25 November 1999
Source: http://gpo.sailor.lib.md.us/bin/GPOAccess.cgi

This provides excerpts from three Congressional reports on intelligence funding for 2000 which describe actions concerning the National Security Agency, SIGINT operations and other initiatives.

See related news report: http://www.cnn.com/US/9911/25/nsa.woes/

[Excerpts; full report: http://cryptome.org/hr106-457.txt]

[Page H11630-H11643]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

                     CONFERENCE REPORT ON H.R. 1555

  Mr. GOSS submitted the following conference report and statement on 
the bill (H.R. 1555), to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2000 
for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United 
States Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central 
Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other 

                  Conference Report (H. Rept. 106-457)



       (a) Report.--Not later than 60 days after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the Director of Central Intelligence, 
     the Director of the National Security Agency, and the 
     Attorney General shall jointly prepare, and the Director of 
     the National Security Agency shall submit to the appropriate 
     congressional committees, a report in classified and 
     unclassified form providing a detailed analysis of the legal 
     standards employed by elements of the intelligence community 
     in conducting signals intelligence activities, including 
     electronic surveillance.
       (b) Matters Specifically Addressed.--The report shall 
     specifically include a statement of each of the following 
     legal standards:
       (1) The legal standards for interception of communications 
     when such interception may result in the acquisition of 
     information from a communication to or from United States 
       (2) The legal standards for intentional targeting of the 
     communications to or from United States persons.
       (3) The legal standards for receipt from non-United States 
     sources of information pertaining to communications to or 
     from United States persons.
       (4) The legal standards for dissemination of information 
     acquired through the interception of the communications to or 
     from United States persons.
       (c) Definitions.--As used in this section:
       (1) The term ``intelligence community'' has the meaning 
     given that term under section 3(4) of the National Security 
     Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)).
       (2) The term ``United States persons'' has the meaning 
     given that term under section 101(i) of the Foreign 
     Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801(i)).
       (3) The term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means 
     the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the 
     Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives 
     and the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on 
     the Judiciary of the Senate.



       It is the sense of Congress that the systematic 
     declassification of records of permanent historical value is 
     in the public interest and that the management of 
     classification and declassification by Executive branch 
     agencies requires comprehensive reform and the dedication by 
     the Executive branch of additional resources.



       Section 506(b) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for 
     Fiscal Year 1996 (Public Law 104-93; 109 Stat. 974), as 
     amended by section 502 of the Intelligence Authorization Act 
     for Fiscal Year 1998 (Public Law 105-107; 111 Stat. 2262), is 
     further amended by striking ``for fiscal years 1998 and 
     1999'' and inserting ``for fiscal years 2000 and 2001''.



       The managers on the part of the Senate and the House at the 
     conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the 
     amendment of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 1555) to authorize 
     appropriations for fiscal year 2000 for intelligence and the 
     intelligence-related activities of the United States 
     Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central 
     Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for 
     other purposes, submit the following joint statement to the 
     Senate and
     the House in explanation of the effect of the action agreed 
     upon by the managers and recommended in the accompanying 
     conference report:
       The Senate amendments struck all of the House bill after 
     the enacting clause and inserted a substitute text.
       The House recedes from its disagreement to the amendment of 
     the Senate with an amendment that is a substitute for the 
     House bill and the Senate amendment. The differences between 
     the House bill, the Senate amendment, and the substitute 
     agreed to in conference are noted below, except for clerical 
     corrections, conforming changes made necessary by agreements 
     reached by the conferees, and minor drafting and clerical 
       The managers agree that the congressionally directed 
     actions described in the respective committee reports or 
     classified annexes should be undertaken to the extent that 
     such congressional directed actions are not amended, altered, 
     or otherwise specifically addressed in either this Joint 
     Explanatory Statement or in the classified annex to the 
     conference report on the bill H.R. 1555.


sec. 309. report on legal standards applied for electronic surveillance

       The House bill and Senate amendment contained similar 
     provisions. The Senate recedes to the House provision with a 


 sec. 502. funding for infrastructure and quality of life improvements 
                at menwith hill and bad aibling stations

       The Senate amendment contained a similar provision. The 
     House bill did not. The House recedes to the Senate position.


