17 December 1997: Typos and links corrected.
See related document on PK crypto history:
http://cryptome.org/jya/nsam160.htm
16 December 1997
Source:
http://www.cesg.gov.uk/ellisint.htm
Thanks to David Parkinson
THE STORY OF NONSECRET ENCRYPTION
This paper by James Ellis was written in 1987. It was commissioned shortly
after his retirement to provide a firsthand historical account of the early
work by James and others in CESG, discovering the techniques that were later
to become known as Public Key Cryptography. Although there would have been
some academic interest in the paper back in 1987, it was decided on balance
to keep the record internal and accordingly the paper was given a low
classification and retained within CESG.
Since 1987 there have been three aspects which have created enormous changes
for CESG. First, the growth in the need for secure communications for
confidentiality and authentication has vastly increased key management
requirements. Second, the increase in processing speed has enabled large
arithmetical computations to be practicable. Third, the 1994 RPS gave CESG
responsibility for the communications security of the entire UK government
market. PKC is now seen as the best if not the only method for allowing wide
area manyuser secure communications. With this increase in CESG's external
visibility there has been a growing desire for greater openness.
During the past 11 years there had been no urgency to publish the paper,
but the necessary spark came when Clifford Cocks solved an important problem
that had been highlighted at a recent 'RSA' conference. Cliff is presenting
this solution in a paper at the IMA Conference on Cryptography and Coding
in Cirencester. Since he was one of the main contributors to our early work
it was clearly the right opportunity to set the record straight. As the paper
was being prepared for publication we heard that James had become very ill.
He died before the paper was published. We now publish it as a testament
to his imaginative and groundbreaking work.
Click here to download the
PostScript version of this paper. [See HTML version below]
Posted 16th December 1997.
Source:
http://www.cesg.gov.uk/ellisdox.ps
THE STORY OF NONSECRET ENCRYPTION
by J H ELLIS
1. Publickey cryptography (PKC) has been the subject of much discussion
in the open literature since Diffie and Hellman suggested the possibility
in their paper of April 1976 (reference 1) . It has captured
public imagination, and has been analysed and developed for practical use.
Over the past decade there has been considerable academic activity in this
field with many different schemes being proposed and, sometimes, analysed.
2. Cryptography is a most unusual science. Most professional scientists aim
to be the first to publish their work, because it is through dissemination
that the work realises its value. In contrast, the fullest value of cryptography
is realised by minimising the information available to potential adversaries.
Thus professional cryptographers normally work in closed communities to provide
sufficient professional interaction to ensure quality while maintaining secrecy
from outsiders. Revelation of these secrets is normally only sanctioned in
the interests of historical accuracy after it has been demonstrated clearly
that no further benefit can be obtained from continued secrecy.
3. In keeping with this tradition it is now appropriate to tell the story
of the invention and development within CESG of nonsecret encryption (NSE)
which was our original name for what is now called PKC. The task of writing
this paper has devolved on me because NSE was my idea and I can therefore
describe these early developments from personal experience. No techniques
not already public knowledge, or specific applications of NSE will be mentioned.
Neither shall I venture into evaluation. This is a simple, personal account
of the salient features, with only the absolute minimum of mathematics.
4. The story begins in the 60's. The management of vast quantities of key
material needed for secure communication was a headache for the armed forces.
It was obvious to everyone, including me, that no secure communication was
possible without secret key, some other secret knowledge, or at least some
way in which the recipient was in a different position from an interceptor.
After all, if they were in identical situations how could one possibly be
able to receive what the other could not? Thus there was no incentive to
look for something so clearly impossible.
5. The event which changed this view was the discovery of a wartime,
BellTelephone report by an unknown author describing an ingenious idea for
secure telephone speech (reference 2). It proposed that
the recipient should mask the sender's speech by adding noise to the line.
He could subtract the noise afterwards since he had added it and therefore
knew what it was. The obvious practical disadvantages of this system prevented
it being actually used, but it has some interesting characteristics. One
of these, irrelevant to the main theme, is the amusing party trick of using
the negative of the speech signal as the added noise. This leaves no signal
on the line but the received signal unimpaired. This is easy to do and somewhat
startling, but a simple analysis of the feedback shows that it is simply
an amplifier with a low input impedance which shorts out the line.
6. The relevant point is that the receiver needs no special position or knowledge
to get secure speech. No key is provided; the interceptor can know all about
the system; he can even be given the choice of two independent identical
terminals. If the interceptor pretends to be the recipient, he does not receive;
he only destroys the message for the recipient by his added noise. This is
all obvious. The only point is that it provides a counter example to the
obvious principle of paragraph 4. The reason was not far to seek. The difference
between this and conventional encryption is that in this case the recipient
takes part in the encryption process. Without this the original concept is
still true. So the idea was born. Secure communication was, at least,
theoretically possible if the recipient took part in the encipherment.
7. The next question was the obvious one, "Can this be done with ordinary
encipherment? Can we produce a secure encrypted message, readable by the
authorised recipient without any prior secret exchange of the key etc?" This
question actually occurred to me in bed one night, and the proof of the
theoretical possibility took only a few minutes. We had an existence theorem.
The unthinkable was actually possible. The only remaining question was "Can
it be made practicable?" This took a while to answer.
8. I published the existence theorem in 1970 (reference 3).
Its outline is as follows. We may represent an encipherment process by a
lookup table, with the settings, message etc as the variables used for lookup,
and the cipher text as the contents of the table. Such a table will normally
be impossibly huge but it could, in principle, always be constructed. Conversely,
such a table itself can be used as such a process, even if a more conventional
embodiment cannot be found. This proof treats the encipherment processes
as tables, and demonstrates a form which satisfies the requirements.
