Note: Today the Court Reporter reissued the transcript for Day 40 to correct page numbers. Download the corrected version:

8 May 2001
Source: Digital file from the Court Reporters Office, Southern District of New York; (212) 805-0300.

This is the transcript of Day 41 of the trial, May 8, 2001.

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   2   ------------------------------x


   4              v.                           S(7) 98 Cr. 1023

   5   USAMA BIN LADEN, et al.,

   6                  Defendants.

   7   ------------------------------x

                                               New York, N.Y.
   9                                           May 8, 2001
                                               10:00 a.m.


  12   Before:

  13                       HON. LEONARD B. SAND,

  14                                           District Judge













   1                            APPEARANCES

            United States Attorney for the
   3        Southern District of New York
   4        KENNETH KARAS
            PAUL BUTLER
   5        Assistant United States Attorneys

            Attorneys for defendant Mohamed Sadeek Odeh
  11        Attorneys for defendant Mohamed Rashed Daoud Al-'Owhali

  13        Attorneys for defendant Khalfan Khamis Mohamed

  16        Attorneys for defendant Wadih El Hage











   1            (Trial resumed)

   2            (Jury not present)

   3            THE COURT:  I have received a letter from the

   4   government on the timing of the penalty phase, and we will

   5   take that up at 4:30.

   6            MR. BAUGH:  We would join in the government's

   7   request.

   8            (Jury present)

   9            THE COURT:  I am not sure what post May 17, May 19

  10   means.

  11            (Jury present)

  12            THE COURT:  Good morning.

  13            JURORS:  Good morning.

  14            THE COURT:  Mr. Cohn on behalf of Mr. Al-'Owhali.

  15            MR. COHN:  May it please the court, ladies and

  16   gentlemen of the prosecution, colleagues at the defense table,

  17   Mr. Al-'Owhali.

  18            Listening to Mr. Ricco yesterday, as he discussed

  19   sleepless nights, it became apparent to me that I ought to

  20   start this discussion with two words and what they mean.  The

  21   first word is in communicado, which Mr. Ricco said you must

  22   all understand, and as he said that, Ms. Gasiorowski, the

  23   young blond lady over there, the brains of our operation, said

  24   I'm not sure, some of them looked like they didn't.  I thought

  25   I would start because it is important to me later on that you


   1   do understand what it means.  In communicado means simply

   2   being held isolated and unable to communicate with anyone.

   3   That is the meaning of in communicado, at least insofar as we

   4   are going to discuss it.

   5            The other word I thought we would talk about,

   6   seemingly having nothing to do with this case, is the word

   7   serendipity.  Serendipity is when you find something of value

   8   at an unexpected place, at an unexpected time.  Having spent

   9   the same sleepless nights as Mr. Ricco, I sat there even

  10   yesterday, wondering what I was going to say to preface my

  11   remarks about what is really important about the case.  And

  12   although I was scheduled to follow Mr. Ricco, and had he been

  13   somewhat less prolix, I would have gotten up yesterday if we

  14   had finished a half hour earlier.  I still didn't really know,

  15   I didn't have a handle on what to say to make you understand

  16   what it is that from the standpoint of Mr. Al-'Owhali's case,

  17   from Mohamed's case, I think you have to do, because it is

  18   somewhat different than the other cases here.  This is a joint

  19   trial and the judge will tell you that it is four individual

  20   trials, and technically that is true, but in reality, every

  21   trial here impacts on the others.  For instance, yesterday Mr.

  22   Ricco, in referring to everybody fleeing, said, and that young

  23   man over there, talking about Mohamed, didn't flee because he

  24   didn't have a family, he's a young man.  I got to tell you I

  25   was somewhat annoyed by that.  After all, if Mr. Ricco in the


   1   reaches of the night when we both weren't sleeping had called

   2   me and said Fred, I'm going to say this about Mr. Al-'Owhali,

   3   do you mind, I would have said yeah, do you have to do it, and

   4   if he said yeah, he did, because it was for his client and he

   5   represents his client, I would have understood that.  And if

   6   he didn't he might have said well, if I don't have to do it

   7   then, you know, I don't need it, I'll forgo it.

   8            That's the serendipity that I am talking about,

   9   because after getting annoyed I realized that I had found

  10   something of value in a strange place.  Because if he could

  11   make that mistake, and make a judgment not knowing

  12   Mr. Al-'Owhali's case, having focused on his own case, what is

  13   that to say about you who didn't know the law, who haven't yet

  14   heard the law on conspiracy and on statements made by

  15   defendants and their voluntariness?

  16            MR. RICCO:  Your Honor, I object and request that my

  17   understanding be stricken from the record.

  18            THE COURT:  I think that the ruminations of what it

  19   is that Mr. Cohn might have said to Mr. Ricco is really quite

  20   beside the point, and the objection is sustained.

  21            MR. COHN:  What does it mean about you, who don't

  22   know the case, and what you have heard is testimony in this

  23   courtroom that Mohamed said that he did it, that he

  24   essentially assisted in the bomb truck, went out, put up flash

  25   grenades, and the bomb went off.  And you heard other things.


   1   What does it say about you, because how can I stand up here in

   2   the face of that.

   3            The judge has told you, don't formulate your opinions

   4   yet.  But what I learned yesterday serendipitously is that

   5   really I have to confront that issue with you and tell you

   6   something that we generally don't say, that I would be

   7   surprised if there were two of you in this jury box who did

   8   not at least surmise and assume that Mr. Al-'Owhali is guilty.

   9   Does that mean that's a legal opinion?  No.  Does that mean

  10   that the presumption of innocence has been stripped from him

  11   at this point?  No.  But I would be a fool, and not the kind

  12   of fool that Mr. Ricco talked about yesterday if I did not

  13   recognize that.

  14            So what I wanted to talk to you about first is that,

  15   and tell you that my job here is to make you ignore that

  16   assumption and focus on the law.  Not on justice, not on

  17   morality, but the law.  People sometimes use, and the judge

  18   may use, or may have in the past -- it's been so long --

  19   called you the judges of the facts, and essentially that you

  20   are.  In most cases as judges of the fact it means that you

  21   find out what is the truth and what isn't, what are the

  22   probabilities and what aren't, and you apply those facts and

  23   come up with a verdict of guilty or not guilty as to the

  24   defendant.

  25            In this case I am asking you to be more judges than


   1   judges of the fact.  The judge will tell you the law and you

   2   will apply it.  I don't mean to intrude on that and if I did I

   3   would be brought up short without an objection from anybody.

   4            The judge will charge you a couple of things.  He

   5   will charge you on the law of conspiracy, which is highly

   6   complex and which I don't speak for any other lawyer here but

   7   which I at least understand imperfectly, and I am not sure

   8   that anybody can grab it all at once.  He will also charge you

   9   on something called voluntariness.  He will say that if you

  10   find that a statement is made involuntarily, you may give it

  11   such weight as you wish, if any.  That means you may disregard

  12   it altogether.

  13            What I am going to do this morning is talk to you

  14   first about the conspiracy charges, all four of them, and I am

  15   going to ask you to assume that what you heard from

  16   Mr. Al-'Owhali, allegedly, through the lips of Mr. Gaudin, are

  17   the facts.  They are evidence, and I am going to talk to you

  18   about why I don't believe that you should convict on any of

  19   the conspiracy counts because they are insufficiently pleaded

  20   by the government.  I am not going to stand here and contend

  21   that there is evidence in this case, or lack of evidence, that

  22   Mr. Al-'Owhali did not participate in the bombing.  What I am

  23   going to say to you first is that even with what he said,

  24   given the way the government has pleaded this case, you must

  25   acquit on the conspiracy counts.  Then what I am going to talk


   1   about is the voluntariness of the confession, ask you to

   2   consider whether it was involuntary, and, if involuntary, ask

   3   you to disregard it.  And if you disregard it, then you must

   4   find not guilty because there is no other evidence of any

   5   import than the statement of Mr. Al-'Owhali against his own

   6   interest.  We will talk about that.

   7            That's real hard.  You know, I mean, two defense

   8   lawyers so far have stood up and told you you need courage,

   9   it's an American jury.  I have a great deal of faith that you

  10   can do this, if you must know the truth.  But that's why I say

  11   that this is a matter of law and not morality.  This is a

  12   matter of law and not justice.  If the judge charges you as I

  13   have said he would, then you must consider under your oaths

  14   whether or not you can do this.  Can you?  I don't know.  Will

  15   I know if you don't?  Probably not.  But that is what I am

  16   asking you to do.

  17            The first part, therefore, is the conspiracy.  What

  18   is a conspiracy?  You have been told before and I will tell

  19   you again, insofar as it matters for this part of the

  20   discussion.  A conspiracy is an agreement between people to

  21   commit an illegal act, and in most cases something is done by

  22   a conspirator to further that act.  It is not the crime in and

  23   of itself.  You can have a conspiracy to commit murder without

  24   completing the murder.  The murder, if it exists, is a

  25   separate crime.


   1            Under the evidence, using Mr. Al-'Owhali's statement,

   2   there is evidence that Mohamed joined some conspiracy, and

   3   that conspiracy is a conspiracy to bomb the Nairobi embassy.

   4   Well, isn't that enough?  The answer to that is no, it's not.

   5   The government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that

   6   Mohamed joined the conspiracies as charged, and the

   7   conspiracies charged are all broader than that.  The

   8   indictment says in the preamble, or introductory portion, at

   9   all times, at all relevant times, from in or about 1989 until

  10   the date of filing of this indictment, an international

  11   terrorist group existed which was dedicated to opposing

  12   nonIslamic governments with force and violence.

  13            You know from the statement that Mohamed was born in

  14   1978, '77.  At the time this terrorist organization was formed

  15   he was 12.  Did he join that conspiracy then?  Hardly likely.

  16   We will talk about the relationship backwards, because the

  17   judge at some point will tell you that of course somebody who

  18   joins a conspiracy later, after its beginning, adopts the

  19   prior acts of the conspiracy, if they should have known about

  20   them, if they did know.  We will talk about that more.

  21            That's the introduction, it's not really the

  22   conspiracy.  They have charged four conspiracies, and each

  23   conspiracy count starts with the following language.  I've got

  24   this in two forms.  The first form is to show you with all the

  25   extra stuff in it that we are not misquoting, and the second


   1   way we have dealt with it is to extract the stuff so you have

   2   the meat and here it is.  It says:

   3            From at least 1991 until the date of filing of this

   4   indictment ... in Afghanistan, the United Kingdom, Pakistan,

   5   the Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Somalia, Kenya Tanzania,

   6   Azerbaijan and elsewhere ... I actually pronounced Azerbaijan,

   7   that's terrific -- Mohamed Rashed Daoud Al-'Owhali, ...

   8   together with other members and associates of Al Qaeda,

   9   Egyptian Islamic Jihad, and others known and unknown to the

  10   grand jury, unlawfully, willfully and knowingly combined,

  11   conspired, confederated and agreed to kill nationals of the

  12   United States.

  13            Every count starts with that and every count has the

  14   same overt act.  How are they different?  They are different

  15   because the objectives of each conspiracy, says the

  16   government, are different, and they have charged the

  17   conspiracy four different ways.

  18            If you believe the introduction, Mohamed was 14 at

  19   the time, from at least 1991, and my guess is you don't really

  20   believe that he was a knowing member of Al Qaeda or an

  21   associate or doing anything in support of whatever they claim

  22   that Mr. Bin Laden was doing in those particular years.  But

  23   it's important that a person joins the conspiracy that he is

  24   proven to have joined and that if he is not in a position to

  25   appreciate that other conspiracy and he joined some other


   1   conspiracy, he is not guilty of the conspiracy charged.  That

   2   is maybe hard for you to accept.  My heavens, man said he

   3   participated in the bombing.  He assisted, he rode in the

   4   truck, he went out with flash grenades.  How can we do that?

   5   Maybe you can't.  But if you accept my logical arguments, then

   6   perhaps you must.

   7            In addition, if the conspiracy charge is in fact a

   8   collection of smaller conspiracies, multiple conspiracies, and

   9   the judge will charge you about multiple conspiracies, then

  10   you must acquit.  What does that mean?  I will take a look at

  11   it later in a different way.  But let's take a look at the

  12   objectives of the conspiracies charged in each of the four

  13   conspiracy counts.  This is what is charged in Count 1.  It

  14   was a part and object of said conspiracy that the defendants

  15   and others, known and unknown, would and did murder United

  16   States nationals.

  17            Seems simple enough.  Does it encompass this

  18   particular act?  Well, US nationals were killed, and my guess

  19   is that one could logically argue that if you intend to bomb

  20   the United States Embassy in the middle of the day you intend

  21   to kill US nationals.  But does this mean that was part of

  22   this conspiracy?  Under this object, any US national anywhere

  23   killed anyhow is part of that conspiracy.  Is that what

  24   Mohamed Al-'Owhali joined?  Did he intend that?  Was he in a

  25   position to know that this conspiracy had lasted for years,


   1   according to the government's theory, and that they were going

   2   to kill nationals everywhere, in all these other countries

   3   that we talked about, Azerbaijan and Somalia?  Here is a man

   4   who at the time of the bombing was 20 years old.  As we will

   5   talk about later, he didn't know anything about the object at

   6   the time until he was actually in place in Kenya after about,

   7   I think, the 3rd of August of that year.  He knew that there

   8   was a mission, he was told he was doing a mission, but did he

   9   know about all this other stuff?  Is this one conspiracy?

  10   Think about it.  We are going to talk about it later in the

  11   context of the other conspiracies that are charged, because

  12   Count 2 says:

  13            It was a part and objective of said conspiracy that

  14   the defendants and others, known -- sorry, we did the typo,

  15   not the government -- known and unknown, would and did (1)

  16   kill officers and employees of the United States and agencies

  17   and branches thereof while such employees were engaged in and

  18   on account of the performance of their official duties, and

  19   persons assisting such employees in the performance of their

  20   duties, in violation of the section of law, including

  21   members -- and here's the other part:  Including members of

  22   the American military stationed in Saudi Arabia, Yemen,

  23   Somalia and elsewhere, and employees of the United States in

  24   Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam; and (2) kill internationally

  25   protected persons as that term is defined.


   1            Look, the government had a choice.  How do you charge

   2   this indictment?  They made that choice for reasons that are

   3   known to the government.  Do you think on the evidence that

   4   you saw here that Mohamed Al-'Owhali knew anything or joined

   5   any conspiracy or there is any evidence today that he was

   6   going to kill American military stationed in Saudi Arabia,

   7   Yemen and Somalia?

   8            Let's talk about Somalia briefly.  It's the only

   9   other evidence in the case of other stuff.  It is 1993.  He

  10   was 16 and still in school.  There is no evidence or

  11   suggestion by the government that he participated in training

  12   in Somalia.  There is no indication that he was in Somalia.

  13   Did he join that conspiracy?

  14            Look, it's hard, folks.  He said he participated in

  15   the bombing.  And you say we're Americans, and even if we

  16   weren't Americans, there are a serious amount of dead people

  17   out there, how can we do that?  The way you can do it is to

  18   follow the law.  I am not saying if you follow the law you

  19   will do it.  It's your choice after listening to the evidence,

  20   after analyzing the evidence, after listening to me, to Mr.

  21   Fitzgerald after he stands up for his rebuttal summation.  But

  22   can you do it?  Yes.  Will you do it?  Only your conscience

  23   will tell you.

  24            Count 3.  It was part and object of said conspiracy

  25   that the defendants and others, known and unknown, would and


   1   did:  (1) bomb the embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es

   2   Salaam, Tanzania, and employees of the American government

   3   stationed at those embassies; and (2) attack American military

   4   facilities in the gulf region in the horn of Africa and

   5   members of the American military in those other places again.

   6            This is the clearest indication that the government

   7   had that if they wanted to they could charge a conspiracy to

   8   bomb the embassy in Nairobi, and maybe under the evidence,

   9   under a stretch of the evidence Tanzania, because you may

  10   remember that in Mr. Al-'Owhali's statement he said that he

  11   learned of the Tanzanian bombing when he learned about his own

  12   mission, which was about August 3.  So at least there is some

  13   evidence that he knew about it and maybe he joined that

  14   conspiracy if it was retroactively.

  15            But that's not the conspiracy they charged.

  16   Everywhere you turn in this indictment they charge this

  17   overreaching conspiracy, which may have something to do with

  18   Mr. Bin Laden, it may have something to do with other members

  19   of that conspiracy, if they were, may have something to do

  20   with the shura council of Al Qaeda.  But it doesn't have

  21   anything to do with what the evidence shows Mr. Al-'Owhali

  22   knew that he joined or should have known that he joined.  When

  23   I say should have known, because the judge will charge you at

  24   some point, you can't stick your head in the stand.  You can't

  25   be an ostrich, to take somebody else's case for a second, and


   1   ignore something you should have known, and say you didn't

   2   know, you closed your eyes to the facts.  There was no

   3   evidence here of Mohamed Al-'Owhali before May 1998, and the

   4   only evidence of that, and we will talk about that in a

   5   second, is that in May he went to Yemen.  Nothing about

   6   anything that he did there.  Some evidence that he was trained

   7   in camps to fight in either Azerbaijan or Afghanistan against

   8   the remnants, the leftovers, the nominees of the then Soviet

   9   Union.  But that didn't have anything to do with this, killing

  10   Americans.  It had to do with defending his faith at that

  11   particular time, against the enemy of his faith at that

  12   particular time.

  13            Count 4.  It was part and an objective of said

  14   conspiracy that the defendants would and did bomb American

  15   facilities anywhere in the world -- anywhere in the world,

  16   including, not limited to but including the American embassies

  17   in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and again

  18   attack military installations and all those other places; and

  19   (3) -- there is a third one this time -- engage in such

  20   conduct with a result of such conduct directly causing the

  21   death of persons in violation of Title 18, etc.

  22            Once again, ladies and gentlemen, I am not suggesting

  23   to you that there is no credible evidence that he participated

  24   in the bombing.  I am telling you that the government for its

  25   own reasons hasn't charged the right conspiracy.  Once again,


   1   I keep saying it over and over because it preys on my mind, I

   2   don't know how you ignore that.  But my suggestion is that

   3   after you hear the law you at least know that you are going to

   4   have to try.

   5            Mohamed Al-'Owhali was born on January 17, 1977.  I

   6   knew I would get the right date.  You see here a little time

   7   line that starts with the date of his birth.  It doesn't mean

   8   anything.  It is just a graph that shows when it was he is

   9   alleged to have started doing anything with this conspiracy,

  10   and you will see that in May of '98 he was present in Pakistan

  11   during an ABC News interview, and in July he went from Karachi

  12   to Nairobi and he got there, you may remember, a few days late

  13   because he had missed his plane.  In between, essentially

  14   there is nothing of import as to Mohamed Al-'Owhali.  How is

  15   he supposed to know about the scope of this conspiracy?  The

  16   government seeks to hold him criminally responsible for the

  17   activities of people long before he can be held to account for

  18   them.

  19            On July 31, he traveled under a false passport to

  20   Karachi.  What evidence is there that Mohamed knew of greater

  21   conspiracies?  Frankly, there is none at all.  It's all

  22   innuendo.  Do you think that Usama Bin Laden confided in this

  23   young man who was then 20 years old, about the scopes and

  24   desires and his tactics?  Assuming that everything the

  25   government tells you about Somalia is true, just assuming that


   1   for the moment, what makes you think this young man knew

   2   anything about it?  Remember, Mohamed was not a member of Al

   3   Qaeda; it was never suggested that he was.  He did not make

   4   bayat.  He did not know about his mission until just before

   5   the bombing, and he didn't know the object -- when he was in

   6   Pakistan.  He didn't know the object of it until he came to

   7   Nairobi.

   8            Mr. Karas told you, and I think I am quoting, if not

   9   it's close, he said he did not make bayat because he did not

  10   want to wash cars, he wanted to deliver bombs.  That bit of

  11   sarcasm is cute but it doesn't advance our search here much.

  12   I mean, you know that Mohamed was a defender of his faith.  He

  13   wanted a military mission to defend it.  It didn't matter what

  14   military mission it was in the context of the scope of the

  15   conspiracies, he wanted a mission.  If they had told him to go

  16   to some other place he would have considered that.  He went

  17   where he went.  Did he know the scope of the entire

  18   conspiracy?  Did the fact that he didn't make bayat and wanted

  19   a military mission to defend his faith, did that make him know

  20   about the scope of this conspiracy, about the motives of Bin

  21   Laden?  It didn't.  It's a stalking horse, as are many pieces

  22   of the collateral evidence here.  It may mean that he joined a

  23   much more limited conspiracy that the government is yet to

  24   define.  The government doesn't charge it that way.  You

  25   remember, the government introduced some evidence of Harun


   1   that Mohamed was bragging about something that happened in

   2   Somalia.  Is it proof of something that he knew or should have

   3   known and adopted?  It isn't.

   4            How many conspiracies have we?  We don't know.  But

   5   in each one that is charged here, there are clearly more than

   6   one, and the only one that he would be responsible for is the

   7   bombing of the embassy.  Since that is not charged as a single

   8   conspiracy, I would suggest that he has to be acquitted of the

   9   conspiracy counts.

  10            Look at it in a way as a wheel with a hub and spokes

  11   at the rim.  At the hub, there are people who know everything

  12   that is doing, perhaps Bin Laden and some of his closer

  13   associates.  At the end of the spokes on the rim, at the end

  14   of each spoke there is another little conspiracy, a conspiracy

  15   perhaps for Somalia, a conspiracy perhaps for the Kenyan

  16   bombing, a conspiracy for something in Yemen, a conspiracy for

  17   something in Azerbaijan.  It is the government's obligation to

  18   prove that all of the alleged conspirators at the end of the

  19   spokes should have known from the nature of the conspiracy

  20   about what is happening around, or at least that they should

  21   have been able to surmise it.

  22            Classic example is in a drug conspiracy.  In a drug

  23   conspiracy you have the big dealers in the beginning, in the

  24   middle, and at the end of each spoke you have a drug spot.

  25   Clearly they know at the end of each spoke you have other drug


   1   spots and they should have known that.  If they don't know or

   2   shouldn't know, there is more than one conspiracy.  That is a

   3   question of fact for you as the judges of the fact to struggle

   4   with in this case.

   5            There is another way of looking at this.  What

   6   conspiracy did he join, given the best view of the credibility

   7   of the evidence as presented by the government?  We will talk

   8   about the credibility and how they got it in a little while.

