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13 November 1998

USIS Washington File

12 November 1998


(Extends national emergency relating to these weapons)  (4100)

Washington -- President Clinton has notified Congress that he is
extending the national emergency relating to chemical, biological and
nuclear weapons and has broadened the range of activities that would
be subject to penalties aimed at deterring the spread of such weapons.

He announced these actions in a November 12 letter to the Speaker of
the House and the President Pro Tempore of the Senate, which also
contains a report on the administration efforts to control
proliferation of these weapons.

Following is the White House text:

(begin text)


Office of the Press Secretary

November 12, 1998


November 12, 1998

Dear Mr. Speaker:  (Dear Mr. President:)

On November 14, 1994, in light of the dangers of the proliferation of
nuclear, biological and chemical weapons ("weapons of mass
destruction" -- WMD) and of the means of delivering such weapons, I
issued Executive Order 12938, and declared a national emergency under
the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et
seq.). Under section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C.
1622(d)), the national emergency terminates on the anniversary date of
its declaration, unless I publish in the Federal Register and transmit
to the Congress a notice of its continuation.

The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of
delivery continues to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the
national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States.

Indeed, on July 28, 1998, I issued Executive Order 13094 to strengthen
Executive Order 12938 by, inter alia, broadening the types of
proliferation activity that is subject to potential penalties. I am,
therefore, advising the Congress that the national emergency declared
on November 14, 1994, must continue in effect beyond November 14,

Accordingly, I have extended the national emergency declared in
Executive Order 12938, as amended, and have sent the attached notice
of extension to the Federal Register for publication.

On July 28, 1998, I amended section 4 of Executive Order 12938 so that
the United States Government could more effectively respond to the
worldwide threat of weapons of mass destruction proliferation

The amendment to section 4 strengthens Executive Order 12938 in
several significant ways. The amendment broadens the type of
proliferation activity that subjects entities to potential penalties
under the Executive order. The original Executive order provided for
penalties for contributions to the efforts of any foreign country,
project or entity to use, acquire, design, produce, or stockpile
chemical or biological weapons; the amended Executive order also
covers contributions to foreign programs for nuclear weapons and for
missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction. Moreover,
the amendment expands the original Executive order to include attempts
to contribute to foreign proliferation activities, as well as actual
contributions, and broadens the range of potential penalties to
expressly include the prohibition of United States Government
assistance to foreign persons, as well as the prohibition of United
States Government procurement and imports into the United States.

The following report, which covers activities on or before October 31,
1998, is made pursuant to section 204 of the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1703) and section 401(c) of the
National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1641(c)), regarding activities
taken and money spent pursuant to the emergency declaration.
Additional information on nuclear, missile, and/or chemical and
biological weapons (CBW) proliferation concerns and nonproliferation
efforts is contained in the most recent annual Report on the
Proliferation of Missiles and Essential Components of Nuclear,
Biological and Chemical Weapons, provided to the Congress pursuant to
section 1097 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Years 1992 and 1993 (Public Law 102-190), also known as the
"Nonproliferation Report," and the most recent annual report provided
to the Congress pursuant to section 308 of the Chemical and Biological
Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991 (Public Law
102-182), also known as the "CBW Report."

Nuclear Weapons

In May, India and Pakistan each conducted a series of nuclear tests.
In response, I imposed sanctions on India and Pakistan as required by
the Glenn Amendment. Beyond our unilateral response, world reaction
was pronounced and included nearly universal condemnation across a
broad range of international fora and a broad range of sanctions,
including new restrictions on lending by international financial
institutions unrelated to basic human needs and aid from the G-8 and
other countries.

Since the mandatory imposition of US sanctions, we have worked
unilaterally, with other P-5 and G-8 members, and through the United
Nations to dissuade India and Pakistan from taking further steps
toward creating operational nuclear forces, to urge them to join
multilateral arms control efforts, to persuade them to prevent an arms
race and build confidence by practicing restraint, and to resume
efforts to resolve their differences through dialogue. The P-5, G-8,
and UN Security Council have called on India and Pakistan to take a
broad range of concrete actions. The United States has over the past 5
months focused most intensely on several objectives that can be met
over the short and medium term: an end to nuclear testing and prompt,
unconditional adherence to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty
(CTBT); a moratorium on production of fissile material for nuclear
weapons and other explosive devices, and engagement in pro-ductive
negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT); restraint in
deployment of nuclear-capable missiles and aircraft; and adoption of
controls meeting international standards on exports of sensitive
materials and technology.

