16 January 1998: Add link to USA/NSA response
25 December 1997
Source: William H. Payne
See related documents: http://jya.com/whpfiles.htm
[December 23, 1997]
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
William H. Payne )
Arthur R. Morales )
)
Plaintiffs, )
)
v ) CIV NO 97 0266
) SC/DJS
)
Lieutenant General Kenneth A. Minihan, USAF )
Director, National Security Agency )
National Security Agency )
)
Defendant )
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON BASED ON
EVIDENCE FROM ADMISSIONS
1 COMES NOW plaintiffs Payne [Payne] and Morales [Morales]
[Plaintiffs], pro se litigants to exercise their rights
guaranteed under the Constitution and Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.
As the court may know,
Rule 26 (b)(1)
Parties may obtain discovery regarding any mater, not
privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter
involved in the pending action, whether it relates
to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery
or to the claim or defense of any other party, including
the existence, description, nature, custody, condition,
and LOCATION of any books documents, or other tangible
thing and the identity and location of persons have
knowledge of any discoverable matter.
Rule 36 states,
Request for admission (a) A party may serve upon any other
party a written request for the admission, for the
purposes of the pending action only, of the truth of any
matters within the scope of Rule 26(b) set forth the
request that relate to statements or opinions of fact
or of the application of law to fact including the
genuineness of any documents described in the request.
Copies of documents shall be served with the request
unless they have been or otherwise furnished or made
available for inspection and copying. The request
may WITHOUT LEAVE OF THE COURT, be served upon the
plaintiff after commencement of the action and upon any
other party with or after service of the summons and
complaint upon that party. ...
Plaintiffs capitalize WITHOUT LEAVE OF THE COURT.
2 Rule 36 states,
{T]he matter IS ADMITTED unless, within 30 days after
service of the request, or with such shorter or longer
time as the court may allow, the party to whom the
request is directed serves upon the party requesting
the admission a written answer or objection address
to the matter signed by the party or by the party's
attorney, ...
Plaintiffs capitalize IS ADMITTED.
3 PLAINTIFFS' FIRST SET OF REQUEST FOR ADMISSION TO
NSA DIRECTOR KENNETH MINIHAN were served
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy of the foregoing request
for admissions was mailed to Jan Elizabeth Mitchell,
Assistant US Attorney, 525 Silver SW, ABQ, NM 87102
this Monday November 3, 1997.
More than 30 days elapsed and Plaintiff's have received
no response from Minihan or Mitchell.
Therefore, Minihan ADMITS
1 NSA is involved in 'spiking' [modifying the
advertised intended functions] electronic
equipment.
2 NSA 'spiked' Iranian and Libyan cryptographic units
so that the cryptographic key was transmitted with
the cipher text.
3 Iranian messages were given to Iraq during the
Iran/Iraq war.
4 NSA was involved in the conviction, by giving
contents of secret messages, of Ali Vakili-Rad
and Masour Hendi to the Court in Paris in the trial
for the stabbing death of Shapour Baktiar.
5 Minihan knows where copies of intercepted messages
are kept at NSA.
4 Requests for First set of Admission were mailed
October 13, 1997. More than 30 days has elapsed. No
response from lawyer Mitchell or respondents were received
by Plaintiffs.
Therefore, NSA employee Brian Snow ADMITS
1 He designed the cryptographic algorithm for the
Missile Secure Cryptographic Unit (MSCU).
2 NSA funded the MSCU at Sandia labs.
3 In about 1983 he gave a presentation at NSA FANX
building to some Sandians involved with the Missile
Secure Cryptographic Unit.
4 In the presentation he showed electronic schematics
of the units to the Sandians.
5 He told the Sandians about the electronic and
operational problems NSA had with the
cryptographic units he bought with him.
6 He told the Sandians that one of the cryptographic
units failed in the Moscow embassy and transmitted
clear text.
7 He concluded his talk telling the Sandians that NSA
had no operational failures once NSA went to dual
redundant cryptographic units.
8 He told the Sandians not to ask for a theoretical
reason why dual redundant cryptographics never
failed, in the sense of releasing classified data,
but that this was based on practical experience.