   9   Could he have joined a conspiracy involving the events in

  10   Somalia?  Certainly not, and the judge is going to tell you

  11   there are a number of factors you have to consider.  One is,

  12   was there a conspiracy, did it exist, what was the scope, and

  13   the other is did the defendant join that conspiracy.  That is

  14   what this is about.  This is about joining a conspiracy.  What

  15   did he join?  He could only join what he knew about.  He can't

  16   join what he doesn't know about.

  17            What could he have joined?  What did he know?  In his

  18   statement, which we are still discussing for the purposes of

  19   the conspiracy law, he said there were four groups in a cell.

  20   Here is the structure of an Al Qaeda cell, and you got that

  21   from Fadl.  There is the intelligence section, the planning

  22   and preparation section, the administration section and the

  23   execution section.  You know that Mr. Al-'Owhali had to be in

  24   the execution section.  He is not in any of the planning

  25   sections.


   1            There is evidence in the case, and I forget where,

   2   that the execution section doesn't do anything except do the

   3   job, and in this case die, or is supposed to die.

   4            We give you the trial transcript page only because we

   5   want to make sure that you know that we are not misstating the

   6   evidence, and there are times when my recollection may vary

   7   with yours or with Mr. Karas.  It is your recollection that

   8   controls.  Nobody, I am sure, has misstated the evidence

   9   knowingly, although there are times when the government's

  10   recollection, I suggest, is at fault, and we will talk about

  11   that too.

  12            In a real way, Mohamed was the most minor participant

  13   in this event in terms of what we knew.  Remember, he reported

  14   to Azzam, who died, and Azzam knew about the mission, there is

  15   evidence in the case, months before, and what the mission was.

  16   What conspiracy did Mohamed actually join?  Could he have

  17   known the full scope of the conspiracies as they are charged,

  18   or was he in a position in which he could not have known, or

  19   should have known even if he wasn't told?

  20            Remember how decisions are made in Al Qaeda.  This

  21   is, I guess, also from al-Fadl.  There is the emir, and then

  22   there is the shura council.  Underneath the shura council are

  23   the various committees.  I guess the one that would be in

  24   control of this one is the military council.  These are all Al

  25   Qaeda members.  They are the ones making decision.  Beneath


   1   all them are the other Al Qaeda members who aren't on

   2   committees, they just take orders, and who don't formulate

   3   policy.  Somewhere else are the non-Al Qaeda members, who the

   4   government calls associates.  What did he know?  What could he

   5   know?  Not much.

   6            You remember the statement by Mr. Odeh that is in

   7   evidence, Government's Exhibit 6, and it is written in the

   8   form of a 302, a report by Mr. Anticev.  It was put into

   9   evidence by Mr. Odeh's counsel.  Odeh told people, told

  10   Anticev that there were two classifications of people in the

  11   bombings.  One was intelligence and planners, the others who

  12   did the bombing itself, who were good Muslims but did not have

  13   the skills to make themselves otherwise useful.

  14            Where is Mr. Al-'Owhali in all this?  What did he

  15   join?  The planners, the knowers --

  16            MR. RICCO:  Your Honor, objection, based upon --

  17            THE COURT:  The jury has been told and will be told

  18   again that statements made by defendants to law enforcement

  19   after their arrest may be considered only with respect to the

  20   person making the statement.  Therefore, what Odeh said to law

  21   enforcement is something you may consider with respect to

  22   Odeh.  It is irrelevant with respect to Al-'Owhali.

  23            MR. COHN:  The planners, the knowers, the people who

  24   were to continue in this conspiracy if in fact one overarching

  25   conspiracy existed, all fled.  Listen to Mr. Karas, who said,


   1   quote, and this is at 5267, lines 16 through 18:

   2            This is what I was saying earlier, ladies and

   3   gentlemen.  You see the participants in this case come up

   4   early.  They are participants in the conspiracy to murder US

   5   nationals.

   6            The government may say I am taking that out of

   7   context, but it's the truth.  Mr. Al-'Owhali did not come up

   8   early, Mr. Al-'Owhali did not take part in that conspiracy.

   9   It is fact that United States nationals were killed.  It is

  10   not a fact that the conspiracy that he joined, if you take the

  11   evidence as it is presented, was to kill United States

  12   nationals everywhere, any time, anyhow.

  13            The government also said during its summation things

  14   about motive and how you knew that Mr. Al-'Owhali's motive was

  15   the same as Mr. Bin Laden's.  The government said at page

  16   5336, lines 4 through 17:

  17            You know that Bin Laden had the headquarters in Sudan

  18   up until some point in 1996 when he goes to Afghanistan and

  19   issues the declaration of jihad.  What he tells you in this

  20   statement on CNN is that he blames the United States

  21   government for putting pressure on the Sudanese, for driving

  22   him out of Sudan and into Afghanistan.  He takes note of the

  23   fact that part of the pressure was in removing the diplomatic

  24   presence from Khartoum and sending it to Nairobi.  In March of

  25   1997 Bin Laden is keenly aware of that move by the United


   1   States, and I submit to you, says Mr. Karas, it provides a

   2   powerful motive that Bin Laden had to hit the American Embassy

   3   in Nairobi in 1998 to get back to the United States for its

   4   diplomatic pressure on the Sudan that caused him to have to go

   5   to Afghanistan.

   6            The government then refers to an obscure part of

   7   Mr. Al-'Owhali's statement that some of the people who were at

   8   the embassy had been in the Sudan, and equates that therefore

   9   with adopting and knowing of Mr. Bin Laden's motives

  10   altogether.  The motives that they ascribe to Mr. Bin Laden,

  11   which they need not prove beyond a reasonable doubt here

  12   because he is not on trial, are very sophisticated motives

  13   with long-range policy plans, long-range objectives, and maybe

  14   it is, maybe it isn't.  But the fact that there were some

  15   people who had been in the Sudanese embassy and therefore

  16   were, if you believe the statement as it is given, and we will

  17   talk about that in a bit, proper objectives for the bombing,

  18   is not the same.  It does not mean, it doesn't come close to

  19   meaning that Mohamed knew about the objectives of the entire

  20   conspiracy, or adopted them, or approved them, or disapproved

  21   them.

  22            If there is a reasonable view of the evidence, the

  23   evidence that I am asking you to consider, which I will soon

  24   tell you you can't consider, if you can understand that kind

  25   of legal jujitsu, was at best a core, a central hub conspiracy


   1   which may have included the shura council, members of Al Qaeda

   2   to implement, and subconspiracies that were constructed to

   3   implement it.  But whether or not those subconspiracies were

   4   accurately charged here is a question for you.  Had the

   5   government charged Mr. Al-'Owhali in one of those

   6   subconspiracies narrowly drawn, then if you accepted the

   7   evidence you could convict him.  But the government having

   8   chosen to include him in conspiracies which were beyond him, I

   9   suggest to you you cannot.

  10            I now turn to the reason why you must acquit him of

  11   all the charges no matter how reluctant you are to do it, and

  12   if you do that, you don't even have to get to my arguments

  13   about multiple conspiracies.  Here are some general issues I

  14   want you to keep in mind.

  15            Mohamed was, according to the only testimony offered,

  16   kept in the custody of the Kenyans, and no Kenyan witnesses

  17   have been presented to you.  I will make the reason for that

  18   apparent in a second.  The conditions under which the Kenyan

  19   authorities kept suspects were extreme, and you have evidence

  20   of that from Mr. Kherchtou, and we will talk about that in a

  21   minute and what it means.  You don't know precisely what

  22   Mr. Al-'Owhali said to Agent Gaudin because it was through an

  23   interpreter, who has not testified; and second because Agent

  24   Gaudin's testimony is so obviously biased that you can't rely

  25   on the accuracy of even what he presents to you that Mohamed


   1   said.

   2            Mohamed was arrested on August 12, 1998, at

   3   approximately 10 a.m.  He was arrested by Kenyan CID members.

   4   The FBI agents, including Gaudin, conveniently stayed in the

   5   truck, and we do not have a clue as to what was said to

   6   Mr. Al-'Owhali in that room when he was arrested by Kenyan

   7   members of the CID five days after 200 of their countrymen had

   8   been killed and 5,000 wounded.  And no one has been presented

   9   by the government to tell you what it was.  Do they have an

  10   obligation to bring you that witness?  As a technical matter,

  11   no.  The indictment isn't dismissed because of it.  But the

  12   judge will tell you that if they have control over a witness

  13   and they don't bring him, you can consider whether or not what

  14   the witness would have told you hurts the government's case,

  15   is not good.  Does it mean that?  No.  But why haven't you

  16   seen one Kenyan police officer in this case, where he was kept

  17   in Kenyan police custody for 10 solid days before he made the

  18   statement that appears before you?  Particularly after you

  19   heard Kherchtou, and I will talk about that.

  20            When he was arrested, he was injured.  These are the

  21   pictures of his injuries.  None of them are life-threatening.

  22   All of them were probably uncomfortable.  We show them, not

  23   for any plea for sympathy.  There are a couple of reasons.

  24   One, to show you how he looked at the time, and we will get

  25   back to that.  The other is, when you are kept in communicado


   1   and you hurt from injuries and you are not getting medical

   2   attention -- that's what he looked like, ladies and gentlemen,

   3   not what he looks like today.  We will get to that later.

   4   That discomfort leads to having your will overborne.  By

   5   itself is it a lot?  Probably not.  But when you look at

   6   involuntariness you have to look at all the conditions.

   7            On August 22, 10 days later, inexplicably, if you

   8   believe Agent Gaudin, he agreed to speak with Agent Gaudin.

   9   In the intervening time he was kept in isolation, except for

  10   interviews as follows:  On the day he was arrested, 12 a.m.,

  11   and again -- I am sorry, 10 a.m., and again in the afternoon

  12   with an interpreter behind a blanket.  Listen to this.  They

  13   hid the interpreter behind the blanket.  I mean, if that's not

  14   ominous, what is?  You have been arrested, you don't know what

  15   you've been told.  After that he waited alone for 18 hours,

  16   until the 13th around noon, where he was interviewed for a few

  17   hours.

  18            The government may say to you well, the interviews

  19   weren't onerous, he was given food, he was allowed to pray.

  20   It's not the interviews that were onerous, it's the isolation.

  21   It's the isolation of sitting and waiting and wondering what's

  22   to become of you in a place where it is clear nobody thinks

  23   well of you.

  24            You may say who cares, he did what he did, why should

  25   we worry about it?  We do because of the law.  Because the


   1   bottom line is, this is something not about morality, not

   2   about justice, but following the law.  Justice is something

   3   else that we may or may not get to here, but you have to

   4   follow the law.

   5            After the interview on the 13th, he waited alone

   6   again for about 24 hours until he was interviewed again at 3

   7   or 4 p.m. on the 14th.  From that time on, on the 15th and on

   8   the 16th, there were no interviews.  Fifty or 60 hours sitting

   9   alone in a cell.  We will talk about the conditions of that

  10   cell and what we know and what we can surmise in a few

  11   minutes.  But just talking about the silence, the inability to

  12   communicate to anybody, the fear that anybody has to feel.

  13            Well, on the 16th, he did have a visitor.  Agent

  14   Gaudin went and brought him some milk sometime in the middle

  15   of the night.  Why is that important?  It is important for a

  16   couple of reasons.  One is that it shows that Agent Gaudin had

  17   access, and he told you at various times during his testimony

  18   that he was not in control, Kenyan authorities had control of

  19   the custody.  But he had access.  The other reason he went is

  20   because he wanted Al-'Owhali to know that he only had one

  21   friend.  He only had one friend.  If anybody was going to save

  22   him from the Kenyans, it was Gaudin.

  23            The 17th.  He was interviewed for two or three hours

  24   at about 11:00.  On the 18th, no interview.  On the 19th, no

  25   interview.  Fifty hours, more or less.  I suppose the milk


   1   lasted a long time.  On the 20th, there was the identification

   2   parade for one hour.  Gaudin was present.  We will talk about

   3   the identification parade when we talk about the corroboration

   4   the government offers you and why.  And on the 21st he was

   5   interviewed for two hours, and the next day he gave a

   6   statement.

   7            We know something about the conditions that Kenyans

   8   afforded suspects in the bombing, and I caution you that this

   9   is not evidence of Mr. Al-'Owhali's conditions particularly,

  10   but they are evidence of somebody in similar circumstances,

  11   and we will talk about what evidence we have that connects

  12   them.  Listen to the words of Mr. Kherchtou, and I am not

  13   quoting but these are the conditions of confinement that he

  14   testified to.  He was kept in other small room.  He had other

  15   criminals there.  No bathroom, no sleeping mattresses, there

  16   was no blanket, they provided to water.  He was given a jar in

  17   which to urinate.  There was no water to wash either for

  18   personal cleanliness or for prayer.

  19            He was not interviewed at all in the first three

  20   days.  On the fourth day of confinement he was interrogated,

  21   and despite the fact that he was not charged with any crime.

  22   He was interrogated for an additional four or five-day period.

  23   During that period up to the very end, just before the end, he

  24   had no reading material.  And during the period of confinement

  25   he was kept sleepless because he was subjected to constant


   1   cold.

   2            How do we know these were the same conditions of

   3   confinement that Mohamed was subjected to?  We don't entirely,

   4   but you know that he had no reading material, and you know

   5   that there were long periods of isolation.  Nobody has come to

   6   tell you that he was kept in decent conditions, not a soul.

   7            I will talk about the reading material in a second,

   8   but remember something else.  You have to talk about a

   9   statement as being reliable.  Nobody is suggesting that the

  10   statement is totally unreliable and that it never happened.

  11   Nobody is saying that he didn't say that he had participated

  12   in the bombing.  But in terms of nuance, in terms of how you

  13   interpret that statement for what conspiracies if you are

  14   going to do that, this is a totally unreliable statement.  The

  15   person who interviewed Kherchtou, remember, taped every day.

  16   Every day they had a tape recorder.  This is a person who was

  17   an agent of a foreign government, intelligence agent of a

  18   foreign government.  Taped every last word that Kherchtou gave

  19   to him during that interview.  We have no tape.  It has been

  20   pointed out by others.  It is shameful.  It is shameful that

  21   the FBI has a policy where they do not tape incriminating

  22   statements, where they do not videotape incriminating

  23   statements.  It is done so that you the juror, and I use that

  24   generically, can be told anything they want to tell you, and

  25   somebody like me, some poor fool like me has to stand up and


   1   say the FBI are liars.  Certain ones are and certain ones

   2   aren't.  I suggest to you you saw two kinds here.  You saw

   3   Anticev and you saw Gaudin.

   4            (Continued on next page)























   1            MR. COHN:  (Continuing) But at least if Gaudin had

   2   taped anything, you would have had Mohamed's own words.  They

   3   would have been in Arabic.  They could have brought you an

   4   interpreter.  They would have interpreted.  You would get

   5   another of these endless stipulations that say, you know, that

   6   it's an accurate translation and you would have heard what it

   7   is he had to say in full bloom.  Do you have it?  No.

   8            At least we could confirm one thing.  Remember that

   9   Agent Gaudin told you that at some point he came to the cell

  10   where he had no control over the conditions and Mr. al-'Owhali

  11   was looking at a magazine?  Here's the first page of it.  The

  12   magazine is in evidence.  He told the guards to take it away

  13   from him and they did.  He said, how come he has this

  14   magazine?

  15            Agent Gaudin had a reason to keep him in isolation.

  16   Agent Gaudin had a reason to want him to sit there and not

  17   think about anything else, not look at the pictures, not read

  18   it if he could, but think, because thought was his worst

  19   enemy.

  20            Is it a surprise that after ten days of living at the

  21   mercy of guards, who had to hate him, in a country where the

  22   anger was palpable, he made a statement in order to escape

  23   sure destiny in Kenya and have a trial under American law,

  24   this trial?  Not at all.

  25            Is this a voluntary statement?  Surely not.  Well,


   1   why else should you ignore this involuntary statement?

   2   Because it's really not, as I said, a nuance, at least very

   3   reliable.  You really don't know what was said because Agent

   4   Gaudin admitted that he only got what the interpreter told

   5   him.  And no interpreter has been produced here, as I

   6   mentioned at the beginning.

   7            And even assuming goodwill, a reasonably large

   8   assumption, the government's own witness, Special Agent Saleh,

   9   you may remember, who was an FBI language expert, told you

  10   that simultaneous translations are much more difficult than

  11   doing what he did.  He took written things and he translated.

  12   That's translation.  Actual simultaneous translations are

  13   interpretation.  An interpreter doesn't have a chance to go to

  14   the dictionary, an interpreter doesn't have a chance to make

  15   up for dialect problems and, at the best, mistakes could be

  16   expected.  And Saleh said that at page 3705.  But it's Agent

  17   Gaudin's bias that should convince you that the statement is

  18   not reliable.

  19            We start earlier in his cross-examination with

  20   exhibits Al-'Owhali J and K.  Now, these were pictures of

  21   Agent Gaudin, whom you recognize, Mohamed, and some tall

  22   fellow who must have been a co-agent, and the other picture of

  23   Agent Gaudin with Al-'Owhali, and they are in a cell and he

  24   wants you to believe that these pictures were taken as

  25   evidence.  In fact, they were memorabilia.  Agent Gaudin had


   1   done what he believed was a sterling job.  He had cracked this

   2   case.

   3            Remember that they weren't turned up for two years

   4   after they were taken, when they were turned up by Agent

   5   Gaudin somewhere.  They had never been logged in.  And you

   6   remember that a lot of government agents talked about

   7   photographic evidence and logging them in.  He had to know

   8   which was evidence and which wasn't.

   9            But why does it matter?  Because he lies about it.

  10   Because he's trying to preserve what he views, as you will

  11   see, as neutrality rather than a man whose pride in bringing

  12   his country's enemy to heel would lead him to shade the truth,

  13   in his distorted view to the effect if he has to appear to be

  14   fair even when he is not, but, ladies and gentlemen, fairness

  15   is a charade.

  16            It's not the only evidence of his dissembling --

  17   excuse me, lying.  I do that sometimes, so stop me.  Here's

  18   his testimony.  And you will forgive me.  You will read it

  19   from the screen, but I'll use my glasses.

  20            When we were talking about -- you remember he

  21   testified that Al-'Owhali told him that he had told Saleh to

  22   move the bomb because he was going to do maximum damage in

  23   another place, and when we started cross-examination, this is

  24   what happened.  And I will leave out Q and A.  I think you

  25   will recognize who is doing what.  I'll just try and do it as


   1   quickly as possible.

   2            "Agent Gaudin," and this is by me, "yesterday you

   3   told us as part of what the interpreter said to you that

   4   Mr. al-'Owhali said that Mr. al-'Owhali lobbied to have the

   5   bomb put underneath the embassy rather than where it was

   6   planned to go.  Do you remember that testimony?

   7            "Yes, sir.

   8            "And you testified, did you not, that it was the

   9   purpose, Mr. al-'Owhali's purpose in doing that to do more

  10   damage and kill more Americans.  Is that right?

  11            "Something to that effect.

  12            "That's what you testified to, right?

  13            "Something to that effect, yes, sir.

  14            "Well, did you say, so we can be precise, at page

  15   2020,' and then quoting from 2020, 'Al-'Owhali had expressed

  16   to Saleh that, wouldn't it be better if it were to put the

  17   bomb truck in front of the U.S. embassy and Saleh disagreed.

  18   And then Al-'Owhali suggested, wouldn't it be better for us to

  19   put the bomb underneath the U.S. Embassy in the garage that

  20   goes underneath, and in that way -- and in that way we would

  21   cause more damage to the Americans since the U.S., since the

  22   U.S. Embassy, but Saleh explained to him that it would be

  23   difficult to do to get past the section of the security gate

  24   to Al-'Owhali.  The plan didn't get changed.'

  25            "That was your testimony; is that right?


   1            "Yes, sir.

   2            "That's not precisely true, is it?

   3            "I'm sorry, sir?"

   4            And then the court intervened.

   5            Question:  "What you said was Mr. al-'Owhali's

   6   purpose in suggesting that is not exactly what he told you

   7   during the 22nd; is that right?

   8            "No, sir, that's what he told me.

   9            "You issued a report called a 302, didn't you?

  10            "Yes, I did.

  11            "And in fact, you have it in front of you, don't you?

  12   I think it's tabbed in the black book, and if you return to

  13   page 9 of your 302 that you generated for the period of 8/22

  14   to 25/98, it's 3528 for the record.

  15            "Thank you, Mr. Ricco."  I think that was Mr. Ricco

  16   intervening in helping me out with the page.

  17            "Do you have page 9?

  18            "Yes, I do, sir.

  19            "If you look on page 9 in the second full

  20   paragraph -- now, this is something you signed, right?

  21            "Yes, sir.

  22            "And you drafted it, right?

  23            "Yes, I did.

  24            "And you drafted it from handwritten notes, did you

  25   not?


   1            "And my memory, sir.

   2            "And your memory.  And you knew that it was supposed

   3   to be accurate in all respects, did you not?

   4            "Yes, sir.

   5            "Fine.  Did Mr. al-'Owhali not say to you, according

   6   to this report, that subject advised that his enemy is the

   7   United States and not Kenya and try to get Saleh to reconsider

   8   his plan.  Subject believed that placing the bomb in the rear

   9   of the embassy would cause excessive collateral damage to the

  10   Kenyans; didn't he tell you that?

  11            "Yes, sir."  And then he goes on.

  12            Now, why did he do that?  Because the reason he gave

  13   makes Mohamed seem irredeemably bad, while the reason it had

  14   to come out through cross paints a less stark picture of what

  15   Agent Gaudin sees as good and evil.  The problem is that Agent

  16   Gaudin shouldn't be making that determination.  He stopped

  17   being a police officer.  He's become an advocate, and you

  18   can't trust what he says because of it.

  19            There are two kinds of agents, as I said.  Agent

  20   Anticev is the other.  He told you a number of things that

  21   Gaudin didn't do or what the FBI won't do.  For instance, the

  22   FBI has forms of advice of rights in Arabic.  Did they use one

  23   for Mohamed?  No.  Why not?  Because if he read his rights in

  24   Arabic, he might understand them, it might give him some

  25   comfort.


   1            Now, how else do you know that the statements are not

   2   reliable?  Because the government went to great lengths to

   3   give you what it thinks or wants you to think is corroboration

   4   of important points, stuff which we suggest is not

   5   corroboration at all and should make you doubt whether the

   6   government believes this testimony in full itself.

   7            For instance, there is evidence about the bullets and

   8   the keys.  And you remember that somebody came in and said --

   9   some ballistics expert came in and said that the bullets were

  10   shaved, right, so that they would fit a .9 millimeter gun.

