Niger AuthFalse 001
22 October 2003. Thanks to David Loepp for images and English translations, who writes:
Thanks to Hersh [The New Yorker, October 21, 2003] I see there may still be interest in this stuff. Here are my thoughts on the matter with four Niger docs in two photos. I include translations. It shouldn't be too hard to sort out. In the photo "Niger AuthFalse 001" the two docs to the left are most likely authentic, while the one on the right is false. The idea that some of the documents are authentic has already been advanced, but I regret that I cannot remember off-hand who first voiced it. My acknowledgements & apologies...The three documents in the photo correspond to the first three in my list of all seventeen documents in "On August 10th..." The document displayed in photo "Niger CodeFalse" corresponds to number 14.
The doc "IraqEmbAuth" is the translation of the center page of jpg "Niger Auth&False." The only difference between that page and the false underlying page is the date.
See also:
http://cryptome.org/niger-docs2.htm
On August 10th the Sunday Independent published an interview with former Iraqi ambassador to the Holy See:
The Niger-Iraq dossier with few exceptions continues to be given short shrift by the English language press. We are subject to repetitions of trite facts and spin culled from a next door source, with just a touch of racial profiling. Yes, the whole thing was thrown together by a providential African on the make for a fast buck, coupled with his lack of knowledge of Niger's history, rulers- and the French language. And if that doesn't work, throw in the well-smeared French, and to hell with motivations. Niger is all livestock and uranium, so why else send an Iraqi ambassador there? Must be the uranium ore. Is the dossier really all that important, even if it was thrown into major speeches and declarations by the administration? Certainly, it did not make a difference in the course of events. The Iraqi adventure went ahead despite the IAEA communiqué that the dossier was not authentic. But these are not the questions I would like to address here. The point is what is the actual state of our knowledge concerning the dossier? This is an attempt to do so.
On August 10th The Sunday Independent published an interview with former Iraqi ambassador to the Holy See Wissam Al Zahawie about his self-claimed unwitting involvement in the Niger scam. Mr. Zahawie at one point offers a detailed account of his interrogations by weapons inspectors of the IAEA shortly after February 10th about his suspected role. Although Mr. Zahawie was not allowed to see the Iraqi-Niger documents, he mentions a letter of 6 July 2000, allegedly signed by him concerning Niger uranium. He was also questioned about the Iraqi embassy seal which apparently was impressed on at least one document.
None of the seventeen pages published by Panorama and la Repubblica correspond to Mr. Zahawie's description.
Of the seventeen pages at least three are probably authentic, since they refer to Ambassador Zahawie's official visit to Niger in February 1999, related in detail by him in the interview. One of the three pages is a letter from him to the Niger Embassy in Rome confirming his planned visit to Niger with flight details. Although it is partially covered in the Panorama layout, it seems to bear no seal. A second page is a Niger embassy letter to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs concerning Mr. Zahawie's official visit. The last page is a telex that confirms the planned trip.
There is only one Iraqi forged document published so far. The forgery is so blatant as to invite immediate suspicion since it is an identical copy of the probably genuine Iraqi document with only a change in date. Supposedly, Mr. Zahawie made a second trip to Niger, same flight, same hour, one week before September 11, 2001. According to Mr. Zahawie, he was not even ambassador at the time. It would be interesting to have his opinion on the alleged Iraqi documents so far published.
The presence of genuine documents could indicate that they were stolen from the Niger embassy during the New Year's holiday 2001. If this were true, it would lend strength to the hypothesis that plumbers linked to intelligence services or special interest groups were active at an early date, whatever their motives may have been at the time. The possibility of a corrupt embassy employee is not to be excluded, although chances are that if he were involved in fabricating the forgeries, he would at least know his minister's name.
The ex-VIII division of the Italian intelligence service SISMI was specialized in the gathering and assessing of information on the illegal proliferation of arms. They were probably aware of Mr. Zahawie's visit to Niger and did open a file on the possibility of a uranium transaction, perhaps at the behest of an unidentified third party that furnished some bait. According to a qualified anonymous source cited by Gianni Cipriani in the Italian center-left daily, l'Unità, the VIII division concluded that there was no substance to the uranium sales claim and informed their colleagues abroad. It is very unlikely that the original dossier put together by the SISMI was passed on to other services, or that it had been stolen and put back into circulation. It's probable that whoever fed the forgeries to the SISMI went for another outlet more likely to take the bait.
The Berlusconi government has attempted to liquidate the matter by claiming that the dossier is covered by state secret motivated by the need to protect their source or sources. The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Franco Frattini, who was in charge of the intelligence services at the time flatly denied that the dossier was covered by state secrecy and added that the services had other means to protect the identity of their sources.
The Procura of Rome (Italian equivalent of the District Attorney) has opened a criminal investigation for sabotage against the state (attentato alla costituzione, articolo 289) rather than simple forgery. The alleged crime would be a conspiracy to deliberately diffuse disinformation so as to impede or interfere with the lawful prerogatives and functions of state institutions. The charge has rarely been filed partly because of the difficulty to put a case together.