9 William H. Payne was one of the Sandians in the
audience of his talk.
10 He sat across the table from William H. Payne at
lunch in the cafeteria in the basement of the
FANX building directly after his talk.
11 He was involved in algorithms associated with
the Clipper project.
12 He where the documents specifying the MSCU
algorithm are located at NSA.
13 He knows where the documents specifying
algorithms associated with the Clipper project
are located at NSA.
NSA employee Thomas White ADMITS
15 He served as the liaison between NSA and Sandia
for the Deployable Seismic Verification System.
16 He forwarded documents such as NSA's Orange book
and the public key Firefly chip to Sandia.
17 He told Bill Payne that NSA regarded former
president Ronald Reagan as one of the US's
greatest traitors.
18 He told Bill Payne that the reasons NSA regarded
Ronald Reagan as one of the US's greatest traitors
is that Reagan, on TV announced to the world
that the US was reading Libyan communications.
19 He Bill Payne that the following day [after
Reagan's TV announcement] NSA could no longer
read Libyan communications.
20 He knows where the documents specifying
Benincasa's correction to the original USO
seismic data authentication algorithm are
located at NSA.
NSA employee Mark Unkenholtz ADMITS
21 He visited Sandia in about 1986-87 with R
division employee Ed Georgio to discuss which
data authentication algorithm should be used for
the US/USSR deployable seismic verification
system (DSVS).
22 He and Bill Payne discussed using public key for
the DSVS system.
23 He concluded that there were too many problems
with public key so it was best to continue using
the old Benincasa USO (unmanned seismic
observatory) algorithm.
24 In 1989 he and others asked Bill Payne to write a
memorandum to NSA deputy director James J. Hearn
requesting help from NSA to develop new data
authentication algorithms.
25 He did this is because R division needed a letter
of support for more funding.
26 The DRAFT letter he asked Payne to write is seen
on Internet at jya.com, click cryptome, catch the
thread at August 29, 1997, SANDIA REPORT,
SAND91-2201 UC 706, Data Authentication for the
Deployable Seismic Verification System,
Appendix T, Benincasa's Algorithm Deficiencies.
27 He asked Payne to fax the DRAFT letter to his
fiancee, Amy Johnston, since NSA did not have fax
for unclassified work readily available to use.
28 The "To Mark and Ed, R" on page 183 of
SAND91-2201 UC 706 addressed him and his boss
boss at the time, Ed Donohue.
29 He told Payne that NSA takes about a year to
evaluate an encryption/authentication algorithm
before it can be distributed for use.
30 He told Payne, in a response to a question from
Payne, that NSA runs crypto algorithms through
statistical tests.
31 After Payne wrote the Appendix T memorandum, NSA
sent a delegation to Sandia.
32 He and NSA employee Scott Judy designed a
replacement algorithm for Beninicasa's USO
algorithm.
33 The replacement algorithm was code named GRANITE.
34 The GRANITE design addressed some of the
deficiencies in Benincasa's algorithm enumerated
in Payne's Appendix T June 21, 1989 DRAFT letter
to Hearn.
35 The GRANITE design addressed some of the
deficiencies in Benincasa's algorithm enumerated
in Payne's Appendix T June 21, 1989 DRAFT letter
to Hearn.
36 He knows where the documents specifying
Benincasa's to the original USO seismic data
authentication algorithm are located at NSA.
37 He knows where the documents specifying his and
Judy's GRANITE algorithm are located at NSA.
NSA employee Scott Judy ADMITS
38 He met Payne at Sandia sometime after he wrote
the DRAFT letter on Internet at jya.com, click
cryptome, catch the thread at August 29, 1997,
SANDIA REPORT, SAND91-2201 UC 706, Data
Authentication for the Deployable Seismic
Verification System, Appendix T, Benincasa's
Algorithm Deficiencies.
39 He later met Payne again at NSA in a meeting.
40 He told Payne that NSA bases its cryptographer
algorithm on principles other than mathematics.
