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The Security Service is also known as MI5. "xxxx" indicates text censored by hand. "Cropped" means during copying, not by censoring.

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[14 pages.]



TEL: 0171-828 8688 EXT: 88300
GTN: 3033
FAX: 0171-630 1428


                                       Our Ref: PF690551/G9/0

                                       Date:  1 December 1995

Dear xxxxxxxxx

         Libyan Intelligence Service activity in the UK

     Since his arrival as Head of the Libyan Interests Section
in London in July 1993, we have been monitoring the activities
of Khalifa Ahmad BAZELYA.  We have concluded that he is actively
engaged in carrying out tasks on behalf of the Libyan
Intelligence Service (LIS).

2.   In parallel to our investigation SIS and more recently,
ourselves have cultivated BAZELYA as a potential source of
intelligence.  Although BAZELYA has provided some low-grade
intelligence, we assess that his first loyalty remains to the
Libyan regime.  We consider the balance of advantage to lie
in ending BAZELYA's hostile intelligence activities.  We propose
that he be declared Persona Non Grata in the immediate future.

3.   Exact timing is of course a matter for your consideration.
You will be aware of the overtures made through one of our
sources by xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx regarding the delivery of the
Lockerbie suspects into UK jurisdiction.  This was discussed
on 28 November at a meeting between xxxxxxxxxx (G9)and xxxxx
xxxxxxxxx (G6), and xxxxxxxxxxxxxx (DICTD) and xxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxx (NENAD).  We assess that the expulsion of BAZELYA will not
have serious repercussions for our source.

4.    I attach a written case against BAZELYA.  It was discussed
with xxxxxxxxxxxxxx of NENAD on 17 November.  xxxxxxxxxx invited
submission in a telephone conversation we had on 28 November.


       Envelope for return [balance of boxed notation cropped]

