10 May 2003. One of the Intelligence
Community Black Actions series.
(A Report Prepared for the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, House of Representatives) Richard A. Best, Jr. Analyst in National Defense and Herbert Andrew Boerstling Research Assistant Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division February 28, 1996 TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 PART I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Intelligence Reform Proposals Made by Commissions and Major Legislative Initiatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 The Truman Administration, 1945-1953. . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 The First Hoover Commission, 1949 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Intelligence Survey Group (Dulles-Jackson-Correa Report), 1949 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Summary of the Truman Administration Intelligence Investigations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 The Eisenhower Administration, 1953-1961. . . . . . . . . . . 9 Second Hoover Commission, 1955. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 The Doolittle Report, 1954. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Bruce-Lovett Report, 1956 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 Summary of the Eisenhower Administration Intelligence Investigations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 The Kennedy Administration, 1961-1963 . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 The Taylor Commission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 The Kirkpatrick Report. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Summary of the Kennedy Administration Intelligence Investigations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 The Johnson Administration, 1963-1969 . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 The Nixon Administration, 1969-1974 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 The Schlesinger Report, 1971. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 Summary of the Nixon Administration Intelligence Investigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 The Era of Public Investigations, 1974-1981 . . . . . . . . . 19 Murphy Commission, (Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy), 1975. . . 19 Rockefeller Commission (Commission on CIA Activities within the United States), 1975 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 Church Committee (Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities), 1976. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 Pike Committee (House Select Committee on Intelligence), 1976 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 Clifford and Cline Proposals, 1976. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 Proposed Charter Legislation, 1978-1980 . . . . . . . . . . . 28 The Executive Branch Response, 1976-1981 . . . . . . . . . . 29 The Turner Proposal, 1985 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 Iran-Contra Investigation, 1987 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 Boren-McCurdy, 1992 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the U.S. Intelligence Community (Aspin Commission), 1995-1996 . . 33 PART II. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 Advantages and Disadvantages of Major Proposals. . . . . . . . . . 35 Role of the DCI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 Role of the CIA Operations Directorate. . . . . . . . . . . . 39 Disclosing the Intelligence Budget. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 PROPOSALS FOR INTELLIGENCE REORGANIZATION, 1949-1996 SUMMARY Proposals for the reorganization of the United States Intelligence Community have repeatedly emerged from commissions and committees created by either the executive or legislative branches. The heretofore limited authority of Directors of Central Intelligence and the great influence of the Departments of State and Defense have inhibited the emergence of major reorganization plans from within the Intelligence Community itself. The history of efforts--successful and otherwise --to reorganize the U.S. Intelligence Community can be largely traced in the proposals of outside commissions set up to investigate perceived shortcoming in intelligence capabilities. Proposals to reorganize the Intelligence Community date to the period immediately following passage of the National Security Act of 1947 (P.L. 80-253) that established the position of Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Recommendations have ranged from adjustments in the DCI's budgetary responsibilities to the actual dissolution of the CIA and returning its functions to other departments. The goals underlying such proposals have reflected trends in American foreign policy and the international environment as well as domestic concerns about governmental accountability. In the face of a hostile Soviet Union, early intelligence reorganization proposals were more concerned with questions of efficiency. In the Cold War context of the 1950s, a number of recommendations sought aggressively to enhance U.S. covert action and counterintelligence capabilities. The chairman of one committee charged with investigating the nation's intelligence capabilities, Army General James H. Doolittle, argued that sacrificing America's sense of "fair play" was wholly justified in the struggle to prevent Soviet world domination. Following the failed invasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs, the unsuccessful results of intervention in Vietnam, and the Watergate scandal, investigations by congressional committees focused on the propriety of a wide range of heretofore accepted intelligence activities that included assassinations and some domestic surveillance of U.S. citizens. Some forcefully questioned the viability of secret intelligence agencies within a democratic society. These investigations resulted in much closer congressional oversight and a more exacting legal framework for intelligence activities. At the same time, the growth in technical intelligence capabilities led to an enhanced--but by no means predominant--leadership role for the DCI in determining community-wide budgets and priorities. With the end of the Cold War, emerging security concerns, including transnational terrorism, narcotics trafficking, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, face the United States. Most recent proposals for intelligence reorganization address post-Cold War requirements for covert action, the structure and size of the CIA, and the extent of the DCI's authority over all elements of the Intelligence Community. These post-Cold War issues can be usefully addressed with an awareness of arguments pro and con that were raised by earlier investigators. PROPOSALS FOR INTELLIGENCE REORGANIZATION, 1949-1996 INTRODUCTION The National Security Act of 1947 (P.L. 80-253) established the statutory framework for the managerial structure of the United States Intelligence Community, including the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the position of Director of Central Intelligence (DCI). A fundamental intent of this legislation was to coordinate, and to a certain extent centralize, the nascent intelligence efforts of the United States as an emergent superpower in the face of a hostile Soviet Union. In addition, the act provided the CIA with the ability to assume an operational role by charging it with: Perform[ing] such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct./1/ In 1947, the foundation of the present-day Intelligence Community consisted only of the relatively small intelligence components in the Armed Services, the Departments of State and the Treasury, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the fledgling CIA. Since 1947, however, the Intelligence Community "has greatly expanded in size and acquired a much broader range of responsibilities in the collection, analysis, and dissemination of foreign intelligence."/2/ The U.S. Intelligence Community is defined by the Fiscal Year 1996 Intelligence Authorization Act (P.L. 104-93). It listed the following agencies and organizations that conduct intelligence and intelligence-related activities: Central Intelligence Agency Department of Defense Defense Intelligence Agency National Security Agency National Reconnaissance Office Departments of the Army, Navy, Air Force Department of State Department of the Treasury Department of Energy Federal Bureau of Investigation Drug Enforcement Administration Central Imagery Office. Beginning in January 1948, numerous independent commissions, individual experts, and legislative initiatives have examined the growth and evolving mission of the Intelligence Community. Proposals by these groups have sought to address perceived shortcomings in the Intelligence Community's structure, management, role, and mission. These proposals have ranged in scope from basic organizational restructuring to, more recently, the dissolution of the CIA. In 1948 and 1949, two executive branch commissions examined the intelligence and operational missions of the CIA, and identified fundamental administrative and organizational loopholes in P.L. 80-253. By the 1950s, however, the physical growth and evolving mission of the Intelligence Community led subsequent commissions to broaden the scope of their proposals to include the enhancement of the DCI's community-wide authority, and the establishment of executive and legislative branch intelligence oversight committees. Unlike the intelligence investigations of the 1970s and 1980s, these early studies were primarily concerned with questions of efficiency and effectiveness rather than with issues of legality and propriety. Following the Vietnam War and "Watergate," investigatory bodies became increasingly critical of the national intelligence effort. Beginning in the mid-1970s, the impetus shifted to the legislative branch where investigatory committees led by Senator Frank Church and Representative Otis G. Pike issued a broad range of proposals, including the separation of the DCI and CIA Director positions, dividing the CIA's analytical and operational responsibilities into two separate agencies, and the establishment of congressional oversight committees. In 1976 and 1977, respectively, recommendations by the these committees led to the establishment of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI). These committees were heavily involved in the investigations into the Iran-Contra affair of the mid-1980s. With the end of the Cold War, and in the wake of the Aldrich Ames espionage case, both the executive and legislative branches are currently undertaking studies to determine the future roles, capabilities, management, and structure of the Intelligence Community. These studies include such issues as the need to maintain the CIA as a separate entity, the extent and competence of U.S. counterintelligence (CI) efforts, and the managerial structure of intelligence components in the armed services and the Department of Defense (DOD). A comprehensive examination of the DCI's roles, responsibilities, authorities, and status is also being undertaken. In an era of budgetary constraints and shifting policy concerns, these studies are also examining personnel issues, allocation of resources, duplication of services, expanded use of open source Intelligence (OSCINT), and the need for maintaining a covert action (CA) capability. In the course of recurring proposals for altering the organization of the Intelligence Community, the forty-eight year history of these investigations has witnessed the gradual transformation of intelligence from a White House asset to one that is shared between the executive and legislative branches. Congress not only has access to intelligence judgments but to most information that intelligence agencies acquire as well as the details of intelligence activities. Congress has accepted some responsibility as a participant in the planning and conduct of covert actions. In significant measure, this process has been encouraged by these external intelligence investigations. This report provides a chronological overview and examination of the major executive and legislative branch intelligence investigations made from January 1949 to date. In Part I, all major proposals are listed in chronological order with a brief discussion of their respective results. In Part II, these proposals are grouped together by issues and include an examination of arguments for and against. Proposals specifically relating to congressional oversight of the Intelligence Community are not included in this report. PART I Intelligence Reform Proposals Made by Commissions and Major Legislative Initiatives Alice soon came to the conclusion that it was a very difficult game indeed. -Lewis Carroll, Alice's Adventures In Wonderland/3/ The Truman Administration, 1945-1953 Following the Second World War, the United States emerged as a global political, military, and economic leader. In the face of Soviet aggressiveness, the U.S. sought to enhance its national defense capabilities to curb the international spread of communism and to provide security for the nation itself. The National Security Act (P.L. 80-253), signed July 26, 1947, established the statutory framework for the managerial structure of the United States Intelligence Community, including the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the position of Director of Central Intelligence (DCI). The Act also created a semi-unified military command structure under a Secretary of Defense, and a National Security Council (NSC) to advise the President "with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security."/4/ The fundamental intent of this legislation was to coordinate U.S. national defense efforts, including intelligence activities, in the face of a Soviet Union intent upon expanding and leading a system of communist states. In response to the rapid growth and changing role of the Federal government following the Second World War, several studies were conducted to examine the structure and efficiency of the executive branch, including the intelligence agencies./5/ Between 1948 and 1949, two important investigations of the national intelligence effort were conducted. The first, the Task Force on National Security Organization of the First Hoover Commission, was established by a unanimous vote in Congress. The second, known as the Dulles-Jackson-Correa Report, was initiated by the NSC at the request of President Harry S. Truman. The First Hoover Commission, 1949 The Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the government was established pursuant to P.L. 80-162 of July 27, 1947./6/ Under the chairmanship of former President Herbert Hoover, the twelve man bipartisan commission conducted a comprehensive review of the federal bureaucracy, including the intelligence agencies. The commission's Task Force on National Security Organization was headed by Ferdinand Eberstadt, a strong advocate of a centralized intelligence capability who had been instrumental in drafting the National Security Act of 1947./7/ Hearings conducted by the task force began in June 1948. On January 13, 1949, the Hoover Commission submitted the task force's 121 page unclassified report to Congress./8/ Known as the Eberstadt Report, it found the "National Security Organization, established by the National Security Act of 1947, [to be] soundly constructed, but not yet working well."