41 He and NSA employee Mark Unkenholtz designed a
replacement algorithm for Beninicasa's USO
algorithm.
42 His replacement algorithm was code named GRANITE.
43 GRANITE design addressed some of the deficiencies
in Benincasa's algorithm enumerated in Payne's
Appendix T June 21, 1989 DRAFT letter to Hearn.
44 The number stepping on the internal registers of
GRANITE was decreased in response to
deficiency 2 enumerated in the June 21, 1989
letter to Hern.
45 He knows where the documents specifying
Benincasa's correction to the original USO
seismic data authentication algorithm are
located at NSA.
46 He knows where the documents specifying his
and Unkenholtz's GRANITE algorithm are located
at NSA.
NSA employee Edward Donohue ADMITS
47 He met Payne at Sandia sometime after he wrote
the DRAFT letter on Internet at jya.com, click
cryptome, catch the thread at August 29, 1997,
SANDIA REPORT, SAND91-2201 UC 706, Data
Authentication for the Deployable Seismic
Verification System, Appendix T, Benincasa's
Algorithm Deficiencies.
48 He was head of NSA's R division cryptographic
algorithms division in 1989.
49 He knows where
1 Benincasa's original NSS/USO algorithm,
2 Benincasa's revision of 1,
3 The Unkenholtz - Judy GRANITE algorithm,
4 Brian Snow's MSCU algorithm,
5 the clipper algorithms,
6 the STU III algorithms.
written specifications are located at NSA.
NSA employee Paul Bridge ADMITS
50 He assumed liaison control from NSA employee
Tom White for the US/USSR seismic data
authenticator.
51 He placed a copy of
WORKING AGREEMENT BETWEEN SANDIA NATIONAL
LABORATORIES AND THE NATIONAL SECURITY
AGENCY CONCERNING RESEARCH IN CRYPTOGRAPHY
AT SANDIA NATIONAL LABORATORY
Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) and the National
Security Agency (NSA) have established a working
relationship which has gown substantially over
the last decade. Currently, there exist several
joint project areas of mutual interest.
Different policies and administrative procedure
exist at SNL and NSA which govern the handling
of sensitive and classified material, and the
documentation and dissemination of such
work. It is the purpose of the Agreement to
specify the general guidelines under which work
will be administered in the area of cryptography
research at SNL.
First, SNL, in its role as systems integrator,
requires and indigenous cryptographic capability
to support its Department of Energy mission in the
design and development of safe and secure nuclear
weapons and in treaty verification. SNL and NSA
agree to a cooperative effort to support SNL's needs
in a manner consistent with the role of such work
to national security.
Second, NSA, in its role as the U.S. Government
approval authority for cryptographic systems
developed for and used in national security
applications, recognizes its responsibility to
provide support and guidance to SNL's activities
in applying cryptography.
Third, SNL will regard cryptographic research
work as classified when it is initiated or
created, i.e., will protect such work as
"created classified", and will consult with
NSA prior to handling such work as unclassified.
Periodic technical and managerial discussions
between SNL and NSA will be held to increase
the awareness of the security concerns of
both organizations and to develop and maintain
an SNL cryptographic classification guide which
will protect the national security interests of
both organizations.
This working agreement shall be effective on
the date of the last signature and will be
reviewed annually by SNL and NSA. It will be
valid until terminated by mutual agreement.
AGREED:
ALBERT NARATH RADM JAMES S. MCFARLAND
(USN)
President Plans and Policy
TITLE TITLE
SANDIA NATIONAL NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
LABORATORIES
June 10, 1991 22 July 1991
DATE DATE
which is now seen on Internet at jya.com,
click cryptome, catch the thread at August 29,
1997.
52 His purpose of giving Payne a copy of the
Narath/MacFarland agreement an attempt to
threaten Payne.
53 He told Payne that Sandia must regard the
US/USSR Deployable Seismic Verification
System (DSVS) authenticator as classified
and get permission from NSA to place the
unit in the field.
54 He told Payne that Sandia must have the DSVS
authenticator TEMPEST tested .
