Islam in the Russian Federation

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Key Points

* The Moslem component of the Russian Federation has a higher birth rate than the Slavic component. In a few decades, Russia could be a much more Moslem country.

* This will have a profound effect on Russian society, politics and foreign policy, which could move in a more Moslem direction.

* Currently the Moslem population is not highly politicised. There is no Moslem lobby in Russian politics. The influence of militant Islam outside the Northern Caucasus is limited, although it does exist.

* If Russian elites attempt to block the emergence of Moslem elites over the next few decades, then tensions could emerge between Slavs and Moslems.

* Slav chauvinism is already in evidence.
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In Russia there are 20 million Moslems, and therefore our country is also, to a certain degree, part of the Islamic world.


THE NUMBERS

In the last USSR census of 1989, Moslems in the Russian Federation were reckoned to be 12 million, or 8 per cent of the Russian Federation population. The 2002 Russian Federation census reveals that the Moslem component of the Russian Federation is 14.5 million (out of a total population of 144 million). However this is claimed in some quarters to be an underestimate. Ravil Gaynutdin, head of the Council of Muftis of Russia, announced in August 2005 that Russia’s population contains 23 million ethnic Moslems. The Moslem population has been boosted by the influx of immigrants from Moslem parts of the former Soviet Union. An estimated 3-4 million Moslems are migrants from former Soviet regions, including 2 million Azeris, 1 million Kazakhs, and several hundred thousand Uzbeks, Tajiks and Kyrgyz. Moreover, the growth rate of the Moslem population is faster than that of the Slavic population of the Russian Federation. Although the total Russian population dropped by 400,000 in the first half of 2005, it increased in 15 regions, such as the Moslem republics of Chechnya, Dagestan and Ingushetia. The birth rate is 1.8 children per woman in Dagestan, versus 1.3 for Russia as a whole. Male life expectancy is 68 in Dagestan, versus 58 for Russia overall.

Russia had about 300 mosques in 1991 and now there are at least 8,000 (more than in Egypt, which has a population of 75 million), about half of which were built with money from abroad, especially from Turkey, Iran and Saudi Arabia. There were no Islamic religious schools in 1991 and today there are between 50 and 60, teaching as many as 50,000 students. There are 3098 registered Moslem communities. The number of Russians going on the hajj each year has increased from 40 in 1991 to 13,500 in 2005.

At the same time, the Slavic component of the Russian Federation population is declining. This has led some analysts to argue that Russia could have a Moslem majority later in the 21st century. Paul Goble, previously an advisor on Soviet nationality problems and Baltic affairs to former US Secretary of State James Baker, stated in February 2006 that:

Within most of our lifetimes the Russian Federation, assuming it stays within current borders, will be a Moslem country. That is it will have a Moslem majority and even before that the growing number of people of Moslem background in Russia will have a profound impact on Russian foreign policy. The assumption in Western Europe or the United States that Moscow is part of the European concert of powers is no longer valid. ... The Moslem growth rate, since 1989, is between 40 and 50 percent,
depending on ethnic groups. Most of that is in the Caucasus or from immigration from Central Asia or Azerbaijan.9

A Russian expert on Islam, Aleksei Malashenko, stated in 2005 that he does not expect Russia to become “a Moslem society in several years, although maybe in half a century we’ll see something surprising”.10

There are several signs of the potential of Islam to play a more important role in Russia:

- In September 2005, Ravil Gaynutdin spoke of the possibility that Russia might at some point in the future reintroduce the post of a vice-president, who would be a representative of the Moslem community.11 That such a development could be envisaged is indicative of the how the ethno-religious demographic balance could shift over the next few decades.

- In December 2005, in a further sign of increased Moslem assertiveness, the chairman of the Spiritual Administration of Moslems of the Asian Part of Russia, Nafigull Ashirov, called for Christian symbols to be removed from the Russian Federation coat of arms.12

- An Islamic Heritage Society was formed in March 2005.13 This society is seen by its founders as a mediator between the Islamic community in Russia and the political establishment.

- In 2005 the Russian Federation became an observer at the Organisation of the Islamic Conference, the principal international organisation of Moslem states.

- In October 1997 leading Moslem clergymen including Gabdulla Khazrat Galiulla, the chairman of the Spiritual Board of Moslems of Tatarstan, and Sheikh Ravil Gaynutdin, the chairman of the Council of Russian Muftis met the then Minister for Nationalities Vyacheslav Mikhailov and Deputy Prime Minister Ramazan Abdulatipov, to discuss the possibility of forming special Moslem regiments in the Russian army.14

The Islamic population in the Russian Federation is concentrated into two main areas:

**The Volga-Urals region**, i.e. Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Udmurtia, Chuvashia, Mari-El, and pockets in Ulyanovsk, Samara, Astrakhan, Perm, Nizhniy Novgorod, Yekaterinburg oblasts.

The other Moslem area is **the Northern Caucasus** where the total number of compactly settled (but ethnically fragmented) Moslems is about 4.5 million.15

Each of these two regions is divided by internal ethnic differences, and preoccupied with their own problems, including relations with the central government. The large majority of Russian Moslems are Sunnis. Azeri immigrants, part of the Lezgins and Dargins of Dagestan are Shias. Of the four legal schools (mazhabs), two are widespread in Russia - Khanafi and Shafi. Khanafi is the most liberal of the four, and it is prevalent among Tatars, Bashkirs, the majority of North Caucasian groups and Central Asian diasporas. The more conservative Shafi mazhab prevails among Dagestanis (except Nogay), Chechens and Ingush. Among Chechens and Ingush
there are followers of non-temple Islam, belonging to the Nakshbandiya and Kadiriya sects.