SECRET & PERSONAL covering TOP SECRET DELICATE SOURCE UK EYES A [Emblem] 5. With regard to the murder of Libyan dissident Al Mehmet ABU SAID in London on 26 November, we have no reliable intelligence implicating BEZELYA. However, intelligence on a possible lead to Libyan regime involvement has been received and is being assessed. We will report further in due course although we do not believe that it would add to our submission on this matter. 6. Please contact me if there are any aspects of this proposal which you may wish to discuss. Yours ever [by hand] xxxxxx xxxxxxxxx [signature] Pxxxxx [Name or title] PD/SLH xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx PUSD FCO Copied to: xxxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxx NENAD DICTD F4 Division FCO FCO Home Office SECRET & PERSONAL covering TOP SECRET DELICATE SOURCE UK EYES A
TOP SECRET DELICATE SOURCE UK EYES A Khalifa Ahmad BAZELYA Head of Libyan Interests Section, London Cooptee of Libyan Intelligence Service Recommendation We recommend that Khalifa Ahmad BAZELYA, head of Libyan Interests Section in London, be declared Persona Non Grata for engaging in activity incompatible with his diplomatic status which we believe poses a direct threat to the national security of the United Kingdom. Summary 2. Our investigation of BAZELYA's activities since his [balance of page cropped.]
TOP SECRET DELICATE SOURCE UK EYES A g. BAZELYA may be involved in a project to establish a Libyan Scientific Centre which will be used as cover for technology transfer to Libya. Background - Career Prior to Current Appointment 3. BAZELYA took up his appointment as replacement for Ahmad Omar AMEISH, Head of the Libyan Interests Section (LIS) London, on 1st July 1993. he is one of two Libyan diplomats currently en poste in the UK. According to a reliable FBI source, BAZELYA was not the Libyan MFA choice for the post. It was therefore assumed that he had obtained the post through patronage or intelligence connections or function. We later received collateral for this in October 1993. According to a reliable SIS source BAZELYA admitted that QADHAFI and BAZELYA's other intelligence patrons secured his appointment to London. 4. BAZELYA had previously been en poste in this country as cultural attache and then press attache between 1974- 1979, when he was responsible for liaison with Libyan backed extremist groups in the UK. We suspected he had an intelligence function, though this assessment was based mainly on BAZELYA's contacts rather than his actions. However, a reliable SIS source reported that he was one of QADHAFI's agents in the UK. Another source of unknown reliability reported having seen a revolver in the glove compartment of BAZELYA's car. 5. Separate sources reported that during this period BAZELYA had links with Sinn Fein in the Republic of Ireland. In January 1992 the FBI reported it had reliable source information linking BAZELYA with PIRA, although we have no further details or the date of the information. BAZELYA certainly visited Dublin on a number of occasions and was in contact with a number of Irish nationals. He was also in regular contact with the Irish-Arab Society in Dublin, then suspected of having close links to PIRA. An SIS source whose reliability is currently being reassessed, also reported BAZELYA's numerous Irish contacts and said BAZELYA had a bank account at Dublin airport. On one occasion the source was given a checque drawn on this account. 6. BAZELYA was posted to Addis Ababa in March 1981. Separate sources have reported that during his 11 year tour he was heavily involved in activities on behalf of Libyan intelligence. These activities resulted in the expulsion of BAZELYA and another Libyan official from Ethiopia in March 1991. A CIA source of unestablished TOP SECRET DELICATE SOURCE UK EYES A
TOP SECRET DELICATE SOURCE UK EYES A reliability reported that they were expelled for meeting anti-government rebel groups including the Eritrean People's Liberation Front and providing them with unspecified assistance. This supports earlier intelligence from a Kenyan liaison service. In 1985 it reported that BAZELYA was thought to play a major role in channelling Libyan funds to Libyan backed African groups. 7. Further collateral for this was provided recently by a reliable source, delicate and well-placed Security Service source, who reported that for several years BAZELYA provided munitions to the Muslim-backed Eritrean Liberation Front. Some of these munitions reportedly may have been used to assassinate an Ethiopian minister during the Ethiopian civil war. According to source, weapons were smuggled in the Libyan diplomatic bag via Libyan Arab Airlines flights and BAZELYA was expelled after one of these consignments was intercepted by the Ethiopian authorities. 