27 May 1999. Source: Betrayal, Bill Gertz, Washington, D.C., 1999. ISBN 0-89526-317-3. Thanks to Bill Gertz.

See Betrayal excerpts: http://www.washtimes.com/investiga/gertz1.html

Selections from an Appendix of 59 images of classified government documents, pp. 219-84.

See other secret documents from the book:





[pp. 233-36]

These excerpts from a presidential directive order a major strategic weapons review, revealing plans for a dubious "grand bargain" with Russia to expand the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and make future treaty changes more difficult. (4 pages)




                         Executive Summary

A. Context for Decisions

o On September l, 1993, the President approved the 
  recommendations from the Bottom-Up Review (BUR), including 
  SecDef's recommendations for a fundamental restructuring of 
  ballistic missile defense (BMD) programs.

o Specifically, the U.S. will pursue an $18 billion BMD 
  program between FY95 and FY99 that will include (1) $12 
  billion to provide for enhanced theater missile defense 
  (TMD) capability later this decade; (2) $3 billion for 
  maintaining national missile defense (NMD) as a technology 
  (R&D) program; and (3) $3 billion for a modest follow-on 
  technologies {FOT) and research and support (R&S) program.

o These decisions have profound implications for U.S. policy 
  in the areas addressed in this PRD:

  -- Absent the emergence of a Third World ICBM threat or a 
     reversal of trends in our improving relationship with 
     Russia, there will be no acquisition program for NMD 
     systems. NMD will remain for the indefinite future as 
     a technology program, and 10-15 years would be required 
     to deploy a system were a decision taken to do so. As 
     a result, for all intents and purposes NMD ABM Treaty 
     amendment issues are now moot, notwithstanding the 
     goals Congress articulated in the Missile Defense Act 
     (MDA) as recently as one year ago.

  -- The requirement for robust TMD programs has been 
     validated as a top priority of the United States; thus, 
     ensuring that the ABM Treaty is updated to reflect 
     changes in TMD technologies is more important than 

o The decisions taken in this PRD also occur in the context of 
  a radically transformed international political landscape.

  -- The Soviet Union has disintegrated.

  -- Russia finds many of its ABM assets on foreign soil.

  -- The Newly Independent States (NIS) are claiming co-
     equal status for the purposes of succession to the ABM 
     Treaty as Ukraine and Belarus underscored at the 
     recently completed five-year ABM Treaty Review 
     Conference in Geneva.