/9/ The report identified fundamental organizational and qualitative shortcomings in the national intelligence effort and the newly created CIA. A principal concern of the task force was the adversarial relationship and lack of coordination between the CIA, the military, and the State Department. It suggested that this resulted in unnecessary duplication and the issuance of departmental intelligence estimates that "have often been subjective and biased."/10/ In large measure, the military and State Department were blamed for their failure to consult and share pertinent information with the CIA. The task force recommended "that positive efforts be made to foster relations of mutual confidence between the [CIA] and the several departments and agencies that it serves."/11/ In short, the report stressed that the CIA "must be the central organization of the national intelligence system."/12/ To facilitate community coordination in the production of national estimates, a founding intent of CIA, the task force recommended the creation within CIA "at the top echelon an evaluation board or section composed of competent and experienced personnel who would have no administrative responsibilities and whose duties would be confined solely to intelligence evaluation."/13/ To foster professionalism and continuity of service, the report also favored a civilian DCI with a long term in office./14/ In the arena of covert operations and clandestine intelligence, the Eberstadt Report supported the integration of all clandestine operations into one office within CIA, under NSC supervision. To alleviate concerns expressed by the military who viewed this proposal as encroaching upon their prerogatives, the report stated that clandestine operations should be the responsibility of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) in time of war./15/ In examining the daily workings of the CIA, the task force found the agency's internal structure and personnel system "not now properly organized."/16/ This led to recommendations for the adoption of clearer lines of departmental responsibilities, and the establishment of proper personnel selection and training systems./17/ In response to legislative concerns regarding intelligence budgets, the report supported establishing a legal framework for budgetary procedures and authorities, and in maintaining the secrecy of the CIA budget in order to provide the "administrative flexibility and anonymity that are essential to satisfactory intelligence."/18/ The report also addressed, and rejected, the possibility of placing the FBI's counterintelligence responsibilities in the CIA./19/ Of particular concern was the level of professionalism in military intelligence, and the glaring inadequacies of medical and scientific intelligence, including biological and chemical warfare, electronics, aerodynamics, guided missiles, atomic weapons, and nuclear energy./20/ The report declared that the failure to appraise scientific advances in hostile countries (i.e., the Soviet Union) might have more immediate and catastrophic consequences than failure in any other field of intelligence. Accordingly, the report stressed that the U.S. should establish a central authority "to collect, collate, and evaluate scientific and medical intelligence."/21/ Intelligence Survey Group (Dulles-Jackson-Correa Report), 1949 On January 8, 1948, the National Security Council established the Intelligence Survey Group (ISG) to "evaluate the CIA's effort and its relationship with other agencies."/22/ Commissioned at the request of President Truman, the group was composed of Allen W. Dulles, who had served in the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) during the Second World War and would become DCI in 1953, William Jackson, a future Deputy DCI, and Matthias Correa, a former assistant to Secretary of Defense James V. Forrestal when the latter had served as Secretary of the Navy during the war. Under the chairmanship of Dulles, the ISG presented its findings, known as the Dulles-Jackson-Correa Report, to the National Security Council on January 1, 1949. The 193-page report, partially declassified in 1976, contained fifty-six recommendations, many highly critical of the CIA and DCI./23/ In particular, the report revealed problems in the agency's execution of both its intelligence and operational missions. It also criticized the quality of national intelligence estimates by highlighting the CIA's--and, by implication, the DCI's--"failure to take charge of the production of coordinated national estimates."/24/ The report went on to argue that the CIA's current trend in secret intelligence activities should be reversed in favor of its mandated role as coordinator of intelligence./25/ The Dulles Report was particularly concerned about the personnel situation at CIA, including internal security, the high turnover of employees, and the excessive number of military personnel assigned to the agency./26/ To add "continuity of service" and the "greatest assurance of independence of action," the report argued that the DCI should be a civilian and that military appointees be required to resign their commissions./27/ As with the Eberstadt Report, the Dulles Report also expressed concern about the inadequacies in scientific intelligence and the professionalism of the service intelligence organizations, and urged that the CIA provide greater coordination./28/ This led to a recommendation for increased coordination between the DCI and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in the arena of counterespionage. In turn, the report recommended that the Director of FBI be elevated to membership in the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC), whose function was to help the DCI coordinate intelligence and set intelligence requirements./29/ The principal thrust of the report was a proposed large-scale reorganization of the CIA to end overlapping and duplication of functions. Similar to the Eberstadt Report, the Dulles study suggested incorporating covert operations and clandestine intelligence into one office within CIA. In particular, the report recommended that the Office of Special Operations (OSO), responsible for the clandestine collection of intelligence, and the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC), responsible for covert actions, be integrated into a single division within CIA./30/ Accordingly, the report recommended replacing existing offices with four new divisions for coordination, estimates, research and reports, and operations. The heads of the new offices would be included in the immediate staff of the DCI so that he would have "intimate contact with the day-to-day operations of his agency and be able to give policy guidance to them."/31/ These recommendations would become the blueprint for the future organization and operation of the present-day CIA. Summary of the Truman Administration Intelligence Investigations The Task Force on National Security Organization was almost immediately eclipsed by the Dulles-Jackson-Correa Report, that found a sympathetic ear in the White House. On July 7, 1949, the NSC adopted a modified version of the Dulles Report, and directed DCI Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter to begin implementing its recommendations, including the establishment of a single operations division at CIA. In 1953, the OSO and OPC were merged within the CIA to form the Directorate of Plans (DP). (DP was designated the Directorate of Operations (DO) in 1973.) Although the Eberstadt Report was not as widely read among policymakers as the Dulles study, it did play a principal role in reorganization efforts initiated by DCI Walter Bedell Smith in 1950. The two reports, and the lessons learned from fall of China to the Communists and the unexpected North Korean invasion of South Korea in June 1950, prompted Smith to create an intelligence evaluation board called the Board of National Estimates (BNE). Designed to review and produce National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs), the BNE was assisted by an Office of National Estimates (ONE) that drew upon the resources of the entire community./32/ The Eisenhower Administration, 1953-1961 The Eisenhower Administration witnessed the Soviet Union solidify its hold over Eastern Europe, crushing the Hungarian revolution, and the rise of Communist insurgencies in Southeast Asia and Africa. This was a period in which extensive covert psychological, political, and paramilitary operations were initiated in the context of the threat posed by Soviet-led Communist expansion. However, between 1948, when a covert action program was first authorized through NSC Directive 10/2, and 1955 there was no formally established procedure for approval. Between 1954 and 1956, this prompted three investigations into U.S. intelligence activities, including the CIA. The first, the Task Force on Intelligence Activities of the Second Hoover Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, was sponsored by Congress. The second, the Doolittle Report, was commissioned at the request of President Dwight D. Eisenhower in response to the Second Hoover Commission. The third, the Bruce-Lovett Report was initiated by the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities (PBCFIA), and reported to President Eisenhower. Second Hoover Commission, 1955 The Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, also chaired by former President Hoover, was created pursuant to P.L. 83-108 of July 10, 1953. Known as the Second Hoover Commission, it contained a Task Force on Intelligence Activities under the chairmanship of General Mark W. Clark. In May 1955, the task force submitted both classified and unclassified reports. The classified version was sent directly to President Eisenhower, and has not been declassified according to available information. The unclassified version was sent to Congress. The unclassified report's seventy-six pages contained nine recommendations and briefly described the evolution of the Intelligence Community and its then-current functioning. The report initiated the official use of the term "Intelligence Community."/33/ Until that time, the U.S. had sought to apply increasing coordination to departmental intelligence efforts, without the concept of a "community" of departments and agencies. The task force began by expressing the need to reform the CIA's internal organization, including the recommendation that the DCI concentrate on intelligence issues facing the entire community by leaving the day-to-day administration of the CIA to an executive officer or chief of staff./34/ It foresaw the need for better oversight of intelligence activities and proposed a small, permanent, bipartisan commission, including Members of Congress and other "public-spirited citizens," to provide independent oversight of intelligence activities that were normally kept secret from other parts of the government./35/ The full commission's report elaborated on this by recommending the establishment of both a congressional oversight committee and a presidential advisory panel. The task force also expressed concern about counterintelligence and recommended systematic rechecking of all personnel every five years "to make sure that the passage of time has not altered the trustworthiness of any employee, and to make certain that none has succumbed to some weakness of intoxicants or sexual perversion."/36/ In addition, the task force recommended that the CIA replace the State Department in the "procurement of foreign publications and for collection of scientific intelligence."/37/ Finally, there were a number of "housekeeping" recommendations such as the need to construct an adequate CIA headquarters, to improve linguistic training, and to raise the salary of the DCI to $20,000 annually./38/ The Doolittle Report, 1954 In response to the establishment of the Second Hoover Commission's Task Force on Intelligence Activities, President Eisenhower sought and secured an agreement for a separate report to be presented to him personally on the CIA's Directorate of Plans, that now had responsibility for both clandestine intelligence collection and covert operations. Accordingly, in July 1954, Eisenhower commissioned Lieutenant General James Doolittle (USAF) to report on the CIA's covert activities and to "make any recommendations calculated to improve the conduct of these operations."/39/ On September 30, 1954, Doolittle submitted his 69-page classified report directly to Eisenhower. Declassified in 1976, the Doolittle Report contained forty-two recommendations. The report began by summarizing contemporary American Cold War attitudes following the Korean War: It is now clear that we are facing an implacable enemy whose avowed objective is world domination by whatever means and at whatever cost. There are no rules in such a game...If the United States is to survive, long-standing American concepts of "fair play" must be reconsidered. We must develop effective espionage and counterespionage services and must learn to subvert, sabotage and destroy our enemies by more clever, more sophisticated and more effective methods than those used against us. It may become necessary that the American people be made acquainted with, understand and support this fundamentally repugnant philosophy./40/ The report went on to recommend that "every possible scientific and technical approach to the intelligence problem" be explored since the closed society of the Eastern Bloc made human espionage "prohibitive" in terms of "dollars and human lives."/41/ In examining the CIA, Doolittle found it to be properly placed in the organization of the government. Furthermore, the report found the laws relating to the CIA's functions were sufficient for the agency to meet its operational needs, i.e. penetration of the Soviet Bloc./42/ The report went on to issue several recommendations calling for more efficient internal administration, including recruitment and training procedures, background checks of personnel, and the need to "correct the natural tendency to over classify documents originating in the agency."/43/ It also called for increased cooperation between the clandestine and analytical sides of the agency, and recommended that the "Inspector General ... operate on an Agency-wide basis with authority and responsibility to investigate and report on all activities of the Agency."/44/ Finally, the report mentioned the need to provide CIA with accommodations tailored to its specific needs, and to exercise better control (accountability) of expenditures in covert projects. Shortly after submitting the written report, General Doolittle voiced his concern to President Eisenhower over the potential difficulties that could arise from the fact that the DCI, Allen Dulles, and the Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, were brothers and might implement policies without adequate consultation with other administration officials./45/ Bruce-Lovett Report, 1956 In 1956, PBCFIA's chairman, James Killian, president of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, directed David Bruce, a widely experienced diplomat, and Robert Lovett, a prominent attorney, to prepare a report for President Eisenhower on the CIA's covert action programs as implemented by NSC Directive 10/2. The report itself has not been located by either the CIA's Center for the Study of Intelligence or by private researchers. Presumably, it remains classified. However, Peter Grose, biographer of Allen Dulles, was able to use notes of the report prepared years earlier by historian Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr./46/ According to Grose's account of the Schlesinger notes, the report criticized the CIA for being too heavily involved in Third-World intrigues while neglecting the collection of hard intelligence on the Soviet Union. Reportedly, Bruce and Lovett went on to express concern about the lack of coordination and accountability of the government's psychological and political warfare program. Stating that "no charge is made for failure," the report claimed that "No one, other than those in CIA immediately concerned with their day-to-day operation, has any detailed knowledge of what is going on."