Against this backdrop of international pressure on India and Pakistan,
US high-level dialogue with Indian and Pakistani officials has yielded
some progress. Both governments, having already declared testing
moratoria, indicated publicly that they are prepared to adhere to the
CTBT under certain conditions. Both withdrew their opposition to
negotiations on an FMCT in Geneva at the end of the 1998 Conference on
Disarmament session. They have also pledged to institute strict
control of sensitive exports that meet internationally accepted
standards. In addition, they have resumed bilateral dialogue on
outstanding disputes, including Kashmir, at the Foreign Secretary

In recognition of these positive steps and to encourage further
progress, I decided on November 3 to exercise my authority under the
Brownback provision of the 1999 Omnibus Appropriations bill (Public
Law 105-277) to waive some of the Glenn sanctions. Through this
action, I have authorized the resumption of Export-Import Bank,
Overseas Private Investment Corporation, Trade and Development Agency,
and International Military Education and Training programs in India
and Pakistan and have lifted restrictions on US banks in these
countries. We will continue discussions with both governments at the
senior and expert levels, and our diplomatic efforts in concert with
the P-5 and in international fora.

So far, 150 countries have signed and 21 have ratified the CTBT.
During 1998, CTBT signatories conducted numerous meetings of the
Preparatory Commission (PrepCom) in Vienna, seeking to promote rapid
completion of the International Monitoring System (IMS) established by
the Treaty.

On September 23, 1997, I transmitted the CTBT to the Senate,
requesting prompt advice and consent to ratification. The CTBT will
serve several US national security interests by prohibiting all
nuclear explosions.

It will constrain the development and qualitative improvement of
nuclear weapons; end the development of advanced new types; contribute
to the prevention of nuclear proliferation and the process of nuclear
disarmament; and strengthen international peace and security. The CTBT
marks a historic milestone in our drive to reduce the nuclear threat
and to build a safer world.

The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) held its 1998 Plenary in Edinburgh,
Scotland, March 30 to April 2, on the twentieth anniversary of the
publication of the Nuclear Suppliers Guidelines. With 35 member
states, the NSG is a mature, effective, and widely accepted
export-control arrangement. Over the past 7 years the NSG has
established a Dual-Use Regime (DUR), agreed to require full-scope
safeguards as a condition of nuclear supply, created an effective
Joint Information Exchange, and strengthened controls over technology
and retransfers. The NSG is considering further activities to promote
regime transparency, following the success of the 1997 Vienna
transparency seminar, and is preparing for a transparency seminar in
New York during the run-up to the 1999 NPT PrepCom.

The NSG is considering membership for Belarus, China, Cyprus,
Kazakhstan and Turkey. China is the only major nuclear supplier that
is not a member of the NSG, although China did join the Zangger
Committee last year and recently has expressed an interest in learning
more about the NSG.

The NPT Exporters (Zangger) Committee has demonstrated its continued
relevance to the multilateral nonproliferation regime as the
interpreter of Article III-2 of the NPT by the membership of China in
October 1997 by recently agreeing to a statement deploring the Indian
and Pakistani nuclear tests. This is the first time the Zangger
Committee has ever issued a statement not directly related to
publication of its Guidelines.

Furthermore, the Zangger Committee is considering a US proposal to add
conversion technology to the Trigger List.

Chemical and Biological Weapons

The export control regulations issued under the Enhanced Proliferation
Control Initiative (EPCI) remain fully in force and continue to be
applied by the Department of Commerce in order to control the export
of items with potential use in chemical or biological weapons or
unmanned delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction.

Chemical weapons (CW) continue to pose a very serious threat to our
security and that of our allies. On April 29, 1997, the Convention on
the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of
Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (the Chemical Weapons
Convention or CWC) entered into force with 87 of the CWC's 165
signatories as original States Parties.

The United States was among their number, having deposited its
instrument of ratification on April 25. Russia ratified the CWC on
November 5, 1997, and became a State Party on December 5, 1997. As of
October 31, 1998, 120 countries (including Iran, Pakistan, and
Ukraine) have become States Parties.

