2 November 2000. Thanks to author and publisher.
Source: The China Threat, Bill Gertz; Regnery, Washington, D.C.; 2000. ISBN 0-89526-281-9.
Selections from several classified and unclassified documents. See another secret document from the book on spying on US nuclear weapons and technology: http://cryptome.org/tct-docs2.htm
Anotations by the author.
[Appendix, pp 246-47.]
A report from the CIA's National Intelligence Daily analyzing Chinese President Jiang Zemin's efforts to consolidate power. (2 pages)
CHINA: Jiang's Position Remains Unconsolidated (S NF)
Communist Party General Secretary Jiang Zemin appears to have weathered criticism of his Taiwan policies but remains unable to parlay his appointment as Deng Xiaoping's chosen successor into the paramount position. The US Embassy reports that rivals are trying to limit his power as next fall's 15th Party Congress nears.press reports say National People's Congress Chairman Qiao Shi has been openly critical of Jiang's Taiwan policy and key appointments and(S NF OC)
In addition, Jiang has been unable to assert his authority in areas he should be able to control after seven years as party General Secretary, six as Central Military Commission chairman, and three as President.
deposed Beijing party secretary and former Politburo member Chen Xitong, whose corruption investigation Jiang spearheaded, will not be brought to trial.
military leaders, some of whom Jiang promoted, last summer attacked Jiang's policy toward Taiwan as too lenient.-- Jiang is still resorting to Deng's theories to provide legitimacy to the Communist Party, suggesting an inability to claim Deng's mantle on his own.(S NF OC)
Jiang's inability to consolidate his power means he will remain focused on domestic issues and is unlikely to initiate any steps to improve relations with the US or Taiwan that could spark internal criticism. Rather, he will pursue less controversial activities -- such as his recent African tour -- to build his own and China's international stature. (S NF) -CIA, DIA-
13 3 June 1996
|China: Jiang's Rivals for Influence
|Maintains tactical alliance with Jiang when collective leadership faces threat, such as economic downturn. but working to undercut Jiang's authority behind the scenes has criticized Jiang as too soft on Taiwan, US issues.|
|Frequently identified in press, other reporting as Jiang's chief rival . . . criticizes Jiang's policies in private, seldom makes obligatory references tJo him in public speeches attempting to strengthen influence of NPC to boost own political standing past behavior suggests more likely to act as "kingmaker" for another challenger than to take on Jiang directly.|
|Vice Premier member.
|Has maintained low profile in recent months but had past disagreements with Jiang over economic policy still frequently cited as likely to hold higher office in future.|
|Largely sidelined in recent years, but support would add prestige to a Jiang challenger associated with group of Dengist reformers critical of Jiang's performance has input on Taiwan, Hong Kong policy decisions.|
|Vice Chairman, National
|Has backed Qiao Shi's efforts to bolster influence of NPC,
probably shares his views on Jiang associated with Dengist
|Former President||Charged by Deng Xiaoping to support Jiang but has criticized
some of Jiang's decisions. according to a variety of reporting
often rumored in Hong Kong media to be planning direct
challenge . . . probably seeks acknowledgment of preeminent
stature among elders after Deng . . . has been courted by Jiang in
attempts to ensure his backing.
|Rumored to be among group of Jiang opponents criticizing his
handling of Taiwan affairs . . . also disagreed with Jiang on some
corruption cases. according to press reports among most active
of party elders ... has been associated with Qiao Shi, Tian Jiyun,
other Dengist reformers.
[Appendix, pp. 250-52.]