/47/ These operations, asserted Bruce and Lovett, were in the hands of a "horde of CIA representatives (largely under State or Defense cover),...bright, highly graded young men who must be doing something all the time to justify their reason for being."/48/ As had Doolittle, Bruce and Lovett criticized the close relationship between Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and his brother DCI Allen W. Dulles. Due to the unique position of each brother, the report apparently expressed concern that they could unduly influence U.S. foreign policy according to their own perceptions./49/ The report concluded by suggesting that the U.S. reassess its approach to covert action programs, and that a permanent authoritative position be created to assess the viability and impact of covert action programs./50/ Summary of the Eisenhower Administration Intelligence Investigations As a result of the Second Hoover Commission's Report and General Doolittle's findings, two new NSC Directives, 5412/1 and 5412/2, were issued pertaining to covert activities in March and November 1955, respectively. Together, these directives instituted control procedures for covert action and clandestine activities. They remained in effect until 1970, providing basic policy guidelines for the CIA's covert action operations. In 1956, in response to the Clark Task Force, and to preempt closer congressional scrutiny of intelligence gathering, President Eisenhower created the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities (PBCFIA) to conduct independent evaluations of the U.S. intelligence program. PBCFIA became the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) in 1961. Permanent intelligence oversight committees were not established in Congress until the mid-1970s. When the Bruce-Lovett Report was first issued in the autumn of 1956, its immediate impact was muted due to the contemporaneous Suez Canal crisis and the Soviet invasion of Hungary. However, it did establish a precedent for future PBCFIA investigations into intelligence activities. The Kennedy Administration, 1961-1963 In the 1950s, the Eisenhower Administration had supported covert CIA initiatives in Iran (1953) and Guatemala (1954) to overthrow governments unfriendly to the United States. These operations were planned to provide the United States with a reasonable degree of plausible deniability. During the last Eisenhower years, revolution in Cuba resulted in a Communist government under Fidel Castro. In the context of the Cold War, a communist Cuba appeared to justify covert U.S. action to secure a change in that nation's government. In April 1961 an ill-fated U.S. backed invasion of Cuba led to a new chapter in the history of the Intelligence Community. On April 17, 1961, some 1,400 Cuban exiles of the Cuban Expeditionary Force (CEF), trained and supported by the CIA, landed at the Bay of Pigs in Cuba with the hope of overthrowing the communist regime of Fidel Castro. Known as Operation Zapata, the invasion was a complete disaster. Over the first two days, Castro succeeded in defeating the invasion force and exposing direct U.S. involvement. The fiasco led to two official examinations of U.S. involvement and conduct in Operation Zapata. The first, the Taylor Commission, was initiated by President John F. Kennedy in an attempt to ascertain the overall cause of the operation's failure. The second, the Kirkpatrick Report, was an internal CIA investigation to determine what had been done wrong. The Taylor Commission On April 22, President Kennedy asked General Maxwell Taylor, former Army Chief of Staff, to chair a high-level body composed of Attorney General Robert Kennedy, former Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Arleigh Burke, and DCI Allen Dulles to ascertain the reasons for the invasion's failure. Known as the Taylor Commission, the study group's 53-page classified report was submitted to President Kennedy on June 13, 1961. Declassified in 1977, the report examined the conception, development, and implementation of Operation Zapata. The commission's final report focused on administrative rather than operational matters, and evenly leveled criticism at the White House, the CIA, the State Department, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff./51/ The report found that the CIA, at White House direction, had organized and trained Cuban exiles to enter Cuba, foment anti-Castro sentiment, and ultimately overthrow the Cuban government. Originally intended by the Eisenhower Administration as a guerrilla operation, Zapata was supposed to operate within the parameters of NSC Directive 5412/2, that called in part for plausible U.S. deniability. However, in the Kennedy Administration, the operation grew in size and scope to include a full-scale military invasion involving "sheep-dipped" B-26 bombers, supply ships and landing craft./52/ The report found that "the magnitude of Zapata could not be prepared and conducted in such a way that all U.S. support of it and connection with it could be plausibly disclaimed."/53/ In large measure, the report blamed the operation's planners at the CIA's Directorate of Plans for not keeping the President fully informed as to the exact nature of the operation. However, the report also criticized the State Department, JCS, and the White House for acquiescing in the Zapata Plan, that "gave the impression to others of approving it" and for reviewing "successive changes of the plan piecemeal and only within a limited context, a procedure that was inadequate for a proper examination of all the military ramifications."/54/ The Taylor Commission found the operation to be ill-conceived with little chance for ultimate success. Once underway, however, the report cited President Kennedy's decision to limit overt U.S. air support as a factor in the CEF's defeat./55/ This decision was apparently reached in order to protect the covert character of the operation. The report criticized this decision by stating that when an operation had been approved, "restrictions designed to protect its covert character should have been accepted only if they did not impair the chance of success."/56/ The failure in communication, breakdown in coordination, and lack of overall planning led the Taylor Commission to conclude that: The Executive Branch of government was not organizationally prepared to cope with this kind of paramilitary operation. There was no single authority short of the President capable of coordinating the actions of CIA, State, Defense and USIA [U.S. Information Agency]. Top level direction was given through ad hoc meetings of senior officials without consideration of operational plans in writing and with no arrangement for recording conclusions reached./57/ The lessons of Operation Zapata led the report to recommend six courses of action in the fields of planning, coordination, effectiveness, and responsibility in overall Cold War strategy. The report recommended the creation of a Strategic Resources Group (SRG) composed of representatives of under-secretarial rank from the CIA and the Departments of State and Defense. With direct access to the President, the SRG would act as a mechanism for the planning and coordination of overall Cold War strategy, including paramilitary operations. The report recommended including the opinions of the JCS in the planning and implementation of such paramilitary operations. In the context of the Cold War, the report also recommended a review of restraints placed upon the United States in order to make the most effective use of the nation's assets, without concern for international popularity. The report concluded by reaffirming America's commitment to forcing Castro from power./58/ The Kirkpatrick Report Concurrent with the Taylor Commission, DCI Dulles instructed the CIA's Inspector General, Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr., to conduct an internal investigation to determine what the CIA had done wrong in the Cuban operation. Completed in five months, the report was viewed by the few within CIA who read it as professionally shabby./59/ Whereas the Taylor Report had more of the detached perspective of a management-consultant, the Kirkpatrick Report was viewed as a personal attack against the CIA and DCI Dulles. The 170-page report remains classified. However, in 1972, Kirkpatrick published an article in the Naval War College Review that apparently reflected the findings of his report./60/ In particular, Kirkpatrick criticized the Zapata planners at the Directorate of Plans for not having fully consulted the CIA's Cuban analysts before the invasion. The article also criticized the operation's internal security, that Kirkpatrick claimed was virtually nonexistent. Calling the operation frenzied, Kirkpatrick accused the CIA of "playing it by ear" and misleading the President by failing to inform him that "success had become dubious."/61/ In Kirkpatrick's view, the CIA bore most of the blame, and the Kennedy Administration could be forgiven for having trusted the advice of the operation's planners at the Agency. Summary of the Kennedy Administration Intelligence Investigations On May 4, 1961, following the Bay of Pigs, President Kennedy reconstituted the PBCFIA as the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB). Although little is known of the Kirkpatrick Report's impact, the Taylor Report influenced Kennedy's desire to improve the overall management of the intelligence process. In 1962, this prompted the President to instruct the new DCI, John McCone, to concentrate on his community-wide coordination role: As [DCI], while you will continue to have overall responsibility for the Agency, I shall expect you to delegate to your principal deputy, as you may deem necessary, so much of the detailed operation of the Agency as may be required to permit you to carry out your primary task as [DCI]./62/ The Johnson Administration, 1963-1969 No major investigations of the Intelligence Community were conducted under President Lyndon B. Johnson. In large measure, this was due to America's growing preoccupation with the Vietnam conflict and the strain that this placed on the community's resources. The only major investigation during the Johnson Administration was the Warren Commission on the assassination of President Kennedy. Former DCI Allen Dulles served on the commission. The Nixon Administration, 1969-1974 During the Vietnam War, the Intelligence Community devoted enormous attention in both manpower and resources towards achieving U.S. policy objectives in Southeast Asia. As the U.S. effort in Vietnam and Laos wound down, and attention turned towards strategic weapons concerns with the Soviet Union, some members of the Nixon Administration believed that the community was performing less than adequately. In 1970, President Richard M. Nixon and National Security Advisor Henry A. Kissinger undertook a review of the Intelligence Community's organization. The Schlesinger Report, 1971 In December 1970, President Nixon commissioned the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to examine the Intelligence Community's organization and recommend improvements, short of legislation. In March 1971, the report, "A Review of the Intelligence Community," was submitted by Deputy OMB Director James R. Schlesinger, a future DCI. Known as the Schlesinger Report, the study's forty-seven pages noted the community's "impressive rise in...size and cost" with the "apparent inability to achieve a commensurate improvement in the scope and overall quality of intelligence products."/63/ The report sought to uncover the causes of this problem and identify areas in which constructive change could take place. In examining the Intelligence Community, Schlesinger criticized "unproductively duplicative" collection systems and the failure in forward planning to coordinate the allocation of resources./64/ In part, the report cited the failure of policymakers to specify their product needs to the intelligence producers./65/ However, the report identified the primary cause of these problems as the lack of a strong, central Intelligence Community leadership that could "consider the relationship between cost and substantive output from a national perspective."/66/ Schlesinger found that this had engendered a fragmented, departmental intelligence effort. To correct these problems, Schlesinger considered the creation of a Director of National Intelligence (DNI), enhancing the DCI's authority, and establishing a Coordinator of National Intelligence (CNI) who would act as the White House-level overseer of the Intelligence Community to provide more direct representation of presidential interest in intelligence issues./67/ In the end, the report recommended "a strong DCI who could bring intelligence costs under control and intelligence production to an adequate level of quality and responsiveness."