  11            Now, here is a conspiracy, ladies and gentlemen, that

  12   has the money to try to seek to buy plutonium.  Remember that?

  13   Why they told you about that other than to frighten you, I

  14   don't know.  But you think that they can't buy ammunition for

  15   a gun that Mohamed was supposed to carry and they have to

  16   shave down other bullets?  That's silliness.

  17            They brought you a money changer to show that

  18   Al-'Owhali, who when he was stranded, tried to get, and did

  19   get, money from another source in Yemen, a money changer who

  20   provided documents that he admitted under cross-examination

  21   had been tampered with.  You know, there was some later

  22   discussion about somebody being paranoid, but they had to go

  23   back, bring him back again with another document that perhaps

  24   had not been tampered with, at least there was no evidence on

  25   the face of it.  Why?  For what purpose?  Because they're not


   1   secure in the detail of what Mr. al-'Owhali is alleged to have

   2   said.

   3            They brought you the worst, without doubt the worst

   4   identification witness in the history of the Western world.

   5   Charles Mwaka Mula, who identified the defendant in the I.D.

   6   parade.  And you remember that there was testimony that there

   7   were six people who had an opportunity to see the perpetrator

   8   that day who was brought to the I.D. parade.  The other five

   9   failed to identify Mr. al-'Owhali of doing anything, and

  10   Mr. Mwaka Mula was brought to you to show that he had

  11   identified him in the parade, a parade at which Agent Gaudin

  12   attended, by the way, and to identify him here in the

  13   courtroom.

  14            Now, this is a picture of what the parade looked

  15   like, and Mwaka Mula says that he saw a picture of

  16   Mr. al-'Owhali or what he -- the perpetrator, excuse me, in

  17   the newspaper and he called somebody and ultimately he got to

  18   the FBI.  When he was shown a picture by the government, he

  19   said, is this the picture that you saw?  He said, I don't

  20   remember.  So the government couldn't lay a foundation for

  21   putting it in evidence and we moved it in evidence.

  22            And then you were told that he had been interviewed

  23   by an FBI agent and he made a composite picture, and here's

  24   the picture.  A sharp resemblance to Mr. al-'Owhali.  I

  25   suggest you not commission this person to do a family portrait


   1   if you want a good likeness.  Clearly it's neither one of

   2   them.  He said he didn't remember this either.  I had to move

   3   it into evidence.

   4            Now, then -- by the way, the government stipulates

   5   that these are the two, these two items are in fact --

   6   remember I read one stipulation during our case?  This is it.

   7   They stipulate that these were the things that we say they

   8   were -- a picture that he had, the composite that he dictated,

   9   essentially, and the picture that he says caused him to call

  10   the FBI in the first place.

  11            And take look at them.  Neither one of them is

  12   Mr. al-'Owhali as he looked then.  But it's even better,

  13   because then they say, do you see him in the room?  Now,

  14   ladies and gentlemen, look at the I.D. parade again.

  15            And, Katie, if you would highlight Mr. al-'Owhali for

  16   us.

  17            That's the way he looked then.  This is the way he

  18   looks today.

  19            Did Mr. Mwaka Mula have any difficulty picking him

  20   out after not being able to identify the pictures that he had

  21   drawn?  Not only did he point right at Mr. al-'Owhali and say

  22   "that's him" -- now, there are six bearded men in this

  23   courtroom, one of whom is the judge, so we don't count him,

  24   and one of whom is Mr. Herman, and we don't Count him.  And he

  25   pointed directly to Mr. al-'Owhali.


   1            Mr. Karas predicted, with some prescience, that I

   2   would say that he was coached.  I do.  Do I say that Mr. Karas

   3   or any member of the prosecution team sitting here at the

   4   table did it?  Absolutely not.  There are lots of candidates,

   5   folks, one of whom has come under great discussion.

   6            Now, how else do we know that the statement is

   7   coerced and not reliable?  You were told on the government's

   8   summation that on the 21st of August, Mohamed was shown

   9   information that made him change his mind.  Now, ladies and

  10   gentlemen, I have said to you before, and I say to you again,

  11   it's your recollection of what was said in this courtroom, not

  12   mine, certainly not Mr. Karas' either, but I suggest you look

  13   at Agent Gaudin's testimony and try and find that, please.  It

  14   doesn't exist.

  15            The government says that the motive of Mr. al-'Owhali

  16   exists, adopts is the transfer of the embassy in Sudan.  And I

  17   talked about that.  What is Agent Gaudin doing?  The

  18   government in its summation recalled that I had asked a

  19   question of Mr. Kherchtou about, how do you construct a lie?

  20   And you remember that he was instructed by this agent of a

  21   foreign government is you construct a lie out of bits of the

  22   truth.  You use as much of the truth as you can so that it

  23   bears up and you don't see the falsities.

  24            Well, with respect, that's what Agent Gaudin is

  25   doing.  You may remember I asked a -- you know, we are full of


   1   these legal fictions.  Things are stricken.  You're not

   2   supposed to remember.  Whole witnesses testifying.  You're not

   3   supposed to remember.  We hope you don't.  We hope you try and

   4   put it out of your mind, but one of the things, I asked the

   5   question, which there was an objection which was sustained,

   6   I'm sure you don't remember it, but I can do it now because

   7   it's summation.  I asked Gaudin, "Have you ever heard of

   8   plausible deniability?"

   9            THE COURT:  I'm sorry, you asked a question and the

  10   objection was sustained?

  11            MR. COHN:  Yes.  And now I'm using it as argument.

  12   I'm saying this as comment, as argument.

  13            THE COURT:  That is not as a fact but as an argument?

  14            MR. COHN:  That's correct.

  15            THE COURT:  All right.

  16            MR. COHN:  I said, "Have you ever heard of plausible

  17   deniability?"  And the reason it was stricken was because it

  18   was argumentative and it was nasty and sarcastic and all the

  19   things I'm not supposed to be in a courtroom.  But trust me,

  20   Agent Gaudin has heard of plausible deniability, as have all

  21   of you.

  22            Mohamed was kept in terrible conditions, in fear of

  23   his life from jailers, with jailers who had to hate him.  It

  24   was clear that he wasn't going to get any trial in Kenya, and

  25   if he did, one so summary as not to be worthy of the name.


   1            To get a trial, he ultimately had to come to the

   2   United States, avowedly his enemy, but the only refuge that he

   3   had, and as the statements he made to Gaudin tell you, after

   4   begging for assurance that he would go to the United States

   5   for trial, he paid for the trip in the only coin he had, which

   6   was his statement.

   7            Do you believe the statement was not coerced?  If so,

   8   then you should convict.  If it was coerced, involuntary, the

   9   result of a will overborne by deprivation, isolation and

  10   implicit or explicit threats from the Kenyan handmaidens of

  11   the United States Government, even though you don't want to,

  12   even though you think that it may be true, you must put it

  13   aside, as the judge will tell you that you may.

  14            You are the judges of the fact and you evaluate this

  15   testimony and you give it the weight, the credibility and the

  16   importance, if any, that it has.

  17            This is harder than what other defendants have asked

  18   you to do.  They have asked you to evaluate the testimony in

  19   terms of whether or not the government has proven its case

  20   beyond a reasonable doubt.  I'm asking you to do something

  21   infinitely harder.  I'm asking you to evaluate the testimony

  22   as how they got the evidence, and if you find that it is

  23   untrustworthy, if you find that it is unAmerican, then I'm

  24   asking you to ignore it; and if you ignore it, you have to

  25   acquit because there is no other evidence.


   1            Why should we do this?  He said he is our enemy.  Why

   2   should we apply a Constitution in his favor when he may be the

   3   one who took the lives of countrymen, allies, employees and

   4   people who just happened to be there?  Because it's who we

   5   are.  I'm not wrapping myself up in the flag when I say this

   6   is that.  This is who we are.  The Constitution entitles him

   7   to this trial and to his defense, and to not apply it to the

   8   verdict phase of this trial is to make a mockery of the

   9   process and all our efforts.

  10            After you have reached a verdict and before you come

  11   out and deliver it, if you can say that each of you would have

  12   reached your verdict on this evidence no matter who the

  13   defendant was, that you have looked at the evidence and say

  14   that you are certain of your verdict and that it is not really

  15   expedient because of the nature of the charges, then no one

  16   can quarrel with your decision.

  17            But, on the other hand, if you are left with a

  18   feeling that it is who he is that has caused you to decide

  19   that the horrific nature of the charges has prompted your

  20   response, and not a certainty that the government has properly

  21   charged him or properly obtained his statement, then you

  22   should reexamine your verdict because you are in danger of

  23   violating your oath, the oath that you took and which is the

  24   bedrock of our system, no matter who is the defendant.

  25            In the end, I believe that the oath you took will


   1   prevail and that each of you will do what the law as Judge

   2   Sand charges you and that, in a broad sense, justice will

   3   prevail.

   4            Thank you.

   5            THE COURT:  Thank you, Mr. Cohn.  We'll take our

   6   midmorning recess.

   7            (Recess)

   8            THE COURT:  Mr. Fitzpatrick.

   9            Mr. Fitzgerald.

  10            MR. FITZGERALD:  Yes, your Honor.  When you say

  11   "Fitzgerald," we'll know the trial is over.

  12            I have an objection to some of Mr. Cohn's remarks,

  13   and I particularly have an objection to the way he

  14   characterized what happened in the period before

  15   Mr. al-'Owhali executed the waiver of rights form.

  16            Mr. al-'Owhali has sought to suppress what happened

  17   between his arrest and when the form was signed ultimately in

  18   later August.  Then Mr. Cohn argued to the jury that you don't

  19   know what happened on that date that caused Al-'Owhali to

  20   change his mind, implying to the jury that he wouldn't talk

  21   before and they kept him in isolation, and then he did talk,

  22   when in fact he was talking all along, he was threatening

  23   agents.  And I think he has created a completely misleading

  24   view of what happened during the period before the Miranda

  25   rights.


   1            And I think the appropriate remedy is not to reopen

   2   the case at this point, but I think the government should be

   3   allowed to argue in rebuttal summation that Mr. Cohn had Agent

   4   Gaudin on the stand, and if he wanted to know what happened

   5   before, whether he had talked before he signed the Miranda

   6   rights, he should have asked him then.  Because this jury has

   7   been led to believe that he changed his mind at a certain

   8   point, when he had been talking al along.

   9            MR. COHN:  He did change his mind, your Honor.  He

  10   gave false exculpatories before when pressed and are no

  11   statements.  And I never said he made no statements.  I was

  12   very careful to say that -- not to say that.  And a false

  13   exculpatory at this point, since it couldn't be used, is no

  14   statement at all.  And I said that he was interrogated.  I

  15   gave the periods of interrogation.  I said that they gave him

  16   food and an opportunity to pray, and I don't know what I

  17   misrepresented.  I'm not obligated --

  18            THE COURT:  The question is "didn't talk," which you

  19   are interpreting to mean literal silence, and I think Mr. Cohn

  20   was suggesting by "didn't talk," didn't say anything

  21   incriminatory.

  22            MR. COHN:  I don't think I even used the words

  23   "didn't talk."  I just said that --

  24            THE COURT:  You did.  I think you did indicate that

  25   suddenly he started to talk.


   1            MR. COHN:  I'm told by the gallery that I did.

   2            MR. FITZGERALD:  Your Honor, we're telling the jury

   3   that he talked at a certain date.  He changed his mind.  He

   4   talked on that date.  I think the jury thinks, okay, he didn't

   5   talk before.  And we have this specter of the handmaidens in

   6   the American government and threats, explicit and implicit,

   7   when we were barred from getting into the circumstances of the

   8   period before he executed that waiver.

   9            THE COURT:  Again, it's a question of what you mean

  10   by "talk."  If you mean literally speak, then of course he did

  11   literally speak.  If by "talk" is used in the criminal law

  12   context of making incriminatory statements, then I think that

  13   it's accurate, that he didn't make any incriminatory

  14   statements until the 22nd.

  15            MR. FITZGERALD:  But he wouldn't be isolated if he

  16   was talking with people during that time.  I think the jury is

  17   being told he changed his mind.

  18            THE COURT:  You want to tell the jury that in fact he

  19   was being interviewed during the period prior to that time?

  20            MR. COHN:  I told them that.

  21            THE COURT:  I think you did.

  22            MR. COHN:  I told them the periods, the length of

  23   time.

  24            MR. FITZGERALD:  And if he was concerned that there

  25   was improper conduct going on, explicit or implicit threats by


   1   the handmaidens of the American government, he could have

   2   asked Agent Gaudin about what happened during that time.

   3            MR. COHN:  Agent Gaudin said he didn't know what

   4   happened when he wasn't there.  I never said Agent Gaudin said

   5   anything.  He's not a handmaiden, he is an American.

   6            MR. FITZGERALD:  Agent Gaudin was there.  Your Honor,

   7   he has created the impression.  We weren't allowed to talk

   8   about what happened during those days.  Now he leaves the

   9   impression to the jury that some awful things happened that

  10   caused him to change his mind.

  11            THE COURT:  What is it you want to do?

  12            MR. FITZGERALD:  I want to make a comment during

  13   rebuttal summation.

  14            THE COURT:  What is the comment?

  15            MR. FITZGERALD:  The comment will be if he wanted

  16   you, the jury, to believe that some awful things happened

  17   before he signed that form that caused him to change his mind,

  18   he had Agent Gaudin up there, he could asked him what happened

  19   during the interviews the days before.

  20            THE COURT:  What's wrong with that?  What's wrong

  21   with that?

  22            MR. COHN:  I'm thinking, Judge.  I can hear the

  23   wheels creaking.  I'm old and slow.

  24            Could I have that read back?

  25            THE COURT:  Surely.


   1            (Record read)

   2            MR. FITZGERALD:  The days before.

   3            THE COURT:  The record should indicate that Mr. Cohn

   4   is shrugging his head.  I translate that to mean no objection.

   5            MR. COHN:  It means I will reluctantly consent.

   6            THE COURT:  Very well.  Mr. Ruhnke, are you going to

   7   give the closing?

   8            MR. RUHNKE:  Yes.

   9            THE COURT:  If you can give me some approximation.

  10   You reserved three hours, but --

  11            MR. RUHNKE:  We'll be done certainly before lunch.

  12            THE COURT:  Certainly before lunch.  Before lunch.

  13   And the government's rebuttal, then, this afternoon?

  14            MR. FITZGERALD:  Yes, Judge.

  15            THE COURT:  And the charge tomorrow morning.

  16            MR. FITZGERALD:  Yes, Judge.  I don't know if the

  17   time allotment -- I may spill into the morning, but not very

  18   far.

  19            MR. DRATEL:  Your Honor, how did your Honor want to

  20   handle the exhibits?  Should we put them in binders for the

  21   jury?

  22            THE COURT:  You should have the exhibits ready.  I do

  23   not automatically send in exhibits, I think particularly in

  24   this case it would not be helpful to the jury to send in all

  25   of the exhibits, but they should be available in a form in


   1   which they can be sent in to the jury.  In other words, if the

   2   only copy that we have is one that needs redactions, they

   3   should be redacted.

   4            MR. DRATEL:  Your Honor, one copy?  12 copies?

   5            THE COURT:  I think one copy unless, if you have 12,

   6   fine.  I think just one.

   7            MR. DRATEL:  Thank you.

   8            (Recess)

   9            (Jury present)

  10            THE COURT:  Next we'll hear from Mr. Ruhnke on behalf

  11   of defendant K.K. Mohamed.

  12            MR. RUHNKE:  May it please the Court, Judge Sand,

  13   prosecution team, colleagues at the defense table, and ladies

  14   and gentlemen of the jury.  Good morning.  I'm the last one to

  15   speak to you on behalf of any of the four men who are on trial

  16   in these very serious charges, in this very serious case.

  17            We've been together here for about three months,

  18   three or four months.  You remember the day this case started.

  19   The snow was outside.  The wind was howling through the

  20   courtroom.  And you all shuffled in here for the first time

  21   and were told by Judge Sand and given an oath by Judge Sand to

  22   well and truly try this case between the United States of

  23   America and the four individual men who are standing trial in

  24   this case.

  25            In that moment, you became an American jury, and in


   1   that moment you made promises to the Court, to the lawyers,

   2   you made promises to the men on trial that you indeed would

   3   well and truly try this case.  There's nothing more that I'm

   4   going to ask of you than to stay true to that oath.

   5            You would be forgiven, even though we have been

   6   together since February, if you don't know my name, because I

   7   have not been up on my feet all that often.  So I'll tell you

   8   my name again.  My name is David Ruhnke.  I'm a lawyer and I

   9   represent Khalfan Khamis Mohamed, the gentleman in the blue

  10   shirt and the glasses who has been sitting to my left

  11   throughout the trial.  Sitting next to Mr. Mohamed is David

  12   Stern, who is the other attorney representing Mr. Khalfan

  13   Mohamed.

  14            There had been a third attorney in the case, Mr.

  15   Schneider, who withdrew shortly after the case began, and it's

  16   now Mr. Stern and I who are charged with representing Khalfan

  17   Khamis Mohamed before you ladies and gentlemen of the jury.

  18            Like the other lawyers in the case, like the

  19   prosecutors have asked you, I come before you simply to ask

  20   that you do justice.  You may gather that while everybody is

  21   asking you to do the same thing, they all come from different

  22   perspectives, and maybe we all have a different definition of

  23   what justice is.

  24            But what should be important and what should be

  25   obvious and apparent to all of you by now is that it is not my


   1   job to say what justice is.  It's not Judge Sands' job to tell

   2   you what "justice" means in this case.  It is emphatically not

   3   the prosecutors' job or the newspapers' or anyone else in the

   4   courtroom to tell you what justice is.  That's your

   5   responsibility.  That's what you took on when you decided that

   6   you would become an American jury and you would take on this

   7   case.

   8            You knew when you were selected in this jury, when we

   9   selected all of you as members of this jury, at any given

  10   point, at any number of points, any one of you could have

  11   opted out of this process.  You were asked questions, you

  12   filled out questionnaires, you were questioned by Judge Sand,

  13   and if any of you had said, you know, I want off this jury, I

  14   don't want to serve, there isn't a doubt in my mind that each

  15   and every one of you could have gotten yourselves off the jury

  16   if you didn't want to serve.  So you wanted to serve on this

  17   jury.  We welcome you and we're glad you're here.

  18            What I intend to use my allotted time for this

  19   morning is to do three things.  And I'm not going to use all

  20   of my allotted time this morning.  First, I would like you to

  21   gain a sense of where things happened in this case.  You have

  22   been given a swirl and a flurry of names and places and cities

  23   and interrelationships, and I would be guessing, but I think

  24   it would be a pretty informed guess, that a lot of you don't

  25   know a simple question like:  How far is it from Dar es Salaam


   1   to Nairobi?  Where does Tanzania compare to Somalia?  Where

   2   exactly is Bosnia, Herzegovina?  Where is Afghanistan compared

   3   to these other places?

   4            I'm going to take some time just to show you so that

   5   when you start to deliberate on this case, at least you got a

   6   sense of where it was that Khalfan Khamis Mohamed was and

   7   thought about and did during the time period that is important

   8   in this case.

   9            I'm also going to spend some time trying to outline

  10   for you when certain things happened, and the simplest way to

  11   do that is by just a chronology; when, from the perspective of

  12   one man in this room, Khalfan Khamis Mohamed, on August 7,

  13   1998 was 25 years old, when things happened that matter to

  14   this case.

  15            And I'm also going to spend some time talking about

  16   the statement that Khalfan Khamis Mohamed gave to the FBI.  I

  17   want you to keep in mind that when you have questions about

  18   Khalfan Mohamed, when you have questions about who he is or

  19   what he did or what he didn't do or what the government says

  20   he did or what the government says he didn't do, you're going

  21   to have in evidence two documents.

  22            The first document is Government Exhibit 1071.  It's

  23   a 302.  You hear people talking about a 302.  Have you ever

  24   wondered what the heck is a 302?  Where do people get that

  25   word from?  It's a form number.  If you look at the top


   1   left-hand corner of this, you will see it says "Federal Bureau

   2   of Investigation Form No. 302, Revised 10/6/95."  It's the

   3   form number the FBI uses to record interviews of witnesses.

   4            The second document that you will have in the

   5   evidence, which is kind of the alpha and the omega, the be all

   6   and the end all, the beginning and the end of the case against

   7   Khalfan Khamis Mohamed is a document marked 1070, one, zero,

   8   seven, zero.  1070 is the rough interview notes, the notes

   9   taken by the two agents, Abigail Perkins and Michael Forshea,

  10   who interviewed Khalfan Khamis Mohamed in Cape Town, South

  11   Africa and on the plane back from Cape Town, South Africa over

  12   the period of time beginning October 5, 1999 through October

  13   7, 1999.

  14            That's a time line I want to you keep in mind.  We're

  15   talking about interviews that occurred in October of 1999, not

  16   '98 when the bombing occurred, but 14 months later that the

  17   interviews actually took place.  Most of the interviews you

  18   have heard about in this case have happened within a period of

  19   a few days or months or weeks from the bombings of the

  20   embassies.  We're talking about interviews that occurred well

  21   over a year after the fact.

  22            As you go through these interview notes, it will

  23   quickly become apparent to you that there are two different

  24   handwritings from two different agents.  You will find out and

  25   I will tell you circumstantially by references that the


   1   handwriting that is very, very difficult to decipher is the

   2   handwriting of Agent Perkins who testified in this case,

   3   Abigail Perkins, and the handwriting that is probably a joy to

   4   his fourth grade teacher is the handwriting of Agent Forshea.

   5   It's a pleasure to read.  It's easy to read and easy to

   6   follow.

   7            But I will tell you, having spent hours and hours and

   8   hours trying to figure out what Agent Perkins is writing, it

   9   does make sense after a while and you see that there's a logic

  10   and a style and a consistency to her.

  11            You will notice, for example, that in her handwritten

  12   notes she will use the mathematical sign of an equal sign with

  13   a line drawn through it to mean "not," in the sense of not

  14   equal, and other kinds of shorthand that become apparent as

  15   you look through her statement.

  16            So let's begin by looking at the "where" of this

  17   case.  I'm going to ask that we display Map 1 on the screen,

  18   which is the Continent of Africa.  It's where most of the

  19   things that happened in this case took place.

  20            If you start on the left-hand corner of Africa and

  21   you see the Country of Morocco, that's where Hussein Kherchtou

  22   is from, the witness who testified who was the second

  23   government major, major witness.

