EU TERRORISM SITUATION AND TREND REPORT
2007
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AND TREND REPORT
2007
TE-SAT 2007
EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2007

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

A large number of various types of terrorist organisations have an active presence in the EU. Some of them aim at Member States or Third State targets situated in Member States, whereas some others who conduct their campaigns mainly outside the EU, use the EU as their logistical base or for fundraising.

Altogether 498 attacks were carried out in the EU in 2006. The vast majority of them resulted in limited material damage and were not intended to kill. However, the failed attack in Germany and the foiled London plot demonstrate that Islamist terrorists also aim at mass casualties.

A total of 706 individuals suspected of terrorism offences were arrested in 15 Member States in 2006. Investigations into Islamist terrorism are clearly a priority for Member States’ law enforcement as demonstrated by the number of arrested suspects reported by Member States.

The small number of suspects arrested for dissemination of propaganda may indicate the lack of legal basis and difficulty in investigating these types of crimes.

France, Spain and the UK are the countries most severely affected by terrorism as concluded from the number of terrorist attacks and arrested suspects as well as the average penalties handed out by the courts.

Islamist Terrorism

Along with the failed terrorist attack that took place in Germany, Denmark and the UK each reported one attempted terrorist attack in 2006. No further information on prevented or disrupted Islamist terrorist attacks was made available by the Member States’ law enforcement authorities.

The London airplane plot and the trolley bomb case of Germany targeted civilians and transportation infrastructure in Member States. The radicalisation process of the suspects in these cases is reported to have been rapid.

The weapon of choice of Islamist terrorists are Improvised Explosive Devices made with homemade explosives. The cases reported by the UK and Denmark involved the use of Triacetone Triperoxide (TATP), a highly volatile explosive the use of which requires a certain degree of expertise.

Half of all the terrorism arrests were related to Islamist terrorism. France, Spain, Italy and the Netherlands had the highest number of arrests of Islamist terrorist suspects. The majority of the arrested suspects were born in Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia and had loose affiliations to North African terrorist groups, such as the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group and the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat.

However, the suspects involved in the foiled plots reported by the UK and Denmark were born or raised in a Member State. Converts, who had been radicalised in Europe, were involved in both cases.

The frequency of video statements by members of the original al-Qaeda leadership and other Islamist terrorists shows a marked increase. The propaganda is of greater sophistication, of high quality and more professional. English is used more often, either in direct speech or in subtitles, allowing potential access to a wider audience...
than previous publications in Arabic. These facts may point to a coordinated global media offensive from Islamist terrorists.

**Ethno-Nationalist and Separatist Terrorism**

In 2006, separatist terrorists carried out 424 attacks in the EU. The Member States most affected were France – with 60 percent of the attacks – and Spain. Attacks were, for the most part, limited to the Basque regions and Corsica.

Five attacks took place in the UK and one in Ireland. No group claimed responsibility for these attacks.

After the unilateral cease fire declared in March 2006, Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) mainly used Taldes Y to carry out a high number of low intensity attacks to maintain pressure on the Spanish government and to demonstrate to its supporters its determination to fight for its goals. However, the attack at the Madrid airport on 30 December 2006 by ETA resulted in casualties and injuries. ETA has not only maintained but also rebuilt its capabilities to strike with well-prepared, organised and coordinated attacks against high profile targets.

Separatist terrorists in Corsica carried out a very high number of low intensity attacks resulting mainly in limited material damage. Only six percent of the attacks were committed against governmental targets. Although Corsican separatists have not directly tried to kill people, the volume of attacks may increase the risk of casualties.

The rise of fundraising activities by the PKK in the EU is related to the escalation of the terrorist campaign of Kurdish terrorists in Turkey.

**Left-Wing and Anarchist Terrorism**

In 2006, left-wing and anarchist terrorists carried out 55 attacks in the EU. Their campaigns mainly targeted Greece, Italy, Spain and Germany.

Left-wing and anarchist terrorists carried out a relatively high number of low-intensity attacks which resulted in limited material damage against business and governmental targets. A minority of the attacks, however, were intended to kill or injure.

A variety of left-wing and anarchist terrorist groups are active mostly in Germany, Greece, Italy and Spain. In Greece, the number of terrorist attacks rose rapidly towards the end of 2006.

Left-wing and anarchist terrorist attacks are motivated by domestic politics but they are also perpetrated as a part of wider international campaigns; for instance, the G8 Summit 2007 that still has to be held has already been the target of left-wing and anarchist terrorists.

**Right-Wing Terrorism**

Right-wing violence is mainly investigated as right-wing extremism and not as right-wing terrorism.

Although violent acts perpetrated by right-wing extremists and terrorists may appear sporadic and situational, right-wing extremist activities are organised and transnational. For instance, details regarding possible targets are collected and disseminated on the Internet.
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1. FOREWORD BY THE DIRECTOR

The TE-SAT 2007 is the fifth edition of the EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report. However, this edition is the very first ‘Europol TE-SAT’, as it is the first TE-SAT produced after the Council of the European Union delegated to Europol the power to approve the final version of the report. After the EU Organised Crime Threat Assessment (OCTA), this is the second major public awareness product for which Europol assumes full responsibility. This formal change was accompanied by a methodological reorientation. In the beginning of 2006, Europol proposed to widen the data collection for the TE-SAT in order to enhance the quality of the report and to make it a better awareness tool for decision makers.

Terrorism is not a new phenomenon in the EU. Nevertheless, in the twenty-first century, the threat posed by terrorism to Member States is more serious than ever. The attacks in Madrid in 2004 and in London in 2005 resulted in mass casualties, and the failed bomb attacks in Germany, together with a considerable number of plots disrupted in 2006, are a strong reminder that this threat prevails.

Virtually all terrorist activities are transnational. Therefore, counter-terrorism in the EU is a matter of solidarity. As stated on many different occasions in the past, effective counter-terrorism in the EU requires increased information exchange, cooperation and coordination between Member States’ competent authorities. In addition to this, we need to have a common assessment of the situation to be able to counter terrorism in a joint effort and to find more effective responses.

The challenge in understanding terrorism as a phenomenon is not the lack of information, but rather the huge amount and varying quality of information publicly available. The TE-SAT 2007 provides an overview of the phenomenon of terrorism in the EU from the law enforcement perspective. We believe that this approach provides a solid basis for decision making, since terrorism inevitably involves the commission of violent crimes and other criminal activities. Consequently, the investigation, trial and punishment of the perpetrators and their accomplices, irrespective of their motive, are clearly a matter for the criminal justice system. The TE-SAT 2007 establishes the basic facts and figures regarding terrorism in the EU based on the Member States’ reporting on criminal investigations into terrorism and the prosecution and convictions for terrorist offences.

The methodology of the TE-SAT 2007 was developed in consultation with the Finnish and German Presidencies, Eurojust and SITCEN. Europol is grateful to their support and valuable contribution. I would also like to thank the Member States and Eurojust for the quantity and the quality of the data provided to Europol for the TE-SAT 2007.

Max-Peter Ratzel
Director of Europol
The EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT) was established as a reporting mechanism from the Terrorism Working Party (TWP) to the European Parliament in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks in 2001. Four editions of the TE-SAT have been presented to date by the Presidencies “based on a file and on the analyses supplied by Europol” from Member States’ contributions.\(^1\)

In the beginning of 2006, Europol proposed to widen the data collection for the TE-SAT in order to enhance the quality of the report. The proposal was endorsed by the Justice and Home Affairs Council on 1 and 2 June 2006. This TE-SAT follows the new methodology developed by Europol in consultation with the Finnish and German Presidencies, Eurojust and SITCEN.

According to ENFOPOL 65 (8196/2/06), the TE-SAT is an unclassified annual document which provides information on the phenomenon of terrorism in the EU. The phenomenon of terrorism is discussed in the TE-SAT 2007 from the law enforcement point of view as a ‘crime’ although, admittedly, terrorism is fundamentally a political phenomenon driven by political motives and oriented toward political ends.

As an analytical report, the TE-SAT is a situation report. It describes the outward manifestations of terrorism i.e. terrorist attacks and activities. It neither attempts to analyse the root causes of terrorism nor to assess the threat posed by terrorism. Furthermore, the TE-SAT does not assess the impact or effectiveness of counter-terrorism policies and law enforcement measures taken, despite the fact that they form an important part of the phenomenon.

The TE-SAT 2007 is an EU report and as such aims at providing an overview of the situation in the EU instead of describing the situation in single Member States as was the case in earlier editions of the TE-SAT. It seeks to establish basic facts and figures regarding terrorist attacks and activities in the EU.

The TE-SAT is, however, also a trend report. Since a trend can be defined as “a general tendency in the way a situation is changing or developing,” the TE-SAT is a forward-looking report, which is why the first issue of the Europol TE-SAT is called TE-SAT 2007. However, due to changes in the methodology, it is difficult to compare the findings of the TE-SAT 2007 to earlier editions of the TE-SAT and establish trends.

The TE-SAT is based mainly on information contributed by the Member States concerning and resulting from criminal investigations into terrorism offences. The TE-SAT does not contain information which is classified or which could jeopardise ongoing investigations.

\(^1\) ENFOPOL 41 REV 2 (8466/2/01).
3. TE-SAT 2007 METHODOLOGY

3.1. Definitions

Terrorism

Terrorism is not an ideology or movement, but a tactic or a method for attaining political goals. This view is also reflected in the Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on Combating Terrorism (2002/275/JHA). All Member States had to align their national legislation with this Framework Decision by 31 December 2002. According to the EU Action Plan on Combating Terrorism of 13 February 2006, most Member States apart from Slovakia, Austria, Cyprus and the Czech Republic have adapted their national legislation. New legislative procedures are in preparation for in all four Member States.

