1 May 2001
Source: Digital file from the Court Reporters Office, Southern District of New York; (212) 805-0300.

This is the transcript of Day 37 of the trial, May 1, 2001.

See other transcripts: http://cryptome.org/usa-v-ubl-dt.htm


   2   ------------------------------x


   4              v.                           S(7) 98 Cr. 1023

   5   USAMA BIN LADEN, et al.,

   6                  Defendants.

   7   ------------------------------x

                                               New York, N.Y.
   9                                           May 1, 2001
                                               9:45 a.m.


  12   Before:

  13                       HON. LEONARD B. SAND,

  14                                           District Judge













   1                            APPEARANCES

            United States Attorney for the
   3        Southern District of New York
   4        KENNETH KARAS
            PAUL BUTLER
   5        MICHAEL GARCIA
            Assistant United States Attorneys

   9        Attorneys for defendant Wadih El Hage

  12        Attorneys for defendant Mohamed Sadeek Odeh

  14        Attorneys for defendant Mohamed Rashed Daoud Al-'Owhali

  16        Attorneys for defendant Khalfan Khamis Mohamed











   1            (In open court)

   2            THE COURT:  Certain consistency in punctuality.

   3   Mr. Schmidt is not here nor is Mr. Dratel.  You know where

   4   they are?

   5            MS. BESOBRASOW:  They should be here any moment, your

   6   Honor.

   7            THE COURT:  Are there any matters that require the

   8   Court's attention?

   9            MR. FITZGERALD:  I believe not, your Honor.  I could

  10   tell your Honor all that's left of the government's rebuttal

  11   case, we're just going to offer corrected stipulations, a

  12   stipulation chart, and to read one stipulation between the

  13   government and defense counsel for Odeh.  That should take

  14   literally two minutes and we'll be ready to do the summations.

  15            MR. RICCO:  Yes.

  16            THE COURT:  Anybody have a different view?

  17            Very well.  Then as soon as Mr. Schmidt arrives,

  18   we'll bring in the jury.

  19            MR. FITZGERALD:  Thank you.

  20            (Recess)

  21            THE COURT:  Let's bring in the jury.

  22            MR. DRATEL:  Your Honor, a couple of -- one scope of

  23   items.

  24            THE COURT:  This was called for 9:45.

  25            MR. DRATEL:  I know, your Honor.  I'm sorry.


   1            THE COURT:  Yes.

   2            MR. DRATEL:  Mr. El Hage's Grand Jury testimony?

   3            THE COURT:  Yes.

   4            MR. DRATEL:  I guess it's the first one in September

   5   '97.

   6            THE COURT:  Yes.

   7            MR. DRATEL:  Went in virtually in toto and at the

   8   time we had moved to strike certain parts that were

   9   prejudicial and on 403 grounds, and at the time certain -- a

  10   couple of things stayed in, one in particular because it was

  11   in the indictment as a part of a perjury charge which has

  12   since been dismissed, which was the old Count 290, on the

  13   identification of a person and it had to do with the imam in

  14   Tucson and the murder of the imam in Tucson.  Now there is

  15   nothing in the indictment, there are no pending charges that

  16   relate to that, and we would ask that that be stricken.

  17            THE COURT:  You are asking -- this is an overt act?

  18            MR. DRATEL:  Not an overt act.

  19            THE COURT:  There is a charge?

  20            MR. DRATEL:  It was part of a charge, a perjury

  21   charge.

  22            THE COURT:  Which count is this?

  23            MR. DRATEL:  It's old Count 290.  It has been

  24   dismissed.

  25            THE COURT:  And the count has been dismissed.  So you


   1   want dismissed from the Grand Jury testimony the questioning

   2   that related to something which became the subject of

   3   something that has been since dismissed?

   4            MR. DRATEL:  Yes.  And that it be stricken also from

   5   the, I guess the introductory part of the perjury part of the

   6   indictment.

   7            MR. FITZGERALD:  Your Honor, if this is going to take

   8   great length, I can tell you it's not coming up in the

   9   summation at all so we can deal with it at the end of the day.

  10   But we would oppose that because Mr. El Hage has put much

  11   testimony in even as late as yesterday about goats regarding

  12   counts not charged in the indictment, lies not charged, to

  13   show the context of the Grand Jury appearance and I think --

  14            THE COURT:  We'll take it up at 4:30.

  15            MR. DRATEL:  Your Honor, there's one other, one

  16   question and answer really in the Grand Jury --

  17            THE COURT:  It is also going to be -- say what the

  18   subject matter is.  We do intend to schedule things and to

  19   have some timing.

  20            MR. DRATEL:  Yes, your Honor.  I'm sorry.

  21            THE COURT:  Tell me what the matter is.

  22            MR. DRATEL:  There was questioning about a visa in

  23   the first Grand Jury appearance, there was a question about a

  24   visa for Ethiopia for Mr. El Hage, questioning about an

  25   assassination attempt on the Egyptian president.  There's been


   1   no other proof of that at all.

   2            THE COURT:  Same issue?

   3            MR. DRATEL:  Yes.

   4            THE COURT:  Same issue.

   5            MR. DRATEL:  Not same issue as far as the perjury

   6   counts.  This was never a perjury count.  It was in there but

   7   there has been no other proof.  So right now it's prejudicial

   8   without any other proof.

   9            MR. FITZGERALD:  We can take it up at 4:30, Judge.

  10   It's not part of the government's summation.

  11            THE COURT:  Take it up at 4:30.

  12            MR. DRATEL:  Thank you, your Honor.

  13            THE COURT:  Bring in the jury.

  14            MR. DRATEL:  Your Honor, a clothing issue for Mr. El

  15   Hage.

  16            THE COURT:  I sent that memo to the warden and as I

  17   sent a previous letter and the warden advises that there is no

  18   health risk involved in the concern raised by Mr. El Hage and

  19   that with respect to tooth brushes, he will get the new

  20   toothbrush when the existing supply is exhausted.  And I know

  21   of no reason and have no inclination to interfere with these

  22   matters of the operation of the MCC.

  23            MR. DRATEL:  Your Honor, I'm also concerned about the

  24   immediate clothing issue, that he was not given his other

  25   shirt today and now he's --


   1            THE COURT:  I understand.  I have sent that to the

   2   warden.  What would you like me to do?

   3            MR. DRATEL:  I don't know, your Honor.

   4            THE COURT:  Neither do I.  Please be seated.

   5            Thank you.

   6            (Jury present)

   7            THE COURT:  Good morning.  Mr. Fitzgerald.

   8            MR. FITZGERALD:  Yes, Judge, good morning.  The

   9   government formally offers but does not read at this time

  10   corrected pages to the Stipulation 1, Government Exhibit 162R,

  11   163R, and a corrected stipulation 154R, and we also offer but

  12   do not read at this time Government Exhibit 7, which is a

  13   chart of all the stipulations offered by the government in

  14   this case.

  15            THE COURT:  Received.

  16            (Government Exhibits 7, 154R, 162R and 163R received

  17   in evidence)

  18            MR. FITZGERALD:  And we also offer at this time

  19   Government Exhibit 193, which is a stipulation between the

  20   government and Odeh and his counsel, and I would like to read

  21   that.

  22            THE COURT:  Yes.

  23            MR. FITZGERALD:  It is hereby stipulated and agreed

  24   by and between the United States of America and defendant

  25   Mohamed Sadeek Odeh, by and with the consent of his


   1   undersigned attorneys, as follows:

   2            If recalled to testify as a witness, Kelly Mount

   3   would testify that on or about March 17, 1999, she vacuumed

   4   Government Exhibit 529, the Nike bag, and each of its contents

   5   other than those items about which she testified previously,

   6   namely, Government Exhibits 535A, through 535E and 535G

   7   through 535I, obtaining a single filter sample.  She then

   8   analyzed that sample, which analysis proved negative for the

   9   presence of explosives residue in that sample.

  10            It is further stipulated and agreed that this

  11   stipulation may be received in evidence as a government

  12   exhibit at trial.

  13            THE COURT:  Received.

  14            (Government Exhibit 193 received in evidence)

  15            MR. FITZGERALD:  With that your Honor, the government

  16   rests its rebuttal case.

  17            THE COURT:  Government rests.  So the record is

  18   complete, ladies and gentlemen.  All of the evidence is now

  19   before you and we proceed to the closing arguments.  One of my

  20   functions with respect to closing arguments is I am the

  21   timekeeper, and we'll proceed now with the government's

  22   closing argument.

  23            MR. KARAS:  Your Honor, counsel, ladies and

  24   gentlemen, good morning.

  25            You may recall that my partner, Mr. Butler, began his


   1   opening statement by setting the scene for you in the

   2   midmorning hours of August 7, 1998, just minutes before two

   3   bombs ripped through our embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar

   4   es Salaam, Tanzania.  I would like to begin my closing

   5   statements by showing you what the scene was like in the

   6   immediate aftermath of those bombings to remind all of us

   7   about why we are here.

   8            (Video played)

   9            MR. KARAS:  Ladies and gentlemen, those portions of

  10   those videos serve as a painful symbol, painful reminder of

  11   why it is that we have spent the last two and a half months

  12   together, spending the last two and a half months to review

  13   evidence that was collected from all over the world.

  14            And the reason that we have done this is because we

  15   have been involved in a search for justice, a search to

  16   determine who it is that committed these acts, these

  17   unspeakable acts that ended the lives and the hopes and the

  18   dreams of hundreds of people, these vicious acts that

  19   shattered three friendly nations, these evil acts defined no

  20   justification, these unjust acts that demand accountability.

  21            Now this search for justice began by Mr. Butler

  22   committing to you that the government would establish beyond a

  23   reasonable doubt that the defendant Mohamed Odeh and the

  24   defendant Mohamed Al-'Owhali participated in the bombing of

  25   the American Embassy in Nairobi on August 7th and that Khalfan


   1   Khamis Mohamed participated in the bombing of the embassy in

   2   Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.  And I submit to you, ladies and

   3   gentlemen, we have honored that commitment and we have

   4   established the guilt of those defendants for those crimes in

   5   this case.

   6            But we committed to more.  We committed to showing to

   7   you that there was a conspiracy behind these embassy attacks,

   8   a conspiracy to murder the people of the United States simply

   9   because they were American, and we committed to showing to you

  10   that all four of these defendants participated in that

  11   conspiracy.  And I submit to you that we have honored that

  12   commitment, that we have established beyond a reasonable doubt

  13   the guilt of all four of those defendants in connection with

  14   the conspiracy.

  15            Now, ladies and gentlemen, we have now come to the

  16   close of the case and all of the evidence has been put before

  17   you, and I understand that hundreds of exhibits went before

  18   you very quickly and without explanation.  And sometimes they

  19   went in by way of stipulation and they went in even more

  20   quickly, and I know, because I helped read some of these

  21   stipulations.

  22            But now is the time, now is the time where we can

  23   discuss what the evidence tells you and how it is that the

  24   pieces of the puzzle come together to show to you why it is

  25   that we have proved these defendants guilty beyond a


   1   reasonable doubt.  This is our opportunity to walk through the

   2   evidence and explain the context of the conspiracies and the

   3   events that preceded the bombings as well as the acts that

   4   were carried out in furtherance of the bombings.

   5            The way I'm going to do this, ladies and gentlemen,

   6   is the first thing I'm going to do is offer a brief summary of

   7   what the evidence shows these defendants did, and I do that

   8   because I don't want people to be concerned about the number

   9   of names that you have heard, about the number of places and

  10   acts and companies and countries, because at its core, the

  11   case against each and every single one of these defendants is

  12   relatively straightforward.

  13            Once we go through the summary of what the evidence

  14   shows these defendants did, we will walk together through the

  15   chronology of the events, the chronology that comprises the

  16   conspiracy to murder, the conspiracy to commit war against the

  17   United States.  And when we have gone through that chronology,

  18   we will talk about the counts in the indictment.  We will talk

  19   about every count in the indictment.

  20            Now, the indictment has 300 counts, a little over 300

  21   counts, and that is not so much a reflection of the complexity

  22   of this case but of the sad fact that each and every victim is

  23   represented in a separate count in this indictment, a separate

  24   count of murder.

  25            Now, I'll tell you up front, ladies and gentlemen,


   1   this is going to take some time.  There has been a lot of

   2   evidence presented before you and I want to take the time and

   3   make sure that you understand what the evidence means, and I

   4   think this is going to take the balance of today and tomorrow.

   5   So let's roll up our sleeves, let's go through the evidence,

   6   and let's continue this search for justice.

   7            Now, let's begin with the summary.  What does the

   8   evidence show that the defendant Wadih El Hage did in

   9   connection with this conspiracy?  Now, in his opening

  10   statement, counsel for El Hage, on behalf of El Hage, said to

  11   you that Mr. El Hage was a mediator and that he was somebody

  12   who shared in the tragedy of the embassy bombings.

  13            Ladies and gentlemen, I submit to you that the

  14   evidence shows that Wadih El Hage was a facilitator, somebody

  15   who performed key logistical acts on behalf of the al Qaeda

  16   conspiracy and somebody who obstructed the investigation into

  17   al Qaeda within a year of the bombing and within weeks after

  18   the bombing.

  19            What the evidence shows, ladies and gentlemen, is

  20   that, like many people in al Qaeda, Wadih El Hage has a family

  21   and that Wadih El Hage conducts business transactions.  But

  22   like other people in al Qaeda, the evidence shows that Wadih

  23   El Hage led a double life, a secret criminal life on behalf of

  24   al Qaeda, and that he performed logistical services for al

  25   Qaeda to make sure that others in al Qaeda could carry out


   1   their deadly acts.

   2            The evidence shows that as far back as 1992 and 1993

   3   Wadih El Hage was in charge of the al Qaeda payroll in

   4   Khartoum, Sudan when al Qaeda was headquartered in that

   5   country.  It showed that Wadih El Hage made efforts to

   6   transport Stinger Missiles from Pakistan to Sudan in 1993, the

   7   same year that al Qaeda was targeting the American

   8   peace-keeping mission in Somalia, and the evidence shows that

   9   Wadih El Hage arranged for the transport of five al Qaeda

  10   people from Khartoum down to Nairobi, also during the time

  11   that al Qaeda was targeting the American presence in Somalia.

  12            What else does the evidence show?  The evidence shows

  13   that Wadih El Hage served as Usama Bin Laden's personal

  14   assistant, the gatekeeper to the man that was the head of this

  15   secret conspiracy.  The evidence also shows that in 1994 Wadih

  16   El Hage moved from Khartoum, Sudan down to Nairobi, Kenya to

  17   become a leader of the East African cell of al Qaeda.

  18            And the evidence shows that when he got down to

  19   Nairobi, he maintained a close operational working

  20   relationship with the East African cell -- and, ladies and

  21   gentlemen, this is the same cell that would carry out the

  22   bombings of the embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam; that

  23   Wadih El Hage arranged for the facilitation and delivery of

  24   false travel documents of other al Qaeda members; that he

  25   communicated in code and passed on messages to others in al


   1   Qaeda; that he maintained a close working relationship with

   2   others in the East African cell, such as the defendant,

   3   Mohamed Odeh.

   4            And in 1997 you heard evidence that Wadih El Hage

   5   went twice to visit Usama Bin Laden and his commander, Abu

   6   Hafs, here in Afghanistan.  And when he returned from that

   7   first trip in February of 1997, Wadih El Hage brought back

   8   with him a new policy, a policy to militarize, to militarize

   9   the cell that in 16 or 18 months thereafter would carry out

  10   the bombings in East Africa.

  11            And then you heard that El Hage went back to see Bin

  12   Laden in August of 1997, a year after Bin Laden had publicly

  13   declared war against the United States, six months after he

  14   gave the interview with CNN where he said he would send dead

  15   Americans home.  And when El Hage returned, he was met by

  16   American officials and he testified in a Grand Jury in this

  17   courthouse, when the American government was conducting an

  18   investigation of al Qaeda to try to learn about what al Qaeda

  19   was doing in its war against America, to try to stop al Qaeda

  20   from carrying out its deadly mission.

  21            And it was at that moment that Wadih El Hage was

  22   faced with a choice:  He could honor his oath, he could tell

  23   the truth, he could help the United States against al Qaeda,

  24   or he could side with al Qaeda and Bin Laden.  And the

  25   evidence overwhelmingly establishes that what Wadih El Hage


   1   did was he sided with Jihad, he sided with al Qaeda.  The

   2   American citizen chose Bin Laden over America.

   3            And he would do it again, because the evidence shows

   4   that in 1998, merely weeks after our embassies were bombed,

   5   Wadih El Hage testified again in the Grand Jury and again he

   6   took an oath and again he chose al Qaeda over the United

   7   States.  And he lied about key members of al Qaeda, and one of

   8   the people that he lied about was the defendant, Mohamed Odeh,

   9   which is where we turn next.

  10            What does the evidence show about Mohamed Odeh?  The

  11   evidence shows, ladies and gentlemen, that Mohamed Odeh was a

  12   sworn member of al Qaeda, that he was a sworn member of al

  13   Qaeda since 1992; that he maintained his status as a sworn and

  14   paid member of al Qaeda through the various fatwahs and

  15   declarations of Jihad issued by Usama Bin Laden; that he

  16   maintained his status as a sworn and paid member of al Qaeda

  17   through August 7th, 1998.  Mohamed Odeh received extensive

  18   training in Afghanistan in firearms, in explosives such as

  19   TNT, and he received advance explosive training at al Qaeda's

  20   camps.

  21            The evidence also shows, ladies and gentlemen, that

  22   Mohamed Odeh trained ideologically similar groups in Somalia,

  23   once again at the same time while al Qaeda was targeting the

  24   American presence in Somalia.

  25            The evidence also shows that Mohamed Sadeek Odeh was


   1   given a business, a fishing business, by the military

   2   commander of al Qaeda, a man by the name of Abu Hafs, and that

   3   Mohamed Odeh remained an active member of the East African

   4   cell of al Qaeda, maintaining contact and working with Wadih

   5   El Hage and others.  And some of the others that he worked

   6   with carried out the bombings and he carried them out with

   7   them.

   8            In particular, ladies and gentlemen, the evidence

   9   shows that Mohamed Odeh attended several meetings in the

  10   spring and the summer of 1998, with the very same people who

  11   carried out the bombing, and what you will see and what the

  12   evidence shows is that Mohamed Odeh's role was as the

  13   technical advisor to those who carried out the bombing in

  14   Nairobi.

  15            The evidence also shows that Mohamed Odeh traveled to

  16   Nairobi in the days before the bombing.  He checked into a

  17   hotel using a fake name, supported by a fake passport; that he

  18   attended meetings where he knew that al Qaeda was expecting

  19   American retaliation for something that al Qaeda was about to

  20   do; and that he fled Nairobi the night before the bombing,

  21   using that fake passport, on his way to Afghanistan, the

  22   headquarters of al Qaeda and the home of Usama Bin Laden, and

  23   that he was caught on the morning of August 7th in Pakistan.

  24            Now, the evidence shows that Mohamed Al-'Owhali had a

  25   very different role in this case.  Mohamed Al-'Owhali was to


   1   carry out the attack.  He was the person who was supposed to

   2   execute the bombing in Nairobi, and you know from the evidence

   3   that he was supposed to die in the bombing.

   4            Now, what the evidence shows is that Mohamed

   5   Al-'Owhali also received training at al Qaeda camps in

   6   Afghanistan.  He learned about explosives, he learned about

   7   weapons, but he also learned about hijackings, he learned

   8   about kidnappings, and he was proficient enough at this

   9   training to earn an audience with Usama Bin Laden.  And it was

  10   during one of his meetings with Usama Bin Laden that Mohamed

  11   Al-'Owhali asked for a mission, a mission that you know he got

  12   and that you know he carried out, to the detriment of 213

  13   people.

  14            Now, Mohamed Al-'Owhali, he, too, gets a fake

  15   passport and the evidence shows that he goes to Yemen in May

  16   of 1998 and then he goes back to Afghanistan, where he gets

  17   the details of where it is that the operation is supposed to

  18   be carried out.  He made a video that was supposed to take

  19   credit for his martyrdom operation, a video that al Qaeda was

  20   going to show to celebrate its attack against the embassy in

  21   Nairobi.  And then he got to Nairobi in the early days of

  22   August and he met with the other people that he was going to

  23   work with to carry out the bombing.

  24            He did some last-minute surveillance of the embassy.

  25   He reviewed some photos and some sketches of the embassy.  He


   1   learned all about the plan in Dar es Salaam, and then he was

   2   given his instructions.  And what you know is he carried out

   3   his instructions.

   4            On the morning of the bombing, in that back parking

   5   lot of the embassy, Mohamed Al-'Owhali got out of the truck,

   6   he threw his flash grenades in an effort to get that truck as

   7   close to the target as possible -- the American Embassy in

   8   Nairobi, Kenya.

   9            Only the plan called for him to die, and he ran.  And

  10   when he ran, and realizing he had no travel documents and that

  11   he had no money, he reached out to al Qaeda.  He called Yemen,

  12   and Mohamed Al-'Owhali and al Qaeda worked together to rescue

  13   Al-'Owhali before he was apprehended in Nairobi, Kenya.

  14            What does the evidence show about Khalfan Khamis

  15   Mohamed?  The evidence shows that he, too, obtained the

  16   requisite training in Afghanistan and that he, too, went to

  17   Somalia to train others, but that in March of 1998 Khalfan

  18   Khamis Mohamed was approached about doing a Jihad job, a job

  19   he readily accepted, and that it was Khalfan Khamis Mohamed

  20   that purchased the utility vehicle, that white Suzuki that was

  21   used to transport the component of the bomb, the TNT, the gas

  22   cylinders, the detonators.

  23            And you learned that Khalfan Khamis Mohamed rented

  24   that place, that house at 213 Ilala that functioned as the

  25   bomb factory where Khalfan Khamis Mohamed and the others


   1   ground the TNT and put together the bomb and loaded the bomb

   2   on the bomb truck so that it could be delivered to the

   3   American Embassy in Dar es Salaam.  And you know that Khalfan

   4   Khamis Mohamed went with that bomb truck and he prayed that

   5   the bomb would go off, and he was happy when it did.  And

   6   Khalfan Khamis Mohamed cleaned up the house in an effort to

   7   erase the trail that would connect him and his cohorts in the

   8   bombing and he fled to South Africa.

   9            Now, ladies and gentlemen, that was just a brief

  10   summary of what the evidence shows that these four defendants

  11   did, what it is that they did that makes them guilty of the

  12   charges that have been brought against them in this

  13   indictment.

  14            What I would like to do now is turn to the chronology

  15   and to walk through the conspiracy from its beginning up

  16   through the bombings, and you will learn, ladies and

  17   gentlemen, that all of the parts connect, that the people

  18   within al Qaeda worked very closely together, that they react

  19   to situations and that they plan accordingly, and you will see

  20   this as we go through this chronology.

  21            Now, the beginning of this conspiracy is in

  22   Afghanistan, and that's where we're going to begin.  And we're

  23   going to talk a little bit about how it is that al Qaeda was

  24   set up, how it was structured, who the leaders were, and how

  25   it is that al Qaeda transformed itself into an organization


   1   that sought more than anything else to kill Americans.

   2            The conspiracy begins in the late 1980s in

   3   Afghanistan, at a time when the mujahadeen are finishing their

   4   fight against the Soviet Union, a fight that you know by way

   5   of stipulation that the American government supported.  But

   6   what turned out as an effort to help Afghanis from the Soviet

   7   Union transformed into something else, because you heard from

   8   the third person to join this group, Jamal Al-Fadhl, the very

   9   first witness who testified, and what he told you about was

  10   that at the beginning there was this organization called the

  11   Mektab al Khidemat, which just means the Services Office.  And

  12   in fact Jamal Al-Fadhl told you that he would attend and go to

  13   meetings at The Services Office in Brooklyn and that's where

  14   he found out about the fight in Afghanistan against the

  15   Soviets.

  16            And what Jamal Al-Fadhl told you was is that Bin

  17   Laden and somebody by the name of Abdallah Azzam were sort of

  18   in charge of this Mektab al Khidemat but that Bin Laden had a

  19   different view as the hostilities were winding down against

  20   the Soviets.  He wanted to export Jihad, and he wanted to take

  21   the group that had been collected in Afghanistan and he wanted

  22   to form a group that would reach out and fulfill his dream,

  23   his view of how he thought the world should work.

  24            So Usama Bin Laden, who was pictured in Government

  25   Exhibit 100, formed this organization with two other people --


   1   we can show Exhibit 105 -- among others, but the three people

   2   that Jamal Al-Fadhl talked to you about who were part of this

   3   were, on the left part of the screen, a man by the name of

   4   Ayman al Zawahiri, and then you see Bin Laden there in the

   5   middle, and on the right-hand part of the screen is Mohamed

   6   Atef, known as Abu Hafs.

   7            And Abu Hafs, ladies and gentlemen, he's going to

   8   become the military commander of al Qaeda, the military

   9   commander.  And of course, as Mr. Butler mentioned in his

  10   opening statements, when we're talking about military, we're

  11   not talking about armies doing battle, armed opponents

  12   battling one another, we are talking about terrorism, we're

  13   talking about preying on civilians.  And Abu Hafs is the

  14   person who is going to run the military committee.

  15            You are going to see later on that Abu Hafs is the

  16   person who sets up Odeh with his fishing business.  Abu Hafs

  17   is the person who is going to meet with Wadih El Hage in

  18   Kenya, and he's one of the many, many al Qaeda people that

  19   Wadih El Hage is going to lie about in the Grand Jury in 1997

  20   and 1998.

  21            Now, Ayman al Zawahiri is the man on the left.  He's

  22   one of the founders of al Qaeda.  You will see that he's one

  23   of people that served on the committees.  He's also the emir

  24   or the leader of this group known as the Egyptian Islamic

  25   Jihad, or EIJ.  And EIJ is an organization that forms a joint


   1   venture with al Qaeda.  You will see that Ayman al Zawahiri

   2   joins in the February 1998 fatwa where Bin Laden says it is

   3   the duty to kill all American civilians.

   4            So Jamal Al-Fadhl told you about those three people

   5   and he told you that there was another person by the name of

   6   Abu Ubaidah.  Now, Abu Ubaidah was the person who was also one

   7   of the military commanders of al Qaeda.  Abu Ubaidah is the

   8   person who drowns in that ferry accident in Lake Victoria in

   9   the spring of 1996 and he is one of the military commanders

  10   who meets with Wadih El Hage and he's one of the military

  11   commanders that Wadih El Hage is going to lie about in 1997

  12   and 1998.

  13            So how did somebody become a member of al Qaeda?

  14   Well, you heard from two sworn members.  You heard from Jamal

  15   Al-Fadhl, the third man to take the oath, and he said that

  16   when you take the oath, you pledge allegiance to the emir,

  17   Usama Bin Laden, and you pledge allegiance to the group al

  18   Qaeda.

  19            And what he meant by that was that you are able, and

  20   you are ready and willing and able to do whatever it is they

  21   ask you to do that is Islamically correct, as they determine

  22   what is Islamically correct through their scholars.  And one

  23   example that Jamal Al-Fadhl gave you was that he said that if

  24   you are in al Qaeda and you take the bayat, you are a doctor

  25   and they ask you to wash a car, you wash the car.  You do what


   1   they ask you to do, when they ask you to do it, and you carry

   2   it out.

   3            And that's precisely what the witness Kherchtou told

   4   you -- that he took the same oath and that he understood that

   5   he had to follow the Islamically correct orders of al Qaeda

   6   and of the emir, and that he would swear allegiance to Bin

   7   Laden and the group.

   8            Now, you learned a great deal about the structure of

   9   this organization al Qaeda.  The undisputed leader is Usama

  10   Bin Laden and you learned that under Bin Laden there are

  11   committees.  The governing council is known as the Shura

  12   Council, and the prominent members you heard about.  You heard

  13   about several, but the ones you heard about that you see over

  14   and over again in this case, Abu Hafs, the military commander;

  15   Ayman al Zawahirial, the person who is also head of EIJ, the

  16   person who was in that picture with Bin Laden.

  17            Another person that was on that committee was Abu

  18   Fadhl al Makkee.  Different than Jamal Al-Fadhl.  Abu Fadhl al

  19   Makkee is somebody you are going to hear a great deal about.

  20   He is going to be on other committees and he's going to serve

  21   a very interesting role that we'll talk about later on.

  22            Then there was the military committee.  I talked to

  23   you about what al Qaeda means by military, but the two

  24   prominent members of that committee were Abu Ubaidah and Abu

  25   Hafs; the money and business committee, and this was run by


   1   this person Abu Fadhl al Makkee that I mentioned to you about,

   2   and Jamal Al-Fadhl described him for you.  He said that Abu

   3   Fadhl al Makkee was the person who married Usama Bin Laden's

   4   niece.  He was the person who had his leg amputated below the

   5   knee.