  24            You will see as you look towards Europe, we all

  25   know -- we can all find Italy, the boot of Italy.  Right


   1   across from the right-hand side of Italy is the former

   2   Czechoslovakia.  That's where Bosnia, Herzegovina is located.

   3   It's where Sarajevo was, the city that was a jewel that hosted

   4   the winter Olympics and became void during a period of what is

   5   known shamefully as ethnic cleansing.

   6            You heard Mr. Kherchtou testify about ethnic

   7   cleansing in Bosnia, and what happened in Bosnia was after the

   8   Czechoslovakia broke up, when the Soviet Union broke up, that

   9   it retreated to centuries-old ethnic enclaves, and one ethnic

  10   enclave, the Serbians wanted to cleanse, to cleanse their area

  11   of the former Yugoslavia of Muslim people.  And they engaged

  12   in what is undoubtedly and defines the word genocide --

  13   killing people because of their ethnic background.  And that's

  14   what ethnic cleansing was.  When people talked about going to

  15   Bosnia to protect Muslims, they're talking about defending

  16   against genocide.  But that's where Bosnia, Herzegovina is.

  17            If you go across through Turkey and into Asia, you

  18   don't even see on this particular map the designations of

  19   Pakistan and Afghanistan, but if you take India over on the

  20   right-hand side and you go to the top of India and move a

  21   little bit to the left, that country that opens onto the

  22   Indian Ocean is Pakistan.  Pakistan was created out of hole

  23   cloth in 1948 when India won its freedom to divide areas

  24   between the Muslims who had the area that is now Pakistan and

  25   the disputed Province of Kashmir and the Sikhs and the Hindus


   1   retained the rest of Northern India.

   2            And as you go into Africa, the places we have heard

   3   about, we've heard about the Sudan and Ethiopia and Somalia,

   4   we've heard much about Somalia, and you look at the map and it

   5   is hard to picture where these places are and the sizes of

   6   them.

   7            And I remember seeing a map displayed in this

   8   courtroom which tells us that Somalia is the size almost of

   9   the entire Eastern United States; that the northern border of

  10   Somalia, if you laid it on the East Coast of the United

  11   States, would touch southern New England and Vermont and the

  12   southern point of Somalia would touch Florida.  It would go as

  13   far west as Ohio and Michigan and we would be in this country

  14   of Somalia.

  15            And it is impossible for us to sit in a courtroom

  16   here in the year 2001 and imagine a country of that size that

  17   has no government, and for significant periods of time had no

  18   government, just had people preying on each other, seeking

  19   power and territory with clans and warlords that date back

  20   hundreds and hundreds of years, if not thousands.

  21            If I could see the second map, please, Map 2, a more

  22   closeup view.  Again, if you look in the upper left-hand

  23   corner of the map, you see Belgrade.  You are looking now at

  24   the area of Bosnia, Herzegovina, and across the entire sweep

  25   of Northern Africa and South Asia through Afghanistan, which


   1   you can now see on the map, and Pakistan, which you now see on

   2   the map.

   3            And when people talk about going to Karachi, like my

   4   client talked about going to Karachi for training in

   5   Afghanistan, you see Karachi at the bottom on the Indian

   6   Ocean, and traveling to Peshawar.  You see Peshawar where the

   7   cursor is going.  If you move the cursor a little bit to the

   8   left toward Kabul, which is the capitol of Afghanistan, you

   9   are in the Hindu Kush, some of the most rugged territory that

  10   there exists anywhere in the world.

  11            And at this moment as we talk in this courtroom here

  12   in New York City, in May of 2001, Usama Bin Laden is sitting

  13   in a cave in the Hindu Kush and able to communicate to the

  14   world with satellite phones that connect with a satellite

  15   hanging over the Indian Ocean and talk anywhere in the world.

  16            Can I see Map 3, please.

  17            Now we begin to get closer to where we are and where

  18   we've been for the past several months.  You see Kenya and you

  19   see Nairobi, and below Nairobi, about an hour flight away,

  20   maybe 300 or 400 miles, it's like going from here to

  21   Cincinnati or here to Atlanta, the distance between these two

  22   capitols.  You see Dar es Salaam and then you see Zanzibar.

  23   Zanzibar is the place where my client grew up, where Khalfan

  24   Khamis Mohamed was raised.

  25            A country like Kenya, a country like Tanzania has


   1   mixed populations of Muslims and Christians and tribal

   2   religions.  Zanzibar, as you heard from some of the evidence,

   3   is a place that is almost entirely a Muslim country, 95

   4   percent of the people on the Island of Zanzibar, the

   5   archipelago of Zanzibar, are Muslims.

   6            Zanzibar used to be part of the Ohman Empire.  It was

   7   Arab-Sultan made at some point in that history of that part of

   8   the world.  But you get a sense of where things are and how

   9   close they are.

  10            You see how close Mombasa is to Dar es Salaam and to

  11   Zanzibar and how short the coastline is in Kenya before you

  12   touch southern Somalia -- not Mogadishu, but southern Somalia,

  13   the Gedo region of Somalia, places where Ethiopia was at war

  14   with Somalia, attempting to take over, places where

  15   individuals you have heard about in this case went in an

  16   effort to try to defend Muslims.

  17            Can I see Map 3, please.  I'm sorry, Map 4.  No, Map

  18   9.

  19            This is a closer view of Zanzibar, which is sometimes

  20   referred to by the name of Unguja, and the northern isle above

  21   that which has the cities of Wati and Chocha-Chocha is Pemba,

  22   the part of Zanzibar Archipelago, and as you will see, the

  23   place where my client was born, where Khalfan Khamis Mohamed

  24   was born.

  25            Could I see Map 6, please.


   1            Map 6 is a closeup of the Island of Zanzibar in the

   2   Indian Ocean, and you see highlighted right in the middle of

   3   this a little tiny white lettering that says Kidimni.  Kidimni

   4   is a tiny rural village on Zanzibar, where my client was born

   5   and where most of his family resides today, as he is in New

   6   York city and they are in the Indian Ocean.

   7            And finally, if I could have map number 5.  Map

   8   number 5 shows Dar es Salaam.  If I could have the center of

   9   that highlighted, please.  And as you see on the map of Dar es

  10   Salaam, you have heard tale of the bomb house at 213, house

  11   number 213 if the Ilala section of Dar es Salaam.  And you see

  12   on that map where the Ilala section of Dar es Salaam is.

  13            You see a section called Oyster Bay on the screen

  14   right on the ocean.  Oyster Bay is the section of Dar es

  15   Salaam where the American Embassy was located, the former

  16   American Embassy.  It's been relocated.  There's a new embassy

  17   being built in Dar es Salaam as we speak.  And you will see on

  18   the distances, when you hear evidence that someone traveled

  19   from Ilala to Oyster bay or left a certain area and went to

  20   Oyster bay, how far apart those are.

  21            If we can switch and I can have displayed the first

  22   chart, chart 1.

  23            What I have done for you, if you find it useful, and

  24   I hope you find it useful, is to prepare a chronology, a

  25   series of events that track Khalfan Khamis Mohamed's life from


   1   birth to today, when he is on trial for his life.  And we'll

   2   just follow on through this chronology.

   3            On July 25, 1973, he was born.  He was born on the

   4   islands.  Pemba, this is northern island that we saw, he and

   5   his twin sister Fatuma were born, and he grew up in this

   6   village of Kidimni where he was educated, although he did not

   7   complete high school, as we learned as part of this case.  And

   8   as he is growing up, things are happening on the world stage.

   9            In December of 1979, the former Soviet Union invaded

  10   Afghanistan.  The Arab mujahadeen, led in part by Usama Bin

  11   Laden, rallied, and with the backing of the United States

  12   Government, not always the overt backing of the United States,

  13   but with often the covert backing of the United States,

  14   mobilized to repel the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

  15   Khalfan Mohamed -- these are the world events that are going

  16   on around him -- is six years old.

  17            In 1989, ten years later, the Soviet Union is driven

  18   out of Afghanistan and the United States continues to provide

  19   support to the mujahadeen and continues to provide support to

  20   the mujahadeen for the next two years as they attempt to repel

  21   the Soviet puppet government that's been set up.

  22            And our government, my government, your government,

  23   continues to ship things like Stinger Missiles to the Arab

  24   mujahadeen because it is in the national interests of the

  25   United States to support what they are doing in Afghanistan.


   1            Khalfan Mohamed is 16 years old.

   2            At age 17 in 1990, he moves to Dar es Salaam to live

   3   and to work.  As you may imagine, the opportunities in Kidimni

   4   are few.  And he begins to work with his brother who has a

   5   store in Dar es Salaam.  The evidence is that Khalfan Khamis

   6   Mohamed did not grow up in a very religious household.  In

   7   fact, his family is not very religious at all.  It's really at

   8   age 16 and 17, when he moves to Dar es Salaam, that he begins

   9   to study Islam for the first time with any degree of

  10   seriousness.

  11            He begins to attend a mosque in the Ilala section of

  12   Dar es Salaam and he is befriended by a man from Mombasa,

  13   Kenya, named Sulieman, whose full name is Suleiman Abdallah,

  14   and he begins, as it says, his first serious studies of Islam.

  15            The world events continue to move forward, and in

  16   that same year, Iraq, another Muslim country, invades Kuwait,

  17   another Muslim country, on the Saudi Peninsula, and what we

  18   call the Gulf War begins.  And the United States, under

  19   President George Bush, the first George Bush president, I'll

  20   call him George Bush 41 and George Bush 43, because I recently

  21   learned George Bush was the 41st president and George Bush now

  22   is the 43rd, but under George Bush 41, the Gulf War begins.

  23            The United States sends troops to Saudi Arabia.  The

  24   king of Saudi Arabia, King Fahd, invites the American troops

  25   into what to many Muslims is a sacrilege into the land of the


   1   two holy places, as we have heard it referred to from time to

   2   time, Mecca and Medina, the two holiest sites in Islam.

   3            And very quickly, by January 1991 Iraq is defeated.

   4   Saddam Hussein is not deposed, removed from government,

   5   remains in government, but Iraq is defeated, is driven from

   6   Kuwait, but the United States forces remain in Saudi Arabia,

   7   indeed, where they remain today.

   8            In 1994, Khalfan Mohamed has continued to pursue his

   9   studies of Islam.  As you will see, if you dig into the

  10   statement, he listens to lectures, he listens to cassette

  11   recordings, he listens to scholars and other teachers to tell

  12   him about Islam, and he meets a man named Fahid, who is Fahid

  13   Mohammed Ally, who tells Khalfan Khamis Mohamed that although

  14   he is a nice man, he does not trust Khalfan Mohamed, but if he

  15   went to Afghanistan and got some training, perhaps then he

  16   would trust him.

  17            And Khalfan Mohamed goes to Afghanistan through

  18   Karachi, into Afghanistan, into a camp that is primarily run

  19   by Pakistani people.  It's supported by groups from Pakistan.

  20   The teachers and the leaders at the camp are from Pakistan.

  21   You will learn that it was his belief that his reason and

  22   purpose for going to training was to learn how to help other

  23   Muslims, if necessary, through arms struggle, and he thought

  24   he might go to Bosnia to help Muslim people there.

  25            The quotes are from his statement.  I'm not just


   1   giving you the quotes, they are contained within his

   2   statement.

   3            Now, the government argues in an effort, perhaps, to

   4   put Khalfan Mohamed into a conspiracy that is existing long

   5   before he becomes aware of it and into a conspiracy that is

   6   aimed at killing Americans.  Remember, the first Count of this

   7   indictment is a conspiracy to kill Americans.  The government

   8   claims that by going to Afghanistan and taking training,

   9   Khalfan Mohamed has joined the conspiracy and is participating

  10   in it.

  11            Mr. Karas, in summing up for the government, made the

  12   statement, well, we had the witness Hamisi who said Khalfan

  13   Mohamed realized that his training camp was underwritten by

  14   Usama Bin Laden.  If wishes were horses, they say beggars

  15   would ride.  It's not that the government has a lot to wish

  16   for in its proofs again Khalfan Mohamed, but that was a

  17   misunderstanding of what Mr. Hamisi actually said.

  18            The question that Mr. Karas actually asked of

  19   Mr. Hamisi was the following, and the transcript reference is

  20   there for you:

  21            "Did Khalfan tell you who it was that he believed had

  22   financed the training he had taken?"  And the witness, like

  23   witnesses often do, especially witnesses who are not

  24   sophisticated, answers the question two different ways.  He

  25   says:  "He mentioned to me, he says Usama Bin Laden is the one


   1   who helps a lot of groups over there."  So you got one piece

   2   of information.  Usama Bin Laden helps a lot of groups over

   3   there in Afghanistan.  "But he didn't go into detail that he

   4   received that help."

   5            This was not an act in furtherance of this

   6   overarching conspiracy.  What was it?  An effort to be trusted

   7   by people he greatly, greatly respected and wanted to be part

   8   of.

   9            So what happened after 1995?  One thing that did not

  10   happen is that he was not asked to join al Qaeda.  You will

  11   recall Mr. Kherchtou's testimony that what would happen after

  12   the training in Afghanistan is that the best prospects would

  13   be pulled aside, taken aside and asked to become a member of

  14   al Qaeda.  He was not asked to do that.

  15            In fact, after the training was over, what Khalfan

  16   Mohamed did was he returned to Afghanistan by himself.  He

  17   left a contact address, which was his brother's post office

  18   box where he was living, and didn't hear anything at all until

  19   1998.  Another three years went by.  Meanwhile, world events

  20   are going on.

  21            It is August of 1996 that Usama Bin Laden issues his

  22   declaration of Jihad.  In 1997, and again the Bible, the core,

  23   the alpha and omega of this information is the statement that

  24   is in evidence, the statement that the government's case

  25   accurately summarizes what Khalfan Mohamed told the agents.


   1            He visits Mombasa, Kenya three times -- you recall

   2   really how close it is between Dar es Salaam and Mombasa --

   3   traveling on a boat, Suleiman's boat.  He engages in further

   4   religious discussions.  A person more sophisticated than I in

   5   terrorism or recruitment might very well say this is a man

   6   who's being recruited by some other people for some purpose.

   7            There are many religious discussions about how to

   8   help Muslims, and he meets a man named Hussein, who is also

   9   called Mustafa.  You heard about Mustafa in connection with

  10   Nairobi.  Mustafa Mohamed Fadhl.  And Fahid, his friend, Fahid

  11   describes this gentleman who he knows as Hussein as a good

  12   brother, and Hussein knows Khalfan Mohamed lives in Dar es

  13   Salaam.

  14            Still, in 1997, he makes two trips to Somalia.

  15   Remember, in 1997 certainly there are no Americans troops in

  16   Somalia in 1997.  Any American troops that were ever in

  17   Somalia are long gone.  It is truly anarchy in Somalia in

  18   1997.  There are tribal wars between Muslim groups.

  19            He goes there twice.  There is again religious

  20   discussions.  He is wondering if he is going to get to put his

  21   training to use and go fight on the front lines, but he's

  22   basically told that he is not needed and he goes home.

  23            In March of 1997, Usama Bin Laden gives that

  24   interview that we saw with CNN.  In the spring and summer of

  25   that same year, his brother relocates to London.


   1            Now we come to another event capable of two

   2   interpretations.  In January of 1998, Khalfan Mohamed asked

   3   his friend, Zabron Nassor Mulid, somebody from Zanzibar,

   4   somebody he had gone to school with -- you may remember that

   5   Zabron, Mr. Malid, or Zabron Nassor Mulid, testified here as

   6   witness.  He knew Mr. Mohamed's family.  He had been to their

   7   home.  They had gone to school together.  He had played soccer

   8   with Khalfan's brother Rubaya, who is apparently a good soccer

   9   player.

  10            But what's important in this case is that Khalfan

  11   Mohamed asked Zabron to help him get identification documents.

  12   He wants to go to London and he wants to go to London to start

  13   a new life, is the words he explains to his friend, and he

  14   also is seeking to bring his brother's children, his brother's

  15   wife with him and to go there and start a new life.  And

  16   Zabron agrees.

  17            As the world turns, as events go, if Khalfan Mohamed

  18   had left to go to London to start a new life, probably the

  19   embassy would have been bombed on August 7, 1998 anyway, and

  20   that would not have changed, but everything would have changed

  21   for him and he would not be sitting here, facing your

  22   judgment.  But that's not how the world turned.

  23            In March or April of 1998, Hussein approaches him and

  24   asked him if he will help with a mission or a jihad job, and

  25   he agrees to help.  He doesn't know what the purpose is.  In


   1   fact, to the extent that he's thinking at all of what the

   2   purpose might be, he is thinking it's most likely Somalia.

   3   He's been to Somalia.  He knows what has been happening in

   4   Somalia.

   5            We'll talk about the 302 document that is -- I'm

   6   sorry, the handwritten notes that are in evidence and why

   7   certain things appear in the notes and why things don't appear

   8   in the final memorandum, but if you look at the notes, these

   9   notes are 87 pages long, unnumbered.  If you care about them,

  10   you might spend the two or three minutes it takes to number

  11   them.

  12            But at page 86 of the notes, while the agents are

  13   appraising some of the things that are being told,

  14   Mr. Mohamed, according to these notes, says when Hussein told

  15   him about the Jihad job, he didn't know where or the target.

  16   Maybe Somalia, he didn't know.  He had previously rented the

  17   house we heard about, 22 Kidugalo Street in the Magomeni

  18   section of Dar es Salaam.  During this period of time, Hussein

  19   is meeting with others who come to the house, but Khalfan is

  20   basically not invited into the meetings.

  21            In May, as events progress, he actually applies for

  22   the passport, but as the FBI interview and I think as the

  23   government's theory should be, if it's not actually, this has

  24   nothing at all to do with this mission, with this Jihad job.

  25   He still has this plan to go to London.


   1            In June of 1998, specifically, June 9, 1998, Khalfan

   2   Mohamed purchases, in the sense that his name goes on the

   3   documents, this 1989 Suzuki Samurai.  He makes the purchase

   4   with money that is provided by other people, not by him.  He

   5   never drives that Suzuki Samurai, so when the government talks

   6   about what a crucial role it was in this offense for him to

   7   buy that Suzuki, he have never drives it.  He doesn't know how

   8   to drive.  He doesn't have a license.

   9            And world events turn.  Usama Bin Laden continues to

  10   be something of a media darling, and on June 10, 1998, ABC

  11   News airs its interview of Usama Bin Laden.

  12            On June 15, 1998, using money that has been provided

  13   by others, Khalfan Mohamed rents the house number 213 in the

  14   Ilala section of Dar es Salaam.  Remember, Hussein said the

  15   house at Kidugalo Street is not suitable for what we want to

  16   do and we need to relocate to a more suitable home.

  17            On June 17, 1998, again you have heard the evidence,

  18   somebody else, not Khalfan Mohamed, purchases a 1987 Nissan

  19   Atlas, which is the truck, the refrigeration truck, which is

  20   later used to carry the bomb to the embassy in Dar es Salaam.

  21   That same person arranges for modifications to the truck and

  22   also arranges to purchase two large truck batteries that are

  23   needed to use to set the mechanism that will ignite this bomb

  24   with such terrible results.  He's not involved in any of this.

  25            As we get closer to the bombing, according to the


   1   government's statement, at some point he is told it's not

   2   Somalia.  That's just according to the statement.  We know on

   3   July 31, 1998, that the engineer arrives at 213 Ilala to

   4   actually wire the bomb.  Others are using the Suzuki Samurai

   5   now to bring the material to 213 Ilala to construct the bomb.

   6            And as the date comes even closer, everybody has left

   7   town.  Everybody is gone.  And now, sitting in a house at 213

   8   Ilala, according to the government's statement, are Khalfan

   9   Mohamed and the gentleman we call Ahmed the German, whose name

  10   is Hamden Khalif al Awad, a man from Egypt, who will actually

  11   be the one who drives the truck to the embassy.

  12            On the day of the bombing, Ahmed the German calls his

  13   family to say he is about to leave this life, and later that

  14   day the bomb explodes at the embassy in Dar es Salaam, killing

  15   11 people, I think injuring approximately 85 people.

  16            According to the statement given to the FBI, Khalfan

  17   rode a short distance with the truck that day as Ahmed the

  18   German went wherever he was going, as far as Uhuru Road, in

  19   the bomb truck.  This is a map of Dar es Salaam, a more

  20   detailed map than I can put up on the screen, and I want to

  21   mark with a Post-it two areas.

  22            First, I want to mark Ilala.  You'll find Ilala, this

  23   area right here of downtown Dar es Salaam, which I'm going to

  24   mark with Ilala.

  25            (Continued on next page)


   1            MR. RUHNKE:  (Continuing) You will see, one of the

   2   curious things about the 302, by which I mean this document,

   3   the typed out document, as things get transposed from these

   4   notes sometimes mistakes are made.  In the typed 302 what is

   5   said is that Ahmed the German goes to Uhuru Road, which is

   6   right here -- you will have this in the jury room if you ask

   7   for it -- and makes a right onto Uhuru Road.  But what the

   8   notes say accurately is that he makes a left.  Khalfan Khamis

   9   Mohamed leaves the truck at Uhuru Road.  The truck turns left

  10   towards Nelson Mandela Road -- that's this road here, and

  11   there is a loop around Dar es Salaam, which if you have ever

  12   been in Dar es Salaam or heard the agents tell you there is a

  13   reason why you loop around Dar es Salaam if you want to get

  14   anywhere.  Drives up to this, I can't pronounce it, road, to

  15   the Bogomoni Road, onto this area here, which is Oyster Bay,

  16   which I showed you earlier on this map, and on this map you

  17   will see in Oyster Bay right at this section a little street

  18   called Laibon Road, and Laibon Road is right here where the

  19   embassy was located.  If you recall some of the pictures, you

  20   see what appears to be a relatively modern highway on one side

  21   of the picture and what seems to be a very unimproved road,

  22   which is Laibon Road.  This is the major highway, Al Hassan

  23   road coming by the embassy.  The truck starts here in Ilala.

  24   You remember the one agent testified as you went to the bomb

  25   house at 213 Ilala, made a short series of turns until you


   1   came to Uhuru Road, which is paved, and that is as far as

   2   Khalfan Khamis Mohamed comes with the truck, according to the

   3   statement.  It makes a left onto Uhuru Road onto Nelson

   4   Mandela Road and on its way to the American Embassy,

   5   obviously, where it wound up.