8. The same source has also reported that in 1984 the Revolutionary Committee in Libya, of which BAZELYA was a prominent member, was directly responsible for ordering the hanging of 13 anti-regime student activists at Al Fatah University in Tripoli. Attempts to Recruit BAZELYA 9. BAZELYA has been a long standing target for recruitment by SIS and more recently the Security Service. Prior to his arrival in the UK in 1993 he had significant intelligence traces. However, he was granted a visa to come to the UK as it was assessed at the time that the potential intelligence dividends of recruiting him outweighed the likely threat he would pose to the security of the UK. Since then we have received further adverse information about BAZELYA's activities before he came to the UK. Although his cultivation has continued he had not provided intelligence of value and has continued to work against UK interests. Activities During Current Appointment Security Service Sources 10. Reporting from several sources has enabled us to build up a detailed picture of BAZELYA's activities in London. Much of our information comes from reliable, delicate and well-placed sources within the LIS (source 1), the revolutionary student community (source 2) and the TOP SECRET DELICATE SOURCE UK EYES A
TOP SECRET DELICATE SOURCE UK EYES A Libyan dissident community (source 3), who are in close contact with BAZELYA. Other Security Service sources, telephone intercept, surveillance, SIS sources, and liaison sources have provided substantial additional intelligence and collateral for these agents' reporting. BAZELYA's contacts within the Libyan Regime 11. Since his arrival in the UK BAZELYA has been in frequent contact with senior members of the Libyan regime, including the Libyan intelligence services. The most significant of these are: a) MUSA KUSA: KUSA is the head of the Libyan External Security Organization (ESO), the principal intelligence institution in Libya which has been responsible for supporting terrorist organizations and for perpetrating state sponsored acts of terrorism. He is also the head of Al Mathaba, the Libyan centre for anti-imperialist propaganda which has funded third world guerilla groups. KUSA is wanted by the French authorities for questioning about the UTA 772 bombing. According to CX report 93/35282, KUSA was instrumental in securing BAZELYA his posting to London. Their relationship is long-standing and close. Separate sources have commented that BAZELYA is KUSA's "puppet" or "right hand man". According to source 1, BAZELYA's loyalty to KUSA is unquestioned; BAZELYA considers KUSA the only person he can trust. The two are in frequent telephone contact. Telephone intercept on the LIS (telecheck) has indicated that on his trips back to Libya, BAZELYA visits KUSA at ESO headquarters and regularly receives and carries out instructions from KUSA. For example, in October 1995 telecheck and source 1 reported that BAZELYA was initially unhappy about extending the student status of Muhammad WARRAD, a hardline revolutionary student suspected of having links with PIRA during the 1980s. However, BAZELYA quickly changed his mind on the receipt of a fax from KUSA ordering WARRAD's studentship to continue. Similarly, BAZELYA, though not happy with the arrangement, is obeying KUSA's instructions to subsidise another revolutionary student, Muhammad MARWAN, a suspected Libyan intelligence officer, out of LIS funds to enable him to stay in the UK. TOP [Balance cropped.]
TOP SECRET DELICATE SOURCE UK EYES A b) Muhammad NIAMA @ NAAMA: NIAMA is the ESO's General Secretary. Telecheck has revealed that BAZELYA is in regular contact with him, most notably in April 1995 when BAZELYA informed NIAMA that he had arranged for some papers to be faxed to KUSA at the ESO from a third country rather than from the UK. BAZELYA tasked Isa BARUNI, financial attache at the LIS. to fax the documents from Turkey, and instructed him to destroy them after faxing them. 12. According to an SIS source of unknown reliability, BAZELYA knows QADHAFI personally and has hosted him at his home in Libya. In October 1993 a reliable SIS source reported that BAZELYA had powerful patrons in Libya; in addition to KUSA these were Abdullah SENUSSI and Abdusalem SADMA, who at the time were de facto head and deputy head of the ESO. 13. BAZELYA is in telephone contact with other members of Libyan intelligence, including Khaled MABRUK, and ESO official close to KUSA. In July 1995 Mustafa ZAIDI, and IO with a history of violence in Europe, tried to contact BAZELYA at the LIS and left a number where BAZELYA could reach him. At the time ZAIDI was trying to come to the UK reportedly to co-ordinate Libyan regime activity against dissidents. ZAIDI was refused a UK visa. BAZELYA's Agent-Running Activities 14. Separate sources continue to report that the Libyan regime has increased its monitoring of Libyan dissidents and oppositionists abroad. This is largely a reaction to an aborted coup in 1993 which QADHAFI believes was orchestrated by oppositionists abroad. BAZELYA is actively involved in this monitoring. He runs a network of agents in the UK who report to him on the dissident and oppositionist communities. According to source 1, BAZELYA pays these agents £500-800 per agent per month form a "political" budget which is virtually limitless and unaccountable. The ESO in Tripoli simply requires regular intelligence reports and statements of how many agents/informants BAZELYA is running. We are aware of four agents. a) Mohammad Abdelhakim DIAB: DIAB is a UK based Egyptian [balance of page cropped.]