   6            And Abu Fadhl al Makkee, ladies and gentlemen, is

   7   somebody who in 1997 al Qaeda is going to believe is

   8   cooperating with America, and you are going to hear how the

   9   group reacts to that.  We're going to go through the

  10   conversations where Abu Hafs, Wadih El Hage's deputy, is on

  11   the phone with other al Qaeda members and they are panicking

  12   because they think that this Abu Fadhl al Makkee -- and

  13   they're going to describe him, with the amputated leg and the

  14   person who is with the Sheik Bin Laden's family -- is

  15   cooperating with America.  And in their reaction, you will see

  16   precisely how this group operates, what it is that motivates

  17   them, what it is they fear and what it is they want to attack,

  18   and that is the United States.

  19            Now, then there's the fatwah committee.  The fatwah

  20   committee issues these orders.  These are the scholars that

  21   Jamal Al-Fadhl talked about and this is what forms the basis

  22   of what is Islamically correct within al Qaeda.  And two of

  23   the prominent members you heard about were Ayman al Zawahiri,

  24   the person who is in that three-person picture, and another

  25   person by the name of Abu Hajer.


   1            If we can display Government Exhibit 106 is Abu

   2   Hajer.  Abu Hajer is an important person because he is

   3   somebody who is going to work for some of these companies that

   4   al Qaeda is going to create in Sudan and he's going to work

   5   with Wadih El Hage.  Abu Hajer is somebody whose business card

   6   Wadih El Hage is going to have in 1997, and Abu Hajer, as

   7   we're going to go through the chronology, is going to issue

   8   some fatwahs that are going to justify, in al Qaeda's eyes,

   9   the activities that they are going to carry out against

  10   America.

  11            Finally, ladies and gentlemen, you heard about the

  12   media committee, and you heard about this both from Jamal

  13   Al-Fadhl and from Kherchtou.  And they talked to you about

  14   they publish the Jihad paper and they had this funny name for

  15   the guy who ran it Abu Musab al Reuter.  And they thought that

  16   was funny.

  17            The reason that this committee is important, ladies

  18   and gentlemen, is because one of the methods that al Qaeda

  19   uses in its war against America is to recruit people, and

  20   propaganda is something that is very important to them.  It is

  21   important to recruit people, to train them, so they can carry

  22   out operations, and propaganda is important because it is one

  23   of the ways in which they seek to terrorize their enemies.

  24            And you see no better example of that than when the

  25   group claimed responsibility for the embassy bombings in


   1   Nairobi in Kenya, those claims of responsibility that you saw

   2   were sent to London and then re-sent out to the media

   3   organizations the day after the bombing.  And we'll go through

   4   these and explain how you know that those are al Qaeda claims.

   5            Now, both Jamal Al-Fadhl and Kherchtou talked to you

   6   a great deal about the methods that al Qaeda operated, and one

   7   of the things that was very important to them was maintaining

   8   secrecy.  Security and secrecy were very important to protect

   9   themselves from the Americans and from others that they

  10   perceived as their enemies.

  11            From the very beginning, they were protective of

  12   their secrets, and throughout they were concerned about

  13   learning about those who they thought were informants against

  14   them.  And Jamal Al-Fadhl told you that al Qaeda would seek

  15   out and kill anybody they suspected of being informants

  16   against the group.

  17            What that tells you, ladies and gentlemen, in no

  18   uncertain terms, is this is not a charity organization.  This

  19   is not a benevolent group.  This is a group that is very

  20   serious about its business and they will do anything they can

  21   to maintain secrecy.  And the other thing it tells you is that

  22   they're going to be very careful about who they trust, who it

  23   is they're going to talk about al Qaeda business around.

  24            And it is from that that you know who it is that's in

  25   the inner circle of al Qaeda, it is from that that you know


   1   that whether or not somebody observes somebody taking a bayat,

   2   they knew who was in and who was not in, who they could talk

   3   about business to, al Qaeda business, and who they couldn't.

   4   And that is something that looms very important in this case

   5   when it comes to determining who is involved in this

   6   conspiracy and what it is that they did.

   7            Now, another thing that al Qaeda did to protect

   8   itself was it made liberal use of aliases, aliases such as,

   9   for example, Bin Laden would be known as Abu Abdallah, or al

  10   Qa Qa.  And Government Exhibit 4, which I believe you all have

  11   a copy of, is a series of pictures with people's names and

  12   their aliases as testified to you by Kherchtou.

  13            And you see other corroboration of this, but another

  14   person who had an alias is Abu Hafs.  And Abu Hafs, the

  15   military commander, he went by the name Abu Khadija, he went

  16   by the name Abu Fatima.  And other evidence shows that Abu

  17   Hafs goes by the name Mohamed Atef, and Mohamed Atef is a name

  18   you're going to see in Khalid al Fawwaz's address book, one of

  19   people in London.  And you are going to see references to Abu

  20   al Hafs in Nairobi.

  21            The witness, Jamal Al-Fadhl, talked about a couple of

  22   other people he knew and he only knew their aliases, but you

  23   will see from other evidence who these people are.  He

  24   mentioned to you, for example, somebody by the name of Abu

  25   Anas, and Jamal Al-Fadhl described Anas al Liby as a computer


   1   expert.

   2            And what you see is that Kherchtou will describe for

   3   you, and did describe for you, that Anas al Liby was somebody

   4   he received surveillance training with and that Anas al Liby

   5   was somebody who was very good with computers.  And what you

   6   saw was there was a search in Manchester that came in by way

   7   of stipulation, one of these many stipulations, and some of

   8   the documents that were found in this house, which a passport

   9   found in the house shows us is this guy Anas al Liby's house.

  10   The computer contains documents that talks about Jihad and

  11   talks about the methods of doing Jihad, about using aliases

  12   and using fake passports and the need to attack, among other

  13   things, the embassies of your enemy.

  14            Somebody else that Jamal Al-Fadhl talked about was

  15   somebody he knew as Abu Fazhul, somebody he described as

  16   Swahili and French from The Comoros, which he thought was the

  17   moon.  And you know from other evidence, including Kherchtou,

  18   that that is Harun.  Harun will carry out the bombing in

  19   Nairobi.  He will be the guy who rents the bomb factory.  He

  20   will be the guy that gets the utility vehicle.  He will be the

  21   guy that stays behind in Nairobi to clean up, just like

  22   Khalfan Khamis Mohamed does in Dar es Salaam.

  23            And Harun is Wadih El Hage's deputy.  He is the one

  24   who uses El Hage's phone.  He uses his computer.  He's one of

  25   the people that El Hage will lie about in September of 1997


   1   and 1998.

   2            Al Qaeda, as you know, was a transnational

   3   organization.  People from all over the world joined it and

   4   people within al Qaeda traveled all over the world.  And al

   5   Qaeda, as Jamal al Fadhl told you, trained its members on how

   6   to travel secretly so they wouldn't draw attention from

   7   people.  Al Qaeda trained its members to shave their beards

   8   and to wear Western clothes to avoid detention by Western

   9   intelligence agencies.

  10            And both he and Kherchtou describe for you that the

  11   group would use fake passports, and this is one of the many

  12   niche businesses that you are going to see al Qaeda gets into.

  13   It's their lifeblood, it's how al Qaeda is able to get their

  14   people in and out of countries without being detected.

  15            Kherchtou described for you two people who he said

  16   helped do the passports for al Qaeda.  One was somebody he

  17   knew by the name of Abu Mohamed el Masry and the other one was

  18   Harun.  And you're going to see Kherchtou doesn't know this,

  19   but later on you're going to see evidence that Harun and El

  20   Hage actually did this.

  21            You see that there were travel stamps in the

  22   computer, and we will go through the conversations where Wadih

  23   El Hage and Harun are speaking with al Qaeda members,

  24   arranging for the delivery of passports for al Qaeda people.

  25   DHL calls and letters which clearly establish, just as


   1   Kherchtou said, that Harun is involved in this.  And you're

   2   going to see that El Hage was with him all the way.

   3            Now, both Jamal Al-Fadhl and Kherchtou describe for

   4   you the al Qaeda training camp experience.  They even

   5   described many similar camps, again, many of the names.  You

   6   heard about places called Miram Shah and Khalid Ibn Walid and

   7   the al Farouq Camp and the Jihad Wal Camp and the Sadeek Camp.

   8   And during these camps, the group gets training in weapons,

   9   they get training in mortars, they get training in explosives,

  10   they get training in counter-intelligence, and some of these

  11   names, some of these camps are the same places where Mohamed

  12   Odeh and Mohamed Al-'Owhali are training later on.

  13            Now, by 1990, the foundation for al Qaeda is in

  14   place.  Bin Laden, Abu Hafs, Abu Ubaidah, Ayman al Zawahiri

  15   are at the top of the organization.  And in August of 1990,

  16   something that is very significant in al Qaeda lore happens,

  17   and that is Iraq invaded Kuwait.  And in response to that

  18   invasion, you know this by way of stipulation, President Bush

  19   dispatched the first of the American troops, with the

  20   agreement of the Saudi government, to Saudi Arabia.  And he

  21   did that on August 7th, 1990.

  22            And eight years later, ladies and gentlemen, that is

  23   when al Qaeda will bomb the embassies in Nairobi and in Dar es

  24   Salaam.  You see, the American military presence in Saudi

  25   Arabia is something that becomes the cause of al Qaeda.  You


   1   will see this in what Al-Fadhl tells you about Bin Laden's

   2   private statements to al Qaeda members and you see this and we

   3   will go through this in Bin Laden's public statements.

   4            More than anything else, he says that it is the duty

   5   of al Qaeda and, in his view, everybody, every Muslim, to do

   6   anything in their power to drive the Americans from Saudi

   7   Arabia, to kill them anywhere they are.  And on August 7th,

   8   1998, the anniversary of the arrival of those troops, that is

   9   precisely what al Qaeda did.  That is precisely what they did.

  10            Now, also in 1990 the evidence shows that that is

  11   when Mohamed Odeh arrives in Afghanistan.  Earlier in his life

  12   he had been in the Philippines and he had been studying

  13   architecture and engineering, something that he would use

  14   later on.

  15            Just like Kherchtou, Odeh arrived at the Bait al

  16   Ansar Camp where he left his valuables, just like Kherchtou

  17   described for you, and he went to al Farouq Camp and he took

  18   training in small arms and he took training in map reading and

  19   he took training in basic explosives which included TNT, the

  20   same material that would be used to blowup the embassies in

  21   1998.

  22            Now, you know that after Odeh completes his training,

  23   he stays around in Afghanistan and he works as a mechanic and

  24   he's around for some of the battles in Afghanistan and that's

  25   where he is in 1990.  And we'll come back later on as we go


   1   through the chronology.

   2            Now, Jamal Al-Fadhl told you that at some point in

   3   1991, 1992 al Qaeda wanted to leave Afghanistan and set up

   4   somewhere else.  There was some concern in the group about

   5   where to go.  One of the places that he considered was the

   6   Sudan, but there were some people within the organization that

   7   were troubled by this because they didn't know if it was an

   8   Islamically acceptable place to be.

   9            And the person who persuaded the group that it was

  10   acceptable to go there was this person Abu Hajer.  And Abu

  11   Hajer is the person I mentioned to you who is on the fatwah

  12   committee and he will issue several fatwahs.  Abu Hajer says

  13   that it is okay for al Qaeda to go there because the

  14   organization that runs the Sudan The National Islamic group is

  15   a group al Qaeda work with.

  16            So you know from what al Qaeda told you is that the

  17   group in fact moved to Sudan, and when the group got to Sudan,

  18   one of the things that Jamal al Fadhl himself did was he would

  19   purchase farms, farms that the group would use to meet, farms

  20   that the group would use for what he called refresh training

  21   in some of the terrorist tactics that al Qaeda would teach its

  22   members.

  23            And it was after the group moved to Sudan and after

  24   the American forces arrived in Saudi Arabia that Bin Laden and

  25   Abu Hajer begin to speak privately to al Qaeda members about


   1   Bin Laden's and al Qaeda's views about their duties with

   2   respect to Americans.  The bottom line was that Americans had

   3   to be attacked, and Bin Laden and Abu Hajer issued a fatwah to

   4   the members of al Qaeda that they would have to fight the

   5   United States to drive them from the Gulf.

   6            Now, at some point in 1992, the defendant Odeh elects

   7   to join al Qaeda and he takes the same bayat that Kherchtou

   8   and Al-Fadhl did:  To follow the emir's orders; to do what the

   9   group asks.  And what you learn is that Odeh then goes and

  10   receives additional training, advanced training in explosives,

  11   where he learns how to figure out what type of explosive to

  12   use and how much of that explosive to use in carrying out an

  13   operation.

  14            And one of the people who trains him is somebody by

  15   the name of Abdel Rahman.  And Abdel Rahman, ladies and

  16   gentlemen, is going to show up at the Hilltop Hotel in Nairobi

  17   just days before the bombing in Nairobi, and he's going to

  18   meet with Mohamed Odeh just days before the bomb goes off in

  19   Nairobi.

  20            Also in 1992, you heard from the witness Kherchtou

  21   and he described for you a different type of training that he

  22   received.  He was ordered to get this training by Abu Hafs,

  23   the military commander, and he told you that was training that

  24   was offered by somebody he knew as Abu Mohamed al Amriki, and

  25   we see him in Government Exhibit 4, page 5.  Abu Mohamed al


   1   Amriki, and Amriki means the American.  And you see him

   2   pictured there and the fake names for Abu Mohamed al Amriki

   3   listed there.

   4            This person, ladies and gentlemen is Ali Mohamed.

   5   Ali Mohamed, and just to give you a sense of who Ali Mohamed

   6   is, he is the person whose house is searched in California in

   7   1998.  He is a person who has computer documents and has other

   8   documents that show him in communication with Wadih El Hage

   9   and other al Qaeda members, and he is one of the people who

  10   lurks in the background through this whole conspiracy.

  11            He provides training, he carries out operations, and

  12   he maintains contact with critical members in al Qaeda and he

  13   is part of the long list of al Qaeda members that Wadih El

  14   Hage is going to lie about in the Grand Jury in September of

  15   1997 and 1998.

  16            And what Kherchtou told you about the training he was

  17   offered is he was trained with a small group of people, and

  18   one of the people he was trained with went by the name of Anas

  19   al Liby.  And he's also pictured in Government Exhibit 4-9.

  20   Anas al Liby is one of the people that Kherchtou trained with,

  21   and to put it into context, Anas al Liby is one of people he

  22   is going to visit in Kenya in 1993 with some camera equipment.

  23   He is going to be one found on Moi Avenue, about 500 meters

  24   from the American Embassy, and his picture is going to be

  25   found in the files of Wadih El Hage in Nairobi in 1998.


   1            Now, what is it that these folks were trained in?

   2   Well, Kherchtou told you that they were trained how to make

   3   surveillance of a target, and he described for you how they

   4   would learn to target buildings, to collect information on

   5   that building, for example, by taking pictures, and they

   6   learned how to use small cameras and to take pictures

   7   surreptitiously.

   8            And they would learn how to develop these pictures

   9   and to put this information into a report, a report that would

  10   be marked secret, that would tell the reader when the report

  11   was prepared, what the target was.  The target would be given

  12   a number, and then somebody else would carry out whatever it

  13   was they were going to do with this.

  14            One of the things that Kherchtou described for you

  15   was that, in addition to learning how to target the exterior

  16   buildings, the group would learn how to go into a room.  And I

  17   don't know if you remember, but during his testimony when he

  18   described this, he looked around in this room, almost doing a

  19   quick surveillance himself, and it was very instructive to

  20   you, ladies and gentlemen, because it tells you something

  21   about al Qaeda.  It tells you that there's a part of al Qaeda

  22   that remains in every single one of these people.

  23            Jamal Al-Fadhl, when he testified and he was asked

  24   questions, Can you tell us how al Qaeda did this?  Can you

  25   tell us how al Qaeda did that?  Did you notice every now and


   1   then he would say "we."  We would do it this way.  We would do

   2   it that way.

   3            This is a group that trains its members very

   4   effectively, ladies and gentlemen.  One of the things that

   5   Kherchtou said to you about Anas al Liby -- he was the person

   6   we just saw in that picture -- Anas al Liby was somebody very

   7   good with computers.  He bought a computer, in fact, in

   8   connection with training.

   9            Remember what Jamal al Fadhl said.  He heard of

  10   somebody Anas who was a computer expert, and you're going to

  11   see additional evidence of Anas al Liby's expertise in

  12   computers.

  13            (Continued on next page)














   1            MR. KARAS:  (Continuing) One of the things that

   2   Kherchtou said to you that he learned in this training was

   3   that there were four parts to an operation.  There was

   4   surveillance; there was targeting, which is what the bosses

   5   would decide; there were facilitators, the people who would

   6   supply; and then there were the executors, the people who

   7   would carry out the operation.  Ladies and gentlemen, you are

   8   going to see that those four parts of an operation are very

   9   similar to what Mohamed Al-'Owhali described to Agent Gaudin

  10   in his confession.  That is precisely what he was instructed

  11   about, precisely the way Al Qaeda teaches its people that an

  12   operation has to be carried out.

  13            The corroboration from what Kherchtou says is seen in

  14   one of the computer documents from Ali Mohamed's house in

  15   California, Government's Exhibit 353.  As I said, this is one

  16   of the documents that is found on a computer in Ali Mohamed's

  17   house.  At the bottom of this page you see, it is written as

  18   MO3 Iana plan.  Number one, you write the date of the writing

  19   of the plan; 2, the date of the starting of the execution; 3,

  20   specifying the target; 4, the team doing the drawing and the

  21   description; 5, the equipment; 6, the cover.  That's how you

  22   carry out a surveillance operation and that's what Kherchtou

  23   said he was trained in and that's what you see in that

  24   document.

  25            One of the other documents found in Ali Mohamed's


   1   computer describes the four levels of organizing an operation,

   2   Government's Exhibit 355, another document found in Ali

   3   Mohamed's computer.  At the very top there, you see how it is

   4   described, the idea of working.  Remember, one of the codes

   5   that you learned about Al Qaeda, jihad is called work.  Work

   6   is not 9 to 5, doing your job and getting paid a salary, work

   7   is doing jihad.  Ali Mohamed describes it just as, and there

   8   he says just like Kherchtou told you, headquarters,

   9   information, preparation, execution, the four phases to an

  10   operation that Al Qaeda is trained in, just as Kherchtou

  11   described for you.

  12            Kherchtou told you that after completing some of this

  13   surveillance training, he took part in some electronics

  14   training.  He didn't graduate in the course but learned about

  15   remote controls to be used in watches, radios and so forth,

  16   and he mentioned to you that he himself knew that by 1992

  17   there was discussion among Al Qaeda that the United States was

  18   the enemy of Islam, that the United States was the enemy of

  19   Islam.  Indeed, by 1992 and 1993, the witness Jamal al-Fadl

  20   told you that Bin Laden and Abu Hajer had issued a very

  21   specific fatwah regarding the United States, that it was their

  22   argument that the prophet Mohamed would not tolerate two

  23   religions on the Holy Land and therefore they had to be

  24   attacked.  In their view, what the United States was doing was

  25   Islamically correct.  In their view, what that required, what


   1   that obligated was attacking the United States.

   2            There has been some discussion about what is

   3   Islamically correct and what isn't Islamically correct.  You

   4   are not a court that decides that.  This isn't an Islamic

   5   court.  That's not the point, ladies and gentlemen.  Whether

   6   the imam Siraj Wahhaj is correct that the prohibition is that

   7   there can only be two religions in Mecca or whether that

   8   covers Saudi Arabia is not a question that you have to

   9   resolve, because what matters is what Al Qaeda thinks, because

  10   it is based on that premise that they carry out the actions

  11   that they do, and from their perspective a long, long time

  12   ago, it was the obligation of their members to carry out these

  13   attacks.

  14            Jamal al-Fadl described for you that these statements

  15   and these fatwahs would be issued, that meetings would be held

  16   among the inner circle of Al Qaeda, people who could be

  17   trusted, at the guesthouse in the Riyadh section in Sudan.  He

  18   described to you that one of the people who would attend some

  19   of these meetings would be the defendant Wadih El Hage.

  20   Remember, ladies and gentlemen, what I said earlier.  Only

  21   those they trust can attend these meetings.  You have to be

  22   trusted to be allowed in.

  23            One of the things that Al Qaeda did in 1992 and '93

  24   in Sudan was set up a business network.  Remember what Jamal

  25   al-Fadl told you about Bin Laden's business.  He told you in


   1   one story about how the group went to him and said the

   2   business isn't going that well.  And Bin Laden said to them

   3   our purpose is bigger than business.

   4            The business is bigger than jihad, ladies and

   5   gentlemen.  It provides resources that finance the operations.

   6   It provides a way that employs the people that you want to

   7   keep employed.  It provides terrific cover if you want to

   8   bring in munitions or have people travel.  Al-Fadl told you

   9   about the plane that went up with sugar to Afghanistan and

  10   returned with guns and rockets.  It's a great cover.

  11            Al-Fadl described for you some of the companies that

  12   were called Wadi al Aqiq.  There was the company called Al

  13   Hijra, the construction company, the farm company, and Al

  14   Qudurat Transportation Company.  The farm company, for

  15   example, maintains the farms where Al Qaeda can meet and train

  16   its members.  Some of the prominent members of Al Qaeda were

  17   some of the employees of these companies.  They were some of

  18   the managers.  But first and foremost they were Al Qaeda

  19   members.  So yes, there was a lot of business going on.  But

  20   the motive wasn't profit.  This wasn't an attempt to get on

  21   the Fortune 500.  This wasn't Money Incorporated, ladies and

  22   gentlemen, this was about Jihad Inc.  This was the purpose to

  23   these businesses and this is why Al Qaeda used them.

  24            One of the things that the witness Jamal al-Fadl

  25   described for you that he did for the companies was, he was in


   1   charge of the payroll for the Al Qaeda people.  Remember, he

   2   described that people would get paid two salaries.  They would

   3   get paid a salary if they worked for the company, and those

   4   who worked for the company and who worked for Al Qaeda got a

   5   stipend.  It was Jamal al-Fadl who was one of the people who

   6   would hand out that Al Qaeda bonus, if you will.

   7            Jamal al-Fadl told you that the person he trained to

   8   replace him was the defendant Wadih El Hage.  As far back as

   9   in Sudan in 1993, this is one of the things that Wadih El Hage

  10   does for Al Qaeda.  Jamal al-Fadl gave you a very detailed

  11   description of the offices that Al Qaeda had, the Wadi Al Aqiq

  12   offices.  Remember he said this person had an office, the

  13   first office on the left and the second office on the left.

  14   He described for you an office in the residential section of

  15   Khartoum that was very exclusive, where Bin Laden had an

  16   office and Abu Hajer had an office and Wadih El Hage had an

  17   office.  To get to Abu Hajer and to get to Bin Laden, you had

  18   to get through El Hage.  El Hage very early on serves as the

  19   gatekeeper to both Abu Hajer and Bin Laden.

  20            You remember the testimony of Essam al Ridi.  He is

  21   the person that we all remember who crashed Bin Laden's plane.

  22   He is the person who described for you that same office, that

  23   very exclusive office in that section in Khartoum in 1993.

  24            Yes, Al Qaeda would sometimes send its people to buy

  25   tractors.  Yes, they would buy bicycles.  Yes, they sold


   1   sesame seeds.  But they also made efforts to buy chemical

   2   weapons, and al-Fadl gave you that very specific story about

   3   the group's efforts to obtain nuclear weapons.  Nuclear

   4   weapons, we submit, are not weapons that one uses when you

   5   target one victim, it is when you go after targeting entire

   6   people.  That is what he was trying to do as far back as 1993,

   7   al-Fadl told you.

   8            Something else happens in 1992, 1993, and that

   9   something else, ladies and gentlemen, is the peace-keeping

  10   effort in Somalia.  You know that at some point the United

  11   States government joined the United Nations effort in Somalia,

  12   and you heard from Dr. Samatar that there was mass starvation

  13   in Somalia and the United Nations showed up in an effort to

  14   deal with that problem.

  15            Ladies and gentlemen, Al Qaeda had a different view

  16   of that mission.  The American presence in Somalia angered Al

  17   Qaeda.  They saw it as an effort to colonize Somalia, an

  18   Islamic country.  You heard that Abu Hajer joined with Usama

  19   Bin Laden issue a fatwah to the members of Al Qaeda to do what

  20   they can to stop the Americans, to drive them from Somalia.

  21   The specific words that Bin Laden used were, we have to cut

  22   off the head of the snake.

  23            As far back as 1993, this is what is on Al Qaeda's

  24   mind, the United States presence in Somalia.

  25            Abu Hajer in his fatwah described how it was


   1   Islamically acceptable to attack the infidel, to attack the

   2   enemy even if that meant that you were going to kill what they

   3   called innocent third parties.  Jamal al-Fadl told you about

   4   how Abu Hajer relied on this scholar Ibn al Tamiyeh, who gave

   5   the parable of the Tartars and the battle that justified these

   6   attacks even if it meant killing innocent people.

   7            Ladies and gentlemen, you are going to see that Bin

   8   Laden is going to rely on this person Ibn Tamiyeh.  In the

   9   August 1996 declaration against the United States, Bin Laden

  10   makes clear that we will do whatever it takes to drive

  11   Americans from the Gulf, exactly the way al Fadl described it

  12   for you.  You saw it in a different form.  When Khalfan Khamis

  13   Mohamed was asked does it occur to you that you were going to

  14   kill Tanzanians and not Americans, Khalfan Khamis Mohamed said

  15   yes, that's part of the job, but if they're innocent, Allah

  16   will take care of them, and if they're not, then they are

  17   going to get what they deserve.  That's exactly what al Fadl

  18   said Abu Hajer told the group.  If they are innocent, they

  19   will go to paradise.  If not, they will get what they deserve.

  20            Is this really Islamically correct?  I don't know.

  21   But is it what Al Qaeda believed?  Absolutely.  And once they

  22   adopt that belief, it makes perfect sense that they would

  23   carry out among other things the operation of East Africa in

  24   August of 1998.

  25            So once Bin Laden and Abu Hajer raise a call to arms


   1   with respect to Somalia, Somalia becomes a magnet for Al Qaeda

   2   people.  Jamal al-Fadl described for you that Abu Hafs the

   3   military commander took two trips.  The first was for all

   4   practical purposes a scouting mission.  When he came back from

   5   this trip he told Jamal al-Fadl that I went down there, I

   6   don't think we can take America head on.  This is what Jamal

   7   al-Fadl said.  He said there are different tribes down there.

   8   There is no one in control.  But we will start a little bit

   9   and if it goes good we'll go bigger.

  10            You know, the witness Dr. Samatar described for you

  11   the situation in Somalia, that there were many tribes and that

  12   they were fighting amongst each other and fighting

  13   collectively against other tribes.  That is exactly what Abu

  14   Hafs recognized when he went there.

  15            Ladies and gentlemen, Al Qaeda didn't storm the

  16   beaches with an army and we are not submitting to you that Al

  17   Qaeda members were the ones that fired the rockets or the

  18   bullets or set off the mines.  What we are saying to you is

  19   that Al Qaeda sent people to Somalia to pursue its goal to

  20   drive the Americans out of Somalia.  If that meant training

  21   people to carry out operations, that's what they would do.  If

  22   it meant training some who would train others, that's what

  23   they would do.

  24            At bottom what this reflects is that as far back as

  25   1993, Al Qaeda is going to focus wherever America is and do


   1   whatever it thinks it can to carry out its mission.  Abu Hafs

   2   recognized the need and the limitations, but nonetheless, as

   3   you will see, Al Qaeda did what it could to drive the

   4   Americans out.

   5            In fact, Jamal al-Fadl described a second trip that

   6   Abu Hafs took, and when he returned from the second trip he

   7   said that Al Qaeda was responsible for what happened to the

   8   Americans.  Again, does that mean he is saying that Al Qaeda

   9   members were the ones that fired the guns?  Not necessarily.

  10   They are responsible, whether or not he is even telling the

  11   truth, feel responsible, which tells you a great deal about

  12   their mind set.

  13            When the call to arms goes out, help comes from

  14   everywhere.  From Khartoum -- again, we are talking about

  15   1993 -- you remember the testimony of Essam al Ridi, the pilot

  16   who was called by Wadih El Hage when he was back in Texas to

  17   see about buying a plane for Bin Laden.  One of the things

  18   that El Hage asked Essam al Ridi was if a plane would have

  19   enough range to go from Pakistan to Sudan because he wanted to

  20   know if Essam al Ridi would help deliver Stinger missiles from

  21   Pakistan to Sudan, at precisely the same time that American

  22   forces are in Somalia.

  23            The other thing that Essam al Ridi told you was after

  24   he bought the plane and brought it to Khartoum, Wadih El Hage

  25   asked him to fly five members of Al Qaeda from Khartoum to


   1   Nairobi, which borders Somalia to the southwest.  Essam al

   2   Ridi told you these five people got on a plane and he

   3   described the plane and that's all he told you.  But remember,

   4   Kherchtou told you that he remembers hearing that the Bin

   5   Laden plane flew five people down from Khartoum to Nairobi,

   6   one of them being Abu Hafs, the military commander, and that

   7   those people went on to Somalia.