55 He agrees Payne responded to him that the
previous unit had already passed TEMPEST
testing and that Payne's Sandia project
leader, H. B. [Jim] Durham, did not want to
spend the money to repeat the testing.
56 He told Payne that NSA should be getting the
capability to build cryptographic devices.
NSA employee Rick Proto ADMITS
57 He and group of other NSA employees met
Sandians H. B. Durham, Ron Moya, and
William Payne at NSA at Fort George G.
Meade in about 1986 to discuss, in part,
implementation of the Deployable Seismic
Verification System data authenticator.
58 He and other NSA employees directed that
the NSA Unmanned Seismic Observatory data
authenticator algorithm designed by NSA
employee Ronald Benincasa be implemented
entirely in hardware.
59 He and the other NSA employees at the meeting,
directed that the data authenticator be
enclosed in a TEMPEST enclosure. Sandians
expressed objection to the TEMPEST enclosure
in that the authenticator was housed in a steel
tube buried about 100 meters beneath ground
surface.
60 He agrees that he and NSA employee Robert
Morris met with Sandia cryptographer G. J.
Simmons when Simmons asked them both the two
questions:
1 NSA is sorry it delegated cryptographic
implementation responsibility to Sandia
for nuclear weapons;
2 NSA is trying to take back this
responsibility?
61 He and/or Morris refuse to respond to
Simmons' above question.
Retired Sandia Employee Gustavus J Simmons ADMITS
62 He with Sandia Paul Stokes designed a data
authentication algorithm for seismic treaty
verifications in the early 1970s.
63 He and Stokes either patented, tried to patent,
or contemplated patenting their
authentication algorithm.
64 NSA, when we presented their seismic data
authentication algorithm to the Agency,
rejected its use.
65 He know that NSA gave Sandia the data
authentication algorithm designed by NSA
employee Ronald Benincasa to use in seismic
verification rather than use your and
Stokes algorithm.
66 He feels that the algorithm that he and Stokes
proposed is as good or better than
Benincasa's algorithm.
67 He feels that NSA demanding Sandia use
Benincasa's algorithm could be a case of
Not-invented-here as opposed to technical
advantages over his and Stokes
algorithm.
68 In about 1986 he gave a presentation in
Sandia spook-shop building 868 to promote
the use of public key cryptography for use
in the Deployable Seismic Verification System.
69 No one, until he received a copy of Payne's
technical report in 1992, SANDIA REPORT,
SAND91-2201 UC 706, Data Authentication for
the Deployable Seismic Verification System
told him what algorithm and authentication
technology was used.
70 He asked NSA employees Rick Proto and Robert
Morris to the effect,
1 NSA is sorry it delegated cryptographic
implementation responsibility to Sandia
for nuclear weapons;
2 NSA is trying to take back this
responsibility.
71 Proto or Morris did not answer his questions.
72 He retired before he planned from Sandia Labs.
73 He felt that NSA exerted some pressure on
Sandia to have him retire.
74 He told William Payne on the phone that he
was forced into early retirement as a result
of NSA pressures.
75 He felt that some NSA algorithms do not are
properly classifiable.
76 He felt that NSA abuses classification with
regard to cryptography.
77 He feels that cryptography, by its 'slippery
math' basis, is difficult, if not impossible,
to regulate.
Sandia employee D. Jerry Allen ADMITS
78 He was a supervisor Sandia's weapons components
department.
79 NSA has responsibility for furnished Sandia the
cryptographic algorithms and approving the
implementation technology which went into the
electronic locks in the US nuclear arsenal.
80 He told William Payne in about 1991-92 that
it cost $300,000 per nuclear bomb to recall
bombs to Pantex to remove and repair Sandia's
failing semiconductor chips.
Sandia employee Ronald Kulju ADMITS
81 He worked in Sandia weapons components
department in about 1986/7.
82 He was working on a project which involved
use of the Cylink corporation CY 1024 public
key cryptography semiconductor chip.
82 He made an agreement in about 1986/7 with
Payne. He would design the hardware
oscillator for the CY 1024 if Payne would
try to get CY 1024 to communicate with an
80c51 microcontroller using synchronous
Mode 0 communications.