Before the adoption of the Framework Decision, seven Member States had specific legislation in the field of counterterrorism, namely France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Greece, Spain and the United Kingdom. In the other countries, ordinary criminal law was used to prosecute these types of crimes. The legal situation with regard to the implementation of the Framework Decision in the eight Member States which provided information on convictions to Eurojust is described in Annex 3.

Types of Terrorism

Most statistical reports on terrorism make a distinction between international and domestic terrorism. International or transnational terrorism refers to terrorist activities in more than one country, while domestic terrorism is confined within the borders of one country, sometimes within a particular locality in the country. In addressing domestic terrorism, a country can be self-reliant if it possesses sufficient resources, whereas in the case of transnational terrorism, which are open to interpretation.

For practical reasons, the data collected for the TE-SAT 2007 relies on Member States' definitions of terrorist offences.

Even if Member States approximated their national legislation fully in this respect, Article 1 of the Framework Decision includes subjective elements such as the impact of the act concerned, which are open to interpretation. For practical reasons, the data collected for the TE-SAT 2007 relies on Member States' definitions of terrorist offences.

The TE-SAT 2007 focuses on terrorism only. Extremism as a phenomenon may be related to terrorism and exhibit similar behavioural patterns. Although all terrorists are extremists, not all extremists are terrorists. Extremism does not necessarily include the use of violence with the intention of, for instance, seriously destabilise or destroy the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country as required for a terrorist offence under Member States' national laws. Politically motivated violent acts and other crimes committed, for instance, by right-wing or animal rights extremists are thus not included in the TE-SAT data collection unless reported as terrorist activities by Member States.
countries’ counter-terrorism policies are interdependent. Since it was not always possible to determine whether terrorist attacks or activities were transnational or domestic from the basis of the reported cases, it was decided not to use this typology in this report. It should be noted that almost all terrorist campaigns are transnational; terrorists may seek inspiration and resources – financing, weapons and expertise – where available, also outside their own geographical area of influence.

Types of terrorist organisations in the TE-SAT are categorised by their source of motivation. This is, however, not an easy task as many groups have a mixture of motivating ideologies, although usually one ideology or motivation dominates.

The choice of categories used in the TE-SAT is pragmatic and reflects the current situation in the EU. The categories are not necessarily mutually exclusive.

Islamist terrorism is motivated either in whole or in part by an extreme interpretation of Islam and the use of violence is regarded by its practitioners as a divine duty or sacramental act.6

Ethno-nationalist and separatist terrorist groups, such as Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) and the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) which renamed itself Kongra-Gel in 2003, seek international recognition and political self-determination. They are usually motivated by nationalism, ethnicity and religion.

Left-wing terrorist groups, such as the Revolutionary People’s Liberation Army (DHKP-C), seek to change the entire political social and economic system to an extreme left model and their ideology is often revolutionary Marxist-Leninist. The agenda of anarchist terrorist groups, such as the Unofficial Anarchist Federation (Federazione Anarchica Informale, FAI), is usually revolutionary, anti-capitalist and anti-authoritarian. For practical reasons, the activities of left-wing and anarchist terrorist groups are discussed in the same chapter of this report.

Right-wing terrorist groups seek to change the entire political social and economic system to an extreme right model. The ideological roots of European right-wing terrorism can usually be traced back to National Socialism.7

3.2. TE-SAT 2007 Data

The data collection for the TE-SAT covered terrorist attacks and activities in the EU and terrorist attacks outside the EU, in which EU interests were affected. In addition, Eurojust collected data on prosecutions and convictions for terrorist offences in Member States.

The data collection of terrorist attacks impacting on EU interests outside the EU was not comprehensive. The distinction between attacks related to insurgency, terrorism and even organised crime is becoming increasingly blurred in Afghanistan and Iraq. Furthermore and as an example, some EU-based international companies are being targeted more or less regularly in certain regions. Since it was not always possible to verify the motivation of these attacks, they were not included in the data collected by Europol unless clearly perpetuated by terrorists.

Because of the change in the reporting period, the data collection covered not only 2006, but also the period of October-December 2005.

Europol extracted quantitative TE-SAT data on terrorist attacks and activities as well as on arrested suspects from reports on terrorist incidents contributed by the Member States. As requested by Belgium, Belgian data originates mainly from the Monthly Bulletins of the Federal Police. The processed data was cross-checked and, in case of gaps, complemented by open source data.

- The data regarding terrorist attacks was cross-checked with the RAND Incident Database8 as made available by the MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base (see for more information www.tkb.org).

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7 Their American counterparts, white supremacist groups, are often categorised as religious terrorists. See Hoffman, Bruce (2006) Inside Terrorism, p. 237.
8 The RAND Incident Database is regarded as one of the best resources in the world and is widely used in terrorism research.
The data regarding terrorist activities and arrested suspects was cross-checked with open source data systematically monitored, collected and processed by Europol’s Counter-Terrorism Unit.

After this, Europol requested Member States to validate their own national data.

Thirteen Member States also provided Europol with qualitative data on terrorist attacks and activities.

Eurojust collected data based on the Council Decision on the Exchange of Information and Cooperation Concerning Terrorist Offences (2005/671/JHA), according to which Member States are obliged to collect all relevant information concerning prosecutions and convictions for terrorist offences and send it to Eurojust. A questionnaire was produced at the end of 2006 asking for details on convictions related to terrorism including, among others, the crimes with which the suspects were charged, the crimes for which they were sentenced and the penalty imposed. Twenty-three Member States responded to the questionnaire. Part of the national data was collected at Eurojust through an analysis of the court rulings.

Eight Member States provided Eurojust with information on cases in their national courts. The UK provided information only on a small number of high-profile cases. Luxembourg, Poland, Latvia, Estonia, Hungary, Finland, Austria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Lithuania, Malta, Portugal, Slovakia and Slovenia reported having had no cases. Ireland reported having had cases, but could provide no details as yet. No response was received from Greece and Cyprus. Although the data is not complete, Member States mostly affected by terrorist offences provided their contribution.

The abovementioned Council Decision also obliges Member States to collect all relevant information concerning and resulting from criminal investigations conducted by their law enforcement authorities with respect to terrorist offences and send it to Europol. This information facilitates Europol’s data collection for the TE-SAT only to a limited extent, as the TE-SAT does not contain information that may jeopardise ongoing investigations.

The collected data for October-December 2005 and for the year 2006 concerned a total of 549 attacks, 128 terrorist activities, 810 arrested suspects and 303 trials in the EU. It should be noted that the arrests and convictions were not necessarily related to terrorist offences that took place during the reporting period.

Gaps in the data collected by Europol may be due to the fact that the investigations into the terrorist attack or activities concerned are still ongoing. It is also known that terrorist activities are not always investigated as terrorist offences. Furthermore, it seems likely that terrorist attacks and activities with perceived low and/or local impact are underreported to Europol. Since only the ‘most spectacular’ cases – particularly regarding terrorist activities – end up in the media, it is impossible to track these investigations via open sources monitoring and include them in the data.

As stated before, criminal investigations into extremist activities were neither reported to nor collected by Europol.

The level of detail in Member States’ reporting on terrorist attacks, activities and arrests varied from complete national statistics to general descriptions of the situation. For instance, there were instances where an attack was reported, but not the number of casualties or fatalities, or the number of suspects arrested in a major operation was given, but no further details regarding the age or nationality were made available.

The data contributed to the TE-SAT by France and Spain is very detailed and complete, but the French data did not cover October-December 2005. The UK was unable to give full...
data due to legal restrictions. For instance, no details regarding arrested suspects could be made available as the UK does not provide statistics on cases that are awaiting trial.

The description and analysis of Islamist activities on the Internet is mainly based on the data collected by the monitoring of Islamists’ communication methods launched in October 2004 within the Counter-Terrorism Task Force.

Both quantitative and qualitative Member States’ data on terrorist attacks and activities was collected. Terrorism is not mass or collective violence but rather the direct activity of small groups, however popular these groups may be. Even if supported by a larger organisation, the number of active militants who engage in terrorism is usually small.\textsuperscript{12} However, some aspects of the phenomenon such as attacks and arrested suspects can also be analysed with the use of quantitative research methods. Due to the relatively small number of investigations into terrorist activities reported by Member States, terrorist activities are analysed and described mainly with the help of qualitative data although quantitative data was collected to support analytical work.

\begin{itemize}
\item[12] Crenshaw, Martha (2003) Thoughts on Relating Terrorism to Historical Contexts, p. 4. In Crenshaw, Martha (ed.) \textit{Terrorism in Context}.
\end{itemize}
4. OVERVIEW OF THE SITUATION IN THE EU

4.1. Terrorist Attacks

Eleven Member States were targeted by 498 terrorist attacks in 2006. During October-December 2005, 51 terrorist attacks were carried out in the EU. Despite the high number of terrorist attacks, the vast majority of them resulted only in material damage and were not intended to kill.

There were no successful Islamist terrorist attacks in the EU in 2006. However, a coordinated but ultimately failed attack aimed at mass casualties took place in Germany.

The vast majority of terrorist attacks were perpetrated by separatist terrorist groups targeting France and Spain. In France, 283 attacks took place in Corsica in 2006. In Spain, despite the truce declared by ETA in March 2006, separatist groups perpetrated 136 attacks, mainly in the Basque region. Only the attack at the Madrid airport on 30 December 2006 resulted in casualties.

Left-wing and anarchist terrorist groups campaigned mostly in Greece, Italy, Spain and Germany. None of the attacks resulted in casualties, but some of them were intended to kill.

