1 May 2001
Source: Digital file from the Court Reporters Office, Southern District of New York; (212) 805-0300.
This is the transcript of Day 37 of the trial, May 1, 2001.
See other transcripts: http://cryptome.org/usa-v-ubl-dt.htm
5212 1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 2 ------------------------------x 3 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 4 v. S(7) 98 Cr. 1023 5 USAMA BIN LADEN, et al., 6 Defendants. 7 ------------------------------x 8 New York, N.Y. 9 May 1, 2001 9:45 a.m. 10 11 12 Before: 13 HON. LEONARD B. SAND, 14 District Judge 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 5213 1 APPEARANCES 2 MARY JO WHITE United States Attorney for the 3 Southern District of New York BY: PATRICK FITZGERALD 4 KENNETH KARAS PAUL BUTLER 5 MICHAEL GARCIA Assistant United States Attorneys 6 7 SAM A. SCHMIDT JOSHUA DRATEL 8 KRISTIAN K. LARSEN MARSHALL MINTZ 9 Attorneys for defendant Wadih El Hage 10 ANTHONY L. RICCO EDWARD D. WILFORD 11 CARL J. HERMAN SANDRA A. BABCOCK 12 Attorneys for defendant Mohamed Sadeek Odeh 13 FREDRICK H. COHN DAVID P. BAUGH 14 Attorneys for defendant Mohamed Rashed Daoud Al-'Owhali 15 DAVID STERN DAVID RUHNKE 16 Attorneys for defendant Khalfan Khamis Mohamed 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 5214 1 (In open court) 2 THE COURT: Certain consistency in punctuality. 3 Mr. Schmidt is not here nor is Mr. Dratel. You know where 4 they are? 5 MS. BESOBRASOW: They should be here any moment, your 6 Honor. 7 THE COURT: Are there any matters that require the 8 Court's attention? 9 MR. FITZGERALD: I believe not, your Honor. I could 10 tell your Honor all that's left of the government's rebuttal 11 case, we're just going to offer corrected stipulations, a 12 stipulation chart, and to read one stipulation between the 13 government and defense counsel for Odeh. That should take 14 literally two minutes and we'll be ready to do the summations. 15 MR. RICCO: Yes. 16 THE COURT: Anybody have a different view? 17 Very well. Then as soon as Mr. Schmidt arrives, 18 we'll bring in the jury. 19 MR. FITZGERALD: Thank you. 20 (Recess) 21 THE COURT: Let's bring in the jury. 22 MR. DRATEL: Your Honor, a couple of -- one scope of 23 items. 24 THE COURT: This was called for 9:45. 25 MR. DRATEL: I know, your Honor. I'm sorry. 5215 1 THE COURT: Yes. 2 MR. DRATEL: Mr. El Hage's Grand Jury testimony? 3 THE COURT: Yes. 4 MR. DRATEL: I guess it's the first one in September 5 '97. 6 THE COURT: Yes. 7 MR. DRATEL: Went in virtually in toto and at the 8 time we had moved to strike certain parts that were 9 prejudicial and on 403 grounds, and at the time certain -- a 10 couple of things stayed in, one in particular because it was 11 in the indictment as a part of a perjury charge which has 12 since been dismissed, which was the old Count 290, on the 13 identification of a person and it had to do with the imam in 14 Tucson and the murder of the imam in Tucson. Now there is 15 nothing in the indictment, there are no pending charges that 16 relate to that, and we would ask that that be stricken. 17 THE COURT: You are asking -- this is an overt act? 18 MR. DRATEL: Not an overt act. 19 THE COURT: There is a charge? 20 MR. DRATEL: It was part of a charge, a perjury 21 charge. 22 THE COURT: Which count is this? 23 MR. DRATEL: It's old Count 290. It has been 24 dismissed. 25 THE COURT: And the count has been dismissed. So you 5216 1 want dismissed from the Grand Jury testimony the questioning 2 that related to something which became the subject of 3 something that has been since dismissed? 4 MR. DRATEL: Yes. And that it be stricken also from 5 the, I guess the introductory part of the perjury part of the 6 indictment. 7 MR. FITZGERALD: Your Honor, if this is going to take 8 great length, I can tell you it's not coming up in the 9 summation at all so we can deal with it at the end of the day. 10 But we would oppose that because Mr. El Hage has put much 11 testimony in even as late as yesterday about goats regarding 12 counts not charged in the indictment, lies not charged, to 13 show the context of the Grand Jury appearance and I think -- 14 THE COURT: We'll take it up at 4:30. 15 MR. DRATEL: Your Honor, there's one other, one 16 question and answer really in the Grand Jury -- 17 THE COURT: It is also going to be -- say what the 18 subject matter is. We do intend to schedule things and to 19 have some timing. 20 MR. DRATEL: Yes, your Honor. I'm sorry. 21 THE COURT: Tell me what the matter is. 22 MR. DRATEL: There was questioning about a visa in 23 the first Grand Jury appearance, there was a question about a 24 visa for Ethiopia for Mr. El Hage, questioning about an 25 assassination attempt on the Egyptian president. There's been 5217 1 no other proof of that at all. 2 THE COURT: Same issue? 3 MR. DRATEL: Yes. 4 THE COURT: Same issue. 5 MR. DRATEL: Not same issue as far as the perjury 6 counts. This was never a perjury count. It was in there but 7 there has been no other proof. So right now it's prejudicial 8 without any other proof. 9 MR. FITZGERALD: We can take it up at 4:30, Judge. 10 It's not part of the government's summation. 11 THE COURT: Take it up at 4:30. 12 MR. DRATEL: Thank you, your Honor. 13 THE COURT: Bring in the jury. 14 MR. DRATEL: Your Honor, a clothing issue for Mr. El 15 Hage. 16 THE COURT: I sent that memo to the warden and as I 17 sent a previous letter and the warden advises that there is no 18 health risk involved in the concern raised by Mr. El Hage and 19 that with respect to tooth brushes, he will get the new 20 toothbrush when the existing supply is exhausted. And I know 21 of no reason and have no inclination to interfere with these 22 matters of the operation of the MCC. 23 MR. DRATEL: Your Honor, I'm also concerned about the 24 immediate clothing issue, that he was not given his other 25 shirt today and now he's -- 5218 1 THE COURT: I understand. I have sent that to the 2 warden. What would you like me to do? 3 MR. DRATEL: I don't know, your Honor. 4 THE COURT: Neither do I. Please be seated. 5 Thank you. 6 (Jury present) 7 THE COURT: Good morning. Mr. Fitzgerald. 8 MR. FITZGERALD: Yes, Judge, good morning. The 9 government formally offers but does not read at this time 10 corrected pages to the Stipulation 1, Government Exhibit 162R, 11 163R, and a corrected stipulation 154R, and we also offer but 12 do not read at this time Government Exhibit 7, which is a 13 chart of all the stipulations offered by the government in 14 this case. 15 THE COURT: Received. 16 (Government Exhibits 7, 154R, 162R and 163R received 17 in evidence) 18 MR. FITZGERALD: And we also offer at this time 19 Government Exhibit 193, which is a stipulation between the 20 government and Odeh and his counsel, and I would like to read 21 that. 22 THE COURT: Yes. 23 MR. FITZGERALD: It is hereby stipulated and agreed 24 by and between the United States of America and defendant 25 Mohamed Sadeek Odeh, by and with the consent of his 5219 1 undersigned attorneys, as follows: 2 If recalled to testify as a witness, Kelly Mount 3 would testify that on or about March 17, 1999, she vacuumed 4 Government Exhibit 529, the Nike bag, and each of its contents 5 other than those items about which she testified previously, 6 namely, Government Exhibits 535A, through 535E and 535G 7 through 535I, obtaining a single filter sample. She then 8 analyzed that sample, which analysis proved negative for the 9 presence of explosives residue in that sample. 10 It is further stipulated and agreed that this 11 stipulation may be received in evidence as a government 12 exhibit at trial. 13 THE COURT: Received. 14 (Government Exhibit 193 received in evidence) 15 MR. FITZGERALD: With that your Honor, the government 16 rests its rebuttal case. 17 THE COURT: Government rests. So the record is 18 complete, ladies and gentlemen. All of the evidence is now 19 before you and we proceed to the closing arguments. One of my 20 functions with respect to closing arguments is I am the 21 timekeeper, and we'll proceed now with the government's 22 closing argument. 23 MR. KARAS: Your Honor, counsel, ladies and 24 gentlemen, good morning. 25 You may recall that my partner, Mr. Butler, began his 5220 1 opening statement by setting the scene for you in the 2 midmorning hours of August 7, 1998, just minutes before two 3 bombs ripped through our embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar 4 es Salaam, Tanzania. I would like to begin my closing 5 statements by showing you what the scene was like in the 6 immediate aftermath of those bombings to remind all of us 7 about why we are here. 8 (Video played) 9 MR. KARAS: Ladies and gentlemen, those portions of 10 those videos serve as a painful symbol, painful reminder of 11 why it is that we have spent the last two and a half months 12 together, spending the last two and a half months to review 13 evidence that was collected from all over the world. 14 And the reason that we have done this is because we 15 have been involved in a search for justice, a search to 16 determine who it is that committed these acts, these 17 unspeakable acts that ended the lives and the hopes and the 18 dreams of hundreds of people, these vicious acts that 19 shattered three friendly nations, these evil acts defined no 20 justification, these unjust acts that demand accountability. 21 Now this search for justice began by Mr. Butler 22 committing to you that the government would establish beyond a 23 reasonable doubt that the defendant Mohamed Odeh and the 24 defendant Mohamed Al-'Owhali participated in the bombing of 25 the American Embassy in Nairobi on August 7th and that Khalfan 5221 1 Khamis Mohamed participated in the bombing of the embassy in 2 Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. And I submit to you, ladies and 3 gentlemen, we have honored that commitment and we have 4 established the guilt of those defendants for those crimes in 5 this case. 6 But we committed to more. We committed to showing to 7 you that there was a conspiracy behind these embassy attacks, 8 a conspiracy to murder the people of the United States simply 9 because they were American, and we committed to showing to you 10 that all four of these defendants participated in that 11 conspiracy. And I submit to you that we have honored that 12 commitment, that we have established beyond a reasonable doubt 13 the guilt of all four of those defendants in connection with 14 the conspiracy. 15 Now, ladies and gentlemen, we have now come to the 16 close of the case and all of the evidence has been put before 17 you, and I understand that hundreds of exhibits went before 18 you very quickly and without explanation. And sometimes they 19 went in by way of stipulation and they went in even more 20 quickly, and I know, because I helped read some of these 21 stipulations. 22 But now is the time, now is the time where we can 23 discuss what the evidence tells you and how it is that the 24 pieces of the puzzle come together to show to you why it is 25 that we have proved these defendants guilty beyond a 5222 1 reasonable doubt. This is our opportunity to walk through the 2 evidence and explain the context of the conspiracies and the 3 events that preceded the bombings as well as the acts that 4 were carried out in furtherance of the bombings. 5 The way I'm going to do this, ladies and gentlemen, 6 is the first thing I'm going to do is offer a brief summary of 7 what the evidence shows these defendants did, and I do that 8 because I don't want people to be concerned about the number 9 of names that you have heard, about the number of places and 10 acts and companies and countries, because at its core, the 11 case against each and every single one of these defendants is 12 relatively straightforward. 13 Once we go through the summary of what the evidence 14 shows these defendants did, we will walk together through the 15 chronology of the events, the chronology that comprises the 16 conspiracy to murder, the conspiracy to commit war against the 17 United States. And when we have gone through that chronology, 18 we will talk about the counts in the indictment. We will talk 19 about every count in the indictment. 20 Now, the indictment has 300 counts, a little over 300 21 counts, and that is not so much a reflection of the complexity 22 of this case but of the sad fact that each and every victim is 23 represented in a separate count in this indictment, a separate 24 count of murder. 25 Now, I'll tell you up front, ladies and gentlemen, 5223 1 this is going to take some time. There has been a lot of 2 evidence presented before you and I want to take the time and 3 make sure that you understand what the evidence means, and I 4 think this is going to take the balance of today and tomorrow. 5 So let's roll up our sleeves, let's go through the evidence, 6 and let's continue this search for justice. 7 Now, let's begin with the summary. What does the 8 evidence show that the defendant Wadih El Hage did in 9 connection with this conspiracy? Now, in his opening 10 statement, counsel for El Hage, on behalf of El Hage, said to 11 you that Mr. El Hage was a mediator and that he was somebody 12 who shared in the tragedy of the embassy bombings. 13 Ladies and gentlemen, I submit to you that the 14 evidence shows that Wadih El Hage was a facilitator, somebody 15 who performed key logistical acts on behalf of the al Qaeda 16 conspiracy and somebody who obstructed the investigation into 17 al Qaeda within a year of the bombing and within weeks after 18 the bombing. 19 What the evidence shows, ladies and gentlemen, is 20 that, like many people in al Qaeda, Wadih El Hage has a family 21 and that Wadih El Hage conducts business transactions. But 22 like other people in al Qaeda, the evidence shows that Wadih 23 El Hage led a double life, a secret criminal life on behalf of 24 al Qaeda, and that he performed logistical services for al 25 Qaeda to make sure that others in al Qaeda could carry out 5224 1 their deadly acts. 2 The evidence shows that as far back as 1992 and 1993 3 Wadih El Hage was in charge of the al Qaeda payroll in 4 Khartoum, Sudan when al Qaeda was headquartered in that 5 country. It showed that Wadih El Hage made efforts to 6 transport Stinger Missiles from Pakistan to Sudan in 1993, the 7 same year that al Qaeda was targeting the American 8 peace-keeping mission in Somalia, and the evidence shows that 9 Wadih El Hage arranged for the transport of five al Qaeda 10 people from Khartoum down to Nairobi, also during the time 11 that al Qaeda was targeting the American presence in Somalia. 12 What else does the evidence show? The evidence shows 13 that Wadih El Hage served as Usama Bin Laden's personal 14 assistant, the gatekeeper to the man that was the head of this 15 secret conspiracy. The evidence also shows that in 1994 Wadih 16 El Hage moved from Khartoum, Sudan down to Nairobi, Kenya to 17 become a leader of the East African cell of al Qaeda. 18 And the evidence shows that when he got down to 19 Nairobi, he maintained a close operational working 20 relationship with the East African cell -- and, ladies and 21 gentlemen, this is the same cell that would carry out the 22 bombings of the embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam; that 23 Wadih El Hage arranged for the facilitation and delivery of 24 false travel documents of other al Qaeda members; that he 25 communicated in code and passed on messages to others in al 5225 1 Qaeda; that he maintained a close working relationship with 2 others in the East African cell, such as the defendant, 3 Mohamed Odeh. 4 And in 1997 you heard evidence that Wadih El Hage 5 went twice to visit Usama Bin Laden and his commander, Abu 6 Hafs, here in Afghanistan. And when he returned from that 7 first trip in February of 1997, Wadih El Hage brought back 8 with him a new policy, a policy to militarize, to militarize 9 the cell that in 16 or 18 months thereafter would carry out 10 the bombings in East Africa. 11 And then you heard that El Hage went back to see Bin 12 Laden in August of 1997, a year after Bin Laden had publicly 13 declared war against the United States, six months after he 14 gave the interview with CNN where he said he would send dead 15 Americans home. And when El Hage returned, he was met by 16 American officials and he testified in a Grand Jury in this 17 courthouse, when the American government was conducting an 18 investigation of al Qaeda to try to learn about what al Qaeda 19 was doing in its war against America, to try to stop al Qaeda 20 from carrying out its deadly mission. 21 And it was at that moment that Wadih El Hage was 22 faced with a choice: He could honor his oath, he could tell 23 the truth, he could help the United States against al Qaeda, 24 or he could side with al Qaeda and Bin Laden. And the 25 evidence overwhelmingly establishes that what Wadih El Hage 5226 1 did was he sided with Jihad, he sided with al Qaeda. The 2 American citizen chose Bin Laden over America. 3 And he would do it again, because the evidence shows 4 that in 1998, merely weeks after our embassies were bombed, 5 Wadih El Hage testified again in the Grand Jury and again he 6 took an oath and again he chose al Qaeda over the United 7 States. And he lied about key members of al Qaeda, and one of 8 the people that he lied about was the defendant, Mohamed Odeh, 9 which is where we turn next. 10 What does the evidence show about Mohamed Odeh? The 11 evidence shows, ladies and gentlemen, that Mohamed Odeh was a 12 sworn member of al Qaeda, that he was a sworn member of al 13 Qaeda since 1992; that he maintained his status as a sworn and 14 paid member of al Qaeda through the various fatwahs and 15 declarations of Jihad issued by Usama Bin Laden; that he 16 maintained his status as a sworn and paid member of al Qaeda 17 through August 7th, 1998. Mohamed Odeh received extensive 18 training in Afghanistan in firearms, in explosives such as 19 TNT, and he received advance explosive training at al Qaeda's 20 camps. 21 The evidence also shows, ladies and gentlemen, that 22 Mohamed Odeh trained ideologically similar groups in Somalia, 23 once again at the same time while al Qaeda was targeting the 24 American presence in Somalia. 25 The evidence also shows that Mohamed Sadeek Odeh was 5227 1 given a business, a fishing business, by the military 2 commander of al Qaeda, a man by the name of Abu Hafs, and that 3 Mohamed Odeh remained an active member of the East African 4 cell of al Qaeda, maintaining contact and working with Wadih 5 El Hage and others. And some of the others that he worked 6 with carried out the bombings and he carried them out with 7 them. 8 In particular, ladies and gentlemen, the evidence 9 shows that Mohamed Odeh attended several meetings in the 10 spring and the summer of 1998, with the very same people who 11 carried out the bombing, and what you will see and what the 12 evidence shows is that Mohamed Odeh's role was as the 13 technical advisor to those who carried out the bombing in 14 Nairobi. 15 The evidence also shows that Mohamed Odeh traveled to 16 Nairobi in the days before the bombing. He checked into a 17 hotel using a fake name, supported by a fake passport; that he 18 attended meetings where he knew that al Qaeda was expecting 19 American retaliation for something that al Qaeda was about to 20 do; and that he fled Nairobi the night before the bombing, 21 using that fake passport, on his way to Afghanistan, the 22 headquarters of al Qaeda and the home of Usama Bin Laden, and 23 that he was caught on the morning of August 7th in Pakistan. 24 Now, the evidence shows that Mohamed Al-'Owhali had a 25 very different role in this case. Mohamed Al-'Owhali was to 5228 1 carry out the attack. He was the person who was supposed to 2 execute the bombing in Nairobi, and you know from the evidence 3 that he was supposed to die in the bombing. 4 Now, what the evidence shows is that Mohamed 5 Al-'Owhali also received training at al Qaeda camps in 6 Afghanistan. He learned about explosives, he learned about 7 weapons, but he also learned about hijackings, he learned 8 about kidnappings, and he was proficient enough at this 9 training to earn an audience with Usama Bin Laden. And it was 10 during one of his meetings with Usama Bin Laden that Mohamed 11 Al-'Owhali asked for a mission, a mission that you know he got 12 and that you know he carried out, to the detriment of 213 13 people. 14 Now, Mohamed Al-'Owhali, he, too, gets a fake 15 passport and the evidence shows that he goes to Yemen in May 16 of 1998 and then he goes back to Afghanistan, where he gets 17 the details of where it is that the operation is supposed to 18 be carried out. He made a video that was supposed to take 19 credit for his martyrdom operation, a video that al Qaeda was 20 going to show to celebrate its attack against the embassy in 21 Nairobi. And then he got to Nairobi in the early days of 22 August and he met with the other people that he was going to 23 work with to carry out the bombing. 24 He did some last-minute surveillance of the embassy. 25 He reviewed some photos and some sketches of the embassy. He 5229 1 learned all about the plan in Dar es Salaam, and then he was 2 given his instructions. And what you know is he carried out 3 his instructions. 4 On the morning of the bombing, in that back parking 5 lot of the embassy, Mohamed Al-'Owhali got out of the truck, 6 he threw his flash grenades in an effort to get that truck as 7 close to the target as possible -- the American Embassy in 8 Nairobi, Kenya. 9 Only the plan called for him to die, and he ran. And 10 when he ran, and realizing he had no travel documents and that 11 he had no money, he reached out to al Qaeda. He called Yemen, 12 and Mohamed Al-'Owhali and al Qaeda worked together to rescue 13 Al-'Owhali before he was apprehended in Nairobi, Kenya. 14 What does the evidence show about Khalfan Khamis 15 Mohamed? The evidence shows that he, too, obtained the 16 requisite training in Afghanistan and that he, too, went to 17 Somalia to train others, but that in March of 1998 Khalfan 18 Khamis Mohamed was approached about doing a Jihad job, a job 19 he readily accepted, and that it was Khalfan Khamis Mohamed 20 that purchased the utility vehicle, that white Suzuki that was 21 used to transport the component of the bomb, the TNT, the gas 22 cylinders, the detonators. 23 And you learned that Khalfan Khamis Mohamed rented 24 that place, that house at 213 Ilala that functioned as the 25 bomb factory where Khalfan Khamis Mohamed and the others 5230 1 ground the TNT and put together the bomb and loaded the bomb 2 on the bomb truck so that it could be delivered to the 3 American Embassy in Dar es Salaam. And you know that Khalfan 4 Khamis Mohamed went with that bomb truck and he prayed that 5 the bomb would go off, and he was happy when it did. And 6 Khalfan Khamis Mohamed cleaned up the house in an effort to 7 erase the trail that would connect him and his cohorts in the 8 bombing and he fled to South Africa. 9 Now, ladies and gentlemen, that was just a brief 10 summary of what the evidence shows that these four defendants 11 did, what it is that they did that makes them guilty of the 12 charges that have been brought against them in this 13 indictment. 14 What I would like to do now is turn to the chronology 15 and to walk through the conspiracy from its beginning up 16 through the bombings, and you will learn, ladies and 17 gentlemen, that all of the parts connect, that the people 18 within al Qaeda worked very closely together, that they react 19 to situations and that they plan accordingly, and you will see 20 this as we go through this chronology. 21 Now, the beginning of this conspiracy is in 22 Afghanistan, and that's where we're going to begin. And we're 23 going to talk a little bit about how it is that al Qaeda was 24 set up, how it was structured, who the leaders were, and how 25 it is that al Qaeda transformed itself into an organization 5231 1 that sought more than anything else to kill Americans. 2 The conspiracy begins in the late 1980s in 3 Afghanistan, at a time when the mujahadeen are finishing their 4 fight against the Soviet Union, a fight that you know by way 5 of stipulation that the American government supported. But 6 what turned out as an effort to help Afghanis from the Soviet 7 Union transformed into something else, because you heard from 8 the third person to join this group, Jamal Al-Fadhl, the very 9 first witness who testified, and what he told you about was 10 that at the beginning there was this organization called the 11 Mektab al Khidemat, which just means the Services Office. And 12 in fact Jamal Al-Fadhl told you that he would attend and go to 13 meetings at The Services Office in Brooklyn and that's where 14 he found out about the fight in Afghanistan against the 15 Soviets. 16 And what Jamal Al-Fadhl told you was is that Bin 17 Laden and somebody by the name of Abdallah Azzam were sort of 18 in charge of this Mektab al Khidemat but that Bin Laden had a 19 different view as the hostilities were winding down against 20 the Soviets. He wanted to export Jihad, and he wanted to take 21 the group that had been collected in Afghanistan and he wanted 22 to form a group that would reach out and fulfill his dream, 23 his view of how he thought the world should work. 24 So Usama Bin Laden, who was pictured in Government 25 Exhibit 100, formed this organization with two other people -- 5232 1 we can show Exhibit 105 -- among others, but the three people 2 that Jamal Al-Fadhl talked to you about who were part of this 3 were, on the left part of the screen, a man by the name of 4 Ayman al Zawahiri, and then you see Bin Laden there in the 5 middle, and on the right-hand part of the screen is Mohamed 6 Atef, known as Abu Hafs. 7 And Abu Hafs, ladies and gentlemen, he's going to 8 become the military commander of al Qaeda, the military 9 commander. And of course, as Mr. Butler mentioned in his 10 opening statements, when we're talking about military, we're 11 not talking about armies doing battle, armed opponents 12 battling one another, we are talking about terrorism, we're 13 talking about preying on civilians. And Abu Hafs is the 14 person who is going to run the military committee. 15 You are going to see later on that Abu Hafs is the 16 person who sets up Odeh with his fishing business. Abu Hafs 17 is the person who is going to meet with Wadih El Hage in 18 Kenya, and he's one of the many, many al Qaeda people that 19 Wadih El Hage is going to lie about in the Grand Jury in 1997 20 and 1998. 21 Now, Ayman al Zawahiri is the man on the left. He's 22 one of the founders of al Qaeda. You will see that he's one 23 of people that served on the committees. He's also the emir 24 or the leader of this group known as the Egyptian Islamic 25 Jihad, or EIJ. And EIJ is an organization that forms a joint 5233 1 venture with al Qaeda. You will see that Ayman al Zawahiri 2 joins in the February 1998 fatwa where Bin Laden says it is 3 the duty to kill all American civilians. 4 So Jamal Al-Fadhl told you about those three people 5 and he told you that there was another person by the name of 6 Abu Ubaidah. Now, Abu Ubaidah was the person who was also one 7 of the military commanders of al Qaeda. Abu Ubaidah is the 8 person who drowns in that ferry accident in Lake Victoria in 9 the spring of 1996 and he is one of the military commanders 10 who meets with Wadih El Hage and he's one of the military 11 commanders that Wadih El Hage is going to lie about in 1997 12 and 1998. 13 So how did somebody become a member of al Qaeda? 14 Well, you heard from two sworn members. You heard from Jamal 15 Al-Fadhl, the third man to take the oath, and he said that 16 when you take the oath, you pledge allegiance to the emir, 17 Usama Bin Laden, and you pledge allegiance to the group al 18 Qaeda. 19 And what he meant by that was that you are able, and 20 you are ready and willing and able to do whatever it is they 21 ask you to do that is Islamically correct, as they determine 22 what is Islamically correct through their scholars. And one 23 example that Jamal Al-Fadhl gave you was that he said that if 24 you are in al Qaeda and you take the bayat, you are a doctor 25 and they ask you to wash a car, you wash the car. You do what 5234 1 they ask you to do, when they ask you to do it, and you carry 2 it out. 3 And that's precisely what the witness Kherchtou told 4 you -- that he took the same oath and that he understood that 5 he had to follow the Islamically correct orders of al Qaeda 6 and of the emir, and that he would swear allegiance to Bin 7 Laden and the group. 8 Now, you learned a great deal about the structure of 9 this organization al Qaeda. The undisputed leader is Usama 10 Bin Laden and you learned that under Bin Laden there are 11 committees. The governing council is known as the Shura 12 Council, and the prominent members you heard about. You heard 13 about several, but the ones you heard about that you see over 14 and over again in this case, Abu Hafs, the military commander; 15 Ayman al Zawahirial, the person who is also head of EIJ, the 16 person who was in that picture with Bin Laden. 17 Another person that was on that committee was Abu 18 Fadhl al Makkee. Different than Jamal Al-Fadhl. Abu Fadhl al 19 Makkee is somebody you are going to hear a great deal about. 20 He is going to be on other committees and he's going to serve 21 a very interesting role that we'll talk about later on. 22 Then there was the military committee. I talked to 23 you about what al Qaeda means by military, but the two 24 prominent members of that committee were Abu Ubaidah and Abu 25 Hafs; the money and business committee, and this was run by 5235 1 this person Abu Fadhl al Makkee that I mentioned to you about, 2 and Jamal Al-Fadhl described him for you. He said that Abu 3 Fadhl al Makkee was the person who married Usama Bin Laden's 4 niece. He was the person who had his leg amputated below the 5 knee. 6 And Abu Fadhl al Makkee, ladies and gentlemen, is 7 somebody who in 1997 al Qaeda is going to believe is 8 cooperating with America, and you are going to hear how the 9 group reacts to that. We're going to go through the 10 conversations where Abu Hafs, Wadih El Hage's deputy, is on 11 the phone with other al Qaeda members and they are panicking 12 because they think that this Abu Fadhl al Makkee -- and 13 they're going to describe him, with the amputated leg and the 14 person who is with the Sheik Bin Laden's family -- is 15 cooperating with America. And in their reaction, you will see 16 precisely how this group operates, what it is that motivates 17 them, what it is they fear and what it is they want to attack, 18 and that is the United States. 