A final note on the Seal of the Embassy of Iraq to the Holy See, mentioned by Mr. Zahawie. Although it is not difficult to a forge a seal, a signet of it is required to do so. Were there Iraqi documents with the seal in the Niger embassy, or did a signet of the seal come from elsewhere?
******
For the sake of clarity here is a summary of the documents published as of this date by Panorama and la Repubblica.
1) A letter in Italian from the Iraqi ambassador to the Holy See received by the Niger embassy on February 1, 1999, confirming Mr. Zahawie's forthcoming trip to Niger. Probably authentic.
2) A letter identical to the preceding except for the date, September 3, 2001. False.
3) A letter from the Niger embassy in Rome to the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Niger announcing Mr. Zahawie's trip also dated February 1, 1999. Probably authentic.
4) A telex dated February 1, 1999, identical in text to the preceding letter. Probably authentic. [niger-doc-04]
5) A telex published by Panorama, partially visible and illegible, dated February 5,1999.
6) A letter from the Niger Ministry of Foreign Affairs to his ambassador in Rome asking him to contact the Iraqi ambassador (sic), Mr. Zahawie, concerning an agreement signed June 28, 2000, to furnish uranium to Iraq. The letter is dated July 30, 1999. In the Panorama version the date has been hand corrected to the year 2000. False. [niger-doc-05]
7) Page one of a letter from the president of Niger to Saddam Hussein confirming the agreement to furnish 500 tons of uranium, dated July 27, 2000. The president swears by a constitution that has been replaced four times since independence. False. [niger-doc-01]
8) Page two of the same letter. [niger-doc-06]
9) Accompanying letter to a formal agreement between Iraq and Niger to furnish uranium to the former, sent to the Niger embassy in Rome by the Minister of Foreign Affairs. The letter is dated October 10, 2000, but is received in Rome on September 28, 2000. The letter is signed by Ailele Elhadj Habibou, no longer minister since 1989. False. [niger-doc-07]
10) A page with the word "Accord." [niger-doc-08]
11) Page one of schedule n° 1 to the agreement. The actual text of the agreement has not surfaced as of this writing. False. [niger-doc-02]
12) Second and final page of schedule n°1 to the agreement. [niger-doc-03]
13) A letter in code from the Minister of Foreign Affairs dated February 7, 2001. Panorama does not furnish a deciphered version.
14) A letter in code from the Secretary of State of Niger to the Ambassador in Rome dated July, 2001. Panorama furnishes a deciphered version. The text details the shipping of uranium to Iraq and cautions utmost secrecy. False.
15) A letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador in Rome dated August 28, 2001, confirming a shipment of uranium. No destination is specified. It could just as well refer to a presumed sale to China. See below. [niger-nitra-01]
16) A report on a meeting between the ambassadors of Niger, Sudan, Iraq, Pakistan, Libya and Iran on June 14, 2002, to set up a secret elite military corps to aid nations and groups that are victims of unjust embargos, sanctions or accusations. The ensuing pages have not surfaced yet. Badly written fantasy politics. [niger-global-01]
17) A letter dated May 3, 2002, from the Nigerien embassy. Since it is partially covered in the Panorama spread, the text is incomprehensible.
An eighteenth page in code was also published by Panorama. According to the author of the service, it refers to a presumed sale of uranium to China. The letter is hand dated August 9, 2001. Ms. Burba's source affirmed that he had received the documents from someone within the Niger embassy while he was investigating a presumed China-Niger uranium sale. A similar transaction seems remote. Although China- and not only China- was involved in the Pakistani atomic and has been accused of furnishing high tech to Iran, it certainly doesn't need Niger uranium. The China link appears more likely to be part of the scam.
A close scrutiny of the documents invites a few considerations. At least two of the documents are so preposterous as to question the motives of Ms. Burba's source in pawning them off as real. As noted above, the second document is identical to the first except for the date: one week before the tragedy of the Twin Towers. The other document (number 16) is simply ridiculous. One hopes that Ms. Burba's purported CIA contacts at the US Embassy had, for the sake of credibility, the good grace to trash these two documents before forwarding the dossier to Washington.
******
The Berlusconi-owned weekly, Panorama, has not faired well in this matter. Surprisingly or not, Panorama only informed the US Embassy of the dossier. Although they have asserted that the false dossier was offered to other news agencies at the same time presumably by their source, no one has come forth as yet to substantiate the claim. Although Panorama may not have connected the dots after the State Department's December 19th allegation against Niger, they must have realized they were sitting on a smoking gun after ElBaradei declared the Niger- Iraq dossier "not authentic" on March 7th. Apparently, following an editorial line has its advantages over professionalism. The least that can be said is that Ms. Burba missed the false scoop of her lifetime.
