14 June 2005. Thanks to J, add links to Michael Smith's September 2994 reports
in The Telegraph and two images, derived from links on The Raw Story:
http://www.rawstory.com/exclusives/muriel/path_of_war_timeline_613.htm
9 June 2005. This file and related Zipped file of documents republished in
response to inquiries.
D. writes:
The New Zealand publication "Scoop"
(http://www.scoop.co.nz) has
published
what purports to be a transcript of a memo concerning the runup to the Iraq
invasion from the U.K. ambassador to the United States, Christopher Meyer,
to David Manning. The source document for this memo is a pdf,
"meyer020318.pdf", from a collection of several others. All of these pdfs
no longer appear to be available on the network. In an analysis of these
documents Michael Lewis of Christ's College, Cambridge referred readers to
an archive of these supposedly to be found at Cryptome,
"leaks-brief.zip". These no longer appear to be on the
Cryptome site. Have they by any chance been removed?
I ask because the authenticity of the documents is now being called into
question.
5 October 2004. Thanks to Michael Lewis, who writes:
Please find attached pdf facsimiles of the leaked UK Cabinet Office documents
discussed in various news outlets around 18th September, e.g.,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2004/09/18/nwar18.xml
The Telegraph (UK)
Secret papers show Blair was warned of Iraq chaos
By Michael Smith, Defence Correspondent
(Filed: 18/09/2004)
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2004/09/18/nwar118.xml
The Telegraph (UK)
'Failure is not an option, but it doesn't mean they will avoid it'
By Michael Smith
(Filed: 18/09/2004)
![[Image]](leaks-brief-01.jpg)
Source
![[Image]](leaks-brief-02.jpg)
Source
and my analysis of them. The full texts, particularly several passages not
much discussed by the news media, provide clearer evidence than either the
Hutton or Butler reports of positively misleading statements made by Prime
Minister Blair to the press and the UK Parliament.
The documents were not reproduced in full in the press, and are currently
hosted on another site
http://www.middleeastreference.org.uk/ukdocs0203.html
[Now dead. See below for Cryptome mirror]
but too much traffic may take down this site. The analysis below is not as
yet posted anywhere.
Leaked Cabinet Office papers, September 2004: Evidence of false statements
made by Tony Blair to Parliament and the media
Summary
The Butler Report of July 2004 highlighted substantial omissions of evidence
regarding Iraq, but did not argue that positively false information had been
given by the Prime Minister to press or Parliament. On 18 September 2004,
the Daily Telegraph published extracts from a series of newly leaked documents
from the Cabinet Office. With one exception, none of these were quoted in
the Butler Report.[1] The full texts of these documents:
A) Provide clear evidence that the Prime Minister substantively
misled Parliament and press in claiming that:
a. his government’s objective was disarmament, and not regime change
by force; and that
b. as late as February 2003, no decision had been taken to invade Iraq.
Instead, they show that Blair was fully committed to regime change as early
as 8 March 2002, and communicated this position to Bush and his officials.
This is substantive evidence of positive falsehood on the part of the Prime
Minister, not simply an omission of evidence.
B) Demonstrate that a new Security Council Resolution in 2002 and renewed
inspections were designed to provide a trigger for war, as part of an explicitly
set-out sequence of actions by the US/UK to provide political and legal support
for invasion. Claims by the Prime Minister and others that it was only
Saddam’s unwillingness to cooperate with renewed inspections that led
to war were therefore misleading. These policy documents clearly show an
intention to use (and arguably abuse) the UN route to provide a legal pretext
for pre-decided regime change, not as a route to peaceful disarmament.
C) Show that as early as March 2002 the Prime Minister was advised that
a. intelligence on Iraqi weapons was “poor”;
b. containment had been “partially successful”, preventing
Iraq’s resumption of a nuclear programme and restricting chemical and
biological weapons development;
c. Iraq’s security threat was not increasing;
d. as such “current intelligence is insufficiently robust”
to meet the criteria of proof required for legal justification of invasion.
The Prime Minister’s decision, taken at least as early as March 2002,
to commit to regime change by force, was thus taken against the background
of advice that the threat from Iraq was NOT increasing; containment was judged
to be “partially successful”; and that without Iraq’s renewed
rejection of weapons inspections, such a course of action would, on available
evidence, not gain legal sanction under the UN Charter.
