29 April 1998
Thanks to Jeffrey T. Richelson and Ballinger
New York, Ballinger, 1989
This excerpt from Second Edition (soft), pp. 265-287
Despite its huge investment in technical and human intelligence activities, the United States relies for a significant portion of its intelligence on exchange and liaison arrangements with a variety of foreign nations. Some arrangements are long standing, highly formalized, and involve the most sensitive forms of intelligence collection. Others are less wide ranging and reflect very limited common interests between the United States and other nations.
The most important arrangements are the multilateral arrangements with the
United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, and until recently, New Zealand, concerning
the collection and distribution of signals intelligence and ocean surveillance
data. The United States also maintains bilateral arrangements with each of
those nations. Also of major importance are the arrangements with Israel,
Japan, Norway, and China. Among the other nations with which the United States
has exchange and liaison agreements are Italy, Finland, and South Korea.
The U.S.-British military alliance in World War II necessitated a high degree of cooperation with respect to intelligence activities. It was imperative that the United States and Britain, as the main Allied combatants in the European and Pacific theaters, establish a coordinated effort in the acquisition of worldwide intelligence and its evaluation and distribution. Of all the areas of intelligence collaboration, it was in the area of signals intelligence that the most important and vital cooperation took place.
Cooperation began in the spring of 1941 when four representatives (two from the Navy and two from the Army) delivered a model of the Japanese PURPLE machine--used by Japan to encipher diplomatic communications to British codebreakers at Bletchley Park. In return, the British gave the U.S. representatives an assortment of advanced cryptological equipment, including the Marconi-Adcock high-frequency direction finder.1
Further cooperation involved both the exchange of personnel and a division of labor. A small U.S. mission was sent to the Combined Bureau at Singapore for the purpose of cooperation in signals intelligence, and a British naval officer trained in Japanese and experienced in cryptanalysis was introduced into the U.S. signals intelligence station on Corregidor in the Philippines. A secret channel of communication was established between Corregidor and Singapore for the direct exchange of cryptanalytical material. Meanwhile, it was agreed that the British would break Tokyo-London traffic while the Americans broke Tokyo-Washington traffic. The results of the U.S. codebreaking effort that were considered useful to Britain in its war with Germany were passed to London via the British ambassador in Washington.2
U.S. entry into the war expanded the scope of the U.S.-British signals intelligence cooperation. Both U.S. and British commanders in the field (whether directing U.S. forces, British forces, or joint forces) required the most up-to-date intelligence available on the enemy order of battle and plan of action--exactly the type of information that could best be provided by intercepts of military wireless traffic. Thus, in addition to the intercepts of diplomatic traffic being widely exchanged, it was necessary to broaden the exchange of intercepted military traffic and make arrangements for a coordinated attack on such traffic. Britain's production of such intelligence was labeled ULTRA.3
Although ULTRA information was made available to U.S. and British military commanders via Special Liaison Units, the exact nature of its acquisition was initially obscured. It was not until April 1943 that the British revealed to U.S. military intelligence officials the secret--that Britain's codebreaking organization could break the ciphers produced by the German ENIGMA machine used for much of German military communications.4
During the same visit to Bletchley Park at which British officials revealed the ULTRA secret to the United States, a formal agreement of cooperation, the BRUSA Agreement, was concluded between Britain and the United States. The Agreement established high-level cooperation on SIGINT matters and covered the exchange of personnel, joint regulations for the handling of ULTRA material, and procedures for its distribution. The joint regulations included strict security provisions that applied to all British and U.S. recipients of ULTRA material.5
Along with the increased cooperation between Britain and the United States, there was increased involvement by the Anglo-Saxon members of the British Commonwealth--Canada, Australia, and New Zealand--in a wide variety of intelligence activities. U.S.-Canadian cooperation began in October 1941, when the Canadians offered the Federal Communications Commission free access to the product of
Canadian monitoring activities. In return, the United States provided Canada with technical direction-finding data that were "invaluable for pinpointing the location of a transmitter."6
Canadian DF stations subsequently made significant contributions to the Allied North Atlantic SIGINT/ocean surveillance network. The Canadian codebreaking agency was also successful in intercepting and decoding German espionage control messages to and from agents in South America, Canada, Hamburg and Lisbon. In addition, messages to and from the Vichy delegation in Ottawa were intercepted and decoded. Further, the peculiarities of radio wave propagation resulted in Canadian monitoring facilities being able to intercept military transmissions originating in Europe that were inaccessible to equipment based in Britain.7
It was with respect to Japan, however, that SIGINT cooperation among all five nations reached its highest level. Monitoring stations in Canada, particularly the major one at Halifax, gathered large quantities of coded Japanese transmissions. In April 1942, a combined Allied signals intelligence agency for the Pacific, the Central Bureau of the Allied Intelligence Bureau, was activated in Melbourne with a U.S. Chief and an Australian Deputy Chief.8
The extent of cooperation is particularly highlighted in the case of Australian intercept stations. There was an Australian Air Force intercept station at Darwin, a U.S. Army radio intercept station in Townsville, a Royal Australian Navy monitoring station at Darwin, and a British post in Brisbane for the interception and distribution of Japanese radio communications. Additionally, a Canadian Special Wireless Group arrived in Australia on May 18, 1945 to take over the task of intercepting and analyzing Japanese military Morse code signals.9
The intelligence relationship among Australia, Britain, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States that was forged during World War II did not end with the war. Rather, it became formalized and grew stronger. In 1946, William Friedman, America's premier cryptographer, visited the British cryptographers to work out methods of postwar consultation and cooperation. A U.S. Liaison Office was set up in London, and schemes were derived for avoiding the duplication of effort. It was agreed that solved material was to be exchanged between the two agencies. In addition, an exchange program was started under which personnel from each agency would work two or three years at the other.10
Nineteen forty-seven saw an event that set the stage for post-World War II signals intelligence cooperation: the formulation and acceptance of the UKUSA Agreement, also known as the UK-USA Security Agreement or the "Secret Treaty." The primary aspect of the agreement was the division of SIGINT collection responsibilities among the First Party (the United States) and the Second Parties (Australia, Britain, Canada, and New Zealand). The specific agencies now involved are the U.S. National Security Agency, the Australian Defence Signals Directorate (DSD), the British Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), the Canadian Communications Security Establishment (CSE) and until 1986, the New Zealand Government Communications Security Bureau (GCSB).11
Under the present division of responsibilities the United States is responsible for Latin America, most of Asia, Asiatic Russia and northern China. Australia's area of responsibility includes its neighbors (such as Indonesia), southern China, and the nations of Indochina. Britain is responsible for the Soviet Union (west of the Urals) and Africa. The polar regions of the Soviet Union are Canada's responsibility, New Zealand's area of responsibility was the western Pacific. Specific tasking assignments are specified in the SIGINT Combined Operating List (SCOL).12 Britain's geographical position gives it a significant capability for long-range SIGINT collection against certain targets in the Soviet Union. Britain's historical role in Africa led to its assumption of SIGINT responsibility for that area. Canada's responsibility for the northern Soviet Union stems from its geographical position, which gives it "unique access to communications in the northern Soviet Union." The areas of responsibility of Australia and New Zealand clearly result from their geographical location.13
The UKUSA relationship (and its SIGINT aspect) is more than an agreement to coordinate separately conducted intelligence activities and share the intelligence collected. Rather, the relationship is cemented by the presence of U.S. facilities on British, Canadian, and Australian territory; by joint operations (U.S.-U.K., Australian-U.S., U.K.-Australian) within and outside UKUSA territory and, in the case of Australia, of U.K. and U.S. staff at all DSD facilities.14
In addition to specifying SIGINT collection responsibilities, the Agreement also concerns access to the collected intelligence and security arrangements for the handling of data. Standardized code words (e.g., UMBRA for signals intelligence), security agreements that all employees of the respective SIGINT agencies must sign, and procedures for storing and disseminating code word material are all part of the implementation of the Agreement.15 Thus, in a memo concerning the Agreement, dated October 8, 1948, the U.S. Army Office of the Adjutant General advised the recipients of the memo that
the United States Chiefs of Staff will make every effort to insure that the United States will maintain the military security classifications established by the United Kingdom authorities with respect to military information of UK origin and the military security classifications established by the UK-US Agreement with respect to military information of joint UK-US origin.16
Similarly, in I967, the "COMINT Indoctrination" declaration, which all British-cleared personnel had to sign, included in the first paragraph the statement,
I declare that I fully understand the information relating to the manner and extent of the interception of communications of foreign powers by H.M. Government and other cooperating Governments, and intelligence produced by such interception known as Communications Intelligence (COMINT) is information covered by Section 2 of the Official Secrets Act 1911 (as amended).17
These requirements for standardized code words (see Chapter 18), security arrangements, and procedures for the handling and dissemination of SIGINT material
are apparently detailed in a series of "International Regulations on SIGINT" (IRSIG), which was in its third edition as of 1967.