   8            Same story, different perspectives, just like Mr.

   9   Butler said.  Different people from Al Qaeda who have

  10   different perspectives, giving you from beginning to end, the

  11   efforts by Al Qaeda and El Hage to help Al Qaeda fulfill its

  12   goal with respect to Somalia.

  13            Ladies and gentlemen, this is one of many examples

  14   where you see Wadih El Hage acting as the facilitator for Al

  15   Qaeda, not the mediator, the facilitator.  Think of it in

  16   terms of an army, but remember, this isn't really an army.

  17   When an army fights, there are people who go to the front, but

  18   there are important logistics people, facilitators who have to

  19   make sure that the people at the front are fed, that they are

  20   clothed, that they get communications, that they will get

  21   messages.  That is the role that Wadih El Hage serves.  No.

  22   We are not going to present any evidence that he wired any

  23   bombs, that he offered any training, that he received any

  24   training.  But that doesn't make him not in this conspiracy.

  25   On the contrary, what the evidence shows is that he provides


   1   an essential role for Al Qaeda.  Remember what Kherchtou says?

   2   You don't have to fire a gun to be in Al Qaeda.  You don't

   3   have to fire a gun to be part of this.  Kherchtou was one of

   4   the facilitators and you will see others, and that is one of

   5   the roles that Wadih El Hage plays in this conspiracy.

   6            Kherchtou described the perspective from Nairobi, the

   7   help that was offered in Somalia from the south.  Remember, he

   8   said that he was specifically ordered to go to Nairobi to help

   9   out any way he could.  He was a facilitator.  He was somebody

  10   who was there to provide housing.  He was somebody who was

  11   there to provide visas and translating if they needed, and

  12   Kherchtou told you about some of the people that went into

  13   Somalia on behalf of Al Qaeda.  He described somebody by the

  14   name of Abu Mohamed el Masry, who we know is al Saleh.  He

  15   described Saif al Adel and a person by the name of Shuaib.  We

  16   will talk about those people later on.

  17            In particular what Kherchtou told you was that he

  18   remembers Harun, Wadih El Hage's future deputy, telling you

  19   that he and Saleh, this person known as Abu Mohamed el

  20   Masry -- just to give you some perspective, this is a person

  21   pictured in Government's Exhibit 119.  This is Saleh.  And

  22   that Harun told Kherchtou that he and Saleh went into

  23   Mogadishu in Somalia and worked with some of the local tribes

  24   to try to construct a truck bomb to attack the UN forces that

  25   were there, an effort that was unsuccessful.  And Harun told


   1   Kherchtou that they were there one day in a neighborhood in

   2   Mogadishu in a building when they saw helicopter gun fight,

   3   helicopter firing in a building that was in the neighborhood.

   4   Harun told Kherchtou that after that they decided they had to

   5   get out because they might get caught, some of the people that

   6   went to Somalia, ladies and gentlemen, that you will see over

   7   and over again, all of which is a reflection of what Al Qaeda

   8   was doing at the time and who they were targeting.

   9            Kherchtou told you about the electronics contractor

  10   who worked in Pakistan, person who worked with the remote

  11   devices, he was in Nairobi at the time.  One of the other

  12   people that Kherchtou said was in Somalia was the person he

  13   knew as Marwan.  That's the defendant Odeh.  In fact you

  14   remember the defendant Odeh in his statement to the FBI said

  15   in fact that he was given an order by Bin Laden through an Al

  16   Qaeda intermediary, somebody by the same of Saif al Adel, to

  17   go to Somalia, and the mission was that Al Qaeda was going to

  18   train a group the most closely aligned to Al Qaeda.  That's

  19   what Odeh did.  He went to Somalia, the southeastern part of

  20   Somalia, and he provided training to one of the groups there.

  21   Remember, what Odeh told the group was, this is a group that

  22   feared, just like Al Qaeda did, that the UN was going to cause

  23   this group to lose its power, and Odeh described a fire fight

  24   that involved the tribe and a UN force down in the southern

  25   part of Somalia.


   1            When he was in Somalia, Odeh met up with Abu Hafs,

   2   the military commander of Al Qaeda.  Abu Hafs told Odeh that

   3   what he did was, he went to Mogadishu and he met with some of

   4   the groups, and one of the people he met with was Fahad Aidad,

   5   one of the more prominent warlords in Somalia.  Abu Hafs told

   6   Odeh that Al Qaeda had agreed to work with Aidad and others to

   7   attack the Americans.  Again, just like Abu Hafs described,

   8   tribes fighting tribes, go in a little bit and see if it's

   9   good, and maybe we will go bigger.

  10            The other thing Odeh told the FBI, while he was in

  11   Somalia he met with somebody named Daroud, who told him that

  12   he had participated in attacks against the United Nations and

  13   the United Nations was leaving.

  14            The final thing to consider about Odeh and Somalia,

  15   ladies and gentlemen, he told the FBI he was there in March

  16   1993 and he left in November 1993, again, at the heart of the

  17   time when the American forces are in Somalia, the heart of the

  18   time that all this other activity that Al Qaeda is engaging in

  19   to drive the Americans from Somalia is going on.

  20            That is where Al Qaeda sits in 1993, and you see the

  21   import of Somalia in a number of ways.  First, it tells you

  22   about the mind set, and we talked about that.  Second, who Al

  23   Qaeda sends to Somalia introduces you to some of the people

  24   that you will see play a more prominent role in this

  25   conspiracy as it evolves and develops.  The third thing is,


   1   you will see a number of different ways it corroborates

   2   precisely what Kherchtou told you about al Fadl, where he too

   3   claims credit for what happens in Somalia.

   4            The last thing, ladies and gentlemen, the reason

   5   Somalia is important, it establishes the link between Al Qaeda

   6   and Nairobi.  Remember what I said at the beginning.  The

   7   thing about this conspiracy and why it makes sense for us to

   8   do this chronically, you see that events have a cause and

   9   effect relationship.  Because Al Qaeda wanted to target

  10   Somalia, they decided they had to set up operations in

  11   Nairobi.  Once they set up operations in Nairobi, they have a

  12   foundation in place that they are going to make use of five

  13   years later to attack the embassies in East Africa.

  14            What you know not only from Jamal al-Fadl and not

  15   only from Kherchtou but from some of the documents that were

  16   seized and the phone records and communications, it is that Al

  17   Qaeda has offices all over the world.  It is like a

  18   multinational organization.  It has hubs.  It has headquarters

  19   in Afghanistan.  It has headquarters in Sudan.  It has a hub

  20   in Nairobi.  It has a hub up here in Azerbaijan.  We will go

  21   through telephone calls with Al Qaeda people in Germany.

  22   There were documents seized in England.  But one of the key

  23   hubs is going to be Nairobi.  And of course if you are Al

  24   Qaeda, you want to make sure that the people you have running

  25   that hub are people you trust and people who will do what you


   1   need them to do, something that will play out as a very

   2   important factor as we go through the evidence.

   3            THE COURT:  Is this a good time?

   4            MR. KARAS:  Yes, your Honor.

   5            THE COURT:  We will take a break.

   6            (Jury excused)

   7            THE COURT:  Mr. Wilford.

   8            MR. WILFORD:  Your Honor, may we be heard in the

   9   robing room?

  10            THE COURT:  Yes.

  11            (Pages 5263 through 5265 sealed)

  12            (Continued on next page)















   1            (Recess)

   2            (Jury present)

   3            MR. KARAS:  May I proceed, your Honor?

   4            THE COURT:  Yes, please.

   5            MR. KARAS:  We left off in Nairobi in 1993, and what

   6   I was saying was that the witness Kherchtou was the person who

   7   had been sent to Nairobi to the base of operations, the new

   8   base in Nairobi at the time that Al Qaeda was targeting the

   9   American presence in Somalia.  Kherchtou told you about two

  10   people that he met when he first got to Nairobi.  The first

  11   was somebody who he knew by the name of Nawawi.  We see

  12   pictured here in Government's Exhibit 4-12.  Nawawi's real

  13   name is Ihab Ali, and you see a couple of his other nicknames,

  14   Abu Suliman, and Joseph Kenana and Abu Jaffar al Tayar.  He is

  15   another person who lurks in the background as we go through

  16   this chronology.  He is somebody who is an Al Qaeda member,

  17   and he is somebody who ends up in Florida and somebody who is

  18   going to be exchanging communications with Wadih El Hage,

  19   communications that Wadih El Hage denied having any knowledge

  20   of before the grand jury in September of 1998.  We will talk

  21   about those communications, but this is somebody that

  22   Kherchtou told you he met in 1993 in Nairobi.

  23            Another person who he met there is displayed in

  24   Government's Exhibit 4-13.  This was somebody he told you he

  25   knew among other names as Abu Khalid al Nubi down at the


   1   bottom.  This, ladies and gentlemen, is Mustafa Fadhl, who

   2   also goes by the name Abu Jihad and Khalid.  Khalid is a name

   3   you will see in some of the documents that Wadih El Hage

   4   brings back, documents that talk about the new policy that

   5   Wadih El Hage brings back, to militarize the cell in East

   6   Africa when he returns from his visit with Bin Laden in 1997.

   7   You will see references to Khalid in some of those documents.

   8   Mustafa al-Fadl is one of the prominent members of the cell in

   9   East Africa and he is a person who among other things is going

  10   to be in charge of the operation in Dar es Salaam to blow up

  11   the embassy in Dar es Salaam.  He is the person who is

  12   identified by Khalfan Khamis Mohamed as the person who

  13   approached him to do the jihad mission in March of 1998.  He

  14   is the person that Khalfan Khamis Mohamed lives with at that

  15   bomb factory that Khalfan Khamis Mohamed rented at 213 Ilala.

  16            This is what I was saying earlier, ladies and

  17   gentlemen.  You see these participants in this case come up

  18   early.  They are participants in the conspiracy to murder US

  19   nationals.

  20            Let me just say for a moment, by the way, when I talk

  21   about the conspiracy to murder US nationals and Al Qaeda's

  22   involvement, I am talking about the first count in the

  23   indictment, the count which charges a conspiracy among the

  24   people you will see named in that indictment that include

  25   these defendants and others, some of whom were members of Al


   1   Qaeda, to murder nationals of the United States.  What I ask

   2   you to bear in mind, and we will go through the counts,

   3   probably tomorrow, that there are four conspiracies.  There is

   4   a conspiracy to use weapons of mass destruction against

   5   American targets, there is a conspiracy to kill the officers

   6   and employees of the United States government, and there is a

   7   conspiracy to destroy American buildings by way of explosives.

   8   So when I say the conspiracy, what I am referring to, in

   9   shorthand, is the first count, the conspiracy to murder

  10   nationals of the United States.  We will talk about the other

  11   conspiracy counts.  But I wanted to alert you to that at this

  12   point as we go through the evidence.

  13            One of the things that Kherchtou said that he was

  14   supposed to do was to learn how to fly, and he was sent to a

  15   school in Nairobi.  He told you that when he first got to

  16   Nairobi, he stayed at a Ramada Hotel and that after he met

  17   Nawawi and Mohamed Abu al Nubi, he met some other people,

  18   including Abu Ubaidah al Banshiri, the person who is the

  19   military commander of Al Qaeda.  What Kherchtou told you about

  20   Abu Ubaidah was that Abu Ubaidah lived a secret life in

  21   Nairobi.  He had a second wife in Nairobi, he had another wife

  22   that was, I believe, up in Khartoum.  Kherchtou told you that

  23   that was something that very few people knew about, that

  24   Ubaidah had a second wife and family, that it was something

  25   that he was keeping secret.  You may remember the testimony of


   1   Ashif Juma, the person who was with Abu Ubaidah in the ferry

   2   accident, he is the brother-in-law of Abu Ubaidah.  He told

   3   you that when Abu Ubaidah got married to his sister, there was

   4   nobody from Abu Ubaidah's side of the family who was at that

   5   wedding.  That aligns precisely with what Kherchtou told you

   6   about the life that Abu Ubaidah was living in Kenya at the

   7   time.

   8            The other person that Kherchtou introduced you to was

   9   somebody by the name of Khalid al Fawwaz, who is pictured in

  10   Government's Exhibit 4-11.  You will see his aliases down

  11   below, Abu Omar al Sebai and Hamad.  What Kherchtou told you

  12   was, for example, when he needed expenses paid for the flight

  13   school or the hotel, he would go to Abu Ubaidah, and if Abu

  14   Ubaidah wasn't around, he would go to this person pictured in

  15   government 4-11, Khalid al Fawwaz.  Fawwaz was somebody who

  16   helped run the base in Nairobi for Al Qaeda.  He worked under

  17   Abu Ubaidah.  He is someone you will see shortly is replaced

  18   by the defendant Wadih El Hage.

  19            One of the things that Kherchtou told you about Abu

  20   Fawwaz, and this is a common refrain within the Al Qaeda

  21   story, Fawwaz tried to start a business in Nairobi, and he

  22   named it Asma, and it was named after Fawwaz's daughter.  The

  23   business didn't work out.  He tried to import some vehicles

  24   from Dubai, and at the end of the day the business failed

  25   because the cars were expensive and he couldn't resell them.


   1            One of the ways you know Kherchtou is telling you

   2   exactly the truth about this, there are documents found in

   3   Wadih El Hage's files that belong to Khalid Fawwaz.  For

   4   example, you see Government's Exhibit 626 on the screen.

   5   Government's Exhibit 626 is one of the documents that I

   6   mentioned.  This is an articles of association of this company

   7   Asma Ltd. that Kherchtou described Khalid al Fawwaz tried to

   8   find.  This is the first page.  If you take a look at the

   9   bottom of the first page, you see the name of the attorney who

  10   prepared these papers, M.M. Chaudhri.  That is a name that

  11   Kherchtou testified about in connection with the group's

  12   efforts to free Fawwaz when he was arrested by Kenyan

  13   authorities, something we will talk about in a minute.

  14            If you take a look towards the end of this document,

  15   you will see who the ostensible board of directors is of this

  16   company.  Mohammed Karama Salim, businessman; Khalid al

  17   Fawwaz, businessman; and Jalal Fouad, businessman.  Just like

  18   Kherchtou told you, Fawwaz starts the business, and the person

  19   at the bottom, Jalal Fouad, you will see, is Abu Ubaidah, the

  20   person who dies in the ferry accident, Abu Ubaidah the

  21   military commander who Wadih El Hage is going to not only lie

  22   about but even deny that he knew him by that name Jalal.

  23            So you see, as far back as 1993 and into 1994, Khalid

  24   al Fawwaz and the others are playing out the Al Qaeda play

  25   book in Nairobi.  They are establishing businesses, they are


   1   living in Nairobi, but they are actually also carrying out the

   2   activities of Al Qaeda.  You will see the connections here

   3   between these two gentlemen in this business.

   4            There were other documents that were found among

   5   Wadih El Hage's files and we are not going to display them

   6   now.  We will talk about them later.  But there were phone

   7   records registered in Khalid al Fawwaz's name, Government

   8   Exhibit 626.  A copy of Fawwaz's passport, Government's

   9   Exhibit 622A.  There was a stamp for Asma Ltd., Government's

  10   Exhibit 629, and a business card for Abu Karama Muslim,

  11   Government's Exhibit 630.

  12            You heard from Kherchtou that before Ramadan in 1994,

  13   which there was a stipulation on was February of 1994, so

  14   before that, he remembered his former surveillance trainer Abu

  15   Mohamed al Amriki come to Nairobi with the person Anas al

  16   Liby, the person with whom he received the surveillance

  17   training.  Remember Anas al Liby and Ali Mohamed.  Ali

  18   Mohamed, the trainer who Kherchtou knew as Abu Mohamed al

  19   Amriki, and the computer expert, who did the computer training

  20   on surveillance.  What Kherchtou told you was that they

  21   arrived sometime before February and other Al Qaeda people

  22   show up right about this time:  Abu Hafs, the military

  23   commander; Abu Fadhl al Makkee, one of the founders, leader of

  24   Al Qaeda; and Abu Ubaidah.

  25            This is precisely when it was that Ali Mohamed


   1   arrived.  If you look, for example, at Government's Exhibit

   2   362, this is Ali Mohamed's passport.  If you take a look at

   3   page 7 of that, you see an entry stamp for his arrival into

   4   Nairobi on the 9th of December 1993.  If we take a look at

   5   Khalid al Fawwaz's passport, which I had mentioned earlier is

   6   Government's Exhibit 622A, and one of the documents found in

   7   Wadih el Hage's files, there you see the Saudi passport for

   8   Khalid al Fawwaz, and there you see on the left, and being

   9   highlighted for you, is the entry stamp for December 17, 1993.

  10   What Kherchtou tells you is that Abu Mohamed al Amriki and

  11   Anas al Liby set up a photographic operation in Kherchtou's

  12   apartment.  They set up a camera and photo developing

  13   equipment and folders and they set up a lab.  He told you that

  14   one day he was walking down the street on Moi Avenue about

  15   five hundred meters from the American embassy, and Abu

  16   Moustafa Karama.  He told you he knew that Al Qaeda was

  17   targeting the United States.  He also told you this is a time

  18   when Abu Hafs, the military commander, and Khalid al Fawwaz

  19   was also in Nairobi.  What I submit to you, ladies and

  20   gentlemen, is that what Kherchtou was telling you about as

  21   corroborated by some of the other physical evidence is that Al

  22   Qaeda members and those associated with Al Qaeda are there to

  23   conduct surveillance of American targets.  One of the targets

  24   that you know they were near with a camera was the American

  25   Embassy.  You will see evidence, of course, that other people


   1   in this conspiracy participated in the bombing of the American

   2   Embassy.

   3            Anas al Liby, the person with the camera, he is the

   4   person I mentioned earlier was living in Manchester in the

   5   United Kingdom.  By way of stipulation you learned there was a

   6   search of this place in Manchester and one of the things found

   7   in this search was a passport.  If you look at Government's

   8   Exhibit 1675, you see the passport and the name there, Al

   9   Raghie Nazeh, if you see on the top right.  You see the

  10   picture and you compare that to the picture of Government's

  11   Exhibit 112.  If you compare it also on the right-hand side of

  12   the screen to Government's Exhibit 604, 604 is a series of

  13   passport-size photos that are found among Wadih El Hage's

  14   files in that MIRA office in 1998, and one of those photos is

  15   a photo of Anas al Liby, who has that passport in Manchester

  16   in the United Kingdom.  One of the things found in the search

  17   of Anas al Liby's house is a document that is a manual on

  18   terrorist activities.  In fact, if you look at Government's

  19   Exhibit 1677, the second page, the document is entitled

  20   Declaration of Jihad Holy War Against the Countries, Tyrants,

  21   Military Series.  On the 12th page of that document there is a

  22   description about how to organize for operations, and it

  23   describes forged documents, counterfeit currency, apartments

  24   and hiding places, communication means, transportation means,

  25   and on down.  At the bottom of that document there is a


   1   description that one of the things this document advocates

   2   attacking, number 7, blasting and destroying the embassies and

   3   attacking vital economic centers.

   4            So, ladies and gentlemen, you have in 1993 the person

   5   who does the surveillance training for Al Qaeda, the person

   6   who is the expert in the computers, the person with the camera

   7   near the embassy, developing pictures in a secret lab,

   8   attending meetings with other prominent people in Al Qaeda, at

   9   a time when Al Qaeda is targeting the United States.

  10            Now we get to 1994.  1994, during Ramadan, Kherchtou

  11   tells you, which you know is in February 1994, Kherchtou tells

  12   that you Khalid al Fawwaz, among others, gets arrested, and

  13   one of the people who helps out to get Khalid al Fawwaz

  14   released is Abu Fadhl, the person pictured in Government's

  15   Exhibit 117, again, Mustafa Fadhl, the person that Kherchtou

  16   met when he first got to Kenya, the person who is going to

  17   carry out the operation to bomb the embassy in Dar es Salaam.

  18   What Kherchtou told you was that when Fawwaz got arrested, he

  19   reached out for a lawyer named Mr. Chaudhri, the lawyer who

  20   prepared the documents for Asma Ltd., who told you about their

  21   efforts to get him.  Kherchtou also told you that the group

  22   contacted Abu Ubaidah who was at the time in Sudan to spend

  23   the time and money to get Khalid Fawwaz out, and Abu Ubaidah

  24   gave his blessing.

  25            Eventually they get Khalid Fawwaz out from jail and


   1   what you learn from Kherchtou and you see in the other

   2   exhibits, Khalid al Fawwaz leaves Nairobi.  What I submit to

   3   you, ladies and gentlemen, is, he leaves Nairobi and he goes

   4   to London, which you will see him and we will talk about,

   5   because he has attracted the attention of the authorities, and

   6   to take the heat off the group Khalid al Fawwaz is going to

   7   get out of town to make sure the attention he is attracting

   8   doesn't spill over to the others in the group.  You will see

   9   this played out by Wadih El Hage three years later.

  10            What Kherchtou tells you is that when Khalid al

  11   Fawwaz leaves, soon thereafter, who arrives from Sudan but the

  12   defendant Wadih El Hage.  He specifically described it as

  13   Wadih El Hage took over.  Kherchtou told you that when Wadih

  14   El Hage arrived, he lived with Wadih El Hage.  First they

  15   lived together in a hotel.  Then he told you that Wadih El

  16   Hage rented a place, Fedha Estates, which had a house and

  17   separate back place where he would stay.  You know that is

  18   exactly right, because Agent Coleman who testified about the

  19   search of the Wadih El Hage's house, you remember he testified

  20   that they got some tapes in that separate back house.  What

  21   does Kherchtou telling you about being with Wadih El Hage in

  22   Nairobi?  He tells you that he personally sees him meet with

  23   Abu Hafs, the military commander of Al Qaeda.  He says they

  24   meet two or three times in Wadih El Hage's house in Nairobi.

  25   Kherchtou was there for those meetings.  He tells you that El


   1   Hage and Abu Hafs took one of the cars that belonged to Al

   2   Qaeda and took a trip to Mombasa, and wouldn't tell Kherchtou

   3   what they were doing there.

   4            Kherchtou also told you about how they came to Wadih

   5   El Hage and Kherchtou about arranging some travel for Abu Hafs

   6   and specifically told him do not tell Abu Mohamed al Amriki

   7   because I do not want him to know the alias I am traveling on.

   8   So when he needed to make a secret trip and wanted people to

   9   facilitate the trip, he went to the people that he trusted.

  10   Kherchtou told you about it, and he told you it was him and El

  11   Hage the military commander trusted.  It is the same Abu Hafs

  12   that Wadih El Hage will lie about in the grand jury in 1997

  13   and 1998.

  14            Kherchtou also told you that Abu Hafs and Wadih El

  15   Hage met together many times and that Wadih El Hage was one of

  16   the people in on Abu Ubaidah's secret life in Kenya.  He told

  17   you the story about the watch that had Wadih's name on it and

  18   ultimately ended up with Abu Ubaidah's wife.  Kherchtou also

  19   told you the story about Abu al Nalfi, the person with the

  20   amputated leg, purchased dogs for security and Kherchtou went

  21   out and got these dogs and arranged to have them shipped to

  22   the Sudan.

  23            What else happened in 1994?  Mohamed Odeh settles in

  24   Mombasa in Kenya, along the coast.  He is set up in a fishing

  25   business by Abu Hafs, the same military commander, who gives


   1   him a boat and a couple of employees and agrees to give him an

   2   Al Qaeda salary.  You know about some of this business because

   3   of some of the documents found once again in Wadih El Hage's

   4   files.  If you look at Government's Exhibit 614, 614 is a

   5   letter -- you can see it is dated January 1995, from Mohammed

   6   Karama, who appoints Mohamed Odeh, and he gives an i.d.,

   7   1773666, an i.d. that you will see is the i.d. number that was

   8   obtained when he got his identification in Kenya, which we

   9   will see in Government Exhibit 507 on the right.  It is being

  10   highlighted for you.  There you see Odeh's Kenyan i.d. number.

  11            There are a couple of other things that are

  12   interesting about this document regarding Odeh's i.d. number.

  13   If we pull up on the left Government's Exhibit 508 and if we

  14   highlight down at the bottom where it talks about mother's

  15   names, where each applicant is to give their mother's names --

  16   I just want to highlight the lower section of each one -- on

  17   the left, and now it's been magnified for you, is the

  18   application for Mustafa Fadhl.  You will see that he lists his

  19   mother as Marion Omar Hassan.  By the way, he claims he was

  20   born in Mombasa.  Let's look at what Odeh puts down for his

  21   mother's name.  Miriam Omar.  The other thing you see on that

  22   document is that Odeh lists his country of birth as Kenya,

  23   which is something he did not tell the agents.  He told the

  24   agents he was not from Kenya.

  25            The other thing that happens in 1994 -- remember I


   1   told you Khalid al Fawwaz, the person that Wadih El Hage

   2   replaced, after his release he goes to London, England, and

   3   what he does is, he sets up an organization called the Advice

   4   and Reformation Committee.  It is set up with the support of

   5   Usama Bin Laden.  If you look at Government's Exhibit 1606, a

   6   document found in Khalid al Fawwaz's house in London, this is

   7   a document that establishes by way of resolution -- and you

   8   see the signature there of Usama Bin Laden, and if we look at

   9   Government's Exhibit 1606-T, you see that July 1994 is when it

  10   is that Khalid al Fawwaz is set up as the leader of the London

  11   office of the Advice and Reformation Committee.  What I submit

  12   to you, ladies and gentlemen, is, the Advice and Reformation

  13   Committee is another front organization.  It is something

  14   again that is out of the Al Qaeda play book.  They establish a

  15   front.  They can do what apparently are legitimate activities

  16   that are used to shield a second line of work, work that

  17   supports the activities of Al Qaeda.

  18            Towards the end of 1994, Kherchtou tells you that Ali

  19   Mohamed, Abu Mohamed al Amriki, comes back to Nairobi and that

  20   there is a meeting that takes place just among Kherchtou and

  21   Abu Mohamed al Amriki.  What he says is that Abu Mohamed told

  22   Kherchtou that Abu Hafs and he, Kherchtou, were supposed to go

  23   do some surveillance work of French targets in Senegal and

  24   that they were going to do that together, but that they ended

  25   up not going because what happened was, according to


   1   Kherchtou, there was a phone call that came in on the mobile

   2   phone that Wadih El Hage had, and Wadih El Hage had some

   3   issues that he needed to resolve in the United States, some

   4   problems.

   5            What you see in Government's Exhibit 364C, one of

   6   those many summary charts that you saw, this one is calls from

   7   a number in California, 408-244-1209.  That is Ali Mohamed's

   8   phone back in California.  You see on October 18, 1994, two

   9   calls:  254, which is the country call for Kenya, 7120221,

  10   which is the mobile phone number that El Hage used, just as

  11   Kherchtou described for you.

  12            What you know by way of stipulation is that Ali

  13   Mohamed was dealing with the American authorities back here in

  14   the United States.  There are discussions with an FBI agent,

  15   there are discussions with a prosecutor, and there are

  16   telephone calls at right around the same time these meetings

  17   are going on, again from Ali Mohamed's phone.  You can see the

  18   calls there back and forth to the numbers in America.  And you

  19   also see a call there on December 20 to the mobile phone for

  20   Wadih El Hage.  And then again down at the bottom on December

  21   22 there are two calls.  So while Ali Mohamed is dealing with

  22   the American officials, he is maintaining contact with the

  23   Wadih El Hage mobile number in Nairobi.

  24            That is where things stand as of 1994.  You have met

  25   some of the participants in Al Qaeda, some of the members in


   1   Al Qaeda, some of the people who went to Somalia to further Al

   2   Qaeda's goals there, and you see that the Nairobi base of

   3   operations is firmly in place by 1994.  You saw Harun, and he

   4   was one of the people who went to Somalia.  You saw Mustafa

   5   Fadhl, one of the Al Qaeda members who will show up later in

   6   the bombing in Dar es Salaam.  Mohamed Odeh is set up in his

   7   Al Qaeda fishing business.  Khalid al Fawwaz, one of the

   8   leaders within the base in Nairobi, has moved on to London.

   9   And of course, Wadih El Hage, his replacement is in place by

  10   1994.

  11            In May of 1996, you heard from Kherchtou and from

  12   others that people learned that Abu Ubaidah drowned, the

  13   people within Al Qaeda learned.  And you heard firsthand what

  14   happened from the witness Ashif Juma, because he was on the

  15   ferryboat with Abu Ubaidah.  If we look at Government's

  16   Exhibit 257, you see exactly where it is that this accident

  17   took place.  There was a lot of discussion about Lake

  18   Victoria, and you see that Lake Victoria is basically on the

  19   Kenya, Tanzania border.

  20            Soon after the accident, you heard from Ashif Juma,

  21   Harun shows up to conduct an investigation of the accident,

  22   and in fact there was a videotape that was played for you

  23   where Harun is identified as one of the people who was

  24   captured on that videotape.  One of the things that Kherchtou

  25   told you was that everybody in Al Qaeda knew about Abu


   1   Ubaidah's drowning because everybody in Al Qaeda respected Abu

   2   Ubaidah.  In particular, Kherchtou told you when he spoke to

   3   Wadih El Hage about Abu Ubaidah's death, Wadih El Hage cried,

   4   which is something that you should bear in mind when Wadih El

   5   Hage denies having any knowledge about that ferryboat incident

   6   and denies participation in the investigation of the ferry

   7   accident itself.