9. Suppose the recipient has two tables M1 and M3 while the sender has one,
M2. These machine tables are not secret and may be supposed to be possessed
by the interceptor. M1 takes an input k and produces an output x. M2 takes
inputs x and p giving an output z. M3 takes inputs z and k. All these quantities
are large numbers of the same magnitude. We can think of M1 as a linear table
or simple list, while M2 and M3 are square tables.
10. In operation p is the message which is to be sent, and k is a random
number, the key, chosen by the recipient. He enciphers k by M1 to get x which
he sends. The sender uses x to encipher p with M2 to get z, the cipher text,
which he sends back. Now the recipient uses k to decipher z by means of M3.
It is clearly possible for the entries of M3 to give p under these circumstances,
so we have achieved our objective.
11. If the numbers are large enough, and M1 and M2 sufficiently random to
avoid working backwards, p cannot be found without knowing k. In
publickeyencryption terms, x is the public, encipherment key and k the
private, decipherment key.
12. Having thus demonstrated that NSE was possible, the next task was to
find a practical implementation. There was no difficulty in getting devices
to behave as M1 and M2 in producing output from which the input could not
be found, although it was theoretically defined by the output. The problem
was to devise a method for which M3 could be produced. Various ideas were
found to have flaws, and there was always the possibility that we were trying
to break some subtle law of mathematics in looking for practicability. Of
course there was no need to use the format of the existence theorem; that
was only one option. For instance, suppose we could find two secure encipherment
processes which commuted; presumably one process with two different keys
but not necessarily. Then the sender (S) could encipher his message, p, and
send it to the recipient (R). R could now reencipher and sent it back to
S. Because the two encipherments commute the result would be the same as
if R had enciphered first, and S second; so S could remove his encipherment.
This text, which he sends back to R is the same as p enciphered by R, so
R can decipher. At no time is unenciphered text or key transmitted. This
has the disadvantage of an extra pass, but this does not debarr it.
13. Because of the weakness of my number theory, practical implementations
were left to others. The first workable idea was put forward in
reference 4 by Clifford Cocks. This is essentially the RSA
Algorithm. Briefly the method is this. R chooses two large primes P and Q
also prime to P1 and Q1, and sends N=PQ to S. S has a message which he
enciphers as C=M^{N} (mod N).
14. To decipher, R finds P' and Q'
PP' = 1 (mod Q1)
and
QQ' = 1 (mod P1)
Then
M = C^{P'} (mod Q)
M = C^{Q'} (mod P)
so M can be found. The security lies in the difficulty of factorising N.
15. It is interesting to note that this method follows exactly the existence
theorem; k is P and Q, x is N, p is M and z is C. M1 is the startlingly simple
process of multiplying the two parts of k, P and Q, together. M2 consists
of raising M to the power N (mod N) and M3 is the process of paragraph 14.
16. The RSA algorithm (reference 5) differs in that R forms
a pair of integers, d and e, such that
de = 1 (mod (P1)(Q1))
He sends e and N to S, and S enciphers M as
C = M^{e} (mod N)
R deciphers as
M = C^{d} (mod N)
17. The differences between the two algorithms are superficial. Cocks is
a special case of RSA in that it puts e = N. Also it suggests a more
computationally efficient method of decryption by retaining the factorisation
of N and carrying out the exponentiation twice, but to the smaller moduli
P and Q. Of course the decipherment could still be done by forming d such
the dN = 1 (mod(P1 )(Q1)). This technique for reducing the computation
is now wellknown in the context of RSA.
18. The RSA algorithm has the merit that it is symmetrical; the same process
is used both for encipherment and decipherment, which simplifies the equipment
needed. Also e can be chosen arbitrarily so that a particularly simple version
can be had for encipherment. In this way the complex process would be needed
only for the recipient. Indeed, the same simple e could be used for all
encipherments, with the recipients just supplying different N. These differences,
however are small. The two algorithms are variants of the same method.
19. A couple of months later Malcolm Williamson came to me with a different
scheme. This also involved the raising of the message to a power which was
the product of large numbers, but relied on the fact that exponentiation
was commutative. He published this in reference 6.
20. The paper was couched in the rather more general form of finite rings;
but in terms of modular arithmetic the scheme was for S and R each to choose
a large number, k and 1 respectively. Taking the message again as M, to give
some consistency in our notation, S sends M^{k} and R returns
(M^{k})^{l} = M^{kl}; all calculations being mod
some large prime, say P. S forms K so that Kk = 1 (mod P1) and therefore
M^{Kk} = M (mod P). So that by raising M^{k1} to the power
K, S can remove his original encipherment leaving M^{1} which he
sends to R. R removes 1 in the same way and so recovers M. The fact that
k and 1 need not be prime enormously helps their choice. They must of course,
in this version be prime to P1.
21. Later he produced a simple, elegant scheme which was much easier to use.
It was the sort of idea which is obvious once someone else has thought of
it. In this a base x and a modulus q are known. x will be small and q large.
S and R each choose a large random number; say a and b. They then form
x^{a} and x^{b} respectively and send the results to each
other. They both now form x^{ab} by raising the number they have
received to the power of their own chosen number. Thus after two passes and
no decipherment process they both have a large number known only to them
which can be used as key in the normal way.
22. I described this method internally on a number of occasions, and, for
this reason I suppose, I find I have often been given credit for it although
I did, of course, acknowledge the source. I should like to take this opportunity
