6 April 1997
September 14, 1995
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology Paul Kaminski announced today that Maj. Gen. Robert S. Dickman, USAF, has been selected to be the Department of Defense's Space Architect.
The establishment of the DoD Space Architect is the latest step with within the Department to improve space management and organization. Last December, DoD established the office of the deputy under secretary of Defense (DUSD) for Space, and on Aug. 6, 1995 named Robert V. Davis to that position.
As the DoD Space Architect, Dickman will lead a multi-service space architecture planning organization with responsibility for establishing an integrated DoD space architecture capable of meeting U.S. military operational needs, and providing guidance to ensure implementation of space capabilities consistent with the overall DoD space architecture plan. He will also be responsible for ensuring close coordination between space acquisition and architecture planning and development functions, as well as maintaining liaison with those activities assigned to the National Reconnaissance office.
Dickman will report to the under secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology through the Air Force Acquisition Executive and will maintain close coordination with the DUSD for Space.
Dickman is the current director of Space Programs for the assistant secretary of the Air Force for acquisition, and has more than 25 years of experience in operations and acquisition of space systems.
This memorandum provides guidance concerning the establishment of the DoD Space Architect organization proposed to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on March 8, 1995 and discussed in the March 8, 1995 Deputy Secretary of Defense memorandum to the Secretary of the Air Force. It further establishes the purpose, authority, and staffing for the DoD Space Architect.
The purpose of the DoD Space Architect organization is to consolidate the responsibilities for DoD space missions and system architecture development into a single organization that shall integrate space architectures and systems, eliminate unnecessary vertical stovepiping of programs, achieve efficiencies in acquisition and future operations through program integration, and thereby improve space support to military operations. Furthermore, with the purpose of developing fully integrated space architectures for supporting national security requirements, the Architect shall propose space architectures and capabilities with the Intelligence Community through the Joint Space Management Board (JSMB).
The DoD Space Architect will report through the Air Force Acquisition Executive to the Defense Acquisition Executive (DAE). The DUSD(Space), on behalf of the DAE, will provide OSD policy guidance and oversight to the Architect for the development of integrated space architectures consistent with the National Security Strategy, the National Military Strategy, National and DoD policies, Defense Planning Guidance, and fiscal guidance. The DoD Space Architect will submit proposed architectures through DUSD(Space) to the DAE or the JSMB, as appropriate.
The Architect is responsible for developing space architectures across the range of DoD space mission areas to include space support, force enhancement, space control, and force application. In particular, this responsibility will include launch and satellite control and the space-related areas of tactical intelligence; targeting; surveillance and warning (e.g., ballistic missile warning); command, control and communications; navigation; environmental monitoring; and space control. The Architect is further responsible for integrating validated requirements into existing and planned space system architectures - to include the space, ground, and communication link segments, as well as user interfaces - within overarching architectures responsive to the needs of the users.
The DoD Space Architect will assist DUSD(Space) in the development and maintenance of an overall DoD space systems master plan which depicts how assured mission support is provided by space systems to the National Command Authority, Combatant Commanders, and operational forces. Specifically, the master plan will depict how current space system architectures evolve to provide required capabilities. At a minimum, the plan will include a description of existing space systems and architectures, planned/proposed space architectures, modifications to existing space systems, transitions from existing to planned architectures, space-related technology programs, technology infusion opportunities, and interoperability with U.S. Allies for coalition operations. This plan will be a living document with the purpose of defining a clear path to obtaining capabilities derived from space systems to satisfy validated requirements.
The DoD Space Architect will support the ASD(C3I) and other organizations to include the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, Defense Information Systems Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, Defense Mapping Agency, National Imagery Agency, and National Security Agency, in the development of architectures and master plans for which space systems will comprise a critical component. Space control architecture issues will be coordinated with the Director, Information Warfare, OASD(C3I). With respect to requirements, the Architect shall coordinate with the Agencies, the Joint Staff, and the Service Staffs responsible for developing requirements for the purpose of understanding fully each requirement's basis; all CINCs' requirements will be coordinated through the Joint Staff. In addition, the Architect shall coordinate with Agencies and Services responsible for planning, acquiring, and/or operating space systems, to include the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), Space Administration, and the U.S. Space Command.
The DoD Space Architect derives his authority from the DAE. As a planner, the Architect will have significant influence over acquisition decisions, but will have no direct acquisition authority per se. With respect to the acquisition process, all proposals which may involve a space-related solution will be referred to the Architect for evaluation and integration into existing or planned space architectures. The Architect will provide this information in support of DAB and/or JSMB milestone reviews or other applicable reviews for non-ACAT 1D programs. Additionally, the Architect will be key member of integrated product teams in the acquisition review process for space and related C4I systems. To objectively perform his/her duties, the Architect must be able to conduct independent analyses of proposed space architectures. Modeling and simulation used to support such analyses must evaluate the ability of proposed space architectures to satisfy requirements under operational conditions in peacetime, crisis, or war. In conducting these analyses, the Architect will require some support from DoD component's developmental and acquisition centers and their analytical capability. To that end, the DoD Space Architect will have the authority to task these organizations for required support through the respective Service or Agency. For day-to-day activity, the Architect will coordinate directly with the performing organization.
The DoD Space Architect organization will be a non-headquarters, jointly-manned activity. The Architect will be a military officer in the grade of 0-8 or civilian equivalent whom the DAE will select on a best qualified basis. Nominees will be solicited and compiled by the Joint Staff and reviewed by the Air Force Acquisition Executive who will make a recommendation for approval by the DAE. The Architect will serve a minimum two-year tour and shall not be assigned other authorized General Officer or civilian equivalent billet duties; i.e., shall not be dual-hatted during his/her tenure. Each Service will assign an adequate number of personnel to the organization in order to maintain a requisite high degree of joint Service representation. Each Service shall review their individual organizations for functions which replicate those of the DoD Space Architect and may use billets from these functions to fill personnel requirements. In addition, the Air Force, as the lead Service, will assign additional support and administrative personnel to the organization, and program and budget for the operation of the office.