Despite Member States’ reports on incidents involving extreme right-wing violence, only one incident was reported as a terrorist attack in 2006.

The Member States reported criminal investigations into 59 different terrorist groups. Of these, nine were on the EU list of terrorist

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Member State</th>
<th>Islamist</th>
<th>Separatist</th>
<th>Left-Wing</th>
<th>Right-Wing</th>
<th>Other/Not Specified</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
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<td>283</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>11</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
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</tr>
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<td>Spain</td>
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<td>136</td>
<td>8</td>
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<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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<td>424</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>498</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

FIGURE 1: Terrorist Attacks in 2006 by Type of Terrorism
organisations. One third of the terrorist organisations investigated also conduct campaigns outside the EU.

4.2. Arrested Suspects

A total of 706 individuals suspected of terrorism offences were arrested in 15 Member States in 2006.

Despite the small number of Islamist terrorist attacks in the EU, half of the arrests carried out were related to Islamist terrorism (figure 2). France, Spain, Italy and the Netherlands had the highest number of arrests of Islamist terrorist suspects.

A high number of people – 188 – were arrested in France suspected of separatism. Sixty percent of them were related to investigations into terrorist attacks.

Only seven percent of the arrests were related to left-wing and anarchist terrorism, a fact which may indicate that these groups are not perceived as a major threat and a priority by Member States’ law enforcement for the time being.

Thirty-two percent of the arrested individuals (N=550) were suspected of either preparation of or involvement in a terrorist attack (figure 1). Forty-one percent of the arrested individuals (N=550) were suspected of being members of a terrorist organisation. Half of them were linked to a terrorist organisation that could be specified. Only five of these organisations were on the EU list of terrorist organisations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Member State</th>
<th>Islamist</th>
<th>Separatist</th>
<th>Left-Wing</th>
<th>Right-Wing</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>12</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
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<td>France</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>188</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>Germany</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<td>0</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>25</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>59</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>257</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>706</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

FIGURE 2: Arrested Terrorism Suspects in 2006 by Type of Terrorism

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14 Based on open sources reporting, it seems that the number of arrests made in relation to Islamist terrorism in the UK is among the highest in the EU.
15 UK arrests are excluded as no details were made available.
Other most common suspected terrorist activities included financing of terrorism and facilitation such as falsification of documents, organisation of travel and provision of safe houses. The small amount of arrests related to the production and dissemination of propaganda indicates the lack of legal basis and the difficulty in investigating this type of cases as, on many occasions, the suspected criminal activities take place on the Internet.

Almost half of the arrested suspects were EU citizens (figure 4). It should be noted that in seventeen percent of the cases the nationality of the suspect was not reported. 70 percent of female suspects were EU citizens. Almost all suspects coming from outside the EU were men.

The age of the arrested suspects ranged between 17 and 76. The average age is 36 years. However, two thirds of them were aged between 26 and 46. Approximately 75 percent of the suspects who were younger than 30 or older than 51 were EU citizens.

### 4.3. Convictions and Penalties

Three hundred and three persons were tried in relation to terrorism for the period from 1 October 2005 until 31 December 2006, as notified to Eurojust by eight Member States (figure 5). Furthermore, 136 court proceedings were reported for the period concerned. No information was provided regarding the date when the crime was committed and the time that had elapsed between arrest, trial and date of conviction. Generally, it can be stated that the convictions mainly relate to events which occurred before the timeframe of the TE-SAT 2007.

The total of 46 acquittals is to be viewed in relation to the total of 303 persons tried in the relevant timeframe (figure 6). The percentage of acquittals is relatively high in the Netherlands, where six of the 21 persons tried were acquitted. This may be seen in relation to the fact that, for the first time ever, the Dutch prosecution authorities prosecuted two groups – of 14 and six individuals, respectively – in two separate proceedings on the charge of membership of a criminal and terrorist organisation and on the charge of preparing for an armed attack and recruiting for the jihad. Not all members of the
group were found to have had the same level of participation. Appeals are currently pending in both proceedings. Additionally, it may be noted that, at the time of writing, the Dutch Supreme Court had also ordered a re-trial for the single acquittal which took place at the end of 2005.19

Member States reported a number of legal challenges which were commonly encountered in these types of trials and may have had an effect on the acquittals, such as:

- a lack of capacity at both investigation and prosecution stage to deal with the often huge amount of paper and electronic evidence;

- the high cost of translation services and the amount of time required for the translation and analysis of the evidence;

- the duration of pre-trial detention is strictly limited, often not offering enough time in these complicated cases;

- the cost and time demands of the travel and cooperation required by the cross-border nature of the crime;

- the amount of time required for the execution of letters rogatory; and

- the possibility to use intelligence information in court.20

FIGURE 6: Individuals Convicted and Percentage of Acquittals

In the cases of suspended sentences – e.g. four years of which three years suspended – the time of imprisonment was calculated as four years.

The high average of penalties in Spain can be explained by the fact that out of 172 convictions, 33 convictions were given for murder or for collateral fatalities. The number of sentences for terrorist attacks causing vast damage and injuries was high in Spain. In comparison, the German courts handed out a sentence of 15 years to an individual both for assisting to murder in 246 cases and for membership of a terrorist organisation. This particular case was connected to the 9/11 attacks. In the UK, sentences were also relatively high, considering that for instance one individual received a life sentence with a minimum term fixed at 40 years for conspiracy to murder (plans to bomb building in the US and elsewhere).

In France, no convictions were given for killings in October-December 2005 and in the year 2006, but high sentences were given for conspiracy to prepare a terrorist activity in conjunction with other charges. One person was convicted as charged for 20 years; five others for 17 years.

In the Netherlands, the highest conviction in the relevant time frame was for 15 years for the crimes of ‘membership of a criminal organisation (with the aim to spread hatred and incitement) and membership of a terrorist organisation (with the aim to threaten with a terrorist crime)’. The murderer of the Dutch film maker Theo Van Gogh was also convicted again in 2006

19 Eurojust’s contribution to the TE-SAT 2007.
20 Eurojust’s contribution to the TE-SAT 2007.
for the same charges as above, but no additional sentence was given to his previous life sentence for the murder.

4.4. General Findings and Trends

• A large number of various types of terrorist organisations have an active presence in the EU. Some of them target Member States or Third State interests in Member States, whereas some others use the EU as their logistical base or for fundraising and conduct their campaigns mainly outside the EU.

• Altogether 498 terrorist attacks were committed in the EU in 2006. The vast majority of them resulted in limited material damage and were not intended to kill. However, the failed attack in Germany demonstrates that Islamist terrorists also aim at mass casualties.

• Investigations into Islamist terrorism are clearly a priority for Member States’ law enforcement as demonstrated by the number of arrested suspects reported by Member States.

• One fifth of the arrested terrorism suspects from the EU were women. Almost all arrested terrorism suspects from outside the EU were men.

• The small number of suspects arrested for dissemination of propaganda may indicate the lack of legal basis and difficulty in investigating these types of crimes.

• The number of acquittals may reflect legal challenges Member States face in terrorism trials such as a lack of capacity in both the investigation and prosecution stage to deal with the often huge amount of paper and electronic evidence, as well as the fact that the cross-border nature of the crime requires costly and time-consuming travel and cooperation.

• France, Spain and the UK are the Member States that are most severely affected by terrorism as concluded from the number of terrorist attacks and arrested suspects as well as the average penalties.

• Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia and Slovenia seem to be the Member States least affected by terrorism as they reported neither criminal investigations nor court proceedings related to terrorism during October-December 2005 and the year 2006.
5. ISLAMIST TERRORISM

5.1. Terrorist Attacks

Along with the failed terrorist attack that took place in Germany, Denmark and the UK each reported one attempted terrorist attack. No further information on prevented or disrupted Islamist terrorist attacks was made available by the Member States’ law enforcement authorities.

German Trolley Bomb Case

On 31 July 2006, two Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) packed in two suitcases were placed onboard two regional trains near Cologne in an attempted coordinated attack. The devices failed to detonate. Both so-called ‘trolley bombs’ were made up of a gas cylinder, an alarm clock, a functioning detonator and three PET bottles filled with petrol.\(^{21}\) Had the devices detonated, it is estimated that there would have been a significant loss of life in the two trains.\(^{22}\)

Two Lebanese nationals studying in Germany were subsequently arrested on suspicion of placing the IEDs on the trains.

The suspects were reported to have been motivated by the publication of the Danish cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad in German newspapers; it was also reported that the Internet played a role in preparations. Further, there were reports that the suspects had undergone a swift radicalisation process. The suspects initially intended to carry out the attack during the FIFA World Cup but changed their plans due to the security measures in place.\(^{23}\)

UK Airplane Plot

On 10 August 2006, a series of arrests took place in the UK in connection with an alleged suicide bombing plot. The suspects planned to smuggle

\(^{21}\) Germany’s contribution to the TE-SAT 2007.
\(^{22}\) Germany’s contribution to the TE-SAT 2007.
\(^{23}\) Germany’s contribution to the TE-SAT 2007.
the component parts of IEDs onto aircrafts and assemble and detonate them on board and in flight. Liquid explosives concealed in plastic soft drink bottles were to be detonated with battery powered detonators aboard trans-Atlantic airliners en route from the UK to the US. If successful, the attack would have caused mass murder of potentially thousands of civilian air travellers. The prevented attacks had a large impact on civilian air travel with increased restrictions on the amount of liquids allowed in handheld cabin luggage.