   8            What did Ashif Juma tell you?  He told you that Wadih

   9   El Hage referred to the person he knew as Jalal, that Abu

  10   Ubaidah was referred to by El Hage as Jalal, something that

  11   Wadih El Hage is going to deny in front of the grand jury two

  12   years later.  If you look at Government's Exhibit 603, which

  13   is effectively a note, an IOU, it is signed by Wadih El Hage

  14   and it involves Ashif Juma.  It commits Ashif Juma to having

  15   borrowed the amount of 9 million Tanzanian shillings from

  16   Mohammed Karama through Jalal Fouad.  Remember, Jalal Fahad

  17   was the name you saw on the articles of incorporation of Asma,

  18   the business that Khalid al Fadhl set up.  This is Abu

  19   Ubaidah, ladies and gentlemen, and this is Wadih El Hage

  20   signing a contract where he is referring to Jalal Fouad, Abu

  21   Ubaidah.

  22            One of the things that Ashif Juma told you was that

  23   there was a discussion that he had with Wadih El Hage in a

  24   hotel that was near Lake Victoria and that Wadih El Hage

  25   specifically asked what Ashif Juma knew about Abu Ubaidah.


   1   What they were concerned with, ladies and gentlemen, what Al

   2   Qaeda was concerned with, what Harun and El Hage were there to

   3   investigate was whether or not any secrets that Abu Ubaidah

   4   had with him, any objects were going to fall into the wrong

   5   hands.  That is why El Hage and Harun are there.  You will see

   6   later on evidence that they actually prepared a report which

   7   they distribute to other people who are connected with this

   8   case, and in particular we are going to go through a report

   9   that was found in, of all places, Ali Mohamed's house in

  10   California during the search in 1998, a report that Ashif Juma

  11   read and said was accurate and said he did not prepare.  Among

  12   other reasons, he doesn't read, write or speak Arabic.

  13            The other main event that happens in 1996 is in

  14   August, and this is when Usama Bin Laden issues the

  15   declaration of jihad against the United States.  It is issued

  16   on August 23, 1996, and if we take a look at one of the

  17   copies, Government's Exhibit 1600A-T, this is a copy that is

  18   found in Khalid al Fawwaz's place in London.  We will go

  19   through this, but remember that we showed you during the trial

  20   that Khalid al Fawwaz had an electronic copy of this, that

  21   there was a directory of files, there was a directory listing

  22   under the message and electronic copies actually found on a

  23   computer disk in Khalid al Fawwaz's house.  This is going to

  24   be the document, ladies and gentlemen, where Bin Laden is

  25   going to now take public, take public his view that the


   1   Americans have to be driven from the Saudi Arabian gulf by

   2   whatever means are necessary.

   3            If we look at the second page of the document, the

   4   first thing you notice in the second full paragraph is, within

   5   this paragraph about halfway down, there are references to

   6   some people that Bin Laden is going to talk about again and

   7   again.  One of the people he refers to about halfway down the

   8   line that begins with the word heaven, he mentions Omar Abdel

   9   Rahman in America.  He says in his words, the crusader Jewish

  10   alliance killed the symbols of honest scholars and advocates

  11   and was sent by no one but Allah.

  12            (Continued on next page)















   1            MR. KARAS:  (Continuing) And remember what the

   2   witness Jamal al-Fadhl told you:  That there were people

   3   within al Qaeda that were angry at America because of the

   4   arrest of Omar Abdel Rahman and that some people left the

   5   group because they were disappointed that al Qaeda didn't do

   6   something to retaliate about the arrest.  Well, here you have

   7   corroborating what Al-Fadhl is telling you.  Bin Laden voicing

   8   his anger at the United States for the arrest of Omar Abdel

   9   Rahman.

  10            Now, the other thing that this document mentions is

  11   two other scholars, somebody by the name of al-Hawali and

  12   somebody by the name of al Tawbah, and we'll see those names

  13   come up later in connection with the claims for

  14   responsibilities.

  15            Now, if we go to the next, the last full paragraph

  16   down there, remember I mentioned to you earlier about how the

  17   witness, Jamal Al-Fadhl, described this fatwah that Abu Hajer

  18   had given about how it was proper to kill innocents in the

  19   course of attacks against infidels, and the basis for this

  20   were the teaching of Ibn al Tamiyeah.

  21            There you see, ladies and gentlemen, Usama Bin Laden

  22   is talking about Ibn al Tamiyeh, and what he specifically

  23   mentions is the story of the Tartar.  "Furthermore, Ibn al

  24   Tamiyeh, after mentioning the Tartar and their behavior in

  25   changing the law of Allah:  The ultimate aim of pleasing


   1   Allah, raising his word, instituting his religion and obeying

   2   his messenger, peace be upon them, is to fight the enemy in

   3   every aspect and in complete manner:  If the danger to the

   4   religion from not fighting is greater than that of fighting,

   5   then it is a duty to fight them even if the intention of some

   6   of the fighters is not pure, i.e., fighting for the sake of

   7   leadership or if they do not observe some of the rules and

   8   commandments of Islam."

   9            It may very well be that killing innocents is not to

  10   be sanctioned, but if the choice is defeat by the enemies of

  11   Islam, then you do what you have to do.  That is how Bin Laden

  12   interprets Ibn al Tamiyeh and that is the basis for his call

  13   to his followers -- to carry out the attacks against the

  14   United States, because that is the number one priority.

  15            Now, Bin Laden doesn't mince words, and at the bottom

  16   of the 11th page of this document, if you highlight the last

  17   paragraph down there, "Though we know the regime," referring

  18   to the Saudi regime, "is fully responsible for what had

  19   happened to the country and to its tiresome people that the

  20   cause of disease and its tribulations is the occupying

  21   American enemy so all effort must be directed at this enemy,

  22   kill it, fight it, destroy it, break it down, plot against it,

  23   ambush it, and God the almighty willing, until it is gone."

  24            And now what Bin Laden is doing is he's taking the

  25   statements that he privately shared with the members of al


   1   Qaeda in the guesthouse in Khartoum, Sudan and he is taking it

   2   public.

   3            Ladies and gentlemen, Bin Laden didn't wake up that

   4   morning and decide that, oh, there are troops in America for

   5   five years so this is the cause we're going to take on.  This

   6   is the evolution of the theme that he established for al Qaeda

   7   since the troops arrived, since al Qaeda set up its operations

   8   in Khartoum, since Bin Laden and Abu Hajer preached to the

   9   other members of al Qaeda that it was their mission to drive

  10   the American forces from Saudi Arabia.  This is the foundation

  11   of what Bin Laden believes and everything else feeds off of

  12   that.

  13            Everywhere he looks, he sees the American enemy and

  14   he says that every effort must be pooled to kill the American

  15   enemy.  And you'll remember that the witness Jamal Al-Fadhl

  16   told you that when he first approached the Americans in 1996,

  17   he said, you're going to want to talk to me because these

  18   people are waging a war against you.  And they may want to

  19   attack one of your embassies.  As far as back as 1996 that is

  20   what one of the members of al Qaeda believed to be the case.

  21            Now, another thing that happens in 1996 that tells

  22   you a great deal about the activities in this case is that the

  23   group purchases a satellite phone, within three months of the

  24   declaration of Jihad.  And the satellite phone that you heard

  25   about was the one that Marilyn Morelli from Ogara Satellite


   1   Networks testified to, and she told you some basic facts about

   2   satellite phones -- that they are often used in remote areas;

   3   that if you want to call a satellite phone, you have got to

   4   know the three-digit prefix that corresponds to the ocean

   5   region; and the satellite phone isn't like any other ordinary

   6   phone where you use it, you get the bill and you pay it, you

   7   have to purchase minutes in advance, using one of those cards

   8   that comes with a number and then you call off the number of

   9   minutes that you have.

  10            Now, you saw the documents that show that a person by

  11   the name of Ziyad Khalil purchased this phone, and his name

  12   appears on the records, Government Exhibit 592.  And there are

  13   a series of documents in there where he is the one who

  14   purchases this phone on November 1, 1996.  And ladies and

  15   gentlemen, this phone -- you saw this chart many times

  16   throughout this trial -- is the phone that Bin Laden and the

  17   others will use to carry out their war against the United

  18   States.

  19            682505331 is the phone number that is assigned to

  20   that phone, and in 1996 up through October 1998, if you wanted

  21   to call the phone, you had to dial 873 and then the number.

  22   And what you see, ladies and gentlemen, is this phone appears

  23   in the address books of many of the people connected to this

  24   case, starting with Wadih El Hage.  The pop-up phone book,

  25   Government Exhibit 304, the phone book that's found in Wadih


   1   El Hage's house, page 11, there's a reference there to Hafusa,

   2   Abu Hafs, 873682/505331.

   3            Khalid al Fawwaz, the person that El Hage replaced in

   4   Nairobi, he's got several references in his phone books.  If

   5   we take a look at Government Exhibit 1629, which is one of the

   6   address books that's found in Khalid al Fawwaz' house, this is

   7   a translation of one of the pages.  He does not put Abu Hafs

   8   down, he goes with Dr. Mohamed Atef, 873-682505331.

   9            And you know that Abu Hafs is Mohamed Atef, because

  10   there is a telephone call that comes from, I think -- excuse

  11   me, that goes to Wadih El Hage's number and there is a message

  12   left with El Hage's wife saying Abu Hafs is calling, it's

  13   Mohamed Atef.  And Khalid al Fawwaz is referring to Mohamed

  14   Atef using the satellite phone number.

  15            He's got another reference in Government Exhibit

  16   1631, which is another address book found in Khalid al Fawwaz'

  17   house, and that is a copy of the address book itself.  Now,

  18   we'll get to the translation in a minute, but if you see the

  19   number on the left there, 837655, and if we go to the

  20   translation, and that's part of the translation, Mohamed Atef,

  21   and there is a number in Karachi and then the other number

  22   that's assigned to Mohamed Atef, 837655.

  23            Now what's interesting about that, Mohamed Atef,

  24   remember, is Abu Hafs, and if you will remember -- we'll go

  25   through this -- all the fax headers that we took a look at


   1   during the trial, and Kandahar Communications, AFG, and the

   2   number there was 837655.  This is Government Exhibit 2550,

   3   this is a map of a Afghanistan.  Kandahar is one of the

   4   provinces in Afghanistan.

   5            So Fawwaz and others who are involved in the

   6   conspiracy to murder U.S. nationals are getting communications

   7   from Mohamed Atef in Kandahar, Afghanistan from the number

   8   837655.  Mohamed Atef is assigned this number, according to

   9   Khalid al Fawwaz, and that number, the satellite phone number.

  10            It also appears in the Casio of somebody by the name

  11   of Ibrahim Eidarous.  There are three people in London, ladies

  12   and gentlemen, who were part of the conspiracy to murder U.S.

  13   nationals.  Eidarous, Government Exhibit 129, is his picture

  14   with his aliases.  Ibrahim Daoud Abu Abdulla, he's the cell

  15   leader for EIJ, that joint venture group I mentioned by

  16   Zawahiri in London, and he's got a listing in his Casio.

  17            If you take a look at Abu Abdallah.  Now, Abu

  18   Abdallah, you will remember from Government Exhibit 4-1, is

  19   one of the aliases for Usama Bin Laden, and you see how he's

  20   got it listed there is Abu Abdallah, "at" sign, "at" sign,

  21   "at" sign, this is an important number, and what's the number

  22   he's got:  873682505331.

  23            So the cell leader for EIJ has got this number,

  24   Khalid al Fawwaz, one of the al Qaeda members who was in

  25   Nairobi and in London has got the number, and Wadih El Hage


   1   has the number.  And the number is ascribed in these address

   2   books to either Abu Hafs or Bin Laden.

   3            How else do you know?  Well, because the phone was

   4   actually purchased through this person Ziyad Khalil by Khalid

   5   al Fawwaz, who was one of the critical members in this

   6   conspiracy.

   7            Government Exhibit 1626D, and this is a security

   8   report that is prepared by Khalid al Fawwaz, and if you take a

   9   look, this is actually found on his computer.  If you take a

  10   look down at the bottom there, it has been highlighted for

  11   you, he's telling the group what it is that needs to get done.

  12   And what he says on the administrative issues, in order to

  13   solve the problem of communication, it is indispensable to buy

  14   the satellite phone.  And Fawwaz is going to act as the

  15   quintessential facilitator and he's going to purchase the

  16   phone.

  17            If we could take a look at Government Exhibit 593,

  18   which is among the many invoices for the minutes that were

  19   purchased for the phone, remember you have to purchase the

  20   minutes in advance, and what this is, this is correspondence

  21   from Marilyn Morelli, the person who testified, to Ziyad

  22   Khaleel.  And you see the date there, May 8, 1997, and she's

  23   responding to his request for the purchase of minutes.  And

  24   she explains, here are the instructions.

  25            And 593 contains another piece of paper, 593-4, which


   1   is the actual invoice itself, and she told you this is what

   2   gets sent out.  You see M circled there and the date, you see

   3   597, and it says add minutes transaction order, and down at

   4   the bottom are the numbers you need to activate the phone to

   5   use the minutes.

   6            Let's put that, if we could, on the left side of the

   7   screen.  The document on the left side of the screen is in the

   8   business records of Ogara Satellite Networks.  It's a copy of

   9   the minutes invoice that is sent from Ogara to this person

  10   Ziyad Khaleel.  On the right, Government Exhibit 1625, what

  11   you have now before you is Government Exhibit 1625.

  12   Government Exhibit 1625 is a copy of the minutes invoice that

  13   is found in Khalid al Fawwaz' house when the Scotland Yard

  14   officer searched it in 1998, and it's the May 8, 1997 purchase

  15   of minutes.

  16            So Ziyad Khaleel purchases the minutes on May 7 and

  17   he sends it to Khalid al Fawwaz in London, and we'll go

  18   through the records and you know that this is in Khalid al

  19   Fawwaz's phone because, among other reasons, the phone is

  20   constantly calling Khalid al Fawwaz's home number in London.

  21   And we'll go through that in second.

  22            If we could take a look, though, at Government

  23   Exhibit 1633, this is another document found in Khalid al

  24   Fawwaz's house in London.  You see there it's a letter, short

  25   letter from Khalid al Fawwaz dated June 3, because remember,


   1   they transpose the numbers in Europe, June 3, 1997.  "Dear

   2   Brother Ziyad:  As for the transferred money, the bank assured

   3   me that the money was withdrawn on 27/5/97," May 27, "a week

   4   ago, and they told me that the money will be in your account

   5   during this period," etc., etc., etc.

   6            So Khalid purchases the minutes on May 7, he sends

   7   the invoice to al Fawwaz, al Fawwaz reimburses him on May 27,

   8   and he's telling Ziyad Khalil, I sent you the money, you'll

   9   get it.

  10            How else do you know that this is the phone that is

  11   used by Bin Laden and others in Afghanistan?  Well, at some

  12   point in 1998 Ziyad Khalil puts a purchase order in for a

  13   battery pack to Ogara.  If we pull up Government Exhibit 593,

  14   this is one of the documents that Marilyn Morelli testified

  15   about.

  16            This is an invoice from Ogara, and you see on the top

  17   left there, "Customer:  Ziyad Khalil," and you see that what

  18   he is purchasing is the ultra light power supply and the 12VDC

  19   mini battery charger.  Only Ziyad Khalil does not have it sent

  20   to him, he asked, ship to, Tariq Hamdi in Herndon, Virginia.

  21            Now, if we pull up Government Exhibit 1621, this is

  22   another document found in Khalid al Fawwaz' house in London.

  23   By the way, his address is 94 Dewsbury Road, London, England.

  24   We'll talk about that a little later on.

  25            This is a letter from ABC News from Christopher


   1   Isham, a senior producer at ABC News, to Mr. S. Rashid.  This

   2   is found in Khalid al Fawwaz's house.  The first line of the

   3   letter reads, "As per our conversations with Tarik Hamdi in

   4   Washington, I am confirming our interest in interviewing Mr.

   5   Bin Laden for ABC News."  So the person to whom the battery

   6   pack is getting shipped is working with ABC News to arrange an

   7   interview with Bin Laden.

   8            And you see the date by the way of the letter, they

   9   are trying to arrange to interview April 2, 1998, and the

  10   battery pack request comes in on May 11, 1998.  So what

  11   happens?  Government Exhibit 1612 -- maybe we can try the

  12   left/right thing again and put this on the left and on the

  13   right, if we can try the translation.

  14            What you have here is another document found in

  15   Khalid al Fawwaz's house in London, and what you see is the

  16   document on the left is a fax page from the Islamabad Marriott

  17   Hotel, Islamabad City in Pakistan.  That's not too far from

  18   Afghanistan.  It's in the northwest part of Pakistan.

  19            And Tariq Hamdi, see it says "a message to Khalid,"

  20   and that number 441812084423, that's Khalid al Fawwaz' fax

  21   number.  And you know that from the telephone records that are

  22   in evidence.  And it's from Tariq and you see the date on the

  23   fax at the top, 17 May 1998.  Actually he writes it there, May

  24   17, 1998.  And what he says is, "Brother Khalid:  Peace be

  25   upon you.  We arrived safely and now we are in the Marriott


   1   Hotel and its address is," and he gives the address.

   2            So here is the chronology:  Ziyad Khalil requests the

   3   battery pack on May 11, 1998, on May 17, 1998, and he asks

   4   that it be sent to Tariq Hamdi.  On May 11, 1998, Tariq Hamdi

   5   is getting the battery pack for the telephone number

   6   6825053316789.  That's May 11.  May 17, Tariq Hamdi is in

   7   Islamabad on behalf of ABC News and he tells Khalid al Fawwaz

   8   we are in Islamabad and we are fine.

   9            And you know from a stipulation that on May 28, 1998,

  10   ABC News interviewed Bin Laden in Afghanistan.  So the battery

  11   pack goes from Ziyad Khalil requesting it to shipping it to

  12   Tariq Hamdi, to Tariq Hamdi going to Pakistan, and then

  13   Afghanistan, where he delivers the battery pack for the phone.

  14            And the intermediary in all of this is Khalid al

  15   Fawwaz, because he's the guy whose paying Ziyad Khalil for the

  16   minutes and he's the guy who arranges for the interview with

  17   ABC News and he is the guy getting the message from Tariq

  18   Hamdi, the person who delivers the packet.

  19            Now, if we take a look at Government Exhibit 218A-T2,

  20   this is one of intercepted telephone conversations in Kenya,

  21   and this is a conversation between El Hage and Harun, the same

  22   Harun who told Kherchtou he is in Somalia, the same Harun who

  23   you are going to see is going to be a major participant in the

  24   bombing of the embassy in Nairobi.

  25            They are talking about other topics, and then El Hage


   1   switches the conversation.  "Listen," he says, "Dr. Atef."

   2   Now we're back to the doctor, just like Dr. Mohamed Atef in

   3   Khalid al Fawwaz's address book.  "Yeah," says Harun.  "He

   4   moved the clinic," says El Hage.  "Yeah," says Harun.  "He

   5   moved the clinic."  And then El Hage says, "For this reason

   6   his phone was disconnected."

   7            And then El Hage says cryptically, "If you want to

   8   take your family, wife there, take this phone number."  And if

   9   we go down to the bottom of the page, the phone number that El

  10   Hage gives to Harun, he says, "Write down 873682," and then he

  11   stops and he says another number and he gives him the rest of

  12   the number, 505331, and he goes on to tell him "and put the

  13   two numbers together."  So 873682, and then puts the numbers

  14   together with 505331.

  15            Ladies and gentlemen, you know that Dr. Mohamed Atef

  16   is not a doctor and he doesn't have a clinic and Harun isn't

  17   taking his family to Dr. Atef's clinic.  This is El Hage

  18   passing the very carefully forwarded telephone number for Bin

  19   Laden in Afghanistan.

  20            And what's interesting about this satellite phone, if

  21   we take a look at Government Exhibit 594, which is effectively

  22   the phone bill but what they call it is minutes used, and you

  23   see the first three calls there are to numbers in the United

  24   States.  The top one is to Ogara Satellite Networks, the other

  25   two are 573.


   1            And then you see on November 20, if we could just go

   2   on to November 20 on down, those are the first calls that are

   3   made from the satellite phone outside the United States.  The

   4   very first number called, November 20, is Khalid al Fawwaz'

   5   number, 2084411.  Again, from telephone records you know that

   6   that's his number at 94 Dewsbury Road.

   7            The second one is to another number in London.  The

   8   third one, 249, is the country code for Sudan.  And Government

   9   Exhibit 98 gives you the country codes for the countries.  And

  10   the fourth number called by the satellite phone, 2542820067,

  11   which is the number for Wadih El Hage in Nairobi, Kenya and

  12   it's called again that same day, November 23.

  13            Now, the satellite phone is used by Bin Laden and

  14   it's used by Abu Hafs, but it's also used by Ayman al

  15   Zawahiri, the leader of EIJ.  If we take a look at Government

  16   Exhibit 1523-T, T2, what that is, ladies and gentlemen, this

  17   is a letter to Abu Abdallah.  This is a letter found, by the

  18   way, in the trunk of Eidarous' car -- remember, "the boot" the

  19   Scotland Yard officer called it -- the trunk of Eidarous' car.

  20   And one of the aliases for Eidarous, Abu Abdallah, which is

  21   not the Abu Abdallah that Wadih El Hage is known by, a

  22   different Abu Abdallah.  Abu Abdallah says -- he has a series

  23   of things he tells him.  He says, please call telephone number

  24   956375892.

  25            Now, that telephone number, we'll talk a little bit


   1   more about it later, happens to be the telephone number for

   2   the third guy in London to keep an eye on, somebody by the

   3   name of Adel Abdel Bary.  There's three people in London.

   4   Khalid al Fawwaz, Ibrahim Eidarous, and this person, Adel

   5   Abdel Bary, and those are the only three in London we're going

   6   to talk about.  I promise.  And that's the number for Adel

   7   Abdel Bary, whose another person EIJ in London.  And there it

   8   is, Eidarous asking on October 29, 1997 to Zawahiri, please

   9   call this number.

  10            Now, if we go to Government Exhibit 594-9, which

  11   again is the invoice for the minutes used on the satellite

  12   phone, and we go to October 30, the day after Eidarous writes

  13   this letter to Zawahiri, you will see five telephone calls to

  14   that number.  44 is the country code for England, 956375892.

  15            Ladies and gentlemen, that phone is the Jihad phone

  16   in this case.  It is the phone that is used by the

  17   headquarters people in Afghanistan when the group leaves Sudan

  18   and goes to Afghanistan.  And who they call on that phone and

  19   who has that number tells you a great, great deal about the

  20   activities of the people in this case.

  21            Remember, Wadih El Hage has the phone number and he

  22   passes it on to Harun.  Khalid al Fawwaz who helps buy the

  23   phone, he has the number.  Eidarous, the person who runs the

  24   EIJ cell in London, he has the phone.  And where you are going

  25   to see Eidarous and that other person Adel Abdel Bary, and why


   1   I asked you to keep your eye on them, they're going to be

   2   involved in disseminating the claims of responsibility for the

   3   bombings, the claims that you saw that were found at The

   4   Grapevine office in the Beethoven Street office in London,

   5   that's their office.

   6            And that's the phone that Bin Laden and the other

   7   coconspirators are going to use to communicate to carry out

   8   their conspiracy to murder U.S. nationals.  It's the phone,

   9   you are going to see shortly, that they use to communicate the

  10   fatwah in February of 1998 that says kill all American

  11   civilians, and it's the phone that they're going to use to try

  12   to rescue the defendant Mohamed Al-'Owhali when he is stuck in

  13   Nairobi with no passport and no money after the bombing.

  14            Like I said, it is that phone that gives you a window

  15   into how it is that al Qaeda operates.

  16            What else happens in 1996?  Well, that is the year,

  17   according to Al-'Owhali's statement that he gave to the FBI,

  18   that Al-'Owhali gets to Afghanistan.  That is the year that

  19   Mohamed Al-'Owhali gets his al Qaeda training and he's trained

  20   in explosives, hijacking, kidnapping, assassination, and

  21   intelligence.  And after this training, he told the agent, he

  22   gets to have an audience with Usama Bin Laden.  And he asks

  23   Bin Laden for a mission and the mission that you know that he

  24   carries out on August 7th of 1998.

  25            The other thing that happens in 1996, Wadih El Hage


   1   helps to facilitate the delivery of fake passports.  One of

   2   the people that Kherchtou told you who was in the EIJ group

   3   was somebody by the name of Ahmed Hassan, and you're going to

   4   see later on in Government Exhibit I believe it's 1518 a

   5   letter where Ayman Zawahiri appoints Ahmad Hassan as one of

   6   the deputies of EIJ.

   7            And if we take a look at Government Exhibit 304 --

   8   okay, we can pull up 1518.  That's a good idea.  This is a

   9   letter I mentioned to you.  This is found again in the boot,

  10   the trunk of Eidarous' car, and it's from Abu Mohamed Nur

  11   Al-Deen, one of the aliases for Zawahiri, and it's dated

  12   January 18, 1997.  It says, "It's important for me to tell you

  13   that I choose the brothers," and he lists the people.  And "D"

  14   you see "Ahmad Hassan for communications and secretariat."  So

  15   he is appointing this person as one of the deputies within

  16   EIJ.

  17            Now, next, if we go to Government Exhibit 304, again

  18   the pop-up phone book that's found in El Hage's house, and you

  19   see a reference there to a Dardaa, Liby, 955769.  And in the

  20   same book at page 25, you see a reference to Saad and there's

  21   a number there, 999412989965, and then the number again

  22   955769.  And 994 is the country code for Azerbaijan.  And you

  23   can barely see it on this map up here.  Up here it's north of

  24   Iran and that's the country code for Azerbaijan.

  25            Now, a few other things that are found -- by the way,


   1   if you take a look, if you take a look at Government Exhibit

   2   594, the second page, and this is minutes used on the

   3   satellite phone, on December 5, 1996, you see a phone call to

   4   that number 99412989965, one of the numbers that El Hage has

   5   listed for Saad in Azerbaijan.  If we take a look at

   6   Government Exhibit 624J-T, and this is one of the letters

   7   that's found in El Hage's files -- not in his house, but in

   8   the office, a search that took place in August of 1998 -- and

   9   it's a letter to Harun dated October 23, 1996 and it's signed

  10   DRDDA, and it's got ASHRAF in parentheses and he puts Mont

  11   Carlo at the bottom.

  12            He tells Harun, "I received your letter, and thank

  13   God everyone is all right."  He says, "Regarding Suleiman, he

  14   and Abdel Hadi traveled to and they arrived safely, although

  15   Suleiman was delayed a little bit because of the working

  16   contract he had at the airport."

  17            Then he says, "Regarding the Saudi Arabia, please

  18   change the picture of the office only, nothing else.  About

  19   myself, please raise the salary because I heard it is $75 and

  20   this is not enough.  Regarding the married people, please let

  21   them keep their papers with them.  Regarding Brother Nabil, he

  22   needs to change the office's picture and put the office

  23   picture which Basil Nabil sent to you.  Change the name of

  24   office to the name Zuhair Shahan Kulayb.  Clean the office and

  25   take care of it.  Place the golden design, the Yemeni or the


   1   Turkish."

   2            That is a recipe for a fake passport.  "Place the

   3   golden design, the Yemeni or the Turkish."

   4            "Please change the picture of the office only

   5   regarding the Saudi Arabia."

   6            "DRDAA and ASHRAF is asking Harun to do what

   7   Kherchtou told you Harun does for al Qaeda -- he makes fake

   8   passports, the lifeblood, as I mentioned earlier, of al Qaeda.

   9   And among the documents that are found among El Hage's files

  10   are Government Exhibits 623, a passport.

  11            This is an Egyptian passport.  Government Exhibit

  12   631, this one is a Yemeni passport.  Government Exhibit 634,

  13   this is a stamp, a travel stamp for Kenya.  And then on the

  14   computer, Government Exhibit 300, it's found in El Hage's

  15   house, remember, is Government Exhibit 300F.

  16            And remember Agent Crisalli, he was the computer

  17   expert who told you that there was this Adobe function that

  18   allows you to scan in that image and then you can manipulate

  19   it, he said you can change it.

  20            Government Exhibit 300G, another stamp, a Kenya

  21   travel stamp, and then 300H.  This one has a translation that

  22   tells you it's from Yemen.  It's an exit stamp from Yemen.