Two areas require the immediate attention of the DoD Space Architect. A top priority is to further develop a future Military Satellite Communications architecture which encompasses core DoD capabilities; allied, civil, and commercial augmentation; and global broadcast capability. The status of this architectural development, conducted in coordination with the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Space) and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (C3I Acquisition), shall be briefed to the Under Secretary of Defense(A&T) in October 1995. A second critical near-term project is to prepare for the integration of DoD and intelligence system architecture planning. In this regard, the Architect shall begin coordination with the NRO to develop an integration plan and develop a proposed implementation schedule for presentation to the JSMB.
With centralized space architecture planning, the Department should realize economies from improved coordination and integration. The consolidation of existing planning processes should result in a more streamlined and efficient organization and management, and facilitate integration. The DoD Space Architect and the Services will assist the DUSD(Space) in investigation and identifying potential opportunities for savings in areas which can be achieved by the establishment of the DoD Space Architect. The DUSD(Space) will brief the USD(A&T) on his initial findings within 120 days.
December 15, 1995
Secretary of Defense William J. Perry and Director of Central Intelligence John M. Deutch have signed a charter establishing the Joint Space Management Board.
The JSMB, a board of directors for defense and intelligence space programs, is being formed to ensure that defense and intelligence needs for space systems (including associated ground-based subsytems) are satisfied within available resources, using integrated architectures to the maximum extent possible. The JSMB will also provide executive management for defense and intelligence space programs and oversight of the single National Security Space Architect. The JSMB will integrate policy, requirements, architectures, acquisition, and funding for defense and intelligence space programs.
The JSMB will be co-chaired by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology and the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence. The Executive Committee of the JSMB, vested with the full authority to act for the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence, within the bounds of the charter, will include the co-chairs, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Executive Director, Intelligence Community Affairs.
October 8, 1996
The Joint Space Management Board has decided on an architecture for the Military Satellite Communications System. The Board met in late August to review the conclusions of the Department of Defense Space Architect's military satellite communications architecture study.
The JSMB endorsed the Space Architect's set of objectives, transition goals, and a transition strategy leading to a future MILSATCOM architecture that would significantly enhance support to the warfighter well beyond currently planned capabilities. This new architecture would be achieved in an incremental fashion over the next 20 years to ensure uninterrupted support to operations, while still aggressively pursuing enhanced future support.
The architecture encompasses MILSATCOM, as well as other space communications systems that may be used by DoD, such as systems owned by other government agencies and those owned and operated by private/corporate organizations. A presentation describing the architecture study is available on the DoD Space Architect's WEB site: http://www.acq.osd.mil/space/architect/.
The set of objectives, transition goals, and transition strategy are based on the findings of the DoD Space Architect's Architecture Development Team, or ADT, which spent the last 10 months reviewing previous studies, developing architecture alternatives and analyzing numerous trade-offs relative to space communications user requirements and space communications technical capabilities. These objectives were accepted by the JSMB. They are:
1- Provide assured, secure communicationsa - the right communications to the right user, at the right time
b - information services driven
2 - Fully integrate with the DISN
3 - Reduce the communications "footprint" (terminals radios, antenna, RF signature, people, etc.)
4 - Be user friendly, inter-operable
In addition, the transition goals were accepted by the JSMB. These goals are:
1 - Ensure Continuity of Service through Satellite replenishment, operations management, or risk trade-offs
2 - Within limits of low-medium acquisition risk and acceptable funding, take significant steps toward MILSATCOM objectives, with no barriers to evolution
3 - Enable evolution to new Warfighting visions, and facilitate demonstrations and operational use
4 - Accelerate on-going changes in terminal developments toward flexibility, system efficiency
5 - Fully integrate into the overall communications architecture
6 - Take advantage of international cooperative opportunities
The JSMB directed DUSD(Space), in conjunction with the Joint Staff, the Services, and the Defense Agencies, to develop an organizational structure that would further define the system within the architecture and develop an affordable road map to guide the Department's transition towards the architecture's objectives. In the interim, the JSMB directed that the Space Architect's recommended transition strategy to be used as initial guidance for near-term resource decisions.
I'm sure there are some in the audience that consider the title "DOD Space Architect" very descriptive. We come across several of you in the couple of months that we've existed - and most thought it was amazing that Dr. Kaminski would set up an office just to manage the floorspace in the Pentagon.
There are also many who realized the space in our name referred to satellites and that sort of thing, and still thought they knew what a Space Architect does. For better or worse, I'm not sure I'm one of them. We're in new territory, both in our work and in the organizational relationships we have to develop.
Both our Architect organization and the new Deputy UnderSecretary of Defense (Space) office are products of the high level discussions that took place between the summer of 1994 and early 1995. First, it was decided that there was a need for centralized management and oversight of all DOD space programs within the DOD's Acquisition and Technology office, and Bob Davis's shop is the result. Both Mr. Davis' office and mine work directly for Dr. Kaminski, the UnderSecretary for A and T.
Based on their present manning DUSD(Space) has about two dozen folks split among three general functions: policy, acquisition and programs. Their responsibilities cover the entire spectrum: international efforts, budgets and programmatics, integrated product teams, policy and virtually anything else the OSD needs to do with respect to space.
The Architect office is a little different, although formed from the same basic concerns. We are what's called a "Non- management headquarters" -- that is, we aren't responsible for oversight or the staff process, instead, we are tasked to deliver specific products.
By way of introduction, let me first ask the folks that are here from our office to stand up.
If we were all here, and we were fully manned, you'd see about 40 government folks, three-fourths of them officers or equivalent civilians. There would be about ten each from the Air Force and naval services -- Navy and Marine -- about five Army and about five from joint organizations. The support staff would be all Air Force, our parent organization. Today we are only 45% filled, so we have a way to go and those on-board are peddling fast.
In addition to the government people, we'll have about ten SETA firms working with us, including FFRDCs, not-for- profits and industry, totaling about 60 MTS. As of the beginning of December, we live in the Hoffman Building, right by the Eisenhower Metro Station.
The products of the Space Architect, of course, are space architectures -- detailed plans for our space capabilities. During the discussions of a year ago, the leadership decided to address a long-standing problem: that space systems tended to be stovepiped. Very little consideration between systems for mission synergy; not much technology transfer or standardization among programs, single-purpose views of needs and capabilities.