Eleven suspects were charged in connection with the plot. The suspects were predominantly UK citizens of Pakistani descent. They were reportedly motivated to carry out the attack by the situation in Afghanistan and Iraq, and intended to strike a target that would hit both the UK and the US at the same time. They seem to have undergone a ‘rapid radicalisation’: in a matter of ‘some weeks and months, not years’, they were prepared to kill civilians in a suicide attack.

Danish ‘Homegrown’ Vollsmose Group

On 5 September 2006, nine individuals were arrested in Vollsmose, a suburb of Odense, Denmark. Seven were remanded in custody on suspicion of preparing a terrorist attack. Allegedly, they procured material and effects for making explosives. According to one account, the explosives were produced using an unknown quantity of ammonium nitrate and Triacetone Triperoxide (TATP) supplemented by metal splinter shrapnel to increase the bombs’ destructive power.

The Danish Minister of Justice stated that the group had planned one or several terrorist attacks against undisclosed targets within Denmark. The motivation of the group remains unknown. However, several commentators have pointed to Denmark’s military engagement in Iraq and the global row over the cartoons depicting the Prophet Muhammad.

As in the UK case, the members of the Vollsmose group were suspected of being so-called ‘homegrown’ terrorists. More precisely, they were predominantly young second-generation Muslim immigrants of Middle Eastern origin with Danish citizenship. One member of the group was a Danish convert to Islam.

5.2. Arrested Suspects

During the period between October 2005 and December 2006, a total of 340 persons were reported as having been arrested on Islamist terrorism related offences. Two hundred and sixty arrests were carried out in 2006.

Less than ten percent of the arrested individuals were suspected of preparation, planning or execution of terrorist attacks. The arrests took place in the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Spain and Sweden.

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26 Ibid.


32 156 terrorism suspects were arrested in the UK in 2006, but no further details regarding their motivation or background were available. As can be concluded from open sources, a relatively high number of the individuals arrested in various operations in the UK in 2006 were suspected of Islamist terrorism related offences.
The vast majority of the arrested individuals were suspected of being members of a terrorist organisation. Other frequent criminal activities were financing of terrorism and facilitation.

Seven percent of the arrested individuals related to Islamist terrorism were women. This figure rises to 12 percent with regard to all arrested terrorist suspects. Most women arrested in the field of Islamist terrorism were suspected of membership in a terrorist organisation and facilitation, for instance providing accommodation and false documents. No female suspects were arrested for planning, preparing or executing an attack.

Seventy percent of the women arrested for Islamist terrorism activities were EU citizens.

The bulk of the arrests took place in France, Spain, Italy and the Netherlands and the majority of those arrested came from Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia. Arrested suspects originating from North Africa were often loosely affiliated with North African terrorist groups, such as the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (Groupe salafiste pour la prédication et le combat, GSPC) and the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM).

More than two thirds of the arrested suspects were aged between 26 and 41. The relatively small number of young suspects may be partly due to the fact that the data on arrested suspects in the UK was not available as, for instance, the majority of the nineteen individuals arrested on 10 August 2006 in the context of the alleged airplane plot were aged between 22 and 25. One of the arrested was as young as 17.

Suspects in the age group between 30 and 41 years and those under 30 differ with respect to the criminal activities of which they were suspected. Membership of a terrorist organisation represented fifty percent of the arrests in both age groups. Activities such as financing of terrorism or handling of false documents, on the other hand, seemed to be more common among the arrested suspects aged 30 to 41, whereas younger suspects were more often linked to recruitment and facilitation.

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Furthermore, of those aged 30 to 41 years, seven percent were arrested for executing or attempting to execute an attack, while only two percent were arrested for planning or preparing an attack. This pattern is reversed among those under 30. A possible explanation for this phenomenon is that younger suspects fail in the execution of their plans or that law enforcement authorities are more successful against this age group.

**5.3. Terrorist Activities**

**Propaganda**

In October 2006, an Iraqi citizen was arrested in Germany on suspicion of providing support to foreign terrorist groups. He allegedly disseminated audio and video files showing leading personalities of *al-Qaeda* and *al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia*. In addition to this, in 2006 one person was arrested in Denmark for Islamist terrorist propaganda and two in the UK for soliciting murder by publishing inciting statements and running websites inciting murder, urging to fight *jihad* and raising funds, respectively. Law enforcement agencies investigated propaganda offences in Belgium, Denmark, France and Germany. The number of police investigations into this phenomenon seems small compared to the amount of propaganda circulating on the Internet. This is partly explained by the lack of a legal basis for arrests of or investigation against persons using the Internet in this manner. Law enforcement agencies also have difficulties in identifying individuals who spread Islamist terrorist propaganda on the Internet. As an example, in autumn 2005, a suspect arrested in the UK on charges of participating in an alleged bomb plot, turned out to be a key individual that had used the Internet to spread Islamist propaganda.

**Financing of Terrorism**

Financing of terrorism covers two distinct aspects: financing of terrorist attacks and funding of terrorist networks.

Relatively small sums are necessary to carry out a terrorist attack; estimates for the Madrid bombings in 2004 range from EUR 8,000 to 15,000. Given the small amount of money required, the prevention of terrorist financing appears to some extent unrealistic; hence priority is given to financial investigations into the money trail left by terrorists.

Estimating the funds needed by terrorist organisations to sustain their activities is difficult if not impossible. An often quoted estimate places *al-Qaeda*’s yearly expenditures aimed at sustaining itself during the period preceding the 9/11 attacks in 2001 at USD 30 million. There are no estimates of *al-Qaeda*’s actual financial needs. There is little doubt that money for funding Islamist terrorist networks or organisations is gathered in the EU through legal and/or illegal means. In this regard, the fact that almost ten percent of all suspects arrested in the EU during the reporting period were involved in financial and material support to terrorist organisations is significant. These suspects are mostly linked to terrorist organisations, such as the GSPC, the GICM, or *al-Qaeda*.

Financial and logistic support to terrorist organisations is based on funds provided legally or illegally by sympathisers of terrorist groups.

Funding is procured by establishing and managing small companies as sources of legal income, which is then used to support radical groups inside and outside the EU. Another very significant source originates from private donations, and from the misuse of *zakat* payments by

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34 Office of the Federal Attorney-General (Germany), press release no. 41 of 10 October 2006.
35 Denmark’s contribution to TE-SAT 2007.
36 The UK’s contribution to TE-SAT 2007.
37 Respective Member States’ contributions to TE-SAT 2007.
40 *Zakat* is the third pillar of Islam and refers to spending a fixed portion of one’s wealth for the poor or needy. The basic minimum income over which an individual should pay *zakat* is known as *nisab* and is equivalent to the value of 85 grams of gold (that is, app. EUR 1,400).
Muslims. The funds are mostly collected by charitable organisations or associations and individuals.

No estimates are available about the amount of money collected legally or illegally within the EU which could be misused for terrorism funding.

There are strong suspicions that zakat money collected within the EU is used to fund terrorism. A UK-based charity reportedly remitted a large amount of money declared to be relief funds for earthquake victims to suspects in Pakistan who were involved in the UK airplane plot. Funds collected legally can be transferred worldwide using the banking system without arousing suspicion; the fact that money has been misused cannot easily be established through legal means; only post incident inquiries may allow to follow the money trail.

The range of illegal sources for the funding of terrorism appears to cover most criminal activities ranging from vehicle-related crimes to forgery of identity and travel documents or financial crimes, such as the use of false credit cards. Assessing the amount of illegal money used for terrorism financing is also close to impossible. Most of the profits generated, however, are in cash and need to be transferred. Transfers via the banking system and post office bank accounts, the use of credit or debit cards, cheques and travellers' cheques have been identified; however, the most common means of transfer of funds are cash couriers or cash transfers via alternative remittance systems or via legal cash transmittance channels such as Western Union.

The detected transmitting systems are used in two directions: from and to Europe. Funds are collected in Member States and transmitted to regions with a well-developed banking system or to Middle Eastern countries. Money can then be transferred to another destination or even be sent back to Europe with the aim of concealing the original link between the fundraiser and the user of the funds.

Recruitment

Six Member States reported investigations into Islamist terrorist recruitment in the EU between October 2005 and December 2006.

In total, 24 individuals were arrested on suspicion of terrorist recruitment.

The individuals reported as having been arrested for recruitment were linked to the Iraqi Sunni organisation Ansar al-Islam. This may suggest that they were involved in recruiting volunteers in the EU for the support of the armed struggle against coalition troops in Iraq.

In most instances, the recruitment occurred in schools, spiritual meeting places like mosques, or in prisons. The modus operandi includes the use of propaganda material such as videos, tracts and movies supporting the claim that Muslims must take part in the global jihad.

Training

Eight persons were arrested in relation with terrorist training. The charges included plotting to establish a training camp, providing training and receiving training in terrorist techniques.

All arrested suspects were men. No background information was available concerning their age or links to terrorist organisations.

In general, training in extremist ideology and terrorist techniques takes place overseas, where some of the terrorists receive military and specialist training. Nevertheless, one investigation concerned two training camps that were

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41 ‘Quake money used to finance UK plane bombing plot’, Daily Times, 12 August 2006.
42 Based on Portugal’s contribution to TE-SAT 2007.
43 Based on Italy’s contribution to TE-SAT 2007.
44 Based on Italy’s and the UK’s contribution to TE-SAT 2007.
45 This figure includes 3 arrests from 2005.
46 Belgium’s contribution to the TE-SAT 2007.
47 Belgium’s contribution to the TE-SAT 2007.
48 The UK’s contribution to the TE-SAT 2007.
allegedly established in the South of England. In terrorist training camps, participants are taught a very radical interpretation of Islam and trained in handling explosives, as well as setting up and financing terrorist cells. Trainers usually belong to the militant categories of Islamists, maintaining international contacts with other members or networks.49

The camps are mainly located in the Middle or Near East, or in South-East Asia. Training camps in the Sahel region, mostly controlled by al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, seem to acquire increasing importance and are used for the training of several terrorists originating in the Maghreb.50 Individuals that receive terrorist training remain in contact with both their facilitation networks and support cells.51 Religious or paramilitary training activities abroad might be an indicator that terrorists are in the early planning phase of an attack.52

Facilitation

In 2006, a total of 52 individuals were arrested in seven Member States suspected of a wide range of offences related to facilitation of or support to terrorism. Two thirds of the suspected individuals were arrested in France and Spain.