  23   All the tools of the fake passport trade.

  24            But there are telephone calls that go with that

  25   letter.  If we take a look at Government Exhibit 201A-T, this


   1   is a telephone call on October 3, 1996.  Remember that letter

   2   was in October 1996, and the participants in that conversation

   3   are Saad and Harun.  And after the greetings, Saad says:

   4   "Listen.  Listen to me.  I found the office.  I found the

   5   office.  I found the office, but nothing has arrived yet.

   6   Nothing has arrived yet.  Do you understand?"  And Harun says:

   7   "Yes."  And Saad says:  "Do you have anything new?  Do you

   8   have anything new?"  And Harun says:  "There is nothing new.

   9   We are still waiting on news and letters which we haven't

  10   received."  So there, on October 3, Saad is wondering if he

  11   has anything new.

  12            Government's Exhibits 202A-T, this is a telephone

  13   conversation between Harun and Ahmad Hassan, the EIJ member.

  14   What Harun says, again after the greetings, if we go to the

  15   next page and down at the bottom, Harun says:  "Saad sends his

  16   regards to you.  I know...his telephone number was probably

  17   busy...to send him a fax.  I will give you his number.  He

  18   asked for you."  And then Harun says:  "He sent me a fax and

  19   he said:  Is his family with you or with him?  I told him

  20   his...your family is with the people over there."  And then he

  21   proceeds to give him a telephone number in Baku.

  22            We can go to the next page, and he goes ahead and he

  23   gives him that telephone number in Baku.  And down at the

  24   bottom, which has been cut off, there's a reference to the

  25   name of Saad.


   1            Now if we go to Government Exhibit 204A-T, what you

   2   see here, this is a call November 6, 1996, and El Hage is

   3   talking to DHL because he forgot to put an important letter in

   4   a package and he wants to know if he can get it back.  And

   5   then what happens is DHL calls El Hage back later on that day

   6   on November 6 and tells him that he can pick up the package.

   7            Six days later, as we know from Government Exhibit

   8   205A-T, which is a conversation on November 12, and this is El

   9   Hage talking to Saif al Islam, as you can see there, and if we

  10   can go to the second page and you see down there at the

  11   bottom, "I was waiting to get notebooks here."  Saif al Islam

  12   is waiting to get the notebooks, and one of the codes you

  13   learned about was "books" is the code for passports.

  14            In 207C-T, which is a conversation on December 17,

  15   '96, again involving Wadih El Hage and Wadih El Hage and this

  16   person Saad in Baku.  Saad says:  "Concerning Abu al-Darda',

  17   have you sent him the notebook?"  El Hage says:  "Yes, a long

  18   time ago, but they never told us whether they had received it

  19   or not."

  20            Remember, Dardaa is the person whose name appears in

  21   El Hage's address book.  Dardaa is the person who sends the

  22   letter to Harun that talks about the Yemeni and the Turkish

  23   and the gold seal.  And you know "the books" are used as code

  24   for passports, and Saad says:  "Did you send him anything else

  25   with it for Suhail and the other?"  For the other people did


   1   you send the passports.  And El Hage says:  "Yes, yes, it was

   2   with it, but we didn't do anything to them."  So El Hage is

   3   distinguishing what he did with some of the passports but not

   4   with all of the passports.

   5            And then Saad asks:  "What about the green one?  Did

   6   you do anything to it?"  And you see in the passports, they

   7   come in different colors, and El Hage says:  "Oh, let me

   8   think.  It's been a while.  Let me ask Harun about it because

   9   I remember he said it was better not to do anything to it,

  10   otherwise, the projects would get ruined."

  11            So El Hage and Harun are working together to fix some

  12   of these passports and Saad goes on to say:  "So regarding Abu

  13   al Dardaa's, it had been fixed and sent then?"  And El Hage

  14   says:  "Yes."  El Hage says:  Abu al Dardaa's is fine and

  15   fixed, and we sent it to him."  Again, Wadih El Hage is acting

  16   as the facilitator on behalf of al Qaeda to make sure, working

  17   behind the scenes, that the essentials that need to get done

  18   get down on behalf of al Qaeda.

  19            Now, we get to 1997.  In 1997, ladies and gentlemen,

  20   you are going to remember that there were two trips that El

  21   Hage took to see Usama Bin Laden, and the first one takes

  22   place in February 1997.  And bear in mind, this is five or six

  23   months after Bin Laden has publicly declared war on the United

  24   States, after he says that all resources should be pooled to

  25   kill the United States, to drive the American forces out of


   1   Saudi Arabia.  And in spite of the denials that El Hage will

   2   give to the Grand Jury, the evidence overwhelmingly shows that

   3   El Hage went to Afghanistan.  He went to Afghanistan to visit

   4   with Bin Laden and Abu Hafs.  We can go through that evidence

   5   right now.

   6            First, on January 29, 1997, as we know from

   7   Government Exhibit 594, again this is the minutes used on that

   8   satellite phone, there is a call from the satellite phone on

   9   January 29 to 25471202219.  That is the mobile phone that El

  10   Hage uses, and you know 254 is the country code for Kenya.

  11            On February 3, 1997, there are telephone calls from

  12   that mobile number, and we know that from the mobile phone

  13   records.  And so you know, those are Government Exhibit 621C.

  14   There is a call from the mobile phone to the number 521272177.

  15   And if we go to the pop-up phone book, Government Exhibit

  16   304-27, you see that that number I just read to you, 21272177,

  17   is listed for Taysir, and Taysir is one of the names that El

  18   Hage is going to use for Abu Hafs.  And we'll go through that

  19   some more.  So the satellite phone calls El Hage on January

  20   29.  El Hage calls back on February 7 to Taysir, Abu Hafs, on

  21   February 3.

  22            And by the way, you see that number also appear in

  23   the planner that's found in El Hage's house, Government

  24   Exhibit 350.  In the lower right there, Taysir, Box 35341,

  25   272177.


   1            On January 30, and we don't have to pull up the

   2   records, but the satellite phone calls 820067.  That's the

   3   land line at Fedha Estates that belongs to El Hage.

   4            Then, on January 30, there is a call that is

   5   intercepted and it's the transcript containing Government

   6   Exhibit 209A-T.  And it's call from Abu Khadija, and we know

   7   that Abu Khadija is one of the aliases for Abu Hafs.  That's

   8   in Government Exhibit 4-2, I believe.  And that conversation

   9   involves Abu Khadija, Abu Hafs and April El Hage.  And Abu

  10   Khadija asks:  "Is he," referring to Abu Hafs, "present."

  11   April says:  "He is notice present.  He is out.  He may come

  12   after two hours."  And so he leaves a message.

  13            What you know from Government Exhibit 209B-T, which I

  14   won't play to you, is a series of outgoing calls between about

  15   2:47 in the afternoon and 3:22 in the afternoon.  This call

  16   from Khadija takes place at 2:47 in the afternoon.  So right

  17   after April El Hage hangs up, she's dialing and she's getting

  18   a busy signal.  And she keeps redialing and getting a busy

  19   signal for almost a half an hour.

  20            She knows the call is important.  She knows Abu Hafs

  21   is calling for El Hage and she's trying to get the message to

  22   him that Abu Hafs wants to speak to you.  So on Government

  23   Exhibit 209C-T, at 3:22, April El Hage finally gets through to

  24   Wadih El Hage.  And she reaches him and she says -- there are

  25   these greetings back and forth, and she says way down at the


   1   bottom, "Ah...he came back.  Ahmad never came back.  And Abu

   2   Khadija called.  He is going to call you back in two hours."

   3            And if we go to the next page, El Hage says:  "Okay,

   4   I should be home soon."  April says:  "By four...four, five."

   5   They go back and forth.  And when he says:  "Ah, that's too

   6   early," she says:  "It is the other one."  And El Hage says:

   7   "Who?"  And she says:  "The other one."

   8            This is the other Abu Khadija she is referring to,

   9   this is the important Abu Khadija, and she has to distinguish

  10   that because there is another Abu Khadija who El Hage keeps in

  11   touch with and we'll receive conversations belonging him.

  12   That Khadija lives in Germany, but this Khadija, the other

  13   one, the one calling using the satellite phone, he is in

  14   Afghanistan and April El Hage wants to make sure that Wadih El

  15   Hage gets the message.

  16            So how do you know he left?  In addition to these

  17   calls that precede his trip on February 3, 1997, again looking

  18   at the mobile telephone records, the mobile telephone shows

  19   another call to that number 272177.  And then on -- and we

  20   won't display this now, but Government Exhibit 210A-T is a

  21   conversation on February 4, 1997.  It's about 5 in the

  22   afternoon, and El Hage says that he is at the Executive

  23   Guesthouse and he says it's 71E Abdara Road.  And he gives the

  24   phone number, 842593, and, "In case they call, tell them this

  25   is the Executive Guesthouse."


   1            And then he says:  "Yeah, the telephone you gave me

   2   the other day is always closed.  I get recorded messages that

   3   says that it is off."  And what you know from the minutes

   4   records for the satellite phone is that the satellite phone

   5   has no calls during this time.  There's something wrong.

   6   Maybe Ziyad Khalil hasn't gotten the minutes, maybe the phone

   7   is broken, maybe it needs a battery pack, but there are no

   8   calls if you look at the records on 594 for that time period.

   9            And you know from Government Exhibit 646, this is one

  10   of the documents found in El Hage's files in the Mira Office

  11   in 1998, and you see the Executive Guesthouse, just like he

  12   tells Harun.  At the bottom it says 71E Abdara Road and the

  13   phone number, and the place he is staying at, ladies and

  14   gentlemen, is in Peshawar.

  15            Remember Mohamed Ali Odeh, the gem salesman, he was

  16   asked, Do you remember about El Hage going to Pakistan

  17   February 1997?  He said, Yes, I do.  He specifically was

  18   asked, Do you remember him going to Peshawar?  And he said,

  19   No.  And Peshawar is that border town we talked about earlier.

  20   That's where Kherchtou got his surveillance training.  It's

  21   right on the Afghanistan border.

  22            And you know from the telephone conversations between

  23   El Hage and his deputy, Harun, and from the document 646 that

  24   El Hage is right at the border of Afghanistan, staying at a

  25   hotel waiting to cross the border and to meet with the al


   1   Qaeda leadership.

   2            Government Exhibit 211A-T, this is now a conversation

   3   three days later, after El Hage tells Harun that he is in

   4   Peshawar, February 7, 1997.  And this is an outgoing call you

   5   see there from El Hage's phone to the number 451257.  Just so

   6   you know, Government Exhibit 636A shows that that number is

   7   listed to a Must, M-U-S-T, and it's crossed out in the

   8   listing.

   9            And then 636B, which is, by the way, records found

  10   among El Hage's files in the Mira Office in Nairobi in 1998,

  11   shows another listing for 451257 for Mustafa, and that

  12   Mustafa, ladies and gentlemen, is the Mustafa that's Khalid.

  13   That's the person who met Kherchtou when he got to Nairobi,

  14   that's the al Qaeda member who is going to carry out the

  15   bombing in Dar es Salaam.

  16            And if we take a look after the greetings, what Harun

  17   says, if we could go to -- well, I'll read out for you and

  18   we'll also talk about the Ali Odeh reference, Harun says:  A

  19   few days ago, your friend over there had called, the big one,

  20   he said your friend had arrived, he is with me now.  He said

  21   don't worry and that he took him to the hotel.  He's talking

  22   about a conversation he had referring to El Hage and the big

  23   one, and they are meeting over precisely where they are

  24   supposed to be meeting in the Afghanistan/Pakistan border.

  25            Now, later on in this conversation they talk about


   1   how somebody wanted to use El Hage's phone, and Harun is

   2   telling Mustafa that he wouldn't let him use the phone.  And

   3   Harun makes a specific reference to the fact that the person

   4   who wanted to use the phone had a business with him, referring

   5   to El Hage, and he said, "He's the guy that has the head

   6   letter."

   7            And you will remember that Mohamed Ali Odeh talked

   8   about that Black Giant idea that they had, and he was asked

   9   questions about the letterhead and he said, "You mean the head

  10   letter?  The idea, the company that really was just an idea."

  11   And remember when he was asked about any confrontations he had

  12   with Harun about using the phone and how angry he got about

  13   Harun?  He said Harun was rude and that Mohamed Ali Odeh was

  14   respected.

  15            Mustafa and Harun are talking about they don't want

  16   Mohamed Ali Odeh, the businessman, using that cell phone

  17   because that cell phone is to be reserved for al Qaeda

  18   business.  It is not to be used to call Hong Kong to get gems.

  19   And that underscores a point, ladies and gentlemen, precisely

  20   what I mentioned to you at the beginning.

  21            What the evidence shows is that Wadih El Hage may

  22   very well have been involved in a gem business with people

  23   like Mohamed Ali Odeh, but he carries on that side of his life

  24   while at the same time carrying on the different life, the

  25   secret life, the al Qaeda life, so that people like Mohamed


   1   Ali Odeh have no idea that El Hage in fact is not selling gems

   2   in Pakistan in February 19967, that people like Mohamed Ali

   3   Odeh have no idea that El Hage is in Peshawar and he is going

   4   to meet with Bin Laden and Abu Hafs and that people like

   5   Mohamed Ali Odeh have no idea why they can't use the mobile

   6   phone.

   7            And that conversation between two al Qaeda members,

   8   between two people who are participating in the bombings of

   9   the embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam underscore the

  10   point, they make the contrast for you, and that it is not to

  11   the exclusion of doing al Qaeda business that one can engage

  12   in other commercial transactions.

  13            And the other thing that happens in that conversation

  14   is that the two of them, Harun and Fadhl, talk about a number

  15   that they got at Marwan's house.  And again, Marwan is one of

  16   the aliases for the defendant Mohamed Odeh, as Kherchtou told

  17   you.

  18            Now, while El Hage is meeting with the bosses in al

  19   Qaeda, Harun is making sure he keeps people informed.

  20   Government Exhibit 211B-T is a conversation on February 7th,

  21   and it takes place within an hour after Harun speaks to

  22   Mustafa.

  23            If we could display 211B-T -- I'm sorry, C-T.  What

  24   happens there, this person Shuaib, who was one of the people

  25   you heard about earlier on, is giving Harun a number and he's


   1   going to call him back.  That's what's in 211C-T.  And then

   2   you see the two of them talking.  And then if we can go to the

   3   next page, if we can go to the next page -- I'm sorry, the

   4   page after that, if we go halfway down, Harun says to Shuaib:

   5   "We want to come, but as you know, the director is not

   6   present," referring to El Hage.  And Shuaib says:  "Present,

   7   huh?"  Harun says:  "No, he's not present."  And Shuaib says,

   8   "When will he come?"  And Harun says:  "This is the Eid (the

   9   holiday) as they said.  He is not present, in other words.  He

  10   doesn't know, however the man, the X, that one, he may."

  11            And then Shuaib says:  "However, the director on your

  12   end traveled, right?"  And then Harun says:  "No, he left, he

  13   traveled."  And Shuaib says:  "He arrived at the people's

  14   place."  And Harun says:  "He arrived since Sunday.  He

  15   traveled and arrived at the people's place and the big boss

  16   contacted him and told him:  'The man is with me here.'"

  17            The people's place, and you will see this same

  18   reference, is Afghanistan, and "the people" is the other

  19   people in al Qaeda who are in Afghanistan.  And of course, the

  20   big boss is Bin Laden.  And Harun is sharing the news with

  21   Shuaib so he can be kept up to date.

  22            And you will see the same thing happen in Government

  23   Exhibit 211D-T, which is another conversation on February 7,

  24   1997, and this one takes place about four minutes after Harun

  25   and Shuaib get off the phone.  This is a conversation between


   1   Harun and the defendant Odeh, the alias Marwan, and then Harun

   2   says, and this is on the second page of the transcript:  "Your

   3   friend from Malindi has just contacted me," referring to

   4   Shuaib because he just got off the phone with Shuaib.  Marwan

   5   said:  "By God."  Harun said:  "Yes."  Marwan says:  "What is

   6   he saying?  Harun said:  "He says that he is fine.  He wanted

   7   to know your --"  Marwan says:  "Yes, indeed.  Finish.  It's

   8   for sure," etc.

   9            Then what he says is, if we go to the next page,

  10   Marwan says:  "With God's permission."  And they go on and on,

  11   and then down about three-quarters of the way down, Marwan

  12   says:  "So, what's the news with you?  Is there anything new?"

  13   And Harun says:  "No, what's new is that, my friend arrived

  14   there.  My friend arrived there."  And Marwan says:  "Yes."

  15   And Harun says:  "The director had called me two days before."

  16   Marwan says:  "Yes."  And Harun says:  "He told me that the

  17   guest is with him, in other words, he came to him, to his

  18   house, in other words."  Marwan says:  "The news is perfect."

  19   And Harun says:  "Yes, the news and everything else are

  20   perfect."  And then they talk about the guest.  So, again,

  21   Harun is sharing the news with the other people in the group

  22   about El Hage's visit.

  23            Government Exhibit 212A-T is a conversation between

  24   El Hage and Harun, and El Hage says -- and these are the

  25   greetings.  If we go to the next page, down towards the


   1   bottom, El Hage says:  "Thank God.  If God willing there is

   2   good news when I return."  And Harun says:  "Okay, where is

   3   your friend?  Will he come along with you before you?"  And El

   4   Hage says:  "He will come after me.  He will be late a bit."

   5            And then what happens is, if we could go to the next

   6   page -- on that page, by the way, you see about a quarter of

   7   the way down, if we could do the first half of the page, you

   8   see Harun say about halfway down there:  "I don't know.  He

   9   will not travel.  People have been calling him from Hong Kong,

  10   Jordan and so on."

  11            There's the reference to Mohamed Ali Odeh and its

  12   relates back to the conversation that Harun had with Mustafa

  13   Fadhl complaining about Mohamed Ali Odeh using the phone.

  14   Elsewhere in the conversation what El Hage says to Harun is

  15   that "the people send you their regards, the people here are

  16   very comfortable, very comfortable.  If God willing, we will

  17   all go to them."

  18            Again, "the people" is the al Qaeda people that are

  19   in Afghanistan and they are very comfortable, which is a theme

  20   that you will see El Hage will talk about again and it's in a

  21   letter to the other Abu Khadija I mentioned.  "If God willing,

  22   we will all go to them."  So El Hage is talking about his

  23   connection, his meetings with the people in the Afghanistan

  24   headquarters and he's talking to Harun that he's going to

  25   bring back good news upon return from his trip and hopefully


   1   one day they will all join the people.

   2            Now, when El Hage gets back, there's a telephone call

   3   that takes place on February 21, 1997, and it's contained in

   4   Government Exhibit 213A-T.  If we can go to the next page,

   5   what I will do, ladies and gentlemen -- you, of course, are

   6   free to look at all these at the end and during your

   7   deliberations -- what this conversation involves is this is

   8   Wadih El Hage speaking to Marwan, again the defendant Odeh,

   9   and what happens is they discuss a routine where they give a

  10   number and they call it back.  You see it in some of the other

  11   conversations.

  12            And Odeh and El Hage talk about somebody coming from

  13   Odeh to meet El Hage who wants to know if that somebody is

  14   bringing the computer, but is told by Odeh that he's bringing

  15   the diskettes.  And El Hage asks Odeh how his work is going,

  16   and then he says that he will get the information from

  17   Mustafa, implying that Mustafa is the person who is on his way

  18   up.

  19            So El Hage gets back from his trip to see the boss,

  20   the big boss in Afghanistan.  He speaks to the defendant Odeh,

  21   who talks about how somebody is coming up, and in all

  22   likelihood Mustafa, and there is reference to diskettes.  And

  23   you will see, ladies and gentlemen, as we go through the

  24   evidence that these diskettes will contain information that

  25   reveal what the good news was.  What it is that El Hage brings


   1   back is a policy from Bin Laden from al Qaeda, a policy that

   2   is going to dictate what the East African cell of al Qaeda is

   3   going to do next as part of its operations for al Qaeda.

   4            Now, if we go to Government Exhibit 310-73A-T, this

   5   is one of the computer disks that is found in El Hage's house

   6   by Agent Coleman during the search in 1997, and this has the

   7   new policy.  "Number 1.  The return of Wadih and the meeting

   8   with Khaled."

   9            "Wadih" is Wadih El Hage and Khaled is one of the

  10   aliases for Mustafa Fadhl, one of the people who is involved.

  11   This is Mustafa Fadhl, and Kherchtou tells you that he goes by

  12   the name Khaled.

  13            "2.  The preparations of travel to the interior.

  14            "3.  The meeting of Khalid with some Somali officials

  15   before the entry.

  16            "4.  The entry/move of Khalid then Harun via land.

  17            "5.  The entry/move of Marwan with Shuaib via sea,"

  18   and

  19            "6.  The situation in the interior."

  20            And then down at the bottom, "meeting Khalid with the

  21   officials in the interior/meeting with the Arab young men in

  22   the interior/sessions on work arrangement in the

  23   interior/sessions on arrangement of the course."

  24            The new policy is brought back.  There is a meeting

  25   where El Hage shares it with Khaled, with Mustafa Fadhl.  They


   1   make preparations, Khaled, Harun, Marwan.  The defendant Odeh

   2   and Shuaib are going to carry out this new policy that El Hage

   3   has brought back, summarized for you in bullet-point form as

   4   it was contained in the disk when found by Agent Coleman.

   5            Now, you see a little bit more about what this policy

   6   is in Government Exhibit 310-74A-T.  This is a document that's

   7   found on a different disk, once again found in Wadih El Hage's

   8   house in 1997.  And you see at the top the writer of this

   9   report says that the report is top secret, and it's from

  10   Khaled Sheik and it's to the officials in the administration.

  11   Khaled Sheik, another reference to Mustafa Fadhl, the person

  12   who he meets with El Hage who brings back the report, and it's

  13   a report that's going to update the administration about the

  14   activities of the group carrying out the report.

  15            If you take a look at the very first paragraph,

  16   "Report on the Latest News in Somalia," it says just above

  17   that, the first point there, "Abdel Sabbur brings to light the

  18   new policy."  Ladies and gentlemen, Abdel Sabbur is one of the

  19   aliases for the defendant El Hage.  And it says, "When Abdel

  20   Sabbur arrived on 22/2/1997, he contacted Khaled directly and

  21   asked him to come to Nairobi."

  22            Remember the conversation between Odeh and El Hage

  23   where Odeh says, yes, he is coming to you and he will bring

  24   the diskettes, that document tells you that in fact what Odeh

  25   and El Hage were talking about was Khaled coming to Nairobi to


   1   meet with El Hage when he returns with new policy.

   2            The document goes on.  When he arrived and met with

   3   Abdel Sabbur, he informed him about the status of the young

   4   men and the Hajj and that they were fine, and he received from

   5   him the trusts (the letters, the money) and he informed him

   6   also that the Hajj has a new policy pertaining to the region.

   7   Hence, Khaled fully grasped this policy and took the issue

   8   seriously.  The new policy is (to revive the activism in

   9   Somalia) if the expression is correct, and to prepare 300

  10   activists before the arrival of the guest, and he informed him

  11   that the details of this policy (are) with the guest coming

  12   from the Hajj end."

  13            A couple points on this paragraph, ladies and

  14   gentlemen.  The Hajj is Bin Laden, and you know that that is

  15   one of the names he goes buy from Kherchtou.  Kherchtou told

  16   you that without having seen this document.

  17            That document confirms that the Hajj is Bin Laden,

  18   that Wadih El Hage went to see Bin Laden and that he brought

  19   back with him the new policy, things that El Hage will lie

  20   about before the Grand Jury in 1997 and 1998.

  21            The other thing that this one paragraph tells you is

  22   that the new policy was to militarize the situation in East

  23   Africa, to militarize the cell that you know is going to carry

  24   out the bombing of the embassies in August of 1998.

  25            Now, this policy is directed towards the activities


   1   in Somalia after the Americans leave.  You don't want there to

   2   be any misperception about that.  This policy is not directed

   3   at the Americans yet, but what this shows you is the

   4   connection between El Hage and Bin Laden, between El Hage and

   5   the headquarters of al Qaeda, how it is that he acts as the

   6   facilitator, as the messenger, and as somebody who runs the

   7   base of operations in Nairobi, and that he works with people

   8   like Mustafa, Fadhl, also known as Khaled, and the defendant

   9   Mohamed Odeh, also known as Marwan, and that this has nothing

  10   to do with the gem business, the selling of tanzanite or

  11   anything like that.  This is about militarizing, this is about

  12   fulfilling one of the policies that al Qaeda is pursuing, and

  13   El Hage is the person who carries out that mission.

  14            Now, the second paragraph of this document talks

  15   about, if we go down to Khaled Sheik meeting with the

  16   engineers, the only point I'll make and then we'll break is in

  17   here there's a specific reference to the fact that they

  18   appoint -- if you take a look at the sentence that begins

  19   with, "Furthermore, he also tried," he referring to Khaled, "a

  20   young man who would be in charge of the communication between

  21   them and the administration (this young man will be acquainted

  22   with the local news and could be moving to them any time

  23   soon).  Hence, Harun was primarily chosen.  However, this

  24   matter depends on financial resources."

  25            So just remember that in this document, in addition


   1   to discussing the new policy, the group decides that Harun

   2   will be their communications officer, and we'll talk about the

   3   communications he sends out after lunch.

   4            THE COURT:  All right, ladies and gentlemen, we'll

   5   break for lunch and we'll resume at 2:15.

   6            We're adjourned until 2:15.

   7            (Luncheon recess)




















   1                         AFTERNOON SESSION

   2                             2:15 p.m.

   3            THE COURT:  On May 10 we are going to start at 1:00.

   4   We will instruct the jury to have had lunch.  I don't know

   5   where we will be on May 10, but that is to accommodate a juror

   6   so that she can attend her graduation.

   7            (Jury present)

   8            THE COURT:  Ladies and gentlemen, before I forget,

   9   let me tell you that on Thursday, May 10 -- that's a week from

  10   this Thursday -- we will start at 1:00, and let's have lunch

  11   before we come to court.  Thursday, the 10th, we will start at

  12   1.

  13            MR. KARAS:  Thank you, your Honor.  We left off

  14   before lunch discussing Government's Exhibit 310-74AT, which

  15   was the top secret report that was written by Khalid, the

  16   alias for Mustafa Fadhl.  The report discusses a number of

  17   things and there are several reference references you will see

  18   in there to Abdel Sabbour and the use of the car.

  19            At the very end of this report, if you take a look at

  20   the top, and we will highlight the paragraph before the

  21   section marked Ethiopia, the report says that as for the

  22   security situation now inside Kenya, it's somewhat good

  23   because everybody is tuned to the issues around them (Zaire,

  24   Sudan, etc.) and also the approach of the elections in Kenya

  25   make the authorities concerned with the internal issues.


   1            So when this report is written, this report that

   2   discusses the new policy that Bin Laden brings back, the group

   3   considers the security situation in Kenya to be fine.

   4            Ladies and gentlemen, I marked that for you because

   5   you will see that that situation changes later on in 1997,

   6   that the group will perceive that there is a security threat,

   7   and what they will perceive is that the source of that threat

   8   is the United States.  You will see how it is that they react

   9   to that threat, which will tell you a great deal about how the

  10   members of that conspiracy react.

  11            Something else in connection with this new policy in

  12   Somalia in 1997.  Government's Exhibit 10-96T, which we will

  13   display later on, I just want to tell you right now, 710-96 is

  14   a tape and the translation is the translation of what amounts

  15   to a tape letter.  This was found in the defendant Odeh's

  16   house in Witu, and it is a series of taped letters from Odeh

  17   to his wife while Odeh is in Somalia carrying out the new

  18   policy that Bin Laden issued in 1997.  What Odeh says in this

  19   correspondence is, our goal in Somalia was not limited merely

  20   to the training of groups who want to fight and the cause is

  21   over.  However, our goals are bigger than that.  We are not a

  22   relief organization which comes every now and then to assist

  23   the victims that leave.  We are not a relief organization.

  24            Ladies and gentlemen, I submit to you that that is

  25   precisely the case when it comes to the core group of people


   1   that comprise the essence of this conspiracy, as reflected by

   2   the organization that constitutes the core of this conspiracy,

   3   Al Qaeda.  Remember, it is a group that seeks out informants

   4   and it kills them if it thinks they exist.  This is a group

   5   that if it is not fighting it is training others to fight.

   6   Bear in mind that throughout this entire period, the group

   7   considers America to be its chief enemy.

   8            There are other documents that follow El Hage's trip

   9   to Afghanistan that further prove to you what the purpose of

  10   the trip was.  Government's Exhibit 300B-T is another document

  11   found on the computer, Government's Exhibit 300, in El Hage's

  12   house by Agent Coleman, and one of the documents in there is

  13   this report, an update by Abu Hafs, the military commander, on

  14   the Taliban.  It is a lengthy report that we read to you

  15   during the trial, and I invite you to read it during your

  16   deliberations.  It basically discusses the relationship

  17   between Al Qaeda and the Taliban, who are in Afghanistan,

  18   which becomes a new home for Al Qaeda in 1996 when Bin Laden

  19   issues his call for jihad in August of 1996.