The idea of the space architect is to set down the overall vision and then the visions for each type capability, ensuring they all fit together to provide the best support for the warfighter. In a practical sense, it won't work that way, because we didn't have to opportunity to step back from the entire process and build that initial vision. I'm not sure we could have. However, we're doing that as we go along, while first addressing one of the specific "stovepipes."
Since that sounds like fluff, I'd like to explain a little about our process to you today. Our first task is for military satellite communications. Since we are using it both to lay out a course for that portion of the space program and to develop the architectural process, I don't think we could have picked a better topic.
MILSATCOM has it all. All three service are deeply involved -- as acquirers as well as customers. It is lifeblood to the Joint Staff and CINCs. It's what will give our soldiers and sailors and marines and airmen the battlefield awareness needed to fight and win. It's big bucks -- on the order of a billion dollars a year over the long term. It is inextricably linked to other sources of satcom -- commercial being the most obvious --, to how we provide comm in general to our forces, and to how we exercise command and control. And finally, everybody uses it, and so everybody is an expert.
Let me begin by putting our effort in context. During the first half of 1995, a large group of folks from across the DOD -- Services, DISA, OSD staff, program offices and so on, did an enormous amount of work to build a MILSATCOM architecture. Independent teams looked at the technology, business practices, commercial applicability -- all the right elements. At the same time, it was clear that the requirements were growing faster than anyone could predict, with no end in sight.
As they assessed the possible options, there were some constraints put in place that limited the range of alternatives that would be presented. The result was that all this good work was boiled down to a series of alternatives that appeared to be variations on the packaging of a pretty similar set of capabilities.
Cost wasn't a driver. Risk wasn't a driver. Capability wasn't a driver. All were technically feasible, the costs were comparable, at least to the level of accuracy of our estimating, and none of them would come anywhere close to meeting the need.
In addition, things like global broadcast and polar coverage, while acknowledged as essential, we're carried along as complementary stovepipes. If you liked the UHF/SHF/EHF capabilities we have today, you'd love the options as they were finally briefed.
With a new Space Architect office just forming, the outcome was predictable: ask the Architect to use the work that had been done before, but start with a clean sheet of paper.
As we looked at doing MILSATCOM, and knowing that it would be followed by satellite control and space control and space-based IR and launch and weather and remote sensing and probably several more, we decided to break the task down into manageable chunks -- and we organized the office along those lines to provide some continuity from one effort to the next
The first two tasks run in parallel: defining the need and determining what is possible. I'll describe these separately, but in reality the senior staff in our office is involved across the board.
The first is to understand the need. The keeper of the keys on requirements is an organization headed by the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs that includes the vice chiefs of the Services -- the Joint Requirements Oversight Council. They decide what are the key parameters that must be met by acquisition programs, assign responsibility for validating all requirements, approve mission need statements. If the JROC doesn't say something is needed, it doesn't get bought.
The agent for the JROC for military space capability requirements, including satcom, is the United States Space Command in Colorado Springs. They actually write the overall mission needs statement -- the big picture need -- based on what they hear from the other warfighting commands around the world. Without a MNS, there's no program.
At a level of detail far below the JROC and USSPACECOM, for comm, the Defense Information Systems Agency, headed by LtGen Al Edmonds, keeps the definitive data on every comm requirement. If you want service on a satellite, and you aren't in the data base, you're whistling Dixie.
The problem with trying to build an architecture from these requirements documents is that they simply aren't very helpful. In the words of a senior former acquisition official, the mission needs statement hasn't been written that any program manager couldn't interpret to design anything a user might want. They are simply too broad.
At the other end, the elements of the DISA data base are what people want now, or think they might want in a few years. An architecture needs to provide the vision for what we'll be using 10 to 25 years from now. The data base might be a useful cross check, certainly a part of our tool kit, but it doesn't provide any real vision.
There are a couple of other approaches, however.
First, and I believe most useful I the long term, is a new approach called a Capstone Requirement Document. USSPACECOM first did one for Space based IR last year. It was critical to proceeding forward on that program. For MILSATCOM, I think the command has evolved to produce an even better document, and we are being a better customer. They won't ask for UHF or SHF or EHF, or for military or commercial -- they'll say what kind of comm they need to get from where to where, with what kind of protection. Best of all, they'll explain why they need it, so we can talk with them about alternatives, understand how they might change as weapons systems change.
While I'm not part of building the CRD, I'm told that General Ashy, the CINC, has been a tiger about ensuring his people understand what's in the document and are approaching the requirements with an open mind about solutions. They have to represent all the other CINCs as well as the four Services, so that is no small task. The process has been completely open, all the stakeholders are involved. I'm confident both that the CRD will provide the vectors we need to lay out architectural alternatives that are responsive to the warfighters' needs, and that the CRD will become the model for the requirements baseline for major new efforts.
Second, we recognize that even the best warfighter-based requirements process is going to be limited by perspective. A CINC's focus is on today, what's happening in the theater now and over the next few months or years, and how the forces can cope with what they may be called upon to do. Looking ten years out isn't a priority, and looking out 15- 25 years is just not part of the job.
For that you have to look to the Services, and in particular to the Service doctrines and long-range planners. What will the army force structure look like, what weapons will they use and how will they employ them. What does "Forward... from the Sea" tell us about what the comm needs of the naval forces will be. What can we learn from airpower doctrine and Air Force programs that will help us understand the comm needs of the future.
To find out, we made have representatives from the services in our office who stay plugged into what their services are doing. And we had a doctrine day -- invited the four Services to come in and tell us what they thought we ought to know about how they saw the future. Force XXI from the Army. Copernicus for the Navy. And so on.
These inputs don't tell us about specific data rates, circuit paths, transponder sizes, terminal weights or any of that. But we can get a pretty good feel for will be essential to support our forces of the future.
That's task one. The second is to determine what's possible - what are the blocks from which the architecture can be built. If we were architecting a house, we'd need to know about heating and cooling and plumbing and electrical power and construction and materials and finishing and a whole lot more. To pick just one of those, heating, we`d need to tradeoff oil, gas, electric -- know the pro and con of various fuels, applicability of solar and geothermal in the particular location, availability of sources, climate, insulation limitations, heat pumps versus stand alone systems. You get the point. We need to have a comparable understand for our architectures.