In addition, the documents demonstrate the scale of the misgivings expressed
by the Prime Minister’s advisors to him and his ministers around the
time that he committed to assisting regime change. The Cabinet Office, the
Foreign Office, and the Foreign Secretary advised that:
a. the invasion of Iraq could not guarantee a WMD-free Iraq;
b. the invasion of Iraq could not guarantee a democratic Iraq;
c. neither the US nor the UK had credible plans for the aftermath of
regime change;
d. the opposition groups relied upon so heavily before and after invasion
were regarded by most Iraqis as “Western stooges”.
Contrary to recent assertions by the Prime Minister that at that time “the
idea that we did not have a plan for afterwards is simply not correct”,
the documents show that when the Prime Minister took the decision to support
military regime change in March 2002, his officials warned him precisely
that “none has satisfactorily answered how that regime change is to
be secured”, and that “Bush has yet to find the answers to the
big questions …[of] what happens on the morning
after”.[2]
Facsimiles of these documents can be seen at
http://www.middleeastreference.org.uk/ukdocs0203.html
[See below for Cryptome mirror]
If you have any comments, please contact:
Michael Lewis
Christ’s College
St Andrew’s Street
Cambridge CB2 3BU
Email: mhl24@cam.ac.uk
Analysis
A) The Prime Minister’s concealment of his agreement to pursue
regime change
1. Two Downing Street memos from mid-March 2002, marked ‘Secret’,
describe meetings between David Manning (then the Prime Minister's foreign
policy adviser and current UK ambassador to Washington) and Christopher Meyer
(then UK ambassador to Washington), and senior members of the US administration.
Both describe promises made to the US about the UK’s support for regime
change.
I said [to Condoleezza Rice] you [Blair] would not budge in your support
for regime change but you had to manage a press, a Parliament and a public
opinion that was very different than anything in the
States.[3]
On Iraq I opened by sticking very closely to the script that you used with
Condi Rice last week. We backed regime change, but the plan had to be clever
and failure was not an option.[4]
2. Contrary to his frequent public denials, therefore (see below), twelve
months before war with Iraq, and eight months before UNSCR1441, the Prime
Minister committed the UK to pursuing regime change.
3. That the UK envisaged that regime change might involve invasion, rather
than an internal coup or the assassination of Saddam Hussein, is made clear
by a further document, marked ‘Secret’ and entitled ‘Iraq:
Options Paper’, produced on 8 March 2002 by the Overseas and Defence
Secretariat of the Cabinet Office. It states that “[s]ince 1991, our
objective has been to re-integrate a law-abiding Iraq which does not possess
WMD or threaten its neighbours, into the international community. Implicitly,
this cannot occur with Saddam Hussein in power.”[5]
The document considers three options for regime change: covert support for
opposition groups to mount an uprising or coup; air support for opposition
groups; and a full-scale ground campaign.[6]
4. Although it suggests that the first two might be tried as preludes to
the third, it concludes that:
“[i]n sum, despite the considerable difficulties, the use of overriding
force in a ground campaign is the only option that we can be confident will
remove Saddam and bring Iraq back into the international
community.”[7]
5. Although this document is a policy options paper rather than a formal
commitment, it insists that a decision had to be taken relatively soon:
“All options have lead times. If an invasion is contemplated this autumn,
then a decision will need to be taken in principle six months in
advance.”[8] In fact, Blair’s commitment to regime
change in March 2002 demonstrates that such a decision preceded even this
military timetable.
6. Contrary to this evidence, the Prime Minister and other ministers repeatedly
denied throughout 2002 and early 2003 that a decision had been taken to commit
to regime change, and insisted that if Saddam complied with the inspectors,
he would be allowed to remain in power.