  20            One of the other documents that you see is

  21   Government's Exhibit 245-T, which is an identical report

  22   regarding the Taliban, only this report, which El Hage sends

  23   out to at least one Al Qaeda member, does not have Abu Hafs at

  24   the bottom.  That makes sense, because El Hage isn't going to

  25   send out this report and risk the fact that people will see


   1   this report and connect it to Abu Hafs, the military commander

   2   of Al Qaeda.  Remember, the group undertakes efforts to

   3   protect the identity of its people and make sure that others

   4   don't find out who it is that would be connected to the

   5   organization.  We will see evidence of El Hage sending this

   6   report to Abu Khadija in Germany.  Remember I mentioned to you

   7   there were two.  The Abu Khadija in Germany is somebody that

   8   El Hage will communicate with following his seeing Bin Laden

   9   in February 1997.

  10            Government's Exhibit 632A-T, that is a letter dated

  11   February 21, 1997, and it is from El Hage to Abu Suliman.  Abu

  12   Suliman, ladies and gentlemen, is one of the aliases for Ihab

  13   Ali.  Remember, another alias is Nawawi.  By the way, Nawawi

  14   is the copilot with Essam al Ridi when he crashes the Bin

  15   Laden plane.  Remember, it was El Hage who had al Ridi go up

  16   to Khartoum to see about selling the plane in Egypt, and al

  17   Ridi took it up for a test run and he took it with this person

  18   Ihab Ali, and this is one of the people El Hage is going to

  19   lie about in front of the grand jury.  This Exhibit 62 tells

  20   Ihab Ali that he was on a business trip and met with Dr. Atef.

  21   He and his friends say hello to you.  That makes perfect

  22   sense.  The letter is dated on the 21st, right when El Hage

  23   gets back from seeing Bin Laden.  He is saying hello to Ihab

  24   Ali who Kherchtou tells you is an Al Qaeda member.  Right

  25   after he gets back, El Hage is communicating with others.  He


   1   does it again on February 24, 1997, in a letter marked

   2   Government's Exhibit 632B-T, which we will display.  Abu al

   3   Sabbour, one of the aliases for Wadih El Hage.  It is to

   4   brother Abu Khadija.  First I would like to congratulate you

   5   on the Eid al Fitr because I was not here at the time.  I went

   6   to visit Haj Abu al Hawai, who says hello.  Also, the people

   7   who work with him say hello.  Actually, their situation over

   8   there is very good.  They're comfortable, contrary to what we

   9   have been hearing or reading in the newspapers and magazines.

  10   The landowners are cooperating with them and they welcome them

  11   and all those who want to settle in that good land.  The

  12   situation is very good, and security is normal.  I traveled by

  13   myself to and from the capital without any problems.

  14            Down at the bottom he says I will send a report on

  15   the latest situation with the company in a few days.  God

  16   willing, peace be upon you.

  17            So within a matter of days after El Hage returns from

  18   his meeting with Bin Laden, he tells Abu Khadija he went to

  19   visit Haj Abdel al Hawai, Bin Laden, who says hello.  Again,

  20   El Hage is meeting with several people who are there.  Then he

  21   reassures Abu Khadija that their situation over there is very

  22   good.  They are very comfortable, contrary to what we have

  23   been hearing.  The landowners are cooperating with them.  The

  24   landowners are the Taliban, ladies and gentlemen.  They are

  25   the ones, the hosts, the people who are hosting Bin Laden and


   1   Al Qaeda in Afghanistan.  He says down at the bottom I will

   2   send a report with the latest situation on the company in a

   3   few days.  That is a report on the Taliban, Government's

   4   Exhibit 300B-T, that has Abu Hafs' name on it, and 245, the

   5   one that doesn't have Abu Hafs' name on it.  Notice how he

   6   refers to Al Qaeda as the company.  I will send a report on

   7   the latest situation with the company in a few days.  Al Qaeda

   8   code, talking about Al Qaeda, talking about how the group is

   9   comfortable in Afghanistan with the help of the Taliban.

  10            One other point about this letter, where El Hage says

  11   they are very comfortable contrary to what we have been

  12   hearing or reading in the newspapers and magazines.  El Hage

  13   is revealing that he does read what is in the newspapers and

  14   magazines what is said about Al Qaeda, and of course what is

  15   said about Bin Laden.  Consider that and put it in the context

  16   of what El Hage and Bin Laden are talking about in February

  17   1997, merely a matter of months after Bin Laden has publicly

  18   declared war on the United States and nearly seven months

  19   before he will tell the grand jury that he has no idea that

  20   Bin Laden has declared war against America.  He is reading

  21   about Al Qaeda, he is telling Al Qaeda what the truth is,

  22   contrary to what the media is saying about Al Qaeda in

  23   Afghanistan.

  24            There are some other calls that confirm El Hage's

  25   visit.  Government's Exhibit 215A-T, which is a call involving


   1   Ahmed Tawhil and El Hage, one of these people who is around El

   2   Hage in Kenya at the time.  On March 22, 1997, El Hage tells

   3   Ahmed Tawhil, I was calling our friend the doctor, but his

   4   phone kept ringing, but nobody answered.  Our friend who I

   5   came from where he was.  And Tawhil says, Taysir?  And El Hage

   6   says yeah.

   7            The telephone records for the satellite phone,

   8   Government's Exhibit 594, show that with the exception of

   9   March 9, 1997, there are no outgoing calls during this time.

  10   Again, for whatever reason, the phone isn't working.  You know

  11   that's the phone in Afghanistan that is part of the Al Qaeda

  12   headquarters, and that is what El Hage is telling Tawhil, and

  13   Tawhil understands the code, and he says that's Taysir, right?

  14   That's Abu Hafs, and Tawhil says yes.

  15            April 20, 1997, another recording conversation,

  16   marked 2.  Saif al Islam, talking to Wadih El Hage, and Saif

  17   al Islam says the group moved and are not answering the phone.

  18   We have work to do, it's disruptive.  Saif al Islam is talking

  19   about this in the context of needing approval, and he suggests

  20   that they can send money to Saif al Islam through El Hage.  So

  21   when Saif al Islam is having difficulties reaching the group,

  22   again because there are problems with the phone, who does he

  23   call?  He calls the facilitator Wadih El Hage, because we have

  24   work to do.  Remember, ladies and gentlemen, work is code for

  25   jihad.  Wadih El Hage is going to act, or at least Saif al


   1   Islam wants him to act as the go-between between himself and

   2   the Al Qaeda headquarters.

   3            April 20, 1997, Government's Exhibit 594-3, if we

   4   could pull that up.  Again, the minutes from the satellite

   5   phone.  The minutes show a call on April 20, 1997, from the

   6   satellite phone to the El Hage number, lasting 7.3 minutes.

   7   So the phone is back on line, and he gets in touch with El

   8   Hage.

   9            Also on April 20, the telephone records for the

  10   mobile phone 7120219 show a call from the cell phone to the

  11   satellite phone on the same day that the satellite phone calls

  12   El Hage.  We already went through this conversation, but

  13   218A-T is the conversation on April 21 where El Hage gives

  14   Harun in a coded fashion the telephone number for the

  15   satellite phone, for Dr. Atef's clinic, in case Harun wants to

  16   take the family to see Dr. Atef.

  17            What is interesting about that conversation, ladies

  18   and gentlemen, is, compare it to the conversation marked

  19   Defense Exhibit WEHXW19, where El Hage is talking about some

  20   of his business, and he gives out Mr. Imbogo's phone number.

  21   And there is no code, and there is no cryptic references to

  22   clinics or doctors.  That's the business transaction, which is

  23   clearly distinguishable from the conversations where El Hage

  24   is conducting Al Qaeda business.

  25            As we know from the documents, the new policy that El


   1   Hage brought back ordered Al Qaeda members, and in particular

   2   the East Africa cell, to go to Somalia to conduct additional

   3   training.  You know from Government's Exhibit 310-74AT, which

   4   is the report, top secret report from Khalid, that Khalid al

   5   Fadl met with some of the local engineers.  You know from both

   6   that report and also the new policy report, that Marwan, the

   7   defendant Odeh, and Shuaib, they went by sea, which makes

   8   sense, that the fishermen went by sea to go and conduct the

   9   operations in Somalia up the coast.  Shuaib is Government's

  10   Exhibit 115.

  11            One of the documents -- by the way, Khalfan Khamis

  12   Mohamed, you may remember he told Agent Perkins that he went

  13   to Somalia in 1997, that he went a couple of times, and one of

  14   the times he got up there was in Suliman's boat, which he said

  15   was used for jihad.  Suliman, ladies and gentlemen, is

  16   somebody different than --

  17            MR. SCHMIDT:  Objection, your Honor.

  18            THE COURT:  The jury's recollection of the evidence

  19   will control.

  20            MR. SCHMIDT:  That is not the basis of my objection,

  21   your Honor.  If you want me to make it at the bench, I will

  22   make it at the bench.

  23            THE COURT:  I will see you and the reporter.

  24            (Continued on next page)



   1            (Page 5330 sealed)

   2            (In open court)

   3            THE COURT:  The objection is overruled.

   4            MR. KARAS:  One of the other things that Khalfan

   5   Khamis Mohamed said to Agent Perkin was that he himself had

   6   received training in Afghanistan and he had put that timing at

   7   around 1994.  You will remember that the witness Abdullah

   8   Hamisi had mentioned that Khalfan Khamis Mohamed told him that

   9   he had gotten training in Afghanistan, training that was

  10   financed by Bin Laden, training that focused on jihad.  You

  11   remember, he was timing it to when he opened up his juice

  12   cafe.  I submit, ladies and gentlemen, at some point before

  13   Khalfan Khamis Mohamed admitted that he went to Somalia, he

  14   also admitted that he had gotten training in Afghanistan, he

  15   had gotten training in basic explosives and advanced

  16   explosives, and he got this training before he went up to

  17   Somalia in 1997.

  18            One of the documents that is found in the defendant

  19   Odeh's house is Government's Exhibit 702-T.  702-T appears to

  20   be a ledger, a budget of some kind, and you can see that it

  21   talks about the item and the quantity and the amount of

  22   currency and the beneficiary and so forth.  This document had

  23   the fingerprint of Mustafa Fadhl, document that was found in

  24   Odeh's house in Witu, a budget of some sort with Mustafa

  25   Fadhl's fingerprint on it.  The document doesn't have the year


   1   on it.  It does have the date and the month, and it has

   2   references throughout about money being spent in connection

   3   with buying for training and military items.  Down at the

   4   bottom it says expenses note al Saghir was sent to Mombasa

   5   carrying a report.

   6            If we go to the next page, there is a reference on

   7   what appears to be July 21, and again, we don't know the year

   8   for sure but you will see in context it talks about training

   9   and it mentions an $1,800 loan, Ahmed Madhri to purchase a

  10   boat for brother Khalid.  Again, that is Mustafa.

  11            On page 4 there is an entry there for August 7,

  12   weapons and artilleries, quantity 1,000, price in Kenya

  13   currency, 50,000.  Price in dollars, weapons 1,100,

  14   artilleries, 300.  Beneficiary:  Work.  Note:  The money was

  15   sent to purchase weapons and artilleries for work purposes,

  16   since the dollar is worth 35 Kenyan schillings.

  17            Again, work purposes means jihad, and here you have a

  18   budget in Odeh's house where they are purchasing weapons and

  19   artilleries for the jihad work.

  20            The next thing that happens in March of 1997 is that

  21   CNN goes to Afghanistan and conducts an interview with Usama

  22   Bin Laden, and according to a stipulation that was marked as

  23   Government's Exhibit 33, that interview took place in March of

  24   1997.

  25            If we go to the second page of the transcript that is


   1   marked as 80-T, you will see that Bin Laden is asked the

   2   question about his declaration of jihad, and he gives a very

   3   succinct answer.  He says, we declared jihad against the US

   4   government because the US government is unjust, criminal and

   5   tyrannical.  It has committed acts that are extremely unjust,

   6   hideous and criminal, whether directly or through its support

   7   of the Israeli occupation of Palestine.  So he is adding an

   8   additional reason for the war against America.  About two

   9   thirds of the way down that same answer Bin Laden says, as for

  10   what you asked, whether jihad is directed against US soldiers,

  11   the civilians in the land of the two holy places, Saudi

  12   Arabia, or against the civilians in America, we have focused

  13   in our declaration on striking at the soldiers in the country

  14   of the two holy places.  The country of the two holy places

  15   has in our religion a peculiarity of its own over other Muslim

  16   countries.  In our religion it is not permissible for any

  17   nonMuslim to stay in our country.  Therefore, even though

  18   American civilians are not targeted in our plan, they must

  19   leave.  We do not guarantee their safety because we are in a

  20   society of more than a billion Muslims.  A reaction might take

  21   place as a result of US government's hitting Muslim civilians,

  22   a warning that you will see Bin Laden play out later on.  At

  23   the last part of that answer, Bin Laden says so, the US is

  24   responsible for any reaction, because it has transgressed

  25   through war from military personnel to civilians.  This is


   1   what we say.  As for what you asked regarding the American

   2   people, they are not exonerated from responsibility because

   3   they chose this government and voted for it despite their

   4   knowledge of its crimes in Palestine, Lebanon, Iraq and in

   5   other places, and its support of its collaborating regime who

   6   filled our prisons with our best children and scholars.  We

   7   ask that God may release them.

   8            Ladies and gentlemen, Bin Laden is sending a message.

   9   Yes, the main focus of our jihad is the American soldiers in

  10   Saudi Arabia, but we hold the American civilian population

  11   responsible, because you the American civilian population

  12   elected that government that has undertaken the policies that

  13   we find to be so objectionable.  Bin Laden is going to take

  14   that theme and he is going to use it later on to justify

  15   attacks against civilians.  In other words, ladies and

  16   gentlemen, Bin Laden is signaling his intention to make sure

  17   that American civilians are not in his eyes considered

  18   innocent, and that they therefore become justifiable targets.

  19            The next answer at the very end, Bin Laden says, and

  20   this is on the top of page 3, so the driving away jihad

  21   against the US does not stop with its withdrawal from the

  22   Arabian peninsula but rather it must desist from aggressive

  23   intervention against Muslims in the whole world.

  24            Yes, the symbolic act that Bin Laden finds so

  25   objectionable is the presence of American troops in Saudi


   1   Arabia, but it is deeper than that.  He sees the United States

   2   as the cause of all the problems and he sees the United States

   3   as the aggressor, and he believes he is right in reacting in

   4   kind, and he is telling not only the Al Qaeda members but

   5   publicly through CNN what it is that he believes justifies his

   6   actions.

   7            On page 4, down about halfway down that first full

   8   answer, now Bin Laden is talking about the presence of the

   9   troops and American policy in general, and what he says there,

  10   that first line, the sentence beginning with when, when the

  11   Saudi government oppressed and the voices of those who call

  12   for Islam, I found myself forced, especially after the

  13   government prevented Sheik Salman al Awdah and Sheik Safar al

  14   Hawali and some other scholars to carry out a small part of my

  15   duty of joining what is right and fighting what is wrong.  So

  16   I collaborated with some brothers and established a committee

  17   for offering advice and we started to publish some

  18   declarations.  The Advice and Reformation Committee in London.

  19   However, the Saudi regime did not like this and started to

  20   exercise pressure on the Sudanese regime.  The US government,

  21   the Egyptian government and the Yemeni government also helped

  22   in doing so.  They requested me explicitly from the Sudanese

  23   regime and the pressure continued.  Saudi Arabia dropped all

  24   its conditions put to the Sudanese regime in return that I be

  25   driven out of the Sudan.  The US government had already taken


   1   the same stance and pulled out its diplomatic mission from

   2   chart to Nairobi and put forth their condition to return only

   3   after I have left.

   4            You know that Bin Laden had the headquarters in Sudan

   5   up until some point in 1996 when he goes to Afghanistan and

   6   issues the declaration of jihad.  What he tells you in this

   7   statement on CNN is that he blames the US government for

   8   putting pressure on the Sudanese for driving him out of the

   9   Sudan and into Afghanistan.  He takes note of the fact that

  10   part of the pressure was by removing the diplomatic presence

  11   from Khartoum and sending it to Nairobi.  In March of 1997,

  12   Bin Laden is keenly aware of that move by the United States,

  13   and I submit to you it provides a powerful motive that Bin

  14   Laden had to hit the American Embassy in Nairobi in August

  15   1998, to get back to the United States for its diplomatic

  16   pressure on the Sudan that caused him to have to go to

  17   Afghanistan.

  18            On page 6, Bin Laden is asked about some attacks in

  19   Riyadh and in Al Khobar.  He says as to the previous question,

  20   the explosion in Riyadh and Al Khobar, it is no secret that I

  21   was not in Saudi Arabia, but I have great respect for the

  22   people who did this action.  I say, as I said before, they are

  23   heroes.  We look upon them as men who wanted to raise the flag

  24   of -- there is no God but Allah and to bring the flag of

  25   nonbelievers and of injustice that the US brought.  So he is


   1   lauding the efforts of some other people who participated in,

   2   as he calls it, the explosion of Riyadh and Al Khobar.  He is

   3   not taking credit for it.  He is saying I didn't do it but I

   4   applaud what they did for the reasons that you should know,

   5   that the Americans should be driven out.

   6            At the bottom of that page is a very brief reference

   7   again to Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman.  You remember, he is the

   8   person that Bin Laden talks about in his August 1996

   9   declaration of jihad where he blames the American government

  10   for the arrest, something that the witness al Fadl told you,

  11   well before Bin Laden gave this interview.

  12            Then, ladies and gentlemen, on page 7, down at the

  13   bottom, Bin Laden is asked about Somalia.  Bin Laden says the

  14   US government went there with great jubilation and stayed

  15   there sometime with a strong media presence, wanting to

  16   frighten people that it is the greatest power on earth.  It

  17   went there with vanity and 28,000 soldiers to a poor unarmed

  18   people in Somalia.  The goal was to scare the Muslim world and

  19   the whole world to say that it is able to do whatever it

  20   wishes.  As soon as they reached the Mogadishu beaches, they

  21   found no one but children.  The CNN and other media started

  22   photographing them, the soldiers, with their tanks and heavy

  23   arms, and show themselves as the great power on earth.

  24   Resistance started because Muslims did not believe the US

  25   allegations that they came to save the Somalis.


   1            Continuing on the next page, with Allah's grace,

   2   Muslims over there, there was a faction from the Islamic

   3   alliance that emerged and cooperated with some Mujahideen who

   4   were in Afghanistan.  They participated with their brothers

   5   against the American troops and killed large numbers of them.

   6   The American government was aware of that.  After some

   7   resistance, the American troops left without achieving

   8   anything.

   9            Down below, Bin Laden tells the world what he

  10   believed from Somalia.  We learned from those who fought there

  11   that they were surprised to see how low the spiritual morale

  12   of the American fighters was compared with the spirit of the

  13   Russian fighters.  The American fighters ran away from the

  14   fighters who fought and killed them.

  15            Bin Laden is talking very much about the Mujahideen

  16   in Afghanistan working with the local troops to attack the

  17   Americans, and he gives you his interpretation of why he

  18   thinks the Americans were in Somalia, to take over the country

  19   and to show that America was the strongest nation in the

  20   world.  You will see Bin Laden talk more about Somalia when he

  21   gives a second interview with ABC News in 1998.  Towards the

  22   end, on page 9, Bin Laden is asked very simply what are your

  23   future plans.  He says rather ominously, you will see them and

  24   hear about them in the media, God willing.

  25            Then down at the bottom when he is asked if he wants


   1   to deliver a message to President Clinton, he adds a message

   2   to the mothers.  He says to these mothers, the mothers of the

   3   American soldiers, I say, if they are concerned for their

   4   sons, they should object to the government's policy and to the

   5   American president.  He is sending a clear message, ladies and

   6   gentlemen.  You will see and what you will hear what I will

   7   do, and to the American mothers, you will have to put pressure

   8   on your government to get your sons out of the Saudi Gulf

   9   peninsula.

  10            Five months after this interview takes place, Wadih

  11   El Hage goes back to see Bin Laden in Afghanistan, and the

  12   first clue of this trip comes in Government's Exhibit 289A-T,

  13   another intercepted conversation on July 15, 1997, and it

  14   involves Wadih El Hage and an unidentified male.  El Hage

  15   talks about in the conversation that Harun is on the inside,

  16   which is a reference to Somalia, because remember, they are

  17   carrying out the new policy of Bin Laden.  He says listen, I

  18   will be going to see El Hage after a couple of days.  From

  19   there, the unidentified male asks for a stickerat, the thing

  20   that gets you through, talking about a visa that goes on a

  21   passport.  El Hage says yes, fine, if God willing, when I went

  22   the last time they were preparing this kind of thing.

  23            He is once again using the reference.  El Hage says

  24   he is going to see Bin Laden.  By the way, this unidentified

  25   male knows who he is talking about, because he doesn't say


   1   who, and he says what about the stickerats, and El Hage says

   2   when I was there before they were making a few of them.  Part

   3   of what they have to be good at in their business is fake

   4   travel documents.

   5            While El Hage is visiting Bin Laden in Afghanistan,

   6   some very significant events happen.  In early August there is

   7   a newspaper article that we can see as Government's Exhibit

   8   645 -- this, by the way, is found in El Hage's files during

   9   that MIRA search in August 1988.  You see just the headline.

  10   Saudis detain key member on US terror team.

  11            Now if we can display Government's Exhibit 246-T.

  12   This is a facsimile that is sent from El Hage's house by

  13   Harun.  In fact, it even says down at the bottom, your brother

  14   Harun al Kamari, Wadih's residence.  That is a translation of

  15   the document that is faxed.  At the top you see underlined

  16   urgent.  This fax, if you take a look at the records for the

  17   820066 number, goes to Khalid al Fawwaz's number in England,

  18   44208, 44433.  Remember, he has 441 number and the 44433

  19   number, which is the facsimile.  Dear God Khalid, may peace

  20   and God's Mercy and blessings be upon you.  We appeal to God

  21   to be as he please in your religion and worldly existence.  We

  22   have read in one of the magazines which is published where you

  23   are that there was an economic manager who used to work with

  24   the Haj and who has transferred to an American British

  25   company.  Please provide us with the sufficient information on


   1   this manager for we want to know whether he knew of Sabbour's

   2   company here or of his work here in order to take the

   3   appropriate steps to deal with him, knowing that Sabbour had

   4   traveled to the Haj and has not returned yet.

   5            Ladies and gentlemen, they say a picture is worth a

   6   thousand words.  But I say to you, in the small number of

   7   words in this letter you have just learned a great deal about

   8   the conspiracy in this case to kill US nationals.

   9            Government's Exhibit 245 is the Daily Telegraph,

  10   which is a British newspaper.  Khalid Fawwaz, you know, lives

  11   in London.  He is referencing an economic manager who used to

  12   work with the Haj and has transferred to an American British

  13   company.  Harun is talking about somebody who the media is

  14   reporting, somebody who used to be in Al Qaeda, who used to

  15   work with the Haj, who has transferred to an American British

  16   company, using business lingo to make the following point,

  17   somebody is cooperating with the enemy.  Somebody is working

  18   with the enemy, as it is reported in this magazine, and he

  19   says in the next line, please provide us with the sufficient

  20   information on this manager for we want to know whether he

  21   knew of Sabbour's company here.  What does this person who has

  22   gone to the enemy know about El Hage and the cell here in East

  23   Africa and his work here so that Harun and the others can take

  24   appropriate steps to deal with him, knowing that Abdel Sabbour

  25   had traveled to the Haj and has not returned yet.  So knowing


   1   that Wadih El Hage is visiting Bin Laden, Harun gets this very

   2   disturbing news and he reaches all the way out to England to

   3   Khalid al Fawwaz, the person who used to have Wadih El Hage's

   4   job in Nairobi, working for the Al Qaeda cell.  He says please

   5   see what you can find out about this, we are very concerned.

   6   At the bottom he writes, the response is very urgent.

   7            Now we see the heat gets turned up in Government's

   8   Exhibit 223A-T.  This is an intercepted conversation that

   9   takes place on August 13.  So you get the time line.  You will

  10   see that that facsimile was sent on August 2 from Harun to

  11   Fawwaz, and we will see that in a minute.  It is also in the

  12   telephone records.  Now you have a telephone conversation

  13   involving Harun and Abu Khadija in Germany, who says contrary

  14   to what we are hearing, everything is fine in Afghanistan.

  15   Now Harun is talking to him.  If we go to the sixth page -- by

  16   the way, the first five pages of this, if you read it or you

  17   listened to the conversation, you would think they are talking

  18   about medical deals, making the point that they do mix

  19   business with business.  Then at the bottom of page 6, Harun

  20   says the situation is good.  Listen to me, the situation is

  21   good.  There is a manager who used to work with the Haj down

  22   there.  Khadija says yes.  Harun says, it appears that he

  23   moved from his company to an American company.  Khadija says

  24   what do you mean by that?  Harun responds he is one of the

  25   people in Saudi Arabia.  Khadija, still confused, did you read


   1   this in the magazine?  Yes, he did.  You mean he moved, he

   2   started working with them?  Harun, yes, he's worked with them

   3   through Saudi Arabia.  Khadija says tell me who that is.

   4   Harun says you probably know him, he's the same, the same --

   5   what?  The same family?  And Harun says and in a sentence he

   6   tells you who it is.  He, you know, I mean, one leg and a

   7   half.  Khadija.  Really?  Harun, yeah, the magazine was issued

   8   from where Hamad is.  Khadija realizes the danger and his next

   9   line, brother, there is no power and no strength safe in God.

  10   Can this be possible?  Harun, yes, I read it myself.  Then

  11   Khadija completes the identity.  He is the one who got married

  12   with a woman from his side?  That is Abu Fadhl al Makkee, who

  13   El Hage told you married the niece of Usama Bin Laden, who had

  14   his leg amputated below one of his knees, and they are

  15   describing him as being one of the people they are concerned

  16   has now cooperated with the American government.  In fact,

  17   Khadija says he is the one who got married with a woman from

  18   his side, right, the one who married a woman from the Haj's

  19   side.  Khadija says I know him.  Can this be possible?

  20   Doublecheck this.  Harun says it is possible because I heard

  21   it on the radio and then I bought the Daily Telegraph.  He

  22   even tells you the day he bought the Daily Telegraph, the 2nd

  23   of the month, which is the 2nd of August, which is when he

  24   faxes Khalid al Fawwaz.

  25            If we go to the second part of the page, towards the


   1   bottom Khadija says glory, you should have informed me of such

   2   a thing, glory to the Lord.  Harun says I have tried to call

   3   you for a week.  Such things you have to -- right away because

   4   the boss director over there is unable to call us nor to

   5   inform us.

   6            They continue.  Khadija says, halfway down, you know,

   7   I was looking for, you know what I'm doing, I'm looking for

   8   him.  Harun says yes, and Khadija says you have to make sure,

   9   is this news confirmed?  Harun confirms the fax that you saw

  10   earlier.  I sent this to Hamad by fax.  Khadija says tell me,

  11   has the big boss been informed of this or not?  Harun says I

  12   don't know, I don't know.  I have not even informed Wadih.

  13   Khadija says try to inform him so he can take precaution of

  14   the forged check.  Again the business lingo.  He is the money

  15   person, Abu Fadhl al Makkee, and they are worried about the

  16   information he is going to give up to the Americans.  Harun

  17   says I should, because it was written in the newspaper that he

  18   mentions the accounts of Bin Laden all over the world.  I read

  19   that.  Then Khadija goes on a little bit down below.  No, no,

  20   be careful.  One should not think twice about that forgery.

  21   Be careful not to get into a lot of troubles.  Be cautious.

  22   That's it.  We understand now.  Please call.  You have my

  23   telephone numbers, don't you?  The word is out.  Everybody

  24   needs to be careful.

  25            If we go to the top of page 10, you see how aware Al


   1   Qaeda is about the security measures against them.  Khadija

   2   asks, how is your telephone?  Do I get a headache if I use it?

   3   Harun says don't even try, we suspect, we suspect, this is

   4   better, this is better.  Khadija says are they listening to

   5   this call?  Should I call you here?  Harun says absolutely.

   6            So Khadija gives him a different number, and down at

   7   the bottom you see Khadija will announce the code for how they

   8   are going to discuss the matter in the future.  Swear to God,

   9   try not to give my phone numbers to anybody, because it is a

  10   company, you see, and I don't want to -- but it is a headache

  11   about that lame, as you see, call so we know the condition.

  12   Say the condition is such and such so we know the manager.  He

  13   was in charge of the director and the company and he was in

  14   charge of the money, you know, which explains why it is they

  15   were so concerned.

  16            If we go to the next page, you see down at the bottom

  17   half Khadija says no, or Harun says the matter is not easy,

  18   and Khadija confirms no, it is not easy.  The boss wouldn't

  19   have any troubles but we would.  The boss in Afghanistan may

  20   not have the troubles, but we in Kenya and we in Germany are

  21   going to have troubles if this person is truly cooperating

  22   with the Americans.  Harun says I will find out about this

  23   matter.  Yes, so we can change things and stuff like that, in

  24   order to -- you understand, in order to see if I have

  25   something forged that they have wrote on me.  Is there


   1   anything that they have about me, is what Khadija is worried

   2   about.