Her editor-in-chief, Carlo Rosella, has faired better in duty but not in coherence. In an introductory editorial to Ms. Burba's article he denied the charges that money had been paid for the dossier, asserted the sacrosanct right to protect the identity of one's sources and praised the high professional standards of his weekly, ironically only days after being reprimanded by the national syndicate of journalists for having run a cover picture of Berlusconi with hair airbrushed in where baldness reigns. When Mr. Berlusconi's interests are at stake, Mr. Rosella has few qualms in dealing with facts. Panorama ran a false scoop in December 2001 claiming that an international cartel of judges had met secretly in Switzerland to conspire against Mr. Berlusconi. On another occasion the head of the Procura of Palermo, Pietro Grasso, declared that he actually turned one of Panorama's false scoops to his advantage. Although Rosella pointed out that Grasso had qualified his remark, the fact remains that Panorama did publish a false scoop against him. As of this writing, Panorama along with the rest of the Berlusconi press is engaged in an intense smear campaign against the political opposition based on false dossiers and false testimony (the so-called Telekom-Serbia scandal) apparently put together by some old hands affiliated with the outlawed Masonic lodge, Propaganda Due.
Panorama's role in the Niger scam should be addressed with a dose of scepticism.
******
A good deal of verifiable information published in the foreign press has not found its way into the mainstream English language press. According to a French-African dossier Niger denied State's allegations immediately on December 21st and made a number of detailed declarations the following days. The Minister of Mines, Rabiou Hassan Yari, qualified State's allegations as "defamatory" and challenged them to prove it. He explained at length the mechanisms of exploitation and control of the uranium ore, which would preclude any possibility of autonomous government accords or skimming off by the Niger state. Five days later Prime Minister Hama Amadou declared that Iraq had tried to buy an unspecified amount of uranium ore in the 1980's, but President Kountché after consulting his partners declined to sell. Mr. Amadou added that Iraq has never again requested uranium ore from Niger. According to The Independent of September 24, 2002, Saddam Hussein legally acquired 2.8 kg of uranium from Niger in 1981 or 1982, far from the 500 tons that are regularly reported.
In a January 29th Washington Post interview, immediately following the State of the Union address, ElBaradei, head of the IAEA declared that Niger had denied the charges made by the US government.
On February 21st, Niger, through the Minister of Economy and Finances, Ali Badio Gamatié, again denied selling uranium ore to Iraq, once again detailing the commercial and legal obligations that Niger is party to. Yahaya Baaré, Minister of Mines in 2000 when the supposed negotiations were underway, further declared that during the military transition a country "that was not Iraq" tried unsuccessfully to purchase uranium ore. He added that two Nigerien citizens also attempted to clench a deal for an unknown third party, "Niger cannot sell to a state that has not signed all the conventions against the proliferation of nuclear arms."
Although the Department of State had an interest in ignoring Niger's immediate and repeated denials, it is regrettable that the press wasn't doing its job.
Niger AuthFalse 001
[Translation of Niger AuthFalse 001 at left above.]
URGENT
Republic of Niger
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation
The Embassy in Rome
Via Antonio Baiamonti, 10
00195 Rome
Tel: 06/3729013 - Telex 626290
S. 027/49/ABNI/ROME/ML [?]
Rome, February 1, 1999
The Ambassador
TO
His Excellency The Minister
Of Foreign Affairs and
African Integration
Niamey
I am honoured to inform you that the Embassy of Iraq to the Holy See has just informed me that His Excellency Mister Wissam Al Zahawie, Ambassador of Iraq to the Holy See, will make an official visit to our country as a representative of His Excellency Mister Saddam Hussein, President of the Iraqi Republic.
His Excellency Mister Zahawie will arrive in Niamey on Friday, February 5, 1999, at 6:25 PM with Air France flight 730 from Paris.
I would be grateful for whatever measures you may kindly take.
The Ambassador
[Translation of Niger AuthFalse 001 at middle above.]
[... Em]bassy of the Republic of Iraq to the Holy See presents his […] to the honourable Embassy of NIGER in Rome and with the present […in]forms the esteemed embassy as follows:
[…] following our telephone conversation today […Exc]ellency Mister Wissam Al Zahawie, Ambassador of the Republic [of Iraq to] the Holy See, will visit the capital of Niger on an official mission, as […rep]resentative of His Excellency Saddam Hussein, President of the [Republic of Ir]aq, where he will arrive in Niamey February 5, 1999 at approximately 6:25 PM on the French air[line] from Paris, flight number 730.
[…] courteously therefore to inform the authorities of Niger of the […] welcome, as well as the release of a visa.
[…] of the Republic of Iraq to the Holy See avails […re]new to the Honourable Embassy of Niger the sense of his most […]
Niger CodeFalse
[Translation of Niger CodeFalse at top above.]
Confidential
July 2001
Nigerien Ambassador
Rome
A government representative [from Iraq] has concluded his visit with his Nigerien colleague.
Negotiations are underway and look very promising.
It's necessary that you keep in close contact with the ambassador in Rome concerning the transportation of metal 551.91 [sic- 551.81 in original]. The authorization for overflight arrived too late. Our government has decided to send the merchandise secretly by sea under the Gabon banner and tranship in international waters. Contact re-established. Very good work done together with the personal emissary of the Iraqi president.
It's understood that this information is top secret and personal. Be on guard as far as all embassy personnel are concerned.
Secretary of State
Mamadou El Hadji