7. In an interview on 14 November 2002, Blair insisted that:
So far as our objective, it is disarmament, not regime change - that is our
objective. Now I happen to believe the regime of Saddam is a very brutal
and repressive regime, I think it does enormous damage to the Iraqi people....but
on the other hand I have got no doubt either that the purpose of our challenge
from the United Nations is disarmament of weapons of mass destruction, it
is not regime change.[9]
8. In his monthly press conference on 13 January 2003, Blair said:
Of course no-one wants conflict, everyone would prefer this to be resolved
peacefully.[10]
9. In his monthly press conference on 18 February 2003, Blair again insisted:
There is no inexorable decision to go to war but there is an inexorable decision
to disarm Saddam Hussein. How that happens is up to Saddam….when we
went to the UN last November, that was America taking the decision that if
Saddam co-operated that disarmament would happen peacefully, without war
and without regime change.[11]
10. In the House of Commons on 25 February 2003, Blair continued to insist,
contrary to his commitment to regime change, that Saddam could remain in
power if he cooperated with weapons inspections:
even now, today, we are offering Saddam the prospect of voluntary disarmament
through the UN. I detest his regime - I hope most people do - but even now,
he could save it by complying with the UN's demand. Even now, we are prepared
to go the extra step to achieve disarmament peacefully.[12]
11. Given the evidence of a policy decision taken to pursue regime change
as early as March 2002, these statements could only be true if government
policy changed from supporting regime change up to March 2002, to supporting
disarmament between mid-2002 and February 2003; and returned to support for
regime change in March 2003. Blair needs to demonstrate that this ostensibly
unlikely scenario was indeed the case: if not, then these statements clearly
show that he misled media and Parliament.
B) UNSCR 1441 and the inspection regime designed to provide a trigger
for war, as part of an explicitly set out sequence of actions by the US/UK
to provide political and legal support for invasion
12. In his memo on lunch with Paul Wolfowitz, Christopher Meyer reported
to Downing Street that:
“I then went through the need to wrongfoot Saddam on the inspectors
and the UN SCRs”[13]
This suggests that renewed inspections, provided by a new UN Security Council
Resolution (UNSCR) in November 2002, were intended to make Saddam default,
providing a justification for a pre-planned war.
13. This is supported by the “Iraq: Options Paper” of 8 March,
which establishes that renewed inspections and UNSCRs are part of a process
explicitly designed to provide a pretext for war:
A legal justification for invasion would be needed. Subject to Law Officers
advice, none currently exists. This makes moving quickly to invade legally
very difficult. We should therefore consider a staged approach, establishing
international support, building up pressure on Saddam, and developing military
plans. There is a lead time of about 6 months to a ground
offensive.[14]
….
34. To
launch such a [ground] campaign would require a staged approach:
* winding up the pressure: increasing the pressure on Saddam through tougher
containment….A refusal to readmit UN inspectors, or their admission
and subsequent likely frustration, which resulted in an appropriate finding
by the Security Council could provide the justification for military action.
* careful [military] planning….
* coalition building: diplomacy….
* incentives: as an incentive guarantees will need to be made with regard
to Iraq’s territorial integrity.
* tackling other regional issues [including the Middle East Peace Plan]
* sensitising the public: a media campaign to warn of the dangers that Saddam
poses and to prepare public opinion both in the UK and
abroad.[15]
14. The paper thus explicitly establishes that the UN/weapons inspector route
was designed, contrary to the assertions of the Prime Minister (cf. paras.
7-10), to lead to invasion, not to peaceful disarmament.
15. A timescale is also suggested:
Sufficient air assets would need three months and ground forces at least
four-five months to assemble so on logistical grounds a ground campaign is
not feasible until autumn 2002. The optimal times to start action are early
spring[16]
16. Yet in his 18 February press conference, Blair denied that a timetable
had been considered:
QUESTION: I just want to come back to this point about timing. Once Hans
Blix reports on the 28th [February], how long does the Security Council have
realistically to secure a second resolution after that? Is the request from
the French of 14 March a realistic request to come back and discuss things
then?