According to unofficial statistics, there are up to 1,500,000 Moslems (and six mosques) in Moscow, giving the Russian capital the largest concentration of Moslems in Europe, and about 250,000 in St. Petersburg and the region.\textsuperscript{16} It is claimed that even in Karelia, the Moslem population comprises 3 per cent of the total population of that republic.\textsuperscript{17}

**MOSLEM ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURES**

However, there has never been any single all-Russian Moslem community or umma. Various Islamic political movements were formed in the 1990s in Russia, such as Refak, Nur and the Party of Islamic Revival, but they failed to make a significant impact.\textsuperscript{18} There is currently no “Moslem vote” in the Russian Federation. The Islamic Party of Russia (IPR) was formed in 2001, and led by Dagestani banker Magomed Radzhabov. He claimed a membership of 3.5 million. However explicitly religious parties were banned, and the IPR was effectively replaced by two movements, True Patriots of Russia, and Justice and Development of Russia. They formed a bloc in the 2003 Duma election and gained about 0.25 per cent of the total vote.\textsuperscript{19} However, several Moslem organisations exist. There are Spiritual Moslem Boards in most regions of Russia. Since the mid-1990s at least five centres have been competing to become central institutions, representative of all Moslems of Russia:

- the Central Spiritual Board of the Moslems of Russia and the European States of CIS, head – mufti Talgat Tadzhuddin;
- the Council of Muftis, headed by mufti Ravil Gaynutdin; muftis of many regions are members of the council;\textsuperscript{20}
- the Supreme Coordinating Centre of the Moslems of Russia, its chairman Abdul Wahed Niyazov calls himself supreme mufti of Russia;
- the Islamic Cultural Centre in Moscow, director Abdul Wahed Niyazov;
- the Union of the Moslems of Russia, which was initially headed by Nadirshah Khachilaev.

In addition there is the Coordinating Centre of the Moslems of the Northern Caucasus, headed by Mufti Ismail Berdiev.

The two principal organisations are the Central Spiritual Board of the Moslems of Russia and the European States of CIS, and the Council of Muftis.\textsuperscript{21} In April 1996, the heads of a number of spiritual boards created the Council of Russian Muftis. This is probably the most important of the Moslem organisations in Russia. The principal aims of the Council are:

1. to consolidate the Moslem religious organizations of the Russian Federation with the goal of compatibly identifying the most important problems concerning all Russian Moslems together;
2. to coordinate and assist in the operation of each other’s organization;
3. to define positions in relations with the organs of the central and local government, the organizations representing different religions, and international foreign organizations;
4. to create necessary conditions for the observance of the rights and the protection of the interests of Russian Moslems.
In 2003 there was much discussion about creating a single administrative structure for Moslems in Russia, a so-called Higher Moslem Council, that would be analogous to the Moscow Patriarchate in the Russian Orthodox Church. The emergence of a single structure is favoured by the Kremlin, although it recognises that such a process cannot be imposed by the state. Talgat Tadzhuddin opposes the formation of a Higher Moslem Council if it includes the Council of Muftis. Tadzhuddin opposes Gaynutdin, claiming that the Council of Muftis supports foreign Wahhabite organisations. This is denied by Gaynutdin. He denies support for extremist organisations, and claims that the term Wahhabite is often misunderstood and wrongly applied to Moslems in the Northern Caucasus fighting the pro-Moscow Chechen leadership. Tadzhuddin stated that Gaynutdin’s comments were deliberately aimed at bringing about the legalisation in Russia of the extremist teachings of Wahhabism. Tadzhuddin’s opposition to Gaynutdin on this issue is shared by the mufti Ismail Berdiev.

The Kremlin had sought a constructive relationship with both Tadzhuddin and Gaynutdin. However, Tadzhuddin fell out of favour with the Russian leadership when he called in 2003 for a jihad against the USA in response to the US invasion of Iraq. Ravil Gaynutdin opposed this move by Tadzhuddin. Tadzhuddin’s response to the US attack on Iraq resulted in an investigation by the General Procuracy. Since then, the Kremlin decided to regard Gaynutdin as its favoured Moslem leader. Gaynutdin, in contrast to Tadzhuddin, was appointed to the Public Chamber.

Gaynutdin has a cooperative relationship with the Putin leadership, and supports its policy towards Chechnya. In February 2003 he stated:

The position of Islamic figures often turns out for foreign VIP-guests to be more important than the opinions of representatives of the state authorities. We inform them that Moslems have equal rights along with other religions, that the state gives us the opportunity to develop freely. In Chechnya also the authorities do not hinder the spreading of Islam, the opening of new mosques, the publishing of religious literature. Therefore those who oppose the federal authorities in this republic do not have the moral right to justify themselves by allegedly defending Islam, and the rights of Moslems, so that they are not damaged. Politicians who consider that a clash of two civilisation, two cultures and religions, namely Islam and Christianity, is taking place in Chechnya are mistaken. Those who take up arms have their own selfish goals. The people who follow them are simply being led into a delusion.