/68/ Summary of the Nixon Administration Intelligence Investigation The Schlesinger Report led to a limited reorganization of the Intelligence Community under a Presidential directive dated November 5, 1971. In part, the directive called for: An enhanced leadership role for the [DCI] in planning, reviewing, and evaluating all intelligence programs and activities, and in the production of national intelligence./69/ Consequently, two boards were established to assist the DCI in preparing a consolidated intelligence budget and to supervise community-wide intelligence production. The first, was the ill-fated Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee (IRAC), that replaced the National Intelligence Resources Board (NIRB) established in 1968 under DCI Richard Helms. The IRAC was designed to advise the DCI on the preparation of a consolidated budget for the community's intelligence programs. However, IRAC was not afforded the statutory authority necessary to bring the intelligence budget firmly under DCI control. The second, and the only long lasting result of the Nixon directive, was the establishment of the Intelligence Community Staff (ICS) in 1972. Created by DCI Helms, the ICS was meant to assist the DCI in guiding the community's collection and production of intelligence. However, the ICS did not provide the DCI with the statutory basis necessary for an expanded community-wide role./70/ In 1992, DCI Robert Gates replaced the ICS with the Community Management Staff (CMS). The Era of Public Investigations, 1974-1981 In the late 1940s and throughout the 1950s, there had been widespread public agreement on the need for an effective national security structure to confront Soviet-led Communist expansion. However, by the late 1960s, the war in Vietnam had begun to erode public consensus and support for U.S. foreign policy. The controversy surrounding the Watergate Investigations after 1972, and subsequent revelations of questionable CIA activities involving domestic surveillance, provided a backdrop for increasing scrutiny of government policies, particularly in such fields as national security and intelligence. Between 1975 and 1976, this led the Ford Administration and Congress to conduct three separate investigations that examined the propriety of intelligence operations, assessed the adequacy of intelligence organizations and functions, and recommended corrective measures. A fourth panel, convened earlier to look more broadly at foreign policy, also submitted recommendations for intelligence reform. Murphy Commission, (Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy), 1975 The Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy, created pursuant to the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FY1973 (P.L. 92-352) of July 13, 1972, was headed by former Deputy Secretary of State Robert D. Murphy. It looked at national security formulation and implementation processes rather than the government as a whole. As such, the Murphy Commission was more focused than either of the two Hoover Commissions and devoted greater attention to intelligence issues. Although it made reference to the need to correct "occasional failures to observe those standards of conduct that should distinguish the behavior of agencies of the U.S. Government,"/71/ the commission's approach was marked by an emphasis of the value of intelligence to national security policymaking and was, on the whole, supportive of the Intelligence Community. Many of the Murphy Commission's recommendations addressed problems that have continued to concern successive intelligence managers. The commission noted the fundamental difficulty that DCIs have line authority over the CIA but "only limited influence" over other intelligence agencies./72/ Unlike other observers, the Murphy Commission did not believe that this situation should be changed fundamentally: "[It] is neither possible nor desirable to give the DCI line authority over that very large fraction of the intelligence community that lies outside the CIA." At the same time, it recommended that the DCI have an office in close proximity to the White House and be accorded regular and direct contact with the President. The commission envisioned a DCI delegating considerable authority for managing the CIA to a deputy while he devoted more time to community-wide responsibilities. The commission also recommended that the DCI's title be changed to Director of Foreign Intelligence./73/ The commission provided for other oversight mechanisms, viz., a strengthened PFIAB and more extensive review (prior to their initiation and on a continuing basis thereafter) of covert actions by a high-level interagency committee. It argued that although Congress should be notified of covert actions, the President should not sign such notifications since it is harmful to associate "the head of State so formally with such activities."/74/ It was further recommended that intelligence requirements and capabilities be established at the NSC-level to remedy a situation in which "the work of the intelligence community becomes largely responsive to its own perceptions of what is important, and irrelevant information is collected, sometimes drowning out the important."/75/ It also recommended that this process be formalized in an officially approved five-year plan. A consolidated foreign intelligence budget should also be prepared, approved by an inter-agency committee and OMB and submitted to Congress. Although the importance of economic intelligence was recognized, the commission did not see a need for intelligence agencies to seek to expand in this area; rather, it suggested that the analytical capabilities of the Departments of State, Treasury, Commerce, Agriculture, and the Council of Economic Advisers should be significantly strengthened. The commission noted the replacement of the Board of National Estimates by some eleven National Intelligence Officers (NIOs) who were to draw upon analysts in various agencies to draft National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs). This practice was criticized because it laid excessive burdens on chosen analysts and because NIEs had in recent years been largely ignored by senior officials (presumably Secretary of State Kissinger) who made their own assessments of future developments based on competing sources of information and analysis. Thus, the commission recommended a small staff of analysts from various agencies assigned to work with NIOs in drafting NIEs and ensure that differences of view were clearly presented for the policymakers. Rockefeller Commission (Commission on CIA Activities within the United States), 1975 Prior to the mid-1960s, the organization and activities of the Intelligence Community were primarily the concern of specialists in national security and governmental organization. The Murphy Commission, although working during a subsequent and more politically turbulent period, had approached intelligence reorganization from this perspective as well. The political terrain had, however, been shifting dramatically and the Intelligence Community would not escape searching criticism. During the era of the Vietnam War and Watergate, disputes over national security policy focused attention on intelligence activities. In 1975, media accounts of alleged intelligence abuses, some stretching back over decades led to a series of highly publicized congressional hearings. Revelations of assassination plots and other alleged abuses spurred three separate investigations and sets of recommendations. The first was undertaken within the Executive Branch and was headed by Vice President Nelson A. Rockefeller. Other investigations were conducted by select committees in both houses of Congress. The Senate effort was led by Senator Frank Church and the House committee was chaired by Representative Otis Pike. These investigations led to the creation of the two permanent intelligence committees and much closer oversight by the Congress. In addition, they also produced a number of recommendations for reorganization and realignment within the Intelligence Community. Established by Executive Order 11828 on January 4, 1975, the Commission on CIA Activities within the United States was chaired by Vice President Rockefeller and included seven others appointed by President Ford (including then-former Governor Ronald Reagan). The commission's mandate was to investigate whether the CIA had violated provisions of the National Security Act of 1947, precluding the CIA from exercising internal security functions. The Rockefeller Commission's 30 recommendations/76/ included a number of proposals designed to delimit CIA's authority to collect foreign intelligence within the United States (from "willing sources") and proscribe collection of information about the domestic activities of U.S. citizens, to strengthen PFIAB, to establish a congressional joint intelligence committee, and to establish guidelines for cooperation with the Justice Department regarding the prosecution of criminal violations by CIA employees. There was another recommendation to consider the question of whether the CIA budget should be made public, if not in full at least in part. The commission recommended that consideration should be given to appointing DCIs from outside the career service of the CIA and that no DCI serve longer than 10 years. Two deputies should be appointed; one to serve as an administrative officer to free the DCI from day-to-day management duties; the other a military officer to foster relations with the military and provide technical expertise on military intelligence requirements. The CIA position of Inspector General should be upgraded and his responsibilities expanded along with those of the General Counsel. Guidelines should be developed to advise agency personnel as to what activities are permitted and what are forbidden by law and executive orders. The President should instruct the DCI that domestic mail openings should not be undertaken except in time of war and that mail cover operations (examining and copying of envelopes only) are to be undertaken only on a limited basis "clearly involving matters of national security." The commission was specifically concerned with CIA infiltration of domestic organizations and submitted a number of recommendations in this area. Presidents should refrain from directing the CIA to perform what are essentially internal security tasks and the CIA should resist any effort to involve itself in improper activities. The CIA "should guard against allowing any component ... to become so self-contained and isolated from top leadership that regular supervision and review are lost." Files of previous improper investigations should be destroyed. The agency should not infiltrate American organizations without a written determination by the DCI that there is a threat to agency operations, facilities, or personnel that cannot be met by law enforcement agencies. Other recommendations were directed at CIA investigations of its personnel or former personnel, including provisions relating to physical surveillance, wire or oral communications, and access to income tax information. As a result of efforts by some White House staff during the Nixon Administration to use CIA resources improperly, a number of recommendations dealt with the need to establish appropriate channels between the agency and the Executive Office of the President. Reacting to evidence that drugs had been tested on unsuspecting persons, the commission recommended that the practice should not be renewed. Also, equipment for monitoring communications should not be tested on unsuspecting persons within the United States. An independent agency should be established to oversee civilian uses of aerial photography to avoid any concerns over the improper domestic use of a CIA-developed system. Concerned with distinguishing the separate responsibilities of the CIA and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the commission urged that the DCI and the Director of the FBI prepare and submit to the National Security Council a detailed agreement setting forth the jurisdictions of each agency and providing for effective liaison between them. The commission also recommended that all intelligence agencies review their holdings of classified information and declassify as much as possible. Church Committee (Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities), 1976 Established in the wake of sensational revelations about assassination plots organized by the CIA, the Church Committee had a much wider mandate than the Rockefeller Commission, extending beyond the CIA to all intelligence agencies./77/ It too, however, concentrated on illegalities and improprieties rather than organizational or managerial questions per se. After extensive and highly publicized hearings, the committee made some 183 recommendations in its final report, issued April 26, 1976./78/ The principal recommendation was that omnibus legislation be enacted to set forth the basic purposes of national intelligence activities and defining the relationship between intelligence activities and the Congress. Criticizing vagueness in the National Security Act of 1947, the committee urged charters for the several intelligence agencies to set forth general organizational structures and procedures, and delineate roles and responsibilities. There should also be specific and clearly defined prohibitions or limitations on intelligence activities. The effort to pass such legislation would consume considerable attention over a number of years, following the completion of the work of the Church Committee. A number of recommendations reflected the committee's views on the appropriate role of the National Security Council in directing and monitoring the work of the intelligence agencies. The apparent goal was to encourage a more formal process, with accountability assigned to cabinet-level officials. The committee concluded that covert actions should be conducted only upon presidential authorization with notification to appropriate congressional committees. Attention was given to the role of the DCI within the entire Intelligence Community. The committee recommended that the DCI be recognized by statute as the President's principal foreign intelligence advisor and that he should be responsible for establishing national intelligence requirements, preparing the national intelligence budget, and for providing guidance for intelligence operations. The DCI should have specific responsibility for choosing among the programs of the different collection and production agencies and departments and to insure against waste and unnecessary duplication. The DCI should also have responsibility for issuing fiscal guidance for the allocation of all national intelligence resources. The authority of the DCI to reprogram funds within the intelligence budget should be defined by statute./79/ Monies for the national intelligence budget would be appropriated to the DCI rather than to the directors of the various agencies. The committee also recommended that the DCI be authorized to establish an intelligence community staff to assist him in carrying out his managerial responsibilities. The staff should be drawn "from the best available talent within and outside the intelligence community."/80/ Further, the position of Deputy DCI for the Intelligence Community should be established by statute (in addition to the existing DDCI who would have responsibility primarily for the CIA itself). It also urged consideration of separating the DCI from direct responsibility over the CIA. The DCI, it was urged, should serve at the pleasure of the President, but for no more than ten years. The committee also looked at intelligence analysis. It recommended a more flexible and less hierarchical personnel system with more established analysts being brought in at middle and upper grades. Senior positions should be established on the basis of analytical ability rather than administrative responsibilities. Analysts should be encouraged to accept temporary assignments at other agencies or on the NSC staff to give them an appreciation for policymakers' use of intelligence information. A system should be in place to ensure that analysts are more promptly informed about U.S. policies and programs affecting their areas of responsibility. In addressing covert actions, the committee recommended barring political assassinations, efforts to subvert democratic governments, and support for police and other internal security forces engaged in systematic violations of human rights. The committee addressed the questions of separating CIA's analysis and production functions from clandestine collection and covert action functions. It listed the pros and cons of this approach, but ultimately recommended only that the intelligence committees should give it consideration. Reflecting concerns about abuses of the rights of U.S. citizens, the committee made a series of recommendations regarding CIA involvement with the academic community, members of religious organizations, journalists, recipients of government grants, and the covert use of books and publishing houses. A particular concern was limiting any influence on domestic politics of materials published by the CIA overseas. Attention was also given to proprietary organizations CIA creates to conduct operations abroad; the committee believed them necessary, but advocated stricter regulation and congressional oversight. The committee recommended enhanced positions for CIA's Inspector General (IG) and General Counsel (GC), urging that the latter be made a presidential appointee requiring Senate confirmation. In looking at intelligence agencies other than the CIA, the committee recommended that the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) be