[Excerpts; full report: http://cryptome.org/ic110999.txt]

[Page H11755-H11762]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

                            FISCAL YEAR 2000

  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to the unanimous consent agreement of 
earlier today, I call up the conference report on the House bill (H.R. 
1555) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2000 for intelligence 
and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, 
the Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency 
Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes, and ask for 
its immediate consideration in the House.


  Mr. Goss.
  Mr. Speaker, in H.R. 1555 we begin the funding for the intelligence 
community of the next millennium. That, Mr. Speaker, is a most useful 
perspective for what we have tried to do in our conference report. How 
can we adapt the tools and skills of the Cold War to meet the 
challenges of the 21st century? These are new times. We need new ways 
to approach them.
  Underlying that question is how, and in some cases whether, we plan 
to meet those challenges. How we define our interests, Mr. Speaker, 
will depend on how we define ourselves. What kind of country will we be 
in the next century? In 2020, when my grandchildren are grown, what 
will the American flag mean to them and to people around the world?
  In the classified schedule of authorizations in our conference 
report, we frame a preliminary answer to these questions. In that 
report, Mr. Speaker, we bring forward the basic tools and skills of the 
Cold War to bear on the new threats of the next century: the 
international drug cartels that bring poison into our cities, the 
elusive conspiracies that put the pieces of nuclear weapons into the 
hands of rogue leaders, and the shadowy networks that want to bomb our 
buildings overseas and here at home.
  We will also need to use these tools and skills to meet new and 
unanticipated challenges that will arise in the coming years. Synthetic 
pharmaceuticals, genetic terrorists? I cannot know what threats will 
face my grandchildren in the year 2020 as Americans, but I can tell the 
Members what intelligence tools and skills will be necessary to meet 
those threats.
  That is our job. We may not know the who, In other words, but we 
clearly know the how. We have learned that, and now we have to provide 
for it. In our conference report, Mr. Speaker, we continue to focus on 
this, how we will meet the threats and the challenges of the future, 
which is indeed upon us.
  We will need more human intelligence or HUMINT, as we call it. Over 
the past year we have had to understand and to act upon crises in 
Belgrade, Nairobi, Dar es Salaam, East Timor, southern Colombia, and a 
whole host of other hard-to-pronounce places. In each case, 
policymakers need more HUMINT on the plans and the intentions of the 
rogue leaders, dissidents, terrorists, guerillas, and traffickers 
involved in these crises.
  Where will the crises of the year 2000 arise, Kabul, Kinshasa, Lagos? 
I do not know, but they will be out there, and wherever they do arise 
our policymakers will need intelligence officers on the ground to 
collect HUMINT on the plans and intentions of those involved.
  For that reason, Mr. Speaker, our conference report continues the 
rebuilding of our HUMINT capabilities around the world. No surprises is 
the right way to go.
  We will continue to need signals intelligence, or SIGINT, as it is 
called. As in the past, our ability to collect SIGINT has helped to 
protect our shores from cocaine and our citizens from terrorists. That 
ability, however, is threatened in a fundamental way by digital 
  For that reason, Mr. Speaker, our conference report continues the 
recapitalization of our SIGINT capability.

This is a huge undertaking and an extraordinarily significant one.
  We must improve the processing of imagery intelligence, or IMINT as 
it is called. Our ability to collect imagery has accelerated at 
lightning speed, but our ability to process imagery remains at a crawl. 
Collection and processing, however, are two halves of one whole. They 
must work together.
  At present, the combination of collection and processing and imagery 
is a Ferrari welded to a Ford Falcon. That combination simply will not 
drive our IMINT capability in 2020. And for that reason, Mr. Speaker, 
our conference report challenges the Intelligence Community to invest 
more in its ability to process imagery. It does no good to have the 
pictures if we do not have analysts to review them.
  We must rebuild our covert action capability. The rise of rogue 
leaders and regional conflicts has demonstrated once again that the 
President must have an option between the use of F-16s and doing 
nothing. The President must have, whenever appropriate, the ability to 
influence an adversary through the various forms of covert action, 
properly oversighted, of course.
  For that reason, Mr. Speaker, our conference report provides 
additional funding for development of the Intelligence Community's 
covert action capabilities.
  Rebuilding and refining our HUMINT, our SIGINT, our IMINT, and our 
covert action capabilities are central to the conference report 
accompanying H.R. 1555. In addition, we address legislatively a number 
of specific issues that have arisen with regard to the use and the 
oversight of these capabilities.
  In section 309 of our conference report, we direct the National 
Security Agency, the NSA, to report in detail on the legal standards 
that it employs for the interception of communications. I can report, 
notwithstanding this provision, that the committee has substantial 
insight into the action of the NSA and the guidance of its legal staff. 
I have thus far no reason to believe that the NSA is not scrupulous in 
following the Constitution and the laws conducting its SIGINT mission. 
However, our job is oversight and we take it seriously.