There are some space areas where folks in DOD probably know as much as anyone about what can be done. For SATCOM, that may have been the case in the early sixties, and still true for specific areas up through the early eighties. When we built FLTSATCOM, it was the most advanced satellite of its kind ever built. Same was true for DSCS II and DSCS III, and is still true today for a highly processed, extremely complex spacecraft like MILSTAR. But across the board in the communications satellite business, in 1995 we are behind the times. We hadn't developed a new system in almost 15 years.
Where is the technology headed: tubes in the 150 watt range, routine spacecraft power in the 15 kW range, assembly line productions at a rate of a satellite a month, antenna patterns tailored to desired contours within tens of miles, transponders carrying dozens of megabits, ATM switching on- board, continuously variable data rates, 18 inch terminals that cost a few hundred dollars, capable of handling tens of megabits of data. To somebody in the business, all this is almost obvious. So to find about it, we went to industry.
In conjunction with the MILCOM-95 meeting in San Diego last month, we spent about an hour each with more than a dozen major firms. The items I mentioned were common themes from lots of the companies: what was really exciting is that many of the firms were willing to be very open about what they were planning. Things that may be key to their competitive advantage. It was a great reminder to us that the companies that make up the industrial base in this country are every bit as concerned about this nation's security, about our future military, as anyone who is wearing a uniform.
We've now circulated the notes taken by the dozen government folks who sat through every session, and next week we'll all meet to agree on the "vetors" we heard -- what we can expect to see, to have available, over the next 5-25 years. By the way, we haven't figured out the details since we have to protect every bit of proprietary information we heard, but we plan to provide those vectors back to industry somehow, so they'll know what we're thinking about doing -- not with 100% confidence, but a long time before it appears in an RFP.
Our goal is for these two tasks to be about done by the end of the year - we should have a good picture of what kinds of things our customers will need and of what will be in the toolbox to satisfy their needs.
As we pick up the heavy duty work after the New Year, with the Archictural Development Team in place, the immediate task will be to define a spectrum of alternatives. A range that covers the spread of technical risk, cost, requirements satisfaction, flexibility, growth potential. There will be almost no constraints during this phase - we'll look at all altitudes, innovative ways to use our available spectrum, new relationships between military and commercial systems, interfaces with the ground. Since both Jeff Grant at the NRO and I have been told that we won't bring forward any architectural approaches that don't consider the other's needs and contributions, we'll be working closely with them on this process.
To be honest, I think after that is when we'll face our most difficult work. Narrowing down the set of options to a few that have enough difference to give the decision makers choices, and to provide the detailed analysis of the measures of effectiveness of these options so good decisions can be made.
To do that will require some good analysis tools. Modeling. Simulation. Costing. I hope that by the time we do our second or third architecture we'll have a good idea what tools are available and best fit out needs. Today we don't. We know we don't want to build our own - there are something like 640 separate modeling and simulation tools already built by the department. We probably will have to do some tailoring, but good stuff has to be out there if we can find it.
We plan to look to any available source: the Battle labs, the Service acquisition organizations, the joint centers, the FFRDCs, the CINCs and warfighting commands. We have only a few constraints.
These constraints may not be realistic -- maybe models would have to be too simple to meet these restrictions. But I'm a firm believer in Richard Feynmann's observation that if you can't explain something on the back of an envelope, you probably don't really understand it.
We need to understand our analysis tools as well as we understand the requirements and the capabilities, or the results simply won't be credible-- to us or to our customers or to the decision makers. The process of narrowing the range of architectures and becoming comfortable with the analysis tools will likely be done in parallel. It would be nice if we had the tools in place, but that isn't the case. However, by working the process hard, we should be able to have good confidence in our capabilities as we enter the phase of doing detailed assessments of the subset of architectures that survive the winnowing process -- perhaps half a dozen, maybe a couple more or a couple less.
These will be put through a considerable more rigorous analysis, and they will be defined in more detail. Not only will we need to be able to capture what effect the different approaches have on support to the warfighter, we'll need to understand acquisition risk, investment cost, our ability to consider cost as an independent variable, life cycle costs, operability, flexibility and so on. Beyond that, the interfaces with the rest of the communications architecture and infrastructure will be enormously important.
It should be obvious that an architecture isn't just about satellites. They may be the investment cost driver, but the terminals and interface with the rest of the C4I world have a lot more to with the operations and maintenance and flexibility.
My sense at this point is that we'll have to project our architectures down to a level of detail that is actually finer than we will eventually deliver to the JSMB for their consideration. If for no other reason, we'll need to do that to make accurate cost and risk estimates.
I also expect we'll go to industry to help with the costing. I'm just not sure that with the rate of change of technology, if we project an architecture that depends heavily on concepts that are being introduced in the commercial world but are different from what we've built in DOD before, we have the in-house models to get accurate projections.
The final phase of the work will be concentrated on consensus building. As I mentioned earlier, there are an enormous number of stakeholders in any segment of the space business, and probably more in the SATCOM business than anywhere else.
By the time we go to the JSMB, I want to be sure there is agreement that we've got the facts right, the analyses are done well and are as complete as necessary to make good decisions, and that we have the key positions out on the table.
Under the standard rules of engagement for the team process in the Quality construct, this should happen all along the path. The reality is that either we aren't mature enough in DOD yet in terms of teams, or it's just too hard, but there are as many examples of principals arriving at a decision meeting with unexpected questions or positions as there are of full openness and empowerment. So we'll work with every stakeholder, up to the principal level, to ensure we're communicating.
It may be that the decision for the JSMB will be straightforward -- but I doubt it. In fact, if one architecture stands out as clearly superior in every regard, we've probably cooked the books. That doesn't mean that we can't gain consensus; it certainly doesn't mean I don't think we can get a decision. Just the opposite, in fact.
Once the JSMB has heard the architectures and our analysis, and asked whatever questions they want, we'll assume we get a decision. That's near the end of the process for the Architect, but there will be a lot still to be done.
Our goal for the architectures is to provide the framework for future acquisitions - what needs to be satisfied by what capabilities, when, for about how many dollars. If you will, we'll lay out the plans for the building: how many rooms, what kind of construction. We won't decide which the bathrooms will have tubs or stall showers, how many windows will be in the master bedroom, who the general contractor should be, or how it will be financed, and so on.