made part of the civilian Office of the Secretary of Defense and that a small J-2 staff provide intelligence support to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It was urged that the directors of both DIA and the National Security Agency (NSA) should be appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. The committee believe that either the director or deputy director of DIA and of NSA should be civilians. Turning to the State Department, the committee urged the Administration to issue instructions to implement legislation that authorized ambassadors to be provided information about activities conducted by intelligence agencies in their assigned countries. It also stated that State Department efforts to collect foreign political and economic information overtly should be improved. Funding for intelligence activities has been included in Defense Department authorization and appropriations legislation since the end of World War II. The Church Commission advocated making public, at least, total amounts and suggested consideration be given as to whether more detailed information should also be released. The General Accounting Office (GAO) should be empowered to conduct audits at the request of congressional oversight committees. Tests by intelligence agencies on human subjects of drugs or devices that could cause physical or mental harm should not occur except under stringent conditions. The committee made a number of recommendations regarding procedures for granting security clearances and for handling classified information. It also recommended consideration of new legislative initiatives to deal with other existing problems. Finally, the Committee recommended the creation of a registry of all classified executive orders, including NSC directives, with access provided to congressional oversight committees. Pike Committee (House Select Committee on Intelligence), 1976 The House Select Committee on Intelligence, chaired by Representative Otis G. Pike, also conducted a wide-ranging survey of intelligence activities. In the conduct of its hearings, the Pike Committee was far more adversarial to the intelligence agencies than the Senate Committee. Publication of its final report was not authorized by the House, although a version was published in a New York tabloid. The Pike Committee's recommendations, however, were published on February 11, 1976./81/ There were some twenty recommendations, some dealing with congressional oversight, with one dealing, anomalously, with the status of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. The Pike Committee recommended that covert actions not include, except in time of war, any activities involving direct or indirect attempts to assassinate any individual. The prohibition was extended to all paramilitary operations. A National Security Council subcommittee would review all proposals for covert actions and copies of each subcommittee member's comments would be provided to congressional committees. The committee further recommended that congressional oversight committees be notified of presidential approval of covert actions within 48 hours. According to the proposal, all covert actions would have to be terminated no later than 12 months from the date of approval or reconsidered. The committee recommended that specific legislation be enacted to establish NSA and define its role in monitoring communications of Americans and placed under civilian control. The Pike Committee further recommended that all "intelligence related items" be included as intelligence expenditures in the President's budget and that the total sum budgeted for intelligence be disclosed. The committee recommended that transfers of funds be prohibited between agencies or departments involved in intelligence activities. Reprogramming of funds within agencies would be dependent upon the specific approval of congressional oversight and appropriations committees. The same procedures would be required for expenditures from reserve or contingency funds. The Pike Committee also looked at the role of the DCI. Like many others who have studied the question, it recommended that the DCI should be separate from managing any agency and should focus on coordinating and overseeing the entire intelligence effort with a view towards eliminating duplication of effort and promoting competition in analysis. It advocated that he should be a member of the National Security Council. Under this proposal the DCI would have a separate staff and would prepare national intelligence estimates and daily briefings for the President. He would receive budget proposals from agencies involved in intelligence activities. (The recommendations did not indicate the extent of his authority to approve or disapprove these recommendations.) The DCI would be charged with coordinating intelligence agencies under his jurisdiction, eliminating duplication, and evaluating performance and efficiency. The committee recommended that the GAO conduct a full and complete management and financial audit of all intelligence agencies and that the CIA internal audit staff be given complete access to CIA financial records. The committee recommended that a permanent foreign operations subcommittee of the NSC, composed of cabinet-rank officials, be established. This subcommittee would have jurisdiction over all authorized activities of intelligence agencies (except those solely related to intelligence gathering) and review all covert actions, clandestine activities, and hazardous collecting activities. It was recommended that DIA be abolished and its functions divided between the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the CIA. The intelligence components of the military services would be prohibited from undertaking covert actions within the U.S. or clandestine activities against U.S. citizens abroad. Relations between intelligence and law enforcement organizations were to be limited. Intelligence agencies would be barred from providing funds to religious or educational institutions or to those media with general circulation in the United States. The committee recommended that specific legislation be considered to deal with the classification and regular declassification of information. It was also recommended that an Inspector General for Intelligence be nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate with authority to investigate potential misconduct of any intelligence agency or personnel. He would make annual reports to the Congress. The committee also made recommendations regarding the organization and operations of the FBI and its role in investigating domestic groups. In an additional recommendation, Representative Les Aspin, a member of the committee, urged that the CIA be divided into two separate agencies, one for analysis and the other for clandestine collection and covert operations. A similar recommendation was made by Representative Ron Dellums, who also served on the committee. Clifford and Cline Proposals, 1976 In 1976 hearings by the Senate Committee on Government Operations, Clark Clifford (who had served as President Johnson's final Secretary of Defense and, in an earlier position in the Truman Administration, had been involved in legislation creating the CIA) proposed the creation of a post of Director General of Intelligence to serve as the President's chief adviser on intelligence matters and as principal point of contact with the congressional intelligence committees. There would be a separate director of the CIA whose duties would be restricted to day-to-day operations./82/ In the same year, Ray Cline, a former Deputy Director of the CIA, made a number of recommendations./83/ He recommended that the DCI exert broad supervisory powers over the entire intelligence community and the CIA be divided into two agencies, one to undertake analytical work and the other for clandestine services. He also proposed that the DCI be given cabinet rank, a practice that would find support in both the Reagan and Clinton administrations. Proposed Charter Legislation, 1978-1980 Subsequent to the establishment of permanent intelligence oversight committees in the Senate in 1976 and the House of Representatives in 1977, attention in Congress shifted to consideration of charter legislation for intelligence agencies./84/ It was envisioned that the charter legislation would include many of the recommendations made earlier by the Church and Pike Committees. Introduced by Senator Walter Huddleston and Representative Edward Boland, the draft National Intelligence Reorganization and Reform Act of 1978 (S.2525/H.R.11245, 95th Congress) would have provided statutory charters to all intelligence agencies and created a Director of National Intelligence (DNI) to serve as head of the entire Intelligence Community. Day-to-day leadership of CIA could be delegated to a deputy at presidential discretion. The draft legislation contained numerous reporting requirements (regarding covert actions in particular) to Congress and an extensive list of banned or restricted activities. The draft legislation of more that 170 pages was strongly criticized from all sides in hearings; some arguing that it would legitimize covert actions inconsistent with American ideals and others suggesting that its complex restrictions would unduly hamper the protection of vital American interests. The bills were never reported out of either intelligence committee, although the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (P.L. 95-511) provided a statutory base for electronic surveillance within the United States. Charter legislation was also introduced in the 96th Congress. It contained many of the provisions introduced in the earlier version, but also loosened freedom of information regulations for intelligence agencies and the requirements of the Hughes-Ryan amendments of 1974 requiring that some eight committees be notified of covert actions. This legislation (S.2284, 96th Congress) came under even heavier criticism from all sides than its predecessor. It was not reported by the Senate Intelligence Committee, but other stand-alone legislation did pass and a shorter bill reducing the number of committees receiving notification of covert actions--and "significant anticipated intelligence activities"--was introduced and eventually became law in October 1980 as part of the FY1981 Intelligence Authorization Act (P.L. 96-450). The Executive Branch Response, 1976-1981 Concurrent with, and subsequent to, these legislative initiatives, the Executive Branch, in part to head off further Congressional action, implemented some of the more limited recommendations contained in their respective proposals. Presidents Gerald Ford, Jimmy Carter, and Ronald Reagan each issued detailed Executive Orders (E.O.) setting guidelines for the organization and management of the U.S. Intelligence Community. Issued by President Ford on February 18, 1976, prior to the release of the Church and Pike Committee findings, Executive Order 11905 undertook to implement some of the more limited recommendations of the Rockefeller and Murphy Commissions. In particular, E.O. 11905 identified the DCI as the President's primary intelligence advisor and the principal spokesman for the Intelligence Community and gave him responsibilities for developing the National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP). It also delineated responsibilities of each intelligence agency, provided two NSC-level committees for internal review of intelligence operations, and established a separate three-member Intelligence Oversight Board to review the legality and propriety of intelligence activities. It placed restrictions on the physical and electronic surveillance of American citizens by intelligence agencies./85/ On January 24, 1978, President Carter issued Executive Order 12036, that superseded E.O. 11905./86/ Carter's Executive Order sought to define more clearly the DCI's community-wide authority in areas relating to the "budget, tasking, intelligence review, coordination and dissemination, and foreign liaison."/87/ In particular, it formally recognized the establishment of the National Foreign Intelligence Program budget and the short-lived National Intelligence Tasking Center (NTIC), that was supposed to assist the DCI in "translating intelligence requirements and priorities into collection objectives."/88/ E.O. 11905 also restricted medical experimentation and prohibited political assassinations. President Reagan continued the trend towards enhancing the DCI's community-wide budgetary, tasking, and managerial authority. On December 4, 1981, he issued Executive Order 12333, detailing the roles, responsibilities, missions, and activities of the Intelligence Community. It supplanted the previous orders issued by Presidents Ford and Carter. Fifteen years later, E.O. 12333 remains the governing executive branch mandate concerning the managerial structure of the Intelligence Community. E.O. 12333 designates the DCI "as the primary intelligence advisor to the President and NSC on national foreign intelligence."/89/ In this capacity, the DCI's duties include the implementation of special activities (covert actions), liaison to the nation's foreign intelligence and counterintelligence components, and the overall protection of the community's sources, methods, and analytical procedures./90/ It grants the DCI "full responsibility for [the] production and dissemination of national foreign intelligence," including the authority to task non-CIA intelligence agencies, and the ability to decide on community tasking conflicts./91/ The order also sought to grant the DCI more explicit authority over the development, implementation, and evaluation of NFIP./92/ To a certain extent, E.O. 12333 represented a relaxation of the restrictions placed upon the community by Carter. Although it maintained the prohibition on assassination, the focus was on "authorizations" rather than "restrictions." "Propriety" was removed as a criterion for approving operations. Arguably, the Reagan Administration established a presumption in favor of government needs over individual rights./93/ However, in the absence of legislation, the DCI continued to lack statutory authority over all aspects of the Intelligence Community, including budgetary issues. The Turner Proposal, 1985 In 1985, Admiral Stansfield Turner, DCI in the Carter Administration, expressed his views on the need for intelligence reform./94/ In part, Turner recommended reducing the emphasis on covert action and implementing a charter for the Intelligence Community. The most important recommendation involved the future of the DCI of which Turner maintained: The two jobs, head of the CIA and head of the Intelligence Community, conflict. One person cannot do justice to both and fulfill the DCI's responsibilities to the President, the Congress, and the public as well./95/ Turner went on to propose the separation of the two jobs of DCI and head of the CIA with the creation of a Director of National Intelligence, separate and superior to the CIA. Turner also recommended placing less emphasis on the use of covert action than the Reagan Administration. Iran-Contra Investigation, 1987 During highly publicized investigations of the Reagan Administration's covert support to Iran and the Nicaraguan Resistance, the role of the Intelligence Community, the CIA, and DCI Casey were foci of attention. Much of the involvement of National Security Council staff was undertaken precisely because legislation had been enacted severely limiting the role of intelligence agencies in Central