  This conference report would add about 1 percent to the President's 
request for national intelligence activities. As with the House version 
of the bill, there would be modest increases in the budgets for 
activities centered in the National Security Agency, the Defense 
Intelligence Agency, and the Central Intelligence Agency, and somewhat 
less money for the National Reconnaissance Office, which manages the 
acquisition of our intelligence satellites.
  I am pleased that we have fully funded the major satellite 
acquisition programs, including the new future imagery architecture, or 
FIA. These new imagery satellites will greatly increase the volume of 
imagery we can collect, as well as provide for more frequent coverage 
of targets, which together will address deficiencies identified in 
Operation Desert Storm and more recent conflicts.
  However, these enhanced collection capabilities will not count for 
much unless we also invest in the means to exploit and disseminate the 
imagery on the ground. On this score, executive branch planning has 
been extremely poor. The conference report would require a reduction in 
planned collection capabilities unless substantial improvements are 
planned for exploitation and dissemination.
  I would also like to call attention to significant problems at the 
National Security Agency. The NSA is facing tremendous challenges 
coping with the explosive development of commercial communications and 
computer technology. As the new NSA director has pointed out, while the 
new technology is providing incredible benefits to our Nation's 
security and economy, it is taxing in the extreme to those charged with 
intercepting the communications of hostile powers and drug lords. At 
the same time, NSA has not demonstrated much prowess in coping with the 
  The new director of NSA, I believe, grasps the seriousness of the 
situation. I hope that we have made progress in focusing the attention 
of the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence on 
this critical issue.
  Fixing NSA's internal problems is only half the answer. A sustained 
funding increase of some magnitude will also probably be necessary, and 
there are no obvious candidates yet for offsetting cuts. Action, 
however, is imperative since the nation cannot navigate with an 
impaired sense of hearing.
  In closing, Mr. Speaker, this is a responsible bill that will enhance 
our nation's security. It supports our military forces and our efforts 
to combat terrorism, narcotics trafficking, and weapons proliferation. 
I am pleased to endorse it, and I urge my colleagues on both sides of 
the aisle to support it as well.


  In our hearings on support for the military, a predominant theme was 
the continued imbalance between collection and other intelligence 
assets. For years, the committee has stressed the need for better 
planning and financing of intelligence processing, analysis and 
dissemination. This year we are insisting that our future imagery 
satellite capabilities be at least roughly balanced with ground 
  Signals intelligence has also suffered from gaps in what we call 
``end to end'' capability, as well as from enormous leaps in target 
technology. For several years, the committee has insisted that changes 
are needed at the National Security Agency in order to modernize our 
SIGINT capabilities and improve efficiency.
  The committee is most gratified that the new director of NSA, 
Lieutenant General Mike Hayden, agreed to conduct unrestrained studies 
of the need for reform, using both an internal and an external team. 
These studies were just completed. Both endorsed previous committee 
findings identifying systemic obstacles to efficiency and change. The 
difficult part, sorting and implementing solutions proposed by the 
teams, soon begins. General Hayden has our strong support for decisive 
action that will, by nature, be controversial.
  We will not rest easy until SIGINT is once again healthy.


[Excerpts; full report: http://cryptome.org/ic111999.txt]

[Page S14947-S14950]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]


  Mr. SHELBY. Mr. President, on behalf of the majority leader I submit 
a report of the committee of conference on the bill (H.R. 1555) to 
authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2000 for intelligence and 
intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, the 
Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency 
Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes, and ask for 
its immediate consideration.


  The conference report includes key initiatives that I believe are 
vital for the future of our Intelligence Community.
  These initiatives include:
  1. bolstering advanced research and development across the Community, 
to facilitate, among other things, the modernization of NSA and CIA;
  2. strengthening efforts in counter-proliferation, counter-terrorism, 
counter-narcotics, counter-intelligence, and effective covert action;
  3. expanding the collection and exploitation of measurements and 
signatures intelligence, especially ballistic missile intelligence;
  4. boosting education, recruiting, and technical training for 
Intelligence Community personnel;
  5. enhancing analytical capabilities;
  6. streamlining dissemination of intelligence products;
  7. developing our ability to process, exploit and disseminate 
commercial imagery; and
  8. providing new tools for information operations.