83 He told Payne that Sandia's public key
cryptography chips did not get the same
answers as the CY 1024.
84 He told Payne that NSA and Sandia was in
the process of removing the public key
cryptography from weapons systems.
4 Admissions reveal that NSA employees KNOW where
the lawfully requested documents reside. And that
NSA has EMBARRASSING problems with its cryptographic
algorithms.
5 Rule 56 states. Summary Judgment states,
The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith
if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any,
show that there is NO GENUINE ISSUE AS TO ANY
MATERIAL FACT and that the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Plaintiffs capitalize NO GENUINE ISSUE AS TO ANY
MATERIAL FACT.
Admissions attest to the contention that there
are NO GENUINE ISSUE AS TO ANY MATERIAL FACT.
WHEREFORE,
6 Replace Judges Svet and Campos because these judges
have demonstrated, IN WRITING, they do not follow the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
7 Award Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment
as a matter of law based on admissions.
8 Have replacement judges ORDER Defendant to
produce immediately produce documents in
machine-readable format for publication on
Internet. In preparation for settlement of
this unfortunate bungled spy sting. And analysis
of 'deficient' NSA cryptographic algorithm work
designed to get the US government out of the
cryptography business.
9 Grant such other relief as the Court may deem
just and proper.
Respectfully submitted,
_________________________
William H. Payne
13015 Calle de Sandias NE
Albuquerque, NM 87111
_________________________
Arthur R. Morales
1024 Los Arboles NW
Albuquerque, NM 87107
Pro se litigants
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy of the foregoing memorandum
was mailed to Lieutenant General Kenneth A. Minihan, USAF,
Director, National Security Agency, National Security Agency,
9800 Savage Road, Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6000
and hand delivered to Jan E Mitchell, Assistant US Attorney,
525 Silver SW, ABQ, NM 87102 this Monday December 22, 1997.
13
Tuesday December 9, 1997 06:26
Certified - return receipt requested
Gilbert F. Casellas, Chairman
U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
1801 L Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20507
Dear Chairman Casellas:
Tuesday November 11, 1997 I filed a Privacy Act/Freedom of
Information Act appeal with your office.
No acknowledgment of that appeal was received.
I wrote you in that letter,
An agency is required to make a decision on an appeal
within 20 days (excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and legal
holidays). It is possible for an agency to extend the time
limits by an additional 10 days. Once the time period has
elapsed, a requester may consider that the appeal has been
denied and may proceed with a judicial appeal.
Since I did not send my appeal letter certified, I assume
that it took three days, a the courts allow for filing
by mail, to reach your office.
Therefore, I assume that the letter arrived at your office
on Friday November 14. This assumption means that your
office had 9 days in November to process my appeal.
The remaining 11 working days before administrative remedies
are exhausted expires on December 15.
If you did not receive my appeal letter at the time I supposed
you did, then I ask you to write me and tell me this.
Otherwise, I and everyone else must conclude administrative
remedies have been exhausted on December 15.
Chairman Casellas, should anyone in your office not believe
that we are proceeding to judicial appeal and a defamation
lawsuit, let the following article published on Internet
assure you that we are.
Unless we settle this matter, of course.
NSA, Crypto AG, and the Iraq-Iran Conflict
by J. Orlin Grabbe
One of the dirty little secrets of the 1980s is that the U.S.
regularly provided Iraq's Saddam Hussein with top-secret
communication intercepts by the U.S. National Security
Agency (NSA). Consider the evidence.
When in 1991 the government of Kuwait paid the public
relations firm of Hill & Knowlton ten million dollars to drum
up American war fever against the evil dictator Hussein, it
brought about the end of a long legacy of cooperation
between the U.S. and Iraq. Hill & Knowlton resurrected the
World War I propaganda story about German soldiers
roasting Belgian babies on bayonets, updated in the form
of a confidential witness (actually the daughter of the
Kuwaiti ambassador to the U.S.) who told Congress a tearful
story of Iraqi soldiers taking Kuwaiti babies out of incubators
and leaving them on the cold floor to die. President George
Bush then repeated this fabricated tale in speeches ten times
over the next three days.