Those are acquisition decisions. Before the architecture gets implemented it will be broken down into programs -- with a time phasing based on need dates. There may be elements that enter the process immediately, and others that wait several years. A lead Service will be selected, an Operational Requirements Document will be written for specific capabilities, tradeoffs will be run on the details of the systems designs and an acquisition strategy will be executed.
The Architect will be involved in these steps, mostly to ensure the architecture remains intact, or that any changes are reflected wherever else they impact. Along the same lines, as programs come into place, and as technology, requirements and capabilities change, the architecture will have to adapt. In addition, we'll take what we learn, apply it to the vision of the overall space architecture I mentioned at the beginning, and include it in the Space Master Plan to be produced under Bob Davis's office.
That about captures what we're trying to do. I've described it in terms of processes, but it is really about people. Our own folks in the Architect shop, of course, and the extremely talented individuals that have been provided by their organizations to work with us, sometimes full time for several months. We built our operating concept around the assumption that the stakeholders in each architecture would commit their best to the work, and it has turned out to be true.
We'll be turning to many of you for help, too, and we hope you'll be as forthcoming as you have been in the past.
Now, if you'd like to probe more deeply into any of these areas, perhaps we have time to open the floor to a few questions.
February 3, 1997
Good afternoon. I've read about this conference for years - it's wonderful to be here
The session organizers asked me to address the government's policy and plans for space, a topic rich in recent activity. Just this past fall, the President released his National Space Policy - updated to address the changes and challenges of a rapidly evolving geopolitical and economic environment.
This policy reflects the post cold-war international security environment, recent military operations such as Desert Storm, Bosnia, Somalia - declining government spending, the civil focus and the rapid growth of commercial space environment.
Last night you heard from Congressman Brown about the difficulties associated with the government budgets. My theme has a somewhat different direction. I think that we are, or can be, poised to recover the enthusiasm and growth that has been lost in the space program - but to do so we have to change how we do business!
The policy is an excellent point of departure, because in the years between the Bush Policy and President Clinton's much has changed, and not just in budgets.
For the first time, the commercial interest in space is perhaps the biggest driver of national policy. As the United States was a sea-faring nation in the last two centuries - it is now a space-faring nation, and that commerce will grow astronomically in the next century - pun intended. US technology advances during the last 50 years in aerospace, computing, medicine, and manufacturing have paved the way for, even necessitated, exploitation of the space environment.
Fortunately, the US is already the world's leader in space use. The updated national space policy creates an opportunity to maintain and take advantage of that lead.
Last year at this conference Mr. Bob Davis, the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Space, spoke of how the Department was re-organizing to better focus on space issues. He spoke of the role of his own organization, the creation of a Space Architect and the need to integrate the efforts of the defense and intelligence communities.
Much has happened in the year since. My organization - The DoD Space Architect - is now fully functioning. We've addressed 2 space issues, satellite communications and space control, and will soon complete an architecture addressing satellite operations within the DoD and civil space sectors. In addition, all of our work has been done in cooperation with the intelligence community through my counterpart in the NRO.
This coming year we will see the satellite communications, space control, satellite operations, imagery and SIGINT architectures integrated with the larger focus of a future C4ISR architecture and subjected to the affordability and strategy assessments of the Quadrennial Defense Review.
The process of building an architecture, and perhaps harder, building the consensus to proceed with implementation, is a fascinating story in itself. However, unless you've spent a majority of your adult life in Washington, DC, it would probably sound more like "Alice Through the Looking Glass." I'll leave discussion of details of the architecture work for the question and answer period.
Before focusing in on the national security aspects of the policy, let me make some general observations. The first has to do with the relationships among the sectors - civil, national security and commercial - and I'll use a paradigm described by Steven Covey in his "Seven Habits of Highly Successful People" to make the point.
Dr. Covey says that as we mature we should strive to grow from dependence through independence to interdependence. We start out as babies, totally dependent on others for our food, education, quality of life. As we get older we strive for independence - the ability to earn our own way, make our own decisions. If fact, there are some who view this as the ultimate goal.
But there is a higher plane, one that demands trust, openness, cooperation. That, of course, is interdependence. Marriage is interdependence. Successful business is interdependence. Living as a contributing part of society is interdependence. It is the only basis upon which to build real growth.
Well, let's look at the space program in that paradigm. In the early days, from the mid-1950s to the mid-1960, the civil program was, in many areas, dependent on the military. The military provided the rockets for Mercury and Gemini and to launch our unmanned satellites. It provided most of the infrastructure - the launch bases, the recovery forces - and it provided much of the technology.
By the mid-1960s, independence was becoming much more the dominant characteristic. The giant Saturn was a NASA rocket. The Johnson and Kennedy Space Centers replaced Cape Canaveral, NASA was the major force in aerospace technology.
The national security sector continued with its own, very robust and successful space program, and commercial space began to develop life of its own. But over the last thirty years the instances of close cooperation, fully integrated efforts, were few and far between.
And that is why I find the new Presidential direction so fascinating, so promising. An underlying thrust of the policy is the shift from independent sectors to an interdependent national effort. To demonstrate that, let me highlight some specific policies, and paraphrase elements from the Presidential document to make the point:
NASA is directed to emphasize flight programs that reduce mission costs and development times by promoting partnerships between government, industry and academia. They will acquire spacecraft from the private sector unless specifically approved by the Administrator.
They are to make use of relevant private sector remote sensing capabilities, data and information products.
They will examine, with DoD and NOAA, the feasibility of consolidating ground facilities and data communications systems, but only those that can't be provided by the private sector.
Defense to foster the integration and interoperability of satellite control for all government space activities.
To stimulate private sector investment, we are to facilitate stable and predictable U.S. commercial sector access to appropriate U.S. Government space-related hardware, facilities and data.
We're directed to enter into appropriate cooperative agreements to encourage and advance private sector basic research, development and operations while protecting the commercial value of the intellectual property developed.
To be sure, the proof of the pudding isn't in reading the recipe. But we've taken big steps forward simply acknowledging at the unclassified, public level that, among other things, we are all in the remote sensing business, and that we can do it better if we figure out how to cooperate on everything from technology to data dissemination
I would like to tell you that every space office in DoD, NASA, NOAA, DOE, DOT, DOC and so on has the National Space Policy on the wall, and uses the sections I've paraphrased as the guiding principles. In reality, there are also sections that allow for business as usual - but the encouraging thing is that at the most senior levels, the commitment to interdependence is real, and being fostered.