Despite numerous references to the Agreement in print, officials of some of the participating countries have refused to confirm not only the details of the Agreement but even its existence. Thus, on March 9, 1977, the Australian Opposition Defense Spokesman asked the Prime Minister:
1. Is Australia a signatory to the UKUSA Agreement?
2. Is it a fact that under this agreement NSA operates electronic intercept stations in Australia?
3. Does any other form of station operate in Australia under the Agreement; if so, is it operated by an Australian or overseas authority, or is it operated under some sort of joint authority?
4. Will he [the Prime Minister] identify the participating country or countries in any such Agreement?
The Prime Minister refused to answer and referred to a previous response wherein he said the government would not confirm or deny speculation in that area. And the Australian D Notice, "Ciphering and Monitoring Activities," requests the media to refrain from publishing material on Australian collaboration with other countries concerning monitoring activities.18
Similarly, a 1982 Freedom of Information Act request to the NSA asking for "all documents from 1947 outlining United States-United Kingdom-Australian-Canadian-New Zealand cooperation in Signals Intelligence" was responded to with the statement: "We have determined that the fact of the existence or nonexistence of the materials you request is in itself a currently and properly classified matter."19
Cooperation exists on a similar level in the area of ocean surveillance, with British and Australian stations feeding into the U.S. Ocean Surveillance Information System (OSIS). A station at Hong Kong, jointly operated by the United Kingdom and Australia was, until the mid-1970s, directed almost entirely against the People's Republic of China. Presently, however, it is involved in monitoring Soviet naval movements down the coast of Asia from major Soviet naval bases at Vladivostok and Petropavlovsk-Kamchatka to Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam. Likewise, an Australian-New Zealand unit, the Australian-New Zealand Military Intelligence Service (ANZMIS), located in Singapore, monitors (along with Task Force 168) Soviet naval activities in the region. The information collected, including intercepts and photographs, is distributed to the United States, Britain, Singapore, and Malaysia.20
Several Australian-operated stations also contribute significantly to the Ocean Surveillance Information System. These stations are located at Pearce, Western Australia; Cabarlah, Queensland; and Shoal Bay, New Territories. The Pearce station primarily monitors naval and air traffic over the Indian Ocean. In the early 1980s a Pusher antenna was installed for the interception, monitoring, direction finding, and analysis of radio signals in a portion of the HF band.21
The Cabarlah station on the east coast of Australia is operated by the DSD. Its main purpose is to monitor radio transmissions throughout the Southwest Pacific. Thus, the Cabarlah system was used to monitor Soviet intelligence-gathering trawlers that were watching the Kangaroo II naval exercises of October 1976.22
The most important station for monitoring the Southeast Asian area is the DSD station at Darwin (Shoal Bay), which originally had a very limited direction-finding capability. However, contracts signed in 1981 provided for the procurement of modern DF equipment to enable the station to "participate fully in the OSIS."23
Contributions to monitoring of the European-Atlantic ocean areas is made by Canadian stations at Halifax and a joint U.S.-British station on Ascension Island (which monitors naval traffic in South Atlantic).24
The U.S. Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center (AFMIC) has also been involved in medical intelligence exchange with Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom. The AFMIC is a member of the Quadripartite Medical Intelligence Committee; other members include the Canadian and UK medical liaison offices and the Australian scientific attache.25
In addition to collection activities, the UKUSA nations are also involved in cooperative arrangements concerning defense intelligence analysis, and hold periodic conferences dealing with a wide range of scientific and defense intelligence matters. Thus, in 1g74, the United States participated in the Annual Land Warfare Intelligence Conference, the International Scientific Intelligence Exchange, the Quadripartite Intelligence Working Party on Chinese Guided Missiles, and the Tripartite Defense Intelligence Estimates Conference. Held in London in May 1974, the Annual Land Warfare Intelligence Conference involved British, Canadian and Australian defense intelligence organizations, whose members gathered to discuss the armaments used by Communist armies.26
The Third International Scientific Exchange, involving U.S., British, New Zealand, and Australian defense intelligence organizations, was held in Canberra from June 18-27, 1974. Initially established to discuss Chinese scientific developments, particularly with respect to nuclear weapons, the 1974 meeting also focused on technical developments in India and Japan, nuclear proliferation in Asia, development and military applications of lasers, and application of peaceful nuclear explosives.27
The Quadripartite Intelligence Working Party on Chinese Guided Missiles met in London in 1974. The panel, consisting of representatives from the U.S., British, Australian, and Canadian defense intelligence organizations, focused on Chinese guided missiles and satellite launch vehicles. The United States, New Zealand, and Australia constituted the participants in the Tripartite Defense Intelligence Estimates Conference. This 1974 conference, held in Wellington, New Zealand, involved "the exchange of military estimates and assessments among the countries."28
As a result of New Zealand's policy of prohibiting nuclear vessels, the United States has decreased the access of New Zealand to signals intelligence gathered by U.S. sources, although the extent of this reduction is unclear. According to the New Zealand Ministry of Defense:
It is of particular concern that the Maritime Defence Commander (NZ) now has an incomplete picture of movements of ships within his area of responsibility, NZ has also lost access to communication/electronic information....
