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25 September 2006
Released 22 September 2006 by Freedominfo: http://www.freedominfo.org/news/20060921.htm
[59 pages, marked top and bottom "NATO UNCLASSIFIED".
NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL
CONSEIL DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD
17 June 2002
Note by the Secretary General
Reference: C-M(2002)23 and its Action Sheet
1. This document is the result of a Fundamental Review by the NATO Security Committee (NSC) and it was approved by Council under the silence procedure on 26th March 2002 (reference refers).
2. This present document, in conjunction with C-M(2002)50, Protection Measures for NATO Civil and Military Bodies, deployed NATO Forces and Installations (Assets) against Terrorist Threats, supersedes C-M(55)15(Final). With the exception of Enclosure A, the Security Agreement by the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty which is still valid for those nations which have not yet ratified the "Agreement between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty for the Security of Information, all previous versions of C-M(55)15(Final) should now be destroyed.
3. The following Directives support this present document:
AC/35-D/2000 Directive on Personnel Security
AC/35-D/2001 Directive on Physical Security
AC/35-D/2002 Directive on Security of Information
AC/35-D/2003 Directive on Industrial Security
AC/35-D/2004 Primary Directive on INFOSEC
AC/35-D/2005 INFOSEC Management Directive for GIS
(The first four directives (AC/35-D/2000-2003) were approved by Council (reference refers) and the remaining two AC/35-D/2004 and D/2005) were approved by the NATO Security Committee (NSC) and the NATO C3 Board.
4. For ease of reference, a compendium, containing the two security policy documents (C-M(2002)49 and C-M(2002)50) and the above-mentioned supporting directives, Will be distributed in the near future to all current holders of C-M(55)15(Final).
(Signed) George Robertson
RECORD OF AMENDMENTS
Strike out corresponding number as each amendment is inserted
| 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
8 9 10
11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30
31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40
41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50
Note by the Secretary General
Record of Amendments
Table of Contents
Enclosure "A" - Security Agreement
Enclosure "B" - Basic Principles of Security
Enclosure "C" - Personnel Security
Enclosure "D" - Physical Security
Enclosure "E" - Security of Information
Enclosure "F" - INFOSEC
Enclosure "G" - Industrial Security
ENCLOSURE A to
1 This agreement is currently awaiting ratification by the Governments of the following NATO member nations : Belgium, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Norway, Portugal, Spain and UK. The Security Agreement by the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation contained in Enclosure A to C-M(55)15(Final) remains valid for those nations who have not yet ratified.
The Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty, signed at Washington on 4th April, 1949;
Reaffirming that effective political consultation, cooperation and planning for defence in achieving the objectives of the Treaty entail the exchange of classified information among the Parties;
Considering that provisions between the Governments of the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty for the mutual protection and safeguarding of the classified information they may interchange are necessary;
Realising that a general framework for security standards and procedures is required;
Acting on their own behalf and on behalf of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, have agreed as follows:
The Parties shall:
(i) protect and safeguard:
(a) classified information (see ANNEX l), marked as such, which is originated by NATO (see ANNEX 2) or which is submitted to NATO by a member state;
(b) classified information, marked as such, of the member states submitted to another member state in support of a NATO programme, project, or contract,
(ii) maintain the security classification of information as defined under (i) above and make every effort to safeguard it accordingly;
(iii) not use classified information as defined under (i) above for purposes other than those laid down in the Notth Atlantic Treaty and the decisions and resolutions pertaining to that Treaty;
(iv) not disclose such information as defined under (i) above to non-NATO Parties without the consent of the originator.
Pursuant to Article 1 of this Agreement, the Parties shall ensure the establishment of a National Security Authority for NATO activities which shall implement protective security measures. The Parties shall establish and implement security standards which shall ensure a common degree of protection for classified information.
(1) The Parties shall ensure that all persons of their respective nationality who, in the conduct of their officia1 duties, require or may have access to information classified CONFIDENTIAL and above are appropriately cleared before they take up their duties.
(2) Security clearance procedures shall be designed to determine whether an individual can, taking into account his or her loyalty and trustworthiness, have access to classified information without constituting an unacceptable risk to security.
(3) Upon request, each of the Parties shall cooperate with the other Parties in carrying out their respective security clearance procedures.
The Secretary General shall ensure that the relevant provisions of this Agreement are applied by NATO (see ANNEX 3).
The present Agreement in no way prevents the Parties from making other Agreements relating to the exchange of classified information originated by them and not affecting the scope of the present Agreement.
(a) This Agreement shall be open for signature by the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty and shall be subject to ratification, acceptance or approval. The instruments of ratification, acceptance or approval shall be deposited with the Government of the United States of America;
(b) This Agreement shall enter into force thirty days after the date of deposit by two signatory States of their instruments of ratification, acceptance or approval. It shall enter into force for each other signatory State thirty days after the deposit of its instrument of ratification, acceptance or approval.
(c) This Agreement shall with respect to the Parties for which it entered into force supersede the Security Agreement by the Parties to the Notth Atlantic Treaty Organization approved by the Notth Atlantic Council in Annex A (paragraph 1) to Appendix to Enclosure to D.C. 2/7, on 19th April, 1952, and subsequently incorporated in Enclosure A (paragraph 1) to C-M(55)15(Final), approved by the North Atlantic Council on 2nd March, 1955.
This Agreement shall remain open for accession by any new Patty to the North Atlantic Treaty, in accordance with its own constitutional procedures. Its instrument of accession shall be deposited with the government of the United States of America. It shall enter into force in respect of each acceding State thirty days after the day of the deposit of its instrument of accession.
The Government of the United States of America shall inform the Governments of the other Parties of the deposit of each instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.
This Agreement may be denounced by written notice of denunciation by any Party given to the depository which shall inform all the other Parties of such notice. Such denunciation shall take effect one year after receipt of notification by the depository, but shall not affect obligations already contracted and the rights or prerogatives previously acquired by the Parties under the provisions of this Agreement.
In witness whereof the undersigned, duly authorized to this effect by their respective Governments, have signed this Agreement. Done in Brussels, this . . . . . . . . . . . day of . . . . . . . . . . xxxx in a single copy in the English and French languages, each text being equally authoritative, which shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States of America and of which certified copies shall be transmitted by that Government to each of the other signatories.
This Annex forms an integral part of the Agreement.
NATO classified information is defined as follows:
(a) information means knowledge that can be communicated in any form;
(b) classified information means information or material determined to require protection against unauthorized disclosure which has been so designated by security classification;
(c) the word material includes documents and also any item of machinery or equipment or weapons either manufactured or in the process of manufacture;
(d) the word document means any recorded information regardless of its physical form or characteristics, including, without limitation, written or printed matter, data processing cards and tapes, maps, charts, photographs, paintings, drawings, engravings, sketches, wdrking notes and papers, carbon copies and ink ribbons, or reproductions by an means or process, and sound, voice, magnetic or electronic or optical or video recordings in any form, and portable ADP equipment with resident computer storage media, and removable computer storage media.
This Annex forms an integral part of the Agreement.
For the purposes of the present Agreement, the term NATO denotes the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the bodies governed either by the Agreement on the status of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, National Representatives and International Staff, signed in Ottawa on 20th September, 1951 or by the Protocol on the status of International Military Headquarters set up pursuant to the North Atlantic Treaty, signed in Paris on 28th August, 1952.
This Annex forms an integral part of the Agreement.
Consultation takes place with militaty commanders in order to respect their prerogatives.
ENCLOSURE B to
1. This C-M establishes the basic principles and minimum standards of security to be applied by NATO nations and NATO civil and military bodies in order to ensure that a common degree of protection is given to classified information exchanged among the parties. NATO security procedures only operate to the best advantage when they are based upon and supported by a national security system having the characteristics set out in this Enclosure. This Enclosure also addresses security responsibilities in NATO.
AIMS AND OBJECTIVES
2. NATO nations and NATO civil and military bodies shall ensure that the basic principles and minimum standards of security set fotth in this C-M are applied to safeguard classified information from loss of confidentiality, integrity and availability.
3. NATO nations and NATO civil and military bodies shall establish security programmes that meet these basic principles and minimum standards to ensure a common degree of protection for classified information.
4. These basic principles and minimum standards shall be applied to:
(a) classified information originated by NATO, originated by a member nation and submitted to NATO or submitted by a member nation to another member nation in support of a NATO programme, project or contract;
(b) classified information received by NATO from non-NATO sources; and
(c) classified information entrusted to individuals and organisations outside a government (or a NATO civil or military body), e.g., consultants, industry, universities, which shall protect it according to the same standards applied by the government or NATO civil or military body.
5. Access to, and the protection of, ATOMAL information are subject to the Agreement between the Parties to the Notth Atlantic Treaty for Co-operation regarding Atomic Information - C-M(64)39. The Administrative Arrangements to implement the Agreement between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty for Co-operation regarding ATOMAL Information - the current version of C-M(68)41 - shall be applied to control access to, to handle and protect such information.
6. Access to, and protection of, US-SIOP information are subject to the provisions of C-M(71)27(Revised), Special Procedures for the Handling of United States Single Integrated Operational Plan (US-SIOP) Information within NATO.
7. The sensitive nature of cryptographic information, measures, and products requires the application of stringent security precautions, often beyond those set forth in this C-M. Therefore, access to, and protection of, cryptographie information, measures and products that are nationally- or NAMILCOM-approved, shall be in accordance with Enclosure F, supporting directives and procedures established by the appropriate authority.