TOP SECRET DELICATE SOURCE UK EYES A by BAZELYA on the latter's return to the UK in 1993. DIAB reports on dissidents, including Syrians, Egyptians and Libyans. In January 1995 telecheck reported that BAZELYA arranged to visit KUSA with DIAB. KUSA was keen to see DIAB and believed he might be "useful". b) Wasfi BIN ISSA: BIN ISSA is a UK-based Libyan businessman. Source 1 has reported that he was on the locally engaged staff at the Libyan Embassy in 1970s and knew BAZELYA. In April 1990 a reliable and well placed dissident source, reported that BIN ISSA was initially approached by Abdusalem ZADMA, then the de facto deputy head of the ESO and tasked with gathering information on dissidents. Telecheck has confirmed that BIN ISSA is in contact with BAZELYA and regularly arranges to meet him. I has also reported that BIN ISSA is known to KUSA and has visited him in Libya. BIN ISSA reportedly receives between £500-£700 per month from BAZELYA for his weekly reports on dissident activity. c) Nasr/Abdelnasser ABDRABAH @ AL ANAIZI: Nasr is a veteran of the Afghan war. In April 1994 telecheck revealed that Nasr volunteered to pass BAZELYA information on dissidents. Telecheck and surveillance have established that the two now meet and speak regularly. Nasr seems to have unusually good access to BAZELYA. Telecheck has indicated that Nasr regularly rings BAZELYA at home and on his mobile telephone and while BAZELYA was abroad recently Nasr made concerted efforts to contact him. In September 1995 Nasr passed information to BAZELYA by telephone about the identities of Muslim Fundamentalists involved in disturbances in Benghazi, who had been arrested by Sudanese security. One individual was resident in the UK. Nasr stated he had further information to impart when he met BAZELYA face to face. BAZELYA agreed to pay Nasr for his information. On another occasion BAZELYA advised Nasry that it would be better to speak face to face rather than by telephone. All this strongly indicates that this is a covert relationship between an intelligence officer and an agent. d) Abdelqader BRIFKANI: BRIFKANI is an Iraqi Kurd who has been in regular contact with BAZELYA since at least January 1994. He is also a contact of Abdelhakim DIAB. Source 1 has reported that BRIFKANI TOP SECRET DELICATE SOURCE UK EYES A
TOP SECRET DELICATE SOURCE UK EYES A has visited Libya on several occasions. Telecheck has provided collateral for this and has indicated that BAZELYA has assisted BRIFKANI with his travel arrangements on at least two occasions, in January 1994 and January 1995. Source 1 has stated that BRIFKANI is a "paid agent of BAZELYA" and reports on the activities of the Libyan opposition in the UK. 15. BAZELYA has attempted to recruit at least one other agent. In February 1995 source3, a reliable dissident source, reported that BAZELYA tried to recruit him that month to report on Libyan royalist groups in the UK and Europe who oppose the regime. BAZELYA told source he was interested in behind-the-scenes grass roots activists, rather than dissident leaders. BAZELYA wanted personal particulars, details of travel overseas, opposition groups' printing locations and general modus operandi. BAZELYA implied that he would pay the source for his services. The source declined the offer. 16. In January 1995, telecheck reported that BAZELYA had targeted someone he considered suitable to work for KUSA in the Sudan. This person was prepared to form a group to serve KUSA. BAZELYA implied that the person's suitability was enhanced by the fact that he was not known to other intelligence services. KUSA instructed BAZELYA to make appropriate arrangements and inform him of the details at a face to face meeting. BAZELYA's Alleged Threats to Dissidents 17. In February 1995 source 3 reported that, following his refusal to become one of BAZELYA's informants (see para 15 above), BAZELYA threatened him. The threat was reported to the police and BAZELYA was interviewed by the Diplomatic Protection Group on 16 February 1995. No further action was taken. 18. Also in February 1995 source 3 reported that Dr Salem Omar ISSA was threatened by BAZELYA at the LIS. When interviewed by the Security Service ISSA himself confirmed that he was subjected to harassment, though he stated that it was more of a stern warning than a threat. Nevertheless he took it very seriously. Source 3 later reported that ISSA told him that he had played down the harassment during the interview, out of fear that BAZELYA might somehow learn of his complaint. TOP SECRET DELICATE SOURCE UK EYES A