Eighty-six percent of those arrested for facilitation were men, mainly North African or EU nationals.

In the reports contributed by the Member States, facilitation covers a wide range of support activities: provision of false identity documents, resources and fundraising for terrorist networks engaged in conflict areas.53 Other supporters of terrorism provide false administrative documents, consultancy services or assistance in marriages of convenience, in particular for illegal immigrants who adhere to Islamist ideologies.54 Several cells or networks dismantled in Spain and in Italy were found to be supporting North African groups in Europe and facilitating the dispatching of fighters to Iraq.55 Only a few of the cases reported concern the provision of false documentation for the use by Islamists. However, it should be noted that this offence is often considered a common law crime when no link with Islamist terrorism can be established.

5.4. Situation outside the EU

The perceived oppression of Islam or the presence of ‘foreign’ troops in Islamic lands is often invoked as justification for the execution of terrorist acts in several parts of the world, such as Chechnya, Kashmir, Iraq or Afghanistan. The idea that these local struggles are part of a global jihad, seen as a worldwide war between Islam and the non-believers, has been actively promoted by Islamist terrorist ideologues and leaders of Islamist terrorist groups, such as al-Qaeda. Whereas local insurgency or resistance groups aim at overthrowing or seceding from the affected state’s government, the ideology of global jihad identifies the Western world, including the EU Member States, as the principle enemy and target.

Currently, due to the presence there of Member State military forces, the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan have the largest impact upon the security environment of the EU. Aside from the risk of terrorist attacks within Member States aiming to apply pressure to withdraw their troops, suicide attacks and bomb attacks with IEDs have been perpetrated against officials, contractors, journalists and aid workers in Afghanistan and Iraq. While the majority of Islamist terrorist attacks were committed in Iraq, attacks in Afghanistan have increased sharply, killing at least 3,600 persons in 2006. Furthermore, there were 117 suicide attacks, a previously unknown phenomenon in Afghanistan,
during the period under review, which caused 278 fatalities.\(^5^6\) Some of these attacks were reportedly committed by non-Afghans.\(^5^7\) However, the percentage of suicide attacks in Afghanistan is small in comparison to attacks overall.

Other incidents in Afghanistan affecting Member States include the murders of two German journalists in October 2006, the kidnapping of three French aid workers released in September 2006, the kidnapping of an Italian journalist released in November 2006 and the increased targeting of Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) exemplified by the killing of local aid workers and the burning and looting of CARE International, ACTED and OXFAM’s offices in Kabul in June 2006.\(^5^8\)

In North Africa, attacks against Western targets took place in Egypt and Algeria. On 24 April 2006, the tourist resort of Dahab in the Sinai Peninsula, Egypt, was targeted by a group using the name of Jamaat al-Tawhid wal-Jihad. Three explosions killed 23 persons, including a German national, and wounded more than 80, including tourists from Denmark, France, Germany and the UK.\(^5^9\) The Algerian GSPC took responsibility for the bomb attack against a bus transporting staff working for a US construction company on 10 December 2006, in which two people were killed and eight injured, among them four UK nationals.\(^6^0\) Noteworthy North African counter-terrorism (CT) operations took place in Morocco, where 56 members of the Islamist group calling itself Ansar al-Mahdi were arrested in early autumn of 2006\(^6^1\), and in Tunisia, where security forces intercepted a group of suspected GSPC-affiliated terrorists coming from Algeria in December 2006.\(^6^2\)

In East Africa, a number of Swedish nationals fighting with the Union of Islamic Courts movement in Somalia were reportedly killed, while others were arrested.\(^6^3\)

Amid worldwide protests against the publication of cartoons depicting the Prophet Muhammad in a Danish newspaper (see below the chapter on Islamist terrorist propaganda) in February 2006, a German national was briefly abducted in the West Bank, while Palestinian gunmen forced the closing of the European Commission Technical Assistance Office in Gaza.\(^6^4\) Also in Gaza, an Italian photographer was kidnapped and later released in October 2006.\(^6^5\)

In Southeast Asia, on 1 October 2005, three suicide bombers detonated their explosives in southern Bali killing 20 and injuring approximately 130 people. At least one UK citizen was among the wounded. The modus operandi was reportedly similar to the 2002 Bali bombings. The bombing was timed to coincide with the Australian school holidays in order to maximise the number of tourists affected.\(^6^6\) The attacks

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\(^{57}\) For example, on 6 February 2006, a Malian national was arrested while attempting a suicide attack against the Governor of Balkh. See: 'The Foreign Makeup of Afghan Suicide Bombers’ (2006) Terrorism Focus, Volume III, Issue 7.


\(^{61}\) The group planned to attack foreign targets in Morocco. Four of those arrested were women. See ‘Moroccan Terror Plot Foiled With 56 Arrests, Officials Say’, The New York Times, 2 September 2006.


\(^{63}\) ‘Svenskar uppges dödade i Somalial, Svenska Dagbladet, 30 January 2007.


have been attributed to the Islamist group *Jemaah Islamiyah* (JI). On 16 September 2006, a Canadian citizen was among four persons killed in a coordinated detonation of three bombs in Hat Yai, in southern Thailand. About 70 other people were injured in the blasts, several of them foreigners. The Thai authorities suspect the involvement of a local Islamist group named *Gerakan Mujahedeen Islam Pattani*.67

In October 2005, two persons were arrested in Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, for preparing a suicide terrorist attack against an undisclosed target in Bosnia or another European country. The aim of the attack was to force a withdrawal of EU military forces from Iraq or Afghanistan. The arrested were one 19 year-old Turkish citizen born and raised in Denmark and one 18 year-old Swedish national of Bosnian origin. The two had procured explosive material and placed it in a homemade suicide belt before their arrest. They received sentences for terrorist offences in a Bosnian court of 13 years and four months and 15 years and four months in prison, respectively.68

On 9 November 2005, a number of suicide bombers targeted three hotels in Amman, Jordan, known to be frequented by Western military personnel and tourists, killing 60 and injuring 115. The attacks were reportedly orchestrated by *al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia*.69

### 5.5. Islamist Terrorist Propaganda

For more than a decade, supporters of Islamist terror groups have published written statements, articles by ideological leaders and online magazines on the Internet, exploiting the potential for swift and anonymous communication that this medium offers.

More recently, the use of static websites for the propagation of Islamist terrorist propaganda appears to be in decline: such websites are easily closed down by hackers or law-enforcement agencies. Terrorist groups and their supporters may find online forums that support a radical view of Islam to be a more secure way of disseminating their propaganda material. These forums target a particular audience and offer details of access to files stored on so-called ‘free-storage sites’. Files containing, for instance, high-quality full-length films may be obtained from such sites. Since this material is spread over numerous web servers located in different countries, blocking access to all copies of the files becomes virtually impossible.

Arguably, the most professional and most productive propaganda outlet is currently the *al-Sahab Media Production Company*. *Al-Sahab* mainly produces video files which can take the form of documentaries, interviews, speeches or news programmes. Another characteristic of *al-Sahab*’s products is that many of them are accompanied by English subtitles. Where the speaker uses English, Arabic subtitles are added. All known speeches by members of the original *al-Qaeda* leadership released after June 2006 carry the *al-Sahab* logo.

Other Islamist terrorist groups have their own propaganda outlets. Iraqi and Afghan Islamist insurgent groups publish audio and video speeches of their leaders and videos showing attacks on Iraqi and coalition forces under their own labels, such as *al-Furqan Media Production Company* of the *Islamic State of Iraq*, formerly known as *al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia*, or the *Voice of Jihad* of the *Taliban* in Afghanistan. It is often the case that these groups attempt to emulate the stylistic features and technical professionalism of *al-Sahab*.

From its base in Algeria, the GSPC actively tries to compete with other Islamist terrorist propaganda outlets on the Internet. In September 2006, the GSPC was publicly acknowledged by a high-ranking *al-Qaeda* member as part of the

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69 One of the attacks involved a married couple acting as a team. A claim of responsibility by *al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia*, naming the attackers, was posted on the Internet on 10 November 2005. See ‘Al-Qaeda claims Jordan attacks’, BBC News, 10 November 2005.
organisation following a series of communiqués. In January 2007, the group changed its name to al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb.

In general, 2006 saw a rise in the frequency of statements and communiqués by Islamist groups, especially al-Qaeda. The quality and style of video messages and filmed attacks are more professional and the techniques used are increasingly sophisticated. English, either spoken or in subtitles, is often the language of choice. This may be an indication that propagandists are attempting to reach as wide an audience as possible. The frequency and quality of such propaganda, together with the possibilities for global access, are signs of an ongoing coordinated media offensive by Islamist terrorist groups.

5.6. Key Findings and Trends

• Failed and planned attacks by Islamist terrorist as reported by Member States aimed at indiscriminate mass casualties.

• The London airplane plot and the trolley bomb case in Germany targeted civilians and transportation infrastructure in Member States.

In both cases, the radicalisation process of the suspects is reported to have been rapid.

