11 November 2001. Thanks to Anonymous.
Press Release No embargo Sunday, 11 November 2001
[By David Shayler]
In a letter dated 9 November 2001, the Metropolitan Police has confirmed its investigation into the Gaddafi Plot:
"As you know, the Metropolitan Police Service undertook an assessment of the available material and submitted two reports to the Crown Prosecution Service, an interim report in February 2001 and a final report in September 2001. The police enquiry has been extremely thorough, examining all relevant material
"Final advice from the Crown Prosecution Service has now been received, saying that the material does not substantiate the allegation made by David Shayler."
"Although the authorities have done their best to spin their way out of the truth, this clearly confirms that the police have gathered evidence -- 'relevant material' -- about the MI6-funded plot to assassinate Colonel Gaddafi of Libya. The work of the police and the Crown Prosecution Service is not to 'substantiate [ ] allegations' or otherwise. The police gather evidence which they submit to the CPS when they believe they have enough to secure a conviction. The CPS then decides whether to prosecute. In this case, they have concluded that there is not enough evidence to convict the two MI6 officers. It is not a comment or otherwise on the truth of my disclosures but an assessment of the evidence that can be used in court to bring a conviction. Since 'relevant material' from MI6 files will inevitably be subject to PII certificates, this is hardly surprising. The fact that the CPS has not charged me with either perjury or wasting police time indicates that my evidence was honest, reliable and true.
"This is anything but a clean bill of health for the intelligence services and the systems of oversight. I first made the government aware that MI6 had funded the attempted assassination of Colonel Gaddafi on 31st July 1998. As this was an allegation of murder, ministers should have discharged their legal duties and referred the matter to the police to investigate. They did not. In July 1999, I wrote to the Prime Minister, the Home Secretary and the Foreign Secretary to again alert them to the illegal activities of MI6. I received no reply. In November 1999, I sent a statement to former Home Secretary Jack Straw. Again, no action was taken. In March 2000, my partner Annie Machon hand-delivered a statement to the Metropolitan Police Special Branch. The police then tried to avoid investigating the plot claiming that conspiracy to murder did not amount to a crime in Britain. In December 2000, I gave a full statement to DS Gerry Mackinnon and Det Dupt Lewis Benjamin of SO1 of the Met, which I signed in early 2001.
"We also have to ask whether the Crown Prosecution Service is properly independent of government, when it makes decisions about prosecutions which are likely to expose the lies of ministers and undermine the government's public image. In this case, we are currently considering whether we take a judicial review of this decision. In any case, we will ask that the police disclose their evidence to the Foreign Affairs Select Committee so that it can carry its own investigation into the matter. In the meantime, I would ask any policeman who is in a position to do so, to come forward and shed greater light on the plot.
"It is not good enough that the police investigation into conspiracy to murder only began two and a half years after the allegations were originally made and that it took them a year to gather evidence after that. We saw the problems created by police inaction in the investigation into the murder of Stephen Lawrence. Former Foreign Secretary Robin Cook has made it clear that MI6 did not have permission for such an operation. It is now clear that the police have evidence to indicate that there was a plot. We still need to know how far two MI6 officers were operating outside government control.
"We need a statement from the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary clarifying the facts of this matter. In particular, we need to know how around £100,000 of taxpayers' money was used to fund the sort of Islamic Extremists who have connections to Osama Bin Laden's Al Qaeda network. Did ministers give MI6 permission for this? By the time MI6 paid the group in late 1995 or early 1996, US investigators had already established that Bin Laden was implicated in the 1993 attack on the World Trade Centre. Given the timing and the close connections between Libyan and Egyptian Islamic Extremists, it may even have been used to fund the murder of British citizens in Luxor, Egypt in 1996.
"Ministers have tried to spin -- or indeed lie -- their way out of this in much the same way that they misled the press over my disclosure that MI5 had failed to react to reliable intelligence warning of an attack on the Israeli Embassy in 1994. When I made the disclosure in the Mail on Sunday, Jack Straw tried to deny it. It was only when the authorities were obliged to disclose a summary of the report to the Appeal Court that I was vindicated. Where there is the slightest risk of embarrassment and bad publicity, Tony Blair and his government cannot be trusted to protect fundamental human rights like the right to life and the right to security of person, both guaranteed under the Human Rights Act.