8. The North Atlantic Council (NAC) has approved this document which implements the Agreement Between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty for the Security of Information (reproduced at Enclosure A), and thereby establishes NATO Security Policy.
9. The following basic principles shall apply :
(a) NATO nations and NATO civil and military bodies shall ensure that the agreed minimum standards set forth in this C-M are applied to ensure a common degree of protection for classified information exchanged among the parties;
(b) classified information shall be disseminated solely on the basis of the principle of need-to-know to individuals who have been briefed on the relevant security procedures; in addition, only security cleared individuals shall have access to information classified CONFIDENTIAL and above;
(c) security risk management shall be mandatory within NATO civil and military bodies. Its application within NATO nations shall be optional;
(d) classified information shall be safeguarded by a balanced set of security measures, including personnel, physical, security of information and INFOSEC, which shall extend to all individuals having access to classified information, all media-carrying information, and to all premises containing such information;
(e) all suspected breaches of security shall be reported immediately to the appropriate security authority. Reports shall be evaluated by appropriate officiais to assess the resulting damage to NATO and to take appropriate action. Enclosure E provides details;
(f) originators release classified information to NATO and to NATO nations in support of a NATO programme, project or contract on the understanding that it Will be managed and protected in accordance with the NATO Information Management Policy (NIMP) and NATO Security Policy;
(g) classified information shall be subject to originator control;
(h) the release of classified information shall be in accordance with the requirements of Enclosure E to this C-M, and supporting directives; and
(i) subject to the consent of the originator and in accordance with Enclosure E to this C-M, NATO classified information shall only be released to non-NATO nations and organisations that have either signed a Security Agreement with NATO or that have provided a Security Assurance to NATO, either directly or through the NATO nation or NATO civil or military body sponsoring the release. In all cases, the same degree of protection as specified in this C-M shall be required for any NATO classified information released.
10. The foundations of sound national security are:
(a) a security organisation responsible for:(i) the collection and recording of intelligence information regarding espionage, terrorist, sabotage and subversive threats; and
(ii) the centralisation of such information SO that it cari be applied to any situation relating to the employment of individuals in government departments and agencies and by contractors; and
(iii) the provision of information and advice to governments on the nature of the threats to security and the means of protection against them; and
(b) the regular collaboration among government departments and agencies to:(i) identify classified information that needs to be protected; and
(ii) establish and apply common degrees of protection as set forth in this C-M.
11. Personnel security procedures shall be designed to assess whether an individual can,, taking into account his loyalty, trustworthiness and reliability, be authorised to have initial and continued access to classified information without constituting an unacceptable risk to security. All individuals, civilian and military, who require access to, or whose duties or functions may afford access to information classified CONFIDENTIAL or above, shall be appropriately cleared and briefed before such access is authorised. Individuals shall only have access to NATO classified information for which they have a need-to-know.
12. A security clearance is not required for access to RESTRICTED information; individuals shall be briefed about their responsibilities for the protection of RESTRICTED information.
13. Personnel security is addressed further at Enclosure C of this C-M and in the supporting personnel security directive.
14. Physical security is the application of physical protective measures to sites, buildings or facilities that contain information requiring protection against loss or compromise. Physical security programmes, consisting of active and.passive security measures, shall be established to provide levels of physical security consistent with the threat, security classification and quantity of the information to be protected. 15. Physical security is addressed futther at Enclosure D of this C-M and in the supporting physical security directive.
Security of Information
16. Security of information is the application of general protective measures and procedures to prevent, detect and recover from the loss or compromise of information. Classified information shall be protected throughout its life cycle to a level commensurate with its level of classification. It shall be managed to ensure that it is appropriately classified, is clearly identified as classified and remains classified only as long as this is necessary.
17. Security classifications shall be applied to information to indicate the possible damage to the security of NATO and/or its member nations if the information is subjected to unauthorised disclosure, NATO security classifications shall be applied in accordance with Enclosure E to this C-M. It is the prerogative of the originator of the information to determine or modify the security classification.
18. NATO security classifications and their significance are :
(a) COSMIC TOP SECRET (CTS) - unauthorised disclosure would result in exceptionally grave damage to NATO;
(b) NATO SECRET (NS) - unauthorised disclosure would result in grave damage to NATO;
(c) NATO CONFIDENTIAL (NC) - unauthorised disclosure would be damaging to NATO; and
(d) NATO RESTRICTED (NR) - unauthorised disclosure would be detrimental to the interests or effectiveness of NATO.
19. When classifying information, the originator shall take account of the damage if the information is subjected to unauthorised disclosure, and shall indicate, where possible, whether their information cari be downgraded or declassified on a certain date or event.
20. NATO UNCLASSIFIED information - policy and procedures for the management and protection of non-classified information marked NATO UNClASSIFIED are contained in the NATO Information Management Policy (NIMP).
21. Security of Information is addressed further at Enclosure E of this C-M and in the supporting security of information directive.
22. INFOSEC is the application of security measures to protect information processed, stored or transmitted in communication, information and other electronic systems against loss of confidentiality, integrity or availability, whether accidental or intentional, and to prevent loss of integrity or availability of the systems themselves. In order to achieve the security objectives of confidentiality, integrity and availability for classified information stored, processed or transmitted in communication, information and other electronic systems, a balanced set of security measures (physical, personnel, security of information and INFOSEC) shall be implemented to create a secure environment in which to operate a communication, information or other electronic system.
23. INFOSEC is addressed further at Enclosure F of this C-M and in supporting INFOSEC Management and INFOSEC Technical and Implementation directives. Industrial Security
24. Industrial security is the application of protective measures and procedures to prevent, detect and recover from the loss or compromise of classified information handled by industry in contracts. NATO classified information disseminated to industry, generated as a result of a contract with industry, and classified contracts with industry shall be protected in accordance with NATO Security Policy and supporting directives.
25. Before a facility or its employees, managers or owners cari have access to classified information or be invited to bid, negotiate or perform on a classified contract or work on a classified study involving access to information classified CONFIDENTIAL or above, the facility shall be granted a facility security clearance issued by the National Security Authority (NSA) (or, if appropriate, the Designated Security Authority (DSA)) of its nation of origin, that is to say, the nation in which the facility is located and incorporated to do business.
26. Facilities shall be required to protect classified information in accordance with the basic principles and minimum standards contained in this C-M. NSAs shall ensure that they have the means to make their industrial security requirements binding upon industry and that they have the right to inspect and approve the measures taken in industry for the protection of classified information.
27. Industrial security is addressed further at Enclosure G of this C-M and in the supporting industrial security directive.
PROTECTION OF INFORMATION ON KEY POINTS
28. The publication of information about civilian installations (defence supplies, energy supply, etc.) of military significance in times of tension or war may assist bombing, sabotage or terrorist attack by allowing potential enemies to compile a key points list, and to identify points vulnerable to sabotage or terrorism within individual key points. Policy should be designed to hamper the compilation by potential enemies of a Key Points List, to allow the invocation of security exemptions from publication of relevant data, and to encourage awareness of the risks among installation owners and operators.
National Security Authority (NSA)
29. Each member nation shall establish a National Security Authority (NSA) responsible for the security of NATO classified information.
30. The NSA is responsible for:
(a) the maintenance of security of NATO classified information in national agencies and elements, military or civil, at home or abroad;
(b) ensuring that periodic and appropriate inspections are made of security arrangements for the protection of NATO classified information in all national organisations at all levels, both military and civil, to determine that such arrangements are adequate and in accordance with current NATO security regulations. In the case of organisations holding CTS or ATOMAL information, security inspections shall be made at least every 18 months, unless, during that period, they are carried out by the NOS;
(c) ensuring that a security determination of eligibility has been made in respect of all nationals who are required to have access to information classified NC and above, in accordance with NATO Security Policy;
(d) ensuring that such national emergency security plans as are necessary to prevent NATO classified information from falling into unauthorised or hostile hands have been prepared; and
(e) authorising the establishment (or dis-establishment) of national Cosmic Central Registries. The establishment (or dis-establishment) of Cosmic Central Registries shall be notified to the NOS.
Designated Security Authority (DSA)
31. Each member nation may designate one or more DSAs responsible to the NSA. In this case the DSA of a NATO nation is responsible for communicating to industry the national policy in all matters of NATO industrial security policy and for providing direction and assistance in its implementation. In some nations, the functions of a DSA may be carried out by the NSA.
NATO Security Committee (NSC)
32. The NSC is established by the NAC and is composed of representatives from each member nation who are experienced in security matters in their own nation. The NSC is responsible directly to the NAC. A representative of the NATO Military Committee (NAMILCOM) shall be present at the meetings of the NSC. Representatives of NATO civil and military bodies may also be present when matters of interest to them are addressed n
33. The NSC is responsible directly to the NAC for:
(a) examining questions concerning NATO Security Policy;
(b) considering security matiers referred to it by the NAC, a member nation, the Secretary General, the NAMILCOM, or the Heads of NATO civil and military bodies; and
(c) preparing appropriate recommendations to the NAC.
NATO Office of Security (NOS)
34. The NOS is established within the NATO International Staff. It is composed of personnel experienced in security matters in both military and civil spheres. The Office maintains close liaison with the NSA of each member nation, and with NATO civil and military bodies. The Office may also, as required, request member nations and NATO civil and military bodies to provide additional security experts to assist it for limited periods of time when full-time additions to the Office would not be justified. The Director, NOS, serves as Chairman to the NSC.