Although NZ Defence has continued to provide intelligence to the United States without change since 15 Feb 85, intelligence information from US Defense Intelligence Agencies has virtually ceased, except for selected maritime information. Exchange officers have been withdrawn and New Zealand participation in all intelligence conferences attended by US agencies has been denied. However, NZ Defence (DDI) continues to receive some unprocessed intelligence from US sources but the continued flow is less than 20% of that received before the last election.29
However, New Zealand Prime Minister David Lange called the Ministry's claim
of a greater than 80% cutoff "totally and absolutely wrong."30
Additionally, the Chairman of the New Zealand Intelligence Committee said
the loss of United States intelligence had no significant effect on New Zealand's
knowledge of events in the South Pacific. Defence officials disputed the
Chairman's statement, suggesting that information on military movements and
changes and assessments of the related implications had been reduced and
that the Chairman had been referring to mainly economic and political
Although there are formal arrangements among the UKUSA countries with respect to signals intelligence, ocean surveillance, and radio monitoring, no such agreement exists with respect to human intelligence activities. However, there is significant cooperation between the United States and Australia in this area.32
Both the British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) and the CIA have sought Australian cooperation in areas where deployment and operations have been easier for the Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS). The ASIS has provided significant assistance in Chile, Thailand, Indonesia, and Cambodia. Thus, in 1975, William Colby, then Director of the CIA, stated that
ASIS reporting has naturally been of most value in areas where our own coverage is limited, including the following:(a) reporting on Portuguese Timor and North Vietnam
(b) reporting from Indonesian sources
(c) operations and reporting on Chile; and
(d) unique operations and reporting on Cambodia. . .
During the period we were not present in Chile the service was of great help in assisting us to maintain coverage of that country's internal developments. For example, two of our Santiago Station assets were turned over to ASIS for handling and produced 58 disseminated reports during the period January, 1ø~72 through July 1ø,73. The effective and professional handling of these assets by ASIS made possible continued receipt of this very useful information. The same basic comments apply to the case of Cambodia.33
An ASIS station in Phnom Penh was approved by the Department of Foreign Affairs on February 5, 1965 and opened later in the year with one officer and one operational assistant. A second officer slot was added in 1970 but eliminated in 19n. The opening of the second station coincided, approximately, with the withdrawal of the United States Mission in Cambodia.34
The CIA had strongly supported the ASIS proposal to open a new station and, upon U.S. withdrawal, turned a network of agents over to the ASIS. Some agents were still operating when Australia withdrew from Cambodia in 1974, following the fall of the government. Information collected by the ASIS-CIA network was made available to the CIA.35
The presence of the Australian Secret Intelligence Service in Chile can be traced back to a CIA request for ASIS support in early November 1970. It appeared to the U.S. government that the Allende government might sever diplomatic relations with the United States. The CIA, in anticipation of such a move, sought the opening of at least a limited ASIS network. The proposal was supported by the Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs and approved by the Foreign Affairs Minister. The justification was not in terms of the ability of a Santiago station being able to produce intelligence important to Australia, but rather as reciprocation for the large amount of intelligence the United States made available to Australia.36
Actual agent-running operations did not begin until early 1972, after a five-month period during which embassy cover was established, the operational climate was assessed, and sufficient language fluency obtained. Details concerning three agents were passed to the ASIS by the CIA for approval. After the ASIS was satisfied that the agents were trustworthy, approval was given to begin operations. In March 1973, the Minister requested a review of the Chilean station and in April decided that it should be closed down. This decision was communicated to the CIA, active operations were halted on May 1, 1973, and the agents were returned to the CIA. For cover purposes, the ASIS officer remained in Santiago until July, and the operational assistant until October 1973.37
According to the findings of the Hope Report, ASIS activities in support of the CIA in Cambodia and Chile were strictly confined to intelligence gathering and did not involve covert action (destabilization) activities. Thus, according to an Australian Royal Commission report, "at no time was ASIS approached by CIA, nor made aware of any plans that may have been prepared to affect the internal political situation in Chile. The ASIS station in Santiago; was concerned only with intelligence gathering via the agents handed over to it."38
In return for such help, the ASIS has received CIA human intelligence reports concerning areas of the world where the ASIS is represented, although little or nothing concerning areas without ASIS representation. The reports the ASIS has received were described in an official study of the ASIS as being large in quantity and high in quality. Those reports, code-named REMARKABLE, numbered 588 in 1974 and 794 in 1975, and focused mainly on China and Southeast Asia--ranging "from high-grade political and scientific intelligence to relatively humdrum, but intensely detailed, reporting on insurgency in Southeast Asia and sociological conditions within China."39
Canada also has a variety of bilateral intelligence agreements with the United States. Joint U.S.-Canadian estimates produced in the late 1950s focused on Soviet capabilities and likely actions in the event of a major Soviet attack on North America. Thus, the document Soviet Capabilities and Probable Courses of Action Against North America in a Major War during the Period 1 January 1958 to 31 December 1958, as well as a similarly titled document for the period 1 July 1958 to 30 June 1958, prepared by the Canadian-U.S. Joint Intelligence Committee, assessed the Soviet threat to North America. Factors considered included Communist Bloc political stability and economic support; the internal threat to North America; Soviet nuclear, radiological, biological, and chemical weapons; aircraft, including bombers, transport aircraft, and tanker aircraft; guided missiles; naval weapons; electronics; ground, naval, and surface strength and combat effectiveness; Soviet worldwide strategy; and capabilities to conduct air and airborne missile, naval, amphibious, and internal operations against North America. Preparation of such estimates continue on a yearly basis under the title Canadian-United States Intelligence Estimate of the Military Threat to North America.40
In addition to its UKUSA participation, Canada's SIGINT relationship to the United States is defined by the CANUS agreement. On September 15, 1950, Canada and the United States exchanged letters formally recognizing the "Security Agreement between Canada and the United States of America" (which was followed exactly two months later by the "Arrangement for Exchange of Information between the U.S., U.K. and Canada'').41
Negotiations for the CANUS Agreement had been taking place since at least 1948. There was some concern on the part of the U.S. intelligence officials that original drafts of the Agreement provided for too much exchange. Thus, a 1948 memorandum by the Acting Director of Intelligence of the U.S. Air Force noted that Paragraph 6a of the proposed agreement was
not sufficiently restrictive. In effect, it provides for the complete exchange of information. Not only is it considered that the Canadians will reap all the benefits of complete exchange but wider dissemination of the information would jeopardize the security of the information. It is believed that the exchange should be related to mutually agreed COMINT activities on a 'need to know' basis.42
A more recent agreement is the "Canadian-United States Communications Instructions for Reporting Vital Intelligence Sightings" (CIRVIS/MERINT), signed in March 1966. This Agreement specifies the type of information to be reported by airborne or land-based observers--that is, information concerning:
The agreement also specifies eleven types of information that should be provided in any report, among them a description of the object(s) sighted (of which nine aspects are specified), a description of the course of the object and the manner of observation, and information on weather and wind conditions.44 The agreement further specifies that reports (known as MERINT reports) are to be forwarded by seaborne vessels concerning:
Bilateral intelligence relations between the United States and the United Kingdom include human intelligence, signals intelligence, and radio and television broadcast monitoring. The British-U.S. Communications Intelligence Agreement of 1943 is still in force and regulates the bilateral part of the British-U.S. SIGINT relationship.