19 Now, then there's the fatwah committee. The fatwah 20 committee issues these orders. These are the scholars that 21 Jamal Al-Fadhl talked about and this is what forms the basis 22 of what is Islamically correct within al Qaeda. And two of 23 the prominent members you heard about were Ayman al Zawahiri, 24 the person who is in that three-person picture, and another 25 person by the name of Abu Hajer. 5236 1 If we can display Government Exhibit 106 is Abu 2 Hajer. Abu Hajer is an important person because he is 3 somebody who is going to work for some of these companies that 4 al Qaeda is going to create in Sudan and he's going to work 5 with Wadih El Hage. Abu Hajer is somebody whose business card 6 Wadih El Hage is going to have in 1997, and Abu Hajer, as 7 we're going to go through the chronology, is going to issue 8 some fatwahs that are going to justify, in al Qaeda's eyes, 9 the activities that they are going to carry out against 10 America. 11 Finally, ladies and gentlemen, you heard about the 12 media committee, and you heard about this both from Jamal 13 Al-Fadhl and from Kherchtou. And they talked to you about 14 they publish the Jihad paper and they had this funny name for 15 the guy who ran it Abu Musab al Reuter. And they thought that 16 was funny. 17 The reason that this committee is important, ladies 18 and gentlemen, is because one of the methods that al Qaeda 19 uses in its war against America is to recruit people, and 20 propaganda is something that is very important to them. It is 21 important to recruit people, to train them, so they can carry 22 out operations, and propaganda is important because it is one 23 of the ways in which they seek to terrorize their enemies. 24 And you see no better example of that than when the 25 group claimed responsibility for the embassy bombings in 5237 1 Nairobi in Kenya, those claims of responsibility that you saw 2 were sent to London and then re-sent out to the media 3 organizations the day after the bombing. And we'll go through 4 these and explain how you know that those are al Qaeda claims. 5 Now, both Jamal Al-Fadhl and Kherchtou talked to you 6 a great deal about the methods that al Qaeda operated, and one 7 of the things that was very important to them was maintaining 8 secrecy. Security and secrecy were very important to protect 9 themselves from the Americans and from others that they 10 perceived as their enemies. 11 From the very beginning, they were protective of 12 their secrets, and throughout they were concerned about 13 learning about those who they thought were informants against 14 them. And Jamal Al-Fadhl told you that al Qaeda would seek 15 out and kill anybody they suspected of being informants 16 against the group. 17 What that tells you, ladies and gentlemen, in no 18 uncertain terms, is this is not a charity organization. This 19 is not a benevolent group. This is a group that is very 20 serious about its business and they will do anything they can 21 to maintain secrecy. And the other thing it tells you is that 22 they're going to be very careful about who they trust, who it 23 is they're going to talk about al Qaeda business around. 24 And it is from that that you know who it is that's in 25 the inner circle of al Qaeda, it is from that that you know 5238 1 that whether or not somebody observes somebody taking a bayat, 2 they knew who was in and who was not in, who they could talk 3 about business to, al Qaeda business, and who they couldn't. 4 And that is something that looms very important in this case 5 when it comes to determining who is involved in this 6 conspiracy and what it is that they did. 7 Now, another thing that al Qaeda did to protect 8 itself was it made liberal use of aliases, aliases such as, 9 for example, Bin Laden would be known as Abu Abdallah, or al 10 Qa Qa. And Government Exhibit 4, which I believe you all have 11 a copy of, is a series of pictures with people's names and 12 their aliases as testified to you by Kherchtou. 13 And you see other corroboration of this, but another 14 person who had an alias is Abu Hafs. And Abu Hafs, the 15 military commander, he went by the name Abu Khadija, he went 16 by the name Abu Fatima. And other evidence shows that Abu 17 Hafs goes by the name Mohamed Atef, and Mohamed Atef is a name 18 you're going to see in Khalid al Fawwaz's address book, one of 19 people in London. And you are going to see references to Abu 20 al Hafs in Nairobi. 21 The witness, Jamal Al-Fadhl, talked about a couple of 22 other people he knew and he only knew their aliases, but you 23 will see from other evidence who these people are. He 24 mentioned to you, for example, somebody by the name of Abu 25 Anas, and Jamal Al-Fadhl described Anas al Liby as a computer 5239 1 expert. 2 And what you see is that Kherchtou will describe for 3 you, and did describe for you, that Anas al Liby was somebody 4 he received surveillance training with and that Anas al Liby 5 was somebody who was very good with computers. And what you 6 saw was there was a search in Manchester that came in by way 7 of stipulation, one of these many stipulations, and some of 8 the documents that were found in this house, which a passport 9 found in the house shows us is this guy Anas al Liby's house. 10 The computer contains documents that talks about Jihad and 11 talks about the methods of doing Jihad, about using aliases 12 and using fake passports and the need to attack, among other 13 things, the embassies of your enemy. 14 Somebody else that Jamal Al-Fadhl talked about was 15 somebody he knew as Abu Fazhul, somebody he described as 16 Swahili and French from The Comoros, which he thought was the 17 moon. And you know from other evidence, including Kherchtou, 18 that that is Harun. Harun will carry out the bombing in 19 Nairobi. He will be the guy who rents the bomb factory. He 20 will be the guy that gets the utility vehicle. He will be the 21 guy that stays behind in Nairobi to clean up, just like 22 Khalfan Khamis Mohamed does in Dar es Salaam. 23 And Harun is Wadih El Hage's deputy. He is the one 24 who uses El Hage's phone. He uses his computer. He's one of 25 the people that El Hage will lie about in September of 1997 5240 1 and 1998. 2 Al Qaeda, as you know, was a transnational 3 organization. People from all over the world joined it and 4 people within al Qaeda traveled all over the world. And al 5 Qaeda, as Jamal al Fadhl told you, trained its members on how 6 to travel secretly so they wouldn't draw attention from 7 people. Al Qaeda trained its members to shave their beards 8 and to wear Western clothes to avoid detention by Western 9 intelligence agencies. 10 And both he and Kherchtou describe for you that the 11 group would use fake passports, and this is one of the many 12 niche businesses that you are going to see al Qaeda gets into. 13 It's their lifeblood, it's how al Qaeda is able to get their 14 people in and out of countries without being detected. 15 Kherchtou described for you two people who he said 16 helped do the passports for al Qaeda. One was somebody he 17 knew by the name of Abu Mohamed el Masry and the other one was 18 Harun. And you're going to see Kherchtou doesn't know this, 19 but later on you're going to see evidence that Harun and El 20 Hage actually did this. 21 You see that there were travel stamps in the 22 computer, and we will go through the conversations where Wadih 23 El Hage and Harun are speaking with al Qaeda members, 24 arranging for the delivery of passports for al Qaeda people. 25 DHL calls and letters which clearly establish, just as 5241 1 Kherchtou said, that Harun is involved in this. And you're 2 going to see that El Hage was with him all the way. 3 Now, both Jamal Al-Fadhl and Kherchtou describe for 4 you the al Qaeda training camp experience. They even 5 described many similar camps, again, many of the names. You 6 heard about places called Miram Shah and Khalid Ibn Walid and 7 the al Farouq Camp and the Jihad Wal Camp and the Sadeek Camp. 8 And during these camps, the group gets training in weapons, 9 they get training in mortars, they get training in explosives, 10 they get training in counter-intelligence, and some of these 11 names, some of these camps are the same places where Mohamed 12 Odeh and Mohamed Al-'Owhali are training later on. 13 Now, by 1990, the foundation for al Qaeda is in 14 place. Bin Laden, Abu Hafs, Abu Ubaidah, Ayman al Zawahiri 15 are at the top of the organization. And in August of 1990, 16 something that is very significant in al Qaeda lore happens, 17 and that is Iraq invaded Kuwait. And in response to that 18 invasion, you know this by way of stipulation, President Bush 19 dispatched the first of the American troops, with the 20 agreement of the Saudi government, to Saudi Arabia. And he 21 did that on August 7th, 1990. 22 And eight years later, ladies and gentlemen, that is 23 when al Qaeda will bomb the embassies in Nairobi and in Dar es 24 Salaam. You see, the American military presence in Saudi 25 Arabia is something that becomes the cause of al Qaeda. You 5242 1 will see this in what Al-Fadhl tells you about Bin Laden's 2 private statements to al Qaeda members and you see this and we 3 will go through this in Bin Laden's public statements. 4 More than anything else, he says that it is the duty 5 of al Qaeda and, in his view, everybody, every Muslim, to do 6 anything in their power to drive the Americans from Saudi 7 Arabia, to kill them anywhere they are. And on August 7th, 8 1998, the anniversary of the arrival of those troops, that is 9 precisely what al Qaeda did. That is precisely what they did. 10 Now, also in 1990 the evidence shows that that is 11 when Mohamed Odeh arrives in Afghanistan. Earlier in his life 12 he had been in the Philippines and he had been studying 13 architecture and engineering, something that he would use 14 later on. 15 Just like Kherchtou, Odeh arrived at the Bait al 16 Ansar Camp where he left his valuables, just like Kherchtou 17 described for you, and he went to al Farouq Camp and he took 18 training in small arms and he took training in map reading and 19 he took training in basic explosives which included TNT, the 20 same material that would be used to blowup the embassies in 21 1998. 22 Now, you know that after Odeh completes his training, 23 he stays around in Afghanistan and he works as a mechanic and 24 he's around for some of the battles in Afghanistan and that's 25 where he is in 1990. And we'll come back later on as we go 5243 1 through the chronology. 2 Now, Jamal Al-Fadhl told you that at some point in 3 1991, 1992 al Qaeda wanted to leave Afghanistan and set up 4 somewhere else. There was some concern in the group about 5 where to go. One of the places that he considered was the 6 Sudan, but there were some people within the organization that 7 were troubled by this because they didn't know if it was an 8 Islamically acceptable place to be. 9 And the person who persuaded the group that it was 10 acceptable to go there was this person Abu Hajer. And Abu 11 Hajer is the person I mentioned to you who is on the fatwah 12 committee and he will issue several fatwahs. Abu Hajer says 13 that it is okay for al Qaeda to go there because the 14 organization that runs the Sudan The National Islamic group is 15 a group al Qaeda work with. 16 So you know from what al Qaeda told you is that the 17 group in fact moved to Sudan, and when the group got to Sudan, 18 one of the things that Jamal al Fadhl himself did was he would 19 purchase farms, farms that the group would use to meet, farms 20 that the group would use for what he called refresh training 21 in some of the terrorist tactics that al Qaeda would teach its 22 members. 23 And it was after the group moved to Sudan and after 24 the American forces arrived in Saudi Arabia that Bin Laden and 25 Abu Hajer begin to speak privately to al Qaeda members about 5244 1 Bin Laden's and al Qaeda's views about their duties with 2 respect to Americans. The bottom line was that Americans had 3 to be attacked, and Bin Laden and Abu Hajer issued a fatwah to 4 the members of al Qaeda that they would have to fight the 5 United States to drive them from the Gulf. 6 Now, at some point in 1992, the defendant Odeh elects 7 to join al Qaeda and he takes the same bayat that Kherchtou 8 and Al-Fadhl did: To follow the emir's orders; to do what the 9 group asks. And what you learn is that Odeh then goes and 10 receives additional training, advanced training in explosives, 11 where he learns how to figure out what type of explosive to 12 use and how much of that explosive to use in carrying out an 13 operation. 14 And one of the people who trains him is somebody by 15 the name of Abdel Rahman. And Abdel Rahman, ladies and 16 gentlemen, is going to show up at the Hilltop Hotel in Nairobi 17 just days before the bombing in Nairobi, and he's going to 18 meet with Mohamed Odeh just days before the bomb goes off in 19 Nairobi. 20 Also in 1992, you heard from the witness Kherchtou 21 and he described for you a different type of training that he 22 received. He was ordered to get this training by Abu Hafs, 23 the military commander, and he told you that was training that 24 was offered by somebody he knew as Abu Mohamed al Amriki, and 25 we see him in Government Exhibit 4, page 5. Abu Mohamed al 5245 1 Amriki, and Amriki means the American. And you see him 2 pictured there and the fake names for Abu Mohamed al Amriki 3 listed there. 4 This person, ladies and gentlemen is Ali Mohamed. 5 Ali Mohamed, and just to give you a sense of who Ali Mohamed 6 is, he is the person whose house is searched in California in 7 1998. He is a person who has computer documents and has other 8 documents that show him in communication with Wadih El Hage 9 and other al Qaeda members, and he is one of the people who 10 lurks in the background through this whole conspiracy. 11 He provides training, he carries out operations, and 12 he maintains contact with critical members in al Qaeda and he 13 is part of the long list of al Qaeda members that Wadih El 14 Hage is going to lie about in the Grand Jury in September of 15 1997 and 1998. 16 And what Kherchtou told you about the training he was 17 offered is he was trained with a small group of people, and 18 one of the people he was trained with went by the name of Anas 19 al Liby. And he's also pictured in Government Exhibit 4-9. 20 Anas al Liby is one of the people that Kherchtou trained with, 21 and to put it into context, Anas al Liby is one of people he 22 is going to visit in Kenya in 1993 with some camera equipment. 23 He is going to be one found on Moi Avenue, about 500 meters 24 from the American Embassy, and his picture is going to be 25 found in the files of Wadih El Hage in Nairobi in 1998. 5246 1 Now, what is it that these folks were trained in? 2 Well, Kherchtou told you that they were trained how to make 3 surveillance of a target, and he described for you how they 4 would learn to target buildings, to collect information on 5 that building, for example, by taking pictures, and they 6 learned how to use small cameras and to take pictures 7 surreptitiously. 8 And they would learn how to develop these pictures 9 and to put this information into a report, a report that would 10 be marked secret, that would tell the reader when the report 11 was prepared, what the target was. The target would be given 12 a number, and then somebody else would carry out whatever it 13 was they were going to do with this. 14 One of the things that Kherchtou described for you 15 was that, in addition to learning how to target the exterior 16 buildings, the group would learn how to go into a room. And I 17 don't know if you remember, but during his testimony when he 18 described this, he looked around in this room, almost doing a 19 quick surveillance himself, and it was very instructive to 20 you, ladies and gentlemen, because it tells you something 21 about al Qaeda. It tells you that there's a part of al Qaeda 22 that remains in every single one of these people. 23 Jamal Al-Fadhl, when he testified and he was asked 24 questions, Can you tell us how al Qaeda did this? Can you 25 tell us how al Qaeda did that? Did you notice every now and 5247 1 then he would say "we." We would do it this way. We would do 2 it that way. 3 This is a group that trains its members very 4 effectively, ladies and gentlemen. One of the things that 5 Kherchtou said to you about Anas al Liby -- he was the person 6 we just saw in that picture -- Anas al Liby was somebody very 7 good with computers. He bought a computer, in fact, in 8 connection with training. 9 Remember what Jamal al Fadhl said. He heard of 10 somebody Anas who was a computer expert, and you're going to 11 see additional evidence of Anas al Liby's expertise in 12 computers. 13 (Continued on next page) 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 5248 1 MR. KARAS: (Continuing) One of the things that 2 Kherchtou said to you that he learned in this training was 3 that there were four parts to an operation. There was 4 surveillance; there was targeting, which is what the bosses 5 would decide; there were facilitators, the people who would 6 supply; and then there were the executors, the people who 7 would carry out the operation. Ladies and gentlemen, you are 8 going to see that those four parts of an operation are very 9 similar to what Mohamed Al-'Owhali described to Agent Gaudin 10 in his confession. That is precisely what he was instructed 11 about, precisely the way Al Qaeda teaches its people that an 12 operation has to be carried out. 13 The corroboration from what Kherchtou says is seen in 14 one of the computer documents from Ali Mohamed's house in 15 California, Government's Exhibit 353. As I said, this is one 16 of the documents that is found on a computer in Ali Mohamed's 17 house. At the bottom of this page you see, it is written as 18 MO3 Iana plan. Number one, you write the date of the writing 19 of the plan; 2, the date of the starting of the execution; 3, 20 specifying the target; 4, the team doing the drawing and the 21 description; 5, the equipment; 6, the cover. That's how you 22 carry out a surveillance operation and that's what Kherchtou 23 said he was trained in and that's what you see in that 24 document. 25 One of the other documents found in Ali Mohamed's 5249 1 computer describes the four levels of organizing an operation, 2 Government's Exhibit 355, another document found in Ali 3 Mohamed's computer. At the very top there, you see how it is 4 described, the idea of working. Remember, one of the codes 5 that you learned about Al Qaeda, jihad is called work. Work 6 is not 9 to 5, doing your job and getting paid a salary, work 7 is doing jihad. Ali Mohamed describes it just as, and there 8 he says just like Kherchtou told you, headquarters, 9 information, preparation, execution, the four phases to an 10 operation that Al Qaeda is trained in, just as Kherchtou 11 described for you. 12 Kherchtou told you that after completing some of this 13 surveillance training, he took part in some electronics 14 training. He didn't graduate in the course but learned about 15 remote controls to be used in watches, radios and so forth, 16 and he mentioned to you that he himself knew that by 1992 17 there was discussion among Al Qaeda that the United States was 18 the enemy of Islam, that the United States was the enemy of 19 Islam. Indeed, by 1992 and 1993, the witness Jamal al-Fadl 20 told you that Bin Laden and Abu Hajer had issued a very 21 specific fatwah regarding the United States, that it was their 22 argument that the prophet Mohamed would not tolerate two 23 religions on the Holy Land and therefore they had to be 24 attacked. In their view, what the United States was doing was 25 Islamically correct. In their view, what that required, what 5250 1 that obligated was attacking the United States. 2 There has been some discussion about what is 3 Islamically correct and what isn't Islamically correct. You 4 are not a court that decides that. This isn't an Islamic 5 court. That's not the point, ladies and gentlemen. Whether 6 the imam Siraj Wahhaj is correct that the prohibition is that 7 there can only be two religions in Mecca or whether that 8 covers Saudi Arabia is not a question that you have to 9 resolve, because what matters is what Al Qaeda thinks, because 10 it is based on that premise that they carry out the actions 11 that they do, and from their perspective a long, long time 12 ago, it was the obligation of their members to carry out these 13 attacks. 14 Jamal al-Fadl described for you that these statements 15 and these fatwahs would be issued, that meetings would be held 16 among the inner circle of Al Qaeda, people who could be 17 trusted, at the guesthouse in the Riyadh section in Sudan. He 18 described to you that one of the people who would attend some 19 of these meetings would be the defendant Wadih El Hage. 20 Remember, ladies and gentlemen, what I said earlier. Only 21 those they trust can attend these meetings. You have to be 22 trusted to be allowed in. 23 One of the things that Al Qaeda did in 1992 and '93 24 in Sudan was set up a business network. Remember what Jamal 25 al-Fadl told you about Bin Laden's business. He told you in 5251 1 one story about how the group went to him and said the 2 business isn't going that well. And Bin Laden said to them 3 our purpose is bigger than business. 4 The business is bigger than jihad, ladies and 5 gentlemen. It provides resources that finance the operations. 6 It provides a way that employs the people that you want to 7 keep employed. It provides terrific cover if you want to 8 bring in munitions or have people travel. Al-Fadl told you 9 about the plane that went up with sugar to Afghanistan and 10 returned with guns and rockets. It's a great cover. 11 Al-Fadl described for you some of the companies that 12 were called Wadi al Aqiq. There was the company called Al 13 Hijra, the construction company, the farm company, and Al 14 Qudurat Transportation Company. The farm company, for 15 example, maintains the farms where Al Qaeda can meet and train 16 its members. Some of the prominent members of Al Qaeda were 17 some of the employees of these companies. They were some of 18 the managers. But first and foremost they were Al Qaeda 19 members. So yes, there was a lot of business going on. But 20 the motive wasn't profit. This wasn't an attempt to get on 21 the Fortune 500. This wasn't Money Incorporated, ladies and 22 gentlemen, this was about Jihad Inc. This was the purpose to 23 these businesses and this is why Al Qaeda used them. 24 One of the things that the witness Jamal al-Fadl 25 described for you that he did for the companies was, he was in 5252 1 charge of the payroll for the Al Qaeda people. Remember, he 2 described that people would get paid two salaries. They would 3 get paid a salary if they worked for the company, and those 4 who worked for the company and who worked for Al Qaeda got a 5 stipend. It was Jamal al-Fadl who was one of the people who 6 would hand out that Al Qaeda bonus, if you will. 7 Jamal al-Fadl told you that the person he trained to 8 replace him was the defendant Wadih El Hage. As far back as 9 in Sudan in 1993, this is one of the things that Wadih El Hage 10 does for Al Qaeda. Jamal al-Fadl gave you a very detailed 11 description of the offices that Al Qaeda had, the Wadi Al Aqiq 12 offices. Remember he said this person had an office, the 13 first office on the left and the second office on the left. 14 He described for you an office in the residential section of 15 Khartoum that was very exclusive, where Bin Laden had an 16 office and Abu Hajer had an office and Wadih El Hage had an 17 office. To get to Abu Hajer and to get to Bin Laden, you had 18 to get through El Hage. El Hage very early on serves as the 19 gatekeeper to both Abu Hajer and Bin Laden. 20 You remember the testimony of Essam al Ridi. He is 21 the person that we all remember who crashed Bin Laden's plane. 22 He is the person who described for you that same office, that 23 very exclusive office in that section in Khartoum in 1993. 24 Yes, Al Qaeda would sometimes send its people to buy 25 tractors. Yes, they would buy bicycles. Yes, they sold 5253 1 sesame seeds. But they also made efforts to buy chemical 2 weapons, and al-Fadl gave you that very specific story about 3 the group's efforts to obtain nuclear weapons. Nuclear 4 weapons, we submit, are not weapons that one uses when you 5 target one victim, it is when you go after targeting entire 6 people. That is what he was trying to do as far back as 1993, 7 al-Fadl told you. 8 Something else happens in 1992, 1993, and that 9 something else, ladies and gentlemen, is the peace-keeping 10 effort in Somalia. You know that at some point the United 11 States government joined the United Nations effort in Somalia, 12 and you heard from Dr. Samatar that there was mass starvation 13 in Somalia and the United Nations showed up in an effort to 14 deal with that problem. 15 Ladies and gentlemen, Al Qaeda had a different view 16 of that mission. The American presence in Somalia angered Al 17 Qaeda. They saw it as an effort to colonize Somalia, an 18 Islamic country. You heard that Abu Hajer joined with Usama 19 Bin Laden issue a fatwah to the members of Al Qaeda to do what 20 they can to stop the Americans, to drive them from Somalia. 21 The specific words that Bin Laden used were, we have to cut 22 off the head of the snake. 23 As far back as 1993, this is what is on Al Qaeda's 24 mind, the United States presence in Somalia. 25 Abu Hajer in his fatwah described how it was 5254 1 Islamically acceptable to attack the infidel, to attack the 2 enemy even if that meant that you were going to kill what they 3 called innocent third parties. Jamal al-Fadl told you about 4 how Abu Hajer relied on this scholar Ibn al Tamiyeh, who gave 5 the parable of the Tartars and the battle that justified these 6 attacks even if it meant killing innocent people. 7 Ladies and gentlemen, you are going to see that Bin 8 Laden is going to rely on this person Ibn Tamiyeh. In the 9 August 1996 declaration against the United States, Bin Laden 10 makes clear that we will do whatever it takes to drive 11 Americans from the Gulf, exactly the way al Fadl described it 12 for you. You saw it in a different form. When Khalfan Khamis 13 Mohamed was asked does it occur to you that you were going to 14 kill Tanzanians and not Americans, Khalfan Khamis Mohamed said 15 yes, that's part of the job, but if they're innocent, Allah 16 will take care of them, and if they're not, then they are 17 going to get what they deserve. That's exactly what al Fadl 18 said Abu Hajer told the group. If they are innocent, they 19 will go to paradise. If not, they will get what they deserve. 20 Is this really Islamically correct? I don't know. 21 But is it what Al Qaeda believed? Absolutely. And once they 22 adopt that belief, it makes perfect sense that they would 23 carry out among other things the operation of East Africa in 24 August of 1998. 25 So once Bin Laden and Abu Hajer raise a call to arms 5255 1 with respect to Somalia, Somalia becomes a magnet for Al Qaeda 2 people. Jamal al-Fadl described for you that Abu Hafs the 3 military commander took two trips. The first was for all 4 practical purposes a scouting mission. When he came back from 5 this trip he told Jamal al-Fadl that I went down there, I 6 don't think we can take America head on. This is what Jamal 7 al-Fadl said. He said there are different tribes down there. 8 There is no one in control. But we will start a little bit 9 and if it goes good we'll go bigger. 10 You know, the witness Dr. Samatar described for you 11 the situation in Somalia, that there were many tribes and that 12 they were fighting amongst each other and fighting 13 collectively against other tribes. That is exactly what Abu 14 Hafs recognized when he went there. 15 Ladies and gentlemen, Al Qaeda didn't storm the 16 beaches with an army and we are not submitting to you that Al 17 Qaeda members were the ones that fired the rockets or the 18 bullets or set off the mines. What we are saying to you is 19 that Al Qaeda sent people to Somalia to pursue its goal to 20 drive the Americans out of Somalia. If that meant training 21 people to carry out operations, that's what they would do. If 22 it meant training some who would train others, that's what 23 they would do. 24 At bottom what this reflects is that as far back as 25 1993, Al Qaeda is going to focus wherever America is and do 5256 1 whatever it thinks it can to carry out its mission. Abu Hafs 2 recognized the need and the limitations, but nonetheless, as 3 you will see, Al Qaeda did what it could to drive the 4 Americans out. 5 In fact, Jamal al-Fadl described a second trip that 6 Abu Hafs took, and when he returned from the second trip he 7 said that Al Qaeda was responsible for what happened to the 8 Americans. Again, does that mean he is saying that Al Qaeda 9 members were the ones that fired the guns? Not necessarily. 10 They are responsible, whether or not he is even telling the 11 truth, feel responsible, which tells you a great deal about 12 their mind set. 13 When the call to arms goes out, help comes from 14 everywhere. From Khartoum -- again, we are talking about 15 1993 -- you remember the testimony of Essam al Ridi, the pilot 16 who was called by Wadih El Hage when he was back in Texas to 17 see about buying a plane for Bin Laden. One of the things 18 that El Hage asked Essam al Ridi was if a plane would have 19 enough range to go from Pakistan to Sudan because he wanted to 20 know if Essam al Ridi would help deliver Stinger missiles from 21 Pakistan to Sudan, at precisely the same time that American 22 forces are in Somalia. 