Having a national security - wide plan would certainly be a good spring-board for implementing a national space policy, yet there is still much to be done to fully implement the President's direction to the defense space sector.
At the most basic level, the direction to Defense is to ensure this nation's freedom of access and use of space - for commercial, civil, and national security activities. Fortunately, we are postured to think of space as the 4th medium for operations, so the underpinnings to grow as a space-faring nation are in place.
But, how can all the pieces - the programs, architectures, government budgets, military force structure plans, corporate business strategies, etc. - fit together? There are so many systems, countless system interfaces, as well as the still independent strategies and goals of the commercial, civil, and national security space sectors. So how do we start?
We faced similar challenges on a smaller scale in the Space Architect's office when we began the satellite communications architecture over a year ago. There were many organizations, many viewpoints, and many technical issues. We started with our customer - for the DoD that's the warfighter. We asked:
"How will you fight in the future?"
"What is the environment you anticipate?"
"How will you use SATCOM?"
Note that we didn't ask the warfighter's requirements, how many kilobits or megabits from where to where - we tried to understand the needs and uses. In other words we were trying to characterize the market.
The best source we found for this type of information was the service's doctrine organizations. They were forward thinking, yet experienced in warfighting skills - plus in many cases they were well connected to the service battle labs, so they were experimenting - trying new ideas - doing market research.
Joint Vision 2010 - the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's vision - is the point of departure. There are four basic future needs described in the Chairman's vision:
full dimensional protection
These needs are closely tied to the mission areas in the space policy, so by developing and using commercial and military space systems to address the warfighter's "market" we can systematically and affordably move towards the goals of the national space policy.
For example, to meet the dominant maneuver "market" it won't be sufficient to develop space systems that can observe friendly and adversary maneuvers. It will also be necessary to protect those systems from hostile actions - destruction, disruption, take-over, deception. And, it will require those systems to be fully integrated with land, sea, and air warfighting systems. The new challenge, of course, is to do so whether those systems are military or commercial.
In addition, we may also need to deny the use of similar systems to an adversary - a capability to deny imagery to a Saadam Hussain or communications to a terrorist, for example. Not steps to be taken lightly, to be sure, but very likely ones we will have to face in our next conflict.
Similarly, there is a strong link between the Chairman's vision for focused logistics and the policy directive to maintain our capabilities in space support - as well as linkages between precision engagement and force enhancement. From these we can build a strategy - a plan - toward implementing the policy directives for the defense sector.
The head of US Space Command in Colorado Springs - the military commander responsible for the application of space systems to warfighting - has developed a vision which further implements Joint Vision 2010 and the national space policy, and Mr. Davis has led the building of a National Security Space master Plan.
The consistent themes in all of these visions are control of space and force integration. These are significant challenges of themselves - and they are key to US leadership in space exploitation.
The DoD is committed to this approach to solving space related issues - focus on the customer. The approach is not too different in the civil and commercial space sectors. The commercial space sector exists because of a focus on the customer, so it isn't necessary to advocate this approach to them. But what of the civil sector? Who is their customer?
The national space policy helps answer. One of the civil space sector's customer is the private sector. "To develop new technologies in support of U.S. Government needs and our economic competitiveness" is a mandate in the space policy, along with space science and exploration.
The US commercial space sector is very strong worldwide in large part due to their success in marketing the technologies developed for, with and by the government in the last 20 years. For example, high power transponder technology developed for programs like MILSTAR is flying on commercial satellites, competing with fiber to provide global telephonic networking and video services like Direct TV.
In addition, NASA's efforts with reusable launch vehicles and the DoD's efforts with EELV will posture US industry to compete effectively with foreign offerors - in Japan, China, Russia, Europe - who are also bidding for the opportunity to carry payloads to orbit.
Finally, the national space policy guidance is that "all U.S. Government agencies - including the DoD - purchase commercially available space goods and services to the fullest extent feasible except for reasons of national security or public safety." Clearly our national space policy is oriented toward commercial "space-faring.
To further foster the commercial sector aspects of the national space policy, the Department of Commerce has established the Office of Air & Space Commercialization to help encourage creative private sector plans for making space "just another place to do business."
Commercial use of space touches some of the most significant international trade issues - global markets, access to remote areas, government subsidized competition, international standardization & regulation.
With the commercialization and internationalization of space, the most vexing trade and defense conversion issues are very relevant to our space policy. I have mentioned the defense imperative to ensure freedom of access to space for commercial markets, but the overlap of defense and commercial objectives is more extensive.
Measured by revenue, the leading commercial markets are:
- communication services
- ground equipment
- satellite manufacturing
- launch services
- remote sensing
These are all important to the DoD. The department is challenged with the policy mandate to use these commercially available services, while balancing the need to ensure our access to space and ability to use space to support military operations even in conflict.
Two of these balancing acts are the ability of the DoD to compete as a minority customer with little market influence - compared to CNN or coverage of the Olympics - and the differences between military and commercial threats. For example, the military is much more concerned with the impacts of jamming and even low level nuclear effects than NASA or the commercial industry.
The updated national space policy addresses all sectors of space use - commercial, civil, intelligence, and defense, and is remarkably comprehensive.
The message from these few minutes, and it would take longer to read carefully the policy than we've spent here, is that the sectors are no longer independent - and successful implementation of the national space policy will require unprecedented cooperation.
The DoD and the intelligence community have taken our first steps with the establishment of the Joint Space Management Board. Many more will be required to coordinate the civil and commercial sectors, and government and private sector space leaders are working to achieve this.
Just as our nation's past success has been tied to our free access to the seas, our future successes will be tied to free access to space - freedom to pass and collect information globally, freedom to exploit space and the planets, freedom to market space products, freedom to travel through space, freedom "to go where no man has gone."
We are the world's most successful space-faring nation. It is one of the reasons the US holds its current global position. The US has always been a frontier nation - and space is the final frontier! Our national space policy confirms our national intent to be frontiersmen and women.
I appreciate the opportunity to share what may be a somewhat new DoD perspective on interdependence - you heard the birthing noises last year from Bob Davis, and we in the Architect's Office are working closely with his organization to make his predictions come true.