He views the relationship with the Russian state as being harmonious. He states that the growth of Islamic institutions in post-Soviet Russia is largely “thanks to the principally new attitude of the Russian state to Islam, forming partnership relations between the organs of state power and religious organisations.” He views Moslems in Russia as accepting the realities of modern secular Russian society. In November 2003 he commented:

In Russia there has in general formed a perfectly unique type of Moslem. He finds himself under the strong influence of Russian and European culture, and lives in a secular society. Global processes, the development of democracy, the emergence of market relations, the activity of the mass media present the Moslem with a multitude of new problems. Many need to change their professions, and sometimes places of residence, and move
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to districts which in the main are inhabited by people of other cultures and religions.28

Elsewhere he speaks of Islam being able to correspond to the demands of the contemporary world, rather than contradict it.29 In other words, Gaynutdin does not seek to challenge violently the existing order in Russia, but on the contrary accepts it. He favours cooperation with the Russian Orthodox Church, Buddhists and the Jewish religious community in Russia.30

PERCEPTIONS OF ISLAM IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

Could a serious Islamist-jihadist threat emerge in the Russian Federation from areas outside the Northern Caucasus? Whilst a serious terrorist threat has emerged in the Northern Caucasus since 1994, the Moslem communities in the Volga-Urals region have so far shown little inclination to engage in acts of terrorism or other forms of violence. Neither has any political movement emerged with a strong Islamic agenda. Does Russia face the same problems that some West European nations such as Britain, France and the Netherlands face, namely an Islamic community that contains a large number of disaffected elements, particularly among the young, who may be tempted to engage in violence? It has been argued that Russia, in contrast to these former colonial powers has always had a large Moslem population (according to the 1897 census of the Russian Empire, among the total population of 125.6 million there were over 13 million Moslems, or nearly 11 percent. In 1917, there were 30,000 mosques in the Russian Empire), and that Moslems and Orthodox Slavs have peacefully co-existed for centuries. Moslem soldiers in the Imperial armed forces were able to practise their faith, and there was no significant Islamic opposition to Tsardom. In day to day life in the Russian Empire, Moslems were not seen as alien. This contrasts with Britain, France and other West European states, where Moslem communities have developed largely as a result of post-1945 immigration from former colonies, and have often been perceived as alien by large elements of the host population.

The growth of Islam in the Russian Federation in the post-Soviet period has not so far been accompanied by a high degree of politicisation. No significant political movements have emerged. The rebirth of Islam has been largely confined to the religious and cultural spheres, rather than to the political sphere. For the majority of Moslems in the Russian Federation, their political orientation is not linked to their faith. The situation is different in the Northern Caucasus, but Islamic movements there are primarily concerned with North Caucasus issues rather than all-Russian ones.

Many analysts consider that Islam in Tatarstan constitutes a model of “Euro-Islam”, namely a moderate non-political force that poses no threat to the constitutional order in Russia. This is similar to the view of Islam advocated by Ravil Gaynutdin. Euro-Islam is a concept developed by Rafael Khakimov, Director of the Institute of History of the Tatarstan Academy of Sciences and an adviser to the President of Tatarstan, Mintimer Shaymiyev.31 It seeks to ensure that Islam conforms to the modern world, accepts political and religious pluralism and eschews violent forms of struggle. However, although Islam in the Volga-Urals region is in the main moderate, and does not pose a threat to the system, there is concern that the state has not done enough to develop a dialogue with Islam in order to ensure that any possible future politicisation will not develop in a militant direction. The absence of a significant “within system” (systemny) Islamic political
movement with which the state can develop a dialogue means that the state has no levers for influencing radical Islam, should it emerge, other than administrative and coercive.

Vladimir Putin’s statement at the opening of the newly elected Chechen parliament in December 2005, that the “Russian Federation always was, and is the most consistent, loyal and firm defender of Islam,” is an indication of the leadership’s attempt to develop a dialogue with the Islamic community within Russia. The creation of the Russian Islamic Heritage organisation can also be seen as part of the leadership’s attempt to establish such a dialogue, as can the decision to become an observer at the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) in 2005.

Dialogue between the state and the Moslem community is also seen by the Russian Moslem leadership as playing an essential role in preventing the subversion of Russian Islamic educational institutions by extremist imams. Ravil Gaynutdin has expressed concern over the possibility of foreign imams spreading extremist ideas amongst the Islamic community in Russia. In an interview in February 2003 he noted that in the early 1990s, when there were few Russian imams, there was an influx of foreign imams who propagated extremist ideas, and argued that Russian imams lacked a knowledge of true Islam. Gaynutdin argued that this means that Russian Islamic educational institutions now face the task of ensuring that Russian Moslems do not fall under the influence of extreme variants of Islam. The institutions therefore insist that all imams study both theology and various secular disciplines. He also states that the Council of Muftis recommends that young Russian imams study first in Russian Islamic educational institutions before travelling abroad to study in Islamic schools in Moslem states, so that they learn that Russia is a multi-confessional society. Gaynutdin therefore argues that it is in the interests of the Russian state to support Islamic educational institutions to ensure that Russia’s Moslem clergy and laity do not fall under the influence of Islamist ideologies imported from abroad. In 2005 concern was expressed by the adviser to the Russian President, Aslanbek Aslakhanov, who criticised the official Moslem clergy for inadequately opposing terrorism. He argued that the clergy should do more to help persons in the Northern Caucasus from falling under the influence of extremist ideologies.

FEAR OF AN ORANGE-GREEN REVOLUTION

Although most Russian analysts are of the opinion that the influence of extremist Islam outside parts of the Northern Caucasus is limited, some are concerned about what they consider to be the revolutionary potential of Islam in the Russian Federation. Mikhail Delyagin, for example, believes that Russia could face an “orange-green” revolution. He argues that the ideological vacuum caused by the collapse of communism in the Soviet Union in 1991 has led to the emergence of Islam in the Russian Federation as a response to the social and economic problems caused by the imposition of liberal capitalism in Russia. Delyagin believes that Russian society could split into two communities – Russian and Moslem, and the weakness of the state and of the current Russian elite is enabling radical Moslem elements to increase their influence. He warns that this process is likely to be extremely violent. Following the Beslan terrorist incident in 2004, one analyst called for very tough measures, arguing that Russia was not facing terrorism but an attempt to destroy the state. He noted that a non-fascist system could not endure such a challenge; this would appear to be a call for highly authoritarian measures. Further terrorist outrages could result in such developments, and lead...
to the confrontation feared by Delyagin, especially as the Moslem component of the Russian Federation population increases.