What is remarkable about this staged turn of events is that,
until then, Hussein had operated largely with U.S. approval.
This cooperation had spanned three successive
administrations, starting with Jimmy Carter. As noted by
John R. MacArthur, "From 1980 to 1988, Hussein had
shouldered the burdenof killing about 150,000 Iranians, in
addition to at least thirteen thousand of his own citizens,
including several thousand unarmed Kurdish civilians, and in
the process won the admiration and support of elements of
three successive U.S. Administrations" [1].
Hussein's artful slaughter of Iranians was aided by good
military intelligence. The role of NSA in the conflict is an
open secret in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. Only in this
country has there been a relative news blackout, despite the
fact that it was the U.S. administration that let the crypto
cat out of the bag.
First, U.S. President Ronald Reagan informed the world on
national television that the United States was reading Libyan
communications. This admission was part of a speech
justifying the retaliatory bombing of Libya for its alleged
involvement in the La Belle discotheque bombing in Berlin's
Schoeneberg district, where two U.S. soldiers and a Turkish
woman were killed, and 200 others injured. Reagan wasn't
talking about American monitoring of Libyan news
broadcasts. Rather, his "direct, precise, and undeniable proof"
referred to secret (encrypted) diplomatic communication
between Tripoli and the Libyan embassy in East Berlin.
Next, this leak was compound by the U.S. demonstration that
it was also reading secret Iranian communications. As reported
in Switzerland's Neue Zurcher Zeitung, the U.S. provided the
contents of encrypted Iranian messages to France to assist
in the conviction of Ali Vakili Rad and Massoud Hendi for
the stabbing death in the Paris suburb of Suresnes of the
former Iranian prime minister Shahpour Bakhtiar and his
personal secretary Katibeh Fallouch. [2]
What these two countries had in common was they had
both purchased cryptographic communication equipment from
the Swiss firm Crypto AG. Crypto AG was founded in 1952
by the (Russian-born) Swedish cryptographer Boris Hagelin
who located his company in Zug. Boris had created the
"Hagelin-machine", a encryption device similar to the German
"Enigma". The Hagelin machine was used on the side of the
Allies in World War II.
Crypto AG was an old and venerable firm, and Switzerland
was a neutral country. So Crypto AG's enciphering devices for
voice communication and digital data networks were popular,
and customers came from 130 countries. These included the
Vatican, as well the governments of Iraq, Iran, and Libya. Such
countries were naturally skeptical of cryptographic devices
sold in many NATO countries, so turned to relatively neutral
Switzerland for communication security.
Iran demonstrated its suspicion about the source of the leaks,
when it arrested Hans Buehler, a top salesman for Crypto AG,
in Teheran on March 18, 1992. During his nine and a half
months of solitary confinement in Evin prison in Teheran,
Buehler was questioned again and again whether he had
leaked Teheran's codes or Libya's keys to Western powers.
Luckily Buehler didn't know anything. He in fact believed in
his own sales pitch that Crypto AG was a neutral company
and its equipment was the best. They were Swiss, after all. [3]
Crypto AG eventually paid one million dollars for Buehler's
release in January 1993, then promptly fired him once they
had reassured themselves that he hadn't revealed anything
important under interrogation, and because Buehler had begun
to ask some embarrassing questions. Then reports appeared on
Swiss television, Swiss Radio International, all the major
Swiss papers, and in German magazines like Der Spiegel. Had
Crypto AG's equipment been spiked by Western intelligence
services? the media wanted to know. The answer was Yes [4].
Swiss television traced the ownership of Crypto AG to a
company in Liechtenstein, and from there back to a trust
company in Munich. A witness appearing on Swiss television
explained the real owner was the German government--the
Federal Estates Administration. [5]
According to Der Spiegel, all but 6 of the 6000 shares of Crypto
AG were at one time owned by Eugen Freiberger, who resided
in Munich and was head of the Crypto AG managing board
in 1982. Another German, Josef Bauer, an authorized tax
agent of the Muenchner Treuhandgesellschaft KPMG, and
who was elected to the managing board in 1970, stated that his
mandate had come from the German company Siemens. Other
members of Crypto AG's management had also worked at
Siemens. Was the German secret service, the
Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND), hiding behind the Siemens'
connection?