35. The NOS is responsible for:
(a) the examination of any questions affecting NATO security;
(b) identifying means whereby NATO security might be improved;
(c) the overall CO-ordination of security for NATO among member nations and NATO civil and military bodies;
(d) ensuring the implementation of NATO security decisions, including the provision of such advice as may be requested by member nations and NATO civil and military bodies either in their application of the basic principles and the standards of security described in this Enclosure, or in the implementation of the specific security requirements;
(e) informing, as appropriate, the NSC, the Secretary General and the Chairman of the Military Committee of the state of security within NATO, and the progress made in implementing NAC decisions regarding security;
(f) carrying out periodic surveys of security systems for the protection of NATO classified information in member nations, NATO civil bodies, and SHAPE and SACLANT;
(g) co-ordinating, with NSAs and NATO civil and military bodies, the investigation into cases of lest, compromised or possibly compromised NATO classified information;
(h) informing NSAs of any adverse information which comes to light concerning their nationals;
(i) devising security measures for the protection of the NATO Headquarters, Brussels and ensuring their correct implementation; and
(j) carrying out, under the direction and on behalf of the Secretary General, acting in the name of the NAC and under its authority, responsibilities for supervising the application of the NATO security programme for the protection of ATOMAL information under the provisions of the Agreement and supporting Administrative Arrangements referenced at paragraph 5 above.
NATO Military Committee and NATO Military Bodies
36. As the highest military authority in NATO, the NAMILCOM is responsible for the overall conduct of military affairs. The NAMILCOM is consequently responsible for all security matters within the NATO military structure including centralised overall cognisance of measures necessary to assure the adequacy of cryptographic techniques and materials used for transmitting NATO classified information, including the security approval of NATO funded cryptographie equipment as defined in Enclosure F.
In accordance with previously agreed policy and in compliance with its Terms of Reference in paragraph 35 above, the NOS carries out the executive functions for security within the NATO military structure and keeps the Chairman of the NAMILCOM informed.
37. The Heads of NATO military bodies established under the aegis of the NAMILCOM are responsible for all security matters within their establishment. This includes responsibility for ensuring that a security organisation is set up, that security programmes are devised and executed in accordance with NATO Security Policy and that the security measures are inspected periodically ai each command level. In cases of organisations holding COSMIC TOP SECRET (CTS) or ATOMAL information, security inspections are to be made at least every 18 months, unless, during that period, an inspection has been carried out by the NOS.
NATO Civil Bodies
38. The NATO International Staff and NATO civil agencies are responsible to the NAC for the maintenance of security within their establishment. This includes responsibility for ensuring that a security organisation is set up, that security programmes are devised and executed in accordance with NATO Security Policy and that the security measures are inspected periodically at each command level. In cases of organisations holding COSMIC TOP SECRET (CTS) or ATOMAL information, security inspections are to be made at least every 18 months, unless, during that period, an inspection has been carried out by the NOS.
39. Principal organisations with responsibilities for INFOSEC (for example, the NC3B, NCSAs and NDAs) are described in Enclosure F.
40. Any NATO security problem necessitating CO-ordination between NSAs of member nations, and NATO civil and military bodies, shall be referred to the NATO Office of Security (NOS). In cases where such reference is by military authorities, this shall be made through command channels. Any unresolved differences arising in the course of such CO-ordination shall be submitted by the NOS to the NATO Security Committee (NSC) for consideration.
41. Any proposals by member nations and NATO civil and military bodies involving modification of NATO security procedures shall be referred in the first instance to the NOS. Any proposals made by the military authorities shall be transmitted through command channels. If the NATO security problems giving rise to such proposals cannot be resolved except by modification of NATO Security Policy, the proposals shall be referred to the NSC, and if necessary, by it to the NAC.
ENCLOSURE C to
1. This Enclosure sets out the policy and minimum standards for personnel security. Amplifying details are found in the supporting directive on personnel security.
2. There shall be an agreed standard of confidence about the loyalty, trustworthiness and reliability of all individuals granted access to, or whose duties or functions may afford access to, NATO classified information. All individuals, civilian and military, whose duties require access to information classified NC and above shall be sufficiently investigated to give a satisfactory level of confidence as to their eligibility for access to such information.
3. Individuals authorised to have access to information classified NC and above shall have been granted an appropriate personnel security clearance (PSC), granted by their NSA or other competent authority, valid for the duration of the authorised access, and have a need-to-know. The extent of security clearance procedures shall be determined by the classification of the NATO information to which the individual is to have access. Security clearance procedures shall be in accordance with NATO security policy and supporting directives.
4. Individuals who require access to information classified NC and above shall have been granted an appropriate personnel security clearance (PSC) , shall have been briefed on NATO security procedures, shall have acknowledged their responsibilities, and shall have a need-to-know. Individuals who require access to only information classified NR shall have been briefed on their security responsibilities, and shall have a need-to-know. Unless specifically required by national seçurity rules and regulations, a security clearance is not required for access to information classified NR.
5. The granting of a PSC should not be considered as a final step in the personnel security process; there is a requirement to ensure an individuals continuing eligibility for access to NATO classified information. This should be achieved through continuous evaluation by security authorities and managers; and through security education and awareness programmes which remind individuals of their security responsibilities and of the need to report, to their managers or security staffs, information which may affect their security status.
APPLICATION OF THE NEED TO KNOW PRINCIPLE
6. Individuals in NATO nations and in NATO civil and military bodies shall only have access to NATO classified information for which they have a need-to-know. No individual is entitled solely by virtue of rank or appointment or PSC to have access to NATO classified information.
PERSONNEL SECURITY CLEARANCES (PSCs)
7. The PSC responsibilities of NSAs, or other competent national authorities, NATO nations and the Heads of a NATO civil or military body are set out in the suppotting personnel security directive.
8. Individuals shall be made aware of their responsibilities to comply with security regulations, and act in the interests of security.
Personnel Security Directive
9. The suppotting personnel security directive sets out the following :
(a) the requirements for identifying positions requiring an appropriate PSC;
(b) the criteria for assessing the loyalty, trustworthiness and reliability of an individual in order for him to be granted and to retain a PSC;
(c) the investigative requirements for NATO CONFIDENTIAL, NATO SECRET and COSMIC TOP SECRET clearances;
(d) the requirements for the provision of PSCs for employees of NATO civil and military bodies;
(e) the requirements for revalidation of PSCs;
(f) the procedures for addressing adverse information about an individual holding a PSC; and
(g) the requirements for maintaining records of PSCs granted to individuals.
SECURITY AWARENESS AND BRIEFING OF INDIVIDUALS
10. All individuals employed in positions where they have access to NR information, or hold a clearance for access to NC or above, shall be briefed on security procedures and their security obligations. All cleared individuals shall acknowledge that they fully understand their responsibilities and the consequences which the law or administrative or executive order of their nation provides when classified information passes into unauthorised hands either by intent or through negligence. A record of the acknowledgement shall be maintained by the NATO nation or NATO civil or military body authorising access to NATO classified information.
11. All individuals who are authorised access to, or required to handle NATO classified information, shall initially be made aware, and periodically reminded of the dangers to security arising from indiscreet conversation with persons having no need-to-know, their relationship with the media, and the threat presented by the activities of intelligence services which target NATO and its member nations. Individuals shall be thoroughly briefed on these dangers and must report immediately to the appropriate security authorities any approach or manoeuvre which they consider suspicious or unusual.
AUTHORISING ACCESS TO NATO CLASSIFIED INFORMATION
12. An individual shall only be authorized access to NATO classified information after he has been granted the appropriate personnel security clearance, a determination of his need-to-know has been made, and he has been briefed on NATO security procedures and has acknowledged his security obligations.
13. However, circumstances may arise when, for example for urgent mission purposes, some of the requirements in paragraph 12 above cannot be met. Details in respect to provisional appointments, one-time access, emergency access, and attendance at conferences and meetings are set out in the supporting personnel security directive.
ACCESS BY NON-NATO NATIONALS
Access by Integrated Members of Armed Forces of NATO Member Nations
14. Non-NATO nationals serving as integrated members of the Armed Forces of NATO member nations may be authorised access up to and including information çlassified CTS. In the case of such nationals it shall be incumbent upon the NSA to satisfy itself that the conditions for access stipulated in paragraphs 12 or 13 above are fulfilled.
Access in Support of a NATO Project / Programme, Contract, Operation or Related Task
15. Individuals who are nationals2 of non-NATO nations may be granted access to NATO classified information on a case-by-case basis, provided that:
(a) access is necessary in support of a specified NATO programme, project, contract, operation, or related task;
(b) the individual is granted a NATO Personnel Security Clearance (PSC) based on a clearance procedure no less rigorous than that required for a NATO national in accordance with NATO security policy and supporting directives; noting that a NATO PSC is not required for acçess to NR information; and
(c) the prior written consent of the NATO nation or NATO civil or military body that originated the information is obtained.
2 Nationals of non-NATO nations includes nationals of a Kingdom citizens of a State, and landed immigrants in Canada. Landed immigrants in Canada are individuals who have gone through a national screening process including residency checks, criminal records and security checks, and who are going to obtain lawful permission to establish permanent residence in the nation.
16. As an exception to the requirement for originator control in sub-paragraph 15(c) above, NSAs of NATO nations may approve access to NATO classified information by nationals of certain non-NATO nations who are employed by the Government of the NATO nation, or by a contracter that is located and incorporated in the NATO nation, provided that, in addition to those criteria set out in sub-paragraphs 15(a) and 15(b) above, the criteria set out in the equivalent section of the supporting personnel security directive are applied.