America and because efforts to free the hostages through cooperation with Iranian officials had been strongly opposed by CIA officials. The executive branch's review, chaired by former Senator John Tower, expressed concern that precise procedures be established for restricted consideration of covert actions and that NSC policy officials had been too closely involved in the preparation of intelligence estimates./96/ The investigation of the affair by two congressional select committees resulted in a number of recommendations for changes in laws and regulations governing intelligence activities. Specifically the majority report of the two congressional select committees that investigated the affair made a number of recommendations regarding presidential findings concerning the need to initiative covert actions. Findings should be made prior to the initiation of a covert action, they should be in writing, and they should be made known to appropriate Members of Congress in no event later than forty-eight hours after approval. Further, the majority of the committees urged that findings be far more specific than some had been in the Reagan Administration. Statutory inspector general and general counsels, confirmed by the Senate, for the CIA were also recommended./97/ Minority members of the two committees made several recommendations regarding congressional oversight, urging that on extremely sensitive matters that notifications of covert actions be made to only four Members of Congress instead of the existing requirement for eight to be notified./98/ These recommendations were subsequently considered by the two intelligence committees. A number of provisions was enacted dealing with covert action findings in the Intelligence Authorization Act for FY1991 (P.L. 102-88). Boren-McCurdy, 1992 A major legislative initiative, reflecting the changed situation of the post-Cold War world, began in February 1992, when Senator David Boren, the Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, and Representative Dave McCurdy, the Chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, announced separate plans for an omnibus restructuring of the U.S. Intelligence Community, to serve as an intelligence counterpart to the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. The two versions of the initiative (S. 2198 and H.R. 4165, 102nd Congress) differed in several respects, but the overall thrust of the two bills was similar. Both proposals called for: Creating a Director of National Intelligence (DNI) with authority to program and reprogram intelligence funds throughout the Intelligence Community, including the Defense Department, and to direct their expenditure; and to task intelligence agencies and transfer personnel temporarily from one agency to another to support new requirements; Creating two Deputy Directors of National Intelligence (DDNIs); one of whom would be responsible for analysis and estimates, the other for Intelligence Community affairs; Creating a separate Director of the CIA, subordinate to the new DNI, to manage the agency's collection and covert action capabilities on a day-to-day basis; Consolidating analytical and estimative efforts of the Intelligence Community (including analysts from CIA, and some from DIA, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) at the State Department, and other agencies) into a separate office under one of the Deputy DNIs (this aspect of the proposal would effectively separate CIA's analytical elements from its collection and covert action offices); Creating a National Imagery Agency within the Department of Defense (DOD) to collect, exploit, and analyze imagery (these tasks had been spread among several entities; the House version would divide these efforts into two new separate agencies). Authorizing the Director of DIA to task defense intelligence agencies (DIA, NSA, the new Imagery Agency) with collection requirements; and to shift functions, funding, and personnel from one DOD intelligence agency to another; This major restructuring effort would have provided statutory mandates for agencies where operational authority was created by executive branch directives. Both statutes and executive branch directives provided the DCI authority to task intelligence agencies outside the CIA and to approve budgets and reprogramming efforts; in practice, however, this authority had never been fully exercised. This legislation would have provided a statutory basis for the DCI (or DNI) to direct collection and analytical efforts throughout the Intelligence Community. The Boren-McCurdy legislation was not adopted, although provisions were added to the FY1994 Intelligence Authorization Act (P.L. 102-496) that provided basic charters for intelligence agencies and set forth in law the DCI's coordinative responsibilities vis- -vis intelligence agencies other than the CIA. Observers credited strong opposition from the Defense Department and concerns of the Armed Services Committees with inhibiting passage of the original legislation. Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the U.S. Intelligence Community (Aspin Commission), 1995-1996 Established pursuant to the Intelligence Authorization Act for FY 1995 (P.L. 103-359) of September 27, 1994, the Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the U.S. Intelligence Community was formed to assess the future direction, priorities, and structure of the Intelligence Community in the post-Cold War environment. Originally under the chairmanship of the late Les Aspin, the commission was subsequently headed by former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown. Nine members were appointed by the president and eight nominated by the congressional leadership. A final report was scheduled for March 1996. P.L. 103-359 set forth nineteen separate issues for the commission to address, including a determination of intelligence needs and priorities in the post-Cold War world, whether or not existing organizational arrangements provide the most effective and efficient framework to meet those needs, and what resources will be necessary to satisfy these requirements. Specifically, the commission was asked to examine such issues as the need to maintain the CIA as a separate entity, U.S. counterintelligence efforts, and the managerial structure of intelligence components in the armed services. In an era of budgetary constraints and evolving policy concerns, the commission also was expected to address personnel issues, allocations of resources, duplication of services, expanded use of open source intelligence, and the viability of maintaining a covert action capability. The future responsibilities and authorities of the DCI were indicated to be a paramount concern. PART II Advantages and Disadvantages of Major Proposals Many of the recommendations contained in commission reports and legislative initiatives have been--at least in part--adopted either by Executive Order, through other executive branch initiatives, or in statutory law. A number of the issues raised by commissions and with other proposals have been addressed in the context of annual authorization bills (and occasionally through appropriations laws). Many observers believe that this process has proven effective since issues can be dealt with on a case-by-case basis as they appear most urgent. Charter legislation, on the other hand, inevitably involves broad questions relating not only to intelligence, but to defense and foreign policy. The legislative effort involved in sorting out the complexities of such concerns and holding together a coalition for many months is perceived as more difficult than including less ambitious provisions in annual authorization bills. The annual authorization process is not, however, necessarily smooth; in November 1990, President Bush pocket-vetoed an intelligence authorization bill and a replacement was not signed until the following August; the FY1996 Intelligence Authorization Act was not signed until more than three months into the new fiscal year. Although a consolidated legislative charter has not been enacted for the Intelligence Community, legislation has addressed the preponderance of issues that have been raised by commissions and investigatory committees. Title VII of the Intelligence Authorization Act for FY1993 (P.L. 102-496) included provisions defining the role of the DCI and the responsibilities of the Secretary of Defense pertaining to national intelligence activities. In so doing, it provided a statutory basis for intelligence agencies beyond that which they had been granted in previous legislation. Earlier statutes relating to some intelligence agencies primarily concerned buildings and personnel rather than operational missions. A series of laws has also been enacted governing procedures for implementing covert actions./99/ There has been extended controversy on the extent of notice that presidents should provide to Congress concerning such actions; presidents continue to assert a constitutional right to initiate covert actions without notifying Congress in extreme circumstances. Although many in Congress remain opposed to this assertion, observers consider that, on the whole, current procedures are adequate, as long as reasonably good will prevails between the executive and legislative branches. CIA Inspectors General are now nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate; legislation to require presidential appointment of the CIA General Counsel was rejected in the 103d Congress./100/ Little, if any, consideration has been given to limiting the term of the DCI to 10 years, since all recent DCIs have had much shorter tenures. There exists considerable feeling that presidents must have a degree of confidence in their DCIs that could not exist in a person who does not serve at the president's pleasure. Another area of concern reflected in many recommendations is the potential for intelligence agencies to infringe on the rights of U.S. citizens. Such concerns fueled the Church and Pike investigations as well as others. Congress has addressed these issues in several pieces of legislation, including the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 and the Classified Information Procedures Act of 1980 (P.L. 96-456). Legislation relating to warrantless wiretaps and physical searches was enacted as part of the Intelligence Authorization Act for FY1995 (P.L. 103-359). Questions regarding the proper coordination of intelligence collection by the CIA and the FBI were, however, raised anew in the aftermath of the Oklahoma City bombing. A Counterintelligence Policy Board was established, and closer cooperation between the CIA and the FBI on counterintelligence issues mandated, in Section 811 of the FY1995 Intelligence Authorization Act (with the FBI granted a more important role). The FY1996 Intelligence Authorization Act (P.L. 104-93) provided the FBI with enhanced authority to acquire information for counterintelligence purposes. Congress and the executive branch have addressed most of the issues raised by commissions and individual legislators; the results inevitably have not been universally popular. Some continue to seek broader restrictions, if not outright prohibitions of covert actions. Drafting regulations and statutes on classification continues to be contentious. As is the case with any group of federal agencies, there is likely to be a continuing need to adapt the regulations and statutes dealing with the Intelligence Community to changing conditions and public opinion. There remain, nonetheless, several areas of continuing concern that have been addressed by commissions and Members over the years that some believe have never been adequately resolved by Congress or the executive branch. The extent of the DCI's authority over agencies other than the CIA, the role and control of covert actions, and the question of making public the total amount of intelligence spending are of continuing interest. These remain controversial among informed observers and all may be revisited during the 104th Congress (along with the somewhat more narrow question of requiring confirmation of the CIA's General Counsel). The positions of those who support and oppose various proposals are indicated where possible, but in many cases the views noted may only reflect those held at one point in time. Role of the DCI Almost all reform and reorganization proposals through the years have addressed, directly or indirectly, the role of the DCI, and his relationship to the CIA and with other intelligence agencies. Statutory authorities dating from the National Security Act of 1947 give the DCI direct operational control of the CIA. He has, in addition, acquired by statute and presidential direction a degree of influence over the budgetary and operational practices of other intelligence agencies. Most DCIs, however, have chosen (or have been directed) to concentrate their energies on the CIA. Stansfield Turner, DCI under President Carter, was perhaps the DCI most inclined to focus on community-wide concerns. The current DCI, John M. Deutch, following his Pentagon experience, is making vigorous efforts to integrate intelligence activities of different agencies. On the other hand, some DCIs, including those who were most concerned with clandestine operations, such as Allen Dulles, Richard Helms, William Colby, and William Casey, tended not to concentrate on community-wide programs. The personal inclinations of DCIs and Presidents will, it seems, inevitably influence the relative emphasis that is given to community-wide issues. As noted above, some commissions and legislators, perceiving a need for more centralized direction and coordination of the Intelligence Community, have proposed that the DCI be given more authority over all intelligence agencies, specifically in terms of approving budgets, directing collection and analytical tasks, realigning functions, and transferring personnel among agencies. Some have suggested that the senior intelligence official be given the title of Director of National Intelligence (DNI) with a separate position created for the head of the CIA who would have responsibility for the day-to-day management of the agency. Arguments In Favor. Intelligence activities and spending are spread over many agencies and offices, some of which duplicate the work of others; given the end of the Cold War and tight budgetary constraints throughout the federal government, one individual is needed to coordinate and rationalize the nation's intelligence effort, eliminating waste and duplication of effort. Heretofore, despite having been given some authority to review other agency budgets, DCIs have lacked meaningful authority to change budgets, initiate or eliminate programs, and move personnel from one agency to another. The large intelligence agencies of the Defense Department that account for the bulk of intelligence spending, in particular, have been more responsive to the practical needs of senior military officers and the OSD staff than to the DCI. Many of DCI Turner's efforts to merge national and tactical intelligence activities in the late 1970s were, however, successfully resisted by DOD. Despite subsequent efforts to enhance the authority of the DCI, DOD retains enormous influence over both national and tactical systems. Existing arrangements, according to this view, have resulted in faulty coordination, waste, duplication of effort, and a failure to provide the best available intelligence support to customers. Agencies, especially the DOD intelligence agencies, have set their own agendas, procured their own