23 The other thing that Essam al Ridi told you was after 24 he bought the plane and brought it to Khartoum, Wadih El Hage 25 asked him to fly five members of Al Qaeda from Khartoum to 5257 1 Nairobi, which borders Somalia to the southwest. Essam al 2 Ridi told you these five people got on a plane and he 3 described the plane and that's all he told you. But remember, 4 Kherchtou told you that he remembers hearing that the Bin 5 Laden plane flew five people down from Khartoum to Nairobi, 6 one of them being Abu Hafs, the military commander, and that 7 those people went on to Somalia. 8 Same story, different perspectives, just like Mr. 9 Butler said. Different people from Al Qaeda who have 10 different perspectives, giving you from beginning to end, the 11 efforts by Al Qaeda and El Hage to help Al Qaeda fulfill its 12 goal with respect to Somalia. 13 Ladies and gentlemen, this is one of many examples 14 where you see Wadih El Hage acting as the facilitator for Al 15 Qaeda, not the mediator, the facilitator. Think of it in 16 terms of an army, but remember, this isn't really an army. 17 When an army fights, there are people who go to the front, but 18 there are important logistics people, facilitators who have to 19 make sure that the people at the front are fed, that they are 20 clothed, that they get communications, that they will get 21 messages. That is the role that Wadih El Hage serves. No. 22 We are not going to present any evidence that he wired any 23 bombs, that he offered any training, that he received any 24 training. But that doesn't make him not in this conspiracy. 25 On the contrary, what the evidence shows is that he provides 5258 1 an essential role for Al Qaeda. Remember what Kherchtou says? 2 You don't have to fire a gun to be in Al Qaeda. You don't 3 have to fire a gun to be part of this. Kherchtou was one of 4 the facilitators and you will see others, and that is one of 5 the roles that Wadih El Hage plays in this conspiracy. 6 Kherchtou described the perspective from Nairobi, the 7 help that was offered in Somalia from the south. Remember, he 8 said that he was specifically ordered to go to Nairobi to help 9 out any way he could. He was a facilitator. He was somebody 10 who was there to provide housing. He was somebody who was 11 there to provide visas and translating if they needed, and 12 Kherchtou told you about some of the people that went into 13 Somalia on behalf of Al Qaeda. He described somebody by the 14 name of Abu Mohamed el Masry, who we know is al Saleh. He 15 described Saif al Adel and a person by the name of Shuaib. We 16 will talk about those people later on. 17 In particular what Kherchtou told you was that he 18 remembers Harun, Wadih El Hage's future deputy, telling you 19 that he and Saleh, this person known as Abu Mohamed el 20 Masry -- just to give you some perspective, this is a person 21 pictured in Government's Exhibit 119. This is Saleh. And 22 that Harun told Kherchtou that he and Saleh went into 23 Mogadishu in Somalia and worked with some of the local tribes 24 to try to construct a truck bomb to attack the UN forces that 25 were there, an effort that was unsuccessful. And Harun told 5259 1 Kherchtou that they were there one day in a neighborhood in 2 Mogadishu in a building when they saw helicopter gun fight, 3 helicopter firing in a building that was in the neighborhood. 4 Harun told Kherchtou that after that they decided they had to 5 get out because they might get caught, some of the people that 6 went to Somalia, ladies and gentlemen, that you will see over 7 and over again, all of which is a reflection of what Al Qaeda 8 was doing at the time and who they were targeting. 9 Kherchtou told you about the electronics contractor 10 who worked in Pakistan, person who worked with the remote 11 devices, he was in Nairobi at the time. One of the other 12 people that Kherchtou said was in Somalia was the person he 13 knew as Marwan. That's the defendant Odeh. In fact you 14 remember the defendant Odeh in his statement to the FBI said 15 in fact that he was given an order by Bin Laden through an Al 16 Qaeda intermediary, somebody by the same of Saif al Adel, to 17 go to Somalia, and the mission was that Al Qaeda was going to 18 train a group the most closely aligned to Al Qaeda. That's 19 what Odeh did. He went to Somalia, the southeastern part of 20 Somalia, and he provided training to one of the groups there. 21 Remember, what Odeh told the group was, this is a group that 22 feared, just like Al Qaeda did, that the UN was going to cause 23 this group to lose its power, and Odeh described a fire fight 24 that involved the tribe and a UN force down in the southern 25 part of Somalia. 5260 1 When he was in Somalia, Odeh met up with Abu Hafs, 2 the military commander of Al Qaeda. Abu Hafs told Odeh that 3 what he did was, he went to Mogadishu and he met with some of 4 the groups, and one of the people he met with was Fahad Aidad, 5 one of the more prominent warlords in Somalia. Abu Hafs told 6 Odeh that Al Qaeda had agreed to work with Aidad and others to 7 attack the Americans. Again, just like Abu Hafs described, 8 tribes fighting tribes, go in a little bit and see if it's 9 good, and maybe we will go bigger. 10 The other thing Odeh told the FBI, while he was in 11 Somalia he met with somebody named Daroud, who told him that 12 he had participated in attacks against the United Nations and 13 the United Nations was leaving. 14 The final thing to consider about Odeh and Somalia, 15 ladies and gentlemen, he told the FBI he was there in March 16 1993 and he left in November 1993, again, at the heart of the 17 time when the American forces are in Somalia, the heart of the 18 time that all this other activity that Al Qaeda is engaging in 19 to drive the Americans from Somalia is going on. 20 That is where Al Qaeda sits in 1993, and you see the 21 import of Somalia in a number of ways. First, it tells you 22 about the mind set, and we talked about that. Second, who Al 23 Qaeda sends to Somalia introduces you to some of the people 24 that you will see play a more prominent role in this 25 conspiracy as it evolves and develops. The third thing is, 5261 1 you will see a number of different ways it corroborates 2 precisely what Kherchtou told you about al Fadl, where he too 3 claims credit for what happens in Somalia. 4 The last thing, ladies and gentlemen, the reason 5 Somalia is important, it establishes the link between Al Qaeda 6 and Nairobi. Remember what I said at the beginning. The 7 thing about this conspiracy and why it makes sense for us to 8 do this chronically, you see that events have a cause and 9 effect relationship. Because Al Qaeda wanted to target 10 Somalia, they decided they had to set up operations in 11 Nairobi. Once they set up operations in Nairobi, they have a 12 foundation in place that they are going to make use of five 13 years later to attack the embassies in East Africa. 14 What you know not only from Jamal al-Fadl and not 15 only from Kherchtou but from some of the documents that were 16 seized and the phone records and communications, it is that Al 17 Qaeda has offices all over the world. It is like a 18 multinational organization. It has hubs. It has headquarters 19 in Afghanistan. It has headquarters in Sudan. It has a hub 20 in Nairobi. It has a hub up here in Azerbaijan. We will go 21 through telephone calls with Al Qaeda people in Germany. 22 There were documents seized in England. But one of the key 23 hubs is going to be Nairobi. And of course if you are Al 24 Qaeda, you want to make sure that the people you have running 25 that hub are people you trust and people who will do what you 5262 1 need them to do, something that will play out as a very 2 important factor as we go through the evidence. 3 THE COURT: Is this a good time? 4 MR. KARAS: Yes, your Honor. 5 THE COURT: We will take a break. 6 (Jury excused) 7 THE COURT: Mr. Wilford. 8 MR. WILFORD: Your Honor, may we be heard in the 9 robing room? 10 THE COURT: Yes. 11 (Pages 5263 through 5265 sealed) 12 (Continued on next page) 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 5266 1 (Recess) 2 (Jury present) 3 MR. KARAS: May I proceed, your Honor? 4 THE COURT: Yes, please. 5 MR. KARAS: We left off in Nairobi in 1993, and what 6 I was saying was that the witness Kherchtou was the person who 7 had been sent to Nairobi to the base of operations, the new 8 base in Nairobi at the time that Al Qaeda was targeting the 9 American presence in Somalia. Kherchtou told you about two 10 people that he met when he first got to Nairobi. The first 11 was somebody who he knew by the name of Nawawi. We see 12 pictured here in Government's Exhibit 4-12. Nawawi's real 13 name is Ihab Ali, and you see a couple of his other nicknames, 14 Abu Suliman, and Joseph Kenana and Abu Jaffar al Tayar. He is 15 another person who lurks in the background as we go through 16 this chronology. He is somebody who is an Al Qaeda member, 17 and he is somebody who ends up in Florida and somebody who is 18 going to be exchanging communications with Wadih El Hage, 19 communications that Wadih El Hage denied having any knowledge 20 of before the grand jury in September of 1998. We will talk 21 about those communications, but this is somebody that 22 Kherchtou told you he met in 1993 in Nairobi. 23 Another person who he met there is displayed in 24 Government's Exhibit 4-13. This was somebody he told you he 25 knew among other names as Abu Khalid al Nubi down at the 5267 1 bottom. This, ladies and gentlemen, is Mustafa Fadhl, who 2 also goes by the name Abu Jihad and Khalid. Khalid is a name 3 you will see in some of the documents that Wadih El Hage 4 brings back, documents that talk about the new policy that 5 Wadih El Hage brings back, to militarize the cell in East 6 Africa when he returns from his visit with Bin Laden in 1997. 7 You will see references to Khalid in some of those documents. 8 Mustafa al-Fadl is one of the prominent members of the cell in 9 East Africa and he is a person who among other things is going 10 to be in charge of the operation in Dar es Salaam to blow up 11 the embassy in Dar es Salaam. He is the person who is 12 identified by Khalfan Khamis Mohamed as the person who 13 approached him to do the jihad mission in March of 1998. He 14 is the person that Khalfan Khamis Mohamed lives with at that 15 bomb factory that Khalfan Khamis Mohamed rented at 213 Ilala. 16 This is what I was saying earlier, ladies and 17 gentlemen. You see these participants in this case come up 18 early. They are participants in the conspiracy to murder US 19 nationals. 20 Let me just say for a moment, by the way, when I talk 21 about the conspiracy to murder US nationals and Al Qaeda's 22 involvement, I am talking about the first count in the 23 indictment, the count which charges a conspiracy among the 24 people you will see named in that indictment that include 25 these defendants and others, some of whom were members of Al 5268 1 Qaeda, to murder nationals of the United States. What I ask 2 you to bear in mind, and we will go through the counts, 3 probably tomorrow, that there are four conspiracies. There is 4 a conspiracy to use weapons of mass destruction against 5 American targets, there is a conspiracy to kill the officers 6 and employees of the United States government, and there is a 7 conspiracy to destroy American buildings by way of explosives. 8 So when I say the conspiracy, what I am referring to, in 9 shorthand, is the first count, the conspiracy to murder 10 nationals of the United States. We will talk about the other 11 conspiracy counts. But I wanted to alert you to that at this 12 point as we go through the evidence. 13 One of the things that Kherchtou said that he was 14 supposed to do was to learn how to fly, and he was sent to a 15 school in Nairobi. He told you that when he first got to 16 Nairobi, he stayed at a Ramada Hotel and that after he met 17 Nawawi and Mohamed Abu al Nubi, he met some other people, 18 including Abu Ubaidah al Banshiri, the person who is the 19 military commander of Al Qaeda. What Kherchtou told you about 20 Abu Ubaidah was that Abu Ubaidah lived a secret life in 21 Nairobi. He had a second wife in Nairobi, he had another wife 22 that was, I believe, up in Khartoum. Kherchtou told you that 23 that was something that very few people knew about, that 24 Ubaidah had a second wife and family, that it was something 25 that he was keeping secret. You may remember the testimony of 5269 1 Ashif Juma, the person who was with Abu Ubaidah in the ferry 2 accident, he is the brother-in-law of Abu Ubaidah. He told 3 you that when Abu Ubaidah got married to his sister, there was 4 nobody from Abu Ubaidah's side of the family who was at that 5 wedding. That aligns precisely with what Kherchtou told you 6 about the life that Abu Ubaidah was living in Kenya at the 7 time. 8 The other person that Kherchtou introduced you to was 9 somebody by the name of Khalid al Fawwaz, who is pictured in 10 Government's Exhibit 4-11. You will see his aliases down 11 below, Abu Omar al Sebai and Hamad. What Kherchtou told you 12 was, for example, when he needed expenses paid for the flight 13 school or the hotel, he would go to Abu Ubaidah, and if Abu 14 Ubaidah wasn't around, he would go to this person pictured in 15 government 4-11, Khalid al Fawwaz. Fawwaz was somebody who 16 helped run the base in Nairobi for Al Qaeda. He worked under 17 Abu Ubaidah. He is someone you will see shortly is replaced 18 by the defendant Wadih El Hage. 19 One of the things that Kherchtou told you about Abu 20 Fawwaz, and this is a common refrain within the Al Qaeda 21 story, Fawwaz tried to start a business in Nairobi, and he 22 named it Asma, and it was named after Fawwaz's daughter. The 23 business didn't work out. He tried to import some vehicles 24 from Dubai, and at the end of the day the business failed 25 because the cars were expensive and he couldn't resell them. 5270 1 One of the ways you know Kherchtou is telling you 2 exactly the truth about this, there are documents found in 3 Wadih El Hage's files that belong to Khalid Fawwaz. For 4 example, you see Government's Exhibit 626 on the screen. 5 Government's Exhibit 626 is one of the documents that I 6 mentioned. This is an articles of association of this company 7 Asma Ltd. that Kherchtou described Khalid al Fawwaz tried to 8 find. This is the first page. If you take a look at the 9 bottom of the first page, you see the name of the attorney who 10 prepared these papers, M.M. Chaudhri. That is a name that 11 Kherchtou testified about in connection with the group's 12 efforts to free Fawwaz when he was arrested by Kenyan 13 authorities, something we will talk about in a minute. 14 If you take a look towards the end of this document, 15 you will see who the ostensible board of directors is of this 16 company. Mohammed Karama Salim, businessman; Khalid al 17 Fawwaz, businessman; and Jalal Fouad, businessman. Just like 18 Kherchtou told you, Fawwaz starts the business, and the person 19 at the bottom, Jalal Fouad, you will see, is Abu Ubaidah, the 20 person who dies in the ferry accident, Abu Ubaidah the 21 military commander who Wadih El Hage is going to not only lie 22 about but even deny that he knew him by that name Jalal. 23 So you see, as far back as 1993 and into 1994, Khalid 24 al Fawwaz and the others are playing out the Al Qaeda play 25 book in Nairobi. They are establishing businesses, they are 5271 1 living in Nairobi, but they are actually also carrying out the 2 activities of Al Qaeda. You will see the connections here 3 between these two gentlemen in this business. 4 There were other documents that were found among 5 Wadih El Hage's files and we are not going to display them 6 now. We will talk about them later. But there were phone 7 records registered in Khalid al Fawwaz's name, Government 8 Exhibit 626. A copy of Fawwaz's passport, Government's 9 Exhibit 622A. There was a stamp for Asma Ltd., Government's 10 Exhibit 629, and a business card for Abu Karama Muslim, 11 Government's Exhibit 630. 12 You heard from Kherchtou that before Ramadan in 1994, 13 which there was a stipulation on was February of 1994, so 14 before that, he remembered his former surveillance trainer Abu 15 Mohamed al Amriki come to Nairobi with the person Anas al 16 Liby, the person with whom he received the surveillance 17 training. Remember Anas al Liby and Ali Mohamed. Ali 18 Mohamed, the trainer who Kherchtou knew as Abu Mohamed al 19 Amriki, and the computer expert, who did the computer training 20 on surveillance. What Kherchtou told you was that they 21 arrived sometime before February and other Al Qaeda people 22 show up right about this time: Abu Hafs, the military 23 commander; Abu Fadhl al Makkee, one of the founders, leader of 24 Al Qaeda; and Abu Ubaidah. 25 This is precisely when it was that Ali Mohamed 5272 1 arrived. If you look, for example, at Government's Exhibit 2 362, this is Ali Mohamed's passport. If you take a look at 3 page 7 of that, you see an entry stamp for his arrival into 4 Nairobi on the 9th of December 1993. If we take a look at 5 Khalid al Fawwaz's passport, which I had mentioned earlier is 6 Government's Exhibit 622A, and one of the documents found in 7 Wadih el Hage's files, there you see the Saudi passport for 8 Khalid al Fawwaz, and there you see on the left, and being 9 highlighted for you, is the entry stamp for December 17, 1993. 10 What Kherchtou tells you is that Abu Mohamed al Amriki and 11 Anas al Liby set up a photographic operation in Kherchtou's 12 apartment. They set up a camera and photo developing 13 equipment and folders and they set up a lab. He told you that 14 one day he was walking down the street on Moi Avenue about 15 five hundred meters from the American embassy, and Abu 16 Moustafa Karama. He told you he knew that Al Qaeda was 17 targeting the United States. He also told you this is a time 18 when Abu Hafs, the military commander, and Khalid al Fawwaz 19 was also in Nairobi. What I submit to you, ladies and 20 gentlemen, is that what Kherchtou was telling you about as 21 corroborated by some of the other physical evidence is that Al 22 Qaeda members and those associated with Al Qaeda are there to 23 conduct surveillance of American targets. One of the targets 24 that you know they were near with a camera was the American 25 Embassy. You will see evidence, of course, that other people 5273 1 in this conspiracy participated in the bombing of the American 2 Embassy. 3 Anas al Liby, the person with the camera, he is the 4 person I mentioned earlier was living in Manchester in the 5 United Kingdom. By way of stipulation you learned there was a 6 search of this place in Manchester and one of the things found 7 in this search was a passport. If you look at Government's 8 Exhibit 1675, you see the passport and the name there, Al 9 Raghie Nazeh, if you see on the top right. You see the 10 picture and you compare that to the picture of Government's 11 Exhibit 112. If you compare it also on the right-hand side of 12 the screen to Government's Exhibit 604, 604 is a series of 13 passport-size photos that are found among Wadih El Hage's 14 files in that MIRA office in 1998, and one of those photos is 15 a photo of Anas al Liby, who has that passport in Manchester 16 in the United Kingdom. One of the things found in the search 17 of Anas al Liby's house is a document that is a manual on 18 terrorist activities. In fact, if you look at Government's 19 Exhibit 1677, the second page, the document is entitled 20 Declaration of Jihad Holy War Against the Countries, Tyrants, 21 Military Series. On the 12th page of that document there is a 22 description about how to organize for operations, and it 23 describes forged documents, counterfeit currency, apartments 24 and hiding places, communication means, transportation means, 25 and on down. At the bottom of that document there is a 5274 1 description that one of the things this document advocates 2 attacking, number 7, blasting and destroying the embassies and 3 attacking vital economic centers. 4 So, ladies and gentlemen, you have in 1993 the person 5 who does the surveillance training for Al Qaeda, the person 6 who is the expert in the computers, the person with the camera 7 near the embassy, developing pictures in a secret lab, 8 attending meetings with other prominent people in Al Qaeda, at 9 a time when Al Qaeda is targeting the United States. 10 Now we get to 1994. 1994, during Ramadan, Kherchtou 11 tells you, which you know is in February 1994, Kherchtou tells 12 that you Khalid al Fawwaz, among others, gets arrested, and 13 one of the people who helps out to get Khalid al Fawwaz 14 released is Abu Fadhl, the person pictured in Government's 15 Exhibit 117, again, Mustafa Fadhl, the person that Kherchtou 16 met when he first got to Kenya, the person who is going to 17 carry out the operation to bomb the embassy in Dar es Salaam. 18 What Kherchtou told you was that when Fawwaz got arrested, he 19 reached out for a lawyer named Mr. Chaudhri, the lawyer who 20 prepared the documents for Asma Ltd., who told you about their 21 efforts to get him. Kherchtou also told you that the group 22 contacted Abu Ubaidah who was at the time in Sudan to spend 23 the time and money to get Khalid Fawwaz out, and Abu Ubaidah 24 gave his blessing. 25 Eventually they get Khalid Fawwaz out from jail and 5275 1 what you learn from Kherchtou and you see in the other 2 exhibits, Khalid al Fawwaz leaves Nairobi. What I submit to 3 you, ladies and gentlemen, is, he leaves Nairobi and he goes 4 to London, which you will see him and we will talk about, 5 because he has attracted the attention of the authorities, and 6 to take the heat off the group Khalid al Fawwaz is going to 7 get out of town to make sure the attention he is attracting 8 doesn't spill over to the others in the group. You will see 9 this played out by Wadih El Hage three years later. 10 What Kherchtou tells you is that when Khalid al 11 Fawwaz leaves, soon thereafter, who arrives from Sudan but the 12 defendant Wadih El Hage. He specifically described it as 13 Wadih El Hage took over. Kherchtou told you that when Wadih 14 El Hage arrived, he lived with Wadih El Hage. First they 15 lived together in a hotel. Then he told you that Wadih El 16 Hage rented a place, Fedha Estates, which had a house and 17 separate back place where he would stay. You know that is 18 exactly right, because Agent Coleman who testified about the 19 search of the Wadih El Hage's house, you remember he testified 20 that they got some tapes in that separate back house. What 21 does Kherchtou telling you about being with Wadih El Hage in 22 Nairobi? He tells you that he personally sees him meet with 23 Abu Hafs, the military commander of Al Qaeda. He says they 24 meet two or three times in Wadih El Hage's house in Nairobi. 25 Kherchtou was there for those meetings. He tells you that El 5276 1 Hage and Abu Hafs took one of the cars that belonged to Al 2 Qaeda and took a trip to Mombasa, and wouldn't tell Kherchtou 3 what they were doing there. 4 Kherchtou also told you about how they came to Wadih 5 El Hage and Kherchtou about arranging some travel for Abu Hafs 6 and specifically told him do not tell Abu Mohamed al Amriki 7 because I do not want him to know the alias I am traveling on. 8 So when he needed to make a secret trip and wanted people to 9 facilitate the trip, he went to the people that he trusted. 10 Kherchtou told you about it, and he told you it was him and El 11 Hage the military commander trusted. It is the same Abu Hafs 12 that Wadih El Hage will lie about in the grand jury in 1997 13 and 1998. 14 Kherchtou also told you that Abu Hafs and Wadih El 15 Hage met together many times and that Wadih El Hage was one of 16 the people in on Abu Ubaidah's secret life in Kenya. He told 17 you the story about the watch that had Wadih's name on it and 18 ultimately ended up with Abu Ubaidah's wife. Kherchtou also 19 told you the story about Abu al Nalfi, the person with the 20 amputated leg, purchased dogs for security and Kherchtou went 21 out and got these dogs and arranged to have them shipped to 22 the Sudan. 23 What else happened in 1994? Mohamed Odeh settles in 24 Mombasa in Kenya, along the coast. He is set up in a fishing 25 business by Abu Hafs, the same military commander, who gives 5277 1 him a boat and a couple of employees and agrees to give him an 2 Al Qaeda salary. You know about some of this business because 3 of some of the documents found once again in Wadih El Hage's 4 files. If you look at Government's Exhibit 614, 614 is a 5 letter -- you can see it is dated January 1995, from Mohammed 6 Karama, who appoints Mohamed Odeh, and he gives an i.d., 7 1773666, an i.d. that you will see is the i.d. number that was 8 obtained when he got his identification in Kenya, which we 9 will see in Government Exhibit 507 on the right. It is being 10 highlighted for you. There you see Odeh's Kenyan i.d. number. 11 There are a couple of other things that are 12 interesting about this document regarding Odeh's i.d. number. 13 If we pull up on the left Government's Exhibit 508 and if we 14 highlight down at the bottom where it talks about mother's 15 names, where each applicant is to give their mother's names -- 16 I just want to highlight the lower section of each one -- on 17 the left, and now it's been magnified for you, is the 18 application for Mustafa Fadhl. You will see that he lists his 19 mother as Marion Omar Hassan. By the way, he claims he was 20 born in Mombasa. Let's look at what Odeh puts down for his 21 mother's name. Miriam Omar. The other thing you see on that 22 document is that Odeh lists his country of birth as Kenya, 23 which is something he did not tell the agents. He told the 24 agents he was not from Kenya. 25 The other thing that happens in 1994 -- remember I 5278 1 told you Khalid al Fawwaz, the person that Wadih El Hage 2 replaced, after his release he goes to London, England, and 3 what he does is, he sets up an organization called the Advice 4 and Reformation Committee. It is set up with the support of 5 Usama Bin Laden. If you look at Government's Exhibit 1606, a 6 document found in Khalid al Fawwaz's house in London, this is 7 a document that establishes by way of resolution -- and you 8 see the signature there of Usama Bin Laden, and if we look at 9 Government's Exhibit 1606-T, you see that July 1994 is when it 10 is that Khalid al Fawwaz is set up as the leader of the London 11 office of the Advice and Reformation Committee. What I submit 12 to you, ladies and gentlemen, is, the Advice and Reformation 13 Committee is another front organization. It is something 14 again that is out of the Al Qaeda play book. They establish a 15 front. They can do what apparently are legitimate activities 16 that are used to shield a second line of work, work that 17 supports the activities of Al Qaeda. 18 Towards the end of 1994, Kherchtou tells you that Ali 19 Mohamed, Abu Mohamed al Amriki, comes back to Nairobi and that 20 there is a meeting that takes place just among Kherchtou and 21 Abu Mohamed al Amriki. What he says is that Abu Mohamed told 22 Kherchtou that Abu Hafs and he, Kherchtou, were supposed to go 23 do some surveillance work of French targets in Senegal and 24 that they were going to do that together, but that they ended 25 up not going because what happened was, according to 5279 1 Kherchtou, there was a phone call that came in on the mobile 2 phone that Wadih El Hage had, and Wadih El Hage had some 3 issues that he needed to resolve in the United States, some 4 problems. 5 What you see in Government's Exhibit 364C, one of 6 those many summary charts that you saw, this one is calls from 7 a number in California, 408-244-1209. That is Ali Mohamed's 8 phone back in California. You see on October 18, 1994, two 9 calls: 254, which is the country call for Kenya, 7120221, 10 which is the mobile phone number that El Hage used, just as 11 Kherchtou described for you. 12 What you know by way of stipulation is that Ali 13 Mohamed was dealing with the American authorities back here in 14 the United States. There are discussions with an FBI agent, 15 there are discussions with a prosecutor, and there are 16 telephone calls at right around the same time these meetings 17 are going on, again from Ali Mohamed's phone. You can see the 18 calls there back and forth to the numbers in America. And you 19 also see a call there on December 20 to the mobile phone for 20 Wadih El Hage. And then again down at the bottom on December 21 22 there are two calls. So while Ali Mohamed is dealing with 22 the American officials, he is maintaining contact with the 23 Wadih El Hage mobile number in Nairobi. 24 That is where things stand as of 1994. You have met 25 some of the participants in Al Qaeda, some of the members in 5280 1 Al Qaeda, some of the people who went to Somalia to further Al 2 Qaeda's goals there, and you see that the Nairobi base of 3 operations is firmly in place by 1994. You saw Harun, and he 4 was one of the people who went to Somalia. You saw Mustafa 5 Fadhl, one of the Al Qaeda members who will show up later in 6 the bombing in Dar es Salaam. Mohamed Odeh is set up in his 7 Al Qaeda fishing business. Khalid al Fawwaz, one of the 8 leaders within the base in Nairobi, has moved on to London. 9 And of course, Wadih El Hage, his replacement is in place by 10 1994. 11 In May of 1996, you heard from Kherchtou and from 12 others that people learned that Abu Ubaidah drowned, the 13 people within Al Qaeda learned. And you heard firsthand what 14 happened from the witness Ashif Juma, because he was on the 15 ferryboat with Abu Ubaidah. If we look at Government's 16 Exhibit 257, you see exactly where it is that this accident 17 took place. There was a lot of discussion about Lake 18 Victoria, and you see that Lake Victoria is basically on the 19 Kenya, Tanzania border. 20 Soon after the accident, you heard from Ashif Juma, 21 Harun shows up to conduct an investigation of the accident, 22 and in fact there was a videotape that was played for you 23 where Harun is identified as one of the people who was 24 captured on that videotape. One of the things that Kherchtou 25 told you was that everybody in Al Qaeda knew about Abu 5281 1 Ubaidah's drowning because everybody in Al Qaeda respected Abu 2 Ubaidah. In particular, Kherchtou told you when he spoke to 3 Wadih El Hage about Abu Ubaidah's death, Wadih El Hage cried, 4 which is something that you should bear in mind when Wadih El 5 Hage denies having any knowledge about that ferryboat incident 6 and denies participation in the investigation of the ferry 7 accident itself. 