So it would seem. Der Spiegel reported that in October 1970,
a secret meeting of the BND had discussed how the Swiss
company Graettner could be guided into closer cooperation
with Crypto AG, or could even merged with it. The BND
additionally considered how "the Swedish company Ericsson
could be influenced through Siemens to terminate its own
cryptographic business." [6]
A former employee of Crypto AG reported that he had to
coordinate his developments with "people from Bad
Godesberg". This was the location of the "central office for
encryption affairs" of the BND, and the service instructed
Crypto AG what algorithms to use to create the codes. The
employee also remembers an American "watcher", who
strongly demanded the use of certain encryption methods.
Representatives from NSA visited Crypto AG often. A
memorandum of a secret workshop at Crypto AG in August
1975, where a new prototype of an encryption device was
demonstrated, mentions the participation of Nora L.
Mackebee, an NSA cryptographer. Motorola engineer
Bob Newman says that Mackebee was introduced to him
as a "consultant". Motorola cooperated with Crypto AG
in the seventies in developing a new generation of
electronic encryption machines. The Americans "knew Zug
very well and gave travel tips to the Motorola people for the
visit at Crypto AG," Newman told Der Spiegel.
Knowledgeable sources indicate that the Crypto AG
enciphering process, developed in cooperation with the NSA
and the German company Siemans, involved secretly
embedding the decryption key in the cipher text. Those who
knew where to look could monitor the encrypted
communication, then extract the decryption key that was also
part of the transmission, and recover the plain text message.
Decryption of a message by a knowledgeable third
party was not any more difficult than it was for the intended
receiver. (More than one method was used. Sometimes the
algorithm was simply deficient, with built-in exploitable
weaknesses.)
Crypto AG denies all this, of course, saying such reports are
"pure invention".
What information was provided to Saddam Hussein exactly?
Answers to this question are currently being sought in a
lawsuit against NSA in New Mexico, which has asked to see
"all Iranian messages and translations between January 1, 1980
and June 10, 1996". [7]
The passage of top-secret communications intelligence to
someone like Saddam Hussein brings up other questions.
Which dictator is the U.S. passing top secret messages to
currently? Jiang Zemin? Boris Yeltsin?
Will Saddam Hussein again become a recipient of NSA
largess if he returns to the mass slaughter of Iranians? What
exactly is the purpose of NSA anyway?
One more question: Who is reading the Pope's
communications?
Bibliography
[1] John R. MacArthur, Second Front: Censorship and
Propaganda in the Gulf War, Hill and Wang, New York, 1992.
[2] Some of the background of this assassination can be found
in "The Tehran Connection," Time Magazine, March 21, 1994.
[3] The Buehler case is detailed in Res Strehle,
Verschleusselt: der Fall Hans Beuhler, Werd Verlag, Zurich, 1994.
[4] "For years, NSA secretly rigged Crypto AG machines so
that U.S. eavesdroppers could easily break their codes,
according to former company employees whose story is
supported by company documents," "No Such Agency, Part 4:
Rigging the Game," The Baltimore Sun, December 4, 1995.
[5] Reported in programs about the Buehler case that were
broadcast on Swiss Radio International on May 15, 1994 and
July 18, 1994.
[6] "Wer ist der befugte Vierte?": Geheimdienste unterwandern
den Schutz von Verschlusselungsgeraten," Der Spiegel 36,
1996.
[7] U.S. District Court for the District of New Mexico,
William H. Payne, Arthur R. Morales, Plaintiffs, v. Lieutenant
General Kenneth A. Minihan, USAF, Director of National
Security Agency, National Security Agency, Defendant,
CIV NO 97 0266 SC/DJS.
November 2, 1997
Web Page: http://www.aci.net/kalliste/
Sincerely,
William H. Payne
13015 Calle de Sandias
Albuquerque, NM 87111
[End]