• The explosives of choice for Islamist terrorists are IEDs made with home-made explosives. At least two cases involved the use of TATP, a highly volatile explosive requiring a certain degree of expertise.

• The foiled plot in London demonstrates a high level of sophistication in the preparation of an attack and the ability to adapt to the latest security measures, as well as a high degree of creativity in attempting to circumvent them.

• The majority of the arrested suspects were born in Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia and had loose affiliations to North African terrorist groups, such as the GICM and the GSPC.

However, the suspects involved in the foiled airplane plot in London and the Danish Vollsmose group were born or raised in a Member State, including converts, who had been radicalised in Europe.

• The amount of women among those arrested suspected of Islamist terrorism was less than among all terrorism suspects and a large majority were EU citizens. No female suspects were arrested for planning, preparing or executing an attack.

• Islamist terrorist networks are funded from legal and illegal sources depending on the individuals involved. The range of illegal sources for Islamist terrorism funding varied from vehicle-related crimes to forgery of identity and travel documents or financial crimes, such as the use of false credit cards.

• Volunteers are recruited in the EU to support Islamist terrorist activities in Iraq, which has been promoted as the key scene of global jihad by Islamist propagandists. It seems likely that, should other regional conflicts, such as those in Somalia and Afghanistan, become ‘marketed’ as global jihad, more volunteers may be recruited in the EU to support them.

• The frequency of video statements by members of the original al-Qaeda leadership and other Islamist terrorists has shown a marked increase. The propaganda is of greater sophistication, of high quality and more professional. English is used more often, either in direct speech or in subtitles, allowing potential access to a wider audience than previous Arabic-only publications. These facts may point to a coordinated global media offensive by Islamist terrorists.
6. ETHNO-NATIONALIST AND SEPARATIST TERRORISM

6.1. Terrorist Attacks

In 2006, separatist terrorists carried out 424 attacks in the EU. The Member States most affected were France – with 60 percent of the attacks – and Spain. Attacks were, for the most part, limited to the Basque regions and Corsica.

Five attacks took place in the UK and one in Ireland. No group claimed responsibility for these attacks.

Basque separatists committed a total of 144 attacks in Spain and France. ETA claimed responsibility for 11 attacks in Spain and Irrintzi claimed responsibility for another four in France in 2006. Attacks in Spain were committed mostly by Taldes Y which refers to a number of organised and independent groups of young ETA sympathisers who, following ETA’s instructions, usually attack usually minor targets using urban guerrilla techniques.

After the declaration of the ceasefire on 24 March 2006, ETA claimed responsibility for only two attacks. However, the attack at Madrid’s airport on 30 December 2006 resulted in two

FIGURE 10: Separatist Terrorist Attacks and Arrests in 2006
casualties and 36 people were injured. The material damage was initially estimated to EUR 30 million.70 The van used in the Vehicle Borne Explosive Device (VBED) was stolen in southwestern France and the owner of the van was abducted for three days. Usually this modus operandi typical to ETA is used for imminent attacks and the kidnapped individuals are kept for a couple of hours only.71 Furthermore, it was a few days – an exceptionally long time – before ETA officially claimed responsibility for the attack; however, the organisation still insisted on respecting the permanent ceasefire it had unilaterally declared. Soon after the attack, the authorities arrested suspects in France with aggravating evidence in their possession.72

Before the ceasefire, Taldes Y carried out attacks in 14 cities, mainly in or nearby the large northern cities of Spain, such as Bilbao, Pamplona and San Sebastián. Taldes Y temporarily stopped fighting in April and May, but at the end of June, they continued and accelerated their terrorist campaign (figure 11). The campaign also widened geographically to 37 cities; attacks were carried out in small towns.

Taldes Y mainly targeted banks and the offices of the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (Partido Socialista Obrero Español-PSOE).

Half of the 282 attacks carried out in Corsica were claimed by the Front de Liberation Nationale de la Corse (FLNC) – 22 Octobre and the FLNC – Union Des Combattants (UDC). For half of the attacks there was either no claim of responsibility or they could not be attributed to any group. Attacks were committed all around the island.

Separatist terrorist violence targeted private, business and governmental interests (figure 12). However, in Corsica, 60 percent of separatist attacks targeted private property, such as holiday apartments and houses and only 6 percent were carried out against governmental targets.

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**6. ETHNO-NATIONALIST AND SEPARATIST TERRORISM**

70 ‘ETA claims car bombing but says cease-fire stands’, Associated Press Newswires, 10 January 2006.
71 Spain’s contribution to the TE-SAT 2007 (GC).
72 ‘Spanish minister links arrested pair to Madrid blast’, Agence France Presse, 10 January 2007.
Business targets of the Basque separatist groups included automatic teller machines (ATM) and banks.

Basque separatists also targeted critical infrastructure, for instance by placing bombs on the highways in Spain. Spain’s contribution to the TE-SAT 2007.

The choice of targets by separatist terrorist groups in the EU partially reflects extreme leftist elements in their agenda. Yet, it is difficult to put the high number of attacks against private properties into perspective.

Most separatist attacks in the Basque regions and Corsica were committed by using IEDs and Improvised Incendiary Devices (IIDs). Taldes Y also used Molotov cocktails during violent demonstrations and simple IIDs against banks and ATMs.

In Corsica, the FLNC–22 Octobre and the FLNC–UDC only claimed responsibility for IED and IID attacks. The FLNC–UDC also claimed responsibility for the shooting at the Ministry of Interior in Bastia. Almost one third of the unclaimed attacks in Corsica consisted in damaging property by shooting.

In the UK, separatist groups attacked governmental and business targets or rival group members. Attacks in Northern Ireland typically involved the use of low-level IEDs and IIDs or firearms.

6.2. Arrested Suspects

Two hundred and twenty-six persons were arrested in six Member States in relation to ethno-nationalist and separatist terrorism in 2006 (see figure 10). Eighty-two percent of the arrests were made in France and 12 percent in Spain; these arrests were mainly related to Corsican and Basque separatism.

Austria, France, Germany and Luxembourg arrested nine suspects related to the terrorist activities of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). All suspects were Turkish citizens.

More than half of the arrested individuals arrested in France and Spain were suspected of involvement in a terrorist attack or the preparation of an attack. One third of the individuals arrested in France and Spain were suspected of membership in a terrorist organisation. Other suspected terrorist activities included financing of terrorism and facilitation. Only one arrest was related to propaganda.

Almost all separatist terrorist suspects arrested in France and Spain were EU citizens. The percentage of women among separatist terrorism suspects was about the same as among all arrested terrorism suspects with EU citizenship. Two thirds of the separatist terrorist suspects arrested were aged between 26 and 50; their average age was 38 years. Separatist terrorism suspects in France and Spain are clearly older than other arrested terrorism suspects in the EU, which may indicate a longer involvement in terrorist activities and a higher degree of professionalism.

6.3. Terrorist Activities

All in all, 15 suspects were arrested in relation to financing of separatist terrorist activities. Half of them were connected to ETA and four to Corsican separatism. As there was no claim of responsibility for half of the attacks against private property in Corsica, it is possible that these attacks may have been carried out for the extortion of money which would then be used for the
financing of terrorist activities. However, no further data on victims was available.

In Portugal, the activity of the Galician nationalist-separatist groups increased in 2006. In September 2006, several incendiary devices, flyers and propaganda material pertaining to Galician pro-independence groups such as the self-titled GZ Resistência Galega were recovered at the Spanish-Portuguese border.74

Ethno-nationalist and separatist terrorist organisations campaigning outside the EU raised funds in the EU in 2006 for their terrorist activities (see next chapter).

In July 2006, two PKK members were arrested in France for money laundering aimed at financing terrorism. At the end of 2005, three members of the PKK were arrested in Belgium and another one in Germany suspected of financing the PKK. In Belgium, the authorities seized receipt booklets indicating that the arrested suspects were collecting ‘tax’ from their fellow countrymen.

In early 2006, the UK investigated credit card skimming case with possible links to the LTTE75. The suspicion that this modus operandi may have been used for the financing of the activities of the LTTE is supported by the arrest of an LTTE member with a British passport and 28 credit cards in India on 22 January 2007.76 Furthermore, the LTTE is also known to ‘collect donations’ from the Tamils living in the UK.77

6.4. Situation outside the EU

A number of terrorist attacks perpetrated by ethno-nationalist and separatist groups in Turkey and Sri Lanka had a direct or indirect impact on some Member States and the EU.