   6            In the aftermath of the bombing, the government

   7   claims that it was Mr. Mohamed's role to clean up the site or

   8   to clear the materials out so that they could not be tracked

   9   down.  On the day after the bombing, August 8, 1998, what he

  10   actually does -- he is from a poor family.  There are

  11   household items that he basically can't see throwing away.  If

  12   he wanted to discard the items, they could have been discarded

  13   on any of the rubbish heaps that mar downtown Dar es Salaam.

  14   He takes a ceiling fan, a carpet, a wrench, a small child's

  15   training type toilet, to be picked up at 213 Ilala by his

  16   nephew and to be used by his family members.

  17            On the same day, August 8, 1998, Khalfan Mohamed

  18   departs Dar es Salaam by bus.  If you look at a map of Africa,

  19   you will see that the country next below Tanzania as you head

  20   south is Mozambique.  As you transit Mozambique, which is a

  21   very large country, the next country you come down to is South

  22   Africa.  So he transits across Mozambique into South Africa.

  23            Then from August 1998 through October 5, 1999 -- it's

  24   12 months -- Khalfan Mohamed lives and works in Cape Town,

  25   South Africa.  He finds employment as a cook, as an assistant


   1   chef at a restaurant called Burger World, and he eventually is

   2   invited to live with his employer's family.  He has applied

   3   for political asylum so he can remain in South Africa.  It is

   4   a false application for political asylum.  On October 5, 1999,

   5   while going to keep an immigration appointment -- instead of

   6   immigration they call it the Office of Home Affairs in South

   7   Africa -- he is met by immigration officers, placed under

   8   arrest.  FBI agents are there.  He is taken to the airport in

   9   Cape Town eventually, kept there for a couple of days,

  10   interviewed by the agents on October 5 and October 6, and late

  11   in the day on October 6 is placed in an airplane and flown

  12   back to the United States of America.  It is then February

  13   2001 and it is now May 2001, and he is here on trial in New

  14   York City.

  15            That is when things happened.  I want to talk a

  16   little bit about who, the role of others -- you can knock that

  17   chart down and put up chart 003, please.

  18            In terms of the role in the offense, Mr. Cohn spoke

  19   to you briefly and Judge Sand will talk to you in his

  20   instructions about the idea of multiple conspiracies, interior

  21   conspiracies, large and small.  This is what the evidence is

  22   in the case about the role in the offense, and now I am

  23   talking about Dar es Salaam.  Recall, please, that Mr. Mohamed

  24   is not charged or believed or alleged to have had any role or

  25   knowledge of the bombing that occurred in Nairobi.


   1            We have referred to Hussein, Mustafa Mohamed Fadhl,

   2   who I think, if you summarize the evidence honestly, he can be

   3   seen as the overall leader of the group in Dar es Salaam.  He

   4   can be seen as the one who truly recruited Khalfan Khamis

   5   Mohamed to this plot.  He can be seen as somebody who was

   6   taking orders via cell phone from Nairobi.  Another individual

   7   provided funds for the purchase of the Suzuki Samurai.  That

   8   same individual purchased the Toyota Dyna truck in Nairobi.

   9   That same individual also purchased oxygen and acetylene tanks

  10   in Dar es Salaam.  There is another individual involved in

  11   this, according to the evidence, who helped transport the TNT

  12   in the Suzuki Samurai and the other bomb-making materials, who

  13   purchased the Nissan Atlas truck that was used in Dar es

  14   Salaam, who also purchased oxygen and acetylene tanks used in

  15   Dar es Salaam.  There is another individual who wired the

  16   bombs in Dar es Salaam, and also in Nairobi.  According to the

  17   evidence it is the same individual.  And there is another

  18   individual we know as Ahmed the German who drove the Nissan

  19   Atlas to the American Embassy on Laibon Road, from Ilala to

  20   the embassy, and pushed the button that destroyed and ended

  21   his life and destroyed and ended 11 other lives and wounded so

  22   many others, 85 other people.  Mr. Ahmed, the German,

  23   obviously died in the explosion.

  24            Khalfan Khamis Mohamed, the evidence fairly suggests,

  25   if you accept the statement and if you accept the government's


   1   view, and even taking the government's view, located the house

   2   at 213 Ilala, and his name was used on the lease at 213 Ilala.

   3   Other people did not put their name on that lease.  His name

   4   was placed on the Samurai, purchase of the Samurai.  Again, he

   5   didn't drive it, didn't know how to drive.  His job was to

   6   stay at home, stay in the house and deal with visitors.  Clean

   7   the place.  He did manual labor, always at the direction of

   8   others, in the assembly of the bomb, and rode a short way, a

   9   very small piece of the journey with the driver on August 7,

  10   1998.

  11            Now I want to talk about the statement.  If I could

  12   see chart number 2, please.  This is from the Khalfan

  13   Khamis -- you'd think I'd say my client's name right after all

  14   these months -- Khalfan Khamis Mohamed.  Again, this is

  15   Government's Exhibit 1021, and the interview notes themselves,

  16   Government's Exhibit 1070.  The reality and the truth of the

  17   case is that, in broad strokes or in tiny details or somewhere

  18   in between, the government's case against Khalfan Khamis

  19   Mohamed rides and falls with the statement that the agents put

  20   into evidence before you in this case.  The reality is that

  21   without his statement, without his decision to be cooperative

  22   with the agents, there would be very little evidence linking

  23   Khalfan Mohamed to these charges.  Without his cooperation and

  24   without deciding to talk with the agents there would be

  25   evidence of things like his name being on a Suzuki Samurai,


   1   with his name being on the lease to the house.  But it is the

   2   government's theory and it is the government's benefit of that

   3   statement that if accepted as true it fills in every detail of

   4   what the government is now telling you Khalfan Mohamed did or

   5   did not do in connection with this case.

   6            You will see from the statement itself that the

   7   agents made no real promises beyond saying that if you talk to

   8   us, tell us the truth.  Don't try to fool us.  And if you do

   9   talk to us and you do tell us the truth, we will bring that

  10   home, we will tell the judge about it and we will tell the

  11   prosecutors that you were truthful and cooperative and

  12   helpful.  I believe, without speaking for the United States

  13   government, that the government believes that this was a

  14   truthful and accurate statement and that Khalfan Mohamed was

  15   cooperative with the agents as he was making it.

  16            I say that about the statement and now let me say

  17   this about the statement.  It is the year 2001.  We are on the

  18   dawn of and are in the 21st century.  It is a century of

  19   amazing technology.  It's a century and a time when, as I said

  20   before, Usama Bin Laden, in the rugged mountains of the Hindu

  21   wash in Afghanistan can pick up a satellite phone, the jihad

  22   phone, I think the government called it, can pick up the jihad

  23   phone and point it at a satellite hovering somewhere over the

  24   Indian Ocean and speak to anybody in the world.  The FBI

  25   detected on my client's clothes submolecular quantities of


   1   TNT, could detect things that you can't see with a microscope.

   2   You have heard evidence about computer drives being

   3   replicated.  Poor Mr. El Hage, every time he picked up the

   4   phone, some robot was picking up the date and the time from

   5   Nairobi, Kenya, and the government was listening in to what

   6   Wadih El Hage was doing on the telephone.

   7            Now I want to take you back and say it is no longer

   8   the dawn of the 21st century, and let's arbitrarily say it is

   9   the dawn of the 19th century, it is 1801, not 2001.  The

  10   police are about to take a statement from a very important

  11   person to a very important investigation.  What would the good

  12   detective constable here in New York City have done in 1801 to

  13   take the statement?  The good detective constable would have

  14   sat down with a note pad, perhaps a quill pen, and tried to

  15   take down notes as to what the person was saying, and later on

  16   perhaps, the detective constable would take those notes and

  17   try to remember what was said, and put them into a much longer

  18   summary of what was said.  And if we went into the 19th

  19   century, to the mid-19th century, to the 1860's or the 1870's,

  20   my God, technology had improved to the point where we had

  21   typewriters, where not only could notes be taken, but now,

  22   instead of having to handwrite the statement, it could be

  23   typewritten.

  24            The FBI is stuck in the 19th century in terms of

  25   taking down the information from important witnesses.  I don't


   1   blame the field agents.  The field agents don't make policy.

   2   But somewhere some genius in Washington has decided that you

   3   ladies and gentlemen of the jury are not entitled to hear the

   4   questions that were asked and you are not entitled to hear the

   5   answers that were given and judge for yourself, in a case, in

   6   an interview that was conducted in English of a man from

   7   Tanzania, from Zanzibar, who speaks Swahili, who has a command

   8   of the English language that is certainly OK.  But wouldn't

   9   you want to know what was miscommunication?  We all say

  10   things, we hear them later on, I didn't mean to say that.  How

  11   many times have I mistaken my client's name today when I know

  12   it as well as I know my own name?

  13            The FBI would prefer to live in the 19th century

  14   because this is how this document came to be.  You will see at

  15   the bottom of the document that this conversation occurred

  16   October 5, 1999, again, more than a year after the bombing.

  17   You will see where it occurred.  It occurred in South Africa

  18   and parts of the interview occurred on the airplane that left

  19   Cape Town airport and flew back to the United States, I think

  20   to Stewart Air Force Base in Westchester County.  Then you

  21   will see that over a two-day period after they got back the

  22   agents put together a report that was actually not dictated or

  23   put down for further refinement until October 9, 1999.

  24            I guarantee, in the sense that we can all infer

  25   things that we don't actually see, that it is a fair inference


   1   that you would see Agent Michael Forshea and Agent Abigail

   2   Perkins, perhaps in the company of an assistant United States

   3   attorney, saying what did he say about this, my notes say

   4   this, my notes say that, yeah, yeah, that's what he said,

   5   resolving those issues and those questions and producing this

   6   19th century document.  You can buy a tape recorder for $25 at

   7   J & R around the corner.  If you are worried about one of the

   8   tape recorders failing, go ahead, splurge, by two tape

   9   recorders.  If you are worried about both tape recorders

  10   failing, maybe you have to resort to the notes.

  11            This statement is such an important aspect of the

  12   government's case, and to live in the 19th century, I suggest

  13   respectfully, is a decision that is made that the government

  14   would rather have you hear it from the FBI than hear it as it

  15   happened.  So you don't have it as it happened, you have it as

  16   the FBI said it happened.

  17            So let's go into the statement itself and some of

  18   these things that just jump out to you about the statement.

  19   For example, at the very beginning of the 302 you see the

  20   following statement.  The government refers to him as KKM, the

  21   FBI refers to him as KKM, with his initials.  This is after he

  22   has gotten his advice of rights in Swahili and in English and

  23   agrees to speak with the interviewing agents without a lawyer

  24   present, and the following is written down.  KKM asked if he

  25   was going to see America, and investigating agents responded


   1   yes, that there was a good chance that he would.  KKM was

   2   asked later if he had a choice between going to America or

   3   going to Tanzania, where would he want to go.  KKM responded

   4   twice, take me to America.

   5            If you look at the statement, you begin to see some

   6   of this at the beginning.  What difference does it make later

   7   on where he wants to go?  And you begin to follow it.  This is

   8   Agent Perkins' handwriting, which is difficult but not

   9   impossible to follow.  And you see the reference, he was asked

  10   if he had any questions, he asked if he was going to go to see

  11   America, and Special Agent Forshea, you can actually see that,

  12   told him yes.  He stated he had no further questions and he

  13   was ready to talk to us.

  14            Other things that come out of this thing about

  15   Khalfan Mohamed, the statement.  First of all, in determining

  16   his role and where he fits in and what he is all about.

  17   Understand that he never heard the term bayat.  Understand

  18   that he has heard the words Al Qaeda, but he has never heard

  19   of an organization called Al Qaeda.  That he was never

  20   contacted after the training.

  21            On page 11 of this 302 he explains what I think

  22   everybody accepts, that he first learned about the Nairobi

  23   bombing after it happened, and he had no prior knowledge of

  24   that bombing.  He explains that he never drove the Suzuki

  25   Samurai and that he didn't know how to drive.  He explains


   1   what his responsibilities were, which was to take care of the

   2   house, to be in the house if neighbors came over, and he spent

   3   a lot of time in the house.  And when leaving Dar es Salaam,

   4   what he told his nephew was to rent the house and give the

   5   money to his mother.  The house, remember, had been rented,

   6   one year's rent had been paid in advance, the lease had been

   7   signed, so go ahead, we have the house rented, and see if you

   8   can get the money to my mother in Kidimni.  He left things

   9   behind to get the money to his sister and mother.  He had to

  10   ask what TNT was.  There is a reference in the report that he

  11   took some advanced training but not a lot.  At page 14 and 15,

  12   you will see that he did not know what TNT was, and he had to

  13   ask Hussein what the stuff is.  The handwritten notes at page

  14   48 bear that out.

  15            There are some interesting things that appear in the

  16   handwritten notes that don't appear in the typed 302, and it

  17   is significant for your evaluation of his role.

  18            At the bottom of page 48 of the handwritten notes it

  19   says here, discussing the bombing, does not believe any of

  20   their group could have put the bomb together, just Abdel

  21   Rahman or Ahmed the driver.

  22            So any thought that Khalfan Mohamed could have had

  23   the expertise to actually wire this bomb together, according

  24   to the notes he did not, and the only people in the group who

  25   had the expertise to do this were Abdel Rahman or Ahmed the


   1   driver.  You can search the typed 302 for the rest of your

   2   jury service and not find a reference to that.

   3            You can see that he did not know, at page 17 -- he

   4   didn't know what the cylinder tanks were, why they were being

   5   used or what was inside the tanks, if anything at all.  He

   6   does not know how to go to the American Embassy.  Certainly by

   7   October of 1999 he knew that the American Embassy had been

   8   bombed, but he does not know what the route was that was

   9   actually taken by Ahmed.  And in fact he had never been to the

  10   American Embassy in Dar es Salaam and did not know where it

  11   was.

  12            The money used by him throughout this process was

  13   always, always provided by Hussein, by others.  You have heard

  14   talk about the cell phone that was used in Dar es Salaam to

  15   maintain contact with individuals in Nairobi.  He was allowed

  16   to use the cell phone one time and he called his sisters.

  17   When the others left, he was asked to stay behind in order to

  18   assist Ahmed, who spoke no Swahili.

  19            He emphasize to the agents that the purpose of

  20   getting the passport had nothing to do with this case and that

  21   he was going to London to live with his brother, or even if

  22   his brother wasn't there to start a new life in London, prior

  23   to becoming involved with Hussein and the group and the jihad

  24   job that was proposed to him.  The passport was issued

  25   coincidentally after he had been asked to participate.  But


   1   the government makes it that there were four that were part of

   2   the plot.

   3            I also take issue with Mr. Karas's statement that

   4   this was typical Al Qaeda activity, travel on a false

   5   passport.  Whatever typical Al Qaeda means, I think the

   6   government's idea was this idea of creating passports, forging

   7   passports, having visas scanned into computer.  This was a

   8   passport that was applied for in a false name.  It is no

   9   better than that but it is certainly no worse than that.  It

  10   is not an Al Qaeda trademark or operation.

  11            After he learned about the bombing, after he was in

  12   South Africa he made one single attempt to contact the group

  13   from South Africa.  He had been given a number in Yemen that

  14   belonged to, supposedly, Abdel Rahman, who apparently answered

  15   the phone.  But Khalfan Mohamed was calling with a calling

  16   card.  He had no real need to call.  He was just trying to see

  17   if it worked if he ever did need help, and he spoke briefly

  18   with Abdel Rahman in Yemen.

  19            You will see throughout the 302 and throughout the

  20   interview notes that the government is pushing and pushing and

  21   pushing on the issue of what he knows about Usama Bin Laden

  22   and what his relation was to Usama Bin Laden and the overall

  23   organization.

  24            You will see that in the 302, which is the typed

  25   report, the 19th century technology report, Usama Bin Laden


   1   was to him a sheik, a scholar and a leader.  Interestingly,

   2   the agents made very little attempt to distinguish between

   3   what he knew or thought about Usama Bin Laden prior to August

   4   1998 and what he knew or thought about Usama Bin Laden in the

   5   14 months afterward, after the bombing and before the

   6   interview.  He never met Usama Bin Laden, he never heard him

   7   speak.  He said later on in the documents that he had never

   8   heard of a fatwah to kill Americans, although interestingly,

   9   according to the 302 statement, he is asked about innocent

  10   people who died in the embassy bombing.  He says well, Allah

  11   will take care of them.  So although he has never heard the

  12   Bin Laden fatwahs or maybe the Al Qaeda declarations on what

  13   is Islamically right or not Islamically right, that is a sort

  14   of eerie echo of -- of who?  Remember Abu Hajer al Iraqi, also

  15   known as Mamdouh Ahmed Salim, one of the old ones, a very

  16   powerful figure on the ruling council, the shura council of Al

  17   Qaeda, a very imposing man as you see his picture, somebody

  18   who had memorized the Koran, somebody whose opinions were

  19   valued, who, citing an example from Islamic history, said that

  20   if you kill people and they are your enemies they deserve to

  21   die, and if you kill and they are innocent they will go to

  22   heaven and Allah will take care of them.  Although he has not

  23   heard the direct words, that's the kind of thing that he is

  24   hearing.  It's the kind of thing that is out there in the

  25   world that he is inhabiting in Dar es Salaam during this


   1   period of time.

   2            But it does get into the 302, that he will consider

   3   his group, part of Bin Laden's group, and, it is quoted,

   4   because they all share the same feelings.  That is what is

   5   contained in the 302 at page 25.  It is of obvious

   6   significance to the agents that Mr. Mohamed be tied to Mr. Bin

   7   Laden's groups, to make this overarching conspiracy a reality.

   8   You will see, especially in the interview notes, that there is

   9   back and forth about this, that they are recording in their

  10   interviews, and you would love to hear what was said.  But I

  11   will tell you what appears at page 55.  I say 54 because we

  12   renumbered them when there was a card in here.  The exhibit

  13   that you will have is page 55.  He said he is not sure what

  14   Bin Laden looked like.  He did hear a few times that Bin Laden

  15   was responsible for bombings -- from the news.  In other

  16   words, he is listening to the news in South Africa after the

  17   bombings for almost a year, more than a year.  So he heard

  18   that Bin Laden was responsible for bombings from the news but

  19   before the bombing Bin Laden could be his leader, could not be

  20   his leader, maybe yes, maybe not.  This is a quote from the

  21   notes.  Never felt he was part of Bin Laden's group.  Quote

  22   from the notes.  Never felt he was part of Bin Laden's group.

  23   And yet in the typed 302, that gets translated to, would

  24   consider his group part of Bin Laden's group because they all

  25   share the same feelings.  Wouldn't you like to know and


   1   wouldn't you like to have our government trust you with

   2   knowing what was actually said at that moment, whether the

   3   notes are wrong or whether the 302 is wrong or whether the 302

   4   is simply an interpretation of the notes, or how this seeming

   5   contradiction on such an important issue -- this is not that

   6   he turned left or right on Uhuru Road.  This is, is he or is

   7   he not a member of this large worldwide overarching conspiracy

   8   that we have been trying and hearing about since February 5.

   9            Those are some comments I make on the 302's.  It is

  10   certainly going to be -- final comments in terms of role and

  11   everything else.  How did he take direction?  When it came

  12   time to doing the kind of physical labor that we talked about

  13   regarding the bomb, directions came from Abdul Rahman, when

  14   Abdul Rahman wasn't the boss, Hussein was the boss and told

  15   him what to do.

  16            I am just about finished with my remarks on behalf of

  17   Khalfan Khamis Mohamed.  Whether he knew and when he knew

  18   whether this bomb was intended, when he thought he was going

  19   to go fight in Somalia, whether he thought he was going to

  20   fight in Bosnia some day, the evidence that you heard is for

  21   you to consider and for you to decide.  It is not my role to

  22   tell you how to decide this case, as I told you.  It is not

  23   the prosecutor's role to tell you how to decide this case.  It

  24   is not the other defense lawyers especially, since they

  25   represent their own individual clients and seek justice that


   1   may have different definitions on trial and justice may take

   2   different interpretations.  Justice may be not guilty in one

   3   situation, it may be guilty in another situation.

   4            I can't ask for anything more from a jury, you folks,

   5   this particular jury -- there are 16 of you now.  Only 12 of

   6   you are actually going to get to deliberate, and that may be

   7   an overstatement of the benefit, to deliberate on a verdict in

   8   this case.  All I can ask you to do is do justice as you see

   9   it, to find the facts as fairly presented, and to return your

  10   verdict.  We may not welcome the verdict that you return, but

  11   may you return a verdict that has integrity to it, that

  12   follows a conscientious application of the laws.  We are going

  13   to respect your verdict and we will respect you as a jury for

  14   the process that you have undergone.  I thank you very much.

  15            THE COURT:  Thank you, Mr. Ruhnke.  We will break for

  16   lunch and we will resume at 2:15.

  17            (Luncheon recess)










   1                 A F T E R N O O N   S E S S I O N

   2                             2:15 p.m.

   3            THE COURT:  Let's bring in the jury.

   4            MR. RUHNKE:  Your Honor, a brief housekeeping.  I had

   5   ask the Court to respond to the government's Brady letter by

   6   tomorrow morning.  What I would like to do is bring my

   7   response Thursday.  We're starting late on Thursday.

   8            THE COURT:  Yes.

   9            (Jury present)

  10            THE COURT:  We now are at the stage of the

  11   proceedings where the government has its opportunity to make

  12   rebuttal argument.

  13            Mr. Fitzgerald.

  14            MR. FITZGERALD:  Thank you, Judge.

  15            Good afternoon.

  16            THE JURY:  Good afternoon.

  17            MR. FITZGERALD:  What we do here, all of us, is

  18   important work.  And let's just get to work.  Let's dive right

  19   into it.

  20            If I happen to talk too fast at any point, it may

  21   have happened once or twice during the trial, put your hands

  22   up.  I'm not offended.  It's happened before.  Just give me

  23   that look that I need decaf. and I'll slow down.

  24            I'm going to go in order.  I'll start by addressing

  25   the El Hage summation and work from there.  And let me try to


   1   give you some topics we'll cover in rebutting the El Hage

   2   closing.

   3            I would like to talk to you about the witnesses

   4   Al-Fadl and Kherchtou, first Al-Fadl, then Kherchtou, and how

   5   they fit together, what they mean in this case.

   6            Then I would like to talk to you about the issue of

   7   Somalia, what was proved, what was not proved, what it means

   8   and what it doesn't.