equipment, and developed their own programs with insufficient attention to efforts underway elsewhere. In some cases, expensive technologies and/or scarce human agents have been directed to acquire data that could have been obtained from open sources. A major problem area has been a failure by the leadership of the Intelligence Community to prioritize collection requirements adequately. Too often collection efforts have been undertaken more because the technology and administrative infrastructure existed rather than as a result of significant operational or policy needs. Despite having certain responsibilities for the entire Intelligence Community, DCIs for the most part have concentrated on the management of the CIA (and especially the Operations Directorate). Efforts to coordinate the activities of all agencies have been distinctly secondary. To remedy the problem indicated, fundamental statutory changes are required. The DCI would have to be given "line" authority over all intelligence organization, or at least the larger ones--NSA, CIA, NRO, and DIA. Budget authority would have to be appropriated to him and he would have to be given authority to move personnel from agency to agency as needed and to consolidate and direct the activities of the entire community. The creation of the Intelligence Community Staff in 1972 ultimately proved inadequate as it became immersed in technical budgetary staffwork and failed to exert significant leadership of the community. It was replaced in 1992 by the Community Management Staff (CMS) with similar functions but working more closely for the DCI. There is some question that the CMS can resolve the perceived difficulties without changes in the DCI's statutory authorities. Adherents of this view usually indicate that the DCI (or DNI) should not involve himself directly in the day-to-day management of the CIA, but concentrate on community-wide issues. They see him as functioning at the White House level in a manner similar to the OMB Director. These arguments have been put forth, in varying forms, by many observers including Schlesinger, Clifford, Cline, the Pike Committee, and in the Boren/McCurdy bills. Arguments in Opposition. Those who have opposed the above line of argument believe that any separation of the DCI from the management of the CIA would render him far less influential. To a considerable extent, influence in policy derives from institutional functions and, if the DCI had only a small personal staff, he would become merely another White House aide. Power would gravitate to the person who was actually directing the extensive daily affairs of the CIA. The major DOD intelligence agencies are closely related to military combat functions and are staffed with active-duty military personnel. The needs of military commander differ from those of policymakers. Placing them under a civilian official not in the military chain of command would undercut the vital principle of unity of command; it could result in the subordination of the needs of combat forces to civilian concerns and a genuine decrease in military capabilities. The approach might also encourage a tendency within DOD to establish rudimentary and less capable intelligence entities under the direct control of military commanders. Strong opposition to this approach has been set forth by Secretaries of Defense (especially by Secretary Richard Cheney in comments on the Boren-McCurdy proposals). Admiral Bobby Inman, who had served as Director of NSA and Deputy DCI, has noted that "I suspect if you query the former Directors of Central Intelligence, none will support [separating the leadership of the Community from management of CIA], because they all remember the support they got primarily from CIA for carrying out their missions. And they worry that without that they would not be effective in this city. I have even heard the phrase used, that they would be like the Drug Czar./101/ Some opponents of increasing the statutory authority of the DCI do not believe that current procedures for coordinating intelligence collection and analysis are inappropriate. In many cases, they argue, those closest to collection systems have the best insight into ways to optimize collection. Moreover, analysts in various agencies know which problems are of greatest concern to senior officials. The creation of a separate DNI would add another layer of staff not closely connected to ongoing needs for intelligence support to policymakers and military commanders. Others acknowledge that real problems exist with coordination and duplication of effort, but believe that current authorities are adequate. The problems stem from inattention by previous DCIs and, perhaps, poor appointments to leadership positions in the Intelligence Community. They believe that a rigorous exploitation of existing authorities and creative use of the Community Management Staff could allow the DCI to coordinate intelligence activities far more effectively than has been done previously. The earlier efforts by DCI Turner were in part misconceived and, in any event, affected by Cold War issues that are no longer relevant. Now, it is argued, a new approach can be taken to bring intelligence agencies into closer alignment. Role of the CIA Operations Directorate A number of proposals have been made over the years to separate analytical functions from the covert operations that in the popular media constitute the main function of intelligence agencies (although in recent years they absorb only a small percentage of the intelligence budget). Clandestine activities include both human intelligence (HUMINT) collection as well as covert actions; there is considerable use of the same personnel for both duties. Arguments in Favor. Covert actions are, to some critics, antithetical to democratic values and have often undermined American interests and the country's reputation. The continued existence of a sizable CIA Directorate of Operations provides policymakers with a readily available instrument to pursue policies that would not stand up to public scrutiny, especially in the post-Cold War world. Furthermore, there is in CIA's Operations Directorate a culture of secrecy and deceit that some contend has come to permeate the entire agency. If, under exceptional circumstances, the national interest requires that covert actions be undertaken, a small office separated from the CIA, perhaps under DOD control, would be more appropriate. Separating or abolishing it would improve the image of the U.S. government throughout the world and would reflect a renewed American commitment to human rights and democracy. Separation would further help ensure that CIA analysis is not skewed to support or justify the work of the Operations Directorate. Some observers also argue that intelligence analysts should be in close touch with academic scholars, journalists, and others with insight into foreign developments. Especially in an era of diverse threats and opportunities, the Intelligence Community must have access to contacts and analytical resources available in the civilian sector, as it cannot maintain the depth of expertise on each area of the world that it once maintained on the Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact, and China. In Third World areas, the best available information may come from area specialists in universities and from journalists with long experience in the region. The role of the CIA in undertaking covert actions, and the sustained attention these efforts receive in the media, complicate the CIA's relationships with academic and other civilian scholars. The well-known hostility to the CIA among many scholars usually derives from opposition to covert actions (and to the policies that incorporate them) rather than to the agency's analytical products. Few, other than those who would abolish the CIA, argue against the need for the centralized gathering and analysis of information. Although intelligence professionals tend to consider the transfer of hostility to covert actions to encompass all intelligence activities ill-founded and unfair, it is a fact of life that effects the Intelligence Community's ability to provide the best available intelligence to policymakers. The CIA would be best served if covert actions could be undertaken by a smaller separate organization, perhaps one positioned outside the Intelligence Community. While there would probably be some duplication of effort between a separate covert action organization and CIA clandestine collection efforts, the merits of improving the CIA's analytical reputation would outweigh any overlap. Such arguments have been made by Ray Cline, former Representative Aspin, and, earlier, by Professor Harry Howe Ransom./102/ They were also reflected in the Boren-McCurdy proposals. Arguments in Opposition. Those who support the retention of the Operations Directorate within the current CIA organization argue that any separate covert action organization would complicate the nation's intelligence efforts by creating still another agency with its own institutional interests, thereby making centralized coordination more difficult. There have been instances of covert operatives working at cross purposes in the field, and inevitable compartmentalization will complicate efforts of senior policymakers to gain an understanding of information held in all parts of the U.S. government about a given foreign situation. These observers further argue that there is no valid need to protect analysts from the "grimy real world the collectors deal with." Intelligence analysts, they argue, are not academic specialists but government officials responsible for providing warning of threats to the national security. They need, accordingly, the closest contact with those engaged in intelligence collection and operations. Such views have been set forth by former DCI Colby and former senior CIA official George Carver./103/ A Third View. Still other observers have argued that covert actions have never been specifically authorized by statute and that the CIA's conduct of them is legally questionable (although provisions for the reporting of presidential authorizations have been enacted)./104/ Those holding this view would probably oppose an agency specifically established to undertake covert actions and further argue that covert actions are contrary to the national interest and the U.S. should set an example by forswearing them. Disclosing the Intelligence Budget Many observers of the Intelligence Community have long recommended that the overall intelligence budgets be publicly disclosed./105/ Since the creation of the CIA, intelligence spending for the larger intelligence agencies has largely been "hidden" in DOD authorization and appropriations legislation whose totals also include other classified accounts. This has not been the case for the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, the CIA Retirement and Disability Fund, and some other functions. The actual figures are available to Members of Congress and to executive branch officials with a need-to-know, but are not made public. In recent years, there has been widespread media discussions of a given multi-billion dollar figure and the House Appropriations Committee in 1994 released testimony that described dollar amounts included in the Administration intelligence spending request for FY1995./106/ Congress has twice gone on record (in the FY1992 and FY1993 intelligence authorization acts) urging that "the aggregate amount requested and authorized for, and spent on, intelligence and intelligence-related activities should be disclosed to the public in an appropriate manner." In 1993, 1994, and 1995, however, Congress rejected floor amendments to release intelligence budget totals. Arguments in Favor. The principal argument by those in favor of making intelligence spending levels public is based on constitutional provisions requiring regular statements and accounts of public spending (Article I, Section 9, Clause 7). Even if obscuring intelligence spending is considered technically legal, given the end of the Cold War it is unwise and unnecessary. The public has a right to know how taxmonies are being spent. The Church and Pike Committees made this point, as have numerous other observers in more recent years. The secrecy that surrounded the Cold War superpower competition is no longer needed. Even if potential enemies learn how much the United States is spending on intelligence, the information will not assist them. There are unlikely to be any bulges in intelligence spending that would alert them to new American capabilities, and current surveillance systems are widely known. Similarly, it is unlikely that additional U.S. resources directed at a new target would be of sufficient size to create a noticeable increase in total intelligence spending and alert the targeted country. Public discourse regarding intelligence priorities will be enhanced and intelligence activities ultimately improved through the democratic process. Some former senior intelligence officials have come to support public disclosure of total expenditures, including former DCI Turner and Admiral Inman. The current DCI, John Deutch, has stated that disclosing the aggregate total figure for intelligence spending would cause no harm to national security. Arguments in Opposition. Intelligence spending has been kept secret since the early days of the Republic in order to avoid making potentially hostile foreign powers even generally aware of American efforts. Although the international situation has changed dramatically in recent years, publicity surrounding intelligence spending inevitably complicates the conduct of the nation's foreign policy and gives potential adversaries a propaganda boon as well as official notice of U.S. activities and capabilities. Secrecy, they argue, is the prerequisite for intelligence collection and evaluation and spending levels can be a prime indicator of U.S. programs. Such arguments were made by former DCI James Woolsey for the Clinton Administration and by Robert Gates when he served as DCI in the Bush Administration (although at one earlier point he had indicated flexibility on the issue). There are two arguments often made by those opposed to making total figures for intelligence spending public; they are described colloquially as the "slippery slope" and the "rabbit in the snake." The former refers to the difficulty of making public a single figure for intelligence spending without immediately having to set forth an elaborate explanation of what is included and what is excluded. The resulting discussion and cost breakouts would eventually and inevitably result in revealing virtually every aspect of intelligence spending and reveal legitimate areas of secrecy. The "rabbit in the snake" argument suggests that large changes in intelligence spending in a single year would reveal to foreign governments or hostile groups the introduction of new collection systems and allow them to take countermeasures. It is recalled that the advent of satellite systems had produced just such an increase, and information concerning the pace and extent of the U.S. effort would have been highly valuable to Soviet leaders had they had access to budgetary totals. Some opposed to releasing budgetary data also suggest that publishing numbers without extensive explanation could easily mislead the public. Some tactical intelligence programs, for instance, could be moved out of the intelligence budget to justify claims of a major decline in intelligence spending when in fact there had been no net savings to the