TOP SECRET DELICATE SOURCE UK EYES A 19. In April 1995 source 3 reported that a (fnu) IZZ AL-DEN had received money from BAZELYA as a sweetner after being harassed by BAZELYA. However, we have no collateral for this. BAZELYA's Contact with Suspected Libyan Intelligence Officers in the UK 20. Reliable reporting from agents and telecheck indicates that there are at least four Libyan intelligence officers (IOs) in the UK under student cover. Our intelligence suggests they are working to a ESO brief. 21. We would expect that legitimate students would deal directly with the financial attache, not with BAZELYA. However, source 1 has reported that the intelligence officers meet BAZELYA privately at teh LIS to report on the Libyan dissident and student communities in the UK. Source 2 has provided collateral for this and telecheck has confirmed their direct contact with BAZELYA. Source 1 has reported that these IOs also have direct links with Musa KUSA and send their reports to him via DHL courier service. These are reportedly entrusted to BAZELYA who personally oversees their ownward transmission to KUSA. The principal figures are: a) Mohammed MARWAN: MARWAN is a London based law student. Both Source 1 and source 2 have reported that he is a Libyan intelligence officer. According to source 1, MARWAN is a frequent visitor to BAZELYA and a close friend of Musa KUSA. Telecheck and source 2 have provided collateral for this reporting and has revealed that, during his fairly frequent trips back to Libya, MARWAN regularly visits KUSA at ESO offices, and has acted a messenger between KUSA and BAZELYA. Source 1 reported that, following a recent trip to Libya, BAZELYA met MARWAN daily for up to 3 hours at a time to discuss "Musa KUSA business". b) Yousef SHAKONA: SHAKONA is a London based student of international relations. He has significant intelligence traces. According to a reliable Security Service source, he was employed by the Foreign Ministry Intelligence Section in Tripoli and was responsible for letter intercept. Both source 2 and source 1 have reported he TOP SECRET DELICATE SOURCE UK EYES A
TOP SECRET DELICATE SOURCE UK EYES A is an IO. Telecheck has confirmed his contact with BAZELYA and has indicated that BAZELYA holds him in some regard. Source 1 has reported that SHAKONA's student grant has expired and that BAZELYA is helping him to survive with payments from his "political" budget to pay agents. c. Bulghasem MASSOUD: MASSOUD is a Bristol based student whom separate sources have reported as a Libyan IO employed by the ESO. MASSOUD has tried to contact BAZELYA by telephone, and, according to source 1, visits him at the LIS when in London. d. Abdelsalem RADWAN @ Abdulsalem MOHAMMAD: MOHAMMAD is a Colchester-based law student, whom we assess has an intelligence function. In August 1993, BAZELYA visited MOHAMMAD at his Colchester home, one of the few occasions BAZELYA has travelled outside London. According to source 1, MOHAMMAD is in a similar position to SHAKONA, surviving on payments from BAZELYA. BAZELYA's involvement with the Revolutionary Student Community in the UK 22. Libyan revolutionary students have in the past been responsible for violent anti-dissident activity in the UK and abroad. Since the student expulsions of 1986 there has been relatively little revolutionary student activity in the UK and recent reliable reporting has suggested that the Libyan regime has ordered a reduction in revolutionary student activity, at least overt activity, as part of its efforts to improve its image. However, separate reliable reporting has indicated that the students themselves wish to reactivate their activities, source 1 has reported that BAZELYA is colluding with the revolutionary student to help them begin their activities again. He holds frequent meetings with a hard core of revolutionary students who form the revolutionary student committee in the UK, and facilitates revolutionary student funding by personally arranging for the Libyan MFA to officially request the financial attache, BARUNI, to release funds, which BURUNI would otherwise be reluctant to do. 23. BAZELYA has been involved in setting up a new Libyan "club" on the Libyan school premises, which will, according to source 1, be used by the revolutionary students as TOP SECRET DELICATE SOURCE UK EYES A
TOP SECRET DELICATE SOURCE UK EYES A a meeting place to coordinate their activities. In May 1995 telecheck reported that BAZELYA advised Muhammad JIBRIL, leader of the revolutionary students in the UK, that they should remain in the background during the early days of the club, implying that they would be able to exert their influence at a later date. Source 1 has reported that since the club's opening BAZELYA has begun to meet the students there rather than at the LIS. After meeting the students he writes a report for KUSA. We believe that he has changed the location of his meetings to try to prevent our coverage of them. 24. In November 1995 source 1 reported that BAZELYA had put forward a proposal to transfer financial administration of Libyan students in the UK to an English limited liability company funded by the Libyan government. A firm of solicitors has reportedly been engaged to advise the LIS in this matter. If the proposal goes ahead, we believe BAZELYA will be able to deny responsibility for any actions undertaken by