It is true that there have been acts of violence committed by Moslem groups in the Volga region. Five members of the illegal group Islamic Jamaat were sentenced to five- and six-year prison sentences by the Supreme Court of Tatarstan, in August 2006. The defendants were found guilty of participation in an illegal armed group, illegal handling of arms and terrorism. The defendants were arrested in 2004 along with 23 other members of the group, which had links to Chechen warlords. The Tatarstan Procuracy claimed that the Islamic Jamaat members were plotting to set up rebel camps in Tatarstan and neighbouring republics. So far, there has been little militant activity outside of the Northern Caucasus, but the case of Islamic Jamaat does indicate the potential for terrorism. Algis Prazauskas estimated that in autumn 2004 that the system of Jamaats was capable of mobilizing more than 10,000 extremist combatants, and of this number no less than 4000 come from the regions around the Volga and from Central Russia. He noted that radical Jamaats exist in practically all larger cities of the Russian Federation and in Russian as well as Moslem regions of the Russian Federation.37

There is concern that Islamist terrorism in Russia is probably inspired by foreign jihadist elements. This has led to a desire by the Russian Moslem leadership to develop a moderate Islamic education within the Russian Federation. In 1996 the Moscow Islamic University was established.38 The rector is Marat Murtazin, who is the deputy chairman of the Council of Muftis. In 2005 it had 14 teachers and 70 students. Theology is the sole subject taught at the university. The following courses are taught in the theology faculty: the Koran, Islamic Law, Arabic, Russian language and culture, Russian history, world history, State-Religious relations. The Council of Muftis desires a cooperative relationship with the Russian state in the development of Islamic education in the Russian Federation. The Council created in 2005 a special council on Islamic education, which deals with issues relating to cooperation between the state and Islamic organisations. Both the state and the Council of Muftis have a clear interest in promoting moderate Islamic education.

The issue of education has given rise to concern over what Murtazin and other Moslem leaders term Russian Orthodox propaganda in Russian state schools. Murtazin objects to attempts to make the subject “Foundations of Orthodox Culture” a compulsory subject, and to having Orthodox clergy teach this subject. Murtazin comments that in West European schools, “Christian children remain in the class room, and Moslem children can go to the mosque or home. But indeed this concerns Moslem-immigrants! In Russia Moslems are not immigrants, we have lived here during the course of the entire history of the country. Russian Moslems do not intend to consider themselves ‘second class’. This would be an insult of our religious feelings.”39 In March 2006 the Council of Muftis stated that it opposed the teaching of Foundations of Orthodox Culture in state schools, and in August 2006, the deputy chairman of the Council of Muftis, Damir Gizatullin, stated:

The position of the Council of Muftis on this issue remains unchanged. We believe that that all religions should be taught and they should be taught as an elective subject, there shouldn't be a separate subject Foundations of Orthodox Culture or Foundations of Islamic Culture. They should be in one book.40

In Tatarstan, the republic’s leadership opposes the notion of the Islamic University in Tatarstan having a religious rather than secular status. Adviser to the Tatarstan President Rafael Khakimov urges that secular subjects be taught at the university,
and opposes the idea of visiting teachers from Saudi Arabia, stating that he prefers visiting scholars from more moderate Moslem states such as Jordan, Malaysia and Egypt.41

There is certainly a belief that extremist organisations have used Islamic educational organisations as a means of waging jihad in the Russian Federation. 42 In February 2003, the Russian Supreme Court listed 15 organisations as terrorist and banned them from operating in the Russian Federation.43 In October 2006 first deputy interior minister Aleksandr Chekalin said that about 80 international extremist groups promoting radical Islam were operating in Russia. He said that the Interior Ministry has set up a database of extremist groups and their members.44

**IDEOLOGICAL DISPUTES WITHIN RUSSIAN ISLAM**

In addition to the Tadzhuddin-Gaynutdin power struggle, there are various ideological disputes in the Russian Islamic community.45 Rafael Khakimov seeks to develop a modernised, Europeanised Islam, arguing that Russian Islam cannot orient itself towards Islamic countries such as Iran, Pakistan, Sudan or Saudi Arabia. The first deputy mufti of Tatarstan, Vallil Yakupov, opposes Khakimov’s attempts to modernise Islam, as he fears that such attempts to reinterpret Islam will create an opportunity for extremists.

There are disputes between those who believe in proselyteisation to non-Moslems in the Russian Federation, and those such as Tatarstan Mufti Gusman Itskhakov, who says the Russians should remain Orthodox and the Tatars Moslems. There is also a dispute between traditionalists such as Vallil Yakupov and younger more radical Moslems who desire change on a whole range of issues.

There is also a debate about the relationship between Islam and the Russian state. Many take the view favoured by Rafael Khakimov and Ravil Gaynutdin, namely that Islam should coexist peacefully with other religions in a secular political system. Geydar Dzhemal, who is chairman of the Russian Islamic Committee takes a more radical view. He sees Islam as a political project, aiming at the establishment of a global civilisation.46 He states that Jewry has “bought” what he regards as the world elite, which should be opposed by what he terms a “Russo-Islamic opposition”. He contends that “today Islam is a huge civilizational base, on which the contemporary generation of the counter-elite can rely, never losing sight of our country”.47 He also says that Russia, Europe, and the Islamic world should unite against the USA.48

**THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION AND THE OIC**

The Russian Federation’s decision to seek membership of the OIC in 2003 can be regarded as recognition by the Putin leadership of the potential lobbying power that the Russian Moslem community might possess in the future.49 It is a concession to them. It could also serve as a means of softening any criticism that might arise from Moslem states over Russian policy in Chechnya, and may help Russia to build closer ties with Moslem powers, and thereby help improve the dialogue between the Kremlin and the Russian Moslem community. Ramazan Abdulatipov saw Russia’s involvement in the OIC as a means of avoiding misunderstanding and conflicts with the Islamic world. He argued that if Russia had obtained observer status earlier, then it might not have suffered from Islamist terrorism. He argued that it unnatural for Russia to fear Islam, as Islam existed in Russia before Christianity
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Vladimir Putin attended the OIC summit in Malaysia in August 2003 and stated that Russia would like to join the OIC. This was supported both by the Council of Muftis and the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC), who saw membership of the OIC as a means of facilitating the ROC’s efforts to defend the position of Orthodox Christians in Moslem countries. In 2004 the dialogue developed between Russia and the OIC. In February 2004, then foreign minister Igor Ivanov addressed OIC ambassadors in Moscow. It was announced then that an Islamic University would be set up in the Russian Federation. In June 2004, foreign minister Sergey Lavrov attended the OIC summit in Istanbul. Russia acquired OIC observer status at the Thirty-second Session of the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers held in Sana’a, Yemen, in June 2005. In December Kamil Iskhakov, presidential envoy in the Far Eastern Federal District, headed the Russian delegation at the third extraordinary OIC summit in Mecca. This was the first time that a representative of Russia took part in a OIC summit.

If Russia were to become a full member of the OIC (which would not be improbable if her population were to become predominantly Moslem), then complications could ensue in Russo-Israeli relations. In September 2003, the director of the Academy of Sciences’ institute of African and Arab studies, Aleksey Vasilyev, said Russia’s membership in the OIC could prompt it to assume a pro-Palestinian position in the Middle East conflict. He noted that “the charter of this organization [the OIC] reads that Jedda is a provisional place for housing its governing bodies, while in future, they should be relocated to Jerusalem, which the OIC considers to be the capital of the Palestinian state”.

The Russian leadership is sensitive over being perceived as anti-Islamic power. This is because of the desire to avoid antagonising the Moslem community in Russia, and thereby creating the Russo-Moslem conflict feared by Mikhail Delyagin. Petr Krimskiy in Rossiyskiye Vesti in June 2005 expressed concern about the attempt in the mass media of some Islamic countries to portray Russia as a state hostile to Islam because of its policy in Chechnya. He called for closer dialogue with Saudi Arabia as one of the means of countering this tendency. Ravil Gaynutdin has accused the West of cultural aggression against the Moslem world. This accusation may be seen as an attempt to persuade the Moslem world that it faces a threat from the West, rather than from Russia. It should be noted that some advocates of the Eurasianist geopolitical school in Russia see cooperation with Islam both within and outside Russia as an important part of Eurasianist ideology. Tadzhuddin is part of Aleksandr Dugin’s Eurasianist movement, and Abdul Wahed Niyazov and Nafigull Ashirov lead the Eurasian political party.

OUTLOOK

If the Moslem proportion of the Russian Federation population increases, and comes to constitute more than 20 per cent, then it is likely that there will be a major political shift in the country. From 1992-2002, out of the 154 ministers appointed by Presidents Boris Yeltsin and Vladimir Putin, only three were Moslem. In the 1999-2003 Duma, there were only 33 Moslem deputies out of a total of 450.
In the long term, if current demographic trends in the Russian Federation continue, it will be impossible to keep Moslem political representation at its current low level.

The Russian Slav component of the population will eventually no longer be large enough to maintain its current level of domination of the political leadership. The Russian leadership might do well to ponder the comments of the Swedish democracy minister Jens Orback, who said in July 2006 that “we must be open and tolerant towards Islam and Moslems because when we become a minority, they will be so towards us”.\(^5\) (In April 2006 the Swedish Moslem Association demanded separate laws for Moslems in Sweden.\(^5\) The Moslem community in Sweden constitutes about 5 per cent of the population.) As noted above, there is currently no significant Moslem lobby in Russian politics. This could change as the proportion of Moslems in the population grows, and particularly if Moslems come to believe that current Russian elites are preventing them from assuming leadership positions. More explicitly Moslem parties or groupings could emerge and perhaps emulate the Swedish Moslem Association in calling for separate laws for Moslems in Russia. Such groupings would not necessarily be militantly opposed to the constitutional order in the Russian Federation, but would result in Russia becoming a more Moslem country in its outlook (similar perhaps to Turkey). The emergence of such parties, or the transformation of existing parties is likely irrespective of whether Russian elites seek to prevent the Moslems occupying leading positions in the political system. However it is unlikely that even a more Moslem leadership would seek to introduce Shariah law, as this would conflict too much with the existing legal system. Such problems did arise when Aslan Maskhadov attempted to introduce Shariah in Chechnya in the late 1990s.

If Russia does become more Moslem in its outlook, then its foreign policy will change accordingly. Russia has been sympathetic towards many aspects of the USA’s anti-terrorist policy since September 2001, and Vladimir Putin pointed out long before 2001 that Russia was engaged in a struggle to defend Europe against militant Islam.\(^5\) The Euro-Atlanticist aspect of Russian foreign policy is likely to disappear if a more Moslem leadership emerges in Russia. Indeed such a Russia may be more willing to confront what it might perceive as a US policy of hostility towards the Islamic world.