Declassify on: OADR

SECRET 2 -- The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) has heightened interest in early warning sharing and cooperative TMD efforts. o Taking all of this into account, this Review recommends a comprehensive "grand bargain" for meeting U.S. national security requirements in the changed circumstances of the current international security environment and as recently validated in the BUR. -- In return for U.S. agreement to (1) multilateralize the ABM Treaty and (2) defer indefinitely discussion of amendments to the ABM Treaty that would allow for more robust NMD architectures beyond that currently permitted by the ABM Treaty, Russia (and other successor states intent on joining the Treaty) would agree to TMD clarifications that allow the U.S. to execute those TMD programs that the BUR has identified as essential to U.S. national security requirements. -- The U.S. would also be prepared to proceed with sharing of early warning data, planning for use of ATBM forces and TMD technology cooperation, recognizing that the pace of these cooperative efforts would, at least indirectly, be linked to our ability to move forward with our own TMD programs. B. Assessment of the Threat B.I. Threat From Russia o The collapse of the Former Soviet Union (FSU) and the end of the Cold War has dramatically reduced the immediate poten- tial for strategic nuclear war with Russia. Reflecting this change, U S. strategic bombers are no longer on alert, and U.S. nuclear weapons have been withdrawn from surface ships and submarines (with the exception of SLBM warheads, which remain at sea). Also, the U.S. has canceled a number of strategic modernization programs, including rail-garrison MX and Midgetman, and has stopped production of the Advanced Cruise Missile and Trident Mark V warhead. In addition, the United States is now engaged in a broad range of strategic stability enhancement discussions with Russia, including detargeting. (S) o Nonetheless, while the immediate potential for strategic nuclear war with Russia has dramatically reduced, Russian strategic forces (currently consisting of 10,100 weapons) remain on continuous alert and hold U.S. and NATO forces at risk. (s) o Even without further modernization, Russia will still be able to retain a potent, but aging, strategic force through the early 2000s (between 2,600-3,500 warheads). Without further refurbishment, most of the existing strategic systems will reach the end of their service life by 2010- SECRET
SECRET 3 2020; however, we expect maintaining the viability of strategic nuclear forces to remain Russia's highest military priority. (S) o As long as Moscow maintains current security practices, the possibility of an unauthorized launch is remote. During a coup or widespread violence, there is the possibility that the Russian General Staff might misunderstand or miscalculate Western intentions and actions. Technical deficiencies and growing gaps in Russia's ballistic missile early warning and attack assessment capabilities increase the possibility of such miscalculations. (S) B.II. Threat From China o The Chinese intercontinental missile threat is significantly smaller than that posed by Russia, currently consisting of only seven relatively inaccurate single-warhead ICBMs. By the year 2000, Beijing probably will have some 24-28 missiles capable of reaching the CONUS, some of which may be MIRVed. China's medium and intermediate range missile force currently is composed of some 50 launchers, and is expected to double within the next 10 years. (S) B.II[I]. Threat From Others o It is unlikely that any nations beyond Russia, China, and possibly Ukraine will develop ICBMs capable of striking the United States during the next 10-15 years; beyond 10-15 years, one or more nations that are hostile to the United States may be able to indigenously develop ballistic missiles that could threaten the United States. (S) o A number of countries hostile to the United States currently possess short- and intermediate-range missile systems that are capable of threatening U.S. friends and deployed U.S. forces. Of particular concern in this regard are North Korea, Iran, Iraq, and Libya. Within the next 10-15 years, the capabilities of these countries will be increased. (S) -- By the turn of the century, in most cases where U.S. forces could potentially be engaged in a large-scale manner, it is likely that our adversary will potentially possess WMD in some form. Theater ballistic missiles are likely to be included in a future adversary's arsenal of weapons, especially in the Middle East and Southwest Asia, where missiles have been used in four of the last six major wars, or Northeast Asia, where North Korea deploys a number of ballistic missiles. SECRET
SECRET 4 C. Ballistic Missile Defense Systems C.I. Assessment: Requirements and Capabilities: C.l.a U.S. NMD o Prior to completion and approval of the BUR, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) adopted a requirement for strategic ballistic missile defense specifying an overall system performance high enough to ensure a threshold effectiveness of 100% reentry vehicle (RV) negation (with a probability of performance of 95%) against a 20 RV attack launched within 10 seconds. The objective requirement calls for the same effectiveness but against an attack of 200 RVs. In light of the BUR decision to downgrade NMD to a technology-only program, this JROC must be revisited. (S) o Should the United States decide in the future that an emerging Third World ICBM threat or a reversal of reform in Russia required elevating NMD to a systems acquisition program, the maximum level of defense that could be provided 10-15 years later by a single Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) site would be highly dependent on the assumed characteristics of the threat and the suite of sensors used to provide weapon targeting information. (S) o Using currently available or near-term technologies, a single site BMD architecture for the defense of the United States located at Grand Forks that includes 100 Ground Based Interceptors (GBIs) and 1 Ground Based Radar (GBR) and no additional sensors can protect only the central United States against missiles constituting a northerly threat. -- The cost to deploy and maintain this system for 10 years is estimated as $15-17B in FY 88 dollars. (S) o Additional sensors, such as an upgraded early warning radar (UEWR) system, Brilliant Eyes (BE), GSTS, or additional (remote) GBRs, could expand coverage provided by a single BMD site to include the entire CONUS Each of the additional sensor options could provide high levels (>90%) of protection against single launches from proliferant states. However, protection against multiple RVs from CIS or China would vary depending on the type of additional sensor system employed. -- The cost to deploy and maintain each of these sensors for 10 years is: $1B FY 88 for UEWR, $2-4B FY 88 for GSTS, and $5-6B FY 88 for BE for 10 years of operation. (S) o Deploying two ABM sites (each one about in the middle of each U.S. coast) would increase the effectiveness of national missile defenses. SECRET