ENCLOSURE D to
1. This Enclosure sets out the policy and minimum standards for physical security measures for the protection of NATO classified information. Amplifying details are found in the supporting directive on physical security.
2. NATO nations and NATO civil and military bodies shall establish physical security programmes that meet these minimum standards. Such programmes, which consist of active and passive security measures, shall provide a common degree of protection consistent with the security classification of the NATO information to be protected.
3. All premises, buildings, offices, rooms, and other areas in which NATO classified information and material is stored and/or handled shall be protected by appropriate physical security measures. In deciding what degree of physical security protection is neçessary, account shall be taken of all relevant factors, such as:
(a) the level of classification and category of information;
(b) the quantity and form of the information (hard copy/computer storage media) held;
(c) the security clearance and need-to-know of the staff;
(d) the locally-assessed threat from intelligence services which target NATO and/or its member nations, sabotage, terrorist, subversive or other criminal activities; and
(e) how the information will be stored.
4. Physical security measures shall be designed to:
(a) deny surreptitious or forced entry by an intruder;
(b) deter, impede and detect actions by disloyal personnel (the spy within);
(c) allow for segregation of personnel in their access to NATO classified information in accordance with the need-to-know principle; and
(d) detect and act upon all security breaches as soon as possible.
PHYSICAL SECURITY MEASURES
5. Physical measures represent only one aspect of protective security and shall be supported by sound personnel security, security of information, and INFOSEC measures, details of which Will be found respectively in Enclosures C, E and F. Sensible management of security risks Will involve establishing the most efficient and cost-effective methods of countering the threats and compensating for vulnerabilities by a combination of protective measures from these areas. Such efficiency and costeffectiveness is best achieved by defining physical security requirements as part of the planning and design of facilities, thereby reducing the need for costly renovations.
6. Physical security programmes shall be based on the principle of defence in depth, and although physical security measures are site-specific, the following general principles shall apply. It is first necessary to identify the locations that require protection. This is followed by the creation of layered security measures to provide defence in depth and delaying factors. The outermost physical security measures shall define the protected area and deter unauthorised access. The next level of measures shall detect unauthorised or attempted access and alert the guard force. The innermost level of measures shall sufficiently delay intruders until they cari be detained by the guard force. Consequently, there is an interrelationship between the reaction time of the guard force and the physical security measures designed to delay intruders.
7. Regular maintenance of security systems is necessary to ensure that equipments operate at optimum performance. It is also necessary to periodically reevaluate the effectiveness of individual security measures and the complete security system. This is particularly important if there is a change in use of the site or elements of the security system. This cari be achieved by exercising incident response plans.
8. Areas in which information classified NC and above is handled and stored shall be organised and structured SO as to correspond to one of the following:
(a) NATO Class I Security Area: an area in which information classified NC and above is handled and stored in such a way that entry into the area constitutes, for all practical purposes, access to classified information.
Such an area requires:(i) a clearly defined and protected perimeter through which all entry and exit is controlled;
(ii) an entry control system which admits only those individuals appropriately cleared and specifically authorised to enter the area;
(iii) specification of the level of classification and the category of the information normally held in the area, i.e. the information to which entry gives access;
(b) NATO Class II Security Area: an area in which information classified NC and above is handled and stored in such a way that it cari be protected from access by unauthorised individuals by controls established internally. Such an area requires:(i) a clearly defined and protected perimeter through which all entry and exit is controlled;
(ii) an entry control system which admits unescorted access only to those individuals who are security cleared and specifically authorised to enter the area. For all other individuals, provision shall be made for escorts or equivalent controls, to prevent unauthorised access to NATO classified information and uncontrolled entry to areas subject to technical security inspection.
9. Those areas which are not occupied by duty personnel on a 24-hour basis shall be inspected immediately after normal working hours to ensure that NATO classified information is properly secured.
10. An Administrative Zone may be established around or leading up to NATO Class I or Class II security areas. Such a zone requires a visibly defined perimeter within which the possibility exists for the control of individuals and vehicles. Only information classified up to and including NR shall be handled and stored in Administrative Zones.
11. The following measures are identifïed to indicate examples of physical security measures that cari be implemented :
(a) perimeter fence - a perimeter fence will form a useful physical barrier and will identify the boundary of an area requiring security protection. The effectiveness of any security perimeter will depend, to a large extent, on the level of security at the points of access;
(b) intruder detection system (IDS) - IDS may be used on perimeters to enhance the level of security offered by the fente, or may be used in rooms and buildings in place of, or to assist, guards;
(c) control of access - control of access may be exercised over a site, a building or buildings on a site or to areas or rooms within a building. The control may be electronic, electro-mechanical, by a guard or receptionist, or physical;
(d) guards - the employment of appropriately cleared, trained and supervised guards cari provide a valuable deterrent to individuals who might plan covert intrusion;
(e) closed circuit television (CCTV) - CCnl is a valuable aid to security guards in verifying incidents and IDS alarms on large sites or perimeters; and
(f) security lighting - security lighting cari offer a high degree of deterrence to a potential intruder, in addition to providing the illumination necessary for effective surveillance either directly by the guards or indirectly through a CCTV system.
Entry and Exit Searches
12. NATO establishments shall undertake random entry and exit searches which are designed to act as a deterrent to the unauthorised introduction of material into, or the unauthorised removal of NATO classified information from a site or building.
13. A pass or persona1 recognition system governing the regular staff shall control entry into Class I or II security areas. Visitors shall be permitted escorted or unescorted access to a NATO establishment based upon checks on the individual and their access requirements.
MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR THE STORAGE OF NATO CLASSIFIED INFORMATION
14. NATO classified information shall be stored only under conditions designed to deter and detect unauthorised access to the information.
15. COSMIC TOP SECRET (CTS). CTS information shall be stored within a class I or II security area under one of the following conditions :
(a) in an IDS-equipped vault , or in a nationally-approved security container in an area which is subject to continuous protection or periodic inspection; or
(b) an IDS-protected open storage area constructed in accordance with the supporting physical security directive.
16. NATO SECRET (NS). NS information shall be stored within a class I or II security area under one of the following conditions :
(a) in the same manner as prescribed for CTS information; or
(b) in a nationally-approved security container or vault; or
(c) an open storage area, which is IDS-protected, or subject to continuous protection or periodic inspection.
17. NATO CONFIDENTIAL (NC). NC information shall be stored in the same manner as prescribed for CTS or NS information except that supplemental controls, as described in the supporting physical security directive, are not required.
18. NATO RESTRICTED (NR). NR information shall be stored in a locked container.
19. Amplifying details for the storage of NATO classified information are set out in the supporting directive on physical security.
PROTECTION AGAINST TECHNICAL ATTACKS
20. Offices or areas in which information classified NS and above is regularly discussed shall be protected against passive and active eavesdropping attacks, by means of sound physical security measures and access control, where the risk warrants it. The responsibility for determining the risk shall be coordinated with technical specialists and decided by the appropriate security authority.
Technically Secure Areas
21. Areas to be protected against audio eavesdropping shall be designated as technically secure areas and entry to them shall be specially controlled. Rooms shall be locked and /or guarded in accordance with physical security standards when not occupied and any keys treated as security keys. Such areas shall be subject to regular physical and/or technical inspections in accordance with the requirements of the appropriate security authority, and shall also be undertaken following any unauthorised entry or suspicion of such and entry by external personnel for maintenance work or redecoration.
PHYSICAL SECURITY FOR COMMUNICATION AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS (CIS)
22. Areas in which NATO classified information is presented or handled using information technology, or where potential access to such information is possible, shall be established such that the aggregate requirement for confidentiality, integrity and availability is met. Areas in which CIS are used to display, store, process, or transmit information classified NC and above, or where potential access to such information is possible, shall be established as NATO Class I or Class II security areas or the national equivalent. Areas in which CIS are used to display, store, process or transmit information classified NR, or where potential acçess to such information is possible, may be established as Administrative Zones.
23. NSAs shall maintain lists of equipment which they or other NATO nations have approved for the protection of NATO classified information under various specified circumstances and conditions. NATO civil and military bodies shall ensure that any equipment purchased complies with the regulations of a NATO member nation(s).
OTHER PHYSICAL SECURITY MEASURES
24. Detailed requirements are set out in the supporting physical security directive, addressing, for example, rooms and locks, keys and combinations, and containers and locks.
ENCLOSURE E to
1. This Enclosure sets out the policy and minimum standards for the security of NATO classified information. Amplifying details are found in the supporting security of information directive.
2. NATO classified information requires protection throughout its life-cycle. It shall be managed to ensure that it is appropriately classified, clearly identified as classified information, and remains classified only for as long as this is necessary. Security of information measures shall be complemented by personnel, physical and INFOSEC safeguards to ensure a balanced set of measures for the protection of NATO classified information.
CLASSIFICATION and MARKINGS
3. The originator is responsible for determining the security classification and initial dissemination of information. The classification level of NATO information shall not be changed, downgraded or declassified without the consent of the originator. At the time of its creation, originators shall indicate, where possible, whether their information can be downgraded or declassified on a certain date or event.
4. The classification assigned determines the physical security given to the information in storage and transmission, its circulation, destruction and the personnel security clearance required for access. Therefore both over-classification and underclassification should be avoided in the interests of effective security as well as efficiency.
5. NATO nations and NATO civil and military bodies shall introduce measures to ensure that information created by, or provided to NATO is assigned the correct security classification, and protected in accordance with the requirements of the supporting security of information directive.