Attempts to block any Moslem emergence could also result in the development of more militant movements, particularly among the young. Although there are militant groups in Tatarstan,\(^6\) their impact is currently minimal. There has been no “7/7”, and Moslem youth in the Volga-Urals region is currently unlikely to imitate the behaviour of French Moslem youth in October-November 2005, when fierce riots broke out in several French towns. Furthermore, the response to Talgat Tadzhuddin’s call for a jihad against the USA over Iraq in 2003 met with a muted response. This quiescence could change if Moslem aspirations are blocked. Issues such as the teaching of the Fundamentals of Orthodox Culture in schools could become much more contentious.

The current leaderships of Tatarstan and Bashkortostan aim at a cooperative relationship with the Kremlin. Population trends could result in more actively Moslem leaderships emerging in these and other republics. As Tatarstan and Bashkortostan are major oil producing regions, then leaderships that are more hostile to the federal centre or place greater demands on it for economic or political autonomy could pose a serious threat to the cohesion of the federation.

The increase in size of the Moslem population is likely to prove uncomfortable for the rest of the Russian population. Although many Russian observers have been at pains to point out that Russia is not an anti-Islamic power, and that Orthodoxy and
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Islam, Slavs and non-Slavs lived peacefully together during both the Tsarist and Soviet periods, it can also be argued that as an Orthodox Christian power, Tsarist Russia waged wars against Moslem peoples in Central Asia and the Caucasus. In addition there is a long-standing Russian hostility to 'blacks' (*chornyje lyudy*, i.e. non-ethnic Russians). Such hostility could grow if Russians do eventually face the prospect of becoming a minority in their own country. In such a scenario, militant Russian nationalism could become a more influential political force, perhaps akin to the ideology of the Black Hundreds and the Russian National Unity movement. A more militantly nationalist leadership could emerge as an attempt to counter any possible Islamisation of Russian society.

There is speculation that attacks on peoples of Caucasian nationality in Russian towns by Russian skinheads may already be sanctioned by elements within the Russian power structures, and the clampdown on Georgian businesses in Moscow in the wake of the crisis in Russo-Georgian relations in autumn 2006 does reveal the capacity of the Russian state to act against “undesirable” alien elements. The disturbances in Kondopoga in Karelia in September 2006 between Chechens and Russians also indicate the potential for ethnic conflict in Russia. The emergence of a militant nationalist leadership to protect the Russian ethnos in response to a deteriorating demographic position is far from improbable.61

In summary, it would seem that there are three main scenarios for the development of Moslem-Russian relations within the Russian Federation as the Moslem component of the Russian population grows.

1. Russia therefore becomes more Moslem, with Moslems occupying a greater proportion of the political leadership. A relatively harmonious synthesis is formed with the Slavic component of the population, along the lines advocated by some Eurasianist geopolitical theorists.

2. Russian elites hinder the full emergence of Moslem elites, and the Moslem elements of the population become more restive.

3. Russian elites and society fear the emergence of an “Islamic threat” from *chornyje lyudy*, supported by outside Islamic powers. This leads to the emergence of a more overtly Russian nationalist regime.

Endnotes

3 Aleksandra Samarina, ‘Every tenth Russian is a Moslem,’ *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 11 November 2003.
5 [http://www.danielpipes.org/blog/495](http://www.danielpipes.org/blog/495); [http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,3-1721508,00.html](http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,3-1721508,00.html)
7 See footnote 5.
9
Demographic Situation in Russia, CES Studies no.24 July 2006
http://www.gatago.com/misc/survivalism/2834861.html A shift in the ethno-religious demographic balance is therefore not a phenomenon which is confined to Russia alone. In the opinion of some analysts, several other European countries are also facing the increasing Islamisation of their populations. See for example Niall Ferguson 'Eurabia' Hoover Digest, 3, Summer 2004. http://www.hooverdigest.org/043/ferguson2.html
11 Tatar-Inform news agency, Kazan, in Russian 1437 gmt 28 September 2005; BBC Mon FS1 MCU 280905 rj/lr.
13 See the organisation’s website http://www.islamnasledie.ru/main.php
14 Algis Prazauskas, Russia and Islam. p.8.
16 Algis Prazauskas, Russia and Islam. p.5.
17 http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/6350-6.cfm
19 http://www.strana.ru/stories/04/04/29/3493/220978.html
22 Oleg Nedumov, 'Muftis argue about Wahhabites. The former allies of Ravil Gaynudtin reproach him for supporting non-traditional Islamic movements,' NG Religiya, 5 November 2003.
23 Tadzhuddin said that the jihad would consist of a fund to buy weapons and food for Iraq. http://www.cacianalyst.org/view_article.php?articleid=1418&SMSESSION=NO
24 Alexey Malashenko, 'Russian Islam has strong immunity. The greater part of Moslems of our country reject teachings from elsewhere,' NG Religi, 6 August 2003.
25 Aleksandr Petrov, “The September Theses” of Ravil Gaynudtinov. The chairman of the Council of Muftis of Russia are convinced that the authorities must deal with Moslem's, NG Religiya, 5 October 2005. The Public Chamber is an organ established in 2005. It is a
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creative thinking,’ NG Religiya, 15 September 2004.

28 Interview with Ravil Gaynutdin. ‘Islam and reality. Moslem teaching must be renewed
and developed, reckons Ravil Gaynutdin,’ NG Religiya, 5 November 2003.


31 See Aleksey Malashenko NG Religiya, 6 August 2003. Khakimov advocates a form of
Islam known as Jadidism, in essence an attempt by Central Asian Islamic scholars in the
19th century to create a revitalised Islam compatible with the modern world. See Rafael
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http://www.tatar.ru/?DNSID=db25dbbbe87ed283f85925fdd7d4a599&node_id=2761 ;
Rafael Khakimov, ‘Euro Islam in the Volga Region,’ Journal of South Asian and Middle

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dividends to no-one, Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn’, May 2006.