On 27 August 2006, five bombs exploded within 24 hours in Istanbul and the tourist destinations of Marmaris and Antalya killing three people and injuring 47. In Marmaris, ten UK nationals were injured when an IED device destroyed a minibus. Responsibility for the attack was claimed by a group called Kurdistan Freedom Falcons (Teyrbazen Azadiya Kurdistan, TAK); the group stated that foreigners should stay away from tourist areas in Turkey.78 In 2005, TAK carried out a similar terrorist attack in the seaside resort of Kusadasi, where a minibus was blown up, killing and injuring British and Irish nationals.79

On 25 June 2006, an explosion in Manavgat, east of Antalya, killed Dutch, Hungarian, Norwegian and Turkish tourists. No terrorist organisation claimed responsibility for this attack.80

The conflict between Turkey and the Kurds clearly escalated in 2006. For instance, according to the Turkish foreign ministry, 91 Turkish soldiers died in clashes with the PKK in the first seven months of 2006. Turkish politicians and generals claim that the PKK is using bases in northern Iraq to launch attacks on Turkey. In August 2006, a former NATO commander was nominated by the US Department of Justice to co-ordinate US efforts with Turkey and Iraq in order to eliminate the terrorist threat posed by the PKK and other terrorist groups operating in northern Iraq and across the border to Turkey.81

The situation in Sri Lanka deteriorated in 2006. The organisation Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) is suspected of the attacks in Mutur on 22 May 2006, which targeted the compounds of three Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), Non-Violent Peace Force (international), ZOA (Dutch) and Inter SOS (Italian). The attack against Non-Violent Peace Force left three persons injured.82

74 Portugal’s contribution to the TE-SAT 2007.
75 ‘Garage scam ‘funded terror group’’, Hull Daily Mail, 16 January 2007
76 ‘Tamils funded terror group’, Asian Tribune, 22 January 2007
77 ‘British Tamils are intimidated into giving money to terrorists’, The Times, 5 February 2006
78 ‘Kurdish separatists claim deadly attack on popular holiday resorts’, The Independent, 29 August 2006
79 ‘Turkish resort blast kills five’, BBC News, 16 July 2005
80 ‘Turkey covers up terror bombings to protect tourism’, The Sunday Times, 2 July 2006
The inclusion of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in the EU list of proscribed terrorist organisations on 29 May 2006 triggered resentment against the EU and its representatives in Sri Lanka. On 8 June, the LTTE objected to the formal engagement of EU citizens in the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) which was established on 22 February 2002, arguing that it was questionable whether they would be sufficiently impartial to be able to adjudicate critical matters on the ground. Thirty-nine observers to the SLMM from Sweden, Finland and Denmark had to leave Sri Lanka by 1 September 2006.83

Seventeen local employees of the French NGO Action Contre la Faim working on a project for survivors of the 2004 tsunami were murdered in Mutur on 4 August 2006. The LTTE was suspected of the attack but has denied its involvement.84

6.5. Key Findings and Trends

• The attack at Madrid’s airport resulted in loss of life and injuries. ETA has not only maintained but rebuilt its capabilities to strike with well-prepared, organised and coordinated attacks against high-profile targets.

Three months after the unilateral ceasefire, ETA started to use *Taldes Y* to carry out a high number of low intensity attacks to maintain pressure on the Spanish government and to demonstrate to its supporters its determination to fight for its goals.

The threat posed by ETA to Spain depends also on its capability to control its own members.

• Separatist terrorists in Corsica carried out a high number of low intensity attacks resulting mainly in limited material damage. More than half of the attacks targeted private property. Only six percent of the attacks were committed against governmental targets. Although Corsican separatists have not directly tried to kill people, the volume of attacks may increase the risk of casualties.

• Dissident Irish republican terrorist groups continue to engage in acts of terrorism in Northern Ireland involving the use of low-level improvised explosive and incendiary devices against a variety of military or business targets.

The Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) remains committed to the political process.

• Separatist terrorism suspects in France and Spain are clearly older than other terrorism suspects arrested in the EU, which may indicate a longer involvement in terrorist activities and a higher degree of professionalism.

• The rise of fundraising activities by the PKK in the EU is related to the escalation of the terrorist campaign of Kurdish terrorists in Turkey.

• In 2006, the security situation in Sri Lanka deteriorated with the resumption of violence between governmental forces and the LTTE, with the potential to affect EU interests in the region. This could also result in an increase in illegal fund raising activities within the EU.

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83 See the Press Release of the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 21 August 2006.
7. LEFT-WING AND ANARCHIST TERRORISM

7.1. Terrorist Attacks

In 2006, left-wing and anarchist terrorists carried out 55 attacks in the EU. Their campaigns mainly targeted Greece, Italy, Spain and Germany (figure 13).

A variety of traditional left-wing, anarchist and other anti-establishment groups were active in Greece. Half of the 25 attacks carried out were claimed by groups such as Revolutionary Struggle, Revolutionary Brigade, Revolutionary Liberating Action, and Anti-Fascist Action. Anarchist groups, under occasional names such as Comrades Group and Revolutionary Solidarity Cells, accelerated their campaigns particularly towards the end of the year in order to demonstrate solidarity to their imprisoned comrades.85 Their activity centred mainly on Athens and, to a smaller extent, Thessalonica. The agenda of the Greek left-wing and anarchist terrorist groups is driven mainly by domestic politics and social

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85 Greece’s contribution to the TE-SAT 2007.
issues; however, the attack of 26 February 2006, for instance, was called an act of solidarity to the imprisoned members of the French organisation Action Directe.

Italy reported an increase in attacks by left-wing and anarchist terrorist groups. The organisation Brigate Rosse per la Costruzione del Partito Comunista Combattente (BR-PCC) claimed responsibility for one attack and the organisation Federazione Anarchica Informale (FAI) and other anarchist groups were held responsible for nine attacks in Rome, major cities in the north of the country and Tuscany.

In Spain, six attacks were carried out by the First of October Antifascist Resistance Group (GRAPO) in Madrid and Barcelona. Two attacks went unclaimed. The level of activity of anarchist terrorist groups in Spain remained low in 2006.

In Germany, the organisations Militante Gruppe and Working group on Colonialism and War in the Militant Anti-G8 Campaign claimed responsibility for ten low-impact attacks resulting in limited material damage in 2006.

In France, the Turkish group Turkiye Kommunist Partisi/Marksist-Leninist (TKP/ML) was suspected of a arson attack against the Turkish consulate in Paris on 17 June 2006.86

Left-wing and anarchist terrorist groups attacked campaigned mainly governmental and business targets (figure 14). There were no differences between Member States in this respect. In Greece, for instance, diplomatic targets, police forces, vehicles, politicians’ offices and banks, as well as CCTV traffic cameras were attacked.

On 18 October 2006, in Italy, an attack targeted a company dealing with electronic components for weapon systems. Responsibility for this action was claimed in a flyer signed by the organisation Fronte Rivoluzionario.87

Left-wing and anarchist terrorist groups relied on similar tactics in all targeted Member States. Most terrorist attacks (92 percent) were carried out using various IEDs ranging from small letter bombs targeting individuals to larger scale devices with the aim to damage or destroy structures and property. A list of the most serious attacks reads as follows:

- The group Revolutionary Struggle claimed responsibility for a powerful bomb attack on the Greek Culture Minister on 30 May 2006. It stated that its aim had been to assasinate the Minister.88

- On 2 June 2006, an anarchist terrorist group called Rivolta Anonima Tremenda claimed responsibility for a double attack against a police station in the town of Fossano in Italy. The first explosive device was set off to attract attention. Subsequently, another larger device was set off targeting the police arriving at the crime scene.

Arson – intentionally setting fire to cause injury or damage – was also used by many left-wing and anarchist terrorist groups.

The majority of the IEDs and Molotov cocktails were constructed from simple, easily available ingredients, such as butane gas cylinders and flammable materials, the use of which does not require special knowledge, organisation or infrastructure.

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86 This attack was included in the French national data but reported by Spain to the TE-SAT 2007.
87 Italy’s contribution to the TE-SAT 2007.
88 Greece’s contributions to the TE-SAT 2007.
7.2. Arrested Suspects

Fifty-two individuals suspected of left-wing and anarchist terrorist activities were arrested in five Member States in 2006. Almost half of them were arrested in Italy. Five (of the 52) were suspected of involvement in a terrorist attack or the preparation of an attack. Most arrested individuals were suspected of membership of a terrorist organisation.

Spain arrested six GRAPO members. One member of GRAPO and his partner were arrested in Paris on 17 October 2005, after a joint investigation conducted by the Spanish and French authorities.

Two thirds of the arrested suspects in Italy and Spain were aged between 27 and 43 and were EU citizens. One third of the arrested suspects were women, which is a much higher percentage than among all terrorism suspects arrested in the EU.

In France, 15 people were arrested as a result of the dismantling of the French branch of the Turkish TKP/ML while Germany and Belgium arrested a total of six members of the DHKP/C. Eighteen out of the 21 Turkish suspects were male and aged between 26 and 52.

7.3. Terrorist Activities

Left-wing terrorist groups finance their activities through common violent crime such as extortion, bank robberies and kidnapping. For instance, on 6 February 2006, GRAPO carried out an armed attack that caused the death of a business woman and left her husband seriously injured.

GRAPO also carried out an armed bank robbery and a theft in Spain. 89

The dismantling of the French branch of TKP/ML revealed that the organisation financed its terrorist activities in Turkey through criminal activities such as kidnapping, extortion and money laundering.

7.4. Key Findings and Trends

• Left-wing and anarchist terrorists carried out a relatively high number of low intensity attacks against business and government targets which resulted in limited material damage. A minority of the attacks, however, were intended to kill or injure.

• Left-wing and anarchist terrorists prefer to use Molotov cocktails and IEDs made of ingredients which are easily available. Their tactics of choice are unsophisticated and do not require a high level of training, expertise or preparation.

• A variety of left-wing and anarchist terrorist groups are active mainly in Germany, Greece, Italy and Spain.

• In Greece, the number of terrorist attacks rose rapidly towards the end of 2006.

• Left-wing and anarchist terrorist attacks are motivated by domestic politics but they are also perpetrated as a part of wider international campaigns; for instance, the G8 Summit has already been targeted of left-wing and anarchist terrorists.

• All arrested suspects in Italy and Spain were EU citizens. The percentage of women was much higher than among all arrested terrorism suspects in the EU.

• Although the terrorist attacks committed by left-wing terrorists resulted in limited material damage, left-wing terrorist groups finance their activities by violent means such as extortion, bank robbery and kidnapping. This indicates the existing potential for violence.

89 Spain’s contribution to the TE-SAT 2007.
8. RIGHT-WING TERRORISM

Right-wing extremist violence is a serious, increasing problem in a number of Member States. However, reporting on right-wing terrorism is random as right-wing violence and other politically motivated crimes are mainly investigated as right-wing extremism and not as terrorist offences.