The implementing body for the CWC -- the Organization for the
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) -- was established at the entry
into force (EIF) of the Convention on April 29, 1997. The OPCW,
located in The Hague, has primary responsibility (along with States
Parties) for implementing the CWC. It collects declarations, conducts
inspections, and serves as a forum for consultation and cooperation
among States Parties. It consists of the Conference of the States
Parties, the Executive Council (EC), and the Technical Secretariat

The EC consists of 41 States Parties (including the United States) and
acts as the governing body for the OPCW between annual meetings of the
Conference of the States Parties. Since EIF, the EC has met numerous
times to address issues such as scale of assessments, CW production
facility conversion requests, facility and transitional verification
arrangements, and staff regulations.

The TS carries out the verification provisions of the CWC, and
presently has a staff of approximately 500, including about 200
inspectors trained and equipped to inspect military and industrial
facilities throughout the world. The OPCW has conducted nearly 300
inspections in some 20 countries. It conducted nearly 100 such
inspections in the United States. The OPCW maintains a permanent
inspector presence at operational US CW destruction facilities in
Utah, Nevada, and Johnston Island.

The United States is determined to seek full implementation of the
concrete measures in the CWC designed to raise the costs and risks for
any state or terrorist attempting to engage in chemical
weapons-related activities. The CWC's declaration requirements improve
our knowledge of possible chemical weapons activities. Its inspection
provisions provide for access to declared and undeclared facilities
and locations, thus making clandestine chemical weapons production and
stockpiling more difficult, more risky, and more expensive.

The Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998 was enacted
into law in October 1998, as part of the Omnibus Consolidated and
Emergency Supplemental Appropriation Act, 1999 (Public Law 105-277).

Accordingly, we anticipate rapid promulgation of implementing
regulations on submission of US industrial declarations to the OPCW.
Submission of these declarations will bring the United States into
full compliance with the CWC. United States noncompliance to date has,
among other things, undermined US leadership in the organization as
well as our ability to encourage other States Parties to make
complete, accurate, and timely declarations.

Countries that refuse to join the CWC will be politically isolated and
prohibited under the CWC from trading with States Parties in certain
key chemicals. The relevant treaty provision is specifically designed
to penalize in a concrete way countries that refuse to join the rest
of the world in eliminating the threat of chemical weapons. We
anticipate rapid promulgation of US regulations implementing these CWC
trade restrictions.

The United States also continues to play a leading role in the
international effort to reduce the threat from biological weapons
(BW). We are an active participant in the Ad Hoc Group (AHG) striving
to complete a legally binding protocol to strengthen and enhance
compliance with the 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of the
Development, Production and Stock-piling of Bacteriological
(Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (the
Biological Weapons Convention or BWC). This Ad Hoc Group was mandated
by the September 1994 BWC Special Conference. The Fourth BWC Review
Conference, held in November/December 1996, urged the AHG to complete
the protocol as soon as possible but not later than the next Review
Conference to be held in 2001. Work is progressing on a draft rolling
text through insertion of national views and clarification of existing
text. We held four AHG negotiating sessions in 1998, and five are
scheduled for 1999.

On January 27, 1998, during the State of the Union Address, I
announced that the United States would take a leading role in the
effort to erect stronger international barriers against the
proliferation and use of BW by strengthening the BWC with a new
international system to detect and deter cheating. The United States
will work closely with US industry to develop US negotiating positions
and then to reach international agreement on: declarations,
nonchallenge clarifying visits, and challenge investigations. Other
key issues to be resolved in the Ad Hoc Group in 1999 are details on
mandatory declarations, placement of definitions related to
declarations, and questions related to assistance and export controls.

On the margins of the 1998 UN General Assembly, senior United States
Government representatives attended a Ministerial meeting hosted by
the Government of New Zealand and sponsored by the Government of
Australia to promote intensified work on the Compliance Protocol. I
will continue to devote personal attention to this issue and encourage
other heads of state to do the same.