A second highly formalized arrangement consists of an agreement to divide up, geographically, the responsibility for monitoring public radio and television broadcasts--mainly news and public affairs broadcasts. The specific organizations involved are the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) Monitoring Service and
the CIA's Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). Together, those two organizations monitor most of the world's most significant news and other broadcasts. As noted, both the BBC Monitoring Service and the FBIS have a network of overseas stations, operated with varying degrees of secrecy to gather their raw material.46
Cooperation between the BBC Monitoring Service and the FBIS began in 1948 as an openly acknowledged arrangement. Thus, the BBC Annual Report for 1948-49 noted
There [is] close cooperation between the BBC's Monitoring Service and its American counterpart, the Foreign Broadcast Information Branch of the United States Central Intelligence Agency, and each of the two services maintained liaison units at each other's stations for the purpose of a full exchange of information.47
The area of responsibility for the Monitoring Service is roughly equivalent
to the GCHQ's area of responsibility for SIGINT collection--Europe, Africa,
and western Russia. Thus, the Monitoring Service maintains a remotely controlled
listening post on the rooftop of the Vienna embassy to monitor VHF radio
and television broadcasts originating in Hungary and Czechoslovakia. It also
maintains listening posts in Accra, Ghana, and Abidjan in the Ivory Coast.
In 1976-77, the Monitoring Service turned over responsibility for monitoring
Far East broadcasts to the FBIS. To compensate, it had to step up its reporting
of events in Portugal and Spain to meet CIA requirements.45
One of the strongest Western intelligence links is that between the United States and Israel. These arrangements involve the Mossad, AMAN (military intelligence) and a variety of U.S. intelligence agencies--the CIA, the FBI, Defense Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, Foreign Technology Division, and the Foreign Science and Technology Center.
The intelligence liaison between the United States and Israel dates back to the early 1960s, when
the governments of Israel and the United States had agreed to exchange intelligence secrets. . . . Most important of all as far as the Israelis were concerned, the Central Intelligence Agency along with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, had undertaken to supply the Israelis with some top secret equipment, including the most advanced computers for cryptanalysis, as well as to train selected Israeli officers in their use.49
The centerpiece of CIA-Mossad cooperation, until 1975, was the CIA's Chief of Counterintelligence, James Jesus Angleton. Angleton had developed extensive contacts with future Israeli intelligence officials during his World War II activities in Europe with the Office of Strategic Services. In 1957 Angleton set up a liaison unit to deal with the Mossad, and the unit was made responsible for producing Middle East intelligence for both services. In addition, the CIA received intelligence from Mossad networks in the Soviet Union.50
After Angleton's dismissal from the CIA in 1975, the liaison unit was abolished and the Israeli account was moved to the appropriate Directorate of Operations regional division of the CIA. The CIA also began to operate more independently of the Mossad; in the late 1970s the agency began operating on the West Bank.51
Among the present arrangements between the two countries is Israeli provision of information concerning Soviet weapons systems, particularly those captured in various battles. This exchange has given the United States access not only to the captured weapons systems but also data concerning their performance.
Such exchanges took place after the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli Wars. Israel furnished the United States with captured air-to-ground and ground-to-air missiles and with Soviet antitank weapons. Also furnished were Soviet 122- and 130-mm. artillery pieces, along with ammunition for evaluation and testing. After the 1973 war, the furnished material included a Soviet T-72 tank. Upon examination, it was discovered that the T-72 was equipped with a special type of air filter to defend against germ warfare. Additionally, extensive joint analyses were done after the 1973 war: eight volumes of between 200 and 300 pages apiece were produced. These analyses influenced subsequent developments in U.S. weapons tactics and military budgets.52
In early 1983 the Israeli government offered to share military intelligence gained during the war in Lebanon. The offer included details of an "Israeli invention'' that was alleged by Prime Minister Menachem Begin to be the key to Israel's ability to destroy Syria's Soviet-made surface-to-air missiles during the war. However, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger rejected a proposed agreement for sharing that information, feeling it would have trapped the United States into long-range commitments to Israel that he wanted to avoid. Administration officials argued that the information had already been learned through normal military contacts.53
As a condition for sharing the information, Israel insisted on sending Israeli experts to the United States with captured weapons and receiving whatever analysis came from U.S. research. Israel also insisted on the right to veto the transfer of information and analysis to third parties, including members of NATO, and on measures to ensure that sensitive data remained secret. According to diplomats, the Israelis expressed fears that Soviet intelligence agents who had penetrated Western European governments would find out what Israel had learned and would then pass that information along to the Soviets' Arab allies. Subsequently, an agreement was reached that continued the flow of information.54
A late 1983 reassessment of U.S. policy in the Middle East, following the deteriorating situation in Lebanon and continued Syrian intransigence, resulted in National Security Decision Directive 111, which specified a "tilt" toward Israel and expanded U.S.-Israeli strategic cooperation.55
This expanded cooperation reportedly involved a higher degree of sharing of reconnaissance satellite data, including such data on Saudi Arabia and Jordan. William J. Casey, in his first three years as CIA Director (1981-1984), provided Israeli intelligence with access to sensitive photographs and other reconnaissance information that the Israelis had been denied under the Carter Administration. The head of AMAN from 1979 to 1983, Major General Yehoshua Saguy, said in
early 1984 that the CIA was providing Israel with access to data from reconnaissance satellites, and "not only the information but the photos themselves." Under the Carter Administration, DCI Stansfield Turner refused to provide the satellite imagery that had been furnished when George Bush was DCI in 1976 and 1977.56
Upon becoming the DCI in 1981, William Casey decided to resume supplying Israel with actual photographs. Inside the Israeli intelligence community, the satellite photos were often referred to as "Casey's gift" and were considered invaluable. After Israel used some of those photos to aid in targeting Iraq's Osirak reactor, however, Casey restricted Israeli access to only those photographs which could be used for "defensive" purposes relating to Arab states directly on or near the Israeli border.57
Another aspect of the expanded cooperation was reported to be greater Israeli access to the "take" of Cyprus-based SR-71 flights. The United States had been sharing such data with Israel, Egypt, and Syria on a "highly selective basis" as a result of an agreement signed in 1974 after the war of October 1973. The information previously transmitted to Israel primarily concerned Egyptian or Syrian military developments but was now to be expanded to cover a "broader range."58
Israel did not, however, receive everything it wanted. Among the items it did not receive were a dedicated satellite and a system of ground stations that would "directly access" the KH-11 as it passed over the Middle East.59
Another area of expanded U.S.-Israeli cooperation involves the emigres who arrive in Israel from the Soviet Union each year. Information obtained by interviews conducted by the Mossad is reportedly passed on to the CIA.60 Although it is unlikely that any startling revelations are produced, the collective data can be quite valuable.