Only one right-wing terrorist attack was reported in 2006. In May 2006, two skinheads stabbed a member of Antify (Anty Nazi Front) in Warsaw. The personal data and the address of the victim were disseminated on the Internet by Blood and Honour, a neo-Nazi organisation active in a number of Member States.90

Altogether, fifteen terrorism suspects (N=550) arrested in 2006 were related to right-wing terrorism. Terrorist activities investigated included preparation of an attack, membership of a terrorist organisation and dissemination of propaganda.

In September 2006, 11 men and one woman – all members of Blood, Soil and Honour, which is a dissident fraction of Blood and Honour – were arrested in Belgium. Nine of them were suspected of plotting terrorist attacks and three were suspected of arms trafficking. One of them was also suspected of financing terrorist organisations via illegal arms trafficking.91

The Polish police started an investigation into the dissemination of propaganda on the Internet by Blood and Honour in February 2006. The website disseminated a variety of typical right-wing extremist propaganda in Polish. Another website provided contact details of identified targets for possible extremist and terrorist attacks. The server was located in the US, but the website was updated in Poland. The server and the website were closed in cooperation between the Polish authorities and the FBI.92

Right-wing extremists also attack their political opponents on the Internet. For instance, on 5 October 2005, German right-wing extremists hacked a left-wing extremist mail-order site and published customers’ personal data on the Internet. The attack came after left-wing extremists hacked into right-wing extremist discussion forums.93

Key Findings

• Right-wing violence is mainly investigated as right-wing extremism and not as right-wing terrorism.

• The amount of right-wing extremist violence against people is alarming and poses a serious threat. Although violent acts perpetrated by right-wing extremist may appear mainly sporadic and situational, right-wing extremist activities are organised and transnational.

• Right-wing violence is partly driven by the agenda of their perceived opponents.

90 Poland’s contribution to the TE-SAT 2007.
91 Belgium’s contribution to the TE-SAT 2007 (Monthly Overview Terrorism, September 2006).
92 Poland’s contribution to the TE-SAT 2007.
9. CONTEXT OF TERRORISM IN THE EU

Terrorism is not a new phenomenon in Europe. It has changed over time as have its causes and outward manifestations. The context of terrorism in the EU is set primarily by each Member States’ own historical, political, economical and social circumstances. However, the EU as a political institution is increasingly being identified as a symbol and has already become threatened and targeted by terrorists.

The phenomenon of terrorism in the EU cannot be put into perspective without taking into account the international security environment, especially in the case of Islamist terrorism. Terrorist organisations campaigning in Third States use the EU as their logistical basis and for funding. Furthermore, regionally limited terrorist phenomena outside the EU may ‘spill over’ and impact on Member States; for instance, terrorists may target EU tourists to attract attention from the international community to their cause. Terrorism is also increasingly characterised by externality: actions taken by one country have consequences – cost or benefits – on other countries. For instance, protective measures taken by one country may divert a terrorist attack in another country.\(^\text{94}\)

Not very surprisingly, in the age of globalisation terrorists and extremists also seek to ‘go global’ and portray their terrorist activities as having a global reach and impact, even as representing a worldwide movement. Since the end of the 1990s, the Internet has enabled the rapid, pervasive and inexpensive exchange and dissemination of information worldwide. This has empowered terrorist organisations with the ability to shape and disseminate their message in their own way. The Internet is used by terrorists in various ways for both internal and external communication. Virtually all types of terrorist groups have gone online.

Terrorism in the EU is essentially a transnational phenomenon. In order to counter terrorism effectively, law enforcement needs to share information, cooperate closely and coordinate its efforts at European level. Law enforcement does not just investigate terrorist attacks in the EU, but also prevents terrorist campaigns outside the EU by, for instance, disrupting recruitment and funding of terrorist networks in Europe. Therefore, it is important to have a common tool like the TE-SAT 2007 providing an overview of the situation regarding the phenomenon of terrorism in the EU; with this tool Europol can provide added value and support to the Member States in their fight against terrorism.

## ANNEX 1 Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BR-PCC</td>
<td>Brigate Rosse per la Costruzione del Partito Communista Combattente (New Red Brigades, Communist Combatant Party)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DHKP/C</td>
<td>Devrimci Halk Kurtulus Partisi/Cephesi (Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ETA</td>
<td>Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (Basque Fatherland and Liberty)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAI</td>
<td>Federazione Anarchia Informale (Informal Anarchist Federation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FLNC-22 Octobre</td>
<td>Front de Liberation Nationale de la Corse 22 Octobre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FLNC-UDC</td>
<td>Front de Liberation Nationale de la Corse - Union des Combattants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GIMC</td>
<td>Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>GRAPO</td>
<td>Grupo de Restistencia Anti-Fascista Primero de Octubre (First of October Antifascist Resistance Group)</td>
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<tr>
<td>GSPC</td>
<td>Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (Groupe salafiste pour la prédication et le combat)</td>
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<td>GZ</td>
<td>Resistência Galega</td>
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<tr>
<td>IED</td>
<td>Improvised Explosive Device</td>
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<tr>
<td>IID</td>
<td>Improvised Incendiary Devices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRA</td>
<td>Oglaih na hEireann (Irish Republican Army)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTTE</td>
<td>Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKK</td>
<td>Kurdistan Workers’ Party (aka Kongra Gel aka Kadek)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PIRA</td>
<td>Provisional Irish Republican Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAK</td>
<td>Teyrbazen Azadiya Kurdistan (Kurdistan Freedom Falcons)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Taldes Y</td>
<td>“Groups Y”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TATP</td>
<td>Triacetone Triperoxide</td>
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<tr>
<td>TKP/ML</td>
<td>Turkiye Kommunist Partisi/Marksist-Leninist (Turkish Communist Party /Marxist-Leninist)</td>
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<tr>
<td>VBIED</td>
<td>Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device</td>
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</table>
According to Article 1 of the Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on Combating Terrorism (2002/275/JHA), terrorist offences are intentional acts which, given their nature or context, may seriously damage a country or an international organisation where committed.

Terrorist offences are committed with the aim of

- seriously intimidating a population, or
- unduly compelling a Government or international organisation to perform or abstain from performing an act, or
- seriously destabilising or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international organisation.

Terrorist offences include

1. attacks upon a person’s life which may cause death;
2. attacks upon the physical integrity of a person;
3. kidnapping or hostage taking;
4. causing extensive destruction to a Government or a public facility, a transport system, an infrastructure facility, including an information system, a fixed platform located on the continental shelf, a public place or private property likely to endanger human life or result in major economic loss;
5. seizure of aircraft, ships or other means of public or goods transport;
6. manufacture, possession, acquisition, transport, supply or use of weapons, explosives or of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons, as well as research into and development of biological and chemical weapons;
7. release of dangerous substances, or causing fires, floods or explosions the effect of which is to endanger human life;
8. interfering with or disrupting the supply of water, power or any other fundamental natural resource the effect of which is to endanger human life;
9. threatening to commit any of the acts listed above.

Paragraph 2 of Article 2 obliges Member States to take the necessary measures to ensure that directing a terrorist group, participating in its activities including supplying of information or material resources, or by funding its activities are punishable.

Article 3 obliges Member States to take the necessary measures to ensure that terrorist-linked offences include aggravated theft, extortion and drawing up false administrative documents with a view to commit certain terrorist offences.

According to Article 4, inciting or aiding or abetting offences referred to in the Framework Decision should also be made punishable.
### ANNEX 3

**Implementation of the Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism in Member States which Provided Eurojust with Information on Convictions**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Details</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Belgium</strong></td>
<td>Implementation by 8 January 2004 to include the definition of terrorist offences, new investigative powers have been introduced by law of 27 December 2005, which entered into force on 30 December 2005.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>France</strong></td>
<td>The Counterterrorism Act of 1986 defines terrorism and the elements of this crime are defined in the penal code. Existing laws were updated by law (24 January 2006): an act of terrorism or conspiracy to commit a terrorist offence can be punished up to 30 years and a penalty of € 500,000 can be imposed. New investigative powers are now also allowed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Germany</strong></td>
<td>On 28 December 2003, Sections 129a and 129b of the Criminal Code were updated to implement the 2002 Council Decision.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Italy</strong></td>
<td>Terrorism is defined under section 270 of the Criminal Code which dates back to 1980. An amendment in 2001 extended the definition of terrorism to include violence against international organisations. On 31 July 2005, a new definition was adopted reflecting elements of the Framework Decision. Law 29 of 25 January 2006 implements the directive of terrorism financing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The Netherlands</strong></td>
<td>Recruitment for the <em>jihad</em> and conspiracy to commit a terrorist offence were criminalised on 10 August 2004. Maximum penalties were increased (on average by some 50%) if committed with terrorist intent. A penalty of 15 years was increased to life or 20 years for actions committed with terrorist intent and from 1 year to 4 years for conspiracy to commit a terrorist offence. New investigative powers are in place as of 1 January 2006.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Spain</strong></td>
<td>Existing laws were updated on 21 May 2003, where new provisions were introduced regarding the financing of terrorism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sweden</strong></td>
<td>A new Swedish law of 1 July 2003 provides for higher penalties when an action is committed with a terrorist intent, up to a life sentence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>United Kingdom</strong></td>
<td>Terrorism was already defined with the 1989 Prevention of Terrorism Act and further extended with the Terrorism Act of 2000 to include actions that can have very serious consequences for public security. The Crime (International Co-operation) Act of 2003 implements the Framework Decision with regard to extra-territorial jurisdiction over a range of terrorist offences. On 30 March 2006, a new Terrorism Act 2006 was adopted.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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