The United States continued to be a leading participant in the
30-member Australia Group (AG) CBW nonproliferation regime. The United
States attended the most recent annual AG Plenary Session from October
12-15, 1998, during which the Group continued to focus on
strengthening AG export controls and sharing information to address
the threat of CBW terrorism. At the behest of the United States, the
AG first began in-depth political-level discussion of CBW
proliferation and terrorism during the 1995 Plenary Session following
the Tokyo subway nerve gas attack earlier that year. At the 1998
plenary, at the behest of the United States, AG participants shared
information on legal and regulatory efforts each member has taken to
counter this threat. The AG also reaffirmed its commitment to continue
its active outreach program of briefings for non-AG countries, and to
promote regional consultations on export controls and nonproliferation
to further awareness and understanding of national policies in these

The Group also reaffirmed the participants' shared belief that full
adherence to the CWC and the BWC is the best way to achieve permanent
global elimination of CBW, and that all States adhering to these
Conventions have an obligation to ensure that their national
activities support this goal. The AG participants continue to seek to
ensure that all relevant national measures promote the object and
purposes of the BWC and CWC. The AG participants reaffirmed their
belief that existing national export licensing policies on chemical
weapons-and biological weapons-related items help to fulfill their
obligations established under Article I of the CWC and Article III of
the BWC that States Parties not assist, in any way, the acquisition,
manufacture, or use of chemical or biological weapons. Given this
understanding, the AG participants also reaffirmed their commitment to
continuing the Group's activities, now that the CWC has entered into

During the last 6 months, we continued to examine closely intelligence
and other reports of trade in CBW-related material and technology that
might be relevant to sanctions provisions under the Chemical and
Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991. No new
sanctions determinations were reached during this reporting period.
The United States also continues to cooperate with its AG partners and
other countries in stopping shipments of proliferation concern.

Missiles for Delivery of Weapons of Mass Destruction The United States
continues to carefully control exports that could contribute to
unmanned delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction and to
closely monitor activities of potential missile proliferation concern.
We also continue to implement the US missile sanctions law.

In April 1998, we imposed Category I missile sanctions against North
Korean and Pakistani entities for the transfer from North Korea to
Pakistan of equipment and technology related to the Ghauri missile.
Sanctions imposed against two North Korean entities in August 1997 for
transfers involving Category II Missile Technology Control Regime
(MTCR) Annex items also remain in effect.

During this reporting period, MTCR Partners continued to work with
each other and with potential non-Partner supplier and transshipment
states to curb proliferation. Partners emphasized the need for
implementing effective export control systems and cooperated to
interdict shipments intended for use in missile programs of concern.

The United States was an active participant in the MTCR's highly
productive May 1998 Reinforced Point of Contact (RPOC) Meeting. At the
RPOC, MTCR Partners engaged in an in-depth discussion of regional
missile proliferation concerns, focusing in particular on South Asia.
They also discussed steps Partners could take to increase transparency
and outreach to nonmembers, and reached consensus to admit the Czech
Republic, Poland, and Ukraine to membership in the MTCR. (Reports on
their membership have been submitted to the Congress pursuant to
section 73A of the Arms Export Control Act.)

In May 1998, the United States was an active participant in the
German-hosted MTCR workshop on brokering, catch-all controls, and
other export control issues. In June, the United States played a
leading role at the Swiss-hosted MTCR workshops on risk assessment in
MTCR licensing decisions. The workshops involved the participation of
MTCR Partners, as well as several non-MTCR members, and were
successful in providing practical insights on export control and
licensing issues. In particular, it helped participants identify risk
factors and ways to assess them.

The MTCR held its Thirteenth Plenary Meeting in Budapest, Hungary on
October 5-9. At the Plenary, the MTCR Partners shared information
about activities and programs of missile proliferation concern and
considered additional steps they can take, individually and
collectively, to prevent the proliferation of delivery systems for
weapons of mass destruction, focusing in particular on the threat
posed by missile-related activities in South and North East Asia and
the Middle East.

During their discussions, the Partners gave special attention to North
Korean (DPRK) missile activities, expressing serious concern about the
DPRK's missile export practices and its efforts to acquire
increasingly long-range missiles. The MTCR Plenary Chairman issued a
statement reflecting the Partners' concerns, noting in particular that
the Partners urged the DPRK to refrain from further flight tests of
WMD-capable missiles and to cease exports of equipment and technology
for such missiles. The Partners also agreed to maintain special
scrutiny over their missile-related exports in order not to support
North Korean missile development in any way.