6. Each NATO civil or military body shall establish a system to ensure that CTS information whiçh it has originated is reviewed no less frequently than every five years to ascertain whether the CTS classification still applies. Such a review is not necessary in those instances where the originator has predetermined that specific CTS information shall be automatically downgraded alter two years and the information has been so marked.
7. The overall security classification of a document shall be at least as high as that of its most highly classified component. Component parts of documents classified NC and above shall, where possible, be classifred (including by paragraph) by the originator to facilitate decisions on further dissemination of appropriate sections. Covering documents shall be marked with the security classification of the information contained therein when they are separated from the information they accompany.
8. When information from various sources is collated, the product shall be reviewed for overall security classification since it may warrant a higher classification than its component parts. Original security classification caveats must be retained when information is used to prepare composite documents.
9. The terms COSMIC and NATO are qualifying markings which, when applied to classified information, signify that the information shall be protected in accordance with NATO Security Policy.
Special Category Designators
10. The term ATOMAL is a marking applied to special category information signifying that the information shall be protected in accordance with the Agreement and supporting Administrative Arrangements referenced in Ençlosure B, paragraph 5.
11. The term SIOP is a marking applied to special category information signifying that the information shall be protected in accordance with the reference cited in Enclosure B, paragraph 6.
12. The term CRYPTO is a marking and a special category designator identifying all COMSEC keying material used to protect or authenticate telecommunications carrying NATO security-related information; signifying that the information shall be protected in accordance with the appropriate cryptographie security instructions.
Dissemination Limitation Markings
13. As an additional marking to further limit the dissemination of NATO classified information, a Dissemination Limitation Marking may be applied by the originator.
CONTROL AND HANDLING
Objectives of Accountability
14. The primary objective of accountability is to provide sufficient information to be able to investigate a deliberate or accidental compromise of accountable information and assess the damage arising from the compromise. The requirement for accountability serves to impose a discipline on the handling of, and control of access to, accountable information.
15. Subordinate objectives are :
(a) to keep track of access to accountable information - who has, or potentially has, had access to accountable information; and who has attempted to access accountable information;
(b) to know the location of accountable information; and
(c) to keep track of the movement of accountable information within the NATO and national domains.
16. CTS and NS and ATOMAL information shall be accountable, controlled and handled in accordance with the requirements of this Ençlosure and the supporting security of information directive. Where required by National rules and regulations, information bearing other classification or special category markings may be çonsidered as accountable information.
The Registry System
17. There shall be a Registry System which is responsible for the receipt, accounting, handling, distribution and destruction of acçountable information. Such a responsibility may be fulfrlled either within a single registry system, in which case strict compartmentalisation of CTS information shall be maintained at all times, or by establishing separate registries and control points.
18. Each NATO member nation and NATO civil or military body shall establish a Central Registry(s) for CTS, which acts as the main receiving and despatching authority for the nation or body within which it has been established. The Central Registry(s) may also act as a registry(s) for other accountable information.
19. Registries and control points shall act as the responsible organisation for the interna1 distribution of CTS and NS information and for keeping records of all accountable documents held on that registrys or control points charge; they may be established at ministry, department, or command levels. NC and NR information is not required to be processed through the Registry System unless specified by National security rules and regulations.
20. With regard to NATO accountable information, registries and control points shall be able at all times to establish its location. Infrequent and temporary access to such information does not necessarily require the establishment of a registry or control point, provided procedures are in place to ensure that the information remains under the control of the Registry System.
21. The dissemination of information classified CTS shall be through COSMIC registry channels. At least annually, each registry shall carry out an inventory of all information classified CTS for which it is accountable, in accordance with the requirements of the suppot-ting security of information directive. Regardless of the type of registry organisation, those that handle information classified CTS shall appoint a COSMIC Control Officer (CCO).
22. The suppot-ting security of information directive sets out, inter alia, the responsibilities of the CCO, the detailed registty system handling processes for CTS and NS information, the procedures for reproductions, translations and extra&, the requirements for the dissemination of transmission of information, and the requirements for the disposa1 and destruction of information.
23. The NAMILCOM has established a separate system for the accountability, control and distribution of cryptographie material. Material being transferred through this system do not require accountability in the Registry System.
24. NATO nations and NATO civil and military bodies shall prepare contingency plans for the protection or destruction, during emergency situations, of NATO classified information to prevent unauthorised access and disclosure and loss of availability. These plans shall give highest priority to the most sensitive, and mission- or time-critical information.
SECURITY INFRACTIONS, BREACHES AND COMPROMISES
25. The protection of NATO classified information depends on the design of appropriate security regulations to give effect to approved security policy, directives and guidance, and on the effective implementation of these regulations by education and supervision backed up by disciplinary and, in extreme cases, legal sanctions.
26. All breaches of security shall be reported immediately to the appropriate security authority. Each reported breach of security shall be investigated by individuals who have security, investigative and, where appropriate, counterintelligence experience, and who are independent of those individuals immediately concerned with the breach.
27. The main purpose of reporting compromises of NATO classified information is to enable the originating NATO component to assess the resulting damage to NATO and to take whatever action is desirable or practicable to minimize the damage. Reports of the damage assessment and minimizing action taken shall be forwarded to the NOS.
28. When a compromise of NATO classified information has to be reported to the NOS, the report shall be forwarded through the NSA or the Head of the NATO civil or military body concerned. Where possible, the reporting authority should inform the originating NATO component at the same time as the NOS, but the latter may be requested to do this when the originator is difficult to identify. The timing of the reports depends on the sensitivity of the information and the circumstances.
29. The Secretary General of NATO may request the appropriate authorities to make further investigations and to report.
30. The supporting security of information directive sets out the detailed actions, records and reporting requirements for breaches and compromises of security.
31. Separate provisions relating to the compromise of cryptographic material have been issued by the NAMILCOM to communications security authorities of member nations and NATO civil and military bodies.
SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE RELEASE OF NATO CLASSIFIED
INFORMATION TO NON-NATO NATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS
32. Classified information entrusted to or generated by NATO in order to enable it to perform its missions is disseminated and protected in accordance with NATO Security Policy, directives and procedures. This section sets out the policy for the release of NATO classified information to non-NATO nations and international organisations including such nations (hereinafter referred to as non-NATO recipients). This section also covers information contained in documents issued by the NAC, or by any other NATO committee or NATO civil or military body (hereinafter referred to as NATO bodies).
33. The release of NATO classified information to non-NATO recipients shall take place in the context of NATO cooperative activities approved by the NAC. Any request for the release of NATO classified information to non-NATO recipients outside such cooperative activities shall be examined and approved on a case-by-case basis.
34. ATOMAL information of any classification may not be released to any nation/organisation which is not a pat-ty to the current versions of C-M(64)39 and CM(68)41.
Principles for Authorising the Release of NATO Classified Information to Non-NATO Nations and International Organisations
35. Authorisation to release shall always be subject to the consent of the originator(s). Additionally, the following requirements shall apply:
(a) for NATO classified information to be released under NATO cooperative activities approved by the NAC:
(i) the subject matter shall be included in the general work plan for the activity or in the practical measures established for cooperation;
(ii) the release of NATO classified information shall be required for initiating cooperation on a specific subject or for the continuance and further development of cooperation within the approved activity; and
(iii) a Security Agreement, signed by the Secretary General on behalf of NATO and by a representative duly-mandated by the non-NATO recipient, shall have been concluded;
(b) for NATO classified information to be released on special request from either NATO member nations or NATO bodies (the Sponsor) to non-NATO recipients outside NAC-approved cooperative activities:
(i) the Sponsor shall be responsible for providing a written assurance to NATO from the non-NATO recipient that any information received will be protected in accordance with NATO minimum standards;
(ii) the Spo nsor shall forward this written assurance to the relevant committee, together with the release request; and
(iii) the request shall demonstrate the advantage which would accrue to NATO. Justifications for release shall be specific, avoiding general statements.
36. Release decisions made under paragraph 35(a), above, can either concern clearly identified information or a general category of information. Release decisions made under paragraph 35(b) cari only concern clearly identified information.
37. The NAC is the ultimate authority for the release of NATO classified information to non-NATO recipients. This authority adheres to the principle of originator consent and is delegated :
(a) to the relevant committee for information classified up to and including CONFIDENTIAL;
(b) to the NAMILCOM for information classified up to and including NS which has been originated by the NAMILCOM and bodies subordinate to it;
(c) to the NPLO, for NATO classified information originated by and belonging to one or more of the nations participating in the NPLO.
38. Authority for release shall only be delegated to a committee on which the originator(s) is/are represented. If the originator(s) cannot be established, the relevant committee shall assume the responsibility of the originator. Authority for release may be delegated to the lowest committee level best suited to evaluate the importance of the classified information.
39. Delegated release authorities cannot further delegate their powers, although they cari entrust subordinate bodies with the implementation of the release decision.
Administrative Arrangements for the Implementation of a Security Agreement
40. The completion of the administrative arrangements shall be confirmed by a security survey carried out by the NOS of the relevant agencies of the non-NATO recipient. The security survey shall establish the ability of the non-NATO recipient to comply with the provisions of the Security Agreement and with the minimum standards.
41. The NOS shall produce a report of the survey and transmit a copy to the Security Authority of the non-NATO recipient. The original report shall be filed in the NOS, and made available to NATO member nations on request. The conclusion drawn from the survey as to the ability of the non-NATO recipient to protect NATO classified information shall be communicated by the NOS to the relevant NATO bodies and to NATO member nations.