PRIME MINISTER: The reason I hesitate about setting timelines or making dates
of some sort of defining significance is because if I do so I am doing something
where decisions really have not been taken, and it depends frankly what happens
over the next period of time.[17]
C) Advice on Iraq’s weapons, the uncertainty of intelligence,
and the lack of legal justification for offensive military action
Iraq’s weapons and intelligence
17. The September leaks strengthen many of the findings of the Butler Inquiry
that the Prime Minister was advised that (a) Intelligence on Iraqi weapons
was “poor”; (b) there was no new or imminent threat from Iraq’s
weapons capability or intentions which might justify a change in
policy.[18]
18. The ‘Iraq: Options Paper’, quoted in the Butler inquiry’s
report states that:
As at [sic] least worst option, we have supported a policy of containment
[since 1991] which has been partially successful. However: Despite sanctions,
Iraq continues to develop WMD, although our intelligence is poor. Saddam
has used WMD in the past and could do so again if his regime were threatened,
though there is no greater threat now than in recent years that Saddam will
use WMD.[19]
Although it thus argues that Iraq continues to have a WMD capability, it
suggests that its threat is not increasing:
Since 1991, the policy of containment has been partially successful:
* Sanctions have effectively frozen Iraq’s nuclear programme;
* Iraq has been prevented from rebuilding its conventional arsenal to pre-Gulf
War levels;
* ballistic missile programmes have been severely restricted;
* Biological Weapons (BW) and Chemical Weapons (CW) programmes have been
hindered;
* No Fly Zones established over northern and southern Iraq have given some
protection to the Kurds and the Shia. Although subject to continuing political
pressure, the Kurds remain autonomous; and
* Saddam has not succeeded in seriously threatening his
neighbours.[20]
19. In a letter marked “Confidential and Personal” to Jack Straw
on 22 September 2002, written to provide “thoughts for your [Jack
Straw’s] personal note to the Prime Minister”, Peter Ricketts,
the Political Director of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, reiterated
the view that nothing had changed which might justify new efforts at disarmament:
THE THREAT: The truth is that what has changed is not the pace of Saddam
Hussein’s WMD programmes, but our tolerance of them post-11
September….even the best survey of Iraq’s WMD programmes will not
show much advance in recent years on the nuclear, missile or CW/BW fronts:
the programmes are extremely worrying but have not, as far as we know, been
stepped up.[21]
20. The Prime Minister was definitely made aware of this view, passed on
in a letter by Jack Straw on 25 March 2002:
WHAT IS
WORSE NOW?
4. If 11 September had not happened, it is doubtful that the US would now
be considering military action against Iraq. In addition, there has been
no credible evidence to link Iraq with UBL [Usama Bin Laden] and Al Qaida.
Objectively the threat from Iraq has not worsened as a result of 11
September.[22]
Legal justification for offensive military action
21. Given the current lack of evidence for an imminent threat, the ‘Iraq:
Options Paper’ of March 2002 clearly argues that there is currently
unlikely to be legal justification for an invasion:
30. Currently, offensive military action against Iraq can only be [legally]
justified if Iraq is held to be in breach of the Gulf War ceasefire resolution,
687….
31. As the ceasefire was proclaimed by the Security Council in 687, it is
for the [UN Security] Council to decide whether a breach of obligations has
occurred….
32. For the P5 and the majority of the Council to take the view that Iraq
was in breach of 687:
they would need to be convinced that Iraq was in breach of its obligations
regarding WMD, and ballistic missiles. Such proof would need to be
incontrovertible and of large-scale activity. Current intelligence is
insufficiently robust to meet this criterion.[23]
22. Although the Butler Report has shown that Joint Intelligence Committee
reports seen by the Prime Minister did harden their language about Iraq’s
weapons between March and September 2002 (partly from intelligence which
was subsequently withdrawn as unreliable), the Prime Minister, as we have
seen, took the decision to remove Saddam in March 2002: when, according to
advice given to him, the threat from Iraq was NOT increasing; containment
was judged to be “partially successful”; and there was insufficient
evidence as yet to legally justify military action.[24]
23. Unless British policy changed from regime change to disarmament between
2002 and 2003, and back again in March 2003 (for which there is no evidence),
then these papers indicate that British participation in the UN process between
2002 and 2003 was intended to provide a legal justification for regime change,
not to pursue disarmament peacefully.
D) Advice that the invasion of Iraq might not produce a WMD-free
Iraq, nor a democratic one; and that post-war planning, and even broad
objectives, were inadequate
Post-war planning and outcomes
25. While Iraqi democracy is the clearly preferred outcome in the “Iraq:
Options Paper” of March 2002, the paper is astonishingly unconfident
that regime change will result either in Iraqi democracy or in long-term
disarmament. The document even considers the UK accommodating the emergence
of a “Sunni strongman” instead; and it stresses that neither democracy
nor ‘strongman’ can guarantee a WMD-free Iraq:
The US administration has lost faith in containment and is now considering
regime change. The end states could either be a Sunni strongman or a
representative government.
….
11. In considering the options for regime change below, we need to first
consider what sort of Iraq we want? There are two possibilities:
* A Sunni military strongman. He would be likely to maintain Iraqi territorial
integrity. Assistance with reconstruction and political rehabilitation could
be traded for assurances on abandoning WMD programmes and respecting human
rights, particularly of ethnic minorities. The US and other militaries could
withdraw quickly. However, there would be a strong risk of the Iraqi system
reverting to type. Military coup could succeed coup until an autocratic Sunni
dictator emerged who protected Sunni interests. With time he could acquire
WMD; or
* A representative, broadly democratic government….Such a regime would
be less likely to develop WMD and threaten its neighbours. However, to survive
it would require the US and others to commit to nation-building for many
years.