A proposal by White House National Security Council proliferation specialist Gary Samore that would have allowed China to gain access to missile technology in exchange for agreeing not to sell missile technology to rogue states. The plan was never implemented after it became public. (3 pages)
SECRET SECRET NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON. D.C, 20504 March 12, 1998 MEMORANDUM FOR MIKE HAMEL/JOHN NORRIS, OVP JOHN HOLUM, STATE/T ROBERT EINHORN, STATE/PM SUSAN SHIRK, STATE/EAP MELINDA KIMBLE, STATE/OES TED WARNER, DEFENSE MARC BERKOWITZ, DEFENSE KEITH CALHOUN-SENGHOR, COMMERCE CATHERINE NOVELLI, USTR JEFFREY HOFGARD, OSTP NORM WULF, ACDA ROBERT DIEKER, JCS JOHN SHOEMARKER, NASA SUBJECT: China Missile Proposal The attached paper proposes elements of a missile deal with China, to be presented during U/S Holum's trip to China March 25-26. In essence, we would offer to expand commercial and scientific space cooperation with China (in limited areas) if China meets our conditions for joining the MTCR and controlling its missile-related exports to Iran, Pakistan, etc. (Note that Article 10 of the draft NASA-SSTCC Agreement for Scientific Cooperation in the Areas of Earth Observation, Environment, and Climate Change has been largely deleted.) Please provide your comments and clearance to me by COB Tuesday, March 17. Thanks. [Signature] Gary Samore Special Assistant: to the President and Senior Director for Nonproliferation and Export Controls cc: Sandy Kristoff/Jeff Bader SECRET SECRET
SECRET ELEMENTS OF THE CHINA MISSILE DEAL Following are the elements of a missile deal that would be proposed to China during Bob Einhorn's expert-level talks in China March 23-24 and U/S Holum's "Global Security" discussions in China March 25-26. In presenting the package, we would propose to complete the elements in time to be announced during the President's trip to China later this year. What China Does: 1. Establishes effective MTCR export controls, and "catch-all" controls on items destined for MTCR-class missile programs. * This meets one of the MTCR's two substantive requirements for Chinese membership. it would require China to adhere to the current MTCR Guidelines and Annex, and to incorporate them into China's export control system. "Catch-all" is not an MTCR requirement, but is needed to deter circumvention of MTCR controls and to enforce limits on Iran (see below). 2. Does not transfer MTCR-controlled equipment and technology to Category I (MTCR-class) missile programs in any non-MTCR country, including Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Libya, Pakistan, Syria, Turkey, etc. * This meets the second of the MTCR's two substantive requirements. 3. Does not assist ground-to-ground missile programs in Iran. * This would cover all ground-to-ground ballistic and cruise missiles, even those below MTCR thresholds, and would include B610/8610/CSS-8, NP-110, and Shahab-series missiles. What the U.S. Does: 1. Support Chinese MTCR membership, upon implementation of 1 and 2 above. * This would provide China with political prestige, the ability to shape future MTCR decisions, substantial protecticn from future U.S. missile sanctions, and would SECRET SECRET
SECRET expedite somewhat the consideration of MTCR-controlled U.S. exports to China. 2. Conclude NASA-SSTCC Agreement for Scientific Cooperation in the Areas of Earth Observation, Environment, and Climate Change Research. (See attached.) * We would table the draft umbrella agreement during the talks, noting its conclusion would be dependent on a missile deal. (NOTE: Regardless of whether we reach a missile deal, we would proceed with the space projects that were agreed in the context of the Jiang visit.) 3. Issue blanket Presidential waiver of Tiananmen Square sanctions to coverall future commercial satellite launches. * Such waivers currently are issued case-by-case. Under a blanket waiver, we would continue to review case-by-case the export licenses required to launch U.S. satellites on Chinese boosters. 4. Increase number of permitted commercial space-launches. * We would amend the existing Commercial Space Launch Agreement to increase the launch quota. We would also make clear to the Chinese that, as a practical matter, a lack of progress on the missile issue would prevent us form [sic] increasing launch quotas and could even endanger the existing quota. SECRET
[Appendix, p. 263.]
A top secret CIA report on China's weapons sales, including a delivery
of missile-related cargo to Syria. (1 page)
EAST ASIA (continued)
China: Possible Missile-Related Delivery to Syria
China Precision Machinery Import-Export Corporation -- China's premier missile sales firm -- delivered what probably is military-related cargo to Syria early this month, according to special intelligence. Though the exact nature of the equipment, described as special and dangerous, remains unclear, the involvement of CPMIEC and the Syrian end user suggests the shipments are missile related.the cargo was destined for the Scientific Studies and Research Center, which is responsible for Syria's ballistic missile, weapons-of-mass-destruction, and advanced conventional-weapons programs.
-- SSRC runs Syria's Scud C ballistic missile production program and an upgrade program for antiship missiles. Moreover, in recent years it has sought and received assistance for each of the projects from CPMIEC.
China: Seeking Advanced US Defense Technology
a Chinese firm has illicitly obtained sophisticated US-made millimeter-wave traveling wave tubes, power transmission devices that can be used in a variety of military applications, including airborne missile seeking and fire-control radars, targeting systems, and navigation pods.-- The Chinese will most likely try to duplicate the technology in the power transmission tubes. They have reportedly tried -- with little success -- to produce similar tubes in the past; their efforts have included joint ventures with the Russians.
The cost of the tubes -- obtained in the Philippines -- increased fourfold to $80,000 each because of the illegal nature of the transaction, but there is high military and commercial demand for this equipment.
11 17 June 1996
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