8 What did Ashif Juma tell you? He told you that Wadih 9 El Hage referred to the person he knew as Jalal, that Abu 10 Ubaidah was referred to by El Hage as Jalal, something that 11 Wadih El Hage is going to deny in front of the grand jury two 12 years later. If you look at Government's Exhibit 603, which 13 is effectively a note, an IOU, it is signed by Wadih El Hage 14 and it involves Ashif Juma. It commits Ashif Juma to having 15 borrowed the amount of 9 million Tanzanian shillings from 16 Mohammed Karama through Jalal Fouad. Remember, Jalal Fahad 17 was the name you saw on the articles of incorporation of Asma, 18 the business that Khalid al Fadhl set up. This is Abu 19 Ubaidah, ladies and gentlemen, and this is Wadih El Hage 20 signing a contract where he is referring to Jalal Fouad, Abu 21 Ubaidah. 22 One of the things that Ashif Juma told you was that 23 there was a discussion that he had with Wadih El Hage in a 24 hotel that was near Lake Victoria and that Wadih El Hage 25 specifically asked what Ashif Juma knew about Abu Ubaidah. 5282 1 What they were concerned with, ladies and gentlemen, what Al 2 Qaeda was concerned with, what Harun and El Hage were there to 3 investigate was whether or not any secrets that Abu Ubaidah 4 had with him, any objects were going to fall into the wrong 5 hands. That is why El Hage and Harun are there. You will see 6 later on evidence that they actually prepared a report which 7 they distribute to other people who are connected with this 8 case, and in particular we are going to go through a report 9 that was found in, of all places, Ali Mohamed's house in 10 California during the search in 1998, a report that Ashif Juma 11 read and said was accurate and said he did not prepare. Among 12 other reasons, he doesn't read, write or speak Arabic. 13 The other main event that happens in 1996 is in 14 August, and this is when Usama Bin Laden issues the 15 declaration of jihad against the United States. It is issued 16 on August 23, 1996, and if we take a look at one of the 17 copies, Government's Exhibit 1600A-T, this is a copy that is 18 found in Khalid al Fawwaz's place in London. We will go 19 through this, but remember that we showed you during the trial 20 that Khalid al Fawwaz had an electronic copy of this, that 21 there was a directory of files, there was a directory listing 22 under the message and electronic copies actually found on a 23 computer disk in Khalid al Fawwaz's house. This is going to 24 be the document, ladies and gentlemen, where Bin Laden is 25 going to now take public, take public his view that the 5283 1 Americans have to be driven from the Saudi Arabian gulf by 2 whatever means are necessary. 3 If we look at the second page of the document, the 4 first thing you notice in the second full paragraph is, within 5 this paragraph about halfway down, there are references to 6 some people that Bin Laden is going to talk about again and 7 again. One of the people he refers to about halfway down the 8 line that begins with the word heaven, he mentions Omar Abdel 9 Rahman in America. He says in his words, the crusader Jewish 10 alliance killed the symbols of honest scholars and advocates 11 and was sent by no one but Allah. 12 (Continued on next page) 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 5284 1 MR. KARAS: (Continuing) And remember what the 2 witness Jamal al-Fadhl told you: That there were people 3 within al Qaeda that were angry at America because of the 4 arrest of Omar Abdel Rahman and that some people left the 5 group because they were disappointed that al Qaeda didn't do 6 something to retaliate about the arrest. Well, here you have 7 corroborating what Al-Fadhl is telling you. Bin Laden voicing 8 his anger at the United States for the arrest of Omar Abdel 9 Rahman. 10 Now, the other thing that this document mentions is 11 two other scholars, somebody by the name of al-Hawali and 12 somebody by the name of al Tawbah, and we'll see those names 13 come up later in connection with the claims for 14 responsibilities. 15 Now, if we go to the next, the last full paragraph 16 down there, remember I mentioned to you earlier about how the 17 witness, Jamal Al-Fadhl, described this fatwah that Abu Hajer 18 had given about how it was proper to kill innocents in the 19 course of attacks against infidels, and the basis for this 20 were the teaching of Ibn al Tamiyeah. 21 There you see, ladies and gentlemen, Usama Bin Laden 22 is talking about Ibn al Tamiyeh, and what he specifically 23 mentions is the story of the Tartar. "Furthermore, Ibn al 24 Tamiyeh, after mentioning the Tartar and their behavior in 25 changing the law of Allah: The ultimate aim of pleasing 5285 1 Allah, raising his word, instituting his religion and obeying 2 his messenger, peace be upon them, is to fight the enemy in 3 every aspect and in complete manner: If the danger to the 4 religion from not fighting is greater than that of fighting, 5 then it is a duty to fight them even if the intention of some 6 of the fighters is not pure, i.e., fighting for the sake of 7 leadership or if they do not observe some of the rules and 8 commandments of Islam." 9 It may very well be that killing innocents is not to 10 be sanctioned, but if the choice is defeat by the enemies of 11 Islam, then you do what you have to do. That is how Bin Laden 12 interprets Ibn al Tamiyeh and that is the basis for his call 13 to his followers -- to carry out the attacks against the 14 United States, because that is the number one priority. 15 Now, Bin Laden doesn't mince words, and at the bottom 16 of the 11th page of this document, if you highlight the last 17 paragraph down there, "Though we know the regime," referring 18 to the Saudi regime, "is fully responsible for what had 19 happened to the country and to its tiresome people that the 20 cause of disease and its tribulations is the occupying 21 American enemy so all effort must be directed at this enemy, 22 kill it, fight it, destroy it, break it down, plot against it, 23 ambush it, and God the almighty willing, until it is gone." 24 And now what Bin Laden is doing is he's taking the 25 statements that he privately shared with the members of al 5286 1 Qaeda in the guesthouse in Khartoum, Sudan and he is taking it 2 public. 3 Ladies and gentlemen, Bin Laden didn't wake up that 4 morning and decide that, oh, there are troops in America for 5 five years so this is the cause we're going to take on. This 6 is the evolution of the theme that he established for al Qaeda 7 since the troops arrived, since al Qaeda set up its operations 8 in Khartoum, since Bin Laden and Abu Hajer preached to the 9 other members of al Qaeda that it was their mission to drive 10 the American forces from Saudi Arabia. This is the foundation 11 of what Bin Laden believes and everything else feeds off of 12 that. 13 Everywhere he looks, he sees the American enemy and 14 he says that every effort must be pooled to kill the American 15 enemy. And you'll remember that the witness Jamal Al-Fadhl 16 told you that when he first approached the Americans in 1996, 17 he said, you're going to want to talk to me because these 18 people are waging a war against you. And they may want to 19 attack one of your embassies. As far as back as 1996 that is 20 what one of the members of al Qaeda believed to be the case. 21 Now, another thing that happens in 1996 that tells 22 you a great deal about the activities in this case is that the 23 group purchases a satellite phone, within three months of the 24 declaration of Jihad. And the satellite phone that you heard 25 about was the one that Marilyn Morelli from Ogara Satellite 5287 1 Networks testified to, and she told you some basic facts about 2 satellite phones -- that they are often used in remote areas; 3 that if you want to call a satellite phone, you have got to 4 know the three-digit prefix that corresponds to the ocean 5 region; and the satellite phone isn't like any other ordinary 6 phone where you use it, you get the bill and you pay it, you 7 have to purchase minutes in advance, using one of those cards 8 that comes with a number and then you call off the number of 9 minutes that you have. 10 Now, you saw the documents that show that a person by 11 the name of Ziyad Khalil purchased this phone, and his name 12 appears on the records, Government Exhibit 592. And there are 13 a series of documents in there where he is the one who 14 purchases this phone on November 1, 1996. And ladies and 15 gentlemen, this phone -- you saw this chart many times 16 throughout this trial -- is the phone that Bin Laden and the 17 others will use to carry out their war against the United 18 States. 19 682505331 is the phone number that is assigned to 20 that phone, and in 1996 up through October 1998, if you wanted 21 to call the phone, you had to dial 873 and then the number. 22 And what you see, ladies and gentlemen, is this phone appears 23 in the address books of many of the people connected to this 24 case, starting with Wadih El Hage. The pop-up phone book, 25 Government Exhibit 304, the phone book that's found in Wadih 5288 1 El Hage's house, page 11, there's a reference there to Hafusa, 2 Abu Hafs, 873682/505331. 3 Khalid al Fawwaz, the person that El Hage replaced in 4 Nairobi, he's got several references in his phone books. If 5 we take a look at Government Exhibit 1629, which is one of the 6 address books that's found in Khalid al Fawwaz' house, this is 7 a translation of one of the pages. He does not put Abu Hafs 8 down, he goes with Dr. Mohamed Atef, 873-682505331. 9 And you know that Abu Hafs is Mohamed Atef, because 10 there is a telephone call that comes from, I think -- excuse 11 me, that goes to Wadih El Hage's number and there is a message 12 left with El Hage's wife saying Abu Hafs is calling, it's 13 Mohamed Atef. And Khalid al Fawwaz is referring to Mohamed 14 Atef using the satellite phone number. 15 He's got another reference in Government Exhibit 16 1631, which is another address book found in Khalid al Fawwaz' 17 house, and that is a copy of the address book itself. Now, 18 we'll get to the translation in a minute, but if you see the 19 number on the left there, 837655, and if we go to the 20 translation, and that's part of the translation, Mohamed Atef, 21 and there is a number in Karachi and then the other number 22 that's assigned to Mohamed Atef, 837655. 23 Now what's interesting about that, Mohamed Atef, 24 remember, is Abu Hafs, and if you will remember -- we'll go 25 through this -- all the fax headers that we took a look at 5289 1 during the trial, and Kandahar Communications, AFG, and the 2 number there was 837655. This is Government Exhibit 2550, 3 this is a map of a Afghanistan. Kandahar is one of the 4 provinces in Afghanistan. 5 So Fawwaz and others who are involved in the 6 conspiracy to murder U.S. nationals are getting communications 7 from Mohamed Atef in Kandahar, Afghanistan from the number 8 837655. Mohamed Atef is assigned this number, according to 9 Khalid al Fawwaz, and that number, the satellite phone number. 10 It also appears in the Casio of somebody by the name 11 of Ibrahim Eidarous. There are three people in London, ladies 12 and gentlemen, who were part of the conspiracy to murder U.S. 13 nationals. Eidarous, Government Exhibit 129, is his picture 14 with his aliases. Ibrahim Daoud Abu Abdulla, he's the cell 15 leader for EIJ, that joint venture group I mentioned by 16 Zawahiri in London, and he's got a listing in his Casio. 17 If you take a look at Abu Abdallah. Now, Abu 18 Abdallah, you will remember from Government Exhibit 4-1, is 19 one of the aliases for Usama Bin Laden, and you see how he's 20 got it listed there is Abu Abdallah, "at" sign, "at" sign, 21 "at" sign, this is an important number, and what's the number 22 he's got: 873682505331. 23 So the cell leader for EIJ has got this number, 24 Khalid al Fawwaz, one of the al Qaeda members who was in 25 Nairobi and in London has got the number, and Wadih El Hage 5290 1 has the number. And the number is ascribed in these address 2 books to either Abu Hafs or Bin Laden. 3 How else do you know? Well, because the phone was 4 actually purchased through this person Ziyad Khalil by Khalid 5 al Fawwaz, who was one of the critical members in this 6 conspiracy. 7 Government Exhibit 1626D, and this is a security 8 report that is prepared by Khalid al Fawwaz, and if you take a 9 look, this is actually found on his computer. If you take a 10 look down at the bottom there, it has been highlighted for 11 you, he's telling the group what it is that needs to get done. 12 And what he says on the administrative issues, in order to 13 solve the problem of communication, it is indispensable to buy 14 the satellite phone. And Fawwaz is going to act as the 15 quintessential facilitator and he's going to purchase the 16 phone. 17 If we could take a look at Government Exhibit 593, 18 which is among the many invoices for the minutes that were 19 purchased for the phone, remember you have to purchase the 20 minutes in advance, and what this is, this is correspondence 21 from Marilyn Morelli, the person who testified, to Ziyad 22 Khaleel. And you see the date there, May 8, 1997, and she's 23 responding to his request for the purchase of minutes. And 24 she explains, here are the instructions. 25 And 593 contains another piece of paper, 593-4, which 5291 1 is the actual invoice itself, and she told you this is what 2 gets sent out. You see M circled there and the date, you see 3 597, and it says add minutes transaction order, and down at 4 the bottom are the numbers you need to activate the phone to 5 use the minutes. 6 Let's put that, if we could, on the left side of the 7 screen. The document on the left side of the screen is in the 8 business records of Ogara Satellite Networks. It's a copy of 9 the minutes invoice that is sent from Ogara to this person 10 Ziyad Khaleel. On the right, Government Exhibit 1625, what 11 you have now before you is Government Exhibit 1625. 12 Government Exhibit 1625 is a copy of the minutes invoice that 13 is found in Khalid al Fawwaz' house when the Scotland Yard 14 officer searched it in 1998, and it's the May 8, 1997 purchase 15 of minutes. 16 So Ziyad Khaleel purchases the minutes on May 7 and 17 he sends it to Khalid al Fawwaz in London, and we'll go 18 through the records and you know that this is in Khalid al 19 Fawwaz's phone because, among other reasons, the phone is 20 constantly calling Khalid al Fawwaz's home number in London. 21 And we'll go through that in second. 22 If we could take a look, though, at Government 23 Exhibit 1633, this is another document found in Khalid al 24 Fawwaz's house in London. You see there it's a letter, short 25 letter from Khalid al Fawwaz dated June 3, because remember, 5292 1 they transpose the numbers in Europe, June 3, 1997. "Dear 2 Brother Ziyad: As for the transferred money, the bank assured 3 me that the money was withdrawn on 27/5/97," May 27, "a week 4 ago, and they told me that the money will be in your account 5 during this period," etc., etc., etc. 6 So Khalid purchases the minutes on May 7, he sends 7 the invoice to al Fawwaz, al Fawwaz reimburses him on May 27, 8 and he's telling Ziyad Khalil, I sent you the money, you'll 9 get it. 10 How else do you know that this is the phone that is 11 used by Bin Laden and others in Afghanistan? Well, at some 12 point in 1998 Ziyad Khalil puts a purchase order in for a 13 battery pack to Ogara. If we pull up Government Exhibit 593, 14 this is one of the documents that Marilyn Morelli testified 15 about. 16 This is an invoice from Ogara, and you see on the top 17 left there, "Customer: Ziyad Khalil," and you see that what 18 he is purchasing is the ultra light power supply and the 12VDC 19 mini battery charger. Only Ziyad Khalil does not have it sent 20 to him, he asked, ship to, Tariq Hamdi in Herndon, Virginia. 21 Now, if we pull up Government Exhibit 1621, this is 22 another document found in Khalid al Fawwaz' house in London. 23 By the way, his address is 94 Dewsbury Road, London, England. 24 We'll talk about that a little later on. 25 This is a letter from ABC News from Christopher 5293 1 Isham, a senior producer at ABC News, to Mr. S. Rashid. This 2 is found in Khalid al Fawwaz's house. The first line of the 3 letter reads, "As per our conversations with Tarik Hamdi in 4 Washington, I am confirming our interest in interviewing Mr. 5 Bin Laden for ABC News." So the person to whom the battery 6 pack is getting shipped is working with ABC News to arrange an 7 interview with Bin Laden. 8 And you see the date by the way of the letter, they 9 are trying to arrange to interview April 2, 1998, and the 10 battery pack request comes in on May 11, 1998. So what 11 happens? Government Exhibit 1612 -- maybe we can try the 12 left/right thing again and put this on the left and on the 13 right, if we can try the translation. 14 What you have here is another document found in 15 Khalid al Fawwaz's house in London, and what you see is the 16 document on the left is a fax page from the Islamabad Marriott 17 Hotel, Islamabad City in Pakistan. That's not too far from 18 Afghanistan. It's in the northwest part of Pakistan. 19 And Tariq Hamdi, see it says "a message to Khalid," 20 and that number 441812084423, that's Khalid al Fawwaz' fax 21 number. And you know that from the telephone records that are 22 in evidence. And it's from Tariq and you see the date on the 23 fax at the top, 17 May 1998. Actually he writes it there, May 24 17, 1998. And what he says is, "Brother Khalid: Peace be 25 upon you. We arrived safely and now we are in the Marriott 5294 1 Hotel and its address is," and he gives the address. 2 So here is the chronology: Ziyad Khalil requests the 3 battery pack on May 11, 1998, on May 17, 1998, and he asks 4 that it be sent to Tariq Hamdi. On May 11, 1998, Tariq Hamdi 5 is getting the battery pack for the telephone number 6 6825053316789. That's May 11. May 17, Tariq Hamdi is in 7 Islamabad on behalf of ABC News and he tells Khalid al Fawwaz 8 we are in Islamabad and we are fine. 9 And you know from a stipulation that on May 28, 1998, 10 ABC News interviewed Bin Laden in Afghanistan. So the battery 11 pack goes from Ziyad Khalil requesting it to shipping it to 12 Tariq Hamdi, to Tariq Hamdi going to Pakistan, and then 13 Afghanistan, where he delivers the battery pack for the phone. 14 And the intermediary in all of this is Khalid al 15 Fawwaz, because he's the guy whose paying Ziyad Khalil for the 16 minutes and he's the guy who arranges for the interview with 17 ABC News and he is the guy getting the message from Tariq 18 Hamdi, the person who delivers the packet. 19 Now, if we take a look at Government Exhibit 218A-T2, 20 this is one of intercepted telephone conversations in Kenya, 21 and this is a conversation between El Hage and Harun, the same 22 Harun who told Kherchtou he is in Somalia, the same Harun who 23 you are going to see is going to be a major participant in the 24 bombing of the embassy in Nairobi. 25 They are talking about other topics, and then El Hage 5295 1 switches the conversation. "Listen," he says, "Dr. Atef." 2 Now we're back to the doctor, just like Dr. Mohamed Atef in 3 Khalid al Fawwaz's address book. "Yeah," says Harun. "He 4 moved the clinic," says El Hage. "Yeah," says Harun. "He 5 moved the clinic." And then El Hage says, "For this reason 6 his phone was disconnected." 7 And then El Hage says cryptically, "If you want to 8 take your family, wife there, take this phone number." And if 9 we go down to the bottom of the page, the phone number that El 10 Hage gives to Harun, he says, "Write down 873682," and then he 11 stops and he says another number and he gives him the rest of 12 the number, 505331, and he goes on to tell him "and put the 13 two numbers together." So 873682, and then puts the numbers 14 together with 505331. 15 Ladies and gentlemen, you know that Dr. Mohamed Atef 16 is not a doctor and he doesn't have a clinic and Harun isn't 17 taking his family to Dr. Atef's clinic. This is El Hage 18 passing the very carefully forwarded telephone number for Bin 19 Laden in Afghanistan. 20 And what's interesting about this satellite phone, if 21 we take a look at Government Exhibit 594, which is effectively 22 the phone bill but what they call it is minutes used, and you 23 see the first three calls there are to numbers in the United 24 States. The top one is to Ogara Satellite Networks, the other 25 two are 573. 5296 1 And then you see on November 20, if we could just go 2 on to November 20 on down, those are the first calls that are 3 made from the satellite phone outside the United States. The 4 very first number called, November 20, is Khalid al Fawwaz' 5 number, 2084411. Again, from telephone records you know that 6 that's his number at 94 Dewsbury Road. 7 The second one is to another number in London. The 8 third one, 249, is the country code for Sudan. And Government 9 Exhibit 98 gives you the country codes for the countries. And 10 the fourth number called by the satellite phone, 2542820067, 11 which is the number for Wadih El Hage in Nairobi, Kenya and 12 it's called again that same day, November 23. 13 Now, the satellite phone is used by Bin Laden and 14 it's used by Abu Hafs, but it's also used by Ayman al 15 Zawahiri, the leader of EIJ. If we take a look at Government 16 Exhibit 1523-T, T2, what that is, ladies and gentlemen, this 17 is a letter to Abu Abdallah. This is a letter found, by the 18 way, in the trunk of Eidarous' car -- remember, "the boot" the 19 Scotland Yard officer called it -- the trunk of Eidarous' car. 20 And one of the aliases for Eidarous, Abu Abdallah, which is 21 not the Abu Abdallah that Wadih El Hage is known by, a 22 different Abu Abdallah. Abu Abdallah says -- he has a series 23 of things he tells him. He says, please call telephone number 24 956375892. 25 Now, that telephone number, we'll talk a little bit 5297 1 more about it later, happens to be the telephone number for 2 the third guy in London to keep an eye on, somebody by the 3 name of Adel Abdel Bary. There's three people in London. 4 Khalid al Fawwaz, Ibrahim Eidarous, and this person, Adel 5 Abdel Bary, and those are the only three in London we're going 6 to talk about. I promise. And that's the number for Adel 7 Abdel Bary, whose another person EIJ in London. And there it 8 is, Eidarous asking on October 29, 1997 to Zawahiri, please 9 call this number. 10 Now, if we go to Government Exhibit 594-9, which 11 again is the invoice for the minutes used on the satellite 12 phone, and we go to October 30, the day after Eidarous writes 13 this letter to Zawahiri, you will see five telephone calls to 14 that number. 44 is the country code for England, 956375892. 15 Ladies and gentlemen, that phone is the Jihad phone 16 in this case. It is the phone that is used by the 17 headquarters people in Afghanistan when the group leaves Sudan 18 and goes to Afghanistan. And who they call on that phone and 19 who has that number tells you a great, great deal about the 20 activities of the people in this case. 21 Remember, Wadih El Hage has the phone number and he 22 passes it on to Harun. Khalid al Fawwaz who helps buy the 23 phone, he has the number. Eidarous, the person who runs the 24 EIJ cell in London, he has the phone. And where you are going 25 to see Eidarous and that other person Adel Abdel Bary, and why 5298 1 I asked you to keep your eye on them, they're going to be 2 involved in disseminating the claims of responsibility for the 3 bombings, the claims that you saw that were found at The 4 Grapevine office in the Beethoven Street office in London, 5 that's their office. 6 And that's the phone that Bin Laden and the other 7 coconspirators are going to use to communicate to carry out 8 their conspiracy to murder U.S. nationals. It's the phone, 9 you are going to see shortly, that they use to communicate the 10 fatwah in February of 1998 that says kill all American 11 civilians, and it's the phone that they're going to use to try 12 to rescue the defendant Mohamed Al-'Owhali when he is stuck in 13 Nairobi with no passport and no money after the bombing. 14 Like I said, it is that phone that gives you a window 15 into how it is that al Qaeda operates. 16 What else happens in 1996? Well, that is the year, 17 according to Al-'Owhali's statement that he gave to the FBI, 18 that Al-'Owhali gets to Afghanistan. That is the year that 19 Mohamed Al-'Owhali gets his al Qaeda training and he's trained 20 in explosives, hijacking, kidnapping, assassination, and 21 intelligence. And after this training, he told the agent, he 22 gets to have an audience with Usama Bin Laden. And he asks 23 Bin Laden for a mission and the mission that you know that he 24 carries out on August 7th of 1998. 25 The other thing that happens in 1996, Wadih El Hage 5299 1 helps to facilitate the delivery of fake passports. One of 2 the people that Kherchtou told you who was in the EIJ group 3 was somebody by the name of Ahmed Hassan, and you're going to 4 see later on in Government Exhibit I believe it's 1518 a 5 letter where Ayman Zawahiri appoints Ahmad Hassan as one of 6 the deputies of EIJ. 7 And if we take a look at Government Exhibit 304 -- 8 okay, we can pull up 1518. That's a good idea. This is a 9 letter I mentioned to you. This is found again in the boot, 10 the trunk of Eidarous' car, and it's from Abu Mohamed Nur 11 Al-Deen, one of the aliases for Zawahiri, and it's dated 12 January 18, 1997. It says, "It's important for me to tell you 13 that I choose the brothers," and he lists the people. And "D" 14 you see "Ahmad Hassan for communications and secretariat." So 15 he is appointing this person as one of the deputies within 16 EIJ. 17 Now, next, if we go to Government Exhibit 304, again 18 the pop-up phone book that's found in El Hage's house, and you 19 see a reference there to a Dardaa, Liby, 955769. And in the 20 same book at page 25, you see a reference to Saad and there's 21 a number there, 999412989965, and then the number again 22 955769. And 994 is the country code for Azerbaijan. And you 23 can barely see it on this map up here. Up here it's north of 24 Iran and that's the country code for Azerbaijan. 25 Now, a few other things that are found -- by the way, 5300 1 if you take a look, if you take a look at Government Exhibit 2 594, the second page, and this is minutes used on the 3 satellite phone, on December 5, 1996, you see a phone call to 4 that number 99412989965, one of the numbers that El Hage has 5 listed for Saad in Azerbaijan. If we take a look at 6 Government Exhibit 624J-T, and this is one of the letters 7 that's found in El Hage's files -- not in his house, but in 8 the office, a search that took place in August of 1998 -- and 9 it's a letter to Harun dated October 23, 1996 and it's signed 10 DRDDA, and it's got ASHRAF in parentheses and he puts Mont 11 Carlo at the bottom. 12 He tells Harun, "I received your letter, and thank 13 God everyone is all right." He says, "Regarding Suleiman, he 14 and Abdel Hadi traveled to and they arrived safely, although 15 Suleiman was delayed a little bit because of the working 16 contract he had at the airport." 17 Then he says, "Regarding the Saudi Arabia, please 18 change the picture of the office only, nothing else. About 19 myself, please raise the salary because I heard it is $75 and 20 this is not enough. Regarding the married people, please let 21 them keep their papers with them. Regarding Brother Nabil, he 22 needs to change the office's picture and put the office 23 picture which Basil Nabil sent to you. Change the name of 24 office to the name Zuhair Shahan Kulayb. Clean the office and 25 take care of it. Place the golden design, the Yemeni or the 5301 1 Turkish." 2 That is a recipe for a fake passport. "Place the 3 golden design, the Yemeni or the Turkish." 4 "Please change the picture of the office only 5 regarding the Saudi Arabia." 6 "DRDAA and ASHRAF is asking Harun to do what 7 Kherchtou told you Harun does for al Qaeda -- he makes fake 8 passports, the lifeblood, as I mentioned earlier, of al Qaeda. 9 And among the documents that are found among El Hage's files 10 are Government Exhibits 623, a passport. 11 This is an Egyptian passport. Government Exhibit 12 631, this one is a Yemeni passport. Government Exhibit 634, 13 this is a stamp, a travel stamp for Kenya. And then on the 14 computer, Government Exhibit 300, it's found in El Hage's 15 house, remember, is Government Exhibit 300F. 16 And remember Agent Crisalli, he was the computer 17 expert who told you that there was this Adobe function that 18 allows you to scan in that image and then you can manipulate 19 it, he said you can change it. 20 Government Exhibit 300G, another stamp, a Kenya 21 travel stamp, and then 300H. This one has a translation that 22 tells you it's from Yemen. It's an exit stamp from Yemen. 23 All the tools of the fake passport trade. 24 But there are telephone calls that go with that 25 letter. If we take a look at Government Exhibit 201A-T, this 5302 1 is a telephone call on October 3, 1996. Remember that letter 2 was in October 1996, and the participants in that conversation 3 are Saad and Harun. And after the greetings, Saad says: 4 "Listen. Listen to me. I found the office. I found the 5 office. I found the office, but nothing has arrived yet. 6 Nothing has arrived yet. Do you understand?" And Harun says: 7 "Yes." And Saad says: "Do you have anything new? Do you 8 have anything new?" And Harun says: "There is nothing new. 9 We are still waiting on news and letters which we haven't 10 received." So there, on October 3, Saad is wondering if he 11 has anything new. 12 Government's Exhibits 202A-T, this is a telephone 13 conversation between Harun and Ahmad Hassan, the EIJ member. 