32 Nikolay Silaev, ‘Politics. Russian Islam. The embraces of civilisation,’ Ekspert, 6, 13
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34 Petr Krymskiy, ‘The national interest. Russia – part of the Islamic world?’ Rossiyiskie
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35 Mikhail Del’yanin, ‘I request a word. The revolutionising factor of Islam,’ Profil’, 10, 21
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36 Mikhail Leont’yev, ‘By the laws of war time. Today the political leadership of Russia must
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37 Algis Prazauskas, op cit, p.9.

38 http://www.studentport.su/university/about.php?id_razdel=27&id_sub=95&id_vyz=3774

39 Marat Murtazin, Rector of the Moscow Islamic University, ‘Our country is not an Orthodox
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http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/05/C556365A-6A1E-4AFA-B0C5-
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42 Andrey Skrobot, ‘Who digs up the “gardens of the righteous?” “Educational” Moslem
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network in Russia,’ Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 3-4 September 2006.

43 The list as of July 2006 stood at 17. See Appendix 5.

44 ITAR-TASS news agency, Moscow, in Russian 0734 gmt, 0736 gmt 25 October 2006;
BBC Mon FS1 MCU 251006 im/lr

45 See Paul Goble, ‘Four Critical Debates within Russian Islam,’
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Daniil Schipkov, ‘Between East and West. It is beneficial to Russia to be integrated into the Moslem world,’ *NG Religii*, 5 November 2005.

Ramazan Abdulatipov, ‘Russia has never fought with Islam. The Organisation of the Islamic Conference is an important instrument of foreign policy influence and of Russia’s internal political democratisation,’ *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 17–18 October 2003.

See the round table discussion ‘The Islamic World and Russia’s Foreign Policy,’ *Mehdunarodnyaya Zhizn’*, May 2005.

[Daniil Schipkov, ‘Between East and West. It is beneficial to Russia to be integrated into the Moslem world,’ *NG Religii*, 5 November 2005.](http://www.archipelag.ru/ru_mir/rus-subject/fate/)

[Ramazan Abdulatipov, ‘Russia has never fought with Islam. The Organisation of the Islamic Conference is an important instrument of foreign policy influence and of Russia’s internal political democratisation,’ *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 17–18 October 2003.](http://www.kontrudar.ru/material.php?id=201)

[See the round table discussion ‘The Islamic World and Russia’s Foreign Policy,’ *Mehdunarodnyaya Zhizn’*, May 2005.](http://www.politx.ru/xinfo/djemal/)

For example the 4th congress of the Ittifaq party in December 1997 heard these words: ‘We declare the national liberation struggle we are waging against the Russian empire to be henceforth known as jihad aimed at liberation from the infidels’ slavery. We, Muslim nationalists, are launching a struggle for the creation of an Islamic state in Tatarstan.’ Cited by Aislu Yunusova, ‘Islam between the Volga River and the Ural Mountains,’ [http://www.ca-c.org/dataeng/07.yunosova.shtml](http://www.ca-c.org/dataeng/07.yunosova.shtml)

APPENDIX 1: Key Islamic Personalities in the Russian Federation

Ravil Gaynutdin, chairman of the Council of Muftis

Talgat Tadzhuddin, Head of the Central Spiritual Administration of the Moslems of Russia and the European part of the CIS

Nafigullah Ashirov, chairman of the Moslem Board for the Asian part of Russia, co-chairman of the Council of Muftis in Russia

Ismail Berdiev, Head of the coordination centre Moslems of the North Caucasus

Shafiq Pshikhachev, Deputy head of coordination centre Moslems of the North Caucasus

Marat Murtazin, Rector of the Moscow Islamic University, deputy chairman of the Council of Muftis

Geydar Djemal, Chairman of the Russian Islamic Committee

Usman Iskakov, Chief Mufti of Tatarstan

Nurmuhamet Nigmatullin, Chief Mufti of Bashkortostan
APPENDIX 2

Ravil Gaynutdin Chairman of the Council of Muftis

Ravil Gaynutdin was born on 26 August 1959, in Tatarstan. After graduation from secondary school, he entered the Kazan Drama School and graduated from it magna cum laude, certified as Tatar drama actor. The then acted as stage manager for literary and dramatic shows on the Kazan television. Later he entered the Department of Artistic Direction of the State Institute of Theatre, Music and Cinematography in Leningrad and took a correspondence course at this institution.

He began to study the basics of Islam, Arabic and the Koran in 1977, coming to the Cathedral Mosque in Kazan and taking lessons from the oldest theologian in Kazan, Ahmadzaki Safiullin. In 1979, he put in an application to the Moslem Board for the European Part of the USSR and Siberia and, through the intercession of its chairman, was sent to Bokhara to enter the Mir-Arab Madrasah there.

He graduated from it in 1984, having covered its seven-year course in four years, and was immediately elected imam-hatyb (rector) of the second Cathedral Mosque in Kazan. Half a year later, he was invited to take the post of executive secretary of the Moslem Board for the European Part of the USSR and Siberia.

He became the first imam-hatyb of the Cathedral Mosque in Moscow in 1988. In January 1994, he became head of the newly-established Moscow Muftiate and was granted the title of mufti. On 1 July 1996, the constituent assembly of the Council of Muftis in Russia elected Mufti Gaynutdin as its chairman.

Gaynutdin defended his Ph.D thesis in December 2003 at the Russian Civil Service Academy.

He is married and has two daughters.

Gaynutdin is a member of Presidential Council for Cooperation with Religious Association, as well as presidiums of the Interreligious Council in Russia and the Interreligious Council in the CIS.