  In the Senate, we had a distinguished panel of Americans with a broad 
range of expertise--our Technical Advisory Group--that took a look at 
some key areas within the Intelligence Community and brought forward 
some very important recommendations.
  We thank all the members of the Technical Advisory Group for their 
time and efforts.
  I will briefly summarize some of their findings, to the extent that I 
can in open session, along with some of the other findings of our 
  First, our ability to collect and analyze information on the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction requires renewed emphasis 
and innovative thinking.
  As our potential enemies seek out the ability to produce chemical, 
biological, and nuclear weapons, we must develop the ability to detect 
these efforts.
  This bill places a great deal of emphasis on our ability to collect 
such information known as Measurements and Signatures Intelligence or 
  Second, both the House and Senate Intelligence Committees agree that 
our Intelligence Community and our Defense Department must move quickly 
to address what our Technical Advisory Group identifies as a critical 
shortfall in our ability to properly task, process, exploit, and 
disseminate intelligence information collection by our airborne and 
overhead imagery assets.
  As we modernize our Imagery Intelligence or IMINT architecture, the 
Intelligence and Armed Services Committees agree that we should not be 
spending the taxpayers money on collection architectures that we may 
not be able to utilize fully.
  Third, we have once again placed strong emphasis on recapitalizing 
the National Security Agency's information technology infrastructure.


  Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, I rise to join Chairman Shelby in urging 
my colleagues to vote in favor of the intelligence authorization 
conference report. This report is a culmination of the lengthy effort 
to fund intelligence activities for fiscal year 2000. It has not been 
easy to arrive at this point because the committee had to address many 
significant nonintelligence issues ranging from the reorganization of 
the Department of Energy to the establishment of procedures for 
blocking the assets of drug kingpins. We have arrived at this point 
because we have reached several important compromises with our House 
colleagues, and the report deserves the Senate's full support.
  This conference report supports many new initiatives. In my view, one 
of the most important new initiatives is to make the year 2000 a 
watershed year for intelligence. The watershed represents a turnaround 
in spending on intelligence activities. I believe it is time to 
increase spending because we now have a much better understanding
of the threats facing the United States of America and the important 
role intelligence plays in meeting those threats.
  One of the most difficult parts of my job as the Intelligence 
Committee vice chairman has been to talk to people about the importance 
of intelligence. This job is difficult because most of the information 
is classified. Therefore, public debate on the condition of the 
intelligence community is extremely rare and discussing funding levels 
is almost impossible.
  My colleagues are well aware that classified conference reports and 
the classified schedules of authorizations are available for their 
review in S. 407 but you have to go there to get the details. We cannot 
talk about them now.
  Let me say, however, intelligence is stretched very thin. Our global 
reach is supported by intelligence as global coverage. Without adequate 
coverage, we make policy mistakes. The Intelligence Community is 
stretched thin in trying to meet all of its commitments to policy 
makers. But I can't tell you on the floor of the Senate how thin it is 
stretched, and I can't tell you how much it's going to cost to fix. I 
can only tell you I'm glad fiscal year 2000 is a watershed year for 
  A second initiative this bill supports is striking the balance 
between intelligence collection and the subsequent exploitation and 
dissemination of the information collected. My colleagues should know 
that one of the problems of insufficient funding is that the 
Intelligence Community is unable properly to exploit and disseminate 
all of the information it gathers. If you think about it, this may seem 
odd. That is, the Community is collecting more information than it is 
able to analyze and deliver to its customers. But it is not odd. Among 
other things, it reflects constrained Intelligence budgets. As the 
Community has moved into advanced technologies, it has invested in the 
future by developing new intelligence collection systems. The idea was 
that by the time these new systems were ready to be used, we would have 
been able to find the funding to exploit and disseminate the 
information being collected. Well the future is now, and we haven't 
been able to find the funding to balance collection, exploitation, and 
dissemination. In this bill we have confronted the issue and proposed 
important solutions. Again, I urge my colleagues to read the classified 
report in S-407 in order to get the details.