Israel has supplied the United States with intelligence on the Middle East-- both reports from agents and finished intelligence analyses. Some U.S. officials have not been impressed by the political intelligence, however. One CIA official said that he was "appalled at the lack of quality, of the political intelligence on the Arab world.... Their tactical military intelligence was first rate. But they didn't know their enemy. I saw this political intelligence and it was lousy, laughably bad.... It was gossip stuff mostly."61
Both the United States and Israel have received intelligence from the other in crises situations. During the 1973 war Israel received data obtained by the RHYOLITE satellite. In 1976 the United States supplied Israel with both aerial and satellite reconnaissance photographs of Entebbe Airport to supplement the information obtained by Israeli agents in preparation for the Israeli hostage rescue mission. During the 1985 hijacking of the Achille Lauro, Israel provided the United States with the location of the ship on several occasions, the location of the ship's hijackers when they were in Egypt, and the identification number and call signs of the plane carrying the hijackers seconds after it took off from Egypt.62
To the northwest of the Soviet Union, Norway also provides a home for several interception and nuclear detection stations targeted on the Soviet Union and the surrounding ocean area. The SIGINT stations are operated by personnel of Norwegian Military Intelligence but were erected by the NSA and operated for them. Further, according to former U.S. intelligence official Victor Marchetti, CIA and NSA personnel were regularly on assignment at those stations. Although no U.S. personnel are assigned there now, Norway does pass the information acquired to the United States.63
One of the stations is at Vadso, a small fjord town in Norway's Arctic region, close to the Soviet border. Somewhere between several hundred and 1,500 of the town's 5,000 residents are said to work at the intercept station. There are four interception locations at Vadso. The principal high-frequency (HF) listening equipment is a 492-foot diameter array of monopole antennas, within which is a further array of monopoles. About two miles to the southeast is a smaller circular antenna array with an outer ring, eighty-two feet in diameter and consisting of twelve dipoles, while the inner ring consists of six dipoles. There is a hut in the center of the array. The array's location, apart from the main HF site, may mean that they are used for transmission rather than reception. The location of the antenna arrays on the northern shore of Varangerfjord gives them uninterrupted overseas propagation paths all the way to the Soviet Union.64
In addition to the circular arrays there are two VHF-UHF interception sites in the Vadso area. The main site is at the summit of a 397-foot hill. The site is the home of a variety of VHF-UHF antennas known as Yagis, log-periodic arrays (LPAs), vertical wire dipoles, and broadband dipoles. Four of the antennas are pointed in the direction of Murmansk and the associated complex of naval and air facilities--one toward Wickel; two to the coast; and one northeast, towards the Barents Sea. The antennas at the smaller site also point toward the Soviet Union. It has been suggested that the Yagi antennas at the main site are intercepting emissions from a Soviet troposcatter communications system similar to the NATO Ace High system. It has also been reported that Vadso has the capability to intercept voice communications from Soviet pilots to their ground controllers.65
Also, in the very north of Norway, are Viksjofell and Vardo. At Viksjofell, on a 1,476-foot-high hill only three miles from the Soviet border, is a concrete tower with a geodesic radome. On the side of the tower facing toward the Soviet border is a semi-cylindrical extension apparently made of the same material as the radome and surmounted by a VHF log-periodic antenna. The dome itself is surmounted by a VHF Adcock direction-finding antenna. The Viksjofell facility appears to be a very sophisticated VHF installation, and it might be presumed that the dome contains a movable dish antenna that can either be constantly rotated in a scanning or tracking mode. Installations of this type are capable of monitoring all kinds
of VHF-SHF frequencies, including ground-based and air-based radars, communications, and missile command and control links.66
At Vardo there is a tower identical to the one at Viksjofell except that the external direction-finding and log-periodic antennas are absent. Vardo can intercept signals from Plesetsk, a major Soviet missile testing and space center. It has also been suggested that another likely target is the telemetry from Soviet SLBM tests in the Barents Sea. The Viksjofell station apparently was established in 1972, and the Vardo station in 1971, at the same time that an earlier submarine-launched missile, the SS-N-8, became operational.67
At Skage (in Namdalen) and Randaberg (near Stavanger, on Norway's western coast) there are arrays similar to the smaller of the Vadso arrays. These arrays probably are used mainly to intercept HF communications from Soviet ships, submarines, and long-range marine reconnaissance aircraft in the Norwegian Sea. The two stations are operated probably as paired units to allow triangulation of emitter locations.68
Norway also serves as the home of nuclear detonation detection stations. Until 1975 a detachment of the Air Force Technical Applications Center was located in the Lappish community of Karasjok. A still-operational system, the NORSAR (Norwegian Seismic Array), is run under a cooperative arrangement between the United States and Norway. The array is in southeastern Norway, north of Oslo and near the town of Hamar. The NORSAR's location places it on the same continental plate as the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic, home of the Semipalatinsk nuclear weapons testing area. The result is an uncomplicated vibration travel path from Semipalatinsk, over 2,500 miles away, to the NORSAR--a prime requirement for producing high-confidence estimates of the yield of a nuclear explosion. The NORSAR is only 1,500 miles from Novaya Zemlya, a large island in the Barents Sea that is also used by the Soviets for nuclear weapons testing.69
Since 1970, when it began operation, the NORSAR has detected about 100,000 earthquakes and more than 500 presumed nuclear explosions. A teleseismic array, the NORSAR's optimum performance occurs when the seismic event takes place 1,860 to 6,200 miles away. Thus the NORSAR is also able to effectively detect U.S. nuclear tests in Nevada. The array itself is made up of twenty-two subarrays, seven of which are operational. Each subarray is approximately six miles in diameter and consists of one long-period and six short-period seismometers, all placed in vaults or shallow boreholes with depths ranging from ten to forty-nine feet. The long-period seismometers measure ground motion in the vertical, horizontal north-south, and horizontal east-west directions, while the short-period seismometer senses vertical ground motion. The recorded earth motions are transmitted via trenched cables to a central terminal vault at the subarray center and then to the NORSAR Data Processing Center at Kjeller, just north of Oslo, for analysis. The data also can be transmitted by satellite back to the United States.70
A newer facility, the Norwegian Seismic Array, (NORESS), opened in June 1985. Located about sixty miles northeast of Oslo, NORESS was designed and constructed on a cooperative basis by the U.S. and Norwegian governments. Data
from each of the twenty-five sensors in the array's four concentric rings are sent via fiber optics transmission to a hub. The data are collected at the hub and then retransmitted to four receiving stations. The hub is connected by telephone link to the Norwegian analysis center in Kjeller. The same information is sent via satellite to U.S. sites in Virginia, California, and New Mexico. NORESS's capabilities were demonstrated in July 1985, when the array detected a Soviet test of a 0.25-kiloton device at Semipalatinsk.71
The United States also receives the results of Norwegian Air Force photography
of Soviet aircraft taken over the Baltic. Among such photographs are those
taken of a MiG-31 taken from below and the left-rear, which shows AA-9