   3            Then you see on the next page, Harun makes a

   4   reference, and the Nawawi's place, almost all the accounts in

   5   the Nawawi's place have been held.  That is Ihab Ali.  They

   6   want to remove the Haj.  The Nawawi's place is America,

   7   because remember, Nawawi, Ihab Ali, moves to Florida.  So they

   8   are referring to the Nawawi's place as America, who wants to

   9   remove the Haj.  They are pretty much happy with them, you

  10   see.  Then you see down at the bottom, Khadija says yes,

  11   indeed, so there should be, the matter is not easy as to

  12   losing a job like that, the appointment.  So stay, may God

  13   help, is the Nawawi at your place?  Harun says the Nawawi is

  14   there, there in America.

  15            Ladies and gentlemen, you will see, we talked a

  16   little bit about correspondence between El Hage and this

  17   person Nawawi, and this correspondence is some of which El

  18   Hage lies about in the grand jury, when asked whether he knows

  19   anybody who lives in America.  Nawawi is one of the people

  20   they talk about in the conversation about al Makkee

  21   cooperating with the Americans.

  22            So in these two pieces of paper you see all the

  23   critical pieces coming together and how they are reacting to

  24   the threat from their enemy.  Harun is getting in touch with

  25   El Hage.  Harun gets in touch with Abu Khadija, to whom El


   1   Hage said I went to see Bin Laden.  Harun and Khadija are

   2   talking about the need to get in touch with El Hage to protect

   3   the cell in East Africa from the Americans, and of course to

   4   let Bin Laden know so that he can protect himself and others

   5   in Al Qaeda can make sure they do what they have to do to

   6   avoid Americans.

   7            Why is that?  That's because it is one enemy

   8   recognizing the other enemy.  They are not concerned that the

   9   Americans are going to find out about gem deals or the Renan

  10   tribe in Somalia.  They are concerned that people will find

  11   out about the war against Americans by Bin Laden, the people

  12   who continue to work with Bin Laden to carry out wars against

  13   America.  It is the Americans they are worried about, not the

  14   Saudis.  It's the Americans.

  15            You see it again in Government's Exhibit 300A-T.

  16   Ladies and gentlemen, this is a document that is written by

  17   Harun.  You will see several pieces of this that show that.

  18   This is one of the deleted files that was found on El Hage's

  19   computer Government's Exhibit 300, and Agent Crisalli talked

  20   to you about how he was able to retrieve some of the deleted

  21   files from the computer.  At the very beginning of this report

  22   Harun says we can now say that the security position of the

  23   crew is at 100 percent danger.  In this report I will try to

  24   state the reasons that made us feel about this dangerous

  25   situation.  I will also try to offer my recommendation to the


   1   kind and wise high command that understands a lot and we hope

   2   is seeking the best.

   3            Down below that first paragraph Harun says, as we

   4   have heard, witnessed and read, the Haj has declared war on

   5   America and that was confirmed when we heard the tape of the

   6   press interview that took place in Jalalabad, and the sheik

   7   stated some points including:  We declared war against America

   8   because it made itself police of the world.  I have nothing to

   9   do with the two explosions in Saudi Arabia but I am glad they

  10   took place.  You will hear my future plans on radio stations.

  11   Harun adds his comment, and other points that we are pleased

  12   to hear, thanks be to God.

  13            We saw CNN and that we like to hear.  Bin Laden wants

  14   to kill Americans, we're happy about it.

  15            Remember, and you will see this, this is a document

  16   that wasn't meant for the eyes of anybody outside Al Qaeda.

  17   This is a document that Harun writes to the high and wise

  18   administration, the people in Afghanistan.  So he is going to

  19   lay out exactly what it is that he and the others in the East

  20   Africa cell are thinking and what is on their mind.  We heard

  21   about the CNN interview and we liked what Bin Laden said.

  22   Then he says on page 2, keeping in mind all this discussion

  23   about the Abu al Makkee, they should know that they are

  24   America's primary target now and that there is an American

  25   Kenyan Egyptian intelligence activity in Nairobi working to


   1   identify the locations and the people who are dealing with the

   2   sheik, since America knows well that the youth who worked in

   3   Somalia and who are followers of the sheik are the ones that

   4   have carried out operations to hit the Americans in Somalia.

   5   Harun, the person who told Kherchtou that he is in Somalia, is

   6   telling the high and wise command they have figured out we

   7   were there.  America knows full well that the followers of the

   8   Bin Laden were the ones that went into Somalia and that the

   9   main gateway for those people is Kenya.  Therefore, there must

  10   be a center in Kenya.  Ahmad Tawhil told us that he will talk

  11   about changing us because we are in real danger.  I told him

  12   that the crew will welcome this because we are convinced 100

  13   percent that indeed our situation in Kenya is extremely bad.

  14            How things have changed from that report, that top

  15   secret report that said the security situation is good.  From

  16   their perspective, what is the cause of the change?  The

  17   Americans have figured out who is there and what they did.

  18            Harun goes on in the next paragraph.  He read in the

  19   newspaper news of the arrest of five Kenyans in Kenya.  I

  20   warned Ahmad Madurani that there is an intelligence activity

  21   in Kenya to identify the emirs of the brothers and the

  22   foreigners who work with the brothers.  What we think is that

  23   there is American pressure on Kenya to search for the Arabs

  24   living in the region.  Therefore, brother Sharif, be cautious

  25   and whoever is with you of the engineers, and be advised that


   1   that any moment any one of us could fall.

   2            Perception is what guides their action, ladies and

   3   gentlemen, and in August of 1997 Harun is talking about and is

   4   concerned about two different activities he sees the Americans

   5   doing.  First, the cooperation of Abu Fadhl al Makkee that you

   6   saw in the fax and the telephone conversation to Abu Khadija.

   7   The second is that the Americans are very focused on the East

   8   African crew, on the crew that Wadih El Hage runs.  Wadih El

   9   Hage is in Afghanistan at the time, visiting Bin Laden.  Even

  10   now as he perceives the point that the Americans and Kenyans

  11   are working together in their arrests, he is attributing their

  12   security problems to the Americans.  Then he goes on to

  13   discuss Abu Fadhl al Makkee.  The last bit of news, which

  14   almost made me explode when I heard it, was a news item that I

  15   read in one of the British magazines, the Daily Telegraph.  So

  16   I asked brother Tawfiq to buy this magazine in Nairobi after

  17   hearing the news item on BBC on 2 August 1997.  The gist of

  18   the news item is, now in the hands of the American CIA and the

  19   British intelligence service M16, in Saudi Arabia.  The CIA

  20   did not confirm if this man, whose name is Saudi Tayyib and

  21   his nickname is Abu Fadhl, was working as a double agent spy

  22   for the Saudi government or he was arrested.  They only said

  23   that the man was in the hands of the Saudis since the middle

  24   of May and that there is another man called Jamal, who is a

  25   colleague and an assistant to Usama and who has cooperated


   1   with the Saudi government after he was arrested since May.

   2   That is precisely what Jamal al Fadl told you, that Sidi al

   3   Tayyib was a name that Abu Fadhl al Makkee used and that he

   4   had accounts in London.

   5            So now that Harun has identified the American-based

   6   security threat, he describes what it is that he proposes to

   7   do, and he does that in the next paragraph.  He says, there

   8   are some measures that we tried to take here in Nairobi, but

   9   first we wanted to verify that the man called Sidi Tayyib is

  10   the same person known as Abu al Fadl al Makkee.  We have taken

  11   the matter seriously despite the limited resources we have

  12   here in the office.  I have sent a fax to Hamad to provide me

  13   with information, but it was futile.  I do not know whether or

  14   not the letter has reached him.  Until now he has not

  15   complied.  I also tried to call Qatar to verify the name

  16   through engineer al Utabai, but the telephone was always busy.

  17   Finally, and from another location I sent a fax to Abu Ibrahim

  18   in the Sudan and till the writing of this message on 14 August

  19   1997 I have not found a reply to the fax.  He confirms the

  20   conversation with Abu Khadija al Iraqi in the next paragraph.

  21   Abu Khadija al Iraqi from Germany also called me on 13 August

  22   and I informed him about the news, which shocked him, and I

  23   told him to be careful.  Anyway, we are not much concerned

  24   about the man's name, Abu Fadhl.  It is enough that there is a

  25   man who was dealing with the sheik and fell in the hands of


   1   the enemy.  Therefore, we must take the appropriate measures.

   2   I and brother Tawfiq collected all the files which we do not

   3   need and which might pose a danger to us and placed them in

   4   another location.  We did not burn them since they belong to

   5   engineer Abdel al Sabbour, who may have a different opinion.

   6   He will probably arrive next week, God willing.

   7            (Continued on next page)




















   1            So the first thing that Harun does is he gets

   2   together with Ahmed Tawhil and he hides El Hage's files.  And

   3   he doesn't destroy them because El Hage isn't around to

   4   consult with about whether or not El Hage wants the files

   5   destroyed because he is in Afghanistan.

   6            So Harun hides the files, ladies and gentlemen, and

   7   these are the files that turn up in the Mira office during the

   8   August 1998 search, a full year after this document is

   9   written.  The files that have the letters, the communications

  10   between El Hage and between some of the others in al Qaeda,

  11   including Nawawi, the files that have all the Khalid al Fawwaz

  12   documents that I talked about earlier and the files that have

  13   the passport photos that we showed you earlier, Government

  14   Exhibit 6404.  These are the files, the files that Abu Hafs

  15   does not want the enemy to have but he doesn't have the

  16   authority to destroy them because he's got to talk to Wadih El

  17   Hage first.

  18            Then Harun continues:  "We also thought that if we

  19   were indeed under surveillance, then this would make us look

  20   suspicious.  On the same day we heard the news that the

  21   partisans called us from Mombasa and asked them never to call

  22   me at number again.  They told me that Khalid want to talk to

  23   me urgently, but I told them I will get in touch with them but

  24   never to call me at that number again.

  25            "After two days they called me back at the same


   1   number so I forced them to burn that number and immediately

   2   informed Khalid that I had prohibited them from calling me

   3   here, as I am 100 percent sure that the telephone is tapped

   4   after Wadih's wife told me that after three days of reading

   5   the newspaper, she heard strange voices in the television when

   6   she was trying to adjust the speaker."

   7            Down at the bottom Harun gives some additional

   8   advice:  "The second matter is my advice to my kind

   9   intelligent high command, which I pray to God to keep safe

  10   from enemies, which works to return the caliphate to earth and

  11   fight the forces of etheism and dictators who wreaked havoc on

  12   earth.  We, the East Africa crew, do not want to know how work

  13   plans are operated because we are not fit for plans.  We are

  14   just implementers.  We, thanks be to God, trust our command

  15   and appreciate their work and know that they have a lot of

  16   problems.  But the advice here is for work purposes only,

  17   because this work we are doing, the return of an Islamic

  18   state, is a team effort and not an individual one; we are all

  19   participating in it."

  20            Harun is writing the high and wise command, just like

  21   you heard these people are trained.  They are segments.

  22   Headquarters decides the big picture.  You have people who do

  23   intelligence and do the surveillance and then you have, as

  24   Harun describes it, the implementers.  And Harun, ladies and

  25   gentlemen, is one of the implementers who will directly


   1   participate in the bombing of the embassy in Nairobi, about a

   2   year after he writes this report.

   3            On the next page, Harun says, "As you know, we only

   4   knew about the decision to declare war against America through

   5   the media, as have been mentioned, and we were supposed to

   6   know about the decision only, not the plans, so that we can

   7   take the necessary actions for this decision so that we will

   8   not cause any problems or foil your plans for not knowing

   9   about the decision, so that, as you know, if one of the crew

  10   fell in the hands of those due to any decisions, God forbid,

  11   that will be a loss to the group."

  12            So, he's telling the high command in Afghanistan, we

  13   didn't know you were going to take the war public.  We didn't

  14   know you were going to declare war.  It would have been nice

  15   to know because we want to make sure we're coordinated.

  16   Notice he's not saying in there, oh, you mean we're against

  17   America now?  We didn't realize that was what this was about.

  18   We object to that.  No, what Harun is saying is, that's fine,

  19   let's just make sure that we don't get in each other's way.

  20   You don't get in the way of what we're doing, we don't want to

  21   get in the way of what you're doing.

  22            And what he says in particular is, in case one of us

  23   gets caught, we don't want to give up information about others

  24   in the high and wise command.  Again, the elements of how the

  25   operation is to be done and keeping the high command separate


   1   from the implementers.

   2            Then he asks in the next part of the same paragraph:

   3   "We ask you to keep in touch with us through the Internet from

   4   Pakistan, because now we get a lot of information about the

   5   Sheik through this network.  We even find the Sheik's pictures

   6   on the net.  Or you can do as Abdel Sabbur did when he faxed

   7   his family from the border city next to you.  We want to hear

   8   your good words and we are afraid of being disconnected and

   9   taking unapproved plans domestically since we do not have

  10   enough expertise for such difficult decision, because these

  11   decisions need people like you."

  12            So you can communicate with us as Abdel Sabbur, as

  13   Wadih El Hage did, by using a fax in the Border city,

  14   Peshawar, right next to Afghanistan.

  15            And then the last paragraph, Harun says:  "Finally,

  16   this advice was sincerely for the sake of God so that work

  17   will, work will advance without delay.  I did not write this

  18   report until I was officially asked by Brother Khalid to be

  19   responsible for the media information office for the crew in

  20   Nairobi.  He," Khalid, "also asked me to write always from

  21   time to time about the security situation of the crew and the

  22   group here in general in East Africa in the files of the al

  23   Barakar, which always includes seven items.  The third is the

  24   securitization, and remember that top secret report, the one

  25   that went through the new policy, and it said that Khalid


   1   appointed Harun to be in charge of communications."

   2            Ladies and gentlemen, the circle is complete.  Harun

   3   is doing what he's been tasked to do.  He's telling the group

   4   back in Afghanistan:  We are fine with attacking America,

   5   we're fine with the fact it's now public, but we have to be

   6   very careful because the enemy is onto us.  They are onto us

   7   because of Abu Fadhl al Makkee, they are onto us because of

   8   what is going on in Kenya and the security situation is very

   9   dangerous.

  10            And in those series of communications you see exactly

  11   how al Qaeda operates, who they go to when there is trouble,

  12   what it is that they are motivated to do, and it lays the

  13   foundation when you hear Harun say, "We are the implementers."

  14   And you will see that play out later on.

  15            Now, at the bottom there is a second report.

  16            We can take a break now if you like, your Honor.

  17            THE COURT:  All right.  We'll take our mid afternoon

  18   recess at this point.

  19            (Recess)

  20            THE COURT:  Bring in the jury.

  21            (Jury present)

  22            THE COURT:  Mr. Karas, you may continue.

  23            MR. KARAS:  Thank you, your Honor.

  24            We left off at the bottom of 300A-T, and you see that

  25   this is a different report that was retrieved by Agent


   1   Crisalli among the deleted files in the computer found in El

   2   Hage's house.  And in this report, what you see at the end is

   3   written by Ayman al Zawahiri.  The person says:  "The contact

   4   between you and me is the factor.  So you can send it a week

   5   after it reaches you to the center to take the latest news

   6   which will come through Abdel Sabbur and tell him not to call

   7   from any of the phones that we have.  Tell everyone else about

   8   this, and he may call Abdullah and leave a message that he

   9   arrived at the center so that I go to him, God willing."

  10            In the next paragraph there is written:  "Brother

  11   Sharif:  Abdel Sabbur called before he came and by the time of

  12   writing these reports on August 13, 1997, he told us that he

  13   will come after a week.  He told Salim to prepare himself to

  14   go to the director and told him also that he will request to

  15   leave the house immediately.  I understood that Abdel Sabbur

  16   will leave quickly.  I met Ahmed and told him about the matter

  17   and asked him about his readiness to follow up with the

  18   agency.  He," and then continuing on the next page, "told me

  19   that he will not (unintelligible) anything and that it is

  20   better to sell these things and to rent a normal house and put

  21   one of us in it with the communication devices.  What I see

  22   it's that you come to us directly in Nairobi at this critical

  23   period of time so that you can see how things will be in the

  24   future."

  25            So in this paragraph you learn from this document


   1   that the writer of the report, which may be Harun and it may

   2   be somebody else, is in touch with Abdel Sabbur by August 13.

   3   That's the defendant El Hage.  And Abdel Sabbur mentioned that

   4   he told Salim to prepare himself to come to the director, to

   5   Bin Laden in Afghanistan, and that he, El Hage, will request

   6   to leave the house immediately, to leave Nairobi.

   7            And the person goes on to write that "I understood

   8   that Abdel Sabbur will leave quickly and invites Brother

   9   Sabbur to see what things will be like in the future, to see

  10   what will happen," what it is like when Abdel Sabbur, when the

  11   defendant El Hage, leaves Nairobi.

  12            And that specific reference to rent a normal house

  13   and put one of us in it with the communication devices, I

  14   submit to you is precisely what El Hage has been doing in

  15   Nairobi since he replaced Khalid al Fawwaz in 1994 -- get a

  16   normal house and then set up a communication device where you

  17   can then assume the duties of the group, the same way that

  18   Wadih El Hage did and the same way that Khalid al Fawwaz did

  19   before him.

  20            Now, at some point, as you know, Wadih El Hage

  21   returns from his trip to Afghanistan, and among the items that

  22   shows you that is Government Exhibit 315.  315-1 is a ticket

  23   stub that Agent Coleman testified about.  You see the arrival

  24   there, Nairobi.  It says Mr. El Nage, Wadih, and then on page

  25   3 of that exhibit, you see the ticket, El Hage, Nairobi to


   1   Karachi, and then an open return.  And by the way, you see

   2   that the ticket is issued for Pakistani Airways, Flight 744, a

   3   flight number you will see later on in August of 1998.

   4            Now, Government Exhibit 314 is a copy of El Hage's

   5   passport.  We can look at page 2 of that.  This is a later

   6   page that shows -- if we could go to 314-2, and there you see

   7   El Hage's passport.  And then 314-5, what you see there almost

   8   in the middle of the screen, the angled entry stamp 20 Feb.

   9   1997, that's the return trip in February.  And you will see

  10   the return trip in August, that's on page 12.  There you see

  11   the visa, Pakistan, 1997.

  12            Now, El Hage returns in August, August 21, 1997,

  13   which is the time that Agent Coleman is conducting the search

  14   where he found the computer and where he found the address

  15   books that you have seen so many of the names come up, and

  16   that's where he found some of these daily planners and

  17   business card holders.  And one of the business cards that El

  18   Hage had, Government Exhibit 306, at page 200, you will see on

  19   the top right, Mamdouh M. Salim, and Mamdouh Salim you know is

  20   the name for Abu Hajer.

  21            Abu Hajer is the person we talked about earlier this

  22   morning who is on the fatwah committee.  He's the person who

  23   issued some of the earlier fatwahs that deal with al Qaeda

  24   being against America because of the Saudi Arabian Gulf

  25   Peninsula and also because of Somalia.


   1            September 1997, two very important things happen.

   2   The first is Wadih El Hage testifies before the Grand Jury

   3   here in the Southern District of New York and he testifies a

   4   little over a year after Bin Laden has issued his August 1996

   5   declaration of war, a little less than six months after Bin

   6   Laden has the interview with CNN, where he says he's declared

   7   war against America, a little less than after a month after

   8   the group has learned what it believes to be the cooperation

   9   of Abu Fadhl al Makkee with the Americans, and it's a little

  10   less than one year before the embassies are bombed in East

  11   Africa.

  12            And you will see later on, and we will go through the

  13   perjury counts count by count, but Wadih El Hage is asked

  14   questions about his relationship with Bin Laden, his

  15   relationship with some of the leaders of al Qaeda, and his

  16   relationship with other members or suspected members of al

  17   Qaeda.  And it is that moment that Wadih El Hage is given a

  18   choice:  Assist the United States in its investigation of al

  19   Qaeda and its leader who has declared war on the United

  20   States, or continue to side with Bin Laden and al Qaeda.

  21            And you will see, ladies and gentlemen, that the

  22   evidence overwhelmingly established that El Hage made his

  23   choice.  He violated his oath.  He didn't tell the truth.  He

  24   lied about al Qaeda.  He lied about Bin Laden.  He chose,

  25   Wadih El Hage, the American citizen, chose al Qaeda and Bin


   1   Laden over America.

   2            And he did this for two reasons -- really one reason,

   3   ladies and gentlemen.  He did this to protect al Qaeda.  He

   4   did this to conceal al Qaeda's activities from the United

   5   States.  He did this as part of the conspiracy to make sure

   6   that al Qaeda and those he was working with can continue in

   7   their efforts against the United States.

   8            And you see the security concerns that al Qaeda has

   9   when it comes to America in those documents we went through

  10   before the break.  And so when El Hage is asked questions,

  11   what he is going to do is he is going to remain loyal to Bin

  12   Laden, he is going to remain loyal to al Qaeda, and he is

  13   going to obstruct the investigation so that the others can

  14   continue in their work.

  15            And, ladies and gentlemen, El Hage's choice is both

  16   symbolic and its tragic.  It is symbolic because its reflects

  17   precisely his involvement in this conspiracy.  It reflects the

  18   fact that he will remain loyal to it even when confronted with

  19   very simple, straightforward questions about al Qaeda and his

  20   relationship with al Qaeda.

  21            And it is tragic.  It is tragic, ladies and

  22   gentlemen, because it robbed the United States of an

  23   opportunity to investigate and crack the Bin Laden cell nearly

  24   11 months before the embassies are bombed, before the

  25   embassies are bombed by the East African cell that he ran, the


   1   implementers such as Harun, Wadih El Hage's deputy.  And that

   2   is why it is tragic.  It is also illegal, and we will talk

   3   about that later.

   4            Now, not surprisingly, al Qaeda reacts to the

   5   security threat that it perceives, and you heard from the

   6   witness, Kherchtou, who told you that Harun came up to Sudan

   7   and told Kherchtou about the search of El Hage's house.  And

   8   in particular, Kherchtou was told by Harun that the Americans

   9   got the computer -- the computer that you know has the

  10   security report, the computer that has the report regarding

  11   the Taliban and the computer that has other documents that

  12   were written to the al Qaeda high command.

  13            And you may remember Essam al Ridi, the pilot.  He

  14   told you that when he spoke to Wadih El Hage, El Hage

  15   mentioned to him that the Americans took his computer among

  16   the other items.  So al Qaeda does what it did in the Harun

  17   security report.  It's making sure people are aware of where

  18   the Americans are investigating and what it is that they

  19   found.

  20            Now, at the same time all of this is going on, Odeh,

  21   defendant Odeh, is in Somalia, still carrying out the new

  22   policy to train people in Somalia.  And he writes, we talked

  23   about this earlier, the tape letter that is found in his house

  24   in Witu.  And this is an enlargement, Government Exhibit

  25   710-96.


   1            In this letter you see that Odeh is writing his wife,

   2   and what he says is:  "Something happened which you may have

   3   heard of or are aware of some of its details.  Some kind of

   4   distress/crisis has happened to few brothers where you are.

   5   They had some problems.  These problems were expected.  They

   6   were not farfetched.  One expected these problems to happen

   7   today before tomorrow and yesterday before today.  But we had

   8   no idea the nature of these problems and their magnitude.

   9            "We heard the news about something that had happened

  10   which may compel us to stay here in our locations without

  11   moving due to the difficulty of the situation where you are

  12   and also due to the inability to get to you using the way or

  13   any of the ways that could take me to you.  So it has been

  14   decided that we have to stay here and not to move.

  15            "We saw that the best thing is to reassure you and to

  16   keep you well informed of the matter.  Thank God for telling

  17   you everything in details from the beginning and

  18   (unintelligible) that you have endured.  Thank God for your

  19   letters that have been reassuring.  Harun also said good news

  20   about you when he came over.  He said the whole family are

  21   well, thank God, the master of the universe, and all they were

  22   asking is to send them letters."

  23            Now, ladies and gentlemen, this is part of a series

  24   of tape letters, and some of the other ones place the dates of

  25   these letters roughly in September of 1997.  There is a


   1   reference to how he had been in Somalia for six months.  So in

   2   September 1997, defendant Odeh is writing back to his wife

   3   about some problems.  So there's a crisis, and whatever the

   4   crisis is, it's keeping the people who were implementing the

   5   new policy in Somalia, forcing them to stay in Somalia.

   6            And you see the reference down at the bottom to

   7   Harun.  Harun also said good news.  Now, remember Harun is the

   8   communications person within the East African cell, and you

   9   remember this morning we went through some of the telephone

  10   calls where Harun was talking to Shuaib and he was talking to

  11   Mustafa and he was talking to some of the other al Qaeda

  12   members about El Hage's visit to Afghanistan in February 1997.

  13            Harun is the one who writes the security report to

  14   the high and wise command and in there he references the fact

  15   that he's been in touch with Khalid and some other people in

  16   the security situations.  And now the news, whatever this news

  17   is, in September of 1997 has gotten to Odeh in Somalia, and

  18   what he's explaining to his wife is that this is a problem and

  19   it's going to keep me here for a while.

  20            Now, on the next page of the translation, Odeh writes

  21   further, "I appeal to God to ease the burden on you and ask

  22   God to compensate us with goodness for this loss.  By God, I

  23   miss you very much.  I've always wanted us to be together

  24   without being apart for one day, also to be able to visit you

  25   and come back to keep on worshipping, obeying the laws of God,


   1   which I am taking upon myself while you carry on with your

   2   life as usual."

   3            And then the tone changes, "But may God fight against

   4   the enemies.  They neither sleep nor rest and they don't let

   5   anybody rest.  Anyhow, this is the way it should be.  If they

   6   let us rest, we will not let them rest.  So they certainly

   7   have their time and we have ours.  This time may have been

   8   theirs, but not all times will be theirs.  We will never allow

   9   that, and may God, the master of universe, to respond 20 fold

  10   to one of theirs.  "Thank God we are still alive and we are

  11   still capable of giving and resisting.  But of course the

  12   matter will require time, preparation and thinking."

  13            "Time, preparation and thinking."  Ladies and

  14   gentlemen, we will come back in the context of this, but bear

  15   in mind by September of 1997, the al Qaeda cell in East Africa

  16   is concerned about the cooperation with the Americans of Abu

  17   Fadhl al Makkee.  The al Qaeda cell in East Africa has learned

  18   that the Americans have searched the house of Wadih El Hage

  19   and that they have taken his computer among the other objects.

  20            And remember the reference that Harun had to the

  21   arrest of these five people and how they blamed, Harun blamed

  22   the American intelligence for the arrest of these people in

  23   Kenya.  And he said that there is an American/Kenyan

  24   intelligence effort because the Americans know well that it

  25   was the youth of the Sheik that were responsible for what


   1   happened to the Americans in Somalia.

   2            So by September of 1997, America is very much on the

   3   minds of the East African cell of al Qaeda and Mohamed Odeh is

   4   one of the prominent members of that cell and whatever it is

   5   that's keeping him there, but he's telling even his wife that

   6   they're going to respond 20 fold and the matter will take time

   7   and preparation.

   8            Other things that happened in September of 1997.

   9   Ibrahim Eidarous, one of the three people that we talked about

  10   with respect to London, Abu Abdallah Ibrahim and Daoud,

  11   Ibrahim Eidarous, we talked about him in London.  And what

  12   happens in September of 1997 is that Eidarous goes from Baku,

  13   Azerbaijan, we can see it on the map here, and he goes to

  14   England, and that's where he becomes the cell leader of the

  15   EIJ group in London.

  16            And we know that because there is a ticket that is

  17   found in his house, not the trunk of his car, government

  18   Exhibit 1535.  And you see a ticket there that shows a trip

  19   from Baku to Amsterdam to London and it's the 24th of

  20   September, 1997.  And you remember, we read you the second

  21   page of the letter, Government Exhibit 1523-T, and that's

  22   where number 14, where Eidarous writes to Zawahiri, "call this

  23   number, 956375892," and the next day the satellite phone

  24   called that number on October 30th, 1997.

  25            Well, in the first page of that letter, you see at


   1   the top:  "Dear Brother Abu Mohamed," which is one of the

   2   aliases for Ayman al Zawahiri, Government Exhibit 127, the

   3   last alias Abu Mohamed, and what Eidarous writes in 1997,

   4   having just arrived in England, he says, "It's necessary to

   5   advise the brothers of the following:  Firstly, to fear God.

   6   Secondly, to cooperate with and obey the person in charge, for

   7   this is the image that the people see."  And you will see in a

   8   moment that Ayman al Zawahiri complies with Eidarous and makes

   9   sure everybody knows Eidarous is in charge in London.

  10            With that, we move to January of 1998.  In January

  11   1998, Ayman al Zawahiri writes a letter to the EIJ leaders.