42. The supporting security of information directive contains, inter alia, the:
(a) procedures for the release of NATO classified information to non-NATO recipients;
(b) specific release procedures for NATO Production and Logistics Organisations (NPLOs), international organisations and Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTFs);
(c) minimum standards required for the handling and protection of NATO classified information released to non-NATO recipients. The minimum standards apply to any non-NATO recipient, regardless of whether a Security Agreement has been concluded with NATO or a Security Assurance provided to NATO;
(d) detailed administrative arrangements to be implemented by all non-NATO recipients; and
(e) samples of the Security Assurance, the Personnel Security Clearance Cettificate and the Certificate of Security Clearance.
ENCLOSURE "F" to
1. This Enclosure sets out the policy and minimum standards for the protection of NATO classified information, and supporting system services and resources1 in communication, information and other electronic systems (hereafter referred to within this Enclosure as systems) storing, processing or transmitting (hereafter referred to within this Enclosure as handling) NATO classified information.
1 Supporting System Services and Resources - those services and resources required to ensure that the security objectives of the systems are achieved; to include, for example, cryptographic mechanisms and equipments, COMSEC materials, directory services, and environmental facilities and controls.
2. The Primary Directive on INFOSEC, which is published by the NSC and the NC36 in support of this policy, addresses the INFOSEC activities in the system lifecycle, and the INFOSEC responsibilities of committees, and NATC civil and military bodies. The Primary Directive on INFOSEC is supported by directives addressing INFOSEC management (including security risk management, security approval, security-related documentation, and security review / inspection) and INFOSEC technical and implementation aspects (including computer and local area network (LAN) security, interconnection of networks security, cryptographie seçurity, transmission security, and emission security).
3. To achieve adequate security protection of NATO classified information handled in systems, a balanced set of security measures (physical, personnel, information and INFOSEC) shall be identified and implemented to create a secure environment in which a system operates, and to meet the following security objectives:
(a) to ensure the confidentiality of information by controlling the disclosure of, and access to, NATO classified information, and supporting system services and resources;
(b) to ensure the integrity of NATO classified information, and supporting system services and resources; and
(c) to ensure the availability of NATO classified information, and supporting system services and resources.
4. The integrity and availability of NATO classified information, and of supporting system services and resources, shall be protected by a minimum set of measures aimed at ensuring general protection against commonly encountered problems (whether accidental or intentional) known to affect all systems and supporting system services and resources. Additional measures shall be taken, appropriate to the circumstances, where a risk assessment has established that NATO classified information and/or supporting system services and resources are subject to increased risks from specific threats and vulnerabilities.
5. The extent to which the security objectives are to be met, and the extent to which INFOSEC measures are to be relied upon for the protection of NATO classified information and supporting system services and resources shall be determined during the process of establishing the security requirement. The security approval process shall determine that an adequate level of protection has been achieved, and is being maintained.
6. All systems handling NATO classified information shall be subject to a security approval process, addressing the security objectives of confidentiality, integrity and availability.
7. Individuals authorised access to NATO classified information in any form shall be security cleared, to the appropriate level, taking account of their aggregate responsibility for maintaining the confidentiality, integrity and availability of the information and the supporting system services and resources. This includes individuals who are authorised access to supporting system services and resources, or who are responsible for their protection, even if they are not authorised açcess to the information handled by the system.
8. Areas in which NATO classified information is presented or handled using information technology, or where potential access to such information is possible, shall be established such that the aggregate requirement for confidentiality, integrity and availability is met.
Security of Computer Storage Media
9. All classified computer storage media shall be properly identified, stored and protected in a manner commensurate with the highest classification of the stored information.
10. NATO classified information recorded on re-usable computer storage media, shall only be erased in accordance with procedures approved by the Security Authority.
11. There shall be a means to provide sufficient information to be able to investigate a deliberate or accidental compromise of the confidentiality of accountable information and, çommensurate with the damage that would be caused, a deliberate or accidental compromise of the integrity and/or availability of NATO classified information and supporting system services and resources.
12. For all systems handling NATO classified information, a consistent set of security measures shall be applied to meet the security objectives, and to protect information and supporting system services and resources. The security measures shall inçlude, where appropriate, the following:
(a) a means to reliably identify and authenticate persons authorised access. Information and material which controls access to a system shall be controlled and protected under arrangements commensurate with the information to which it may give access;
(b) a means to control disclosure of, and access to, information and supporting system services and resources, based upon the need-to-know principle;
(c) a means to verify the integrity and origin of information, and supporting system services and resources;
(d) a means to maintain the integrity of NATO classified information and supporting system services and resources;
(e) a means to maintain the availability of NATO classified information and supporting system services and resources;
(f) a means to control the connection of systems handling NATO classified information;
(g) a determination of the confidence to be placed in the INFOSEC protection mechanisms;
(h) a means to assess and verify the proper functioning of the INFOSEC protection mechanisms over the life-cycle of the system; and
(i) a means to investigate user and system activity.
13. Security management mechanisms and procedures shall be in place to deter, prevent, detect, and recover from, the impacts of incidents affecting the confidentiality, integrity and availability of NATO classified information and supporting system services and resources, including the reporting of security incidents.
14. The security measures shall be managed and implemented in accordance with directives supporting this policy.
Security Risk Management
15. Systems handling NATO classified information, in NATO civil and military bodies, shall be subject to risk assessment and risk management in accordance with the requirements of directives supporting this policy.
Electromagnetic Transmission of NATO Classified Information
16. When NATO classified information is transmitted electromagnetically, special measures shall be implemented to protect the confidentiality, integrity and availability of such transmissions. NATO authorities shall determine the requirements for protecting transmissions from detection, interception or exploitation. The information being transmitted in a communication system shall be protected based upon the requirements for confidentiality, integrity and availability.
17. When cryptographic methods are required to provide confidentiality, integrity and availability protection, such methods or associated products shall be specifically approved for the purpose.
18. During transmission, the confidentiality of information classified NS and above shall be protected by cryptographie methods or products approved by the NATO Military Committee (NAMILCOM).
19. During transmission, the confidentiality of information classified NC or NR shall bzprotected by cryptographie methods or products approved by either the NAMILCOM or a NATO member nation, except for the case where the method or product is NATO common funded, in which case the approval shall be by the NAMILCOM.
20. During transmission, the integrity and availability of classified information shall be assured in accordance with the communications systems operational requirement. The evaluation requirements and approval authority, for integrity and availability mechanisms based on cryptography, shall be identified and agreed in conjunction with the specification of such mechanisms in the operational requirement, as agreed in technical directives.
21. Under exceptional operational circumstances, information classified NR, NC and NS may be transmitted in clear text provided each occasion is properly authorised. The exceptional cirçumstances are as follows:
(a) during impending or actual crisis, conflict, or war situations; and
(b) when speed of delivery is of paramount importance, or means of encryption are not available, and it is assessed that the transmitted information cannot be exploited in time to adversely influence operations.
22. During transmission within non-NATO nations / International Organisations (NNN/IO) systems, the confidentiality of information classified NS and above shall be protected by cryptographic methods or products approved by the NATO Military Committee (NAMILCOM). During transmission within NNN/IO systems, the confidentiality of information classified NC or NR shall be protected by cryptographic methods or products evaluated and approved by an appropriate authority. The appropriate authority may be the NAMILCOM, the NCSA of a NATO member nation or the equivalent authority of the NNN/IO, provided that the NNN/IO has structures, rules and proçedures in place for the @valuation, selection, approval and control of such methods or products. The structures, rules and procedures shall be agreed between NATO and the NNN/IO.
The Security of Cryptographic Products, Mechanisms, and Information
23. The sensitive nature of the cryptographic products, mechanisms and information used to protect the confidentiality, integrity and availability of NATO classified information necessitates the application of special security precautions beyond those required for the protection of other NATO classified information.
24. The protection which shall be afforded to cryptographie products, mechanisms and information shall be commensurate with the damage that may be caused should that protection fail. There shall be positive means to assess and verify the protection and proper functioning of the cryptographie products and mechanisms, and the protection and control of cryptographie information
25. In recognition of the particular sensitivity of cryptographic information, special regulations and bodies shall exist within NATO and within each member nation to govern the receipt, control and dissemination of NATO cryptographic information to specially certified persons.
26. Special procedures shall also be followed which regulate the sharing of technical information, and which regulate the selection, production and procurement of cryptographic products and mechanisms.
27. Security measures shall be implemented to protect against the compromise of information classified NC and above through unintentional electromagnetic emissions. The measures shall be commensurate with the risk of exploitation and the sensitivity of the information
Specific INFOSEC Responsibilities
NATO C3 Board (NC3B)
28. As the senior Consultation, Command and Control (C3) policy committee within the Alliance, the NC3B supports the NAMILCOM and the NATO political authorities in their validation process for C3 capabilities and projects by reviewing operational C3 requirements. The NC3B is responsible for the provision of secure and interoperable NATO-wide C3 systems.
National Communications Security Authority (NCSA)
29. Each NATO nation shall identify an NCSA. The primary roles of the NCSA are the following:
(a) to control cryptographic technical information related to the protection of NATO information within their nation;
(b) to ensure that cryptographic systems, products and mechanisms for protecting NATO information are effectively and efficiently selected, operated and maintained; and
(c) to communicate on NATO communications security and related technical INFOSEC matters, both civil and military, with appropriate NATO and national bodies.
National Distribution Authority (NDA)
30. Each nation shall identify an NDA, which is responsible for the management of NATO cryptomaterial within their nation and shall ensure that appropriate procedures are enforced and channels established for the comprehensive accounting, secure handling, storage and distribution of all cryptomaterial.