antiaircraft missiles. Another photograph showed the SU-27 Flanker carrying
AA-10 Alamo radar homing missiles, and two AA-10 Alamo IR homing
The PRC's intelligence relationship with the United States began with the late 1970's visit to China of Morton Abramowitz, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. In a meeting with a senior Chinese defense official Abramowitz gave him a highly classified briefing on the deployment of Soviet forces along the Chinese border, and pulled out satellite photographs of Soviet military installations and armor that were facing China. China has apparently continued to receive such photography. According to one U.S. official, the Chinese reconnaissance satellite's footprint "is very small, and they want mapping support, especially of the Soviet Union" in addition to photographs of Soviet forces deployed along their border.73
The Abramowitz meeting led to the most important aspect of U.S.-PRC intelligence cooperation--the establishment of two SIGINT stations in western China located at Qitai and Korla in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region. The United States initially suggested setting up such posts in 1978, prior to the establishment of diplomatic relations between the countries. At first the Chinese, apparently concerned about cooperating too closely with the United States, were reluctant to agree. The issue was raised again after the overthrow of the Shah of Iran in January 1979. In an April 1979 meeting with a visiting U.S. Senate delegation, PRC Vice Premier Deng Xiao Ping indicated that China was willing to use U.S. equipment "to monitor Soviet compliance with a proposed new arms limitation treaty." Deng also indicated that the monitoring stations would have to be run by Chinese and that the data would have to be shared with the PRC.74
The United States and the PRC reached a basic agreement in January 1980. Actual intelligence operations began in the fall of 1980. The stations were constructed by the CIA's Office of SIGINT Operations, whose personnel trained the Chinese technicians and now periodically visit the stations to advise them and to service the equipment as required.75 The initial set of equipment allowed for the interception of telemetry from Soviet missile test and space shots conducted
from two major Soviet launch sites--at Tyuratam near the Aral Sea and at Sary Shagan near Lake Balkash. While somewhat farther from Tyuratam than the Iranian sites, the Chinese sites are closer to the Sary Shagan ABM test site.
Another aspect of U.S.-Chinese intelligence cooperation involves a joint project to set up nine monitoring stations in China, primarily to study and predict earthquakes. These U.S. seismic devices will also monitor Soviet nuclear tests. One device is located in Urumqi in Xinjiang province, and is approximately 600 miles from the Soviet nuclear test site at Semipalatinsk in Central Asia. A second device, in Manchuria, will help U.S. analysts learn more about the geology of the Soviet Union, which in turn will increase the accuracy of intelligence estimates of Soviet test explosions.76
A third aspect of cooperation lies in the covert action area. The International
Liaison Department (ILD) and the CIA have both been active in conducting
coordinated operations against Soviet-backed forces in Angola, Cambodia,
and Afghanistan. Some camps in Pakistan to train Mujahdeen guerillas operate
under the joint direction of the CIA and ILD.77
Japan has an extensive intelligence exchange relationship with the United States. One aspect of that relationship is the sharing of signals intelligence, as indicated by the Japanese sharing of Soviet communications intercepted by a unit on Wakkanai on the night the Soviets shot down Korean Airlines Flight 007. SIGINT sharing is based on mutual interests and intended as partial payment by the United States to Japan for the SIGINT facilities the United States maintains on Japanese territory.78 The Japan-U.S. SIGINT relationship is a formal one, with Japan being one of ten third parties to the UKUSA Agreement.
Japan has also received satellite photographs from U.S. authorities. In 1982 Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger presented the Chief of the Japanese Defense Agency with satellite photographs "showing a Japanese-made floating dock being used in the repair of the Soviet aircraft carrier Minsk."79 That revelation was made to convince the Japanese that technology made available to the Soviets for nonmilitary purposes was being misused.
In addition. it is likely that the Japanese Defense Agency receives satellite photographs or information derived from those photos on a regular basis. Such information would concern Soviet naval capabilities and movements in the vicinity of Japan, Soviet air activity in Siberia, and the deployment of Soviet troops and weapons systems (particularly the SS-20) in the vicinity of Japan.
But the most extensive exchange undoubtedly occurs with respect to ocean surveillance information, particularly regarding Soviet naval movements. One aspect of such cooperation is the CINCPACFLT [U.S. Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet]-- JMSDF [Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Forces] Intelligence Exchange Conference. Likewise, a responsibility of the Intelligence Liaison and Production Section
of the Intelligence Division, U.S. Naval Forces, Japan is to "coordinate Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet and Commander U.S. Naval Forces, Japan intelligence exchange with the Chief of the Intelligence Division, Maritime Staff Office and the Intelligence Officer, CINCSDFLT [Commander in Chief Self-Defense Fleet].80
Information derived from U.S. worldwide ocean surveillance assets--especially
from WHITE CLOUD satellites and the SOSUS network--can substantially increase
the effectiveness of Japan's surface and submarine detection efforts. Among
much of the information likely to be passed on to Japan is that information
coming into the Fleet Ocean Surveillance Information Center at Kamiseya,
Japan. At the same time, the Japanese share information obtained by their
sonar arrays and P-3Cs. According to the staff manual for U.S. Naval Forces,
Japan, the Operations Special Projects Officer of the Operations Division,
U.S. Naval Forces Japan, conducts liaison with cognizant Japanese officials
with respect to Operations Special Projects 6100, 6200, and 6300 Oceanographic
The United States has, at times, maintained a SIGINT exchange relationship with the Republic of South Africa's Directorate of Military Intelligence. The arrangement began in the 1960s and initially concerned Soviet shipping and submarine movements in the South Atlantic and Indian Oceans.82 Since that time the scope of the arrangement has changed with changing political and military events.
By the early 1970s, NSA personnel were stationed at the South African Silvermine facility and reports on Soviet shipping routinely flowed from South Africa to the NSA. South Africa's intelligence installations were vastly expanded in the mid-1970s, as the Soviet Union and Cuba became directly involved in Angola along with the CIA and South Africa. Vast quantities of electronic equipment, including antennas and sophisticated interception receivers, were secretly shipped from Britain and West Germany to South Africa to enable South Africa to build more listening posts. American-made computer chips and other electronic components were involved in the shipments, although under Presidential directive, they could have been banned. In the Carter Administration, Richard M. Moose, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, ordered an end to all collaboration on COMINT between the United States and South Africa. The liaison was continued by the Navy anyway, and South Africa continued to report on Soviet submarine and shipping activity.83
With the advent of the Reagan Administration, cooperation included information on the activities of the African National Congress (ANC), including information obtained from the interception of communications between ANC headquarters in Lusaka, Zambia, its guerilla training camps in Angola, and its offices in Africa and Western Europe. Such cooperation was presaged by a 1980 conference at Cheltenham between GCHQ, NSA, and South African Directorate of Military Intelligence representatives. The South African representatives requested.