….
27. But it should be noted that even a representative government could seek
to acquire WMD and build-up its conventional forces, so long as Iran and
Israel retain their WMD and conventional armouries.[25]
26. In addition to these misgivings, Blair’s advisors also made it clear
in March 2002 that they did not believe that the US had produced a convincing
plan for Iraq’s replacement government and reconstruction. David Manning,
describing his meeting with Condoleezza Rice, wrote:
From what she [Condoleezza Rice] said, Bush has yet to find the answers to
the big questions:…what happens on the morning
after?[26]
27. In a letter to the Prime Minister of 25 March 2002 marked ‘Secret
and Personal’, Foreign Secretary Jack Straw was even less sanguine about
the lack of both US and UK planning, and likely outcomes:
We also have to answer the big question – what will this action achieve?
There seems to be a larger hole on this than on anything. Most of the assessments
from the US have assumed regime change as a means of eliminating Iraq’s
WMD threat. But none has satisfactorily answered how that regime change is
to be secured, and how there can be any certainty that the replacement regime
will be better.
11. Iraq has NO history of democracy so no-one has this habit or
experience.[27]
28. Blair denied the absence of planning when these documents were made public,
on 18 September 2004:
And so the idea that we did not have a plan for afterwards is simply not
correct. We did, and indeed we have unfolded that plan[28]
Yet given the timing of decision-making revealed by these documents, they
show that when the Prime Minister took the decision to support military regime
change in March 2002, his officials warned him precisely that “none
has satisfactorily answered how that regime change is to be secured”,
and that “Bush has yet to find the answers to the big questions …[of]
what happens on the morning after”. They show that the decision
to remove Saddam Hussein was taken well before any plans for his replacement
had been produced – arguably an extremely reckless sequence of
decision-making.
External Iraqi opposition groups
29. A major part of the UK/US pursuit of post-Saddam democracy was to give
substantial public support throughout 2002 and 2003 to external Iraqi opposition
groups. Yet the “Iraq: Options Paper” of 8 March 2002 had warned
ministers that external Iraqi opposition groups were unlikely to provide
credible members of successor regimes:
The external [Iraqi] opposition is weak, divided and lacks domestic credibility.
The predominant group is the Iraqi National Congress (INC), an umbrella
organisation led by Ahmed Chalabi, a Shia and convicted fraudster, popular
on Capitol Hill. The other major group, the Iraqi National Accord (INA),
espouses moderate Arab socialism and is led by another Shia, Ayad
Allawi….Most Iraqis see the INC/INA as Western
stooges.[29]
30. Despite being told by UK advisors that they had little popular legitimacy,
considerable weight was given by both the UK and the US governments to these
groups in forming the post-Saddam regime. On 14 April 2003, Blair assured
the House of Commons that:
In relation to the coalition and Iraqi opposition groups, I hope that some
of the conspiracy theories about people simply being parachuted in to take
over the country can be laid to rest. What is important is that, in the end,
the legitimacy of anyone—from inside or outside Iraq—will rest
on their support from the Iraqi people themselves.[30]
31. Yet on May 22 2003, in response to a question asking what government’s
“policy is on the involvement of Mr. Ahmed Chalabi in the post-war
government in Iraq”,
Foreign Office Minister Mike O’Brien wrote that:
Chalabi is a prominent opposition figure. It is therefore only appropriate
that the group he represents should be able to play a role in Iraq's future.
But that role is for the people of Iraq to determine.[31]
[Ahmed Chalabi was subsequently appointed by the US/UK-led Coalition Provisional
Authority to the Iraqi Governing Council on 13 July 2003.]
32. On 20 July 2004, Blair told the House of Commons that:
If people read the letter from Dr. Allawi, published only the other day,
they will see that he set out the authentic voice of Iraq and its
future—what Iraq can now become.[32]
[Ayad Allawi, leader of the INA, was appointed Interim Prime Minister of
Iraq on 28 May 2003.]