  12   That's Government Exhibit 1518-T.  You see at the bottom,

  13   we'll highlight the text, 18/1/1998.  Again, that's January

  14   18th.  We read the first part of this letter earlier.

  15            "Honorable Brothers, peace be upon you and the mercy

  16   of God."  And then he appoints the people as deputies, and we

  17   talked about Ahmad Hassan earlier.  That's one of the people

  18   involved in the passports with that person Dardaa.

  19            Number 2, Zawahiri says, "We have arrived to a good

  20   rough draft agreement with our friend here.  However, the

  21   third partner hasn't responded to it yet and the brothers

  22   agree that the draft is good.  We hope that God blesses it."

  23            As we will see in a moment, ladies and gentlemen, on

  24   February 23, 1998, barely a month after this letter goes out,

  25   Bin Laden and Ayman al Zawahiri, who writes this letter, and a


   1   leader of another Egyptian group and two other groups issued

   2   the February 1998 fatwah to kill American civilians.  And here

   3   you see Ayman al Zawahiri sharing with the leadership of EIJ

   4   the rough draft of this fatwah.

   5            Showing to you what I mentioned earlier, the joint

   6   venture between al Qaeda and EIJ, a joint venture that will

   7   play out in, among other places, in London, when Eidarous and

   8   Abdel Bary help arrange to set forth the claims of

   9   responsibility for the East Africa bombings.

  10            On Government Exhibit 1519-T, what you see is a

  11   letter from Ayman al Zawahiri.  Down at the bottom, down at

  12   the bottom, Abu Mohammed Nour Al Din, which is another one of

  13   the aliases Zawahiri uses, the second from the bottom, and

  14   it's to Brother Ezzat, who is one of the four people who had

  15   been appointed a deputy.  In fact, Zawahiri repeats that.  I

  16   am honored to tell you I have chosen you along with brothers

  17   Mohammed Ali, Sami and Ahmad Hassan to work with me.

  18            We'll have to come back to that.  I pulled up the

  19   wrong letter.  I apologize.

  20            If we go on to Government Exhibit 93, Government

  21   Exhibit 93 is the Al-Quds article where the fatwah is

  22   published.  And you saw 93-T and we will go through it in a

  23   moment, but this is a daily newspaper that is published in

  24   London and this is where the fatwah is published.  And what

  25   you see is that the satellite phone that we talked about --


   1   the chart here is marked as 598 -- is instrumental in the

   2   dissemination of this critical fatwah.

   3            If we go first to Government Exhibit 95, this is a

   4   summary chart of telephone calls made, as it says on top,

   5   February 22, 1998.  And what we'll do is we'll go through and

   6   identify each of the numbers and then we'll go through the

   7   chronology.

   8            You see the third column talks about the originating

   9   number, and of course the 682505331 is the satellite phone.

  10   Some of the other numbers you see there, the 44, that's the

  11   country code for England.  1812084411, that is Khalid al

  12   Fawwaz's number.  Remember, he's got the 4411, the 4422 and

  13   the 4433.

  14            Then you've got a couple of other numbers down there.

  15   If you look at the number called, the fourth number, again the

  16   441817418008, and these are all reflected off of exhibits that

  17   have the telephone records, but that number belongs to

  18   Al-Quds, the newspaper through which the fatwah is published.

  19            The number below that is the 44956657875 number,

  20   that's the mobile phone number that belongs to Ibrahim

  21   Eidarous.  And the way that you know that is that Eidarous'

  22   name appears in Fawwaz's address book under that number and

  23   the subscriber name is Ibrahim Sayid and his name is Ibrahim

  24   Eidarous.  So those are the numbers that you have on this

  25   page.


   1            What you see is at 11:24 -- GMT is ostensibly London

   2   time -- there's a call, a half-minute call from the satellite

   3   phone to Fawwaz.  And then you see about 45 minutes later,

   4   Fawwaz calls back and he calls back again nine minutes later

   5   to the satellite phone.  Those are relatively short

   6   conversations.

   7            Then what you see is after that 12:51 conversation,

   8   the third one in the row, right after that, a

   9   three-and-a-half-minute conversation with the satellite phone,

  10   Fawwaz hangs up and he calls Al-Quds.  And then three minutes

  11   after that, the satellite phone, basically while Fawwaz is

  12   working things out with Al-Quds, the satellite phone calls

  13   Ibrahim Eidarous.  Calls the leader of the EIJ cell, in

  14   London.

  15            Then there's no activity again until 1:50 p.m., when

  16   Al-Quds calls Fawwaz at his 4411 number.  And a minute later,

  17   Fawwaz calls Al-Quds back and then you see Al-Quds calls

  18   Fawwaz back.  They're trading calls back and forth, very brief

  19   calls, less than even half a minute.

  20            Then at 40:03, the third from the bottom, Fawwaz

  21   calls the satellite phone again, and 40 minutes later the

  22   satellite phone calls Fawwaz back.  And then at 5:25 they call

  23   Fawwaz back again.  If you go to the next page of Government

  24   Exhibit 95, between 5:28 and 5:49 p.m. you will see a flurry

  25   of calls.


   1            At 5:28, Fawwaz calls the satellite phone.  At 5:29,

   2   right afterwards, he calls Al-Quds.  And then right after

   3   that, Fawwaz calls the satellite phone again, and then right

   4   after that he calls Al-Quds again.  These go between here.

   5   Then the satellite phone calls Fawwaz back at 5:45 and there's

   6   one last call, one last making of the arrangements between

   7   Fawwaz and Al-Quds at 5:47 p.m.

   8            And then you see at 5:49 p.m. Al-Quds places a 30.7

   9   minute phone call to the satellite phone on February 22, 1998,

  10   the day before the Al-Quds publishes the fatwah.  They're

  11   dictating, talking about, discussing this fatwah, the day

  12   before Al-Quds obliges and publishes the fatwah.

  13            And then what you see is virtually right after that

  14   call ends, the satellite phone calls Ibrahim Eidarous, the EIJ

  15   leader.  So you have got Khalid al Fawwaz, the al Qaeda person

  16   who was in Nairobi, the al Qaeda person who was replaced by

  17   Wadih El Hage when al Fawwaz left Kenya after he got arrested,

  18   he's in touch with the satellite phone and he's brokering the

  19   arrangement between the al Qaeda headquarters in Afghanistan

  20   and Al-Quds, who will publish the fatwah, and at the same time

  21   you have got the EIJ component part of this fatwah speaking

  22   with the satellite phone as they are working out the

  23   arrangement to disseminate this critical message.

  24            And then what you see is another phone call at 6:36

  25   p.m. to a number we haven't talked about yet from Fawwaz.  You


   1   have the al Qaeda/EIJ relationship played out in London.

   2   Fawwaz speaks to that number 956375892.  And you may remember

   3   that's the number that you Eidarous had written Ayman al

   4   Zawahiri to call in October of 1997.  And you see the five

   5   calls on October 30, 1997.  That's the number that belongs to

   6   the third person in London to keep an eye on, Adel Abdel Bary.

   7   You know that that's his number because Adel Abdel Bary's

   8   number appears in Eidarous's phone book with that number and

   9   in Khalid al Fawwaz's phone book with that number, that

  10   375892.

  11            So they're all talking together, and on the next day,

  12   the very first call in the morning, the day that the fatwah is

  13   published, Government Exhibit 96, at 9:15, Ibrahim Eidarous

  14   calls Adel Abdel Bary.  The EIJ people call the next morning

  15   when Al-Quds publishes the fatwah.  And if you go to the very

  16   end of the first page there, you see a series of calls to an

  17   0087 number, which is actually subscribed to Adel Abdel Bary's

  18   real name.

  19            You see six calls, five or six calls so Khalid al

  20   Fawwaz at 4 in the afternoon, and then the next page there are

  21   three more calls and then you see from a different number,

  22   from an 8904 number as opposed to the 0087 number, Abdel Bary

  23   sends a fax to Khalid al Fawwaz.  The 443 number is the fax

  24   number.

  25            So, remember the calls take place the day the fatwah


   1   is published and then he sends a fax less than a minute the

   2   day that the fatwah is published by Al-Quds.  So what is it

   3   that the fatwah says?  Let's look at Government Exhibit 93-2.

   4            This is a fatwah that, unlike the August 1996

   5   declaration, is to the point.  It doesn't go on for many

   6   pages.  You see at the top there, the portion that is being

   7   highlighted of the translation, that it is Al-Quds, February

   8   23, 1998.  And you see the signatories to this fatwah, and the

   9   first one is Usama Bin Laden, the next one is Ayman al

  10   Zawahiri, and then there are three other groups that are

  11   mentioned there.

  12            And on the second page of this translation you see

  13   about two-thirds of the way down the statement is made:  "The

  14   ruling to kill the Americans and their allies -- civilians and

  15   military -- is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do

  16   it in any country."

  17            So now the group has changed again and now what it

  18   says is, we're going to be explicit:  The ruling is to kill

  19   civilians and military.  The ruling is to kill the Americans.

  20   It is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it.

  21            And what are the twin purposes of this?  The group

  22   tells you, the group who signs the fatwah.  In order to

  23   liberate the al-Aqsa Mosque and the holy mosque from their

  24   grip and in order to liberate the al-Aqsa mosque and the holy

  25   mosque from their grip.


   1            We will compare this later on, ladies and gentlemen,

   2   but when the group claims responsibility for the bombings in

   3   Nairobi and in Dar es Salaam, they name the operations after

   4   these twin goals.  The Nairobi operation is called Holy Kabba,

   5   the Holy Mosque, and the Dar es Salaam operation is called

   6   Operation al-Aqsa, the twin goals that they say support the

   7   killing, the ruling to kill American civilians and military

   8   wherever they can be found.

   9            Ladies and gentlemen, as I mentioned, this is

  10   explicit.  There's no nuance to this.  Bin Laden, Bin Laden,

  11   signs this document and he excludes nobody from this fatwah.

  12   He doesn't make any distinction for innocent Americans

  13   because, in his view, there are no innocent Americans.  He

  14   puts a target on the back of every American, whether the

  15   American wears a uniform, whether the American is a diplomat,

  16   works for a diplomat, it doesn't matter.  They are targets and

  17   it is a duty and he gives the reasons why.

  18            That is on February 23, 1998.  Now, the same day that

  19   this fatwah is published, Harun, the former El Hage deputy,

  20   Harun the person who said we are just the implementers, Harun

  21   buys a ticket on February 23, 1998 to go from Khartoum, Sudan

  22   to Nairobi, and you see this in Government Exhibit 921.  So

  23   Bin Laden and others say we're going to kill American

  24   civilians and Harun gets a ticket to go down to Nairobi from

  25   Sudan.  That's February.


   1            Now we turn to March 1998.  The ink isn't even dry on

   2   the fatwah, ladies and gentlemen, and what Odeh tells the FBI

   3   agents who interview him is that there is a meeting, and what

   4   he said to the agents was that he went to Mombasa as part of

   5   his furniture business and that he had a meeting, that there

   6   was a meeting that Saleh called, and that Odeh, Saleh, Ahmed

   7   the Egyptian, and Harun, they meet.  And during this meeting,

   8   according to what Odeh told the agents, that Saleh said that

   9   he had just returned from Afghanistan and that the word was

  10   that they had to start getting people out of Kenya so that

  11   people had to get their affairs in order and start getting

  12   documents.  That is what the defendant Odeh told the agent.

  13   In March of 1998, he, Saleh, Harun, and Ahmed the Egyptian are

  14   told that al Qaeda wants people to start getting their affairs

  15   in order and they're going to have to go back to leave Kenya.

  16            The other thing that happens in March of 1998,

  17   according to what Khalfan Khamis Mohamed told Agent Perkins,

  18   is it was in March or April of 1998 that Mustafa Fadhl,

  19   Mustafa Fadhl approached Khalfan Khamis Mohamed about doing a

  20   Jihad job.  And what Khafan Khamis Mohamed said is that he

  21   would do that.

  22            Now, the mission was not determined -- he was not

  23   told of the mission at that time, but he knew that it was a

  24   Jihad job and he accepted it, and what he told Agent Perkins

  25   is that he did find out that the target was the American


   1   Embassy and that he found out the week before the bombing.

   2   And at some --

   3            MR. RICCO:  Your Honor, I object and request an

   4   instruction on the manner in which Khalfan Khamis Mohamed's

   5   statement can be used.

   6            THE COURT:  Khalfan Khamis Mohamed's statement?

   7            MR. RICCO:  Yes.

   8            THE COURT:  To the agent after his arrest?

   9            MR. RICCO:  Yes.

  10            THE COURT:  Was received in evidence solely against

  11   Khalfan Khamis Mohamed.

  12            MR. KARAS:  Thank you, your Honor.

  13            Now, in March of 1998, Khalfan Khamis Mohamed is

  14   living at 22 Kidigalo Street, and you know that from Abdel

  15   Salun, who was the next door neighbor at Kidigalo Street, and

  16   the landlord who rented the Kidigalo Street apartment to K.K.

  17   Mohamed.  If we could display Government Exhibit 1400A, that

  18   is place where Khalfan Khamis Mohamed was living since

  19   January, according to those two witnesses that I just

  20   mentioned to you.

  21            And at some point during that time Abdel Salun,

  22   remember that somebody by the name of Hussein shows up and

  23   begins to leave with Khalfan Khamis Mohamed and Abdel Salun

  24   identified this picture as the Hussein.  Mustafa Fadhl, the

  25   person who is the al Qaeda member in the East African cell,


   1   the person who was referred to Khalid in the new policy

   2   reports that El Hage brought back.

   3            At some point, what Abdel Salun told you was that

   4   Hussein, as he knew him, was joined by Hussein's wife and his

   5   two children.  And you learned there name Anas and Yusr.  Now,

   6   in April, the plot is in full gear.  Once again, Odeh admits

   7   to the agents that there was a meeting in Witu this time, and

   8   what he told the agents was that Mustafa Fadhl came to see him

   9   in Witu in April.

  10            And Fadhl once again discussed these instructions

  11   about al Qaeda people leaving Kenya, and in particular, Odeh

  12   said that he and Fadhl discussed the February 1998 fatwah and

  13   whether or not it was right to do this fatwah because the

  14   United States was so powerful and that some in the leadership

  15   in al Qaeda questioned the fatwah, but in the end they wounded

  16   up supporting it.  That's in April of 1998.

  17            In Nairobi, meanwhile, in April of 1998, Harun rents

  18   the location at 43 Runda Estates in Nairobi, and you actually

  19   heard from Tamara Ratemo, the landlord, who talked about the

  20   meetings that she had and discussions she had with Harun.  One

  21   of the things that Harun told Ms. Ratemo was that Harun said

  22   that he would be having businessmen coming to conduct

  23   business, he mentioned the businessmen would be from Dubai,

  24   and the other things he asked her to do was to make

  25   arrangements so that the phone at 43 Runda Estates could be


   1   used to make international calls.

   2            And you may remember that she said that she would

   3   have to go to the telephone and ostensibly guarantee that the

   4   phone would be paid for, and she specifically gave you the

   5   telephone number for 43 Runda Estates during 1998.  The number

   6   she gave you was 512430.  512430.  And you are going to see

   7   that that is the number from which the defendant Al-'Owhali is

   8   going to call Yemen before he carries out the bombing, and you

   9   are going to see that the cell phone that was used in Dar es

  10   Salaam among the members of the bomb plot called that number,

  11   512430, in the days that preceded the bombing establishing the

  12   connection between the Dar es Salaam and the Nairobi bombings.

  13            Now, we won't display it, but there was a lease,

  14   Government Exhibit 568, for the 43 Runda Estates.  And we'll

  15   show you some of the pictures so you can get an idea of what

  16   the place looked like.  Government Exhibit 567A and then

  17   Government Exhibit 567C.  You see 43 and you see the walls and

  18   the gates and you see the gate again in 567E.  Again, a

  19   secluded place, a place in which the group could construct its

  20   bomb, carry out its activities, and follow through on its plot

  21   to bomb the embassies.

  22            And you see and you heard some of the evidence, and

  23   we'll talk about some of the evidence where the FBI went to 43

  24   Runda Estates within two weeks of the bombing and they did a

  25   couple of searches there.  They did numerous of the swabbings


   1   that the agents told you about with those cotton swabs and

   2   they took some soil samples and they found a few other items.

   3            Now, Government Exhibit 787 is the summary chart that

   4   Kelly Mount testified to.  Remember, she's the chemist and you

   5   see the results of the testing on the swabs.  The control swab

   6   tested negative and the four other swabbings of a table top in

   7   43 Runda Estates test positive or PETN and TNT.

   8            And in Government Exhibit 788, which is a three-page

   9   summary of the results of the testing of the items, you see

  10   the swabbings repeatedly test positive for PETN and TNT, and

  11   you also see that there was the presence of aluminum found.

  12   You may remember that the defendant Mohamed Al-'Owhali told

  13   Agent Gaudin that they had in fact used aluminum powder as

  14   part of the bomb.  The forensics results confirm what it was

  15   that Mohamed Al-'Owhali said to Agent Gaudin.

  16            The other thing that was found at 43 Runda Estates

  17   was a Time Magazine article and Mitchell Hollars, the FBI

  18   fingerprint specialist, testified that Government Exhibit 750,

  19   which is the Time Magazine article, had a fingerprint for

  20   Harun -- Harun, the person who rented the bomb factory; Harun,

  21   who worked as Wadih El Hage's deputy; Harun, who was the

  22   person who wrote the security reports that you saw earlier.

  23            Now, in Tanzania, Khalfan Khamis Mohamed and Mustafa

  24   Fadhl, going by the name Hussein, are living together and

  25   Khalfan Khamis Mohamed told Agent Perkins that what they did


   1   at 22 Kidigalo is they would store the TNT and they would

   2   store some of the other components of the bomb.  And one of

   3   the things that the FBI recovered after the fact, you may

   4   recall, was this red carpet that Abdel Ihib talked about

   5   seeing in the house after Khalfan Khamis Mohamed left.  And

   6   1401-P is a photo of that red carpet.

   7            And Government Exhibit 1462 is the summary chart of

   8   the results of the chemists who did the work on the Dar es

   9   Salaam exhibits.  And you see down at the bottom that the red

  10   carpet, 1401, and there was also some foam padding, Government

  11   Exhibit 1402, tested positive for TNT and PETN.

  12            The other thing that happens in April of 1998 is

  13   Khalfan Khamis Mohamed applies for a Tanzania passport not in

  14   his name but in the name of Suheil Nassur Maleek, and he told

  15   Agent Perkins that he applied for the passport -- excuse me,

  16   that the got the passport after it was that he was told about

  17   the Jihad mission.

  18            Now we move to May of 1998, May 6th, and you can

  19   see -- let's look at Government Exhibit 901.  Government

  20   Exhibit 901 is a Yemen passport.  If we could turn that

  21   around, it's a Yemen passport with Al-'Owhali's photograph on

  22   it.  And the name is not Mohamed Al-'Owhali, it's Khalid Salim

  23   Saleh Bin Rashid and he purports to be a merchant here and the

  24   date of issue is 6 May 1998.

  25            Now this passport, ladies and gentlemen, was found in


   1   the residence of Harun in the Comoros after the bombing, and

   2   of course it makes sense, as we'll discover, because Mohamed

   3   Al-'Owhali was not supposed to survivor the attack.  So Harun

   4   in collecting the items.  Harun is making sure there is no

   5   trail so he collects these items and he brings them with him.

   6            Of course, he can't take them with him to

   7   Afghanistan, so he leaves them behind in the Comoros,

   8   comfortable with the notion that he has erased any trail that

   9   will connect him and the others to the bombing.  And what you

  10   see, ladies and gentlemen of the jury, once again, is the

  11   critical nature of fake passports for the group.

  12            This is how they get people like Al-'Owhali into

  13   places like Kenya to carry out operations.  And to do that you

  14   need to have facilitators, people who can take care of fake

  15   passports and people who can arrange for messages and the

  16   travel of others.  And as we talked about earlier, that's one

  17   of the roles that Wadih El Hage played.  Now, we're not saying

  18   he had anything to do with this passport, but the point is

  19   that this is how al Qaeda operates and this is how it is that

  20   Al-'Owhali was able, in part, to carry out his mission.

  21            On May 7th, in London, Abu Hafs goes by the name

  22   Dr. Atef, writes Khalid al Fawwaz, and you see Government

  23   Exhibit 1636-T, which is a translation of a document found in

  24   Khalid al Fawwaz's house.  And you see at the top there the

  25   4433 number I mentioned to you.  That is Khalid al Fawwaz's


   1   fax number, and what Abu Hafs says on the 7th of May --

   2   remember, you got to invert the numbers -- May 7th, 1998, he

   3   says:  "It has been sent to you the fatwah of the Ulma of

   4   Afghanistan and it is a very important and very strong fatwah

   5   and also it has been sent with an introduction of the fatwah

   6   and comments about the fatwa signed by the Sheik," referring

   7   to Bin Laden.

   8            "Please send it to the Arab press, Al-Quds, Al Sharq

   9   Al-Awssat, Al-Moharer, Al-Hayat and the news agencies,

  10   satellite broadcasting agencies and others.

  11            "And if it's possible to publish the fatwah and the

  12   introduction one day, and the comments on the second, this

  13   will be better, especially in Al-Quds."

  14            Now, Al-Quds is the same paper that published the

  15   February 1998 fatwah.  And let's move to Government Exhibit

  16   1602, please, if we could.  Found in Khalid al Fawwaz's

  17   residence, 94 Dewsbury Road, this is going to be -- this is a

  18   translation of what appears.  And you see the translation,

  19   Al-Quds ago Al-Arabi newspaper, May 14, 1998.  And the title

  20   is "Clergymen in Afghanistan Issue a fatwah calling for the

  21   Removal of American Forces from the Gulf.  Saudi opposition

  22   member Usama Bin Laden supports it."

  23            So once again, Al-Quds obliges Bin Laden, publishes

  24   another fatwah.  Once again Khalid al Fawwaz is in the middle

  25   of making sure that this gets disseminated, and you see that


   1   Bin Laden expresses his thanks to the editor of Al-Quds in

   2   Government Exhibit 1634-T.

   3            Down at the bottom you see a signature of Usama Bin

   4   Laden, and the letter is addressed to "the well-known

   5   journalist Mr. Abdel Barry Atwan, owner of Al-Quds Al-Arabi

   6   Newspaper.

   7            "I take pleasure in congratulating you for your

   8   strong journalistic views towards the truth, and the

   9   steadfastness of your newspaper to serve the struggle, and the

  10   use of the pen to defend the nation's causes and its holy

  11   places, and the carrying out of its task to inform, truly

  12   without being touched by elements of temptation and

  13   seduction."

  14            Skipping that next sentence he writes, "As we

  15   congratulate you on this great achievement, the efforts to

  16   defend the nation's causes and support her defenders, I would

  17   like to thank you personally for your interest on the news in

  18   the Arab Peninsula and the country Al-Haramin (Saudi), as well

  19   as your deep understanding of the ongoing struggle between the

  20   good and bad in the area, siding with truth, and supporting

  21   it, is a situation which will not be forgotten by the people

  22   in the area."  And it's dated May 14, 1998, when Al-Quds

  23   published the fatwah that Atef, Abu Hafs, wanted to have

  24   published.

  25            If you take a quick look at the original of this, the


   1   Arabic original, Government Exhibit 1634, if we could invert

   2   that and then focus on the fax header -- you see Bin Laden's

   3   signature there, by the way.  If you focus on the fax header

   4   you see that Kandahar Telecommunications, AFG, 837655.

   5            And you may remember when we were going through

   6   Khalid al Fawwaz's address book there was a listing for

   7   Dr. Mohamed Atef.  There was one that had a listing for the

   8   satellite phone number, and there was one that had a listing

   9   with the number 83765.  And as we talked about earlier,

  10   Kandahar is one of the southern provinces of Afghanistan.  So

  11   the communications are coming directly from al Qaeda

  12   headquarters.  They are going to London, something that you

  13   will see later on as we go through the claims of

  14   responsibility.

  15            Now, on May 10, we don't have to pull it up, but

  16   Government Exhibit 903 is the Harun passport, and there's also

  17   some tickets that are found in his house in the Comoros.  And

  18   there's another trip that Harun takes back to Kenya on May

  19   10th.  And on May 18th -- moving to May 18th, if we can pull

  20   up the passport for Mohamed Al-'Owhali, Government Exhibit

  21   901, in that passport, ladies and gentlemen, you will see a

  22   trip where Mohamed Al-'Owhali flies, he goes from Yemen to

  23   Pakistan, and there's going to be an entry stamp in Pakistan

  24   on May 18.

  25            THE COURT:  Ladies and gentlemen, we'll call it a


   1   day.  It's been a while since I reminded you, so let me remind

   2   you, please, not to read, listen, watch anything which has to

   3   do with this case, anything remotely related to this case or

   4   with respect to McVeigh.

   5            Have a pleasant evening.

   6            (Jury not present)

   7            THE COURT:  My comment with respect to remaining in

   8   the courtroom only referred to the people at the bar, not

   9   spectators.  They can feel free to leave if they wish.

  10            Mr. Karas, how is your timing?

  11            MR. KARAS:  Your Honor, we're still on pace to finish

  12   between two to two and a half days.

  13            THE COURT:  Two to two and a half days.  Certainly

  14   all day tomorrow?

  15            MR. KARAS:  I believe we will go through all day

  16   tomorrow, and I'm hoping to finish by tomorrow but I can't say

  17   for sure.

  18            THE COURT:  Because when we finish, we --

  19            MR. SCHMIDT:  We'll expect to be going on Thursday.

  20            THE COURT:  Thursday, okay.

  21            There was some issue that you raised, I'm sorry if I

  22   was very abrupt, but we did schedule 9:45 and we had been --

  23   we try not to be late.

  24            MR. DRATEL:  I have the page and line numbers on the

  25   two pieces of testimony.  The Khalifa --


   1            THE COURT:  You're referring to which document?

   2            MR. DRATEL:  This is the Grand Jury testimony.

   3            THE COURT:  The Grand Jury testimony.

   4            MR. FITZGERALD:  May I make one suggestion?  If he

   5   gives me the page and line numbers, we can discuss it.  If we

   6   take a five-minute break, we can tell your Honor where we're

   7   at rather than have your Honor endure our discussion.

   8            THE COURT:  That's an offer that would be difficult

   9   to refuse.

  10            We'll take a five-minute recess.

  11            (Recess)

  12            THE COURT:  There is an application to strike certain

  13   portions of the Grand Jury testimony?

  14            MR. FITZGERALD:  I'm glad your Honor is sitting down.

  15   We've reached an agreement.

  16            THE COURT:  And just for the record, what is being

  17   stricken?

  18            MR. FITZGERALD:  From the 1997 Grand Jury transcript

  19   of El Hage, it would be page 72, line 23, through page 90,

  20   line 15, which concerns the episode in Arizona with the

  21   preacher, and then from page 120, line 26, through page 121,

  22   line 26, which corresponds to Ethiopia.

  23            THE COURT:  It doesn't affect the instructions or the

  24   language of the indictment or the verdict form?

  25            MR. DRATEL:  There is parts of the indictment, the


   1   introductory portion.

   2            MR. FITZGERALD:  We can work out the language after

   3   court today on anything that has to be struck from the

   4   indictment.  It is not going to affect the charge to the jury.

   5   It is not going to affect summation.

   6            THE COURT:  There is something in the background

   7   section that is a reference to it?

   8            MR. DRATEL:  The perjury, the preamble to the perjury

   9   counts has a mention of it.

  10            MR. FITZGERALD:  We'll agree on a redaction tonight,

  11   your Honor.  That shouldn't be a problem.

  12            THE COURT:  One other thing, on the subject of the

  13   language of the indictment, Count Four, which is the

  14   conspiracy to destroy buildings and property of the United

  15   States, on page 36 has the language "and attempt to damage and

  16   destroy."  I just want to make sure that that was intended,

  17   since you have stricken "attempt" in other places.

  18            MR. FITZGERALD:  I think it's conspiracy.  It's only

  19   conspiracy that they would damage or attempt to damage, but

  20   not on the substantive counts.

  21            THE COURT:  That's an intentional inclusion?

  22            MR. FITZGERALD:  Yes.

  23            THE COURT:  Very well.

  24            Anything that has to be addressed before the jury

  25   comes in tomorrow?


   1            MR. DRATEL:  No, your Honor, but just to alert the

   2   Court, we have prepared from Mr. El Hage the stipulations that

   3   we put in, the 13th stipulation, the chart, which I gave to

   4   the government this morning.  They just want time to review

   5   it, the descriptions and all of that, and we can hopefully get

   6   that --

   7            THE COURT:  That can be received outside the presence

   8   of the jury and then I will simply add a sentence in the

   9   charge telling them that is the defense counterpart to

  10   Government Exhibit 7.

  11            MR. DRATEL:  Thank you.

  12            THE COURT:  We're adjourned until 10 a.m. tomorrow.

  13            (Adjourned to 10:00 a.m. on May 2, 2001.)













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