6 July 2002. Thanks to Anonymous.
5 July 2002
A couple of people, of late, have expressed an interest in Military Intelligence as a potential career option.
Life in the Army can be very rewarding. As a career Army NCO and a Counterintelligence Agent, I can tell you that (as they say) the Army is a great way of life. But, you have to remember, that with a career in the Army, the profession is soldiering -- not Military Intelligence, which is a specialty. There are no professional intelligence officers or NCOs in Military Intelligence. They are professional soldiers who happen to be assigned military intelligence duties (sometimes).
Within the Army, as there is in most intelligence activities, there are four principal disciplines: Imagery Intelligence (IMINT), Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), Human Intelligence (HUMINT), and (of course) Counterintelligence (CI). They all fall under the umbrella of Army Intelligence. Army Intelligence is not a independent cohort. It is prey to the combat arms which runs the Army, both in day-to-day activities and in policy development. Most of Army Intelligence is heavily influenced by the more technical side of the house (IMINT and SIGINT officers). That means that the HUMINT and CI folks are generally starved of resources and the better leadership. While there is an officer called the CI/HUMINT Director on the staff of the Army G-2, this officer actually does not direct CI activities or HUMINT activities since there are very few G-2 operating activities.
HUMINT is a strange bird in the Army. For everyone else in the national intelligence community, HUMINT is generally understood to mean a positive collection effect in denied areas to obtain the foreign intelligence on intentions and capabilities. The Army abrogated this responsibility years ago, and now has very few assets involved in this regard. Most of those assets are assigned to the Defensive HUMINT Service (DHS). Recently the Army made the determination that the reset of the IC really did not understand HUMINT and so, changed the definition every so slightly, in order to call its IPW assets (Interrogators of Prisoners of War) as HUMINTer. Thus, when you see the term HUMINT operator in the Army today, that general means an Interrogator and not the Area Intelligence Specialist (a Positive Collection Operative) of previous years.
CI is also very strange in the Army. CI, everywhere but in the Army, is defined as a: means information gathered and activities conducted to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted by or on behalf of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign persons, or international terrorist activities. While the Army definition sounds similar, it is extremely tactically oriented. That means that most of the active duty Special Agents of Army Counterintelligence are not running defensive source acquisition programs (DSAPs) (recruiting), not involved in the operations of defensive source networks (ODSNs), and they are not involved in any viable offensive counterintelligence operations (OFCOs) with the purpose of detecting, identifying, exploiting or neutralizing either hostile foreign intelligence services (HoIS), or 4th Generation Warfare activities, or asymmetrical threats (terrorists) beyond that which a combat commander faces. In fact, it was not until late December, following the 9/11 event, that the Army G-2 clarified that Army CI can receive certain threat material (but not collect it). Yes, that is correct. This is because that very few active duty Army CI Agents actually belong to a unit that has a viable mission. This point was recently driven home when the Army G-2, reminded the field activities this:
Since 9/11, there have been numerous instances of well-meaning MI personnel acting outside the MI lane, responding to requests for "threat" information. Please keep in mind that the PATRIOT Act did not change any DoD intelligence authorities. EO 12333, DoD 5240.1-R, and AR 381-10 are still in effect.
Some people may confuse general force protection responsibilities with assigned MI functions. Please read AR 525-13, Antiterrorism, dated Jan 02.
This document lays out responsibilities for force protection. The fusion point for force protection information is not MI, and fused force protection products cannot be disseminated as intelligence products. Before incorporating information from another entity into your intelligence products, consider:* Is the product already disseminated to a larger audience? The Army G-3 Daily Force Protection Message, a fused intelligence and law enforcement product, goes to thousands of recipients worldwide, Army and non-Army. What value do you add by repeating it -- could a repeat cause false confirmation or circular reporting? Could you inadvertently violate AR 381-10 by incorporating information not within your assigned mission?
Part of the problem is that the Army Leadership, mostly combat arms, is the puppet master to Army Intelligence. And they believe that they have just one, non-negotiable contract with America: To win and fight wars. They do not feel it is their job to protect America from 4th GW/Asymmetrical threats. Most Army Officers have never read 10 USC 3062:
It is the intent of Congress to provide an Army that is capable, in conjunction with the other armed forces, of -
(1) preserving the peace and security, and providing for the defense, of the United States, the Territories, Commonwealths, and possessions, and any areas occupied by the United States;
(2) supporting the national policies;
(3) implementing the national objectives; and
(4) overcoming any nations responsible for aggressive acts that imperil the peace and security of the United States.
So, they don not see their job as being principally involved in the preserving the peace and security, and providing for the defense, of the United States, the Territories, Commonwealths, and possessions, and any areas occupied by the United States. Thus, over 60% of the active duty CI resources are not involved in DSAPs, ODSNs or OFCOs in either the fight against terrorism or HoIS, in defense of the nation. Now none of this is new information, or a startling revelation. It is widely known. In testimony, last week before Congress, a couple General Officers of the Army, again, pointed this out.
The Intelligence Community has been slowly changing toward a system of national managers for the main intelligence collection disciplines, the three being signals (SIGINT), imagery (IMINT), and human intelligence (HUMINT) collection. A fourth, counterintelligence, also needs national management but remains fragmented beyond anyone's control at the national level. ...