   9            Then I would like to talk to you about the issue of

  10   perjury.  Perjury is an important part of the case against El

  11   Hage, but certainly not the only part.

  12            Then I would like to talk to you about Wadih El Hage

  13   coming back to America in September of 1997 and the way he was

  14   portrayed by Mr. Schmidt as a great American coming home to

  15   the country he loved.

  16            And then I would like to talk to you about the

  17   conspiracy, the conspiracy charged in Count One of al Qaeda

  18   members and associates, and others conspiring to kill

  19   Americans.

  20            And while I cover those topics, I would like to also

  21   focus on a theme.  Mr. Schmidt said to you during his

  22   summation, "presentation is very important in this case

  23   because the government doesn't have the evidence."  Then he

  24   continued that "presentation, form, is attempting to triumph

  25   over substance," as if there is a game here.  There's no


   1   evidence, slight of hand, that's the proof.  I want to keep

   2   that comment, that assertion by Mr. Schmidt in mind as we go

   3   through the different topics, his assertion that the

   4   government is trying to have form over substance.

   5            Al-Fadl.  You have heard a lot about Al-Fadl.  Let me

   6   tell you a couple of things to think about when you consider

   7   Al-Fadl.

   8            It's not whether you like him.  No one is here to

   9   decide whether you like Al-Fadl, a guy who joined a terrorist

  10   group, stole the terrorist group's money.  No one really cares

  11   that he stole the terrorist group's money.  We wish he stole

  12   it all so they couldn't do anything.

  13            What you are here to decide is whether what he told

  14   you about what he knew was the truth, not whether you like

  15   him.  It's not whether you think he's like Mother Theresa,

  16   because she's at the other end.  Mother Theresa doesn't join

  17   al Qaeda, al-Fadl does.

  18            People don't leave al Qaeda easily, but if you are

  19   caught stealing, you leave, okay?  No one asks you to make him

  20   your friend.  No one asks you to decide whether you want to

  21   have dinner with him.  The question is, is what he told you

  22   the truth.

  23            Second point:  It's what you think.  That's why you

  24   are here.  That's why you are picked.  That's why you are in

  25   the jury box, not me, not Mr. Schmidt.  Don't worry about who


   1   pounds the table the hardest as to whether he told the truth

   2   or didn't.  You size people up every day.  You know how to do

   3   that.  You do it for yourself.

   4            When you go about sizing up what Mr. Al-Fadl told

   5   you, be aware of two things.  He has a cooperation agreement

   6   with the government.  It's in evidence.  Don't worry, I'm not

   7   going to read it out loud to you.  But it's there.  It's

   8   Government Exhibit No. 1 that tells you what the terms of his

   9   deal are.

  10            And I submit to you there is no doubt that Al-Fadl

  11   looks out for number one.  Number one is Al-Fadl.  There's no

  12   doubt that he has an interest in testifying.  The question for

  13   you is, how does that interest affect what he says?  Does it

  14   give him a motive to make things up, or does it give him a

  15   motive not to do that because he may lose something if he gets

  16   caught in a lie?  You can look at that agreement and see what

  17   happens to him if he lies.

  18            The fourth thing, fourth thing I want to say about

  19   Al-Fadl is look at the corroboration.  "Corroboration" is just

  20   a fancy word for whether or not what he says checks out.

  21            Having that in mind, let me go through some of the

  22   things he told you.  One of the most important things you can

  23   think about when you think about Al-Fadl is the process by

  24   which he ended up in the witness stand, because you remember

  25   he left the al Qaeda terrorist group late '95, early 1996 and


   1   he went around and he approached the United States Government

   2   overseas in the summer of 1996.  Then he was debriefed.

   3            People interviewed him.  They took notes in the late

   4   summer and the fall of 1996.  He is telling what he knows and

   5   they are writing it down.  It will be checked out five years

   6   later in this courtroom.

   7            When he talks and he says what al Qaeda is, who is in

   8   al Qaeda, what it does, what it has done, he has no idea who's

   9   going to walk in behind him, he has no idea who may testify,

  10   he has no idea what phones may be wiretapped.  He has no idea

  11   what houses may be searched in the five years between what he

  12   says and when he comes to court.  I submit to you when you saw

  13   him testify, when you saw the stipulations about what seemed

  14   inconsistent between what he said in court and what he said in

  15   1996, it was minor.

  16            What did he tell you?  He told you al Qaeda was an

  17   organization.  He told you the structure:  The emir, the Shura

  18   Council, the committees.  He told you who were on these

  19   committees.  He told you it worked very, very closely with the

  20   Egyptian Islamic group, headed by that guy Ayman al Zawahiri,

  21   the Egyptian guy.  I should hold up his picture, but I forgot

  22   to pull it up.

  23            He told you that America was the enemy of al Qaeda

  24   back when he left the group in 1996.  He's planning and said

  25   America is the enemy of al Qaeda.  And he told you that he


   1   learned in al Qaeda that al Qaeda felt responsible for what

   2   they did in Somalia to go against the Americans.  And he told

   3   you from what he understood of the group, that the group was

   4   willing to attack Americans everywhere -- in the United

   5   States, outside the United States, and even embassies.

   6            Now, he said all that.  He's got to worry about who

   7   comes in behind him, what facts are unearthed later, and let

   8   me tell you about three people who came along to corroborate

   9   Al-Fadl.  I'm not talking about Kherchtou at this moment, I'm

  10   talking about Usama Bin Laden, Harun -- Fadhl -- the famous

  11   Harun you've heard so much about, and a man in this courtroom,

  12   Wadih El Hage.

  13            What did we learn?

  14            By the way, Al-Fadl also told you the reasons why al

  15   Qaeda didn't like America.  It was America being present in

  16   the Saudi Arabian Peninsula which was viewed as being

  17   unacceptable.  He told you it was the Americans coming to

  18   Somalia which was viewed as colonization.  He told you that al

  19   Qaeda was angry at America because this person Omar Abdel

  20   Rahman was arrested.  And he even told you the name of the

  21   Islamic scholar that gave them the justification, that person

  22   Ibn al Tamiyeh, that you have heard about several times.

  23            Well, along comes Bin Laden.  Bin Laden decides in

  24   the fall of 1996 to declare war openly, publicly on the

  25   American military, a declaration of Jihad against the American


   1   military.  Lo and behold, Bin Laden tells you that the enemy

   2   of al Qaeda is America, just like Al-Fadl did.

   3            Bin Laden says in the 1997 CNN interview that he's

   4   just targeting the United States.  That's the main enemy.  In

   5   February of 1998, when Bin Laden issues the fatwah, the ruling

   6   that says you can kill civilians and military, he does it

   7   jointly with the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, signed by Ayman al

   8   Zawahiri, the same group that Al-Fadl says they were working

   9   so closely with.  A lucky guess?  No.

  10            In May 1998, Bin Laden in his speech would single out

  11   embassies when he spoke to ABC, and say after the Khobar

  12   bombing, the American embassies are being used to gather

  13   information.  A dark, sinister hint.  And then in August of

  14   1998, as you have now seen, Bin Laden, his organization,

  15   bombed the embassies in Africa.  Certainly Bin Laden never did

  16   any of that to corroborate Al-Fadl, but it does.

  17            Bin Laden gave reasons in his speeches.  He said he

  18   was angry at America for its presence in Saudi Arabia.  He

  19   talked about the United States in Somalia.  He talked about

  20   the arrest of Omar Abdel Rahman, and he cited the scholar Ibn

  21   al Tamiyeh.

  22            In fact, in Bin Laden's speeches, if you look

  23   carefully at Government Exhibit 1600A-T -- and I'll try not

  24   read too many exhibits, but in 1600A-T Bin Laden even made

  25   clear -- that's the declaration of Jihad -- that while he was


   1   in the Sudan, he wasn't allowed to talk.

   2            And then he left the Sudan and he went to the Hindu

   3   Kush, the mountains in Afghanistan, and now he could talk,

   4   showing you that the hatred of America, attacking America,

   5   America being the enemy was talked about privately before

   6   because the Sudanese government kept him muzzled,

   7   corroborating again that there was a private discussion about

   8   America, the enemy within the group, but not public until he

   9   makes it to Afghanistan.

  10            Harun Fadhl.  How in the world did you ever expect

  11   that this man would come along and corroborate what he must

  12   view as a trader?  Well, what did he tell you?  You remember

  13   that report, which we're going to talk about a number of

  14   times, 300A-T.  It's the security report in the summer of

  15   1997.

  16            What does Harun talk about in there?  Well, he thinks

  17   that America is talking to an insider, not to Al-Fadl, but to

  18   that person Abu Fadhl al Makkee.  The best way to describe

  19   him:  The guy with the missing leg below the knee who is

  20   married to Bin Laden's niece.

  21            And when he's in a panic, what does he write in a

  22   report, not for the newspaper but a report to go back to the

  23   headquarters in Afghanistan?  Oh, my God, we're in trouble.

  24   America knows well we're the people who hit the Americans in

  25   Somalia.  Wow.  That's in 1997, corroborating what Al-Fadl


   1   told you.

   2            Harun also told you that they were panicked about

   3   that same person, Madani al Tayyib.  That's the same person as

   4   Abu Fadhl al Makkee that Al-Fadl told you all about.  He is

   5   saying to you, not meaning to, he got it right.  Abu Fadhl's

   6   in our group, our group exists, we are fighting America and we

   7   fought America in Somalia.

   8            Even El Hage corroborates Al-Fadl.  Mr. Schmidt

   9   talked to you about the bicycle story.  What did Mr. Al-Fadl

  10   tell you about the bicycles?  He said Wadih El Hage travels

  11   overseas.  He goes to buy bicycles.  And I basically look at

  12   him and say, what's up with that?  On the third guy signing an

  13   al Qaeda contract, you're buying bicycles, and what is his

  14   answer?  Is the answer that Al-Fadl gives you, oh, he said I

  15   wasn't buying bicycles, I'm buying nuclear weapons?  He just

  16   said Al-Fadl smiled.  That left you with the impression that

  17   you don't know, did he buy bikes or did he buy something else

  18   as well?

  19            I submit to you, you have seen on the defense case

  20   that he went and he bought bikes and in his notes he bought

  21   bikes.  But what did he see in August '97?  Mohamed Ali Odeh

  22   thought that Wadih El Hage went to Pakistan for strictly gems.

  23   So Wadih El Hage took a detour and went to see Bin Laden.  You

  24   still don't know what happened.  All my point is, Al-Fadl

  25   didn't make it up.  There was a bike deal.  He had a


   1   conversation.  He didn't add anything to it.

   2            Now, what's the most important thing Al-Fadl tells

   3   you?  The most important thing that Al-Fadl tells you is

   4   precisely the fact that there is no secret in al Qaeda that

   5   America is the enemy, we're at war with America, we were at

   6   war with America in Somalia, and it goes way back to at least

   7   1993 if not 1992.

   8            And remember, when we talk about a terrorist group

   9   keeping secrets, sure, you have to keep secrets at times about

  10   operations, but a terrorist group can't keep its enemy secret

  11   from its members.  You're joining a group to fight the enemy.

  12   You join a group and not know who you are supposed to fight?

  13   They know they're fighting America.  They may not know all the

  14   operations.  Someone can do a surveillance and not tell

  15   someone else, that's smart, but you know who you are against.

  16            Let's talk about Kherchtou.  Kherchtou is another

  17   cooperating witness, and again his cooperation agreement is in

  18   evidence and you can look at what it says and what the

  19   incentives are.

  20            Mr. Schmidt would like you to believe that Kherchtou

  21   doesn't really hurt Wadih El Hage's case except that he's

  22   lying whenever he does.  Kherchtou hurts Wadih El Hage's case

  23   without even trying.  He tells you, Who is Abu Ubaidah?  He's

  24   the military commander of al Qaeda.  What happened to him?  He

  25   drowned.  What did Wadih do when he learned it?  He cried.


   1   The guy who stood in front of a Grand Jury in this courthouse,

   2   took an oath and says "I know nothing about that" is crying

   3   over Abu Ubaidah drowning.

   4            Does Kherchtou know what he said in the Grand Jury?

   5   Al Qaeda knew its military commander drowned.  Kherchtou tells

   6   you that El Hage replaced Khalid al Fawwaz as the boss.

   7   Because remember, and you will see this theme later, when

   8   Fawwaz was in trouble in Nairobi, when he got arrested, when

   9   the heat's on and he's in jail, he gets out of town.  Go hide

  10   in open view in London, say I'm the spokesman, go over there,

  11   take the heat off the cell.  And who comes to replace him but

  12   Wadih El Hage.

  13            You know what?  Do you know how you know that

  14   Kherchtou knows less about Wadih El Hage than you do now?

  15   Kherchtou is asked by Mr. Schmidt -- and bear this in mind

  16   when you think about form over substance -- Kherchtou is asked

  17   by Mr. Schmidt, transcript at 1413:

  18            "Did you become aware that Harun," Harun, "was

  19   involved in false passports or other fraudulent documents?"

  20            "Kherchtou:  Yes.

  21            "Mr. Schmidt:  Did you ever see Wadih El Hage

  22   involved with false passports?

  23            "Kherchtou:  No."

  24            Kherchtou didn't know.  Kherchtou didn't see the

  25   letter you saw going back and forth, that Libyan guy in


   1   Azerbaijan.  There was a wiretap you saw conversations of

   2   where Wadih El Hage is involved with a DHL, sending a package

   3   and fixing the office and cleaning the green.

   4            Wadih El Hage, even Mr. Schmidt seems to concede, was

   5   involved with passports when he says, "It doesn't really

   6   matter, because that's okay in the third world.  Only you

   7   suspicious Americans think that's something bad."  I submit to

   8   you, Kherchtou didn't know as much as you did and you will see

   9   that throughout; that you have seen so many different pieces

  10   of the puzzle that you now know about particular things more

  11   than any one witness.  And if Kherchtou wanted to make it up,

  12   wouldn't he have just said, yeah, I saw Wadih do passports?

  13   But he didn't.  He told you what he knew and what he didn't

  14   know.

  15            Kherchtou told you that he sat in Wadih El Hage's

  16   house with Ali Mohamed, a person Abu Mohamed al Amriki,

  17   several pictures of him, the guy who did the surveillance, and

  18   said that the military commander wanted Kherchtou and Ali

  19   Mohamed to go over to Senegal and surveil targets.  He never

  20   reached.  He said Wadih El Hage was present.  He was in his

  21   house.  He could have.  Wadih El Hage would be in the area.

  22   He doesn't have to worry.  But he doesn't.

  23            And you will see later that when Kherchtou told you

  24   the story about al Fawwaz being arrested, he told you that

  25   they paid bribes, they went to a lawyer and they went to a


   1   contact in the Kenyan Intelligence Service, a guy named Ali.

   2   He never once indicated that Wadih El Hage knew Ali or knew

   3   about him.  And yet when you look through Wadih El Hage's

   4   notebooks you will see later on that Wadih El Hage had an

   5   entry in his notebook that said, "Ali from Kenyan Intelligence

   6   can help us with the organization."  Kherchtou didn't reach.

   7            Now, I submit to you the one thing that Mr. Schmidt

   8   cannot accept is that Mr. Kherchtou believes but doesn't know,

   9   but believes that Wadih El Hage is a member of al Qaeda.  And

  10   let's talk about form over substance, because it's

  11   interesting.

  12            On the government's direct examination, I will cite

  13   transcript 76.  You can check it.  Kherchtou is asked right up

  14   front:

  15            "Do you know if Wadih El Hage made bayat?"  He said

  16   no.  He was asked:  "Were you ever told that there was

  17   anything that could not be discussed in front of Wadih El

  18   Hage?"  And he said no.  So he doesn't know if he made bayat,

  19   he didn't see a bayat, but there was nothing he understood he

  20   could not discuss.

  21            Mr. Schmidt, asking Kherchtou on cross -- I'll

  22   display the first one.  1365 of the transcript asks about a

  23   number of people and whether they are in al Qaeda.  But watch

  24   the form, the form of the question:

  25            "And you believed that he was not a member of al


   1   Qaeda, correct?  Is that correct?

   2            "Answer:  Yes."

   3            I won't show all of these.  I'll read them to you and

   4   give you the cite.  1372 about Ahmed Sheik:  "You are fairly

   5   confident that he is not a member of al Qaeda, correct?"  1375

   6   about Abu Khadija:  "You were not aware that he is a member of

   7   al Qaeda; is that correct?"

   8            1376 about Dr. Mubaraka:  "Dr. Mubaraka, to your

   9   knowledge, is not a member of al Qaeda; is that correct?"

  10            "Hamza al Liby, to your knowledge, you do not believe

  11   he is al Qaeda, correct?  Someone else, do you know if he was

  12   al Qaeda?"

  13            1377, "Abu Muath, was he al Qaeda?"  And it goes on

  14   for several pages.

  15            Then we go to transcript 1401, I believe, when it

  16   gets to El Hage it's not "do you believe he's a member."

  17            "Now, so is it fair that you do not know --

  18   withdrawn.  You have no actual knowledge that Mr. El Hage ever

  19   took bayat in al Qaeda; is that correct?

  20            "Answer:  Yes."

  21            And he wants to talk to you about form over

  22   substance.

  23            Then it came back on redirect and Mr. Kherchtou was

  24   asked, "Do you believe he's in al Qaeda?"  And he said "yes."

  25   And then he was crossed again on facts that he said before he


   1   did not know that people in al Qaeda discussed that they did

   2   not know, and that fact is remarkable because most people are

   3   in al Qaeda or they're not, but some of the big people being

   4   Abu Hafs, Abu Hajer, people don't know if they made bayat, but

   5   they know they're important.

   6            And then at 1561 to 1562, what Kherchtou said -- I

   7   hope I'm on the right page -- bottom of the page, line 24,

   8   when asked what he understood, he said:  "That is true.  But

   9   when I have indicated or mentioned that he is a member of the

  10   al Qaeda, it," next page, "it was in relation or in reference

  11   to the way that we were relating to him, and it was open in

  12   how he handled matters."

  13            Skipping over the colloquy, continuing the answer:

  14   "Persons who are not members in the al Qaeda, we cannot talk

  15   to them openly as the way we address members of the al Qaeda

  16   and as the way we addressed him."

  17            Now, you know what, as we have said many a time and

  18   the judge will explain to you, you don't have to be a member

  19   of al Qaeda to be part of the Count One or the other count

  20   conspiracies which are made up of people who are in al Qaeda

  21   and who are not.  And just the same, to be fair, just because

  22   you are in al Qaeda doesn't make you part of the conspiracy.

  23            But focus on the form.  It was brought out fairly.

  24   He didn't know about the bayat, but he could talk.  When it

  25   came down to that, I submit to you El Hage could not deal with


   1   the fact that someone he knew believed he's an al Qaeda

   2   member.  I submit to you, as you sit here today, there are

   3   people in this room, looking at us now, who never saw any of

   4   you take an oath who have good reason to believe that you are

   5   jurors.

   6            What about America?  What did Kherchtou tell you

   7   about al Qaeda's role with regard or position with regard to

   8   America?  He said something different than Al-Fadl, and let's

   9   recognize that.

  10            Al-Fadl is back at headquarters, the person back at

  11   Sudan.  He hears his speeches and he says, yes, Bin Laden said

  12   this about the head of the snake and this about fighting the

  13   Americans, and we'll see some corroboration of what Al-Fadl

  14   said about specific trips into Somalia by the military

  15   commander.

  16            But he heard it that way.  Kherchtou's a field guy.

  17   He's helping people in Nairobi go to Somalia.  He's taking

  18   flying lessons.  And what did he tell you?  He knew, he knew

  19   from talking to the people going up to Somalia, like Harun and

  20   Saleh.  And we'll get to how Harun exaggerates later, because

  21   what Harun told him about what Harun and Saleh did, they were

  22   together.  Harun and Saleh were talking to Kherchtou.  Harun

  23   is going to make up what Saleh did in front of Saleh.

  24            Kherchtou told you he understood that America was the

  25   enemy.  It was so obvious to him he wouldn't remember


   1   particular remarks.  Let me give you an analogy, but let me

   2   tell you why the analogy doesn't work.

   3            We are not here treating al Qaeda as a country.  We

   4   are not here treating Usama Bin Laden as a head of state.

   5   It's a terrorist group.  They may think they are a country,

   6   they may think they get the right to act like a country.  They

   7   don't.  We're not here talking about a military enterprise.

   8   They can call it military, but it's terrorist.

   9            Putting that aside, how many of you remember back in

  10   the days when there was a Cold War how you learned that the

  11   Soviet Union or Russia was the enemy of America?  Can you sit

  12   down and point to a conversation and say I learned it on that

  13   day?  Would it be so obvious to you who the enemy was that if

  14   someone came back now and said, prove you knew.  Who you told

  15   you?  Did you ever hear the president say something bad about

  16   them?  I don't know, I knew.

  17            If he said something bad back then, it wouldn't stick

  18   in my mind.  He also said the surveillance team coming to

  19   Nairobi brought it home to him; dealing with the people who

  20   were going to Somalia, even though he didn't go himself, made

  21   it clear to him from what Saleh and Harun said they were

  22   fighting the Americans.

  23            I submit to you when you take Kherchtou and Al-Fadl

  24   together, two people from different parts of al Qaeda, when

  25   they come together and they tell you, yes, we were in al Qaeda


   1   and we knew back in '93 that America was the enemy, that's the

   2   problem for El Hage.  And that's the problem for Odeh as well,

   3   as we'll see later, because you are in a group from 1993 that

   4   you know is making America its enemy, that is making war in

   5   America, and you do that and you want to help the group do

   6   that, I submit to you that's a long way along the way to

   7   conspiracy.

   8            Let's talk about Somalia.  Mr. Schmidt told you --

   9   actually, before we talk about the factual issues in Somalia,

  10   let's talk about something.

  11            Where did Somalia fit in in this case?  Well, you may

  12   or may not be surprised to learn there is no charge in this

  13   case, no single count that talks about Somalia alone.  There's

  14   no one killed in Somalia that's charged as a murder count.

  15   The participation in Somalia is charged and, I submit, proven

  16   to you as part of the conspiracy, the ongoing conspiracy to do

  17   various things to attack America.

  18            And I'll make very plain:  No one in this courtroom

  19   took any weapon.  We contend we didn't prove, we don't allege

  20   that anyone in this courtroom picked up a gun and shot and

  21   killed an American.  Not Mr. Odeh, not Mr. El Hage, we don't

  22   even contend Al-'Owhali ever went to Somalia.  K.K. Mohamed

  23   didn't go for years later.