ENCLOSURE G to
1. This Enclosure deals with security aspects of industrial operations that are unique to the negotiation and letting of NATO classified contracts and their performance by industry, including the release of NATO classified information during pre-contract negotiations. This Enclosure sets out the security policy for:
(a) the negotiation and the letting of NATO classified contracts;
(b) the security requirements for NATO classified contracts;
(c) the release of NATO classified information in contracting;
(d) Facility Security Clearances (FSCs) for NATO contracts;
(e) the international transportation of NATO classified material;
(f) international visits; and
(g) personnel on loan within a NATO project / programme.
2. This Enclosure is supported by an industrial security directive which sets out the detailed requirements and procedures. The directive includes the requirements for the negotiation and letting of NATO classified contracts, the security requirements for NATO classified contracts, National authorities for granting FSCs and PSCs, the authorities for international transport, the authorities for international visits, a list of the various entities that typically are involved in NATO classified contracts, and their responsibilities, and a list of NATO Programmes/Projects, Participating Nations and NATO Agencies.
NEGOTIATION AND LETTING OF NATO CLASSIFIED CONTRACTS
3. The prime contract for a NATO programme/project shall be negotiated and awarded by a NATO Programme / Project Agency / Office (NPAINPO). A FSC shall be required for all contractors involved in contracts classified NC and above. For contracts classified NR, a FSC is not required unless specifically required by National security rules and regulations.
4. The NPA/NPO who negotiates the contract shall ensure that, for contracts classified NC and above, contracter representatives involved in the negotiations hold appropriate Persona1 Security Clearance (PSC), and only receive access to NATO classified information needed for the negotiation of the contract.
5. After a prime contract has been let, a prime contracter may negotiate subcontracts with other contractors, i.e., sub-contractors. These sub-contractors may also negotiate sub-contracts with other sub-contractors. If a potential sub-contracter is located and incorporated in a non-NATO nation permission to negotiate a sub-contract shall be obtained from the NPAINPO (c.f. Enclosure E, paragraphs 29-33). If the NPA/NPO has placed restrictions on the award of contracts to NATO-nations that are not participants in a programme/project, the NPA/NPO shall give permission prior to contract discussion with contractors from those nations.
6. Upon letting the prime contract, the NPAINPO shall notify the NSA/DSA of the prime contracter, and ensure that the Security Aspect Letter (SAL) and/or the Project Security Instruction (PSI), as applicable, is provided to the prime contracter, with the contract (see paragraphs 8 and 9, below).
SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR NATO CLASSIFIED CONTRACTS
7. The prime contracter and sub-contractors shall be contractually required, under penalty of termination of their contract, to take all measures prescribed by the NSAs/DSAs for safeguarding all NATO classifïed information generated by or entrusted to the contracter, or embodied in articles manufactured by the contracter.
8. NATO classified contracts for Major ProgrammelProjects shall contain a PSI as an annex; a Project Security Classification Guide shall be a part of the PSI. All other NATO classified contracts shall include, as a minimum, a SAL, which may be a PSI that is reduced in scope. In the latter case, the Programme/Project Security Classification Guide may be referred to as a Security Classification Checklist. The PSI and/or SAL, depending on the scope of the programme/project, shall be the single source document for the programme/project, and shall be used to standardise programme/project security procedures among the participating nations and NATO bodies, and their contractors.
9. The responsibility for applying a security classification to elements of a programme/project dealing with a product wherein all elements are clearly defined and their classification pre-determined, rests with the NPA/NPO of the contract, acting in collaboration with the NSAs/DSAs of the participating NATO nations.
10. The classification for programme/project elements of information associated with possible sub-contracts shall be based on the Programme/Project Security Classification Guide.
RELEASE OF NATO CLASSIFIED INFORMATION IN CONTRACTING
11. The release of NATO classified information shall be with the consent of the originator and in accordance with other applicable enclosures to the NATO Security Policy and the supporting industrial security directive.
INDUSTRIAL SECURITY CLEARANCES FOR NATO CONTRACTS
12. The policy described in subsequent paragraphs for facilities and individuals apply to contracts or sub-contracts.
Facility Security Clearances (FSC)
13. The NSAIDSA of each NATO nation is responsible for ensuring that any facility located and incorporated in that nation which Will require access to information classified NC and above in order to enter into pre-contractual negotiations or bid on a NATO classified contract, has adopted the protective security measures necessary to qualify for a FSC. Moreover, the facilitys employees who require access to NATO classified information shall have been properly cleared and briefed before furnishing a Facility Security Clearance Certificate (FSCC). The clearances shall be based upon the classification level of the information, its volume and nature, and the number of individuals who Will require access to it in the course of preparing bids or negotiations.
14. A contracter may participate in pre-contractual negotiations, bid on, or perform on a NATO classified contract provided the NSAIDSA of the nation in which the contracter is located and incorporated to do business has given the contracter facility the requisite level of FSC.
15. The assessment to be made prior to issuing a FSC shall be in accordance with the requirements and criteria set out in the supporting industrial security directive.
16. Lack of a FSC, or PSCs for facility employees, shall not prevent the contracter bidding for a contract or sub-contract classified NR. A nation which, under its National security rules and regulations, requires a FSC for a contract or sub-contract classified NR shall not discriminate against a contracter from a nation not requiring a FSC, but shall ensure that the contracter has been informed of its responsibilities in respect to the protection of the information, and obtains an acknowledgement of those responsibilities.
Personnel Security Clearances for Facility Employees
17. The issuing of PSCs shall be in accordance with Enclosure C, Personnel Security, to NATO Security Policy, and the supporting personnel and industrial security directives.
18. Applications for the security clearance for employees of contracter facilities shall be made to the NSA/DSA which is responsible for the facility. In submitting the request for verification or initiation of a PSC, the facility shall include:
(a) the identity and security classification of the NATO contract or subcontract, and
(b) the level of NATO classified information to which the employee will have access.
19. If a facility wishes to employ a national of a non-NATO nation in a position that requires access to NATO classified information, it is the responsibility of the NSA/DSA of the nation in which the hiring facility is located and incorporated, to carry out the security clearance procedure prescribed herein, and determine that the individual can be granted access in accordance with the requirements of Enclosure C and the supporting personnel and industrial security directives.
INTERNATIONAL TRANSPORTATION OF NATO CLASSIFIED MATERIAL
Security Principles Applicable to all Forms of Transportation
20. The following principles shall be enforced when examining proposed security arrangements for the international transportation of consignments of classified material:
(a) security shall be assured at all stages during the transportation and under all circumstances, from the point of origin to the ultimate destination;
(b) the degree of protection accorded to a consignment shall be determined by the highest classification level of material contained within it;
(c) an FSC shall be obtained, where appropriate, for companies providing transportation. In such cases, personnel handling the consignment shall be cleared in compliance with the provisions of this Enclosure;
(d) journeys shall be point-to-point to the extent possible, and shall be completed as quickly as circumstances permit; and
(e) care shall be exercised to arrange routes only through NATO nations. Routes through non-NATO nations should only be undertaken when authorised by the NSA/DSA of the consignors nation of origin and in accordance with the supporting security of information directive.
21. Arrangements for consignments of classified material shall be stipulated for each programme/project. However, such arrangements shall ensure that there is no likelihood of unauthorized access to classified material.
22. The security standards for the international transportation of NATO classified material cari be found in the supporting security of information directive. The detailed requirements for the hand carriage of NATO classified material, the transportation of classified material by commercial carriers as freight, security guards and escorts, and the transportation of explosives, propellants or other dangerous substances are set out in the supporting industrial security directive.
23. The arrangements described in this section relate to international visits by military and civilian representatives of NATO nations, NATO civil and military bodies, and NATO contractors and sub-contractors who need to visit the following locations on approved NATO-related activities:
(a) a government department or establishment of another NATO member nation;
(b) the facility of a contracter or sub-contracter of another NATO member nation: or
(c) a NATO civil or military body.
24. Visits referred to in paragraph 23 (a) and (b) above shall be approved by the NSA/DSA of the member nation in which the visit(s) Will occur, taking into consideration the following:
(a) the visit has an officia1 purpose related to a NATO programme or project; and
(b) all visitors hold an appropriate PSC and have a need-to-know for the informarion related to the NATO Project or Programme or activity.
25. Government departments and establishments, contractors and sub-contractors, and NATO civil and military bodies receiving visitors shall ensure that:
(a) visits meet the requirements of paragraph 24, above;
(b) visitors are given access only to NATO classified information related to the purpose of the visit; and
(c) records are kept of all visitors, including their name, the organisation they represent, the date(s) of the visit(s) and the name of the person visited. Such records are to be retained in accordance with national requirements.
26. Government departments and establishments and contractors and subcontractors which intend to send personnel on international visits, shall submit to the NSA/DSA of the facility to be visited, through their NSA/DSA or the agreed officia1 channels, an international visit request in accordance with the procedures set out in the industrial security directive. The international visit request shall provide an assurance that each visitor holds a valid personnel security clearance, as appropriate.
27. Where permitted by National security rules and regulations, NR and NU visits may be arranged directly between the Security Office for the visitor and the Security Office of the facility to be visited.