14 What Harun says, again after the greetings, if we go to the 15 next page and down at the bottom, Harun says: "Saad sends his 16 regards to you. I know...his telephone number was probably 17 busy...to send him a fax. I will give you his number. He 18 asked for you." And then Harun says: "He sent me a fax and 19 he said: Is his family with you or with him? I told him 20 his...your family is with the people over there." And then he 21 proceeds to give him a telephone number in Baku. 22 We can go to the next page, and he goes ahead and he 23 gives him that telephone number in Baku. And down at the 24 bottom, which has been cut off, there's a reference to the 25 name of Saad. 5303 1 Now if we go to Government Exhibit 204A-T, what you 2 see here, this is a call November 6, 1996, and El Hage is 3 talking to DHL because he forgot to put an important letter in 4 a package and he wants to know if he can get it back. And 5 then what happens is DHL calls El Hage back later on that day 6 on November 6 and tells him that he can pick up the package. 7 Six days later, as we know from Government Exhibit 8 205A-T, which is a conversation on November 12, and this is El 9 Hage talking to Saif al Islam, as you can see there, and if we 10 can go to the second page and you see down there at the 11 bottom, "I was waiting to get notebooks here." Saif al Islam 12 is waiting to get the notebooks, and one of the codes you 13 learned about was "books" is the code for passports. 14 In 207C-T, which is a conversation on December 17, 15 '96, again involving Wadih El Hage and Wadih El Hage and this 16 person Saad in Baku. Saad says: "Concerning Abu al-Darda', 17 have you sent him the notebook?" El Hage says: "Yes, a long 18 time ago, but they never told us whether they had received it 19 or not." 20 Remember, Dardaa is the person whose name appears in 21 El Hage's address book. Dardaa is the person who sends the 22 letter to Harun that talks about the Yemeni and the Turkish 23 and the gold seal. And you know "the books" are used as code 24 for passports, and Saad says: "Did you send him anything else 25 with it for Suhail and the other?" For the other people did 5304 1 you send the passports. And El Hage says: "Yes, yes, it was 2 with it, but we didn't do anything to them." So El Hage is 3 distinguishing what he did with some of the passports but not 4 with all of the passports. 5 And then Saad asks: "What about the green one? Did 6 you do anything to it?" And you see in the passports, they 7 come in different colors, and El Hage says: "Oh, let me 8 think. It's been a while. Let me ask Harun about it because 9 I remember he said it was better not to do anything to it, 10 otherwise, the projects would get ruined." 11 So El Hage and Harun are working together to fix some 12 of these passports and Saad goes on to say: "So regarding Abu 13 al Dardaa's, it had been fixed and sent then?" And El Hage 14 says: "Yes." El Hage says: Abu al Dardaa's is fine and 15 fixed, and we sent it to him." Again, Wadih El Hage is acting 16 as the facilitator on behalf of al Qaeda to make sure, working 17 behind the scenes, that the essentials that need to get done 18 get down on behalf of al Qaeda. 19 Now, we get to 1997. In 1997, ladies and gentlemen, 20 you are going to remember that there were two trips that El 21 Hage took to see Usama Bin Laden, and the first one takes 22 place in February 1997. And bear in mind, this is five or six 23 months after Bin Laden has publicly declared war on the United 24 States, after he says that all resources should be pooled to 25 kill the United States, to drive the American forces out of 5305 1 Saudi Arabia. And in spite of the denials that El Hage will 2 give to the Grand Jury, the evidence overwhelmingly shows that 3 El Hage went to Afghanistan. He went to Afghanistan to visit 4 with Bin Laden and Abu Hafs. We can go through that evidence 5 right now. 6 First, on January 29, 1997, as we know from 7 Government Exhibit 594, again this is the minutes used on that 8 satellite phone, there is a call from the satellite phone on 9 January 29 to 25471202219. That is the mobile phone that El 10 Hage uses, and you know 254 is the country code for Kenya. 11 On February 3, 1997, there are telephone calls from 12 that mobile number, and we know that from the mobile phone 13 records. And so you know, those are Government Exhibit 621C. 14 There is a call from the mobile phone to the number 521272177. 15 And if we go to the pop-up phone book, Government Exhibit 16 304-27, you see that that number I just read to you, 21272177, 17 is listed for Taysir, and Taysir is one of the names that El 18 Hage is going to use for Abu Hafs. And we'll go through that 19 some more. So the satellite phone calls El Hage on January 20 29. El Hage calls back on February 7 to Taysir, Abu Hafs, on 21 February 3. 22 And by the way, you see that number also appear in 23 the planner that's found in El Hage's house, Government 24 Exhibit 350. In the lower right there, Taysir, Box 35341, 25 272177. 5306 1 On January 30, and we don't have to pull up the 2 records, but the satellite phone calls 820067. That's the 3 land line at Fedha Estates that belongs to El Hage. 4 Then, on January 30, there is a call that is 5 intercepted and it's the transcript containing Government 6 Exhibit 209A-T. And it's call from Abu Khadija, and we know 7 that Abu Khadija is one of the aliases for Abu Hafs. That's 8 in Government Exhibit 4-2, I believe. And that conversation 9 involves Abu Khadija, Abu Hafs and April El Hage. And Abu 10 Khadija asks: "Is he," referring to Abu Hafs, "present." 11 April says: "He is notice present. He is out. He may come 12 after two hours." And so he leaves a message. 13 What you know from Government Exhibit 209B-T, which I 14 won't play to you, is a series of outgoing calls between about 15 2:47 in the afternoon and 3:22 in the afternoon. This call 16 from Khadija takes place at 2:47 in the afternoon. So right 17 after April El Hage hangs up, she's dialing and she's getting 18 a busy signal. And she keeps redialing and getting a busy 19 signal for almost a half an hour. 20 She knows the call is important. She knows Abu Hafs 21 is calling for El Hage and she's trying to get the message to 22 him that Abu Hafs wants to speak to you. So on Government 23 Exhibit 209C-T, at 3:22, April El Hage finally gets through to 24 Wadih El Hage. And she reaches him and she says -- there are 25 these greetings back and forth, and she says way down at the 5307 1 bottom, "Ah...he came back. Ahmad never came back. And Abu 2 Khadija called. He is going to call you back in two hours." 3 And if we go to the next page, El Hage says: "Okay, 4 I should be home soon." April says: "By four...four, five." 5 They go back and forth. And when he says: "Ah, that's too 6 early," she says: "It is the other one." And El Hage says: 7 "Who?" And she says: "The other one." 8 This is the other Abu Khadija she is referring to, 9 this is the important Abu Khadija, and she has to distinguish 10 that because there is another Abu Khadija who El Hage keeps in 11 touch with and we'll receive conversations belonging him. 12 That Khadija lives in Germany, but this Khadija, the other 13 one, the one calling using the satellite phone, he is in 14 Afghanistan and April El Hage wants to make sure that Wadih El 15 Hage gets the message. 16 So how do you know he left? In addition to these 17 calls that precede his trip on February 3, 1997, again looking 18 at the mobile telephone records, the mobile telephone shows 19 another call to that number 272177. And then on -- and we 20 won't display this now, but Government Exhibit 210A-T is a 21 conversation on February 4, 1997. It's about 5 in the 22 afternoon, and El Hage says that he is at the Executive 23 Guesthouse and he says it's 71E Abdara Road. And he gives the 24 phone number, 842593, and, "In case they call, tell them this 25 is the Executive Guesthouse." 5308 1 And then he says: "Yeah, the telephone you gave me 2 the other day is always closed. I get recorded messages that 3 says that it is off." And what you know from the minutes 4 records for the satellite phone is that the satellite phone 5 has no calls during this time. There's something wrong. 6 Maybe Ziyad Khalil hasn't gotten the minutes, maybe the phone 7 is broken, maybe it needs a battery pack, but there are no 8 calls if you look at the records on 594 for that time period. 9 And you know from Government Exhibit 646, this is one 10 of the documents found in El Hage's files in the Mira Office 11 in 1998, and you see the Executive Guesthouse, just like he 12 tells Harun. At the bottom it says 71E Abdara Road and the 13 phone number, and the place he is staying at, ladies and 14 gentlemen, is in Peshawar. 15 Remember Mohamed Ali Odeh, the gem salesman, he was 16 asked, Do you remember about El Hage going to Pakistan 17 February 1997? He said, Yes, I do. He specifically was 18 asked, Do you remember him going to Peshawar? And he said, 19 No. And Peshawar is that border town we talked about earlier. 20 That's where Kherchtou got his surveillance training. It's 21 right on the Afghanistan border. 22 And you know from the telephone conversations between 23 El Hage and his deputy, Harun, and from the document 646 that 24 El Hage is right at the border of Afghanistan, staying at a 25 hotel waiting to cross the border and to meet with the al 5309 1 Qaeda leadership. 2 Government Exhibit 211A-T, this is now a conversation 3 three days later, after El Hage tells Harun that he is in 4 Peshawar, February 7, 1997. And this is an outgoing call you 5 see there from El Hage's phone to the number 451257. Just so 6 you know, Government Exhibit 636A shows that that number is 7 listed to a Must, M-U-S-T, and it's crossed out in the 8 listing. 9 And then 636B, which is, by the way, records found 10 among El Hage's files in the Mira Office in Nairobi in 1998, 11 shows another listing for 451257 for Mustafa, and that 12 Mustafa, ladies and gentlemen, is the Mustafa that's Khalid. 13 That's the person who met Kherchtou when he got to Nairobi, 14 that's the al Qaeda member who is going to carry out the 15 bombing in Dar es Salaam. 16 And if we take a look after the greetings, what Harun 17 says, if we could go to -- well, I'll read out for you and 18 we'll also talk about the Ali Odeh reference, Harun says: A 19 few days ago, your friend over there had called, the big one, 20 he said your friend had arrived, he is with me now. He said 21 don't worry and that he took him to the hotel. He's talking 22 about a conversation he had referring to El Hage and the big 23 one, and they are meeting over precisely where they are 24 supposed to be meeting in the Afghanistan/Pakistan border. 25 Now, later on in this conversation they talk about 5310 1 how somebody wanted to use El Hage's phone, and Harun is 2 telling Mustafa that he wouldn't let him use the phone. And 3 Harun makes a specific reference to the fact that the person 4 who wanted to use the phone had a business with him, referring 5 to El Hage, and he said, "He's the guy that has the head 6 letter." 7 And you will remember that Mohamed Ali Odeh talked 8 about that Black Giant idea that they had, and he was asked 9 questions about the letterhead and he said, "You mean the head 10 letter? The idea, the company that really was just an idea." 11 And remember when he was asked about any confrontations he had 12 with Harun about using the phone and how angry he got about 13 Harun? He said Harun was rude and that Mohamed Ali Odeh was 14 respected. 15 Mustafa and Harun are talking about they don't want 16 Mohamed Ali Odeh, the businessman, using that cell phone 17 because that cell phone is to be reserved for al Qaeda 18 business. It is not to be used to call Hong Kong to get gems. 19 And that underscores a point, ladies and gentlemen, precisely 20 what I mentioned to you at the beginning. 21 What the evidence shows is that Wadih El Hage may 22 very well have been involved in a gem business with people 23 like Mohamed Ali Odeh, but he carries on that side of his life 24 while at the same time carrying on the different life, the 25 secret life, the al Qaeda life, so that people like Mohamed 5311 1 Ali Odeh have no idea that El Hage in fact is not selling gems 2 in Pakistan in February 19967, that people like Mohamed Ali 3 Odeh have no idea that El Hage is in Peshawar and he is going 4 to meet with Bin Laden and Abu Hafs and that people like 5 Mohamed Ali Odeh have no idea why they can't use the mobile 6 phone. 7 And that conversation between two al Qaeda members, 8 between two people who are participating in the bombings of 9 the embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam underscore the 10 point, they make the contrast for you, and that it is not to 11 the exclusion of doing al Qaeda business that one can engage 12 in other commercial transactions. 13 And the other thing that happens in that conversation 14 is that the two of them, Harun and Fadhl, talk about a number 15 that they got at Marwan's house. And again, Marwan is one of 16 the aliases for the defendant Mohamed Odeh, as Kherchtou told 17 you. 18 Now, while El Hage is meeting with the bosses in al 19 Qaeda, Harun is making sure he keeps people informed. 20 Government Exhibit 211B-T is a conversation on February 7th, 21 and it takes place within an hour after Harun speaks to 22 Mustafa. 23 If we could display 211B-T -- I'm sorry, C-T. What 24 happens there, this person Shuaib, who was one of the people 25 you heard about earlier on, is giving Harun a number and he's 5312 1 going to call him back. That's what's in 211C-T. And then 2 you see the two of them talking. And then if we can go to the 3 next page, if we can go to the next page -- I'm sorry, the 4 page after that, if we go halfway down, Harun says to Shuaib: 5 "We want to come, but as you know, the director is not 6 present," referring to El Hage. And Shuaib says: "Present, 7 huh?" Harun says: "No, he's not present." And Shuaib says, 8 "When will he come?" And Harun says: "This is the Eid (the 9 holiday) as they said. He is not present, in other words. He 10 doesn't know, however the man, the X, that one, he may." 11 And then Shuaib says: "However, the director on your 12 end traveled, right?" And then Harun says: "No, he left, he 13 traveled." And Shuaib says: "He arrived at the people's 14 place." And Harun says: "He arrived since Sunday. He 15 traveled and arrived at the people's place and the big boss 16 contacted him and told him: 'The man is with me here.'" 17 The people's place, and you will see this same 18 reference, is Afghanistan, and "the people" is the other 19 people in al Qaeda who are in Afghanistan. And of course, the 20 big boss is Bin Laden. And Harun is sharing the news with 21 Shuaib so he can be kept up to date. 22 And you will see the same thing happen in Government 23 Exhibit 211D-T, which is another conversation on February 7, 24 1997, and this one takes place about four minutes after Harun 25 and Shuaib get off the phone. This is a conversation between 5313 1 Harun and the defendant Odeh, the alias Marwan, and then Harun 2 says, and this is on the second page of the transcript: "Your 3 friend from Malindi has just contacted me," referring to 4 Shuaib because he just got off the phone with Shuaib. Marwan 5 said: "By God." Harun said: "Yes." Marwan says: "What is 6 he saying? Harun said: "He says that he is fine. He wanted 7 to know your --" Marwan says: "Yes, indeed. Finish. It's 8 for sure," etc. 9 Then what he says is, if we go to the next page, 10 Marwan says: "With God's permission." And they go on and on, 11 and then down about three-quarters of the way down, Marwan 12 says: "So, what's the news with you? Is there anything new?" 13 And Harun says: "No, what's new is that, my friend arrived 14 there. My friend arrived there." And Marwan says: "Yes." 15 And Harun says: "The director had called me two days before." 16 Marwan says: "Yes." And Harun says: "He told me that the 17 guest is with him, in other words, he came to him, to his 18 house, in other words." Marwan says: "The news is perfect." 19 And Harun says: "Yes, the news and everything else are 20 perfect." And then they talk about the guest. So, again, 21 Harun is sharing the news with the other people in the group 22 about El Hage's visit. 23 Government Exhibit 212A-T is a conversation between 24 El Hage and Harun, and El Hage says -- and these are the 25 greetings. If we go to the next page, down towards the 5314 1 bottom, El Hage says: "Thank God. If God willing there is 2 good news when I return." And Harun says: "Okay, where is 3 your friend? Will he come along with you before you?" And El 4 Hage says: "He will come after me. He will be late a bit." 5 And then what happens is, if we could go to the next 6 page -- on that page, by the way, you see about a quarter of 7 the way down, if we could do the first half of the page, you 8 see Harun say about halfway down there: "I don't know. He 9 will not travel. People have been calling him from Hong Kong, 10 Jordan and so on." 11 There's the reference to Mohamed Ali Odeh and its 12 relates back to the conversation that Harun had with Mustafa 13 Fadhl complaining about Mohamed Ali Odeh using the phone. 14 Elsewhere in the conversation what El Hage says to Harun is 15 that "the people send you their regards, the people here are 16 very comfortable, very comfortable. If God willing, we will 17 all go to them." 18 Again, "the people" is the al Qaeda people that are 19 in Afghanistan and they are very comfortable, which is a theme 20 that you will see El Hage will talk about again and it's in a 21 letter to the other Abu Khadija I mentioned. "If God willing, 22 we will all go to them." So El Hage is talking about his 23 connection, his meetings with the people in the Afghanistan 24 headquarters and he's talking to Harun that he's going to 25 bring back good news upon return from his trip and hopefully 5315 1 one day they will all join the people. 2 Now, when El Hage gets back, there's a telephone call 3 that takes place on February 21, 1997, and it's contained in 4 Government Exhibit 213A-T. If we can go to the next page, 5 what I will do, ladies and gentlemen -- you, of course, are 6 free to look at all these at the end and during your 7 deliberations -- what this conversation involves is this is 8 Wadih El Hage speaking to Marwan, again the defendant Odeh, 9 and what happens is they discuss a routine where they give a 10 number and they call it back. You see it in some of the other 11 conversations. 12 And Odeh and El Hage talk about somebody coming from 13 Odeh to meet El Hage who wants to know if that somebody is 14 bringing the computer, but is told by Odeh that he's bringing 15 the diskettes. And El Hage asks Odeh how his work is going, 16 and then he says that he will get the information from 17 Mustafa, implying that Mustafa is the person who is on his way 18 up. 19 So El Hage gets back from his trip to see the boss, 20 the big boss in Afghanistan. He speaks to the defendant Odeh, 21 who talks about how somebody is coming up, and in all 22 likelihood Mustafa, and there is reference to diskettes. And 23 you will see, ladies and gentlemen, as we go through the 24 evidence that these diskettes will contain information that 25 reveal what the good news was. What it is that El Hage brings 5316 1 back is a policy from Bin Laden from al Qaeda, a policy that 2 is going to dictate what the East African cell of al Qaeda is 3 going to do next as part of its operations for al Qaeda. 4 Now, if we go to Government Exhibit 310-73A-T, this 5 is one of the computer disks that is found in El Hage's house 6 by Agent Coleman during the search in 1997, and this has the 7 new policy. "Number 1. The return of Wadih and the meeting 8 with Khaled." 9 "Wadih" is Wadih El Hage and Khaled is one of the 10 aliases for Mustafa Fadhl, one of the people who is involved. 11 This is Mustafa Fadhl, and Kherchtou tells you that he goes by 12 the name Khaled. 13 "2. The preparations of travel to the interior. 14 "3. The meeting of Khalid with some Somali officials 15 before the entry. 16 "4. The entry/move of Khalid then Harun via land. 17 "5. The entry/move of Marwan with Shuaib via sea," 18 and 19 "6. The situation in the interior." 20 And then down at the bottom, "meeting Khalid with the 21 officials in the interior/meeting with the Arab young men in 22 the interior/sessions on work arrangement in the 23 interior/sessions on arrangement of the course." 24 The new policy is brought back. There is a meeting 25 where El Hage shares it with Khaled, with Mustafa Fadhl. They 5317 1 make preparations, Khaled, Harun, Marwan. The defendant Odeh 2 and Shuaib are going to carry out this new policy that El Hage 3 has brought back, summarized for you in bullet-point form as 4 it was contained in the disk when found by Agent Coleman. 5 Now, you see a little bit more about what this policy 6 is in Government Exhibit 310-74A-T. This is a document that's 7 found on a different disk, once again found in Wadih El Hage's 8 house in 1997. And you see at the top the writer of this 9 report says that the report is top secret, and it's from 10 Khaled Sheik and it's to the officials in the administration. 11 Khaled Sheik, another reference to Mustafa Fadhl, the person 12 who he meets with El Hage who brings back the report, and it's 13 a report that's going to update the administration about the 14 activities of the group carrying out the report. 15 If you take a look at the very first paragraph, 16 "Report on the Latest News in Somalia," it says just above 17 that, the first point there, "Abdel Sabbur brings to light the 18 new policy." Ladies and gentlemen, Abdel Sabbur is one of the 19 aliases for the defendant El Hage. And it says, "When Abdel 20 Sabbur arrived on 22/2/1997, he contacted Khaled directly and 21 asked him to come to Nairobi." 22 Remember the conversation between Odeh and El Hage 23 where Odeh says, yes, he is coming to you and he will bring 24 the diskettes, that document tells you that in fact what Odeh 25 and El Hage were talking about was Khaled coming to Nairobi to 5318 1 meet with El Hage when he returns with new policy. 2 The document goes on. When he arrived and met with 3 Abdel Sabbur, he informed him about the status of the young 4 men and the Hajj and that they were fine, and he received from 5 him the trusts (the letters, the money) and he informed him 6 also that the Hajj has a new policy pertaining to the region. 7 Hence, Khaled fully grasped this policy and took the issue 8 seriously. The new policy is (to revive the activism in 9 Somalia) if the expression is correct, and to prepare 300 10 activists before the arrival of the guest, and he informed him 11 that the details of this policy (are) with the guest coming 12 from the Hajj end." 13 A couple points on this paragraph, ladies and 14 gentlemen. The Hajj is Bin Laden, and you know that that is 15 one of the names he goes buy from Kherchtou. Kherchtou told 16 you that without having seen this document. 17 That document confirms that the Hajj is Bin Laden, 18 that Wadih El Hage went to see Bin Laden and that he brought 19 back with him the new policy, things that El Hage will lie 20 about before the Grand Jury in 1997 and 1998. 21 The other thing that this one paragraph tells you is 22 that the new policy was to militarize the situation in East 23 Africa, to militarize the cell that you know is going to carry 24 out the bombing of the embassies in August of 1998. 25 Now, this policy is directed towards the activities 5319 1 in Somalia after the Americans leave. You don't want there to 2 be any misperception about that. This policy is not directed 3 at the Americans yet, but what this shows you is the 4 connection between El Hage and Bin Laden, between El Hage and 5 the headquarters of al Qaeda, how it is that he acts as the 6 facilitator, as the messenger, and as somebody who runs the 7 base of operations in Nairobi, and that he works with people 8 like Mustafa, Fadhl, also known as Khaled, and the defendant 9 Mohamed Odeh, also known as Marwan, and that this has nothing 10 to do with the gem business, the selling of tanzanite or 11 anything like that. This is about militarizing, this is about 12 fulfilling one of the policies that al Qaeda is pursuing, and 13 El Hage is the person who carries out that mission. 14 Now, the second paragraph of this document talks 15 about, if we go down to Khaled Sheik meeting with the 16 engineers, the only point I'll make and then we'll break is in 17 here there's a specific reference to the fact that they 18 appoint -- if you take a look at the sentence that begins 19 with, "Furthermore, he also tried," he referring to Khaled, "a 20 young man who would be in charge of the communication between 21 them and the administration (this young man will be acquainted 22 with the local news and could be moving to them any time 23 soon). Hence, Harun was primarily chosen. However, this 24 matter depends on financial resources." 25 So just remember that in this document, in addition 5320 1 to discussing the new policy, the group decides that Harun 2 will be their communications officer, and we'll talk about the 3 communications he sends out after lunch. 4 THE COURT: All right, ladies and gentlemen, we'll 5 break for lunch and we'll resume at 2:15. 6 We're adjourned until 2:15. 7 (Luncheon recess) 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 5321 1 AFTERNOON SESSION 2 2:15 p.m. 3 THE COURT: On May 10 we are going to start at 1:00. 4 We will instruct the jury to have had lunch. I don't know 5 where we will be on May 10, but that is to accommodate a juror 6 so that she can attend her graduation. 7 (Jury present) 8 THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, before I forget, 9 let me tell you that on Thursday, May 10 -- that's a week from 10 this Thursday -- we will start at 1:00, and let's have lunch 11 before we come to court. Thursday, the 10th, we will start at 12 1. 13 MR. KARAS: Thank you, your Honor. We left off 14 before lunch discussing Government's Exhibit 310-74AT, which 15 was the top secret report that was written by Khalid, the 16 alias for Mustafa Fadhl. The report discusses a number of 17 things and there are several reference references you will see 18 in there to Abdel Sabbour and the use of the car. 19 At the very end of this report, if you take a look at 20 the top, and we will highlight the paragraph before the 21 section marked Ethiopia, the report says that as for the 22 security situation now inside Kenya, it's somewhat good 23 because everybody is tuned to the issues around them (Zaire, 24 Sudan, etc.) and also the approach of the elections in Kenya 25 make the authorities concerned with the internal issues. 5322 1 So when this report is written, this report that 2 discusses the new policy that Bin Laden brings back, the group 3 considers the security situation in Kenya to be fine. 4 Ladies and gentlemen, I marked that for you because 5 you will see that that situation changes later on in 1997, 6 that the group will perceive that there is a security threat, 7 and what they will perceive is that the source of that threat 8 is the United States. You will see how it is that they react 9 to that threat, which will tell you a great deal about how the 10 members of that conspiracy react. 11 Something else in connection with this new policy in 12 Somalia in 1997. Government's Exhibit 10-96T, which we will 13 display later on, I just want to tell you right now, 710-96 is 14 a tape and the translation is the translation of what amounts 15 to a tape letter. This was found in the defendant Odeh's 16 house in Witu, and it is a series of taped letters from Odeh 17 to his wife while Odeh is in Somalia carrying out the new 18 policy that Bin Laden issued in 1997. What Odeh says in this 19 correspondence is, our goal in Somalia was not limited merely 20 to the training of groups who want to fight and the cause is 21 over. However, our goals are bigger than that. We are not a 22 relief organization which comes every now and then to assist 23 the victims that leave. We are not a relief organization. 24 Ladies and gentlemen, I submit to you that that is 25 precisely the case when it comes to the core group of people 5323 1 that comprise the essence of this conspiracy, as reflected by 2 the organization that constitutes the core of this conspiracy, 3 Al Qaeda. Remember, it is a group that seeks out informants 4 and it kills them if it thinks they exist. This is a group 5 that if it is not fighting it is training others to fight. 6 Bear in mind that throughout this entire period, the group 7 considers America to be its chief enemy. 8 There are other documents that follow El Hage's trip 9 to Afghanistan that further prove to you what the purpose of 10 the trip was. Government's Exhibit 300B-T is another document 11 found on the computer, Government's Exhibit 300, in El Hage's 12 house by Agent Coleman, and one of the documents in there is 13 this report, an update by Abu Hafs, the military commander, on 14 the Taliban. It is a lengthy report that we read to you 15 during the trial, and I invite you to read it during your 16 deliberations. It basically discusses the relationship 17 between Al Qaeda and the Taliban, who are in Afghanistan, 18 which becomes a new home for Al Qaeda in 1996 when Bin Laden 19 issues his call for jihad in August of 1996. 20 One of the other documents that you see is 21 Government's Exhibit 245-T, which is an identical report 22 regarding the Taliban, only this report, which El Hage sends 23 out to at least one Al Qaeda member, does not have Abu Hafs at 24 the bottom. That makes sense, because El Hage isn't going to 25 send out this report and risk the fact that people will see 5324 1 this report and connect it to Abu Hafs, the military commander 2 of Al Qaeda. Remember, the group undertakes efforts to 3 protect the identity of its people and make sure that others 4 don't find out who it is that would be connected to the 5 organization. We will see evidence of El Hage sending this 6 report to Abu Khadija in Germany. Remember I mentioned to you 7 there were two. The Abu Khadija in Germany is somebody that 8 El Hage will communicate with following his seeing Bin Laden 9 in February 1997. 