Donate $25 for two DVDs of the Cryptome collection of files from 1996 to the present

Natsios Young Architects

4 June 2009

Nuclear List Called No Threat


Published: June 3, 2009

WASHINGTON (AP) — Government officials said Wednesday that the accidental Internet posting of a list of government and civilian nuclear facilities and their activities in the United States included no information that compromised national security. Energy Secretary Steven Chu, who was questioned Wednesday at a House hearing about the disclosure, expressed concern, however, with respect to a uranium storage facility at the department’s Y-12 complex in Oak Ridge, Tenn. The facility holds large quantities of highly enriched uranium, which if obtained could be used to fashion a nuclear weapon. “That’s of great concern,” said Mr. Chu, referring to the Y-12 site. “We will be looking hard and making sure physical security” of the Y-12 sites “is sufficient to prevent ecoterrorists and others getting hold of that material.”

Integrated Safeguards: U.S.-IAEA Safeguards Agreement and U.S.-IAEA Additional Protocol

This pamphlet provides an introduction to the provisions of the U.S.-IAEA Additional Protocol (AP) and the likely impacts associated with the AP's implementation. Following a short history of events leading up to the entry into force of the U.S.-IAEA Safeguards Agreement, the pamphlet describes the need for the AP and for U.S. participation in the IAEA's integrated safeguards regime. Provisions designed to ensure the United States is able to protect its national security, proprietary, and proliferation-sensitive information from disclosure are also discussed.


Defining a Site

The Model AP [US-IAEA Safeguards Additional Protocol] narrowly defines a “site” as being an area delineated as a facility, a closed-down facility, or a location outside facilities where nuclear material is, or was, used as specified in relevant design information. For locations outside facilities where nuclear material was customarily used, the definition of a site is limited to locations with hot cells, which are defined as locations where activities related to conversion, enrichment, fuel fabrication, or reprocessing were conducted. A site also includes all collocated installations providing essential services. These include:

• hot cells for reprocessing irradiated material not containing nuclear material;
• installations for the treatment, storage, and disposal of waste; and
• buildings associated with activities specified in Annex I of the U.S.

U.S. AP Annex I

Activities to be Declared

List manufacture or assembly of:

• aerodynamic separation nozzles or vortex tubes
• centrifuge rotor tubes (paragraph i)
• columns or extraction equipment used in chemical exchange or ion exchange uranium enrichment plants
• critically safe tanks and vessels
• diffusion barriers
• electromagnetic isotope separators
• flasks for irradiated fuel
• gas centrifuges (paragraph i)
• heavy water or deuterium
• hot cells
• irradiated fuel element chopping machines (paragraph xiv)
• laser-based systems for use in uranium enrichment plants
• nuclear grade graphite
• reactor control rods
• Uranium plasma generation systems
• Zirconium tubes


Complementary and Managed Access under the U.S.-IAEA Additional Protocol

This pamphlet reviews the complementary and managed access provisions contained in the U.S.-IAEA Additional Protocol (AP) and describes how these provisions are expected to be implemented in the United States. The role and purpose of security vulnerability assessments in protecting DoD equities is also discussed.

Understanding the U.S.-IAEA Additional Protocol National Security Exclusion

This pamphlet is designed to help treaty implementers understand the U.S. right to invoke the national security exclusion provision under in the U.S.-IAEA Additional Protocol. The pamphlet answers key questions concerning the NSE and describes the effect of applying the NSE where DoD facilities, programs, and other activities are located.


From 1981-1988, the IAEA selected different commercial fuel fabrication plants and power reactors for the application of safeguards at approximately 2-year intervals. From 1990-1993, the IAEA did not select any U.S. facilities due to budgetary constraints. In 1993, President Clinton announced that the United States would place under IAEA safeguards fissile material it considered beyond its defense needs. The initiative helped demonstrate transparency and the irreversibility of the dismantlement process, while underscoring U.S. support for the NPT. The IAEA resumed inspections in 1994 and is reimbursed by the United States for associated expenses.

At present, the following materials at the following four sites have been placed under IAEA safeguards and are inspected monthly by IAEA inspectors:

* highly enriched uranium (HEU) at the DOE Y-12 Plant at Oak Ridge National Laboratory in Oak Ridge, Tennessee (safeguards inspections are expected to end in 2005, after materials have been transferred to the Savannah River site);

* plutonium at the DOE Pacific Northwest National Laboratory - Hanford Site in Hanford, Washington;

* HEU at the DOE storage facility in Savannah River, South Carolina; and

* HEU transferred from Kazakhstan under Project Sapphire at the BWX facility (an NRC facility) in Lynchburg, Virginia.


1 June 2009

Secrecy News happily announces a Sensitive but Unclassified release on US nuclear processing sites: (267pp, 13MB)

Cryptome mirror:

US Declares Nuclear Sites to the IAEA

To the Congress of the United States:

I transmit herewith a list of the sites, locations, facilities, and activities in the United States that I intend to declare to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), under the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the United States of America and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in the United States of America, with Annexes, signed at Vienna on June 12, 1998 (the ‘‘U.S.-IAEA Additional Protocol’’), and constitutes a report thereon, as required by section 271 of Public Law 109–401. In accordance with section 273 of Public Law 109–401, I hereby certify that:

(1) each site, location, facility, and activity included in the list has been examined by each department and agency with national security equities with respect to such site, location, facility, or activity; and

(2) appropriate measures have been taken to ensure that information of direct national security significance will not be compromised at any such site, location, facility, or activity in connection with an IAEA inspection.

The enclosed draft declaration lists each site, location, facility, and activity I intend to declare to the IAEA, and provides a detailed description of such sites, locations, facilities, and activities, and the provisions of the U.S.-IAEA Additional Protocol under which they would be declared. Each site, location, facility, and activity would be declared in order to meet the obligations of the United States of America with respect to these provisions.

The IAEA classification of the enclosed declaration is ‘‘Highly Confidential Safeguards Sensitive’’; however, the United States regards this information as ‘‘Sensitive but Unclassified.’’ Nonetheless, under Public Law 109–401, information reported to, or otherwise acquired by, the United States Government under this title or under the U.S.-IAEA Additional Protocol shall be exempt from disclosure under section 552 of title 5, United States Code.


THE WHITE HOUSE, May 5, 2009

This shows several sites for which maps were provided in the US IAEA-declaration.

Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Y-12 Complex, Building 9720-5, Tube Vault 16, East Storage Array, Highly Enriched Uranium Storage




New Y-12 HEU storage facility

Informative blog on Y-12 and the images below


Storage Racks


Savannah River Site, K-Area Material Storage (KAMS) facility, Building 235-F, Plutonium Oxide Storage



Hanford Nuclear Reservation, Richland, WA, Plutonium Storage



Hanford Nuclear Reservation, Richland, WA, Areva Nuclear Processing Facility, Uranium Hexafluoride (UF6) Processing



[Rotated 180-degrees to match drawing at left.]


MAR Facility, Lynchburg, VA, Areva Nuclear Processing, Uranium Dioxide Pellets




Salem Nuclear Power Station, Hope Creek, NJ, PSEG Nculear Inc., Two Nuclear Reactors and Spent Fuel Rod Storage