I have not yet mentioned counterintelligence (CI) support, which is terribly important for homeland security. To be clear about CI, it is like ordinary intelligence except that it focuses only on hostile intelligence services, their collection capabilities, agents, knowledge of the United States, etc.
Because terrorists have much in common with spies, operating clandestinely, CI must also include counter-terrorism (CT) intelligence, both domestically and abroad. Until CI is better organized within the Intelligence Community, CI support to homeland security will be poor. If a "National CI Service" were created to provide "national management" for all CI =AD and counter-terrorist intelligence =AD removing it from the FBI, then CI/CT could be handled just like SIGINT, IMINT, and HUMINT. Putting the FBI within the new department would not provide better CI/CT, but rather worse. Moreover, it would make CI/CT cooperation with the CIA, Army, Navy, and Air Force virtually impossible. ...
There is one exception. The Intelligence Community is poorly organized to provide "counterintelligence" (CI). CI must also take the lead in providing counter-terrorism intelligence (CT) as well. And its collection and production cannot be the responsibility of criminal law enforcement agencies, not just in the case of the FBI but also in the military services. As the Intelligence Community is now organized, it simply cannot provide a comprehensive CI and CT picture to anyone, not to mention the Homeland Security Department.
-- 21 June 2002 by Lieutenant General William E. Odom
In general, the Department of Homeland Security should not separately develop or field sensors, sources, methods or collection capabilities apart from the existing U.S. IC or relevant elements of law enforcement, counterintelligence and security.
-- 26 June 2002, By Lieutenant General Patrick M. Hughes
We have, in my view, failed to do the right things in the past to forestall the current set of circumstances and consequences we are responding to. This failure includes our inadequate human intelligence gathering capabilities, hamstrung for years by cutbacks and resource shortfalls, an unwillingness, at the policy level to engage in risky operations, and a flawed set of recruiting, training, supporting and sustaining systems for our human intelligence professionals. I am hopeful that progress is now being made in this vital work but I cannot be sanguine about it because I have heard too many times before that we are fixing a problem that has long been identified and not fixed. This is, in part, a function of our national will to do the right things. The work of human intelligence is dirty, messy, and necessary. Without it we are unlikely to know what our enemies intend. ...
I have recently written an article for The Futurist magazine in which I suggested that intelligence support for countering terrorism, in the context of Homeland Security, is akin to searching out criminals who are planning to act and interdicting them, before they act, more than it is about typical military or civilian intelligence directed against established nation-state or alliance opponents in conventional or even "traditional" unconventional warfare. Understanding this construct seems critical to the work of intelligence support since it is much different than the "typical military" context.
-- 26 June 2002, By Lieutenant General Patrick M. Hughes
Moreover, as the events of 11 September so tragically demonstrated, the open nature of our society, and the increasing ease with which money, technology, information, and people move around the globe in the modem era, make effective counterintelligence and security that much more complex and difficult to achieve.
-- 6 Feb 2002, By Vice Admiral Thomas R. Wilson
Like I said in the opening, the Army is a great life; but, it is for soldiers, not the intelligence professional. If you want to be an intelligence professional in IMINT (be a squint) or SIGINT (be an ear), you might want to consider a short stint in the Army. If you want to defend your nation (as LTG Hughes says) in "The work of human intelligence is dirty, messy, and necessary. Without it we are unlikely to know what our enemies intend." or (as LTG Odom says) "counterintelligence (CI) support, which is terribly important for homeland security;" then you might want to consider another element of the intelligence community.
Remember, Army Intelligence leadership, outside the military domain, is the direct equivalent to the CEOs of Enron, WorldCom, and Global-Crossing. The senior Army Intelligence Officers justify their actions (or in some cases inaction) using the very same leadership ethics (the utilitarian Military Decision Making Process) as did these infamous Icons of Business and Captains of Industry. Secretary Rumsfeld, and and his OSECDEF staff, operate very much akin to Arthur Anderson, and plays deaf, dumb and blind. It is men like these that brought you the Marine Barracks in Lebanon, the Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia and the Yemen incident with the USS Cole. In that regard, military intelligence HUMINT and CI mirror these descriptive phrases:
... A fourth, counterintelligence, also needs national management but remains fragmented beyond anyone's control at the national level.
... Until CI is better organized within the Intelligence Community, CI support to homeland security will be poor.
... The Intelligence Community is poorly organized to provide "counterintelligence" (CI). CI must also take the lead in providing counter-terrorism intelligence (CT) as well.
... As the Intelligence Community is now organized, it simply cannot provide a comprehensive CI and CT picture to anyone, ... We have, in my view, failed to do the right things in the past to forestall the current set of circumstances and consequences we are responding to.
... Understanding this construct seems critical to the work of intelligence support since it is much different than the "typical military" context.
Of course, the decision is yours, but in 20 years from now, when your children ask you what you did in the war against terrorism, I wouldn't want to have to say: I was in the motor pool of the the CI Company with the Interim Brigade at Fort Lewis, preparing my HUMVEE to fight a make-believe enemy after the Twin Towers fell.