"When I go around the country giving talks, I get several messages from the British people. They are fed up with the excessive secrecy in this country and they are fed up with the spin, distortion and lies put out by this government. At a time when terrorism is at the centre of public debate, the British people need up-to-date and reliable information about how the intelligence services discharge their duties and spend their taxes, particularly if the money was used to fund enemies of the West.
"This is further evidence that the government will use mealy-mouthed words to escape proper scrutiny, allowing MI6 officers to get away with murder and ministers to pervert the course of justice. This undermines the rule of law, the foundation and protection of our liberties. A semi-literate monkey could decode the heavy-handed spin in the latest official statement on the plot. We all know an assessment of the available criminal evidence is not an assessment of fact. At the same time, we might wonder why it has taken so long for the CPS to come to a decision. It should be obvious to anyone in the media and parliament that this whole thing stinks.
"The whole episode should provide an opportunity for the Intelligence and Security Committee to demonstrate to parliament and the people that it is independent of government and is able to impartially investigate human rights abuses by the intelligence services without government and intelligence service interference.
"Don't forget I was put in prison in France for revealing this crime, even though I used a legal route to disclose my information to government."
Friday, 09 November 2001
[Original document: http://cryptome.org/That-document.doc
Bold numbers keyed to following notes by David Shayler on this "CX document."
5C2C IDP225 O24276 GG9613 ND0044 04122114 1CA952 91.13 1-> OO GG6 GG9 NDO LOG .5 G4 LEDGER LEX095 AAAA 2-> 041807Z DEC 95 3-> FM LONDON 4-> TO PUSD 185 IMMEDIATE 5-> TO RESEARCH DEPT 234 IMMEDIATE
TO MOD 913 IMMEDIATE TO CABINET OFFICE 721 IMMEDIATE 6-> TO SECURITY SERVICE 100 IMMEDIATE BT 7-> IMMEDIATE 8-> LEDGER UK S E C R E T/DELICATE SOURCE/UK EYES ALPHA 9-> REQUIREMENTS: 2LIAPX01 LEDGER DISTRIBUTION: 10-> FCO - PUSD 11-> DICTD 12-> NENAD 13-> RAD - ME 14-> MOD - DI(I AND W) DI (ROW)A 15-> CABINET OFFICE - JIC (ASSESSMENTS STAFF 16-> GCHQ - Z10A2 18-> SECURITY SERVICE - G9A5, G6A5 AND G6A3 BRITISH AUTHORITIES INFORMED: CAIRO 17-> TUNIS WASHINGTON 19-> CX 95/53452 (R/ME/C) OF 04 DECEMBER 1995 (GTN [---------] EXT [-------]) /REPORT PAGE TWO UK S E C R E T/DELICATE SOURCE/UK EYES ALPHA REPORT NO: 95/53452 (R/ME/C) TITLE: LIBYA: PLANS TO OVERTHROW QADAHFI IN EARLY 1996 ARE WELL ADVANCED SOURCE: A NEW SOURCE WITH DIRECT ACCESS WHOSE RELIABILITY HAS NOT BEEN SUMMARY 5 Libyan colonels in charge of plans to overthrow QADAHFI, scheduled to coincide with the next General Peoples Congress in February. Coup will start with unrest in Tripoli, Misratah and Benghazi. Coup plotters are not associated with Islamic fundamentalists. MUSA QADHAF AL-DAM murdered by coup plotters in June. Attempt to assassinate QADAHFI in August thwarted by security police. DETAIL 20-> 1. In late November 1995 [Removed to protect TUNWORTH's identity] described plans, in which he was involved, to overthrow Colonel QADAHFI. He said that 5 colonels from various parts of the armed 21-> forces were in charge of the coup plot. These included [blank------ -----------------------------blank] The latter was most likely to take overall control. 2. The coup was scheduled to start at around the time of the next 22-> General Peoples Congress on 14 February 1996. It would begin with attacks on a number of military and security installations including the military installation at TARHUNA. There would also be orchestrated civil unrest in Benghazi, Misratah and Tripoli. The coup plotters would launch a direct attack on QADAHFI and would /either PAGE THREE UK S E C R E T/DELICATE SOURCE/UK EYES ALPHA 95/53452 23-> either arrest him or kill him. 3. The coup plotters had 1275 active sympathisers in the following areas: TRIPOLI 240 persons; BENGHAZI 135; TOBRUK 114; MISRATAH 148; SIRTE 40; AL-ZAMIYA 180; AL ZUMARAH 300; AL KHUMS 28; GHADAMIS 50. Their occupations ranged from students, military personnel and teachers throgh to businessmen, doctors, police officers and civil servants. The plotters were divided into 5 groups, each with 5 officers in charge. Messages to members of each group were passed via schools and Mosques. The start of the coup would be signalled through coded messages on television and radio. The coup plotters had sympathisers working in the press, radio and television. 