At Budapest, the Partners also discussed ways to further the MTCR's
efforts to promote openness and outreach to nonmembers, including by
sponsoring additional seminars and workshops for members and

The Partners supported a US proposal for an MTCR-sponsored workshop in
1999 on "intangible transfers of technology," in order to develop a
greater understanding of how proliferators misuse the Internet,
scientific conferences, plant visits, and student exchange programs to
acquire sensitive technology and to identify steps countries can take
to address this problem. They also agreed to give further
consideration to a technical-level workshop for border guards and
Customs authorities on export control enforcement. In addition, the
Partners noted China's increased willingness to engage in meaningful
dialogue on missile nonproliferation and export control issues, and
renewed their previous invitation in principle to China to take the
steps necessary to join the Regime.

The Partners also made additional progress at Budapest toward
reformatting the MTCR Annex (the list of MTCR-controlled items) to
improve clarity and uniformity of implementation while maintaining the
coverage of the current Annex. They hope to complete this process in
the near future.

During this reporting period, the United States also worked
unilaterally and in coordination with its MTCR Partners to combat
missile proliferation and to encourage nonmembers to export
responsibly and to adhere to the MTCR Guidelines. Since my last
report, we have continued missile nonproliferation discussions with
China and North Korea and other countries in Central Europe, the
Middle East, and Asia.

In October 1998, the United States and the DPRK held a third round of
missile talks, aimed at constraining DPRK missile production,
deployment, flight-testing, and exports. The United States expressed
serious concerns about North Korea's missile exports and indigenous
missile activities, and made clear that we regard as highly
destabilizing the DPRK's attempt on August 31 to use a Taepo Dong 1
missile to orbit a small satellite. We voiced strong opposition to
North Korea's missile exports to other countries and made clear that
further launches of long-range missiles or further exports of such
missiles or their related technology would have very negative
consequences for efforts to improve US-North Korean relations. The
talks concluded with an agreement to hold another round at the
earliest practical date.

In response to reports of continuing Iranian efforts to acquire
sensitive items from Russian entities for use in Iran's missile
development program, the United States continued its high-level
dialogue with Russia aimed at finding ways the United States and
Russia can work together to cut off the flow of sensitive goods to
Iran's ballistic missile development program. This effort has netted
some positive results. For example, during this reporting period,
Russia began implementing "catch-all" provisions imposing controls
over the export of any material destined for a WMD or missile program,
and provided detailed implementing guidance on these controls for
Russian entities. Russia also agreed to meet regularly with the United
States to discuss export control issues. In addition, at the summit in
September, President Yeltsin and I announced the formation of seven
bilateral working groups -- nuclear, missile, catch-all and internal
compliance, conventional weapons, law enforcement, licensing, and
customs -- for the rapid exchange of information on the wide range of
nonproliferation issues.

In July, Russia launched special investigations of nine entities
suspected of cooperating with foreign programs to acquire WMD and
missile delivery systems. Russia subsequently took steps to end
exports to Iran by three of these entities and to pursue two of the
cases as smuggling issues. Consistent with the Russian action, the
United States took action against seven of the nine entities in July
pursuant in part to Executive Order 12938, as amended. We suspended
all United States Government assistance to these seven entities and
banned all US exports to them and all of their imports to the United


Pursuant to section 401(c) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C.
1641(c)), I report that there were no expenses directly attributable
to the exercise of authorities conferred by the declaration of the
national emergency in Executive Order 12938 during the period from May
14, 1998, through October 31, 1998.



(end text)

Source: [Federal Register: November 13, 1998 (Volume 63, Number 219)] [Presidential Documents] [Page 63587-63589] From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [] [DOCID:fr13no98-163] [[Page 63587]] _______________________________________________________________________ Part VII The President _______________________________________________________________________ Notice of November 12, 1998--Continuation of Emergency Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction Presidential Documents ___________________________________________________________________ Title 3-- The President [[Page 63589]] Notice of November 12, 1998 Continuation of Emergency Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction On November 14, 1994, by Executive Order 12938, I declared a national emergency with respect to the unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States posed by the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons (``weapons of mass destruction'') and the means of delivering such weapons. Because the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the means of delivering them continues to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States, the national emergency first declared on November 14, 1994, and extended on November 14, 1995, November 12, 1996, and November 13, 1997, must continue in effect beyond November 14, 1998. Therefore, in accordance with section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)), I am continuing the national emergency declared in Executive Order 12938. This notice shall be published in the Federal Register and transmitted to the Congress. (Presidential Sig.)<Clinton1><Clinton2> THE WHITE HOUSE, November 12, 1998. [FR Doc. 98-30694 Filed 11-12-98; 1:20 pm] Billing code 3195-01-P