taxpayers. Maneuvering some tactical programs into non-intelligence accounts in order to present a lower overall intelligence budget figure would further, some would argue, undermine the influence of the DCI (and, potentially, congressional intelligence oversight committees) and hamper efforts to closely coordinate expensive national and tactical programs. Conclusion The efforts of commissions and individuals to encourage restructuring of the U.S. Intelligence Community have led to numerous changes through internal agency direction, presidential directives, and new statutes. The general trend has been towards more thorough oversight both by the executive branch and by congressional committees. The position of the DCI has been considerably strengthened and DCIs have been given greater staff and authority to exert influence on all parts of the Community. They have not, however, been given "line" authority over agencies other than the CIA and the influence of the Defense Department remains pervasive (and, in view of the Clinton Administration's emphasis on intelligence support to military operations, may actually increase). It is unquestionable that oversight is now more thorough and that some questionable practices have ended. Congress and the incumbent president now share a degree of responsibility for covert actions. Judgments on the efficacy of legislative and executive branch responses to recommendations made by commissions and outside experts lie beyond the scope of this paper. Some observers believe that issues raised by the commissions and individuals noted above have largely been dealt with, for better or worse. They suggest that the new issues that have arisen in the aftermath of the Cold War and as a result of technological innovations require new and different organizational responses. The advent of highly sophisticated surveillance and communications technologies, the blurring of distinctions between foreign and domestic challenges represented by terrorists and narcotics traffickers, the spread of U.S. security concerns to long-obscure regions of the world should be competently dealt with and, in any event, are grist for new commissions and new recommendations. ------------------------------ FOOTNOTES /1/Section 102(d)(5), National Security Act of 1947, P.L. 80-253; hereafter cited as National Security Act of 1947. /2/Congressional Research Service. Alfred B. Prados, Intelligence Community Leadership: Development and Debate Since 1947, CRS Report 89-414 F, June 27, 1989, p. 1; hereafter cited as Prados, 89-414 F. /3/Lewis Carroll, Alice's Adventures in Wonderland (New York: Barnes & Noble Books, 1994), p. 125. /4/Section 101(a), National Security Act of 1947. /5/For a comprehensive examination of similar Commissions see: Ronald C. Moe, Reorganizing the Executive Branch in the Twentieth Century: Landmark Commissions, CRS Report 92-293 GOV, March 19, 1992. /6/The report was reprinted as The Hoover Commission Report on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1970). /7/For background on Eberstadt, see Jeffrey M. Dorwart, Eberstadt and Forrestal: A National Security Partnership, 1909-1949 (College Station, TX: Texas A & M University Press, 1991). /8/The Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, Task Force Report on National Security Organization, Appendix G, January 1949; hereafter cited as the Eberstadt Report. /9/Eberstadt Report, p. 3. /10/Eberstadt Report, p. 76. /11/Eberstadt Report, p. 16, paragraph d. /12/Arthur B. Darling, The Central Intelligence Agency: An Instrument of Government to 1950 (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1990), p. 293. This is a reprint of an official CIA history prepared in the early 1950's. /13/Eberstadt Report, p. 16. /14/Darling, introduction to Chapter VIII. /15/Darling, introduction to chapter VIII. /16/Eberstadt Report, p. 76. /17/Darling, pp. 295-298. /18/Darling, p. 297. /19/Darling, p. 289. /20/Eberstadt Report, p. 77; Darling, p. 296. /21/Eberstadt Report, p, 20. /22/Mark M. Lowenthal, U.S. Intelligence: Evolution and Anatomy (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1992), p. 20. /23/"The Central Intelligence Agency and National Organization for Intelligence: A Report to the National Security Council," January 1, 1949. Hereafter cited as the Dulles-Jackson-Correa Report; the declassified report remains highly sanitized. A version was reprinted in William M. Leary, ed., The Central Intelligence Agency: History and Documents (University, AL: University of Alabama Press, 1984). /24/Lowenthal, p. 20; Dulles-Jackson-Correa Report, p. 5, 11. /25/Dulles-Jackson-Correa Report, p. 39. /26/DCI Hillenkoetter disputed these findings by producing evidence that CIA's employee turnover was no different than in other government agencies and that only two percent of CIA personnel were active duty military. Darling, p. 327. /27/Dulles-Jackson-Correa Report, p. 138. /28/Dulles-Jackson-Correa Report, pp. 3-4, 149. /29/Dulles-Jackson-Correa Report, p. 58. Although the DCI served as chairman of the IAC, he was not given budgetary or administrative authority over the other intelligence agencies. /30/Dulles-Jackson-Correa Report, pp. 129, 134. /31/Dulles-Jackson-Correa Report, p. 11. /32/The work of the BNE is described in Donald P. Steury, ed., Sherman Kent and the Board of National Estimates: Collected Essays (Washington: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1994). /33/Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, A Report to the Congress, Intelligence Activities, June 1955, p. 13; hereafter cited as Clark Task Force Report. /34/Clark Task Force Report, pp. 70-71. For a more detailed account of the evolution of the DCI's roles and responsibilities, see Herbert Andrew Boerstling, "The Establishment of a Director of National Intelligence," unpublished Master of Arts Policy Paper, Boston University, August 1995. /35/Clark Task Force Report, p. 71. /36/Clark Task Force Report, p. 74. /37/Clark Task Force Report, p. 74. /38/Clark Task Force Report, pp. 72-76. /39/The Report on the Covert Activities of the Central Intelligence Agency, September 30, 1954, Appendix A, p. 54; hereafter cited as the Doolittle Report. /40/Doolittle Report, pp. 6-7. /41/Doolittle Report, pp. 7-8. /42/Doolittle Report, p. 10. /43/Doolittle Report, p. 14. /44/Doolittle Report, p. 17. /45/John Ranelagh, The Agency: the Rise and Decline of the CIA (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987), p. 278. /46/Peter Grose, Gentleman Spy: The Life of Allen Dulles, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1994), pp. 445-448; also the CIA's Center for the Study of Intelligence Newsletter, Spring 1995, Issue No. 3, pp. 3-4. In writing this book, Grose reported using notes Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. discovered in the Robert Kennedy Papers before they were deposited at the John F. Kennedy Library; p. 598, n. 33 and n. 34. Reportedly, the JFK Presidential Library has unsuccessfully searched the RFK papers for the report. /47/Grose, p. 446; from excerpts of the Schlesinger notes. /48/Grose, p. 446; this observation is also taken from excerpts of the Schlesinger notes. /49/Grose, p. 447. /50/Grose, pp. 447-448; from excerpts of the Schlesinger notes. /51/Grose, p. 532. /52/"Sheep-dipped" is a colloquial intelligence term used for administrative arrangements designed to insure that the origin of a person or object is non-traceable. /53/The report was published as Operation Zapata: The "Ultrasensitive" Report and Testimony of the Board of Inquiry on the Bay of Pigs (Frederick, MD: University publications of America, Inc., 1981), p. 40; hereafter cited as the Taylor Report. /54/Taylor Report, p. 43. /55/Taylor Report, p. 38. /56/Taylor Report, p. 40. /57/Taylor Report, p. 39. /58/Taylor Report, pp. 44-53. /59/Ranelagh, p. 380. /60/Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr., "Paramilitary Case Study - Bay of Pigs," Naval War College Review, (November-December 1972). By the same author, see The U.S. Intelligence Community: Foreign Policy and Domestic Activities (New York: Hill and Wang, 1973). /61/Evan Thomas, The Very Best Men, Four Who Dared: The Early Years of the CIA, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995), p. 268. Thomas was given special permission to review the report for use in his book even though it remains classified. /62/Memorandum for the Director of Central Intelligence, January 16, 1962; quoted in Prados, 89-414F, p. 45. /63/A Review of the Intelligence Community, March 10, 1971, p. 1; hereafter cited as the Schlesinger Report. /64/Schlesinger Report, pp. 8-9. /65/Schlesinger Report, p. 9. /66/Schlesinger Report, p. 13. /67/Schlesinger Report, pp. 25-33. /68/U.S. Congress, Senate, 94th Congress, 2nd session, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities Intelligence, Final Report, 1976, Book I, p. 66; hereafter cited as the Church Committee Report. /69/"Reorganization of the U.S. Intelligence Community," Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, November 4, 1971, pp. 1467-1491, 1482. /70/Prados, 89-414F, p. 46. /71/U.S., Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy, Report, June 1975, p. 92. /72/Commission on Organization of the Government, p. 98 /73/Commission on Organization of the Government, pp. 98-99. /74/Commission on Organization of the Government, pp. 100-101. /75/Commission on Organization of the Government, p. 101. /76/Report to the President by the Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States, June 1975. /77/The definitive account of the Church Committee's work is Loch K. Johnson, A Season of Inquiry: Congress and Intelligence, 2nd. ed. (Chicago: Dorsey Press, 1988). /78/U.S. Congress, Senate, 94th Congress, 2nd session, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with respect to Intelligence Activities, Foreign and Military Intelligence, Final Report, Book I, S. Rept. 94-755, April 26, 1976; hereafter cited as the Church Committee Report. /79/Church Committee Report, pp. 434-435. /80/Church Committee Report, p. 435. /81/U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, 94th Congress, 2nd session, Select Committee on Intelligence, Recommendations of the Final Report of the House Select Committee on Intelligence, H. Rept. 94-833, February 11, 1976. /82/U.S. Congress, Senate, 94th Congress, 2nd session, Committee on Government Operations, Oversight of U.S. Government Intelligence\ Functions, Hearings, Jan. 21-Feb. 6, 1976, pp. 203-204. /83/In his book Secrets, Spies, and Scholars (Washington: Acropolis Books, 1976). /84/The effort to pass intelligence charter legislation is described in John M. Oseth, Regulating U.S. Intelligence Operations: A Study in Definition of the National Interest (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1985); also, Frank J. Smist, Jr., Congress Oversees the United States Intelligence Community, Second Edition, 1947-1994 (Knoxville, TN: University of Tennessee Press, 1994). /85/Executive Order 11905, February 18, 1976, United States Foreign Intelligence Activities, as summarized in Alfred B. Prados, Intelligence Reform: Recent History and Proposals, CRS Report 88-562 F, August 18, 1988, p. 18; hereafter cited as Prados, 88-562 F. /86/Executive Order 12036, January 24, 1978, United States Intelligence Activities; hereafter cited as Executive Order 12036. /87/Lowenthal, p. 107. /88/Bruce W. Watson, Susan M. Watson, and Gerald W. Hopple, United States Intelligence: An Encyclopedia (New York: Garland Publishing, 1990), p. 231. /89/Section 1.5(a), Executive Order 12333, December 4, 1981, United States Intelligence Activities. /90/Executive Order 12333, Section 1.5 (d,e,h). /91/Executive Order 12333, Section 1.5(k,h). /92/Lowenthal, p. 107. /93/See Oseth, Regulating U.S. Intelligence Operations, especially p. 155. /94/In his book Secrecy and Democracy: The CIA in Transition (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1985). /95/Secrecy and Democracy, p. 273. /96/U.S., President's Special Review Board, Report, 1987, pp. V-5--V-6. /97/U.S. Congress, 100th Congress, 1st session, Senate Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition and U.S. House of Representatives Select Committee to Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with Iran, Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair with Supplemental, Minority, and Additional Views, S.Rept. 100-216/H. Rept. 100-433, November 17, 1987, pp. 423-427; hereafter cited as the Iran-Contra Report. /98/Iran-Contra Report, pp. 583-586. /99/Reporting of covert actions was most recently addressed in Title VI of the Intelligence Authorization Act for FY1991 (P.L. 102-88) which incorporated changes that reflected judgments of previous weaknesses revealed in the Iran-Contra Affair. Some in Congress had intended to include a provision requiring that Congress be provided prior notice of covert actions (or, in emergencies, within 48 hours of initiation), but the Bush Administration expressed strong opposition and asserted a Constitutional right for the President to undertake covert actions when necessary. The Conference Committee that met on the FY1991 bill noted that neither intelligence committee had ever accepted that the Constitution allowed the President to exercise such authority, but added: "The conferees recognize that this is a question that neither they nor the Congress itself can resolve. Congress cannot diminish by statute powers that are granted by the Constitution. Nor can either the legislative or executive branch authoritatively interpret the Constitution, which is the exclusive province of the judicial branch." U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, 103rd Congress, 1st session, Committee of Conference, Intelligence Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1991, H. Rept. 102-166, July 25, 1991, p. 28. /100/The original Senate version of the intelligence authorization act for FY1995 (S. 2082, 103d Congress) contained provisions requiring Presidential nomination and Senate confirmation of CIA's general counsel, but support from House conferees was not forthcoming. /101/Testimony reprinted in U.S. Congress, Senate, 102nd Congress, 1st session, Select Committee on Intelligence, Review of Intelligence Organization, Hearing, S. Hrg. 102-91, March 21, 1991, p. 23. /102/See Ransom's The Intelligence Establishment (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1970), pp. 246-247. /103/U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, 102d Congress, 2d session, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, H.R. 4165, National Security Act of 1992, Hearings, Part I, March 4, and 11, 1992, especially pp. 38-39, 191-192. /104/See the comments contained in a February 20, 1992 letter from the American Civil Liberties Union, reprinted in U.S. Congress, 102d Congress, 2nd session, Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. Senate, and Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, House of Representatives, S. 2198 and S. 421 to Reorganize the United States Intelligence Community, Joint Hearing, S. Hrg 102-1052, April 1, 1992, pp. 96-97. /105/For additional background, see Richard A. Best, Jr. and Elizabeth B. Bazan, Intelligence Spending: Should Total Amounts Be Made Public?, CRS Report 94-261F, March 22, 1994. /106/U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, 103rd Congress, 2nd session, Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on the Department of Defense, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1995, Hearings, Part 3, 1994, pp. 717, 784.
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