10 Government's Exhibit 632A-T, that is a letter dated 11 February 21, 1997, and it is from El Hage to Abu Suliman. Abu 12 Suliman, ladies and gentlemen, is one of the aliases for Ihab 13 Ali. Remember, another alias is Nawawi. By the way, Nawawi 14 is the copilot with Essam al Ridi when he crashes the Bin 15 Laden plane. Remember, it was El Hage who had al Ridi go up 16 to Khartoum to see about selling the plane in Egypt, and al 17 Ridi took it up for a test run and he took it with this person 18 Ihab Ali, and this is one of the people El Hage is going to 19 lie about in front of the grand jury. This Exhibit 62 tells 20 Ihab Ali that he was on a business trip and met with Dr. Atef. 21 He and his friends say hello to you. That makes perfect 22 sense. The letter is dated on the 21st, right when El Hage 23 gets back from seeing Bin Laden. He is saying hello to Ihab 24 Ali who Kherchtou tells you is an Al Qaeda member. Right 25 after he gets back, El Hage is communicating with others. He 5325 1 does it again on February 24, 1997, in a letter marked 2 Government's Exhibit 632B-T, which we will display. Abu al 3 Sabbour, one of the aliases for Wadih El Hage. It is to 4 brother Abu Khadija. First I would like to congratulate you 5 on the Eid al Fitr because I was not here at the time. I went 6 to visit Haj Abu al Hawai, who says hello. Also, the people 7 who work with him say hello. Actually, their situation over 8 there is very good. They're comfortable, contrary to what we 9 have been hearing or reading in the newspapers and magazines. 10 The landowners are cooperating with them and they welcome them 11 and all those who want to settle in that good land. The 12 situation is very good, and security is normal. I traveled by 13 myself to and from the capital without any problems. 14 Down at the bottom he says I will send a report on 15 the latest situation with the company in a few days. God 16 willing, peace be upon you. 17 So within a matter of days after El Hage returns from 18 his meeting with Bin Laden, he tells Abu Khadija he went to 19 visit Haj Abdel al Hawai, Bin Laden, who says hello. Again, 20 El Hage is meeting with several people who are there. Then he 21 reassures Abu Khadija that their situation over there is very 22 good. They are very comfortable, contrary to what we have 23 been hearing. The landowners are cooperating with them. The 24 landowners are the Taliban, ladies and gentlemen. They are 25 the ones, the hosts, the people who are hosting Bin Laden and 5326 1 Al Qaeda in Afghanistan. He says down at the bottom I will 2 send a report with the latest situation on the company in a 3 few days. That is a report on the Taliban, Government's 4 Exhibit 300B-T, that has Abu Hafs' name on it, and 245, the 5 one that doesn't have Abu Hafs' name on it. Notice how he 6 refers to Al Qaeda as the company. I will send a report on 7 the latest situation with the company in a few days. Al Qaeda 8 code, talking about Al Qaeda, talking about how the group is 9 comfortable in Afghanistan with the help of the Taliban. 10 One other point about this letter, where El Hage says 11 they are very comfortable contrary to what we have been 12 hearing or reading in the newspapers and magazines. El Hage 13 is revealing that he does read what is in the newspapers and 14 magazines what is said about Al Qaeda, and of course what is 15 said about Bin Laden. Consider that and put it in the context 16 of what El Hage and Bin Laden are talking about in February 17 1997, merely a matter of months after Bin Laden has publicly 18 declared war on the United States and nearly seven months 19 before he will tell the grand jury that he has no idea that 20 Bin Laden has declared war against America. He is reading 21 about Al Qaeda, he is telling Al Qaeda what the truth is, 22 contrary to what the media is saying about Al Qaeda in 23 Afghanistan. 24 There are some other calls that confirm El Hage's 25 visit. Government's Exhibit 215A-T, which is a call involving 5327 1 Ahmed Tawhil and El Hage, one of these people who is around El 2 Hage in Kenya at the time. On March 22, 1997, El Hage tells 3 Ahmed Tawhil, I was calling our friend the doctor, but his 4 phone kept ringing, but nobody answered. Our friend who I 5 came from where he was. And Tawhil says, Taysir? And El Hage 6 says yeah. 7 The telephone records for the satellite phone, 8 Government's Exhibit 594, show that with the exception of 9 March 9, 1997, there are no outgoing calls during this time. 10 Again, for whatever reason, the phone isn't working. You know 11 that's the phone in Afghanistan that is part of the Al Qaeda 12 headquarters, and that is what El Hage is telling Tawhil, and 13 Tawhil understands the code, and he says that's Taysir, right? 14 That's Abu Hafs, and Tawhil says yes. 15 April 20, 1997, another recording conversation, 16 marked 2. Saif al Islam, talking to Wadih El Hage, and Saif 17 al Islam says the group moved and are not answering the phone. 18 We have work to do, it's disruptive. Saif al Islam is talking 19 about this in the context of needing approval, and he suggests 20 that they can send money to Saif al Islam through El Hage. So 21 when Saif al Islam is having difficulties reaching the group, 22 again because there are problems with the phone, who does he 23 call? He calls the facilitator Wadih El Hage, because we have 24 work to do. Remember, ladies and gentlemen, work is code for 25 jihad. Wadih El Hage is going to act, or at least Saif al 5328 1 Islam wants him to act as the go-between between himself and 2 the Al Qaeda headquarters. 3 April 20, 1997, Government's Exhibit 594-3, if we 4 could pull that up. Again, the minutes from the satellite 5 phone. The minutes show a call on April 20, 1997, from the 6 satellite phone to the El Hage number, lasting 7.3 minutes. 7 So the phone is back on line, and he gets in touch with El 8 Hage. 9 Also on April 20, the telephone records for the 10 mobile phone 7120219 show a call from the cell phone to the 11 satellite phone on the same day that the satellite phone calls 12 El Hage. We already went through this conversation, but 13 218A-T is the conversation on April 21 where El Hage gives 14 Harun in a coded fashion the telephone number for the 15 satellite phone, for Dr. Atef's clinic, in case Harun wants to 16 take the family to see Dr. Atef. 17 What is interesting about that conversation, ladies 18 and gentlemen, is, compare it to the conversation marked 19 Defense Exhibit WEHXW19, where El Hage is talking about some 20 of his business, and he gives out Mr. Imbogo's phone number. 21 And there is no code, and there is no cryptic references to 22 clinics or doctors. That's the business transaction, which is 23 clearly distinguishable from the conversations where El Hage 24 is conducting Al Qaeda business. 25 As we know from the documents, the new policy that El 5329 1 Hage brought back ordered Al Qaeda members, and in particular 2 the East Africa cell, to go to Somalia to conduct additional 3 training. You know from Government's Exhibit 310-74AT, which 4 is the report, top secret report from Khalid, that Khalid al 5 Fadl met with some of the local engineers. You know from both 6 that report and also the new policy report, that Marwan, the 7 defendant Odeh, and Shuaib, they went by sea, which makes 8 sense, that the fishermen went by sea to go and conduct the 9 operations in Somalia up the coast. Shuaib is Government's 10 Exhibit 115. 11 One of the documents -- by the way, Khalfan Khamis 12 Mohamed, you may remember he told Agent Perkins that he went 13 to Somalia in 1997, that he went a couple of times, and one of 14 the times he got up there was in Suliman's boat, which he said 15 was used for jihad. Suliman, ladies and gentlemen, is 16 somebody different than -- 17 MR. SCHMIDT: Objection, your Honor. 18 THE COURT: The jury's recollection of the evidence 19 will control. 20 MR. SCHMIDT: That is not the basis of my objection, 21 your Honor. If you want me to make it at the bench, I will 22 make it at the bench. 23 THE COURT: I will see you and the reporter. 24 (Continued on next page) 25 5331 1 (Page 5330 sealed) 2 (In open court) 3 THE COURT: The objection is overruled. 4 MR. KARAS: One of the other things that Khalfan 5 Khamis Mohamed said to Agent Perkin was that he himself had 6 received training in Afghanistan and he had put that timing at 7 around 1994. You will remember that the witness Abdullah 8 Hamisi had mentioned that Khalfan Khamis Mohamed told him that 9 he had gotten training in Afghanistan, training that was 10 financed by Bin Laden, training that focused on jihad. You 11 remember, he was timing it to when he opened up his juice 12 cafe. I submit, ladies and gentlemen, at some point before 13 Khalfan Khamis Mohamed admitted that he went to Somalia, he 14 also admitted that he had gotten training in Afghanistan, he 15 had gotten training in basic explosives and advanced 16 explosives, and he got this training before he went up to 17 Somalia in 1997. 18 One of the documents that is found in the defendant 19 Odeh's house is Government's Exhibit 702-T. 702-T appears to 20 be a ledger, a budget of some kind, and you can see that it 21 talks about the item and the quantity and the amount of 22 currency and the beneficiary and so forth. This document had 23 the fingerprint of Mustafa Fadhl, document that was found in 24 Odeh's house in Witu, a budget of some sort with Mustafa 25 Fadhl's fingerprint on it. The document doesn't have the year 5332 1 on it. It does have the date and the month, and it has 2 references throughout about money being spent in connection 3 with buying for training and military items. Down at the 4 bottom it says expenses note al Saghir was sent to Mombasa 5 carrying a report. 6 If we go to the next page, there is a reference on 7 what appears to be July 21, and again, we don't know the year 8 for sure but you will see in context it talks about training 9 and it mentions an $1,800 loan, Ahmed Madhri to purchase a 10 boat for brother Khalid. Again, that is Mustafa. 11 On page 4 there is an entry there for August 7, 12 weapons and artilleries, quantity 1,000, price in Kenya 13 currency, 50,000. Price in dollars, weapons 1,100, 14 artilleries, 300. Beneficiary: Work. Note: The money was 15 sent to purchase weapons and artilleries for work purposes, 16 since the dollar is worth 35 Kenyan schillings. 17 Again, work purposes means jihad, and here you have a 18 budget in Odeh's house where they are purchasing weapons and 19 artilleries for the jihad work. 20 The next thing that happens in March of 1997 is that 21 CNN goes to Afghanistan and conducts an interview with Usama 22 Bin Laden, and according to a stipulation that was marked as 23 Government's Exhibit 33, that interview took place in March of 24 1997. 25 If we go to the second page of the transcript that is 5333 1 marked as 80-T, you will see that Bin Laden is asked the 2 question about his declaration of jihad, and he gives a very 3 succinct answer. He says, we declared jihad against the US 4 government because the US government is unjust, criminal and 5 tyrannical. It has committed acts that are extremely unjust, 6 hideous and criminal, whether directly or through its support 7 of the Israeli occupation of Palestine. So he is adding an 8 additional reason for the war against America. About two 9 thirds of the way down that same answer Bin Laden says, as for 10 what you asked, whether jihad is directed against US soldiers, 11 the civilians in the land of the two holy places, Saudi 12 Arabia, or against the civilians in America, we have focused 13 in our declaration on striking at the soldiers in the country 14 of the two holy places. The country of the two holy places 15 has in our religion a peculiarity of its own over other Muslim 16 countries. In our religion it is not permissible for any 17 nonMuslim to stay in our country. Therefore, even though 18 American civilians are not targeted in our plan, they must 19 leave. We do not guarantee their safety because we are in a 20 society of more than a billion Muslims. A reaction might take 21 place as a result of US government's hitting Muslim civilians, 22 a warning that you will see Bin Laden play out later on. At 23 the last part of that answer, Bin Laden says so, the US is 24 responsible for any reaction, because it has transgressed 25 through war from military personnel to civilians. This is 5334 1 what we say. As for what you asked regarding the American 2 people, they are not exonerated from responsibility because 3 they chose this government and voted for it despite their 4 knowledge of its crimes in Palestine, Lebanon, Iraq and in 5 other places, and its support of its collaborating regime who 6 filled our prisons with our best children and scholars. We 7 ask that God may release them. 8 Ladies and gentlemen, Bin Laden is sending a message. 9 Yes, the main focus of our jihad is the American soldiers in 10 Saudi Arabia, but we hold the American civilian population 11 responsible, because you the American civilian population 12 elected that government that has undertaken the policies that 13 we find to be so objectionable. Bin Laden is going to take 14 that theme and he is going to use it later on to justify 15 attacks against civilians. In other words, ladies and 16 gentlemen, Bin Laden is signaling his intention to make sure 17 that American civilians are not in his eyes considered 18 innocent, and that they therefore become justifiable targets. 19 The next answer at the very end, Bin Laden says, and 20 this is on the top of page 3, so the driving away jihad 21 against the US does not stop with its withdrawal from the 22 Arabian peninsula but rather it must desist from aggressive 23 intervention against Muslims in the whole world. 24 Yes, the symbolic act that Bin Laden finds so 25 objectionable is the presence of American troops in Saudi 5335 1 Arabia, but it is deeper than that. He sees the United States 2 as the cause of all the problems and he sees the United States 3 as the aggressor, and he believes he is right in reacting in 4 kind, and he is telling not only the Al Qaeda members but 5 publicly through CNN what it is that he believes justifies his 6 actions. 7 On page 4, down about halfway down that first full 8 answer, now Bin Laden is talking about the presence of the 9 troops and American policy in general, and what he says there, 10 that first line, the sentence beginning with when, when the 11 Saudi government oppressed and the voices of those who call 12 for Islam, I found myself forced, especially after the 13 government prevented Sheik Salman al Awdah and Sheik Safar al 14 Hawali and some other scholars to carry out a small part of my 15 duty of joining what is right and fighting what is wrong. So 16 I collaborated with some brothers and established a committee 17 for offering advice and we started to publish some 18 declarations. The Advice and Reformation Committee in London. 19 However, the Saudi regime did not like this and started to 20 exercise pressure on the Sudanese regime. The US government, 21 the Egyptian government and the Yemeni government also helped 22 in doing so. They requested me explicitly from the Sudanese 23 regime and the pressure continued. Saudi Arabia dropped all 24 its conditions put to the Sudanese regime in return that I be 25 driven out of the Sudan. The US government had already taken 5336 1 the same stance and pulled out its diplomatic mission from 2 chart to Nairobi and put forth their condition to return only 3 after I have left. 4 You know that Bin Laden had the headquarters in Sudan 5 up until some point in 1996 when he goes to Afghanistan and 6 issues the declaration of jihad. What he tells you in this 7 statement on CNN is that he blames the US government for 8 putting pressure on the Sudanese for driving him out of the 9 Sudan and into Afghanistan. He takes note of the fact that 10 part of the pressure was by removing the diplomatic presence 11 from Khartoum and sending it to Nairobi. In March of 1997, 12 Bin Laden is keenly aware of that move by the United States, 13 and I submit to you it provides a powerful motive that Bin 14 Laden had to hit the American Embassy in Nairobi in August 15 1998, to get back to the United States for its diplomatic 16 pressure on the Sudan that caused him to have to go to 17 Afghanistan. 18 On page 6, Bin Laden is asked about some attacks in 19 Riyadh and in Al Khobar. He says as to the previous question, 20 the explosion in Riyadh and Al Khobar, it is no secret that I 21 was not in Saudi Arabia, but I have great respect for the 22 people who did this action. I say, as I said before, they are 23 heroes. We look upon them as men who wanted to raise the flag 24 of -- there is no God but Allah and to bring the flag of 25 nonbelievers and of injustice that the US brought. So he is 5337 1 lauding the efforts of some other people who participated in, 2 as he calls it, the explosion of Riyadh and Al Khobar. He is 3 not taking credit for it. He is saying I didn't do it but I 4 applaud what they did for the reasons that you should know, 5 that the Americans should be driven out. 6 At the bottom of that page is a very brief reference 7 again to Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman. You remember, he is the 8 person that Bin Laden talks about in his August 1996 9 declaration of jihad where he blames the American government 10 for the arrest, something that the witness al Fadl told you, 11 well before Bin Laden gave this interview. 12 Then, ladies and gentlemen, on page 7, down at the 13 bottom, Bin Laden is asked about Somalia. Bin Laden says the 14 US government went there with great jubilation and stayed 15 there sometime with a strong media presence, wanting to 16 frighten people that it is the greatest power on earth. It 17 went there with vanity and 28,000 soldiers to a poor unarmed 18 people in Somalia. The goal was to scare the Muslim world and 19 the whole world to say that it is able to do whatever it 20 wishes. As soon as they reached the Mogadishu beaches, they 21 found no one but children. The CNN and other media started 22 photographing them, the soldiers, with their tanks and heavy 23 arms, and show themselves as the great power on earth. 24 Resistance started because Muslims did not believe the US 25 allegations that they came to save the Somalis. 5338 1 Continuing on the next page, with Allah's grace, 2 Muslims over there, there was a faction from the Islamic 3 alliance that emerged and cooperated with some Mujahideen who 4 were in Afghanistan. They participated with their brothers 5 against the American troops and killed large numbers of them. 6 The American government was aware of that. After some 7 resistance, the American troops left without achieving 8 anything. 9 Down below, Bin Laden tells the world what he 10 believed from Somalia. We learned from those who fought there 11 that they were surprised to see how low the spiritual morale 12 of the American fighters was compared with the spirit of the 13 Russian fighters. The American fighters ran away from the 14 fighters who fought and killed them. 15 Bin Laden is talking very much about the Mujahideen 16 in Afghanistan working with the local troops to attack the 17 Americans, and he gives you his interpretation of why he 18 thinks the Americans were in Somalia, to take over the country 19 and to show that America was the strongest nation in the 20 world. You will see Bin Laden talk more about Somalia when he 21 gives a second interview with ABC News in 1998. Towards the 22 end, on page 9, Bin Laden is asked very simply what are your 23 future plans. He says rather ominously, you will see them and 24 hear about them in the media, God willing. 25 Then down at the bottom when he is asked if he wants 5339 1 to deliver a message to President Clinton, he adds a message 2 to the mothers. He says to these mothers, the mothers of the 3 American soldiers, I say, if they are concerned for their 4 sons, they should object to the government's policy and to the 5 American president. He is sending a clear message, ladies and 6 gentlemen. You will see and what you will hear what I will 7 do, and to the American mothers, you will have to put pressure 8 on your government to get your sons out of the Saudi Gulf 9 peninsula. 10 Five months after this interview takes place, Wadih 11 El Hage goes back to see Bin Laden in Afghanistan, and the 12 first clue of this trip comes in Government's Exhibit 289A-T, 13 another intercepted conversation on July 15, 1997, and it 14 involves Wadih El Hage and an unidentified male. El Hage 15 talks about in the conversation that Harun is on the inside, 16 which is a reference to Somalia, because remember, they are 17 carrying out the new policy of Bin Laden. He says listen, I 18 will be going to see El Hage after a couple of days. From 19 there, the unidentified male asks for a stickerat, the thing 20 that gets you through, talking about a visa that goes on a 21 passport. El Hage says yes, fine, if God willing, when I went 22 the last time they were preparing this kind of thing. 23 He is once again using the reference. El Hage says 24 he is going to see Bin Laden. By the way, this unidentified 25 male knows who he is talking about, because he doesn't say 5340 1 who, and he says what about the stickerats, and El Hage says 2 when I was there before they were making a few of them. Part 3 of what they have to be good at in their business is fake 4 travel documents. 5 While El Hage is visiting Bin Laden in Afghanistan, 6 some very significant events happen. In early August there is 7 a newspaper article that we can see as Government's Exhibit 8 645 -- this, by the way, is found in El Hage's files during 9 that MIRA search in August 1988. You see just the headline. 10 Saudis detain key member on US terror team. 11 Now if we can display Government's Exhibit 246-T. 12 This is a facsimile that is sent from El Hage's house by 13 Harun. In fact, it even says down at the bottom, your brother 14 Harun al Kamari, Wadih's residence. That is a translation of 15 the document that is faxed. At the top you see underlined 16 urgent. This fax, if you take a look at the records for the 17 820066 number, goes to Khalid al Fawwaz's number in England, 18 44208, 44433. Remember, he has 441 number and the 44433 19 number, which is the facsimile. Dear God Khalid, may peace 20 and God's Mercy and blessings be upon you. We appeal to God 21 to be as he please in your religion and worldly existence. We 22 have read in one of the magazines which is published where you 23 are that there was an economic manager who used to work with 24 the Haj and who has transferred to an American British 25 company. Please provide us with the sufficient information on 5341 1 this manager for we want to know whether he knew of Sabbour's 2 company here or of his work here in order to take the 3 appropriate steps to deal with him, knowing that Sabbour had 4 traveled to the Haj and has not returned yet. 5 Ladies and gentlemen, they say a picture is worth a 6 thousand words. But I say to you, in the small number of 7 words in this letter you have just learned a great deal about 8 the conspiracy in this case to kill US nationals. 9 Government's Exhibit 245 is the Daily Telegraph, 10 which is a British newspaper. Khalid Fawwaz, you know, lives 11 in London. He is referencing an economic manager who used to 12 work with the Haj and has transferred to an American British 13 company. Harun is talking about somebody who the media is 14 reporting, somebody who used to be in Al Qaeda, who used to 15 work with the Haj, who has transferred to an American British 16 company, using business lingo to make the following point, 17 somebody is cooperating with the enemy. Somebody is working 18 with the enemy, as it is reported in this magazine, and he 19 says in the next line, please provide us with the sufficient 20 information on this manager for we want to know whether he 21 knew of Sabbour's company here. What does this person who has 22 gone to the enemy know about El Hage and the cell here in East 23 Africa and his work here so that Harun and the others can take 24 appropriate steps to deal with him, knowing that Abdel Sabbour 25 had traveled to the Haj and has not returned yet. So knowing 5342 1 that Wadih El Hage is visiting Bin Laden, Harun gets this very 2 disturbing news and he reaches all the way out to England to 3 Khalid al Fawwaz, the person who used to have Wadih El Hage's 4 job in Nairobi, working for the Al Qaeda cell. He says please 5 see what you can find out about this, we are very concerned. 6 At the bottom he writes, the response is very urgent. 7 Now we see the heat gets turned up in Government's 8 Exhibit 223A-T. This is an intercepted conversation that 9 takes place on August 13. So you get the time line. You will 10 see that that facsimile was sent on August 2 from Harun to 11 Fawwaz, and we will see that in a minute. It is also in the 12 telephone records. Now you have a telephone conversation 13 involving Harun and Abu Khadija in Germany, who says contrary 14 to what we are hearing, everything is fine in Afghanistan. 15 Now Harun is talking to him. If we go to the sixth page -- by 16 the way, the first five pages of this, if you read it or you 17 listened to the conversation, you would think they are talking 18 about medical deals, making the point that they do mix 19 business with business. Then at the bottom of page 6, Harun 20 says the situation is good. Listen to me, the situation is 21 good. There is a manager who used to work with the Haj down 22 there. Khadija says yes. Harun says, it appears that he 23 moved from his company to an American company. Khadija says 24 what do you mean by that? Harun responds he is one of the 25 people in Saudi Arabia. Khadija, still confused, did you read 5343 1 this in the magazine? Yes, he did. You mean he moved, he 2 started working with them? Harun, yes, he's worked with them 3 through Saudi Arabia. Khadija says tell me who that is. 4 Harun says you probably know him, he's the same, the same -- 5 what? The same family? And Harun says and in a sentence he 6 tells you who it is. He, you know, I mean, one leg and a 7 half. Khadija. Really? Harun, yeah, the magazine was issued 8 from where Hamad is. Khadija realizes the danger and his next 9 line, brother, there is no power and no strength safe in God. 10 Can this be possible? Harun, yes, I read it myself. Then 11 Khadija completes the identity. He is the one who got married 12 with a woman from his side? That is Abu Fadhl al Makkee, who 13 El Hage told you married the niece of Usama Bin Laden, who had 14 his leg amputated below one of his knees, and they are 15 describing him as being one of the people they are concerned 16 has now cooperated with the American government. In fact, 17 Khadija says he is the one who got married with a woman from 18 his side, right, the one who married a woman from the Haj's 19 side. Khadija says I know him. Can this be possible? 20 Doublecheck this. Harun says it is possible because I heard 21 it on the radio and then I bought the Daily Telegraph. He 22 even tells you the day he bought the Daily Telegraph, the 2nd 23 of the month, which is the 2nd of August, which is when he 24 faxes Khalid al Fawwaz. 25 If we go to the second part of the page, towards the 5344 1 bottom Khadija says glory, you should have informed me of such 2 a thing, glory to the Lord. Harun says I have tried to call 3 you for a week. Such things you have to -- right away because 4 the boss director over there is unable to call us nor to 5 inform us. 6 They continue. Khadija says, halfway down, you know, 7 I was looking for, you know what I'm doing, I'm looking for 8 him. Harun says yes, and Khadija says you have to make sure, 9 is this news confirmed? Harun confirms the fax that you saw 10 earlier. I sent this to Hamad by fax. Khadija says tell me, 11 has the big boss been informed of this or not? Harun says I 12 don't know, I don't know. I have not even informed Wadih. 13 Khadija says try to inform him so he can take precaution of 14 the forged check. Again the business lingo. He is the money 15 person, Abu Fadhl al Makkee, and they are worried about the 16 information he is going to give up to the Americans. Harun 17 says I should, because it was written in the newspaper that he 18 mentions the accounts of Bin Laden all over the world. I read 19 that. Then Khadija goes on a little bit down below. No, no, 20 be careful. One should not think twice about that forgery. 21 Be careful not to get into a lot of troubles. Be cautious. 22 That's it. We understand now. Please call. You have my 23 telephone numbers, don't you? The word is out. Everybody 24 needs to be careful. 25 If we go to the top of page 10, you see how aware Al 5345 1 Qaeda is about the security measures against them. Khadija 2 asks, how is your telephone? Do I get a headache if I use it? 3 Harun says don't even try, we suspect, we suspect, this is 4 better, this is better. Khadija says are they listening to 5 this call? Should I call you here? Harun says absolutely. 6 So Khadija gives him a different number, and down at 7 the bottom you see Khadija will announce the code for how they 8 are going to discuss the matter in the future. Swear to God, 9 try not to give my phone numbers to anybody, because it is a 10 company, you see, and I don't want to -- but it is a headache 11 about that lame, as you see, call so we know the condition. 12 Say the condition is such and such so we know the manager. He 13 was in charge of the director and the company and he was in 14 charge of the money, you know, which explains why it is they 15 were so concerned. 16 If we go to the next page, you see down at the bottom 17 half Khadija says no, or Harun says the matter is not easy, 18 and Khadija confirms no, it is not easy. The boss wouldn't 19 have any troubles but we would. The boss in Afghanistan may 20 not have the troubles, but we in Kenya and we in Germany are 21 going to have troubles if this person is truly cooperating 22 with the Americans. Harun says I will find out about this 23 matter. Yes, so we can change things and stuff like that, in 24 order to -- you understand, in order to see if I have 25 something forged that they have wrote on me. Is there 5346 1 anything that they have about me, is what Khadija is worried 2 about. 