4. The military officer said that the plotters would have cars 24-> similar to those in QADAHFI's security entourage with fake security number plates. They would infiltrate themselves into the entourage in order to kill or arrest QADAHFI. 5. One group of military personnel were currently being trained in the desert area near KUFRA for ther role of attacking QADAHFI and his entourage. The aim was to attack QADAHFI after the GPC, but 25-> before he had returned to SIRTE. One officer and 20 men were being 26-> trained especially for this attack. 6. The coup plotters were not associated with the Islamic fundamentalists who were fermenting unrest in Benghazi. However, 27-> they had had some limited contact with the fundamentalists, whom the military officer described as a mix of Libya veterans who served in Afghanistan and Libyan students. The coup plotters also had limited contact with the Algerian and Tunisian governments, but the latter did not know of their plans. /7. PAGE FOUR UK S E C R E T/DELICATE SOURCE/UK EYES ALPHA 95/53452 7. The coup plotters were responsible for the death of [blank,-- Names removed to protect security------------------blank] was about to take up the position as head of Military Intelligence when he was forced off the Tripoli-Sirte road and was killed. The 2 coup plotters involved escaped unhurt. In August 1995, 3 army captains who were part of the coup plot attempted to kill Colonel QADAHFI. However, security police caught them waiting at the roadside on the Tripoli-Sirte road awaiting QADAHFI's entourage. Bothe men escaped to TUNISIA. 8. The plotters had already distributed 250 Webley pistols and 28-> 500 heavy machine guns amongst the groups. SOURCE COMMENT A. The coup plotters expected to establish control of Libya by 29-> the end of March 1996. They would form an interim government before discussions with tribal leaders. The group would want rapproachment with the West. They hoped to divide the country into smaller areas, each with a governor and a democratically elected parliament. There would be a federal system of national government. B. The officer was disclosing this information in the hope that 30-> if the coup was successful, the new government could enlist HMG support. Other plotters were aware of the officer's contact with HMG, but did not entirely approve of it. GRS C0616
[By David Shayler]
1. MI5 copies go to G9, counter middle eastern terrorism, and G6, the international terrorism agent running section. The NDO is the MI5 night duty officer
2. '1807' is the time the telegram arrived on 04 Dec 95. The 'Z' stands for Zulu Time or Greenwich Meantime, as it is better known. I talked of this document long before this material appeared on the Internet. The following is from Secrets and lies, page 24, par 63, published in June 1999:
63 ... In December 1995, MI6 circulated a CX report to Whitehall and the other agencies in which it reported intelligence of a potential coup in Libya. The report also detailed the requirements of the group in terms of equipment and weaponry. The name of the agent and the fact that he was involved in the plot were not made clear in the CX report as is usual in such cases. (If MI6 had not issued the report, it would have been criticised by those not privy to its role in the plot for failing to gather prior intelligence of it).
The equipment requirements are, I believe, further discussed in another more detailed CX report.
3. From London station of MI6, ie MI6 HQ at Vauxhall Cross
4. To the permanent under-secretary's department, telegram no. 185, ie the 185th telegram sent from LONDON to PUSD in 1995
5. Research department of Foreign and Commonwealth Office
6. MI5's name in Whitehall
7. The urgency of this telegram. It ranges from FLASH, the quickest, through IMMEDIATE and PRIORITY to the lowest, ROUTINE.
