

14 September 2010. Via Reddit, HDCP Master Key: http://pastebin.com/kqD56TmU 19 November 2001. Thanks to Scott Crosby. See also Postscript version: http://cryptome.org/hdcp/hdcp111901.ps (133KB)
The attacks on HDCP are neither complicated nor difficult. They are basic linear algebra. Thus, there have been at least 4 independent discoveries of these flaws. The four I know of are my coauthors, Niels Ferguson, Keith Irwin [1], and myself[2]. The last two have been available publically for 3 months and 3 weeks prior to Niels Ferguson's declaration. Niels declaration and the Skylarov case were an eyeopeners and made me fully realize what I had done, and what negative consequences I was in danger of experiencing. What wrathful gods one can risk angering by a 20minute straightforward application of 40yearold math. For me, this was an accident, not a habit. Like other researchers, I do not want to be smited by angry gods, thus I do not expect to analyze any more such schemes as long as the DMCA exists in its current form.  Scott Crosby (This statement is my own and does not represent the opinions of my coauthors.) [1] http://www.angelfire.com/realm/keithirwin/HDCPAttacks.html [2] http://www.cryptome.org/hdcpweakness.htm

Verifies and is not on a blacklist. 
The shared secret is reused later in the protocol.
HDCP uses a linear system for generating the shared secret.
The flaw is that any device whose public key is a linear combination of public keys of other devices will, when assigned a private key that's a similar linear combination of the other devices private keys, successfully authenticate.
This flaw is fundamental, and cannot be worked around.
I assume we have enough private keys whose public keys span , the module generated by all public keys assigned by the central authority. I assume that all of these devices will successfully authenticate with .
As the subspace is 40 dimensional, a set of at most 40 keys will be enough.
Consider any device with whose public key and private key are any nonzero linear combination of 's public and private keys.
Say,
And,
We know that for all because by assumption, 's successfully authenticate with . Therefore, and this authentication succeeds.
Thus, for any device with in , we can decrypt any stream in work by rewriting as a linear combination of .
Furthermore, we can forge keys in at most work by enumerating all wellformed public keys and seeing if they're in . This completely usurps the central authority; we can do all that they can do.
In practice, I expect we can usurp the authority without this work factor.
These avoid the hassle of finding wellformed public keys in .
We don't have to forge to be able to clone, eavesdrop, or avoid the blacklist. We do have a ready source of wellformed public keys: All devices come with such a key, and receivers supply their public key on demand.
We can masquerade as any receiver for whom we have their public key. Just sit in the middle between them and the transmitter, snarf the receivers public key, and use it as our own.
This can be done in work; by rewriting as a linear combination of .
If there are longer key vectors, the attacks continue to work, but we may not be able to forge because of the pesky wellformedness condition on public keys.
For example, they may chose a submodule where it may be hard to find a new key that is wellformed. The best general algorithm I've found for finding wellformed keys is bruteforce.
A variant of this problem is in is NPcomplete (reduction from subsetsum).
But, longer key vectors do not make us immune from any of my nonforging attacks. I can decrypt, clone, and avoid any blacklist.
Modify HDCP to add cryptographic certificates onto public keys so that each device includes a digital certificate on the device's public key signed by the central authority with some conventional algorithm (e.g., RSA). The receiver sends their public key and the certificate of the public key, authentication proceeds only if the certificate is verified.
Call this protocol HDCP+certs.
This scheme is susceptible to the attacks that do not require forging.
I conjecture based on the incomplete specification available that DTCP's Restricted Authentication Protocol may be a variant of HDCP+certs. If so, this raises serious questions about its design.
HDCP's linear key exchange is a fundamental weaknesses. We can:
The weaknesses are not easy to repair. Two proposed modifications are broken and still susceptible in work and sets of keys to:
A Cryptanalysis of the Highbandwidth Digital Content Protection System
PRESENTED AT ACMCCS8 DRM WORKSHOP
11/5/2001
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