  24            What is important is if the people working in al

  25   Qaeda understood that in 1993 that the U.S. participating with


   1   the U.N. coming to Somalia was colonization, an enemy, and

   2   they are working to fight America, that puts the line for the

   3   claim that years later they're surprised, surprised to learn

   4   America is the enemy, that this was something new.  It only

   5   came out when Bin Laden made that speech.

   6            I submit to you that Somalia proves that the group

   7   was working against America way back then.  And they believed

   8   in their own internal discussions, they believed they were

   9   responsible for what happened to the Americans in Somalia.

  10   Harun telling Kherchtou in front of Saleh, we were up there in

  11   Mogadishu in a building with helicopters shooting at us,

  12   someone joining that group, someone working with that group,

  13   someone assisting that group will know what it is they're

  14   working against.

  15            Mr. Schmidt told you that for Somalia all we have are

  16   the words of terrorists who are braggarts and liars.  That's

  17   pretty clever.  Let's walk through it.

  18            First, look at what Al-Fadl told you.  Al-Fadl

  19   approached the government again in the summer of 1996.  And

  20   what does he tell you?  He says, I'm in the Sudan.  Abu Hafs

  21   took two trips to Somalia.  One was to go down to assess what

  22   they could do.  And he came back and he told you, in very

  23   shortened forms, not as articulate as Dr. Samatar, but there's

  24   a whole lot of tribes over there and they are fighting each

  25   other, and Abu Hafs told him "we can't do it easily."  He


   1   said, "It is not going to be easy," transcript 422, 423, "but

   2   we have to start a little bit if it's getting bigger."  He

   3   said, "It is not easy to start because different tribe,

   4   different groups, there's nobody control going on over there,

   5   but we try to start a little bit and if go good, we go

   6   bigger."

   7            And then he told you after coming back from another

   8   trip, Abu Hafs said that the group, al Qaeda, was responsible

   9   for the attacks on the Americans.  That's Al-Fadl.

  10            What do you learn afterward?  You learn afterward

  11   that in 1997 Bin Laden makes statements to CNN that, yes, it's

  12   the Arab mujahadeen from Afghanistan who are responsible for

  13   what happened to Somalia.  And what does Mr. Schmidt say?

  14   Very cleverly:  Well, you're a terrorist.  You have to

  15   terrorize.

  16            MR. SCHMIDT:  Objection, your Honor.

  17            THE COURT:  Overruled.

  18            MR. FITZGERALD:  Your recollection will control, but

  19   he argued to you that Bin Laden, to terrorize, has to take

  20   credit.

  21            Go back, look at that same interview, and what you

  22   will see is he says, I didn't do, I wasn't part of the Riyadh

  23   bombing or the Khobar bombing.  If he is falsely taking

  24   credit, take credit for all of them.

  25            Harun.  Harun's report that we'll hear a lot about,


   1   that report, 300A-T -- and we'll call it the Harun report

   2   because it is clear he wrote it, but the Harun report from the

   3   El Hage computer in the El Hage house, the one that says "the

   4   cell is in danger," now we hear that Harun may be a kid,

   5   according to Mr. Schmidt, and he may exaggerate.

   6            The basis for that is he asked Kherchtou when they

   7   bring him back:  Does he exaggerate?  He says:  Yeah.  Does he

   8   make up stories about himself?  Kherchtou says no, but let's

   9   run with it.  He's a braggart.  He's not a kid.  This man

  10   organized a bombing that killed 213 people.  That's not a kid,

  11   that's a murderer, someone who thinks in cold blood.

  12            Now, when does Harun write this report?  He writes

  13   this report in the summer of 1997.  There's a date, you can

  14   figure it out from the date, August 13 or August 14, when he

  15   has a panic attack, when he thinks that Abu Fadhl al Makkee,

  16   the guy with the missing the leg, married to Bin Laden's

  17   niece, is talking to the Americans.  When he thinks one of

  18   their group, an insider, is talking to the Americans, he

  19   panics.

  20            This is not written for CNN to take credit, this is

  21   written for headquarters, the supreme and wise high command

  22   back in Afghanistan.  It's not for taking credit and it's not

  23   for bragging.  He is talking to Bin Laden about what Bin Laden

  24   did.  You don't make up a story to your boss about what your

  25   boss did.


   1            What does he say?  He says, basically, we're in

   2   trouble.  I'll read you part of a paragraph:  "My advice to my

   3   brothers, the crew of East Africa, is not to be lax with

   4   security matters, and that they should know that they are

   5   America's primary target now and that there's an

   6   American/Kenyan/Egyptian intelligence activity in Nairobi,

   7   working to identify the locations and the people who are

   8   dealing with the Sheik, since America knows well that the

   9   youth who work in Somalia and who are followers of the Sheik

  10   are the ones who have carried out operations to hit the

  11   Americans in Somalia and that the main gateway for those

  12   people is Kenya.  Therefore, there must be a center for them

  13   in Kenya."

  14            Wow.  That's the insider, that's the guy in the group

  15   who says, "Oh, my God, they may know the truth," and this is

  16   what the truth is.  Let the boss know there's a problem.  Did

  17   Al-Fadl get lucky and just guess that?  The important point

  18   is, back in 1993 al Qaeda may have worked with different

  19   tribes.  It's not who they were working with.  The point is

  20   the state of mind as to who they were working against.

  21            And of course, you also heard with regard to Somalia

  22   that in the fall of 2000, Kherchtou tells what he knows, and

  23   he says he talked to Harun and Saleh, and one of them,

  24   probably Harun, told them that they were up in Mogadishu

  25   during the fight against the Americans and they were up in


   1   Mogadishu and they wanted to build a truck bomb to put it in

   2   the U.N. compound but didn't succeed.  And for that,

   3   Mr. Schmidt tells you there's a timing problem, and again I

   4   reference that theme:  Form over substance.  And let's walk

   5   through the timing problem.

   6            I'll give you a hint to what the answer is right now.

   7   Most people, many people, often remember events by what

   8   happened, not the date.  You may remember that that thing

   9   happened at your cousin's wedding and it turns out that you

  10   think your cousin's wedding is in 1993 and it was in 1992.  It

  11   doesn't mean you weren't there, it doesn't mean it didn't

  12   happen, it means you're not good with dates.

  13            And I can give you a very good example to show how

  14   Kherchtou can be off on dates, but right.  Let's talk about

  15   the surveillance, the surveillance team coming to Nairobi.

  16   You remember Kherchtou's in Nairobi and he says that Abu

  17   Mohamed al Amriki -- you know Abu Mohamed, the person whose

  18   house was searched in California -- comes to Nairobi.  He also

  19   says Fawwaz, the guy that Wadih El Hage would later replace,

  20   comes to Nairobi, and Anas al Liby.  Anas al Liby, whose

  21   passport photo was later found in Wadih El Hage's files, he

  22   comes, too.

  23            And he says when they come, they borrow his apartment

  24   to do surveillance.  And not being an idiot, seeing a

  25   surveillance team there with cameras, he knows there's


   1   surveillance.  Then he says later on, and he thinks he says

   2   it's 1994, later on, he says, and after that, Fawwaz was

   3   arrested in his apartment, the same apartment.  And he knows

   4   that that came afterward because if he had been arrested in

   5   his apartment, no one would have ever used that location

   6   again.  If they are watching your apartment, you don't use

   7   that to conduct surveillance.  That came later.

   8            And he remembered that when Fawwaz was arrested, it

   9   was Ramadan because he was walking home when he learned about

  10   the arrest and he's been fasting all day, he's waiting to eat,

  11   and he comes home and he sees a neighbor.  And then after

  12   Fawwaz is arrested, Fawwaz is in jail, they pay the bribe, he

  13   gets out, Fawwaz flips to London, and Wadih El Hage comes.

  14            Now, he says 1994, but what matters more is the

  15   sequence:  Surveillance, arrest, out of jail.  The arrest is

  16   in Ramadan.  There's a stipulation.  Ramadan was February of

  17   1994.  So if Kherchtou is correct, Ali Mohamed and Khalid al

  18   Fawwaz have to be in Nairobi at the same time, sometime prior

  19   to February 1994.

  20            And you can look at the exhibits, 622A, the Fawwaz

  21   passport found in Wadih El Hage's files, and 362, Ali

  22   Mohamed's passport, and they both arrive in Nairobi in

  23   December 1993.  Boom.  Dead on, the same time.

  24            Now, of course, what you have learned is Kherchtou

  25   described this 1994 event, which is really 1993.  He's got his


   1   years off, but it happened.

   2            What did Mr. Schmidt ask Mr. Kherchtou about the

   3   conversation that Kherchtou had with Harun and Saleh?  Go to

   4   transcript 1450 -- I'm sorry, that was the surveillance.

   5   1445.  I'll read the question, but you can have anything read

   6   back that you would like.

   7   "Q.  Did Abu Mohamed el Masry go to Somalia at some period in

   8   time?"

   9            And remember, Saleh is Abu Mohamed el Masry.

  10   "A.  Yes.

  11   "Q.  Now, did he go -- was it -- withdrawn.

  12            "When he went to Somalia, was it in 1994; isn't that

  13   correct?"

  14            Now, remember, he argued to you it couldn't have

  15   happened because the Americans are gone by 1994.  I submit to

  16   you the answer he wants is 1994.

  17            The question again:

  18   "Q.  When he went to Somalia, was it in 1994; isn't that

  19   correct?

  20   "A.  (From Kherchtou) Abu el Masry, he went to Somalia, yes.

  21   "Q.  It was in 1994 that he went to Somalia; isn't that

  22   correct?

  23   "A.  He went before that, I think, yeah."

  24            So Mr. Schmidt pulled out a document and said, well,

  25   here's a report, you said before it was 1994, and refreshes


   1   his recollection.  Then on redirect we bring back and show him

   2   the other part of that document that says when Harun and Saleh

   3   went up there, they were fighting the Americans.  So Kherchtou

   4   says when they were there, the Americans were there.  That's

   5   the important point -- when the events took place, who was

   6   there, not the calendar.

   7            I submit to you if you recall the time when Kherchtou

   8   was called back, he talked about how it was that when he saw

   9   Harun and Saleh, they talked about what happened in Mogadishu.

  10   And the last question I submit to you, you can check the

  11   record, Mr. Schmidt changed it:

  12            "It is your understanding that Harun and Abu Mohamed

  13   el Masry went to Mogadishu after you came to Nairobi for the

  14   second time; isn't that correct?"

  15            And then argues to you there was a time frame

  16   problem.  I submit to you there is no time frame problem.

  17   Kherchtou met with Saleh and Harun and they told him what

  18   happened.  They made it painfully plain that America was the

  19   enemy in Somalia.  This is Harun who is telling Kherchtou,

  20   Harun, who is El Hage's deputy living in his house, using his

  21   computer.  I submit to you that it is damning to show that El

  22   Hage knew America was the enemy a long time ago.

  23            Form over substance.

  24            Stingers.  Airplanes.  Airplane trips.  You heard

  25   about Stinger Missiles.  No one contended that Stinger


   1   Missiles were actually flown from Afghanistan to the Sudan

   2   into Somalia.

   3            You don't know the dates now.  El Hage has in his

   4   notebooks the airplanes, but you can look all the way through

   5   the notebooks and there's no reference to Stingers.  What you

   6   will see, Mr. Schmidt said Mr. El Hage writes everything down.

   7   Well, he writes everything down except bad passports, Stingers

   8   and trips to see Bin Laden in Afghanistan and contacts with

   9   people for fake passports.

  10            The point was al Ridi told you he recalled 1993.

  11   He's having a conversation about the airplane.  The point is

  12   back before anyone got to the Sudan, Kherchtou, Al-Fadl, told

  13   you back in Pakistan, before they left, they're saying America

  14   is the enemy.  El Hage is in the Sudan trying to get Stinger

  15   Missiles from Pakistan to the Sudan, at a time at least

  16   America is the enemy, if not America is in Somalia and already

  17   the enemy.

  18            Remember Mr. Schmidt's opening.  Mr. El Hage related

  19   to Bin Laden as nothing other than a businessman.  Well, a

  20   businessman is getting Stinger Missiles.

  21            What's more important?  Focus, focus on the airplane

  22   trip of Abu Hafs -- classic example of why it is that you now

  23   know more than some of the members or former members of al

  24   Qaeda know, because the trip of Abu Hafs to Somalia pulls a

  25   lot together.


   1            Mr. Schmidt didn't talk about that.  He told you that

   2   because Wadih El Hage once thought about during a phone

   3   conversation taking a flight on El Al, then you should think

   4   differently of him.

   5            Focus on this flight.  Al-Fadl tells us that Abu Hafs

   6   goes down to Somalia in 1993 and takes these trips.  What do

   7   you learn?  Essam al Ridi comes forward and says Wadih El Hage

   8   has him buy the airplane, he brings the airplanes over.  And

   9   Mr. Schmidt said the other day, once the deal went through,

  10   transcript 5642, Mr. El Hage was done with it.  He got the

  11   plane, he did his job as an employee of the companies, and

  12   that was it.

  13            But, no, al Ridi goes home to America and gets called

  14   by El Hage again.  He takes this special flight, this charter

  15   flight down to Kenya.  Remember what al Ridi told you:  He

  16   flew five people down to Kenya.  He gets off, he stayed in a

  17   hotel, and then he went someplace else, one of those propeller

  18   flights

  19            What did Kherchtou tell you?  He says when he gets to

  20   Nairobi, he was told -- and he got there in October of 1993 --

  21   that the plane was used to fly Abu Hafs down to Nairobi with

  22   other guys, four other guys, I believe -- you can check the

  23   record -- and then they went up to Somalia.  The Abu Hafs trip

  24   to Somalia that Al-Fadl told you about, one of the two was

  25   that Essam al Ridi flight that El Hage arranged, the jet to


   1   Nairobi, the propeller job, up to Somalia.

   2            Mr. Schmidt asked Kherchtou the time frame on that.

   3   Kherchtou was very firm.  It happened before he got to Nairobi

   4   in October 1993.  There's no 1994 problem.  El Hage, at a time

   5   when America is the enemy, at a time when the evidence shows

   6   you it's clear to Harun and others that they're fighting the

   7   Americans in Somalia, El Hage is the one arranging the flight,

   8   bringing the military commander down to Nairobi from where he

   9   would then go to Somalia.

  10            Perjury.  Let's talk about perjury.  Let's be blunt.

  11   I submit to you you heard ten of the most pathetic excuses of

  12   perjury ever known.  Let's go through them.

  13            Number one, focus for a moment on someone standing up

  14   and telling you the government is form over substance, Mr. El

  15   Hage has a pure heart and a clear conscience, and then what

  16   are you told regarding those answers?  Number one, you were

  17   told he was never even asked questions about anti-American

  18   activities.  I'll quote transcript 5621.  "And if you look in

  19   the Grand Jury, he is not even questioned about anti-American

  20   activity."

  21            Well, you may not remember word for word of the

  22   transcript, but in 1997 there are a whole lot of questions to

  23   El Hage about what Bin Laden's doing.  He declared war.  What

  24   do you know about it?  Bin Laden declaring war on America is

  25   about anti-American activity.


   1            1998, first question right out of the box:  Who

   2   bombed our embassies?  The last questions when he gave those

   3   ridiculous answers that "it looks like my writing, it looks

   4   like my name, but it's not my writing, it's not my name."

   5            This guy, the terrorist, spends his days

   6   counterfeiting things, writing letters to and from him, he's

   7   told flat-out, this is no joke, 2 -- at the time was a higher

   8   number -- over 200 people were believed to be dead and this

   9   was about a bombing of the embassies.  The Grand Jury was

  10   about anti-American activity because it's a crime.

  11            We've been accused of waving the flag in this case.

  12   You know who brought America to this courtroom?  It came in

  13   twice.  The defendants plotted to kill and murder United

  14   States nationals.  That's what they did.  We have to prove it.

  15   If we didn't bring America into this courtroom, we wouldn't

  16   need a burden of proof, which we welcome and we have met.  And

  17   Mr. El Hage in his opening said he is someone who shared in

  18   this tragedy as a fellow American citizen, so we do have to

  19   talk about America.

  20            The second excuse -- by the way, if he wasn't asked

  21   more about anti-American activity, I submit to you, how could

  22   he be?  If he doesn't say, he won't admit Abu Ubaidah ever

  23   came to Kenya, much less drowned at the lake where he was

  24   investigating him, how can you follow up?  How could he be

  25   asked by the Grand Jury anymore:  Well, that person you don't


   1   admit knowing that you are lying about, could you tell us what

   2   kind of anti-American activities they would be engaged in if

   3   you were to tell us the truth?

   4            Second excuse.  He was tired, jet-lagged and

   5   confused.  Ironic, because during the conspiracy part of the

   6   case he was busy as a beaver flying all over the world, the

   7   international businessman, getting it all done.  Then, the

   8   Grand Jury, jet lag hits.

   9            I submit to you when you look at the questions, no

  10   one asked him to do high math, he wasn't being asked to do

  11   nuclear physics, it wasn't a complicated test, he was being

  12   asked a complicated question as, "Have you seen Usama Bin

  13   Laden?"  It's September 24, 1997.  He saw him the month

  14   before.

  15            I submit to you, with all that was going on in the

  16   Harun report, all that was going on in the world about Usama

  17   Bin Laden, if you saw Usama Bin Laden and you took a secret

  18   trip overseas to Pakistan or Afghanistan to see Usama Bin

  19   Laden, you would remember it.  You don't forget it because of

  20   jet lag.

  21            By the way, not a word, not a word in that

  22   transcript, ever, "I'm confused," never "I'm tired," never

  23   "have a break."  You can look at the dates, the times.  He's

  24   in there for like four hours, 10:30, stops at 4:00.  He

  25   actually corrects, if you read the transcript, he corrects the


   1   questioner once.  The questioner says, Exhibit 64.  No,

   2   Exhibit 54.  It's not jet lag, it's perjury.

   3            The third argument:  They didn't show him his

   4   documents, as Mr. Schmidt said at 5652.  The government has

   5   his documents, didn't show it to him, and now asks you to find

   6   him guilty of perjury.  Well, two things about that:  Number

   7   one, you don't need a document, you don't need a notebook to

   8   figure out whether you have just went and visited Usama Bin

   9   Laden.  It's not a trick question.  It's not a detail.  You

  10   went and saw him or you didn't.

  11            But of all people to make that claim.  His files, he

  12   was told, you were brought back to the Grand Jury and said

  13   your files have been found.  They show you are lying.  Let's

  14   talk about these documents.  And he is shown the documents and

  15   he says, I didn't write it, that's not my letter.  That looks

  16   like my name.  That's not my handwriting.  It looks like my

  17   handwriting.  He was shown his documents and he lied.

  18            The photographs.  Mr. Schmidt said, form over

  19   substance, it's unfair.  How does the government charge that

  20   man, the American citizen, with three Counts of perjury for

  21   not recognizing photographs.  And there are people taking that

  22   witness stand, witnesses who don't recognize people.  Okay,

  23   sounds nice.  Let's look at the facts.

  24            He was charged with three counts of perjury that

  25   involve photographs.  Were they obscure photographs?  Was he


   1   given 100 photographs?  Go through them all.  Oh, you missed

   2   one.  Perjury.  No.  No.  No.  The three photographs were Abu

   3   Ubaidah al Banshiri, Ali Mohamed, the Abu Mohamed fellow, and

   4   Mohamed Sadeek Odeh.  If you look at the record, each person

   5   was talked about at least twice with him and he lied.  And not

   6   only that, for each of them he was given the answer.  He was

   7   given a test, not an open book test, an open book test with

   8   the answer filled in, but he denied it.

   9            Let's walk through it.  Abu Ubaidah, 1997, he says,

  10   hey, I don't know the guy.  I went to look for Adel Habib,

  11   some Dutch businessman who drowned.  He's brought back and he

  12   is shown the picture.  And you look at the transcript:  Isn't

  13   that a picture of Abu Ubaidah?  No.  The loan document says

  14   Jalal, isn't that Jalal?  No.  He's asked in 1997, he's asked

  15   in 1998, he's asked by Miranda.  He just lies and lies and

  16   lies, and he's charged.

  17            Ali Mohamed, he says he doesn't recognize him in

  18   1997.  I show the picture in 1998.  And again, let's look at

  19   the picture.  Is this a guy from California?  Is his name Ali

  20   Mohamed?  Here's a letter from his work.  Sunnyvale,

  21   California.  Isn't that Ali Mohamed?  Nope.  That's not him.

  22   I don't know him.

  23            Mohamed Sadeek Odeh, Mohamed Sadeek Odeh who is on

  24   the telephone with him as Marwan.  Now, Mr. Schmidt would like

  25   you to believe that, gee, that's pathetic.  We just put


   1   Kherchtou up there.  That's the only proof that's Marwan on

   2   the phone.

   3            Well, you heard that there are tapes in evidence of

   4   Odeh talking to his wife, the tape recorded letters, okay.  I

   5   submit to you El Hage has no burden of proof, but if he thinks

   6   Kherchtou got up and lied on the witness stand and said that's

   7   Marwan, but it's not, instead of bringing a handwriting

   8   expert, why didn't you have someone take that tape, listen to

   9   the tape with his wife, listen to his tape with El Hage and

  10   compare the voices?

  11            Not only that, but Kherchtou identified a different

  12   transcript where Marwan, Odeh, spoke to Harun.  Compare that

  13   voice, and you know what?  During this conversation Harun says

  14   to Odeh:  How's Yasr?  And you have learned that Odeh has a

  15   son named Yasr.  It's Marwan.  It's not form over substance.

  16   It's Marwan.  It's Odeh.  And El Hage lied about that.

  17            Odeh is the person that when El Hage comes back with

  18   a new policy from Afghanistan, Marwan, Odeh, goes north of

  19   Somalia.  He's shown the pictures, he's shown the pictures by

  20   Agent Miranda in Texas, and he lies and says he doesn't know

  21   them, he just knows them from T.V.  He's shown the picture in

  22   the Grand Jury and asked, "Isn't that Mohamed Odeh?"  And

  23   Mr. Schmidt argued to you he was shown photos we now know are

  24   Mohamed Odeh.  I submit to you, he was shown the photos, he

  25   was given the answer, he just flat-out lied.


   1            Fifth argument, fifth excuse:  He told them

   2   everything they needed to know about Fawwaz, Harun and Abu

   3   Ubaidah.  We'll deal with that real quick.  Sure, he told the

   4   Grand Jury that Fawwaz is in London as a spokesperson for Bin

   5   Laden.  Well, first of all, he thinks that al Tayyib is

   6   talking at the time.