[pp. 237-41]

President Clinton signed Presidential Decision Directive 17 in 1993, making it the policy of the United States not to seek changes in the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. The policy effectively blocked the United States from building a national missile defense capable of protecting all fifty states from long-range missile attack. (5 pages)

SECRET	               SECRET 

                     THE WHITE HOUSE

                    December 11, l993


                 THE UNITED NATIONS
                 SECURITY AFFAIRS
                 DISARMAMENT AGENCY
SUBJECT:       U.S. Policy on Ballistic Missile Defenses and the
	       Future of the ABM Treaty (S)

This Presidential Decision Directive establishes and directs the 
implementation of U.S. Policy on Ballistic Missile Defenses (BMD) 
and the Future of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. (S)


On April 26, 1993, Presidential Review Directive (PRD)-31 tasked 
a comprehensive examination of U.S. BMD policy, focusing on the 
following three areas:

-- The objectives the Administration should pursue as 
   priority in BMD. (S)

-- An assessment of what, it any, changes in the ABM Treaty 
   should be sought in light of these objectives and the 
   modalities for achieving any changes. (S)

-- A strategy for pursuing our BMD objectives with Russia and 
with friends and allies. (S)

SECRET	               SECRET 
Declassify on: OADR

SECRET SECRET 2 The Review was completed by the Interagency Working Group (IWG) on Arms Control and forwarded to the Deputies Committee on November 13, 1993. It was considered by the Principals Committee on November 22, 1993. (C) U.S. BND Objectives and Program Consistent with the assessment of the ballistic missile threat contained in PRD-31, on August 30 1993 I approved the recommendations from the Bottom Up Review (BUR), including the Secretary of Defense's recommendations for a fundamental restructuring of BMD programs. (C) Specifically, the U.S. will pursue a BMD program between FY95 and FY99 that will provide for: -- [Illegible] theater missile defense (TMD) capability later this decade. (U) -- Maintaining national missile defense (NMD) as a technology research and-development (R&D) program. (U) -- A modest follow-on technologies (FOT) and research and support (R&S) program. (U) The TMD programs identified in the BUR will play a key role in minimizing two critical dangers to U.S. security: regional threats to U.S. interests and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In general, our, TMD forces should: -- Provide highly effective protection against limited tactical ballistic missile attacks for forward deployed and concentrated or dispersed expeditionary elements of the armed forces of the United States and for the facilities and forces of friends and allies of the United States. (U) -- Effectively protect allied population centers. This protection could provide the opportunity for U.S./allies to execute military options in support of national objectives with minimum interference from enemy missile-forces. (U) ABM Treaty Consistent with U.S. BMD programmatic objectives, the following will be the policy of the United States with regard to the ABM Treaty. (S) -- ABM Treaty interpretations: The Administration has already informed the Congress that it will adhere to the traditional, or "narrow,["] interpretation of the ABM Treaty. (U) -- NMD ABM Treaty issues: The United States will not seek amendments to the ABM Treaty to permit (1) expansion of the number of ABM sites and around-based interceptors beyond SECRET SECRET
SECRET SECRET 3 those currentLy permitted (1 and 100, respectively); (2) development, testing or deployment of space-based sensors for direct battle management (i.e., satellites capable of substituting for ABM radars) or (3) development, testing or deployment of space-based interceptors. The United States will, however, reexamine these options if a decision is taken at some future date to elevate NMD to an acquisition and deployment program. (C) -- Brilliant Eyes (BE) ABM Treaty issues: The objective BE space-based sensor system is not sufficiently defined to determine its ABM Treaty implications. If, at some future date, the USG concludes that the ABM Treaty would prohibit the objective BE system, the USG will determine at that time whether to seek changes or redesign the system to make it consistent with the USG interpretation of the ABM Treaty. However, the United States will not negotiate at this time ABM Treaty amendments or otherwise seek formal agreement to the objective BE system. (C) -- Succession: The United States will agree to negotiate a protocol that will multilateralize the ABM Treaty, i.e., to give each of the Bishkek signatories, as well as Georgia and Azerbaijan, the option of becoming parties to the ABM Treaty. (C) -- TMD/ABM clarification: The requirement for robust TMD programs