I would also be remiss if I didn't acknowledge the role "IEEE" has filled over the years in providing a forum for exchange of the most current technical information, and well as informed debate on our nation's path in this uncharted territory.
Friday night we took our seven year old son to watch Star Wars on the big screen. He was as excited as I was twenty years ago. Star Wars is wonderful science fiction and great entertainment - but it is also something more. It draws us, across generations and backgrounds, because it also reminds us about the importance of vision, challenges and values.
So I think it is appropriate that I conclude with "The Force be with you."
11 February 1997
MGen Robert Dickman
To bring you up to speed, our first Architecture on MILSATCOM went to the Joint Space Management Board on August 29th, last year. The transition planning was assigned to DUSD(Space) and that process is expected to last until about this time next year.
Our second architecture, on Space Control - think of it as how do we assure the availability of space capabilities to our forces, deny the opportunity for others to use space against us when necessary, and keep track of what's in space - is about done. It is caught in a little bit of a JSMB backlog, and may go forward sometime next month.
Our third architecture on satellite operations still has a long way to go, although most of the basic fact-finding and a lot of the analysis is behind us. We're trying to look at the mission of controlling satellites on orbit from a national perspective, including Defense, the NRO, NASA and NOAA. As you might expect, all the challenges aren't technical.
While we've also done some specific studies at Bob Davis' or Dr. Kaminski's request, these have generally had a pretty small audience. So the three architectures I've mentioned and the processes associated with building them are really what the Panel members have to form their views.
Although the Space Architect Office is the most visible player in any architecture I would be remiss if I didn't acknowledge the tremendous unseen support by the Services and Agencies in terms of people, time, and money. Many of the participants are asked to consider ideas that are at odds with current doctrine, missions, and programs. They do so, and their bosses let them. We've worked through many of these differences, and as a result, an architecture is generally representative of the best thinking across the entire space community.
Industry has played an important part in the architectures also. Your view of future markets, services, and technologies have given us valuable insight into what is doable 15- 20 years from now. In many areas you are certainly the leaders and we are the followers.
Last year at this time, I suggested our approach would be to develop a series of architectural alternatives, the JSMB would assess them all and approve one of them, and then DUSD (Space) would then turn it into an acquisition. There have been a few twists and turns in that path based on what we have learned.
Developing three to five architectures for the JSMB to choose among simply doesn't work. In order to highlight the trade space, the architecture alternatives emphasize differences, not preferred capabilities. So, in many respects they are not exactly what anyone would want. In addition, expecting an organization the size and complexity of the JSMB to make a decision, in real-time, is fantasy.
So now, we acknowledge up front the alternative architectures serve to frame the discussion during our development process, and out of the discussions and analyses we try to find a common ground on what is important, what is affordable, what is tradable. At the JSMB, we report out a recommended architecture that usually will have elements of each of the alternatives.
This is not a compromise architecture - one that is diluted to accommodate diverging views, though we certainly try to reach consensus before we bring it forward. It is our sense of what's best, taking into account requirements, doctrine, threat, budgets, politics and whatever else. As the Architect, I'm responsible for the final recommendation.
Our commitment is that we won't bring forward to the JSMB an architecture that is flat out unacceptable to any of the members, but within that we know that we are asking many of the stakeholders to accept results are different than their organizations would have proposed. We literally spend months briefing our thoughts through the staffs, up through the one, two and three stars and equivalent civilians before going to the JSMB membership - learning and modifying along the way. By the time we're done, the common ground is pretty consistent across the JSMB members.
I also recall that last year I implied our post-JSMB role would be to stand back and monitor. Our experience to date is mixed.
Within the formal DUSD process on MILSATCOM, we are one of many participants that function within the committee and subcommittee and sub-sub-committee structure that has been put in place. In practice, we've found that we've been engaged almost continuously, for example looking at whether specific acquisitions such as the Universal Modem are consistent with the architecture, helping others understand the relationships between what we did and things like DISA's CSCI initiatives, participating in related architecture developments like the Dick Mosier's C4ISR work, educating the QDR groups on what was done and what was decided, and so on.
We're engaged because as developers of the architecture, we are probably best able to interpret it. We have resources that other staffs and agencies may not have, and we have a broader cross architecture view than those whose task is to focus on a particular mission area. So while it is taking more of our time than I expected, it is time well spent.
From an acquisition and programmatic perspective, an architecture is challenging. It is a tightly coupled collection of individual programs. The dollar value of its component programs will most likely equal an ACAT I program whereas the components may consist of entirely non-ACAT I programs or a mix of small programs with one or more ACAT I.
The challenge is to maintain the JROC and DAE/SAE perspective that was applied to the architecture selection across a breadth of disparate programs, while not trying to manage all of them at the OSD level. Let enough small programs run amuck, and the architecture looses its meaning.
Of course, that isn't our job, it's Bob Davis'. If our help is useful, we're glad to provide it.
By definition, our architectures are stakes in the sand at about 2010. The biggest challenge in planning to implement them is that there are always legacy systems - DSCS, UFO, MILSTAR - and in some cases on-going modernization programs - MILSTAR II/Advanced EHF, Global Broadcast, Universal Modem, SCAMP, and so on.
The programming of the transition to a new architecture may be the most difficult aspect of implementation and may impose the most constraints on schedule, cost, and end state. Funding new systems may require phasing out legacy system or upgrades developed under an older architecture and scheduled to come on line during the transition. In effect, we may have to ask the warfighter to accept more risk now to gain significantly more capability or flexibility in the future, and the acquisition community to make some right- angle turns from their planned path.
Within that construct, our sense is that for end user-focused architectures, changes in the ground systems - SATCOM terminals, for example - will have a far bigger effect on the overall cost and capability of an architecture than the satellites. The space segment, while not a simple problem, is much more tractable. Unfortunately, NOBODY wants to take on the ground programs.
Accommodating architectures in the joint requirements process is also evolving. The major sticking point between the architecture process and the requirements process is the different definitions of the future. An architecture looks ahead 15-25 years; the JROC process looks ahead maybe ten years. An architecture is based on a fuzzy threat, emerging warfighting doctrine, and a security strategy that is apt to change. The JROC process is essentially rooted in the near-term threat, strategy, requirements, and budget.