8. UK S E C R E T This material can only be seen by UK intelligence personnel. Information cannot be shared with a foreign power
DELICATE SOURCE This indicates that a sensitively placed human source was involved
UK EYES ALPHA Apart from being the title of a book about the services by Mark Urban, intelligence correspondence of the BBC, this indicates that only certain departments within the UK are allowed to see this kind of material
9. This is a code for a particular Joint Intelligence Committee intelligence requirement, like for example, 'Intelligence on internal unrest in Libya'
10. Permanent Under-Secretary's Department. This is the FCO's equivalent of Sir Humphrey Appleby's department. The PUSD is a very senior civil servant who advises the Secretary of State directly
11. Drugs International Crime and Terrorism Department of the FCO. Known to wags as the Crime, Undercover Narcotics and Terrorism Section, this department deals with security and crime issues affecting the foreign office. One of its principle tasks is to advise on the Lockerbie issue.
12. North east and North Africa Department. It is responsible for diplomatic relations, such as they've been, with Libya.
13. Research and Analysis Department - Middle East (an offshoot of the foreign office).
14. Defence Intelligence Staff, the department responsible for central intelligence assessments in the MoD.
15. Joint Intelligence Committee. This is where significant intelligence is collated, assessed and disseminated. The members of the committee include the heads of the intelligence agencies and personnel from departments likely to be affected by threats to the UK, ranging from other Civil Service departments to the Bank of England.
16. Government Communications Headquarters. Z10A2 is the head desk officer responsible for Libya.
17. These are MI6 posts abroad, known as 'CX stations'. Hence the MI6 office in Cairo is known as 'CX CAIRO'. The head of station is known as H/CAIRO. His subordinates are known as CAI/1, CAI/2 etc.
18. G9A5 Me, the co-ordinator of MI5's efforts against the Libyan target
G6A5 MI5 handler of Libyan agents
G6A3 MI5 handler of Libyan agents and one of the most capable officers I met in MI5.
19. CX is the name SIS gives to its intelligence reports. It calls MI5 and GCHQ reports 'FX'. 95/53452 is the unique reference number for this report. R/ME/C is the Libyan requirements officer in MI6. The system works like this: the agent TUNWORTH gives PT16/B, his agent runner (not mentioned in this report), the intelligence. PT16/B passes it to R/ME/C, who writes the report and disseminates it to Whitehall. GTN is the Government Telephone Network
20. I have seen the original of this report. I can confirm that the deletions cover material which might have helped identify TUNWORTH.
21. Names of high ranking Libyan officials who were involved in the plot. I believe they will have been removed to protect them from reprisals after this report entered the public domain
22. This is the period I referred to when I first disclosed details about the plot.
23. "The coup plotters would launch a direct attack on QADAHFI and would either arrest him or kill him." This is confirmation of information that I have already disclosed regarding the plot.
24. "The military officer said that the plotters would have cars similar to those in QADAHFI's security entourage with fake security number plates. They would infiltrate themselves into the entourage in order to kill or arrest QADAHFI." This confirms details that I have already disclosed about the plot.
25. I have disclosed that Sirte was the site of the attack on Qadhafi in February or March 1996. This has been stood up also by the Panorama investigation into the plot.
26. "One officer and 20 men were being trained especially for this attack." By this point, TUNWORTH had already met MI6 at least once. Were these officers already being trained with British money or by British personnel for the specific task of assassinating Qadhafi?
27. In August 1998, I disclosed that the group were linked to a rag tag group of Libyan Islamic extremists.
28. On Newsnight, Tom King, chair of the Parliamentary Intelligence and Security Committee, tried to argue that because the plotters had already tried to assassinate Qadhafi and they already had weapons, it didn't matter that the government might have provided further supplies of ammunition. By this reasoning, any supplier of arms to, for example, the IRA could insist that his support didn't really matter just because the group already has weapons and explosives. It is not an argument which stands up in law.