3 Then you see on the next page, Harun makes a 4 reference, and the Nawawi's place, almost all the accounts in 5 the Nawawi's place have been held. That is Ihab Ali. They 6 want to remove the Haj. The Nawawi's place is America, 7 because remember, Nawawi, Ihab Ali, moves to Florida. So they 8 are referring to the Nawawi's place as America, who wants to 9 remove the Haj. They are pretty much happy with them, you 10 see. Then you see down at the bottom, Khadija says yes, 11 indeed, so there should be, the matter is not easy as to 12 losing a job like that, the appointment. So stay, may God 13 help, is the Nawawi at your place? Harun says the Nawawi is 14 there, there in America. 15 Ladies and gentlemen, you will see, we talked a 16 little bit about correspondence between El Hage and this 17 person Nawawi, and this correspondence is some of which El 18 Hage lies about in the grand jury, when asked whether he knows 19 anybody who lives in America. Nawawi is one of the people 20 they talk about in the conversation about al Makkee 21 cooperating with the Americans. 22 So in these two pieces of paper you see all the 23 critical pieces coming together and how they are reacting to 24 the threat from their enemy. Harun is getting in touch with 25 El Hage. Harun gets in touch with Abu Khadija, to whom El 5347 1 Hage said I went to see Bin Laden. Harun and Khadija are 2 talking about the need to get in touch with El Hage to protect 3 the cell in East Africa from the Americans, and of course to 4 let Bin Laden know so that he can protect himself and others 5 in Al Qaeda can make sure they do what they have to do to 6 avoid Americans. 7 Why is that? That's because it is one enemy 8 recognizing the other enemy. They are not concerned that the 9 Americans are going to find out about gem deals or the Renan 10 tribe in Somalia. They are concerned that people will find 11 out about the war against Americans by Bin Laden, the people 12 who continue to work with Bin Laden to carry out wars against 13 America. It is the Americans they are worried about, not the 14 Saudis. It's the Americans. 15 You see it again in Government's Exhibit 300A-T. 16 Ladies and gentlemen, this is a document that is written by 17 Harun. You will see several pieces of this that show that. 18 This is one of the deleted files that was found on El Hage's 19 computer Government's Exhibit 300, and Agent Crisalli talked 20 to you about how he was able to retrieve some of the deleted 21 files from the computer. At the very beginning of this report 22 Harun says we can now say that the security position of the 23 crew is at 100 percent danger. In this report I will try to 24 state the reasons that made us feel about this dangerous 25 situation. I will also try to offer my recommendation to the 5348 1 kind and wise high command that understands a lot and we hope 2 is seeking the best. 3 Down below that first paragraph Harun says, as we 4 have heard, witnessed and read, the Haj has declared war on 5 America and that was confirmed when we heard the tape of the 6 press interview that took place in Jalalabad, and the sheik 7 stated some points including: We declared war against America 8 because it made itself police of the world. I have nothing to 9 do with the two explosions in Saudi Arabia but I am glad they 10 took place. You will hear my future plans on radio stations. 11 Harun adds his comment, and other points that we are pleased 12 to hear, thanks be to God. 13 We saw CNN and that we like to hear. Bin Laden wants 14 to kill Americans, we're happy about it. 15 Remember, and you will see this, this is a document 16 that wasn't meant for the eyes of anybody outside Al Qaeda. 17 This is a document that Harun writes to the high and wise 18 administration, the people in Afghanistan. So he is going to 19 lay out exactly what it is that he and the others in the East 20 Africa cell are thinking and what is on their mind. We heard 21 about the CNN interview and we liked what Bin Laden said. 22 Then he says on page 2, keeping in mind all this discussion 23 about the Abu al Makkee, they should know that they are 24 America's primary target now and that there is an American 25 Kenyan Egyptian intelligence activity in Nairobi working to 5349 1 identify the locations and the people who are dealing with the 2 sheik, since America knows well that the youth who worked in 3 Somalia and who are followers of the sheik are the ones that 4 have carried out operations to hit the Americans in Somalia. 5 Harun, the person who told Kherchtou that he is in Somalia, is 6 telling the high and wise command they have figured out we 7 were there. America knows full well that the followers of the 8 Bin Laden were the ones that went into Somalia and that the 9 main gateway for those people is Kenya. Therefore, there must 10 be a center in Kenya. Ahmad Tawhil told us that he will talk 11 about changing us because we are in real danger. I told him 12 that the crew will welcome this because we are convinced 100 13 percent that indeed our situation in Kenya is extremely bad. 14 How things have changed from that report, that top 15 secret report that said the security situation is good. From 16 their perspective, what is the cause of the change? The 17 Americans have figured out who is there and what they did. 18 Harun goes on in the next paragraph. He read in the 19 newspaper news of the arrest of five Kenyans in Kenya. I 20 warned Ahmad Madurani that there is an intelligence activity 21 in Kenya to identify the emirs of the brothers and the 22 foreigners who work with the brothers. What we think is that 23 there is American pressure on Kenya to search for the Arabs 24 living in the region. Therefore, brother Sharif, be cautious 25 and whoever is with you of the engineers, and be advised that 5350 1 that any moment any one of us could fall. 2 Perception is what guides their action, ladies and 3 gentlemen, and in August of 1997 Harun is talking about and is 4 concerned about two different activities he sees the Americans 5 doing. First, the cooperation of Abu Fadhl al Makkee that you 6 saw in the fax and the telephone conversation to Abu Khadija. 7 The second is that the Americans are very focused on the East 8 African crew, on the crew that Wadih El Hage runs. Wadih El 9 Hage is in Afghanistan at the time, visiting Bin Laden. Even 10 now as he perceives the point that the Americans and Kenyans 11 are working together in their arrests, he is attributing their 12 security problems to the Americans. Then he goes on to 13 discuss Abu Fadhl al Makkee. The last bit of news, which 14 almost made me explode when I heard it, was a news item that I 15 read in one of the British magazines, the Daily Telegraph. So 16 I asked brother Tawfiq to buy this magazine in Nairobi after 17 hearing the news item on BBC on 2 August 1997. The gist of 18 the news item is, now in the hands of the American CIA and the 19 British intelligence service M16, in Saudi Arabia. The CIA 20 did not confirm if this man, whose name is Saudi Tayyib and 21 his nickname is Abu Fadhl, was working as a double agent spy 22 for the Saudi government or he was arrested. They only said 23 that the man was in the hands of the Saudis since the middle 24 of May and that there is another man called Jamal, who is a 25 colleague and an assistant to Usama and who has cooperated 5351 1 with the Saudi government after he was arrested since May. 2 That is precisely what Jamal al Fadl told you, that Sidi al 3 Tayyib was a name that Abu Fadhl al Makkee used and that he 4 had accounts in London. 5 So now that Harun has identified the American-based 6 security threat, he describes what it is that he proposes to 7 do, and he does that in the next paragraph. He says, there 8 are some measures that we tried to take here in Nairobi, but 9 first we wanted to verify that the man called Sidi Tayyib is 10 the same person known as Abu al Fadl al Makkee. We have taken 11 the matter seriously despite the limited resources we have 12 here in the office. I have sent a fax to Hamad to provide me 13 with information, but it was futile. I do not know whether or 14 not the letter has reached him. Until now he has not 15 complied. I also tried to call Qatar to verify the name 16 through engineer al Utabai, but the telephone was always busy. 17 Finally, and from another location I sent a fax to Abu Ibrahim 18 in the Sudan and till the writing of this message on 14 August 19 1997 I have not found a reply to the fax. He confirms the 20 conversation with Abu Khadija al Iraqi in the next paragraph. 21 Abu Khadija al Iraqi from Germany also called me on 13 August 22 and I informed him about the news, which shocked him, and I 23 told him to be careful. Anyway, we are not much concerned 24 about the man's name, Abu Fadhl. It is enough that there is a 25 man who was dealing with the sheik and fell in the hands of 5352 1 the enemy. Therefore, we must take the appropriate measures. 2 I and brother Tawfiq collected all the files which we do not 3 need and which might pose a danger to us and placed them in 4 another location. We did not burn them since they belong to 5 engineer Abdel al Sabbour, who may have a different opinion. 6 He will probably arrive next week, God willing. 7 (Continued on next page) 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 5354 1 So the first thing that Harun does is he gets 2 together with Ahmed Tawhil and he hides El Hage's files. And 3 he doesn't destroy them because El Hage isn't around to 4 consult with about whether or not El Hage wants the files 5 destroyed because he is in Afghanistan. 6 So Harun hides the files, ladies and gentlemen, and 7 these are the files that turn up in the Mira office during the 8 August 1998 search, a full year after this document is 9 written. The files that have the letters, the communications 10 between El Hage and between some of the others in al Qaeda, 11 including Nawawi, the files that have all the Khalid al Fawwaz 12 documents that I talked about earlier and the files that have 13 the passport photos that we showed you earlier, Government 14 Exhibit 6404. These are the files, the files that Abu Hafs 15 does not want the enemy to have but he doesn't have the 16 authority to destroy them because he's got to talk to Wadih El 17 Hage first. 18 Then Harun continues: "We also thought that if we 19 were indeed under surveillance, then this would make us look 20 suspicious. On the same day we heard the news that the 21 partisans called us from Mombasa and asked them never to call 22 me at number again. They told me that Khalid want to talk to 23 me urgently, but I told them I will get in touch with them but 24 never to call me at that number again. 25 "After two days they called me back at the same 5355 1 number so I forced them to burn that number and immediately 2 informed Khalid that I had prohibited them from calling me 3 here, as I am 100 percent sure that the telephone is tapped 4 after Wadih's wife told me that after three days of reading 5 the newspaper, she heard strange voices in the television when 6 she was trying to adjust the speaker." 7 Down at the bottom Harun gives some additional 8 advice: "The second matter is my advice to my kind 9 intelligent high command, which I pray to God to keep safe 10 from enemies, which works to return the caliphate to earth and 11 fight the forces of etheism and dictators who wreaked havoc on 12 earth. We, the East Africa crew, do not want to know how work 13 plans are operated because we are not fit for plans. We are 14 just implementers. We, thanks be to God, trust our command 15 and appreciate their work and know that they have a lot of 16 problems. But the advice here is for work purposes only, 17 because this work we are doing, the return of an Islamic 18 state, is a team effort and not an individual one; we are all 19 participating in it." 20 Harun is writing the high and wise command, just like 21 you heard these people are trained. They are segments. 22 Headquarters decides the big picture. You have people who do 23 intelligence and do the surveillance and then you have, as 24 Harun describes it, the implementers. And Harun, ladies and 25 gentlemen, is one of the implementers who will directly 5356 1 participate in the bombing of the embassy in Nairobi, about a 2 year after he writes this report. 3 On the next page, Harun says, "As you know, we only 4 knew about the decision to declare war against America through 5 the media, as have been mentioned, and we were supposed to 6 know about the decision only, not the plans, so that we can 7 take the necessary actions for this decision so that we will 8 not cause any problems or foil your plans for not knowing 9 about the decision, so that, as you know, if one of the crew 10 fell in the hands of those due to any decisions, God forbid, 11 that will be a loss to the group." 12 So, he's telling the high command in Afghanistan, we 13 didn't know you were going to take the war public. We didn't 14 know you were going to declare war. It would have been nice 15 to know because we want to make sure we're coordinated. 16 Notice he's not saying in there, oh, you mean we're against 17 America now? We didn't realize that was what this was about. 18 We object to that. No, what Harun is saying is, that's fine, 19 let's just make sure that we don't get in each other's way. 20 You don't get in the way of what we're doing, we don't want to 21 get in the way of what you're doing. 22 And what he says in particular is, in case one of us 23 gets caught, we don't want to give up information about others 24 in the high and wise command. Again, the elements of how the 25 operation is to be done and keeping the high command separate 5357 1 from the implementers. 2 Then he asks in the next part of the same paragraph: 3 "We ask you to keep in touch with us through the Internet from 4 Pakistan, because now we get a lot of information about the 5 Sheik through this network. We even find the Sheik's pictures 6 on the net. Or you can do as Abdel Sabbur did when he faxed 7 his family from the border city next to you. We want to hear 8 your good words and we are afraid of being disconnected and 9 taking unapproved plans domestically since we do not have 10 enough expertise for such difficult decision, because these 11 decisions need people like you." 12 So you can communicate with us as Abdel Sabbur, as 13 Wadih El Hage did, by using a fax in the Border city, 14 Peshawar, right next to Afghanistan. 15 And then the last paragraph, Harun says: "Finally, 16 this advice was sincerely for the sake of God so that work 17 will, work will advance without delay. I did not write this 18 report until I was officially asked by Brother Khalid to be 19 responsible for the media information office for the crew in 20 Nairobi. He," Khalid, "also asked me to write always from 21 time to time about the security situation of the crew and the 22 group here in general in East Africa in the files of the al 23 Barakar, which always includes seven items. The third is the 24 securitization, and remember that top secret report, the one 25 that went through the new policy, and it said that Khalid 5358 1 appointed Harun to be in charge of communications." 2 Ladies and gentlemen, the circle is complete. Harun 3 is doing what he's been tasked to do. He's telling the group 4 back in Afghanistan: We are fine with attacking America, 5 we're fine with the fact it's now public, but we have to be 6 very careful because the enemy is onto us. They are onto us 7 because of Abu Fadhl al Makkee, they are onto us because of 8 what is going on in Kenya and the security situation is very 9 dangerous. 10 And in those series of communications you see exactly 11 how al Qaeda operates, who they go to when there is trouble, 12 what it is that they are motivated to do, and it lays the 13 foundation when you hear Harun say, "We are the implementers." 14 And you will see that play out later on. 15 Now, at the bottom there is a second report. 16 We can take a break now if you like, your Honor. 17 THE COURT: All right. We'll take our mid afternoon 18 recess at this point. 19 (Recess) 20 THE COURT: Bring in the jury. 21 (Jury present) 22 THE COURT: Mr. Karas, you may continue. 23 MR. KARAS: Thank you, your Honor. 24 We left off at the bottom of 300A-T, and you see that 25 this is a different report that was retrieved by Agent 5359 1 Crisalli among the deleted files in the computer found in El 2 Hage's house. And in this report, what you see at the end is 3 written by Ayman al Zawahiri. The person says: "The contact 4 between you and me is the factor. So you can send it a week 5 after it reaches you to the center to take the latest news 6 which will come through Abdel Sabbur and tell him not to call 7 from any of the phones that we have. Tell everyone else about 8 this, and he may call Abdullah and leave a message that he 9 arrived at the center so that I go to him, God willing." 10 In the next paragraph there is written: "Brother 11 Sharif: Abdel Sabbur called before he came and by the time of 12 writing these reports on August 13, 1997, he told us that he 13 will come after a week. He told Salim to prepare himself to 14 go to the director and told him also that he will request to 15 leave the house immediately. I understood that Abdel Sabbur 16 will leave quickly. I met Ahmed and told him about the matter 17 and asked him about his readiness to follow up with the 18 agency. He," and then continuing on the next page, "told me 19 that he will not (unintelligible) anything and that it is 20 better to sell these things and to rent a normal house and put 21 one of us in it with the communication devices. What I see 22 it's that you come to us directly in Nairobi at this critical 23 period of time so that you can see how things will be in the 24 future." 25 So in this paragraph you learn from this document 5360 1 that the writer of the report, which may be Harun and it may 2 be somebody else, is in touch with Abdel Sabbur by August 13. 3 That's the defendant El Hage. And Abdel Sabbur mentioned that 4 he told Salim to prepare himself to come to the director, to 5 Bin Laden in Afghanistan, and that he, El Hage, will request 6 to leave the house immediately, to leave Nairobi. 7 And the person goes on to write that "I understood 8 that Abdel Sabbur will leave quickly and invites Brother 9 Sabbur to see what things will be like in the future, to see 10 what will happen," what it is like when Abdel Sabbur, when the 11 defendant El Hage, leaves Nairobi. 12 And that specific reference to rent a normal house 13 and put one of us in it with the communication devices, I 14 submit to you is precisely what El Hage has been doing in 15 Nairobi since he replaced Khalid al Fawwaz in 1994 -- get a 16 normal house and then set up a communication device where you 17 can then assume the duties of the group, the same way that 18 Wadih El Hage did and the same way that Khalid al Fawwaz did 19 before him. 20 Now, at some point, as you know, Wadih El Hage 21 returns from his trip to Afghanistan, and among the items that 22 shows you that is Government Exhibit 315. 315-1 is a ticket 23 stub that Agent Coleman testified about. You see the arrival 24 there, Nairobi. It says Mr. El Nage, Wadih, and then on page 25 3 of that exhibit, you see the ticket, El Hage, Nairobi to 5361 1 Karachi, and then an open return. And by the way, you see 2 that the ticket is issued for Pakistani Airways, Flight 744, a 3 flight number you will see later on in August of 1998. 4 Now, Government Exhibit 314 is a copy of El Hage's 5 passport. We can look at page 2 of that. This is a later 6 page that shows -- if we could go to 314-2, and there you see 7 El Hage's passport. And then 314-5, what you see there almost 8 in the middle of the screen, the angled entry stamp 20 Feb. 9 1997, that's the return trip in February. And you will see 10 the return trip in August, that's on page 12. There you see 11 the visa, Pakistan, 1997. 12 Now, El Hage returns in August, August 21, 1997, 13 which is the time that Agent Coleman is conducting the search 14 where he found the computer and where he found the address 15 books that you have seen so many of the names come up, and 16 that's where he found some of these daily planners and 17 business card holders. And one of the business cards that El 18 Hage had, Government Exhibit 306, at page 200, you will see on 19 the top right, Mamdouh M. Salim, and Mamdouh Salim you know is 20 the name for Abu Hajer. 21 Abu Hajer is the person we talked about earlier this 22 morning who is on the fatwah committee. He's the person who 23 issued some of the earlier fatwahs that deal with al Qaeda 24 being against America because of the Saudi Arabian Gulf 25 Peninsula and also because of Somalia. 5362 1 September 1997, two very important things happen. 2 The first is Wadih El Hage testifies before the Grand Jury 3 here in the Southern District of New York and he testifies a 4 little over a year after Bin Laden has issued his August 1996 5 declaration of war, a little less than six months after Bin 6 Laden has the interview with CNN, where he says he's declared 7 war against America, a little less than after a month after 8 the group has learned what it believes to be the cooperation 9 of Abu Fadhl al Makkee with the Americans, and it's a little 10 less than one year before the embassies are bombed in East 11 Africa. 12 And you will see later on, and we will go through the 13 perjury counts count by count, but Wadih El Hage is asked 14 questions about his relationship with Bin Laden, his 15 relationship with some of the leaders of al Qaeda, and his 16 relationship with other members or suspected members of al 17 Qaeda. And it is that moment that Wadih El Hage is given a 18 choice: Assist the United States in its investigation of al 19 Qaeda and its leader who has declared war on the United 20 States, or continue to side with Bin Laden and al Qaeda. 21 And you will see, ladies and gentlemen, that the 22 evidence overwhelmingly established that El Hage made his 23 choice. He violated his oath. He didn't tell the truth. He 24 lied about al Qaeda. He lied about Bin Laden. He chose, 25 Wadih El Hage, the American citizen, chose al Qaeda and Bin 5363 1 Laden over America. 2 And he did this for two reasons -- really one reason, 3 ladies and gentlemen. He did this to protect al Qaeda. He 4 did this to conceal al Qaeda's activities from the United 5 States. He did this as part of the conspiracy to make sure 6 that al Qaeda and those he was working with can continue in 7 their efforts against the United States. 8 And you see the security concerns that al Qaeda has 9 when it comes to America in those documents we went through 10 before the break. And so when El Hage is asked questions, 11 what he is going to do is he is going to remain loyal to Bin 12 Laden, he is going to remain loyal to al Qaeda, and he is 13 going to obstruct the investigation so that the others can 14 continue in their work. 15 And, ladies and gentlemen, El Hage's choice is both 16 symbolic and its tragic. It is symbolic because its reflects 17 precisely his involvement in this conspiracy. It reflects the 18 fact that he will remain loyal to it even when confronted with 19 very simple, straightforward questions about al Qaeda and his 20 relationship with al Qaeda. 21 And it is tragic. It is tragic, ladies and 22 gentlemen, because it robbed the United States of an 23 opportunity to investigate and crack the Bin Laden cell nearly 24 11 months before the embassies are bombed, before the 25 embassies are bombed by the East African cell that he ran, the 5364 1 implementers such as Harun, Wadih El Hage's deputy. And that 2 is why it is tragic. It is also illegal, and we will talk 3 about that later. 4 Now, not surprisingly, al Qaeda reacts to the 5 security threat that it perceives, and you heard from the 6 witness, Kherchtou, who told you that Harun came up to Sudan 7 and told Kherchtou about the search of El Hage's house. And 8 in particular, Kherchtou was told by Harun that the Americans 9 got the computer -- the computer that you know has the 10 security report, the computer that has the report regarding 11 the Taliban and the computer that has other documents that 12 were written to the al Qaeda high command. 13 And you may remember Essam al Ridi, the pilot. He 14 told you that when he spoke to Wadih El Hage, El Hage 15 mentioned to him that the Americans took his computer among 16 the other items. So al Qaeda does what it did in the Harun 17 security report. It's making sure people are aware of where 18 the Americans are investigating and what it is that they 19 found. 20 Now, at the same time all of this is going on, Odeh, 21 defendant Odeh, is in Somalia, still carrying out the new 22 policy to train people in Somalia. And he writes, we talked 23 about this earlier, the tape letter that is found in his house 24 in Witu. And this is an enlargement, Government Exhibit 25 710-96. 5365 1 In this letter you see that Odeh is writing his wife, 2 and what he says is: "Something happened which you may have 3 heard of or are aware of some of its details. Some kind of 4 distress/crisis has happened to few brothers where you are. 5 They had some problems. These problems were expected. They 6 were not farfetched. One expected these problems to happen 7 today before tomorrow and yesterday before today. But we had 8 no idea the nature of these problems and their magnitude. 9 "We heard the news about something that had happened 10 which may compel us to stay here in our locations without 11 moving due to the difficulty of the situation where you are 12 and also due to the inability to get to you using the way or 13 any of the ways that could take me to you. So it has been 14 decided that we have to stay here and not to move. 15 "We saw that the best thing is to reassure you and to 16 keep you well informed of the matter. Thank God for telling 17 you everything in details from the beginning and 18 (unintelligible) that you have endured. Thank God for your 19 letters that have been reassuring. Harun also said good news 20 about you when he came over. He said the whole family are 21 well, thank God, the master of the universe, and all they were 22 asking is to send them letters." 23 Now, ladies and gentlemen, this is part of a series 24 of tape letters, and some of the other ones place the dates of 25 these letters roughly in September of 1997. There is a 5366 1 reference to how he had been in Somalia for six months. So in 2 September 1997, defendant Odeh is writing back to his wife 3 about some problems. So there's a crisis, and whatever the 4 crisis is, it's keeping the people who were implementing the 5 new policy in Somalia, forcing them to stay in Somalia. 6 And you see the reference down at the bottom to 7 Harun. Harun also said good news. Now, remember Harun is the 8 communications person within the East African cell, and you 9 remember this morning we went through some of the telephone 10 calls where Harun was talking to Shuaib and he was talking to 11 Mustafa and he was talking to some of the other al Qaeda 12 members about El Hage's visit to Afghanistan in February 1997. 13 Harun is the one who writes the security report to 14 the high and wise command and in there he references the fact 15 that he's been in touch with Khalid and some other people in 16 the security situations. And now the news, whatever this news 17 is, in September of 1997 has gotten to Odeh in Somalia, and 18 what he's explaining to his wife is that this is a problem and 19 it's going to keep me here for a while. 20 Now, on the next page of the translation, Odeh writes 21 further, "I appeal to God to ease the burden on you and ask 22 God to compensate us with goodness for this loss. By God, I 23 miss you very much. I've always wanted us to be together 24 without being apart for one day, also to be able to visit you 25 and come back to keep on worshipping, obeying the laws of God, 5367 1 which I am taking upon myself while you carry on with your 2 life as usual." 3 And then the tone changes, "But may God fight against 4 the enemies. They neither sleep nor rest and they don't let 5 anybody rest. Anyhow, this is the way it should be. If they 6 let us rest, we will not let them rest. So they certainly 7 have their time and we have ours. This time may have been 8 theirs, but not all times will be theirs. We will never allow 9 that, and may God, the master of universe, to respond 20 fold 10 to one of theirs. "Thank God we are still alive and we are 11 still capable of giving and resisting. But of course the 12 matter will require time, preparation and thinking." 13 "Time, preparation and thinking." Ladies and 14 gentlemen, we will come back in the context of this, but bear 15 in mind by September of 1997, the al Qaeda cell in East Africa 16 is concerned about the cooperation with the Americans of Abu 17 Fadhl al Makkee. The al Qaeda cell in East Africa has learned 18 that the Americans have searched the house of Wadih El Hage 19 and that they have taken his computer among the other objects. 20 And remember the reference that Harun had to the 21 arrest of these five people and how they blamed, Harun blamed 22 the American intelligence for the arrest of these people in 23 Kenya. And he said that there is an American/Kenyan 24 intelligence effort because the Americans know well that it 25 was the youth of the Sheik that were responsible for what 5368 1 happened to the Americans in Somalia. 2 So by September of 1997, America is very much on the 3 minds of the East African cell of al Qaeda and Mohamed Odeh is 4 one of the prominent members of that cell and whatever it is 5 that's keeping him there, but he's telling even his wife that 6 they're going to respond 20 fold and the matter will take time 7 and preparation. 8 Other things that happened in September of 1997. 9 Ibrahim Eidarous, one of the three people that we talked about 10 with respect to London, Abu Abdallah Ibrahim and Daoud, 11 Ibrahim Eidarous, we talked about him in London. And what 12 happens in September of 1997 is that Eidarous goes from Baku, 13 Azerbaijan, we can see it on the map here, and he goes to 14 England, and that's where he becomes the cell leader of the 15 EIJ group in London. 