The bridge is the CAPSTONE Requirements Document, produced by USSPACECOM and intended to set the overall needs to be met by the architecture, including the rationale behind the requirements. It's a new process, and so far we haven't got the schedules for the CRD and the Architectures lined up exactly right. But even without completed CRDs Space Command has done a great job providing us the vision of the need.
The rub comes when the architecture is graded by today's standards instead of tomorrow's vision. This is not to say that the JROC process is without vision. In fact, we base our work on the Joint Vision and Service doctrines. They simply deal with much more immediate problems, and work in a bigger trade space. So they instinctively want more certitude before committing resources. As a result, we find ourselves in another year of planning the transition from the MilSatCom architecture to its acquisition.
I'm not so sure that's bad, though I wouldn't have chosen it. Maybe our view of the transition from architecture to acquisition was simplistic. Maybe our expectations for a speedy transition decisions were too high. For sure the transition process was an unknown when we started. And we are forced to make the rules as we go.
The POM is another example of using near-term standards. Today's budget levels, plus inflation, are assumed as the working target throughout the architecture time frame. Any architectures above those levels will probably be met with reserved enthusiasm, almost independent of capability.
In the case of MilSatCom, The POM is lower in real dollars than anytime in the last twenty years - lower than in the late 1970s, when the only new acquisition was DSCS III. Staying under that level while expanding on the capabilities provided in 2003 by UFO with GBS, DSCS and MILSTAR is a daunting challenge. So we've built in hooks that allow us to take advantage of larger budgets if that happens, while US Space Command looks at a cost-constrained requirement set.
Could we have made a better case for a more expensive MILSATCOM architecture? Maybe so, if we had a way of showing the direct contribution of space systems to warfighting success. The anecdotal evidence is there to support the basic conclusion that better communications will lead to better warfighting. Limited military experience supports the basic conclusion. But the Department does not have a good tool that tells us how much space support is needed; how to trade between ships, tanks, aircraft, people and satellites.
Even though the Space Architect Office is inside the Beltway, by a mere couple hundred yards, I believe the architecture process has credible warfighter and operator input. The first phase of any architecture studies the requirements: researching traditional needs, the Joint and Service visions, the new Capstone Requirements Document and related requirements databases; visiting the user at his battle labs; in the field; on the ship; at his school houses. We invite the user to participate in the architecture development; to review our progress; and to engage in military utility exercises.
There are some who suggest that involving end users in the internal technical issues about space systems is both a waste of time, and fraught with danger. I couldn't disagree more. They're the customer. It is important that they understand our product, and how it is produced, what it costs, why we've done things as we have. We've gotten some important insights from this interaction, things that have changed our priorities in very fundamental ways. If anything, we're looking for ways to expand this part of the effort.
Before I conclude, I would like to return to one more topic that was a matter of considerable discussion last year, and it allows me to end in an extremely upbeat fashion - that is our relationship with the NRO. A year ago when we talked about integrating architectures with the NRO, I'm sure many gave it little hope of success. I wasn't all that confident myself.
I'm pleased to report that we have a strong working relationship, much better than I would have predicted only a year into the process. We have worked together on five architecture issues, and done them in a completely open environment. The NRO has assigned a full-time representative to the Space Architect Office to work issues that cross between our organizations. I meet on a regular basis with Jeff Grant, my counterpart. I'm sorry he's not here today to give his perspectives, also.
It is in these meetings that Jeff and I find more and more common ground. We have become involved in some of their smaller studies, e.g. re-defining how we calculate satellite mission lifetime, and are moving toward common analysis tools like the Director's Demonstration capability. And finally, we have an approved Memorandum of Agreement that formalizes our working relationship, and areas of responsibility.
The Charter for the JSMB, and much of the discussion from a year ago, addressed the idea of a single National security Space Architect. I wasn't convinced it was practicable a year ago, and I question its value today. The Space Architect and the NRO work within the framework of two architects and one architecture. I do not see, at this time, any need to change.
What is next in store for the Space Architect?
Environmental sensing is probably next... if one looks at the information requirements for battle space characterization, mission planning, BDA, and current operations; new ways of using remote sensing information; and the disparate systems that look at the Earth - weather systems, National systems, Mission to Planet Earth, commercial imagery, radar, and remote sensing systems, one can't help wonder if there isn't some significant synergy between sensors, data processing and fusion, and dissemination.
Environmental sensing is a lead in to the larger issue of remote sensing - biting off something you can chew. We are still studying whether there is low hanging fruit here but for sure it will start us looking at the much larger issues.
We are looking at a number of small scope studies. It might be time to look again at multi-mission satellites and launch on demand. Why? Technology has changed, budgets have decreased, the warfighter brings a new paradigm for space requirements, many more satellites in orbits useful to multiple missions. Multi-mission does not have to necessarily mean multi payload; may mean single payload, multi-mission. I'd use the low altitude IR system, SMTS, that should do both missile warning and space surveillance - as an example. If you really want to think outside the box, consider multi- mission commercial and national security satellites.
Launch on demand would also be studied from a new viewpoint: If you took launch on demand as a given - 72 hours, seven days, thirty days - the time doesn't matter as long as it's predictable, what would you do to the rest of the business: satellite construction, launch vehicle integration, launch processing, constellation size, sparing and on orbit operations.
So there's lots to do.
In closing, let me turn to the topic facing the panel: What difference will Architectures make?
When we stood up the office a year and a half ago, our briefing to the senior leadership included a slide that said that the key to the utility of the architectures would be if the leadership asked, during every space related acquisition discussion, "What does the Architect say?" I still believe that is key.
If every change in leadership, every budget drill, every acquisition milestone is an opportunity to question and change the fundamental assumptions and decisions made in approving the architectures, they will have no lasting impact. The architectures need to be flexible, adapt to changing threats, changing funding, new requirements and modern technologies. They also have to be enduring.
Regardless of the long term impact, architecture development provides us the opportunity to re-think old paradigms, re-assess the environment, consider new uses of space capabilities, and most importantly take a hard look at the entire landscape at one time.
Thank you for the opportunity to be with you. I'll be available during the Panel discussion, and can take a couple of questions now if there is time.
See related Space Communications Architecture.