29. This matches exactly the timing of the plot as I have related it.
30. "The officer was disclosing this information in the hope that if the coup was successful, the new government could enlist HMG support." This at least establishes the principle that the group of coup plotters were looking for support from the government.
Daily Telegraph coverage of Gaddafi Plot
UK News Electronic Telegraph
Monday 10 August 1998
By Michael Smith
ROBIN Cook yesterday dismissed claims by a former intelligence officer of an MI6 plot to assassinate the Libyan leader Col Muammar Gaddafi as "pure fantasy".
The Foreign Secretary said he had investigated the claims and was satisfied that his Conservative predecessor, Sir Malcolm Rifkind, had not authorised any plan to kill the Libyan leader. He pointed out that David Shayler, the disaffected intelligence officer who made the claims, was a junior member of the domestic Security Service MI5 with little or no knowledge of secret MI6 operations.
Mr Cook said: "I do wish people would recognise that somebody who has left another service - not the Secret Intelligence Service MI6, he was never in MI6 - is making allegations, no doubt for his own reasons. I have pursued these allegations. I am absolutely satisfied that the previous Foreign Secretary did not authorise any such assassination attempt. I'm perfectly satisfied that MI6 never put forward any such proposal.
"Nor have I seen anything in the 15 months I have been in the job which would suggest that MI6 has any interest, any role or any experience over the decades of any such escapade. There was no Government-inspired plan to assassinate Gaddafi. There was no SIS proposal to do it, and I'm fairly clear there has never been any SIS involvement. I'm perfectly clear that these allegations have no basis in fact. It is pure fantasy."
Many Labour MPs are, however, unhappy with the treatment and pursuit of Shayler, and are calling for more accountability for the secret service. Clive Soley, chairman of the Parliamentary Labour Party, supported Mr Cook's denial, saying the claims were a "ludicrous suggestion". But he said they proved the need for more transparency. He called for public questioning of intelligence chiefs and also reports which were less heavily censored before publication.
Annie Machon, the girlfriend and former MI5 colleague of Shayler, who is being held in a Paris prison awaiting extradition to Britain to face charges under the Official Secrets Act, insisted that his claims were true. She said: "I believe them absolutely. He was a very, very good intelligence officer when he worked in MI5. He's got very good recall, and if he says something happened, then I believe that it did.
"He headed up the Libyan section in MI5 for over two years, so he was very well informed about all matters relating to Libya. He also managed to develop a particularly good working relationship with his opposite number in MI6 and I gather that is how he found out the details of the plot to kill Gaddafi."
Shayler told the New York Times that MI6 paid an Islamic fundamentalist £100,000 to place a bomb under Gaddafi's car but the plot went wrong when the explosives were placed under the wrong car, killing a number of bystanders.
One of the Libyan exile groups that intermittently reports such attempts to depose Col Gaddafi is based in London and may well have contacts with British intelligence, perhaps explaining why Mr Cook said he was "fairly clear" that MI6 was not involved.
Under the 1994 Intelligence Services Act, MI6 can carry out acts abroad that would be outlawed in Britain providing they are authorised by the Foreign Secretary. But while Col Gaddafi's reputation for backing terrorism is well known, former intelligence officers said the likelihood that MI6 would want to replace him with an Islamic fundamentalist regime would be remote.
The Shayler allegations do bear a close resemblance to an alleged 1996 plot to kill Col Gaddafi by a dissident group of 45 officers, but it apparently took place in September 1996, two months after Shayler left MI5.
8 August 1998: BBC airs Shayler spy
7 August 1998: Are Britain's covert operatives messing up? Don't even ask [text of The New York Times article]
UK News Electronic Telegraph
Saturday 8 August 1998
An edition of Panorama investigating the claims made by David Shayler, the renegade MI5 officer, of a plot to assassinate Colonel Gaddafi was broadcast last night after a change of heart by the Government.
The BBC said the Government had decided not to use an injunction against Shayler to prevent it from showing the programme. The Government denies his claims. Richard Eyre, deputy chief executive of BBC News, said that the corporation believed that airing the allegations would enable a proper public debate about intelligence service activities.
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