16 And we know that because there is a ticket that is 17 found in his house, not the trunk of his car, government 18 Exhibit 1535. And you see a ticket there that shows a trip 19 from Baku to Amsterdam to London and it's the 24th of 20 September, 1997. And you remember, we read you the second 21 page of the letter, Government Exhibit 1523-T, and that's 22 where number 14, where Eidarous writes to Zawahiri, "call this 23 number, 956375892," and the next day the satellite phone 24 called that number on October 30th, 1997. 25 Well, in the first page of that letter, you see at 5369 1 the top: "Dear Brother Abu Mohamed," which is one of the 2 aliases for Ayman al Zawahiri, Government Exhibit 127, the 3 last alias Abu Mohamed, and what Eidarous writes in 1997, 4 having just arrived in England, he says, "It's necessary to 5 advise the brothers of the following: Firstly, to fear God. 6 Secondly, to cooperate with and obey the person in charge, for 7 this is the image that the people see." And you will see in a 8 moment that Ayman al Zawahiri complies with Eidarous and makes 9 sure everybody knows Eidarous is in charge in London. 10 With that, we move to January of 1998. In January 11 1998, Ayman al Zawahiri writes a letter to the EIJ leaders. 12 That's Government Exhibit 1518-T. You see at the bottom, 13 we'll highlight the text, 18/1/1998. Again, that's January 14 18th. We read the first part of this letter earlier. 15 "Honorable Brothers, peace be upon you and the mercy 16 of God." And then he appoints the people as deputies, and we 17 talked about Ahmad Hassan earlier. That's one of the people 18 involved in the passports with that person Dardaa. 19 Number 2, Zawahiri says, "We have arrived to a good 20 rough draft agreement with our friend here. However, the 21 third partner hasn't responded to it yet and the brothers 22 agree that the draft is good. We hope that God blesses it." 23 As we will see in a moment, ladies and gentlemen, on 24 February 23, 1998, barely a month after this letter goes out, 25 Bin Laden and Ayman al Zawahiri, who writes this letter, and a 5370 1 leader of another Egyptian group and two other groups issued 2 the February 1998 fatwah to kill American civilians. And here 3 you see Ayman al Zawahiri sharing with the leadership of EIJ 4 the rough draft of this fatwah. 5 Showing to you what I mentioned earlier, the joint 6 venture between al Qaeda and EIJ, a joint venture that will 7 play out in, among other places, in London, when Eidarous and 8 Abdel Bary help arrange to set forth the claims of 9 responsibility for the East Africa bombings. 10 On Government Exhibit 1519-T, what you see is a 11 letter from Ayman al Zawahiri. Down at the bottom, down at 12 the bottom, Abu Mohammed Nour Al Din, which is another one of 13 the aliases Zawahiri uses, the second from the bottom, and 14 it's to Brother Ezzat, who is one of the four people who had 15 been appointed a deputy. In fact, Zawahiri repeats that. I 16 am honored to tell you I have chosen you along with brothers 17 Mohammed Ali, Sami and Ahmad Hassan to work with me. 18 We'll have to come back to that. I pulled up the 19 wrong letter. I apologize. 20 If we go on to Government Exhibit 93, Government 21 Exhibit 93 is the Al-Quds article where the fatwah is 22 published. And you saw 93-T and we will go through it in a 23 moment, but this is a daily newspaper that is published in 24 London and this is where the fatwah is published. And what 25 you see is that the satellite phone that we talked about -- 5371 1 the chart here is marked as 598 -- is instrumental in the 2 dissemination of this critical fatwah. 3 If we go first to Government Exhibit 95, this is a 4 summary chart of telephone calls made, as it says on top, 5 February 22, 1998. And what we'll do is we'll go through and 6 identify each of the numbers and then we'll go through the 7 chronology. 8 You see the third column talks about the originating 9 number, and of course the 682505331 is the satellite phone. 10 Some of the other numbers you see there, the 44, that's the 11 country code for England. 1812084411, that is Khalid al 12 Fawwaz's number. Remember, he's got the 4411, the 4422 and 13 the 4433. 14 Then you've got a couple of other numbers down there. 15 If you look at the number called, the fourth number, again the 16 441817418008, and these are all reflected off of exhibits that 17 have the telephone records, but that number belongs to 18 Al-Quds, the newspaper through which the fatwah is published. 19 The number below that is the 44956657875 number, 20 that's the mobile phone number that belongs to Ibrahim 21 Eidarous. And the way that you know that is that Eidarous' 22 name appears in Fawwaz's address book under that number and 23 the subscriber name is Ibrahim Sayid and his name is Ibrahim 24 Eidarous. So those are the numbers that you have on this 25 page. 5372 1 What you see is at 11:24 -- GMT is ostensibly London 2 time -- there's a call, a half-minute call from the satellite 3 phone to Fawwaz. And then you see about 45 minutes later, 4 Fawwaz calls back and he calls back again nine minutes later 5 to the satellite phone. Those are relatively short 6 conversations. 7 Then what you see is after that 12:51 conversation, 8 the third one in the row, right after that, a 9 three-and-a-half-minute conversation with the satellite phone, 10 Fawwaz hangs up and he calls Al-Quds. And then three minutes 11 after that, the satellite phone, basically while Fawwaz is 12 working things out with Al-Quds, the satellite phone calls 13 Ibrahim Eidarous. Calls the leader of the EIJ cell, in 14 London. 15 Then there's no activity again until 1:50 p.m., when 16 Al-Quds calls Fawwaz at his 4411 number. And a minute later, 17 Fawwaz calls Al-Quds back and then you see Al-Quds calls 18 Fawwaz back. They're trading calls back and forth, very brief 19 calls, less than even half a minute. 20 Then at 40:03, the third from the bottom, Fawwaz 21 calls the satellite phone again, and 40 minutes later the 22 satellite phone calls Fawwaz back. And then at 5:25 they call 23 Fawwaz back again. If you go to the next page of Government 24 Exhibit 95, between 5:28 and 5:49 p.m. you will see a flurry 25 of calls. 5373 1 At 5:28, Fawwaz calls the satellite phone. At 5:29, 2 right afterwards, he calls Al-Quds. And then right after 3 that, Fawwaz calls the satellite phone again, and then right 4 after that he calls Al-Quds again. These go between here. 5 Then the satellite phone calls Fawwaz back at 5:45 and there's 6 one last call, one last making of the arrangements between 7 Fawwaz and Al-Quds at 5:47 p.m. 8 And then you see at 5:49 p.m. Al-Quds places a 30.7 9 minute phone call to the satellite phone on February 22, 1998, 10 the day before the Al-Quds publishes the fatwah. They're 11 dictating, talking about, discussing this fatwah, the day 12 before Al-Quds obliges and publishes the fatwah. 13 And then what you see is virtually right after that 14 call ends, the satellite phone calls Ibrahim Eidarous, the EIJ 15 leader. So you have got Khalid al Fawwaz, the al Qaeda person 16 who was in Nairobi, the al Qaeda person who was replaced by 17 Wadih El Hage when al Fawwaz left Kenya after he got arrested, 18 he's in touch with the satellite phone and he's brokering the 19 arrangement between the al Qaeda headquarters in Afghanistan 20 and Al-Quds, who will publish the fatwah, and at the same time 21 you have got the EIJ component part of this fatwah speaking 22 with the satellite phone as they are working out the 23 arrangement to disseminate this critical message. 24 And then what you see is another phone call at 6:36 25 p.m. to a number we haven't talked about yet from Fawwaz. You 5374 1 have the al Qaeda/EIJ relationship played out in London. 2 Fawwaz speaks to that number 956375892. And you may remember 3 that's the number that you Eidarous had written Ayman al 4 Zawahiri to call in October of 1997. And you see the five 5 calls on October 30, 1997. That's the number that belongs to 6 the third person in London to keep an eye on, Adel Abdel Bary. 7 You know that that's his number because Adel Abdel Bary's 8 number appears in Eidarous's phone book with that number and 9 in Khalid al Fawwaz's phone book with that number, that 10 375892. 11 So they're all talking together, and on the next day, 12 the very first call in the morning, the day that the fatwah is 13 published, Government Exhibit 96, at 9:15, Ibrahim Eidarous 14 calls Adel Abdel Bary. The EIJ people call the next morning 15 when Al-Quds publishes the fatwah. And if you go to the very 16 end of the first page there, you see a series of calls to an 17 0087 number, which is actually subscribed to Adel Abdel Bary's 18 real name. 19 You see six calls, five or six calls so Khalid al 20 Fawwaz at 4 in the afternoon, and then the next page there are 21 three more calls and then you see from a different number, 22 from an 8904 number as opposed to the 0087 number, Abdel Bary 23 sends a fax to Khalid al Fawwaz. The 443 number is the fax 24 number. 25 So, remember the calls take place the day the fatwah 5375 1 is published and then he sends a fax less than a minute the 2 day that the fatwah is published by Al-Quds. So what is it 3 that the fatwah says? Let's look at Government Exhibit 93-2. 4 This is a fatwah that, unlike the August 1996 5 declaration, is to the point. It doesn't go on for many 6 pages. You see at the top there, the portion that is being 7 highlighted of the translation, that it is Al-Quds, February 8 23, 1998. And you see the signatories to this fatwah, and the 9 first one is Usama Bin Laden, the next one is Ayman al 10 Zawahiri, and then there are three other groups that are 11 mentioned there. 12 And on the second page of this translation you see 13 about two-thirds of the way down the statement is made: "The 14 ruling to kill the Americans and their allies -- civilians and 15 military -- is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do 16 it in any country." 17 So now the group has changed again and now what it 18 says is, we're going to be explicit: The ruling is to kill 19 civilians and military. The ruling is to kill the Americans. 20 It is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it. 21 And what are the twin purposes of this? The group 22 tells you, the group who signs the fatwah. In order to 23 liberate the al-Aqsa Mosque and the holy mosque from their 24 grip and in order to liberate the al-Aqsa mosque and the holy 25 mosque from their grip. 5376 1 We will compare this later on, ladies and gentlemen, 2 but when the group claims responsibility for the bombings in 3 Nairobi and in Dar es Salaam, they name the operations after 4 these twin goals. The Nairobi operation is called Holy Kabba, 5 the Holy Mosque, and the Dar es Salaam operation is called 6 Operation al-Aqsa, the twin goals that they say support the 7 killing, the ruling to kill American civilians and military 8 wherever they can be found. 9 Ladies and gentlemen, as I mentioned, this is 10 explicit. There's no nuance to this. Bin Laden, Bin Laden, 11 signs this document and he excludes nobody from this fatwah. 12 He doesn't make any distinction for innocent Americans 13 because, in his view, there are no innocent Americans. He 14 puts a target on the back of every American, whether the 15 American wears a uniform, whether the American is a diplomat, 16 works for a diplomat, it doesn't matter. They are targets and 17 it is a duty and he gives the reasons why. 18 That is on February 23, 1998. Now, the same day that 19 this fatwah is published, Harun, the former El Hage deputy, 20 Harun the person who said we are just the implementers, Harun 21 buys a ticket on February 23, 1998 to go from Khartoum, Sudan 22 to Nairobi, and you see this in Government Exhibit 921. So 23 Bin Laden and others say we're going to kill American 24 civilians and Harun gets a ticket to go down to Nairobi from 25 Sudan. That's February. 5377 1 Now we turn to March 1998. The ink isn't even dry on 2 the fatwah, ladies and gentlemen, and what Odeh tells the FBI 3 agents who interview him is that there is a meeting, and what 4 he said to the agents was that he went to Mombasa as part of 5 his furniture business and that he had a meeting, that there 6 was a meeting that Saleh called, and that Odeh, Saleh, Ahmed 7 the Egyptian, and Harun, they meet. And during this meeting, 8 according to what Odeh told the agents, that Saleh said that 9 he had just returned from Afghanistan and that the word was 10 that they had to start getting people out of Kenya so that 11 people had to get their affairs in order and start getting 12 documents. That is what the defendant Odeh told the agent. 13 In March of 1998, he, Saleh, Harun, and Ahmed the Egyptian are 14 told that al Qaeda wants people to start getting their affairs 15 in order and they're going to have to go back to leave Kenya. 16 The other thing that happens in March of 1998, 17 according to what Khalfan Khamis Mohamed told Agent Perkins, 18 is it was in March or April of 1998 that Mustafa Fadhl, 19 Mustafa Fadhl approached Khalfan Khamis Mohamed about doing a 20 Jihad job. And what Khafan Khamis Mohamed said is that he 21 would do that. 22 Now, the mission was not determined -- he was not 23 told of the mission at that time, but he knew that it was a 24 Jihad job and he accepted it, and what he told Agent Perkins 25 is that he did find out that the target was the American 5378 1 Embassy and that he found out the week before the bombing. 2 And at some -- 3 MR. RICCO: Your Honor, I object and request an 4 instruction on the manner in which Khalfan Khamis Mohamed's 5 statement can be used. 6 THE COURT: Khalfan Khamis Mohamed's statement? 7 MR. RICCO: Yes. 8 THE COURT: To the agent after his arrest? 9 MR. RICCO: Yes. 10 THE COURT: Was received in evidence solely against 11 Khalfan Khamis Mohamed. 12 MR. KARAS: Thank you, your Honor. 13 Now, in March of 1998, Khalfan Khamis Mohamed is 14 living at 22 Kidigalo Street, and you know that from Abdel 15 Salun, who was the next door neighbor at Kidigalo Street, and 16 the landlord who rented the Kidigalo Street apartment to K.K. 17 Mohamed. If we could display Government Exhibit 1400A, that 18 is place where Khalfan Khamis Mohamed was living since 19 January, according to those two witnesses that I just 20 mentioned to you. 21 And at some point during that time Abdel Salun, 22 remember that somebody by the name of Hussein shows up and 23 begins to leave with Khalfan Khamis Mohamed and Abdel Salun 24 identified this picture as the Hussein. Mustafa Fadhl, the 25 person who is the al Qaeda member in the East African cell, 5379 1 the person who was referred to Khalid in the new policy 2 reports that El Hage brought back. 3 At some point, what Abdel Salun told you was that 4 Hussein, as he knew him, was joined by Hussein's wife and his 5 two children. And you learned there name Anas and Yusr. Now, 6 in April, the plot is in full gear. Once again, Odeh admits 7 to the agents that there was a meeting in Witu this time, and 8 what he told the agents was that Mustafa Fadhl came to see him 9 in Witu in April. 10 And Fadhl once again discussed these instructions 11 about al Qaeda people leaving Kenya, and in particular, Odeh 12 said that he and Fadhl discussed the February 1998 fatwah and 13 whether or not it was right to do this fatwah because the 14 United States was so powerful and that some in the leadership 15 in al Qaeda questioned the fatwah, but in the end they wounded 16 up supporting it. That's in April of 1998. 17 In Nairobi, meanwhile, in April of 1998, Harun rents 18 the location at 43 Runda Estates in Nairobi, and you actually 19 heard from Tamara Ratemo, the landlord, who talked about the 20 meetings that she had and discussions she had with Harun. One 21 of the things that Harun told Ms. Ratemo was that Harun said 22 that he would be having businessmen coming to conduct 23 business, he mentioned the businessmen would be from Dubai, 24 and the other things he asked her to do was to make 25 arrangements so that the phone at 43 Runda Estates could be 5380 1 used to make international calls. 2 And you may remember that she said that she would 3 have to go to the telephone and ostensibly guarantee that the 4 phone would be paid for, and she specifically gave you the 5 telephone number for 43 Runda Estates during 1998. The number 6 she gave you was 512430. 512430. And you are going to see 7 that that is the number from which the defendant Al-'Owhali is 8 going to call Yemen before he carries out the bombing, and you 9 are going to see that the cell phone that was used in Dar es 10 Salaam among the members of the bomb plot called that number, 11 512430, in the days that preceded the bombing establishing the 12 connection between the Dar es Salaam and the Nairobi bombings. 13 Now, we won't display it, but there was a lease, 14 Government Exhibit 568, for the 43 Runda Estates. And we'll 15 show you some of the pictures so you can get an idea of what 16 the place looked like. Government Exhibit 567A and then 17 Government Exhibit 567C. You see 43 and you see the walls and 18 the gates and you see the gate again in 567E. Again, a 19 secluded place, a place in which the group could construct its 20 bomb, carry out its activities, and follow through on its plot 21 to bomb the embassies. 22 And you see and you heard some of the evidence, and 23 we'll talk about some of the evidence where the FBI went to 43 24 Runda Estates within two weeks of the bombing and they did a 25 couple of searches there. They did numerous of the swabbings 5381 1 that the agents told you about with those cotton swabs and 2 they took some soil samples and they found a few other items. 3 Now, Government Exhibit 787 is the summary chart that 4 Kelly Mount testified to. Remember, she's the chemist and you 5 see the results of the testing on the swabs. The control swab 6 tested negative and the four other swabbings of a table top in 7 43 Runda Estates test positive or PETN and TNT. 8 And in Government Exhibit 788, which is a three-page 9 summary of the results of the testing of the items, you see 10 the swabbings repeatedly test positive for PETN and TNT, and 11 you also see that there was the presence of aluminum found. 12 You may remember that the defendant Mohamed Al-'Owhali told 13 Agent Gaudin that they had in fact used aluminum powder as 14 part of the bomb. The forensics results confirm what it was 15 that Mohamed Al-'Owhali said to Agent Gaudin. 16 The other thing that was found at 43 Runda Estates 17 was a Time Magazine article and Mitchell Hollars, the FBI 18 fingerprint specialist, testified that Government Exhibit 750, 19 which is the Time Magazine article, had a fingerprint for 20 Harun -- Harun, the person who rented the bomb factory; Harun, 21 who worked as Wadih El Hage's deputy; Harun, who was the 22 person who wrote the security reports that you saw earlier. 23 Now, in Tanzania, Khalfan Khamis Mohamed and Mustafa 24 Fadhl, going by the name Hussein, are living together and 25 Khalfan Khamis Mohamed told Agent Perkins that what they did 5382 1 at 22 Kidigalo is they would store the TNT and they would 2 store some of the other components of the bomb. And one of 3 the things that the FBI recovered after the fact, you may 4 recall, was this red carpet that Abdel Ihib talked about 5 seeing in the house after Khalfan Khamis Mohamed left. And 6 1401-P is a photo of that red carpet. 7 And Government Exhibit 1462 is the summary chart of 8 the results of the chemists who did the work on the Dar es 9 Salaam exhibits. And you see down at the bottom that the red 10 carpet, 1401, and there was also some foam padding, Government 11 Exhibit 1402, tested positive for TNT and PETN. 12 The other thing that happens in April of 1998 is 13 Khalfan Khamis Mohamed applies for a Tanzania passport not in 14 his name but in the name of Suheil Nassur Maleek, and he told 15 Agent Perkins that he applied for the passport -- excuse me, 16 that the got the passport after it was that he was told about 17 the Jihad mission. 18 Now we move to May of 1998, May 6th, and you can 19 see -- let's look at Government Exhibit 901. Government 20 Exhibit 901 is a Yemen passport. If we could turn that 21 around, it's a Yemen passport with Al-'Owhali's photograph on 22 it. And the name is not Mohamed Al-'Owhali, it's Khalid Salim 23 Saleh Bin Rashid and he purports to be a merchant here and the 24 date of issue is 6 May 1998. 25 Now this passport, ladies and gentlemen, was found in 5383 1 the residence of Harun in the Comoros after the bombing, and 2 of course it makes sense, as we'll discover, because Mohamed 3 Al-'Owhali was not supposed to survivor the attack. So Harun 4 in collecting the items. Harun is making sure there is no 5 trail so he collects these items and he brings them with him. 6 Of course, he can't take them with him to 7 Afghanistan, so he leaves them behind in the Comoros, 8 comfortable with the notion that he has erased any trail that 9 will connect him and the others to the bombing. And what you 10 see, ladies and gentlemen of the jury, once again, is the 11 critical nature of fake passports for the group. 12 This is how they get people like Al-'Owhali into 13 places like Kenya to carry out operations. And to do that you 14 need to have facilitators, people who can take care of fake 15 passports and people who can arrange for messages and the 16 travel of others. And as we talked about earlier, that's one 17 of the roles that Wadih El Hage played. Now, we're not saying 18 he had anything to do with this passport, but the point is 19 that this is how al Qaeda operates and this is how it is that 20 Al-'Owhali was able, in part, to carry out his mission. 21 On May 7th, in London, Abu Hafs goes by the name 22 Dr. Atef, writes Khalid al Fawwaz, and you see Government 23 Exhibit 1636-T, which is a translation of a document found in 24 Khalid al Fawwaz's house. And you see at the top there the 25 4433 number I mentioned to you. That is Khalid al Fawwaz's 5384 1 fax number, and what Abu Hafs says on the 7th of May -- 2 remember, you got to invert the numbers -- May 7th, 1998, he 3 says: "It has been sent to you the fatwah of the Ulma of 4 Afghanistan and it is a very important and very strong fatwah 5 and also it has been sent with an introduction of the fatwah 6 and comments about the fatwa signed by the Sheik," referring 7 to Bin Laden. 8 "Please send it to the Arab press, Al-Quds, Al Sharq 9 Al-Awssat, Al-Moharer, Al-Hayat and the news agencies, 10 satellite broadcasting agencies and others. 11 "And if it's possible to publish the fatwah and the 12 introduction one day, and the comments on the second, this 13 will be better, especially in Al-Quds." 14 Now, Al-Quds is the same paper that published the 15 February 1998 fatwah. And let's move to Government Exhibit 16 1602, please, if we could. Found in Khalid al Fawwaz's 17 residence, 94 Dewsbury Road, this is going to be -- this is a 18 translation of what appears. And you see the translation, 19 Al-Quds ago Al-Arabi newspaper, May 14, 1998. And the title 20 is "Clergymen in Afghanistan Issue a fatwah calling for the 21 Removal of American Forces from the Gulf. Saudi opposition 22 member Usama Bin Laden supports it." 23 So once again, Al-Quds obliges Bin Laden, publishes 24 another fatwah. Once again Khalid al Fawwaz is in the middle 25 of making sure that this gets disseminated, and you see that 5385 1 Bin Laden expresses his thanks to the editor of Al-Quds in 2 Government Exhibit 1634-T. 3 Down at the bottom you see a signature of Usama Bin 4 Laden, and the letter is addressed to "the well-known 5 journalist Mr. Abdel Barry Atwan, owner of Al-Quds Al-Arabi 6 Newspaper. 7 "I take pleasure in congratulating you for your 8 strong journalistic views towards the truth, and the 9 steadfastness of your newspaper to serve the struggle, and the 10 use of the pen to defend the nation's causes and its holy 11 places, and the carrying out of its task to inform, truly 12 without being touched by elements of temptation and 13 seduction." 14 Skipping that next sentence he writes, "As we 15 congratulate you on this great achievement, the efforts to 16 defend the nation's causes and support her defenders, I would 17 like to thank you personally for your interest on the news in 18 the Arab Peninsula and the country Al-Haramin (Saudi), as well 19 as your deep understanding of the ongoing struggle between the 20 good and bad in the area, siding with truth, and supporting 21 it, is a situation which will not be forgotten by the people 22 in the area." And it's dated May 14, 1998, when Al-Quds 23 published the fatwah that Atef, Abu Hafs, wanted to have 24 published. 25 If you take a quick look at the original of this, the 5386 1 Arabic original, Government Exhibit 1634, if we could invert 2 that and then focus on the fax header -- you see Bin Laden's 3 signature there, by the way. If you focus on the fax header 4 you see that Kandahar Telecommunications, AFG, 837655. 5 And you may remember when we were going through 6 Khalid al Fawwaz's address book there was a listing for 7 Dr. Mohamed Atef. There was one that had a listing for the 8 satellite phone number, and there was one that had a listing 9 with the number 83765. And as we talked about earlier, 10 Kandahar is one of the southern provinces of Afghanistan. So 11 the communications are coming directly from al Qaeda 12 headquarters. They are going to London, something that you 13 will see later on as we go through the claims of 14 responsibility. 15 Now, on May 10, we don't have to pull it up, but 16 Government Exhibit 903 is the Harun passport, and there's also 17 some tickets that are found in his house in the Comoros. And 18 there's another trip that Harun takes back to Kenya on May 19 10th. And on May 18th -- moving to May 18th, if we can pull 20 up the passport for Mohamed Al-'Owhali, Government Exhibit 21 901, in that passport, ladies and gentlemen, you will see a 22 trip where Mohamed Al-'Owhali flies, he goes from Yemen to 23 Pakistan, and there's going to be an entry stamp in Pakistan 24 on May 18. 25 THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, we'll call it a 5387 1 day. It's been a while since I reminded you, so let me remind 2 you, please, not to read, listen, watch anything which has to 3 do with this case, anything remotely related to this case or 4 with respect to McVeigh. 5 Have a pleasant evening. 6 (Jury not present) 7 THE COURT: My comment with respect to remaining in 8 the courtroom only referred to the people at the bar, not 9 spectators. They can feel free to leave if they wish. 10 Mr. Karas, how is your timing? 11 MR. KARAS: Your Honor, we're still on pace to finish 12 between two to two and a half days. 13 THE COURT: Two to two and a half days. Certainly 14 all day tomorrow? 15 MR. KARAS: I believe we will go through all day 16 tomorrow, and I'm hoping to finish by tomorrow but I can't say 17 for sure. 18 THE COURT: Because when we finish, we -- 19 MR. SCHMIDT: We'll expect to be going on Thursday. 20 THE COURT: Thursday, okay. 21 There was some issue that you raised, I'm sorry if I 22 was very abrupt, but we did schedule 9:45 and we had been -- 23 we try not to be late. 24 MR. DRATEL: I have the page and line numbers on the 25 two pieces of testimony. The Khalifa -- 5388 1 THE COURT: You're referring to which document? 2 MR. DRATEL: This is the Grand Jury testimony. 3 THE COURT: The Grand Jury testimony. 4 MR. FITZGERALD: May I make one suggestion? If he 5 gives me the page and line numbers, we can discuss it. If we 6 take a five-minute break, we can tell your Honor where we're 7 at rather than have your Honor endure our discussion. 8 THE COURT: That's an offer that would be difficult 9 to refuse. 10 We'll take a five-minute recess. 11 (Recess) 12 THE COURT: There is an application to strike certain 13 portions of the Grand Jury testimony? 14 MR. FITZGERALD: I'm glad your Honor is sitting down. 15 We've reached an agreement. 16 THE COURT: And just for the record, what is being 17 stricken? 18 MR. FITZGERALD: From the 1997 Grand Jury transcript 19 of El Hage, it would be page 72, line 23, through page 90, 20 line 15, which concerns the episode in Arizona with the 21 preacher, and then from page 120, line 26, through page 121, 22 line 26, which corresponds to Ethiopia. 23 THE COURT: It doesn't affect the instructions or the 24 language of the indictment or the verdict form? 25 MR. DRATEL: There is parts of the indictment, the 5389 1 introductory portion. 2 MR. FITZGERALD: We can work out the language after 3 court today on anything that has to be struck from the 4 indictment. It is not going to affect the charge to the jury. 5 It is not going to affect summation. 6 THE COURT: There is something in the background 7 section that is a reference to it? 8 MR. DRATEL: The perjury, the preamble to the perjury 9 counts has a mention of it. 10 MR. FITZGERALD: We'll agree on a redaction tonight, 11 your Honor. That shouldn't be a problem. 12 THE COURT: One other thing, on the subject of the 13 language of the indictment, Count Four, which is the 14 conspiracy to destroy buildings and property of the United 15 States, on page 36 has the language "and attempt to damage and 16 destroy." I just want to make sure that that was intended, 17 since you have stricken "attempt" in other places. 18 MR. FITZGERALD: I think it's conspiracy. It's only 19 conspiracy that they would damage or attempt to damage, but 20 not on the substantive counts. 21 THE COURT: That's an intentional inclusion? 22 MR. FITZGERALD: Yes. 23 THE COURT: Very well. 24 Anything that has to be addressed before the jury 25 comes in tomorrow? 5390 1 MR. DRATEL: No, your Honor, but just to alert the 2 Court, we have prepared from Mr. El Hage the stipulations that 3 we put in, the 13th stipulation, the chart, which I gave to 4 the government this morning. They just want time to review 5 it, the descriptions and all of that, and we can hopefully get 6 that -- 7 THE COURT: That can be received outside the presence 8 of the jury and then I will simply add a sentence in the 9 charge telling them that is the defense counterpart to 10 Government Exhibit 7. 11 MR. DRATEL: Thank you. 12 THE COURT: We're adjourned until 10 a.m. tomorrow. 13 (Adjourned to 10:00 a.m. on May 2, 2001.) 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
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