PERSONNEL ON LOAN WITHIN A NATO PROJECTI PROGRAMME
28. When an individual who has been cleared for access to NATO classified information is to be loaned from one facility to another in the same NATO programme/project, but in a different NATO nation, the individuals parent facility shall request its NSA/DSA to provide a NATO Personnel Security Clearance Certificate for the individual to the NSA/DSA of the facility to which he is to be loaned. The individual on loan shall be assigned using the international visit request procedures set out in the industrial security directive, and in accordance with National security rules and regulations.
|Accountable Information||All information classified CTS and NS and all Special Category Information (such as ATOMAL)|
|Availability||The property of information and material being accessible and usable upon demand by an authorised individual or entity|
|Breach of security||An act or omission, deliberate or accidental, contrary to NATO Security Policy and supporting directives, that results in the actual or possible compromise of NATO classified information or supporting services and resources (including, for example, classified information lest while being transported; classified information left in an unsecured area where uncleared persons have unescorted access; an accountable document cannot be found; classified information has been subjected to unauthorised modification; destroyed in an unauthorised manner or, for CIS, there is a denial of service)|
|Classified Information||Any information (namely, knowledge that can be communicated in any form) or material determined to require protection against unauthorised disclosure and which has been SO designated by a security classification|
|Competent Authority||An authority identified by the NSA of a NATO nation which is authorised to carry out personnel security clearances in order to give their nationals access to NATO classified information|
|Compromise||Compromise denotes a situation when - due to a breach of security or adverse activity (such as espionage, acts of terrorism, sabotage or theft) - NATO classified information has lost its confidentiality, integrity or availability, or supporting services and resources have lost their integrity or availability. This includes loss, disclosure to unauthorised individuals (e.g. through espionage or to the media) unauthorised modification, destruction in an unauthorised manner, or denial of service|
|Confidentiality||The property that information is not made available or disclosed to unauthorised individuals or entities|
|An administrative determination by a NSAIDSA that, from a security viewpoint, a facility cari afford adequate security protection to NATO classified information of a specified classification or below, and its personnel who require access to NATO classified information have been properly cleared and briefed on NATO security requirements necessary to perform on the NATO classified contracts|
|Guards||Civilian (Government or participating contracter employees) or military personnel who may be armed or unarmed. They may be assigned for security guard duties only or may combine security guard duties with other duties|
|Host Nation||General: the nation in which a NATO civil or military body is
Industrial security: the nation designated by an officia1 body of NATO to act as the governmental agency to contract for the performance of a NATO prime contract. Nations in which subcontracts are performed are not referred to as host nations
|Information||Knowledge that can be communicated in any form|
|INFOSEC||The application of security measures to protect information processed,
stored or transmitted in communication, information and other electronic
systems against loss of confidentiality, integrity or availability, whether
accidental or intentional, and to prevent loss of integrity or availability
of the systems themselves.
1. INFOSEC measures include those of computer, transmission, emission and cryptographie security.
2. Such measures also include detection, documentation and countering of threats to information and to the systems.
|Infraction||A security infraction is an act or omission, deliberate or accidental, contrar-y to NATO Security Policy and supporting directives that does not result in the actual or possible compromise of NATO classified information, (e.g. classified information left unsecured inside a secure facility where all persons are appropriately cleared, failure to double wrap classified information, etc.)|
|Integrity||The property that information (including data, such as cipher text) has not been altered or destroyed in an unauthorised manner|
|International Visits||Visits made by individuals subject to one NSA/DSA or belonging to a NATO body, to facilities or bodies subject to another NSA/DSA or to NATO, which Will require, or may give rise to access to NATO classified information or where, regardless of the level of classification involved, national legislation governing the establishment or body to be visited in support of NATO approved related activities requires that such visits shall be approved by the relevant NSA/DSA. All NATO civil and military bodies fall within the security jurisdiction of NATO|
|Life-cycle||Life cycle of information encompasses the stages of planning, collection, creation or generation of information; its organisation, retrieval, use, accessibility and transmission; its storage and protection; and, finally, its disposition through transfer to archives or destruction|
|A programme or project of major significance, normally involving more than two nations and security measures that extend beyond the normal basic requirements described in NATO Security Policy|
|Material||Material includes documents and also any items of machinery, equipment/components, weapons or tools, either manufactured or in the process of manufacture|
|Nationals||Nationals includes nationals of a Kingdom, citizens of a State, and landed immigrants in Canada. Landed immigrants in Canada are individuals who have gone through a national screening process including residency checks, criminal records and security checks, and who are going to obtain lawful permission to establish permanent residence in the nation.|
|An authority of a NATO nation which is responsible for the maintenance of security of NATO classified information in national agencies and elements, military or civil, at home or abroad|
|NATO||NATO denotes the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the bodies governed either by the Agreement on the status of the Notth Atlantic Treaty Organisation, National Representatives and International Staff, signed in Ottawa on 20th September, 1951 or by the Protocol on the status of International Military Headquatters set up pursuant to the North Atlantic Treaty, signed in Paris on 28th August, 1952|
|Any contract issued by a NATO civil or military body or a NATO member nation in support of a NATO funded or administered programme/project that Will require access to or generate NATO classified information|
|(a) information means knowledge that can be communicated in any form
(b) classified information means information or material determined to require protection against unauthorised disclosure which has been so designated by a security classification
(c) the word material includes documents and also any items of machinery or equipment or weapons either manufactured or in the process of manufacture
(d) the word document means any recorded information regardless of its physical form or characteristics, including, without limitation, written or printed matter, data processing cards and tapes, maps, charts, photographs, paintings, drawings, engravings, sketches, working notes and papers, carbon copies or ink ribbons, or reproductions by any means or process, and sound, voice, magnetic or electronic or optical or video recordings in any form, and portable ADP equipment with resident computer storage media, and removable computer storage media
|The highest military authority in NATO; the NAMILCOM is esponsible for the overall conduct of military affairs. The NAMILCOM is responsible for endorsing and prioritising from an lperational point of view the user& requirements submitted by Strategic Commanders.|
|A determination that an individual is eligible to have access to NATO classified information|
|NATO Production and
|A subsidiary body, created within the framework of NATO for the implementation of tasks arising from that Treaty, to which North Atlantic Council grants clearly defined organisational, administrative and financial independence. It shall be comprised of a board of directors; and an executive body, composed of a General Manager and staff|
|NATO Programme||A Council approved programme that is administered by a NATO management /office under NATO regulations|
|NATO Project||A Council approved project that is administered by a NATO management agency/office under NATO regulations|
|The executive body of a NPLO|
|Need-to-know||See under Principle of Need-to-know|
|Negotiations||The term encompasses all aspects of awarding a contract or subcontract from the initial notification of intention to call for bids to the final decision to let a contract or sub-contract|
|Open Storage Area||An area, constructed in accordance with security requirements and authorized by the head of the civil or military body for open storage of classified information|
|Originator||The nation or international organisation under whose authority information has been produced or introduced into NATO|
|Parent Nation||The Kingdom of which an individual is a national, or the state of which an individual is a Citizen|
|Parent National Security
|The NSA of the Kingdom of which an individual is a national, or the state of which an individual is a citizen|
|A determination that an individual is eligible to have access to classified information|
|Prime Contract||The initial contract led by a NATO Project Management / Agency / Office for a Programme/project|
|Prime Contracter||An industrial, commercial or other entity of a member nation which has contracted with a NATO Project Management Agency/Office to perform a service, or manufacture a product, in the framework of a NATO project, and which, in turn, may subcontract with potential sub-contractors as approved|
|The principle according to which a positive determination is made that a prospective recipient has a requirement for access to, knowledge of, or possession of information in order to petform officia1 tasks or services|
|Part of the program (project) security instructions (PSI) which identifies the elements of the program that are classified, specifying the security classification levels. The security classification guide may be expanded throughout the program Iife cycle, and the elements of information may be re-classified or downgraded|
Security Instruction (PSI)
|A compilation of security regulations/procedures, based upon NATO Security Policy and supporting directives, whiçh are applied to a specific projectlprogramme in order to standardise security procedures. The PSI also constitutes an Annex to the main contract, and may be revised throughout the program lifecycle. For sub-contracts let within the program, the PSI constitutes the basis for the SAL|
|Risk||The likelihood of a vulnerability being successfully exploited by a threat, leading to a compromise of confidentiality, integrity and/or availability and damage being sustained|
|Risk management||A systematic approach to determining which security countermeasures are required to protect information and supporting services and resources, based upon an assessment of the threats and vulnerabilities. Risk management involves planning, organising, directing and controlling resources to ensure that the risk remains within acceptable bounds|
|Security Aspects Letter
|A document, issued by the appropriate authority, as part of any NATO classified contract or sub-contract, other than Major ProgrammeslProjects, identifying the security requirements or those elements thereof requiring security protection|
|Security Assurance||A guarantee provided to NATO either directly or through a NATO nation or NATO civil or military body sponsoring release, that a non-NATO recipient of NATO classified information Will provide the same degree of protection to it as required by NATO Security Policy|
|Part of a security aspect letter (SAL) which describes the elements of a contract that are classified, specifying the security classification levels. In case of contracts let within a program/project, such elements of information derive from the programme (project) security instructions issued for that programme|
|Information such as ATOMAL or Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) to which additional handling/protection procedures are applied|
|Sub-contract||A contract entered into by a prime contracter with another contracter (i.e., the sub-contracter) for the furnishing of goods or services|
|Sub-contractor||A contractor to whom a prime contracter lets a sub-contract|
|Threat||The potential for compromise, loss or theft of NATO classified information or supporting services and resources. A threat may be defined by its source, motivation or result, it may be deliberate or accidental, violent or surreptitious, external or internal|
|Vulnerability||A weakness, an attribute, or lack of control that would allow or facilitate a threat actuation against NATO classified information or supporting services and resources|
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