation to prove actual damage to National Security.
So, in the field of National Security, I am looking forward to a few interesting years as the DA-Notice Secretary, during which time I expect to see the new rules tested by the public and by the media, in the corridors of power and in the UK and European Courts, perhaps even in Parliament. And we must not forget that it is not just what is in the laws themselves that matters, but also in how, when and by whom they are used and abused.
Meanwhile, I hope that shortly after the meeting on 17 May of the Defence, Press and Broadcasting Advisory Committee, I will be able to publish to Editors a set of revised DA-Notices, which will number 5 instead of 6, which will include a definition of National Security, and which will have a number of other textual revisions which make them slightly clearer for journalists, editors and others to use.
Please do make use of the benefits of the DA-Notice system where appropriate - it is of course voluntary, but negotiation by me between the media and the officials must be preferable to litigation, especially as litigation tends to be slow and expensive and to end in blanket suppression of a story or source, rather than removal of just a few details.
My job remains to advise the media on removal from publication of only the minimum necessary, to prevent genuine serious National Security damage to operations or individuals. My job also remains to help the main story which you wish to publish to go out, in the public interest. And that DA-Notice function will not change, whatever changes there may be in Freedom of Information or other legislation.
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