1 http://www.interfax-religion.com/?act=bio&div=2
APPENDIX 3

Nafigullah Ashirov
Chairman of the Moslem Board for the Asian part of Russia, co-chairman of the Council of Muftis in Russia

Nafigullah Ashirov was born on 10 September 1954, at the Yurty Tachimovskiye village near Tyumen. He spent his childhood at his village. His ancestors are descendents from the Tatars who call themselves Bukharians.

Ashirov was an active member of the Islamic community since the opening of a mosque in Tobolsk in 1979. He took private lessons on Islam from the local imam and later became a muezzin.

After the restrictions on religion were relieved, he graduated from the Mir-Arab madrasah in Bukhara and later the Amir Abdel Kader Islamic University in Algiers majoring in Islamic Call (dagvat).

After graduation from the university in 1992, Ashirov worked as first deputy mufti of the Republic of Bashkortostan and chairman of the executive committee of the Supreme Coordinating Centre of the Moslem Boards in Russia and later the chairman of the centre.

Sheikh Ashirov is an honorary member of the patrons’ board of the Islamic Call, an international organization based in Khartoum, Sudan, and member of the patrons’ board of the European Islamic Conference uniting Islamic organizations in European countries.

He has taken part in many international conferences and symposia and met leaders of major Islamic countries and international Islamic organizations. He was a signatory to several cooperation agreements between Moslem organizations in Russia and overseas Islamic foundations through which Ashirov initiated the construction of mosques and madrasah in various regions in the Russian Federation. In cooperation with international Islamic universities, he has made a considerable contribution to the training of theological cadres. He is an active supporter of the idea of Islamic unity and brotherhood. With his assistance, an Islamic college called Rasul-Akram has been opened in Moscow to train students from all over Russia.

He led Russian pilgrims to Mecca on five occasions.

In August 1997, a conference of Moslems from the Urals, Siberia and the Far East elected Sheikh Ashirov chairman and supreme mufti of the Moslem Board for the Asian part of Russia.

In 1998, an enlarged meeting of the Council of Muftis in Russia elected him co-chairman of the Council of Muftis in Russia.

2 http://www.interfax-religion.com/?act=bio&div=7
APPENDIX 4

Talgat Tadzhuddin
Central Spiritual Administration of the Moslems of Russia and the European part of the CIS.

Talgat Tadzhuddin was born on 12 October 1948 in Kazan. In October 1966 he commenced studying at the Madras Mir Arab in Bukhara, graduating in 1973. In this year he was chosen as the second imam of the Kazan mosque Al Mardzhani. He then went to study at the Islamic University of Al Azkhar in Cairo, graduating in 1978. Whilst at Al Azkhar, he went on the haj, and later led Soviet Moslem pilgrimages to Saudi Arabia. In 1978 he was also chosen as the first imam of the Kazan mosque. In June 1980 at the congress of the Moslems of the European part of the USSR and Siberia he was elected mufti and chairman of the Spiritual Administration of the Moslems of the European part of the USSR and Siberia. This election took place with the approval of the USSR Council of Ministers and the CPSU Central Committee.

In May 1990 at the convocation of the heads of the Spiritual Administrations of the Moslems of the USSR, he was elected chairman of the Administration of International Ties of the Moslem Organisations of the USSR. This was renamed the Association of Foreign Ties of Moslem Organisations. He remains chairman of this body. He was re-elected elected mufti and chairman of the Spiritual Administration of the Moslems of the European part of the USSR and Siberia in June 1990. In 1990 he assumed the spiritual name Sheikh al-Islam.

In November 1002 the Spiritual Administration was renamed the Central Spiritual Administration of the Moslems of Russia and the European part of the CIS, and Tadzhuddin was elected as Supreme Mufti of Russia.

In February 1994 Moscow Mufti Ravil Gaynutdin registered with the Ministry of Justice the Spiritual Administration of the Moslems of the Central European region of Russia, which formally remained in the Central Spiritual Administration of the Moslems of Russia and the European part of the CIS.

Tadzhuddin has two daughters and three sons. He is an official representative of Russian Moslems in UNESCO, the OIC and European League of Moslems.

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3 [http://www.peoples.ru/state/priest/talgat_tadzhuddin/interview.html](http://www.peoples.ru/state/priest/talgat_tadzhuddin/interview.html)
APPENDIX 5

Banned Terrorist Organisations

On 28 July 2006 Rossiyskaya Gazeta published a list of organizations which the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation has ruled are terrorist and which are banned in Russia. The list is:

1. Supreme Military Majlis ul Shura of the Joint Forces of Mujaheddin in the Caucasus
2. Congress of the People of Ichkeria and Dagestan
3. The Base (Al-Qa'idah)
4. Asbat al-Ansar [also Isbat al-Ansar]
5. Holy War (Al-Jihad or Egyptian Islamic Jihad)
6. Islamic Group (Al-Jama'ah al-Islamiyyah)
7. Moslem Brotherhood (Al-Ikhwan al-Moslemun)
8. Islamic Liberation Party (Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami)
9. Lashkar-e-Taiba
10. Islamic Assembly (Jamaat-e-Islami)
11. Taleban
12. Islamic Party of Turkestan (former Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan)
13. Social Reform Society (Jama'ah al-Islah al-Ijtima'i)
14. Islamic Heritage Revival Society (Jama'ah Ihya ul-Turath al-Islamia)
15. House of The Two Sacred Mosques (Al-Haramayn)
16. Islamic Jihad - Jamaat Mujaheddin
17. Jund ash-Sham
Want to Know More …?

See:

http://www.law.nyu.edu/eecr/vol11num1_2/special/glinski.pdf

Aislu Yunosova, ‘Islam between the Volga River and the Ural Mountains’  
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http://www.bitterlemons-international.org/inside.php?id=516

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