Libyan students in the UK. This could also potentially cause great embarrassment, as a British company could be held responsible for any violent or undesirable activity. Disruption of SIS sources 25. As part of his intelligence brief BAZELYA reports to Musa KUSA at the ESO. Source 1 recently reported that, following the Libyan National Day celebrations, BAZELYA sent a report to KUSA detailing individuals who had not attended. According to source the favored way of dealing with miscreants is usually to recall them to Libya where the individual can be dealt with appropriately, or to make life difficult for them, for example, by obstructing travel on business to Libya. The SIS Libyan agent runner, has pointed out that three of the individuals named are important SIS sources. He voiced great concern that BAZELYA's actions may disrupt these sources' reporting by affecting their ability to travel between the UK and Libya. HMG therefore stands to lose a great deal of important political intelligence. BAZELYA's Possible Involvement in Technology Transfer 26. Source 1 has recently reported that BAZELYA may be involved in facilitating a Libyan project which has technology transfer implications. He has had detailed discussions with Dr Abdul Majid ABDULRAHMAN, a Libyan researcher in High Energy Physics at the Rutherford Appleton Laboratory, about the latter's proposal to set up a Libyan Scientific Centre. The same source has reported that in May 1995 BAZELYA sent Musa KUSA a letter [Balance of page, probably only classification, cropped.]
TOP SECRET DELICATE SOURCE UK EYES A outlining the proposal. KUSA approved teh project. The draft proposal indicates an implicit intent to use the centre as cover for technology transfer to Libya, and to disguise the centre's true purpose by using an unattributable name. Monitoring of the centre's members will reportedly be carried out by the revolutionary students who report directly to KUSA. BAZELYA's Commercial Activities 27. We are currently investigating BAZELYA's role in the transfer of Libyan funds through the UK to an unknown destination. Since 1993 large sums of money, which we assess originate from Al Mathaba, have passed through LIS accounts and from BAZELYA's personal account to a British journalist who has then paid some of the money to client accounts in the name of Kojo TSIKATA, a Ghanaian intelligence officer, held with a British firm of solicitors. Though we are uncertain for what purpose this money has been paid, the routing of the payments is highly suspicious, and efforts have been made to disguise the source. We continue to investigate this matter. 28. BAZELYA has also recently been heavily involved in promoting a Libyan PR campaign aimed at persuading the British public that the Libyans were not responsible for the bombing of Pan Am 103 over Lockerbie. A British PR and lobbying company, GJW, is to carry out the work. Telecheck has suggested that BAZELYA intends to take a huge personal cut from the project's budget. Source 1 has provided collateral fro this, reporting that BAZELYA would get £1.5 million. We believe that the Libyan authorities are not aware of this activity which is incompatible with BAZELYA's diplomatic status (Article 42 of the Vienna Convention). 29. There is some evidence to suggest that BAZELYA has engaged in further commercial activities for personal gain, which would also contravene the conditions of his diplomatic status. For example, in late 1994 telecheck revealed that he was involved in arranging a deal to buy Flit insecticide. We assess that it is likely BAZELYA did secure a profit for himself but there is no firm evidence to prove this. Conclusion 30. Over the last year activity on behalf of the Libyan Intelligence Services, involving the monitoring of Libyan dissidents and oppositionists in the UK, has increased. While we assess that, as long as UN sanctions remain in [Balance of page, probably only classification, cropped.]
TOP SECRET DELICATE SOURCE UK EYES A place, the Libyan regime is unlikely to attack Western interests, we view the stepping up of Libyan intelligence activity with great concern. Though there is at present no firm evidence that the recent murder of Ali Mehmed Abu SAID is connected to Libyan Intelligence Services, we may have to review our assessment. What is clear is that, should the Libyan regime wish to resume its violent activities, it has a pool of individuals in the UK, headed by BAZELYA, who would be willing to participate, and an established structure for coordinating these activities. 31. BAZELYA is the focal point for Libyan intelligence activity in the UK and is becoming increasingly active in his own right. His continued presence in the UK can only serve to facilitate further intelligence activity. 32. BAZELYA's expulsion would severely disrupt the Libyan intelligence effort in the UK. It would also send a strong message to the Libyan regime that HMG will not tolerate Libyan intelligence activity on British soil. TOP SECRET DELICATE SOURCE UK EYES A

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