________________________
[1]
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2004/09/18/nwar18.xml&sSheet=/portal/2004/09/18/ixportaltop.html
[2] Prime Minister, Press Conference at Leeds Castle, 18
September 2004,
http://www.number-10.gov.uk/output/Page6360.asp;
David Manning (Prime Minister’s Foreign Policy advisor), letter to the
Prime Minister on dinner with Condoleezza Rice, 14 March 2002; Jack Straw
(Foreign Secretary), letter to the Prime Minister, 25 March 2002
[3] David Manning (Prime Minister’s Foreign Policy advisor),
letter to the Prime Minister on dinner with Condoleezza Rice, 14 March 2002
[4] Christopher Meyer (UK ambassador to the United States),
note on Sunday lunch with Paul Wolfowitz, to David Manning, 18 March 2002
[5] Overseas and Defence Secretariat, Cabinet Office, "Iraq:
Options Paper", 8 March 2002, Summary. My emphasis
[6] Overseas and Defence Secretariat, Cabinet Office, "Iraq:
Options Paper", 8 March 2002, paras. 17, 5-34
[7] Overseas and Defence Secretariat, Cabinet Office, "Iraq:
Options Paper", 8 March 2002, para. 33
[8] Overseas and Defence Secretariat, Cabinet Office, "Iraq:
Options Paper", 8 March 2002, para. 26
[9] Interview with Prime Minister, 14 November 2002, transcript
at
http://www.iraqwatch.org/government/UK/PMO/uk-pmo-blair-111402.htm
[10] Press conference with Prime Minister, 13 January 2003,
http://www.number-10.gov.uk/output/Page3005.asp
[11] Press conference with Prime Minister, 18 February 2003,
http://www.number-10.gov.uk/output/Page3007.asp
[12] Prime Minister, Commons Hansard, 25 February 2003 Col.
124
[13] Christopher Meyer, note on Sunday lunch with Paul
Wolfowitz, to David Manning, 18 March 2002. My emphasis
[14] Overseas and Defence Secretariat, Cabinet Office, "Iraq:
Options Paper", 8 March 2002, Summary. My emphasis.
[15] Overseas and Defence Secretariat, Cabinet Office, "Iraq:
Options Paper", 8 March 2002, para. 34
[16] Overseas and Defence Secretariat, Cabinet Office, "Iraq:
Options Paper", 8 March 2002, para. 23
[17] Press conference with Prime Minister, 18 February 2003,
http://www.number-10.gov.uk/output/Page3007.asp
[18] cf. Lord Butler, Review of Intelligence on Weapons
of Mass Destruction [‘The Butler Report’], 14 July 2004, paras.
259-270
[19] Overseas and Defence Secretariat, Cabinet Office, "Iraq:
Options Paper", 8 March 2002, Summary. My emphasis.
[20] Overseas and Defence Secretariat, Cabinet Office, "Iraq:
Options Paper", 8 March 2002, para. 3
[21] Peter Ricketts (Political Director, Foreign and
Commonwealth Office), letter to Jack Straw, 22 March 2002, para. 4
[22] Jack Straw (Foreign Secretary), letter to the Prime
Minister, 25 March 2002, para. 4
[23] Overseas and Defence Secretariat, Cabinet Office, "Iraq:
Options Paper", 8 March 2002, paras. 30-32. My emphasis.
[24] Lord Butler, Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass
Destruction [‘The Butler Report’], 14 July 2004, paras. 298-307;
Overseas and Defence Secretariat, Cabinet Office, "Iraq: Options Paper",
8 March 2002, Summary
[25] Overseas and Defence Secretariat, Cabinet Office, "Iraq:
Options Paper", 8 March 2002, paras. 11, 27
[26] David Manning (Prime Minister’s Foreign Policy
advisor), letter to the Prime Minister on dinner with Condoleezza Rice, 14
March 2002
[27] Jack Straw (Foreign Secretary), letter to the Prime
Minister, 25 March 2002
[28] Prime Minister, Press Conference at Leeds Castle, 18
September 2004,
http://www.number-10.gov.uk/output/Page6360.asp
[29] Overseas and Defence Secretariat, Cabinet Office, "Iraq:
Options Paper", 8 March 2002, para. 13
[30] The Prime Minister, Comons Hansard 14 April 2003, Col
622
[31] Mike O’Brien, Commons written answers, 6 May 2003,
Col. 560W
[32] The Prime Minister, Commons Hansard, 20 July 2004,
Col 207
The six leaked documents in a Zipped file:
http://cryptome.org/leaks-brief.zip
(859KB)
straw020325.pdf
manning020314.pdf
meyer020318.pdf
ods020308.pdf
ricketts020322.pdf
fcolegal020308.pdf