To make fulfillment of their first request easier, South Africa provided the GCHQ with information about the radio frequencies used by the various nations. In return, the NSA (and the GCHQ) asked South Africa for
In the early 1980s, the information that the United States received from
South Africa was apparently passed through the GCHQ without specific indication
as to its South African origin.
Other intelligence exchange arrangements include:
UKUSA Third Parties: Countries with which the United States has formal SIGINT sharing relationships with and are "Third Party" signatories of the UKUSA Agreement are: Thailand, Japan, South Korea, Norway, Denmark, West Germany, Italy, Greece, and Turkey.
Pakistan: Pakistan acts as a pipeline for the hundreds of millions of dollars in CIA covert assistance that is provided to the Afghan rebels. Pakistan also cooperates with U.S. intelligence agencies in electronic intelligence gathering near the Soviet Union (at Peshawar) and in southeast Asia.86
Finland: The NSA purchases radar intelligence concerning the Soviet Union collected by the Finnish VKL (Communications Experience Facility).87
Mexico: The CIA is reported to cooperate closely with the Federal Directorate of Security, which is said to tap telephone calls by some Soviet-Bloc embassy staff and send the transcripts to the CIA.88
In 1986 it was reported that the United States had been receiving valuable information about Cuba and Nicaragua from Panamanian "double agents" who, in turn, provide information to those nations about U.S. activities. According to Norman Bailey, a former NSC staff member, Panama's role as an intelligence asset is a principal reason the United States muted (until 1988) its public criticism of General Noriega's drug-trafficking activities and dictatorial control over Panama.89
1. James Bamford, The Puzzle Palace: A Report on NSA, America 's Most Secret Agency (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1982), p. 312.
2 . Ronald Lewin, The American Magic: Codes, Ciphers and the Defeat of Japan (New York: Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, 1982), p. 46.
3. Ibid., p. 47.
4. Bamford, The Puzzle Palace, p. 314.
6. Bob Elliot, Scarlet to Green: Canadian Army Intelligence 19031963 (Toronto: Canadian Military Intelligence Association, 1982), p. 461.
7. F.H. Hinsley, E.E. Thomas, C.F.G. Ransom, and R.C. Knight, British Intelligence in the Second World War Volume 2 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 551n; See p. xv of David Kahn's "Introduction" to Herbert O. Yardley, The American Black Chamber (New York: Ballantine, 1981); Robert Sheppard, "Lack of Quick Action Upset Gouzenko, Papers Say," Toronto Globe and Mail, October 17, 1981, p. 5; Elliot, Scarlet to Green, p. 401.
8. U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack Pearl Harbor Attack, Part 2 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1946), p. 947; D.M. Horner, "Special Intelligence in the South-West Pacific Area in World War 11," Australian Outlook 32, no. 4 (1978): 310-27.
9. Desmond Ball, "Allied Intelligence Cooperation Involving Australia During World War 11," Australian Outlook 32, no 4 (1978): 299-309; Elliot, Scarlet to Green, pp. 384-85.
10. Ronald Clark, The Man Who Broke Purple (Boston: Little Brown, 1977), p. 208.
11. Ball, "Allied Intelligence Cooperation"; Duncan Campbell, "The Threat of the Electronic Spies," New Statesman, February 2, 1979, pp. 140-44; John Sawatsky, Men in the Shadows: the RCMP Security Service (New York: Doubleday, 1980), p. 9n; Transcript of "The Fifth Estate--The Espionage Establishment,' broadcast by the Canadian Broadcasting Company, 1974.
12. Private information; Seymour Hersh, ''The Target is Destroyed '': What Really Happened to Flight 007 and What America Knew About It (New York: Random House, 1986), p. 48n.
13. Chapman Pincher, Inside Story: A Documentary of the Pursuit of Power (New York: Stein & Day, 1979), p. 157; Sawatsky, Men in the Shadows, p. 9n.
14. Desmond Ball, A Suitable Peace of Real Estate: American Installations in Australia (Sydney: Hale & Iremonger, 1980), p. 40.
15. Campbell, "Threat of the Electronic Spies."
16. Department of the Army, Office of the Adjutant General, "United States-United Kingdom Security Agreement," October 8, 1948.
17. See Jeffrey T. Richelson and Desmond Ball, The Ties that Bind: Intelligence Cooperation Between the UKUSA Countries (London: Allen & Unwin, 1985), pp. 148-49.
18. Paul Kelly, "NSA, The Biggest Secret Spy Network in Australia," The National Times, May 23-28, 1977.
19. Letter to the author from Eugene Y. Yeates, Director of Policy, National Security Agency, December 7, 1982.
20. Desmond Ball, "The U.S. Naval Ocean Surveillance Information (NOSIS)--Australia's Role," Pacific Defence Reporter (June 1982): 40-49; Michael Richardson, "Australia and NZ Use Singapore Base to Spy on Soviet Ships for CIA," The Age, April 12,
1984, p. 1.
21. Ball, "The U.S. Naval Ocean Surveillance Information System."
24. "Britania Scorns to Yield," Newsweek, April 19, 1982, pp. 41-6.
25. Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center, Organization and Functions of the Armed Medical Intelligence Center, April 1, 1986, p. vii.
26. Joint Intelligence Organization, Fourth Annual Report, 1974 (Canberra: JIO, 1974), pp. F1-F2.
27. Ibid., pp. 36, F1-F2.
28. Ibid., p. F2.
29. Answer from the Ministry of Defense to a Parliamentary question.
30. Kevin O'Connor, "Defence Heads Shy from PM Clashes," Dominion, October 8, 1986.
32. Justice Hope, The Fifth Report of the Royal Commission on Intelligence and Security (Canberra: Australian Government Printer, 1977), Appendix 5-E, para. 19.
33. Ibid., n. 5-38.
34. Ibid., para. 142-44.
35. Ibid., para. 143.
36. Ibid., para. 179-80.
37. Ibid., para. 181.
38. Ibid., para. 184.
39. Ibid., para. 236, 239; Appendix 5-E, para. 21.
40. Canadian-U.S. Joint Intelligence Committee, Soviet Capabilities and Probable Course of Action Against North America in a Major War Commencing During the Period 1January 1958 to 31 December 1958 (Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency, March I, 1957) in Declassified Documents Reference System 1981169A, U.S. Congress Senate Committee on Armed Services, Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations Fiscal Year 1984, Part 5 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983), p. 2708.
41. Canada-US. Arrangements in Regard to Defence, Defence Production, Defence Sharing (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Policy Studies, 1985), p. 31.