has been validated as a top priority in our defense planning; thus, ensuring that the ABM Treaty is updated to reflect changes in TMD technologies is more important than ever. (U) The U.S. will propose to our ABM Treaty partners that for purposes of determining treaty compliance a TMD system would not be deemed to have been "given the capability to counter" a strategic ballistic missile (SBM) unless it had actually been tested against an SBM. An SBM would, in turn, be defined as having a maximum velocity greater than 5.0 km/second. (S) -- Linkage: The U.S. will implicitly link our positions on succession and TMD/ABM clarification. The U.S. will not conclude one without the other. (S) BMD Cooperation The U S. will be prepared to discuss (1) sharing of ballistic missile early warning information, (2) planning for use of ATBM forces and (3) employing technology cooperation to assist in forging a positive security relationship between the United States and Russia and to serve as part of a general strategy to address the proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction. The United States will adopt a regional/ bilateral approach to BMD cooperation in each of the above three areas. (C) SECRET SECRET
SECRET SECRET 4 In general, the degree to which we are willing no share technology will depend on the country with which we propose to cooperate. In the specific case of Russia, the extent to which we would pursue missile defense technology cooperation would depend on their continued prOgress in political and economic reform; adherence to arms Control agreements and the Missile Technology Control Regime and a willingness to enter into and abide by a bilateral agreement on cooperative activities. (C) The United States will, however, limit these cooperative programs with Russia in two important ways: -- First, the technology development should be generic and not involve direct cooperation in any current U.S. system development (i.e., joint space sensor technology programs should include experiments not tied to BE or other operational system development). (C) -- Second, the United States should focus on jointly developing new technology products rather than transferring existing technology. Thus, only the carefully controlled U.S. technology necessary for specific projects would be incorporated into them. (C) Our program with Russia will proceed on its own merits, although the pace of cooperation will be implicitly linked to our ability to move forward with our own TMD programs. That, in turn, will require a forthcoming response from Russia (and the other New Independent States that would be made Party to the ABM Treaty) on our TMD/ABM demarcation proposals (C) Encouraging other countries to acquire Anti-Tactical Ballistic Missiles (ATBMs), and (as appropriate) sharing U.S. technologies permitted by the MTCR, can further U.S. security interests in some regions of the world, reduce escalatory tendencies that unchecked offensive military capabilities can create and contribute to U.S. counter-proliferation efforts. (C) However, potential tensions and tradeoffs exist between pursuing missile defenses and limiting or preventing proliferation. A tension between our BMD efforts and our nonproliferation goals may arise if and when we need to cooperate with a non-MTCR country in the development or sale of missile interceptors. Entering into such cooperation could easily put the U.S. in the position of engaging in behavior that we would object to -- and might have to impose sanctions on -- if it were carried out by other countries. Thus, the U.S. will strictly limit the number of non-MTCR states with which such cooperation occurs. (C) The Department of Defense and Department of State will formulate a specific proposal for (a) early-warning (b) TMD and (c) technology cooperation with Russia (and, as appropriate, other countries and/or regions) and submit it to the IWG on Arms Control no later than January 7, 1994. (C) SECRET SECRET
SECRET SECRET 5 Negotiating Forum The United States will use the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) as the forum for negotiating clarifications, modifications, state succession and procedural applications of the ABM Treaty. Meeting in the SCC will serve to reaffirm the Administration's commitment to the ABM Treaty and will constitute a good faith effort to cooperate with the Russians on issues over which they have serious concerns. (C) Higher-level political discussions should be used to reach broad agreement on our basic implementation strategy and to set parameters for the SCC sessions to follow. These discussions will also be the main forum for articulating to the Russians our revised BMD cooperation objectives, supplemented by technical discussions in sub-level working groups. (C) Implementation The NSC staff will coordinate the taskings identified in this PDD. (U) [Signature] William J Clinton SECRET SECRET