42. Walter Agee, Acting Deputy Director of Intelligence, "Memorandum for the Coordinator of Joint Operations: Proposed U.S.-Canadian Agreement," Modern Military Branch, National Archives, R 341, Entry 214, File Nos. 2-1900 through 2-1999.
43 . Joint Chiefs of Staff, Canadian-United States Communications Instructions for Reporting Vita/ Intelligence Sightings (CERVIS/MERINT) (Washington, D.C.: JCS, March 1966), p. 2-1.
44. Ibid., pp. 2-4 to 2-6.
45. Ibid., p. 3-1.
46. Duncan Campbell and Clive Thomas, "BBC's Trade Secrets," New Statesman, July 4, 1980, pp. 13-14.
47. Ibid.. p. 14.
48. Ibid., pp. 13-14.
49. Stewart Steven, The Spymasters of Israel (New York: Doubleday, 1979), p. 27.
50. Judith Perera, "Cracks in the Special Relationship," The Middle East (March 1983): 12-18.
52. Stanley A. Blumberg and Gwinn Owens, The Survival Factor (New York: Putnam 1981), p. 272; Richard Halloran, "U.S. Offers Israel Plan on War Data," New York Times, March 13, 1983, pp. 1, 13.
53. Edmund Walsh, "Begin Offers to Give War Intelligence to U.S.," Washington Post, October 15, 1982, p. A18; Richard Halloran, "U.S. Said to Bar Deal with Israel," New York Times, February 10, 1983, pp. Al, A7.
54. Halloran, "U.S. Said to Bar Deal with Israel"; Bernard Gwertzman, "Israelis to Share Lessons of War with Pentagon," New York Times, March 22, 1983, pp. 1, 12.
55. Bernard Gwertzman, "Reagan Turns to Israel," New York times Magazine, November 27, 1983, pp. 62 ff.
56. Bob Woodward, "CIA Sought 3rd Country Contra Aid," Washington Post, May 19, 1984, pp. Al, A13.
57. Bob Woodward, "Probes of Iran Deals Extend to Roles of CIA Director," Washington Post, November 28, 1986, pp. Al, A33.
58. "U.S. to Share More Recon Data, Tighten Air Links with Israel," Aerospace Daily, December 8, 1983, pp. 193-94.
60. "Is the CIA Hobbled?" Newsweek, March 5, 1979, pp. 18-20.
61. Charles Babcock, "Israel Uses Special Relationship to Get Secrets," Washington Post, June 15, 1986, p. A1.
62. "How the Israelis Pulled it Off," Newsweek, July 19, 1976, pp. 42-47; David Halevy and Neil C. Livingstone, "The Ollie We Knew," The Washingtonian, July, 1987, pp. 77ff.
63. F.G. Samia, "The Norwegian Connection: Norway (Un)willing Spy for the U.S.," Covert Action Information Bulletin (June 1980): 4-9.
64. Ibid.; R.W. Apple, Jr., "Norwegians, Ardent Neutralists, Also Want their Defense Strong," New York Times, August 5, 1978, p. 2; Owen Wilkes and Nils Petter Gleditsch, Intelligence Installations in Norway: Their Number, Location, Function and Legality (Oslo, Norway: Peace Research Institute Oslo, 1979), pp. 17-20.
65. Wilkes and Gleditsch, Intelligence Installations in Norway, pp. 24-26; Seymour Hersh, ''The Target is Destroyed,'' p. 42.
66. Wilkes and Gleditsch, Intelligence Installations in Norway, p. 32.
67. Ibid., p. 35; Hersh, ''The Target is Destroyed," p. 42.
68. Wilkes and Gleditsch, Intelligence Installations in Norway, p. 20.
69. Ibid., p. 52.
70. Ibid., pp. 52-56; Svein Mykkeltveit, "Seismological Facilities in Norway," in Workshop on Seismological Verification of a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban (Oslo, Norway: Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1985), pp. 2-5.
71. Glenn Zorpette, "Monitoring the Tests," IEEE Spectrum (July 1986): 57-66.
72. "AA-10 Alamo Missile in Close-Up," Jane's Defence Weekly, July 25, 1987, pp. 145-46; "Norwegian Air Force Intercepts MiG-31 Foxhound," Aviation Week and Space Technology, February 17, 1986, p. 30.
73. Nayan Chandra, Brother Enemy: The War After War (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Jovanovich, 1983), p. 280; "Washington Round-Up," Aviation Week and Space Technology, March 19, 1984, p. 15; Daniel Southerland, "U.S. Navy Call at Chinese Port Symbolizes Growing Military Relationship," Washington Post, November 5, 1986, pp. A23, A29.
74. Philip Taubman, "U.S. and Peking Jointly Monitor Russian Missiles," New York Times, June 18, 1971, pp. 1,14; Murrey Marder, "Monitoring Not So-Secret-Secret:' Washington Post, June 19, 1981, p. 10.
75. Robert C. Toth, "U.S., China Jointly Track Firings of Soviet Missiles," Los Angeles Times, June 18, 1981, pp. 1, 9; David Bonavia, "Radar Post Leak May Be Warning to Soviet Union," London Times, June 19, 1981, p. 5; Taubman, "U.S. and Peking Jointly Monitor Russian Missiles."
76. Michael R. Gordon, "U.S. Uses Seismic Devices in China to Estimate Size of Soviet A-Tests," New York Times, April 4, 1987, pp, 1, 4.
77. Roger Faligot and Remi Kauffer, Kang Sheng et les Services Secret Chinois, (Paris: Robert Laffont, 1987), p. 505.
78. Hersh, ''The Target is Destroyed,'' pp. 63-72.
79. "U.S. Warns Japan Not to Increase Soviet Military Power," Xinhau General Overseas News Service, March 30, 1982.
80. U.S. Naval Forces Japan, COMNAVFORJAPAN Staff Instruction 5450.1G, Staff Organization Manual, May 13, 1983, p. V-5.
81. Ibid., p. VI-8.
82. Seymour M. Hersh, "U.S. is Said to Have Given Praetoria Intelligence on Rebel Organization," New York Times, July 23, 1986, pp. Al, A10.
84. Ibid.; Duncan Campbell and Patrick Forbes, "UK's Listening Link to Apartheid," New Statesman, August 1, 1986, pp. 10-11.
85. Hersh, "U.S. is Said to Have Given Praetoria Intelligence on Rebel Organization"; Campbell and Forbes, "UK's Listening Link with Apartheid."
86. Bob Woodward, "Pakistan Reported Near Atom Arms Production," Washington Post, November 4, 1986, pp. Al, A16.
87. Jukka Rislakki, "Suomi Kuuntelee Kaikiin Ilmansuuntiin,'' HSKK-Inte, December 1987, pp. 32-35.
88. "The CIA and Mexico ' Foreign Report, July 31, 1986, pp. 1, 2.
89.''Panamanians Spying on, for U.S.," Washington Post, September 20, 1986, p. A2.