   7            Second, we showed you a document, there's a public

   8   announcement in 1994 signed by Bin Laden that says Fawwaz is

   9   appointed as the head of this committee in London.  He told

  10   you something that basically you could find out from the phone

  11   book.

  12            What did he leave out?  By the way, Fawwaz used to be

  13   head of a military command camp back at Afghanistan, one at

  14   which Odeh trained.  By the way, Fawwaz used to be in Nairobi.

  15   He was a cell leader of al Qaeda.  By the way, Fawwaz got in

  16   trouble down there.  Bribed his way out of jail.  By the way,

  17   Fawwaz was replaced by me, Wadih El Hage, in Kenya.

  18            How about Harun?  Oh, sure, he said he knew Harun.

  19   He just never knew him to have anything to do with Bin Laden.

  20   Is that everything the Grand Jury needed to know about Harun?

  21            About Abu Ubaidah, he said someone drowned, a Dutch

  22   businessman, Adel Habib, not a military commander of a

  23   terrorist group.

  24            The sixth argument, the sixth excuse:  The questions

  25   are not important since the government knew it all already.  I


   1   submit to you -- and he says to you, look, they had the

   2   wiretap, they had his notebooks.  Well, is the wiretap

   3   self-evident?  You heard that Kherchtou identified voices in

   4   the wiretap.  You saw some unidentified voices in the wiretap.

   5            Did the government, did the Grand Jury know

   6   everything at that time?  And what about his notebooks?  Well,

   7   the Grand Jury cared only about habiscus and sesame seeds.

   8   They knew a lot.  There's nothing in there about Stingers,

   9   there's nothing in there about fake passports, there's nothing

  10   in there about him going to see Bin Laden.

  11            The government, even if the Grand Jury had access to

  12   what the government had, they had his documents, they didn't

  13   have what was in his mind and what the Grand Jury has a right

  14   to when people are put under oath -- your truthful knowledge,

  15   your truthful recollection of what happened.

  16            It was argued that it just wasn't fair the way the

  17   questions were asked in the Grand Jury.  I'll give you one

  18   example.  It's in a count.  It's on the document.  "Have you

  19   seen Usama Bin Laden anyplace in the world in 1995, '96 or

  20   '97?"  What's so hard about that?

  21            We'll talk about the Abu Ubaidah letter.  Remember

  22   the letter that somehow the ostrich fits in?  He's on an

  23   ostrich.  He wrote a letter to his brother-in-law, July 14th.

  24   There's a stipulation he wrote it.  He says he didn't write

  25   it.  So, therefore, he's not lying since he must be mistaken


   1   since he really did write the letter, and now we agreed that

   2   the letter he said he didn't write he wrote.

   3            He must be confused because it's not al Qaeda.  Well,

   4   fine.  It's a letter to his brother-in-law.  But you know

   5   what?  He had already been told his files had been found.  He

   6   had already been told in the Grand Jury that his files showed

   7   he was lying, and he already had been shown documents and

   8   said, "I didn't write them."  He can't then say, "Oh, but that

   9   one, that's mine.  That writing really is mine.  There where

  10   it says Wadih, that's Wadih," and then take the next document

  11   and say otherwise.

  12            Let me just cut the perjury discussion short with

  13   this:  Mr. Karas quoted to you Mark Twain and Abraham Lincoln.

  14   I'll quote to you someone different.  I'll quote to you

  15   Mr. Schmidt.

  16            In discussing other witnesses, he said to you, at

  17   transcript 5683:  "You can tell when you have bad guys who

  18   just can't stop lying, who make things up."  I submit to you,

  19   you keep that in mind when you look at those perjury counts,

  20   and I also submit to you that you keep in mind the

  21   significance of the perjury counts for two reasons:

  22            Mr. Schmidt told you that Mr. El Hage made a bayat to

  23   America.  Mr. Schmidt told you that to blame him for anything

  24   that happened from the government not figuring anything out

  25   was unAmerican.  He said it's unfair, inaccurate, unAmerican.


   1            He implied that this is about a lack of patriotism;

   2   you can't charge someone with a lack of patriotism.  I tell

   3   you right now, no one is on trial for a lack of patriotism.

   4   That's not a crime.  Americans have gone to war to allow

   5   people to express a lack of patriotism.

   6            El Hage is on trial for perjury because it's a crime.

   7   Like everybody else, whether he likes America or not, whether

   8   he's a citizen or not, you are in the Grand Jury, you're in

   9   this courthouse, you raise your hand, you take an oath and you

  10   tell the truth.  I'll tell you something else:  It goes beyond

  11   a crime against America.

  12            MR. SCHMIDT:  Objection, your Honor.

  13            THE COURT:  Overruled.  Argument.

  14            MR. FITZGERALD:  Look at 1998.  When he was in that

  15   Grand Jury, two buildings had been bombed.  In the first one,

  16   213 people lost their lives, thousands were injured.  In the

  17   other building, 11 people lost their lives.  And he's brought

  18   before the Grand Jury, he takes an oath and he shows nothing

  19   but contempt for that oath, for that bayat for whatever

  20   country, contempt for human decency.

  21            If you lied in 1997 and you realized that people that

  22   you were lying for, lying to protect had carried out such an

  23   atrocious deed, if you have a pure heart, if you have a clear

  24   conscience, speak the truth.  Don't make up a sad, pathetic

  25   excuse that you didn't write those documents, you don't know


   1   anything.

   2            I submit to you it shows something.  It shows that

   3   what El Hage was about was lying to protect the enterprise,

   4   the group he knew back in 1993 was fighting America, the group

   5   he knew all along was fighting America, the group he was

   6   playing a game for.  And he showed it in '97, and if there's

   7   any doubt in your mind, he showed it in 1998.  It may have

   8   been brazen, it may have been arrogant, it was perjury.

   9            Let me talk to you briefly about the notion that it

  10   was the great American coming home, that's why he came back to

  11   America, because he loved the place.

  12            Well, I submit to you if that was the story, then you

  13   wouldn't have seen that perjury in the Grand Jury, you

  14   wouldn't have seen that violation of an oath about an awful,

  15   awful crime.

  16            Think about this:  It's 1994 in Nairobi and Khalid al

  17   Fawwaz gets arrested, gets himself out of jail, and he runs

  18   and hides in plain sight off to London, opens a press office,

  19   hangs out there, takes the heat away.  Fawwaz is gone.

  20            Who else comes to Nairobi?  Abu Mohamed al Amriki,

  21   the surveillance guy, Abu Mohamed.  And what did you learn

  22   from Kherchtou?  Kherchtou says he gets a call on El Hage's

  23   cell phone saying there's a problem with American security,

  24   American intelligence.  He has to answer questions or he has

  25   to talk to.


   1            By the way, you can check the phone records, and Ali

   2   Mohamed's phone records go right to El Hage's cell phone,

   3   corroboration Kherchtou.  What did he do?  You saw he went

   4   back to America, never to be heard from again in Kenya, no

   5   contact between him and the government.

   6            Remember, you heard all about Mr. El Hage told the

   7   government where he was traveling.  There were phone calls

   8   from Ali Mohamed to the government, and you saw in 1998 he was

   9   still here lying in the Grand Jury.

  10            I submit to you when the heat was on Fawwaz, he ran

  11   and hid in plain sight in London.  The heat was on Abu

  12   Mohamed, go to California, take the heat away from the group.

  13   In the summer of '97, that's what Wadih El Hage did.

  14   Everyone's onto me, they're looking at me, I'll just go to

  15   Texas, I'll lay low and take the heat off.  That wasn't love,

  16   that was strategy.

  17            Let's talk about conspiracy.  This case is not just

  18   about perjury, but what you ought to understand, it's not like

  19   it's conspiracy over here and perjury over there and never do

  20   they meet, because I submit to you part of what El Hage did

  21   for the conspiracy was his perjury.  Part of it was to block

  22   the American government from finding out what it could.

  23            Remember what the standard will be when Judge Sand

  24   explains it to you.  You will learn that you don't have to all

  25   sit around a room, one big giant table, raise your hand and


   1   say, I solemnly swear that now I'm going to kill Americans, in

   2   violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1117.  It's

   3   what you understood, what you mean to do, and your actions

   4   speak louder than words.

   5            Mr. Schmidt told you about a conspirator versus a

   6   facilitator.  He said they can't just prove he's a

   7   facilitator, they have to prove he's a conspirator.  I submit

   8   to you, take the instruction from Judge Sand on the law.  You

   9   may well learn that a person can be part of a conspiracy if

  10   they knowingly and intentionally want to help that conspiracy

  11   to succeed, if their role is a facilitator.

  12            Kherchtou explained it to you.  You don't have to

  13   shoot the gun if you are helping someone else that you know is

  14   going to do it.

  15            Fake passports.  We heard the argument, yeah, okay,

  16   maybe some fake passports, that's okay, that's a third world

  17   thing for dissidents.  Only you suspicious Americans think

  18   that someone getting fake passports is something else.

  19            Well, what are dissidents to a terrorist group?

  20   There's an introduction in one of these documents, Usama Bin

  21   Laden is a dissident, a dissident who blows up embassies.

  22   Omar Abdel Rahman is a dissident.  And what are we finding

  23   out?  Mr. Schmidt tells you some of these persons have

  24   Egyptian names.  He said, "In fact, many of the people," from

  25   5631, "who espouse retaliation have 'el Masry' at the end of


   1   their name, meaning they are Egyptian.  And what does

   2   retaliation mean for the people they are talking about in this

   3   case with the name el Masry?  Violence."  5632, "This is the

   4   code they use at that time to protect themselves against the

   5   Egyptians, the Saudis, the Kenyans if you are in Kenya, and

   6   perhaps the Americans who turn over dissidents to Saudis and

   7   Egyptians."

   8            And you heard that the group believed that America

   9   was responsible for turning people over to different

  10   countries.  That was offered for state of mind.  You haven't

  11   heard whether it's true or false or what these people were

  12   arrested for, if they were, but to the extent those groups are

  13   angry at America and want to retaliate for violence and you

  14   provide them passports, you are giving passports to people who

  15   are angry at America and want to retaliate, that's not

  16   irrelevant.  I submit to you that's in the heart of being part

  17   of a conspiracy to help others, part of a conspiracy to kill

  18   Americans where you are helping others who want to do it.

  19            That's true in the United States, that's true in

  20   France, that's true in the third world.  We're judging

  21   everyone by the same standard, and I tell you his perjury was

  22   committed right here in this courthouse.

  23            Mr. Schmidt argues to you that not a single piece of

  24   evidence points to a conspiracy to kill nationals, and you

  25   will see that as a theme that many of the defendants wants to


   1   argue to you about single pieces.  You put a puzzle together

   2   over the course of a trial, a picture emerges.  Knock the

   3   puzzle apart, take up each piece and say this doesn't do it,

   4   this doesn't do it, this doesn't do it, but you have to take

   5   it all together.

   6            But there are a lot of pieces.  What are some of the

   7   pieces?  Arranging a plane trip for the military commander to

   8   go to Somalia, Abu Hafs; taking over the Kenya cell from al

   9   Fawwaz.  And remember, Mr. Schmidt pointed out, well, gee,

  10   he's not the new leader because the wiretap call shows that

  11   Mustafa Fadhil took over after the death of Abu Ubaidah.

  12            I submit to you Kherchtou told you Ubaidah was the

  13   boss, but he also went to Fawwaz.  Ubaidah, the military guy.

  14   Fawwaz is a military guy.  Ubaidah leaves, Mustafa Fadhil

  15   replaces him.  Fawwaz leaves, Wadih El Hage replaces him.

  16            We argue to you that he was a leader.  Not the only

  17   leader.  I submit to you that taking over Fawwaz's duties,

  18   taking a trip back to Bin Laden in February of 1997, bringing

  19   back a new policy which he delivered to Mustafa Fadhil to

  20   bring down to others in Mombasa, including Odeh, passing coded

  21   messages, helping people with fake passports, passing out the

  22   Jihad phone number, think about that.  I mean, it sounds funny

  23   afterwards sometimes when you think about the Dr. Atef clinic,

  24   but it's not funny.  It sounds like a poor code once you

  25   figure it out, but that's what codes are like.


   1            If you were listening to that call, didn't it sound

   2   like Wadih is telling Harun he had to go to the doctor?  But

   3   he's giving Harun, the man who was in Mogadishu with Saleh,

   4   the man who would blow up the embassies, a man involved in

   5   military activities, the phone to hook up in Kandahar with Bin

   6   Laden.

   7            That's important.  That may be facilitating, but if

   8   you are doing that so Bin Laden and Harun can get together to

   9   fight the enemy, America, that's conspiring.

  10            I submit to you there's great proof in this case from

  11   the call between Harun and Abu Ubaidah al Banshiri what they

  12   believe Abu Fadhl is the corroboration, there is great

  13   corroboration from the Harun report and there's great proof

  14   that Wadih El Hage wanted this conspiracy to succeed by lying

  15   repeatedly and repeatedly on two different occasions in the

  16   Grand Jury.

  17            I'm going to try and wrap this up quickly on El Hage.

  18   Let me talk about Harun, the kid.  Let me just say to you, you

  19   look at that document and that makes clear not that Harun in

  20   the security report just found out in the summer of 1997 that

  21   America was the enemy.  No, he just found out that his

  22   terrorist boss got on T.V. and told the Western world on CNN,

  23   he's the one saying they know we're the enemy, we attacked

  24   them in Somalia.

  25            This is not what Mr. Schmidt said proved that


   1   everyone in Nairobi figured out America was the enemy in 1997.

   2   It's Harun.  He figured that out in 1993.  He's in Mogadishu

   3   with Saleh.  He's saying, my God, if they know that, they're

   4   coming after us.  What he's writing is that they declared war

   5   in the summer of 1997.  He was on T.V.  He's telling the

   6   world.  It's like the mob boss getting on T.V. and saying

   7   we've got a mafia family.  Sure, they react.  It's not like

   8   the people in the mob saying, oh, my God, we're part of a

   9   criminal enterprise.

  10            The wiretap, I submit to you he contends there's

  11   nothing on it.  Look at those calls.  There's plenty.  But

  12   bear in mind that the whole time in the wiretap El Hage

  13   thought he was being tapped.  You heard his wife talk in code

  14   about green papers.  You heard them talk in code about the

  15   Dr. Atef call.

  16            In the Harun report, his wife is telling Harun, I

  17   think the T.V. is bugged, there's a lady across the street,

  18   she's American, something funny, there are funny sounds from

  19   the phone.  It's remarkable what you did get in either of what

  20   those calls are.

  21            Notice how when he got the Taliban report, the report

  22   written by Abu Hafs takes off the name at the bottom before he

  23   faxes it out.  That's someone who is thinking, thinking I

  24   don't want them to know what I'm doing for these dissidents.

  25            Okay, let me skip over certain things and just pick


   1   out two more points on El Hage and you'll be done with me on

   2   that topic.  Mr. Schmidt told you form over substance.  That's

   3   1600A-T, the declaration of Jihad, a proclamation against

   4   Saudi Arabia.  Proclamation against Saudi Arabia.

   5            Let me be so bold as to read the title of 1600A-T:

   6   "Declaration of Holy War Against the Americans Who Are

   7   Occupying the Lands of the Two Holy Places."  That's not a

   8   proclamation against Saudi Arabia, that's written to kill the

   9   Americans.

  10            It goes on.  It goes on to talk to Defense Secretary

  11   Perry and President Clinton and talks about all the mocking of

  12   what it is they believe and says, "The American enemy.  All

  13   effort must be directed at this enemy.  Kill it, fight it,

  14   destroy it, break it down, plot against it, ambush it and, God

  15   the almighty willing, until it is gone."

  16            The problem, the problem in this case for people in

  17   al Qaeda in August of 1996 when this goes public is it exposes

  18   what they have been doing privately.  If that's not a

  19   proclamation against Saudi Arabia and al Qaeda is what it

  20   is -- a group fighting Americans -- then you can't pretend

  21   that Harun and everyone else is learning in 1997 what it's all

  22   about.

  23            Lastly, you heard that Mr. El Hage was open and

  24   honest with Agent Miranda, telling him his foreign policy

  25   views and that sums up the case.  Great, because what he told


   1   him was he didn't know any Bin Laden people in Kenya, he

   2   didn't know any Bin Laden people in America, and you know

   3   what, if he wanted to contact Bin Laden, he had to get on a

   4   plane, fly to Pakistan, go to the embassy and go ask to talk

   5   to the Taliban, because he certainly didn't have a phone

   6   number.

   7            I submit to you, look in the end at Wadih El Hage,

   8   and what you see is someone who knew, who knew how to work at

   9   it, who knew how to keep notebooks of just the right things,

  10   who knew what was going on, was at the heart of it, an insider

  11   so trusted that Abu Hafs, the military commander, would let

  12   him handle his documents and not the guy he would trust with

  13   surveilling the embassy.

  14            I submit to you at this point in time, after you have

  15   seen the evidence, as far as El Hage is concerned, the mask

  16   has been stripped away.  He is what he did.  He worked for a

  17   group that he knew was fighting against America.  He wanted

  18   them to succeed and he helped every way that he could, whether

  19   it be fake passports, coded messages, taking trips to see the

  20   boss in the cave in Afghanistan, or just coming into this

  21   Grand Jury in this building, raising his hand and lying

  22   through his teeth.

  23            We'll pick up with the oath after the break.  Thanks.

  24            (Jury not present)

  25            MR. WILFORD:  Your Honor, we would like to, on behalf


   1   of Mr. Odeh, file an objection on the part of Mr. Fitzgerald's

   2   argument.  Mr. Fitzgerald seemed to indicate to the jury that

   3   it was appropriate for the jury to use the fact that Kherchtou

   4   pled guilty.

   5            THE COURT:  The fact that perjury was in furtherance

   6   of the conspiracy?

   7            MR. WILFORD:  Kherchtou pled, that Kherchtou pled

   8   guilty.

   9            THE COURT:  Pled guilty.

  10            MR. WILFORD:  As a basis for determining the guilt of

  11   other people seated at this table on trial.  He made the

  12   argument --

  13            THE COURT:  Could you direct me more specifically to

  14   that?

  15            MR. WILFORD:  Yes, your Honor.  It was language to

  16   the effect that Kherchtou explained it best, if you know about

  17   something happening, you're guilty of conspiracy, something

  18   along those lines, and he said Kherchtou explained it best by

  19   his plea of guilty.  It was an attempt to get the jury to

  20   infer from the fact that Kherchtou pled guilty, because he

  21   knew of something, that people seated at this table may have

  22   known of something, were also guilty.

  23            THE COURT:  Mr. Fitzgerald, did you say that?

  24            MR. FITZGERALD:  No.

  25            THE COURT:  I have no recollection of that being


   1   said.  I don't have any recollection of any argument being

   2   made that from the plea of guilty, you may infer anything with

   3   respect to any other defendant.

   4            MR. WILFORD:  It's not necessarily that Mr.

   5   Fitzgerald used those words from the plea, but the tenor of

   6   the argument.

   7            THE COURT:  Tomorrow morning after you get the

   8   transcript, you direct my attention to that and if there was

   9   an erroneous statement, I will tell the jury.

  10            MR. WILFORD:  Thank you.

  11            THE COURT:  While we're here, the note from an

  12   alternate reads:  "Will you please tell us alternates what our

  13   disposition is during deliberations?  Will we be paid our

  14   standby paid status while on call or will we be attending here

  15   separate from the deliberators?"

  16            My understanding is that after the jury is charged

  17   and retires to deliberate, the alternates will be put on hold;

  18   that they will not participate on the deliberations; they will

  19   be on telephone call; if and when we reach a later stage in

  20   the proceedings, they will rejoin the jury.  Is that

  21   everybody's understanding?

  22            MR. RUHNKE:  I'm not sure about the latter part.

  23            MR. COHN:  I'm not sure either.

  24            MR. RUHNKE:  Also at issue, do you want jurors here

  25   if the jury has questions and you are instructing them, the


   1   alternates?

   2            THE COURT:  Do I want what?

   3            MR. RUHNKE:  For example, the jury asks a question,

   4   your Honor will give a clarification, do you want alternates

   5   here listening to it?

   6            THE COURT:  No alternates here.  They would like that

   7   because that would mean they would get paid.  Why would the

   8   alternates need any clarification with respect to a question

   9   during deliberations?

  10            MR. RUHNKE:  In the event they have to be

  11   substituting a juror.

  12            MR. COHN:  They will do it over my objection.

  13            THE COURT:  Well, first of all, if a juror becomes

  14   ill during deliberations, the rules now provide that an

  15   11-person jury is sufficient.  There's a time when you would

  16   bring in an alternate and start over again.  I think that is

  17   no longer the process.

  18            MR. RUHNKE:  Your Honor, just a caveat on that:  I

  19   don't know of any cases where an 11-person jury has returned a

  20   capital murder verdict.

  21            THE COURT:  There are a lot of things we don't know

  22   about capital cases.

  23            MR. RUHNKE:  Silence should not necessarily be

  24   acquiescence in that observation.

  25            THE COURT:  No, no, but I'm interested in the fact


   1   that you don't think that the alternates return for the

   2   penalty phase.  As I see the penalty phase, it can go on for

   3   quite a substantial period of time and the whole theory of the

   4   procedures set out is to have the jury that hears the

   5   deliberations pass on the penalty phase, if we get to it.

   6            MR. RUHNKE:  It has happened before.  It has happened

   7   that an alternate juror has had to be substituted into the

   8   penalty phase.  It's not happened in this circuit.  Arguments

   9   have been made, I think there's one Seventh Circuit case, I'm

  10   not sure which case it is, that a juror that did not

  11   participate in the guilt phase proceeding should not be

  12   allowed to participate in the penalty phase, whether we come

  13   to that bridge or not, but it's hardly, it's hardly black

  14   letter law that that's what's going to occur.

  15            THE COURT:  I'm going to ask the parties to submit a

  16   brief on that.  It can be a letter brief.  But it seems to me

  17   that if there is a possibility that I will complete charging

  18   the jury tomorrow, depending on when we start, we have to know

  19   the answer.

  20            MR. RUHNKE:  Nobody is objecting to having the

  21   alternates stay around during the first stage of the

  22   proceeding.  I don't know if you have -- I don't hear an

  23   objection to that.

  24            THE COURT:  What is the advantage to that?  What is

  25   the advantage to having the alternates sit in the courtroom?


   1            MR. RUHNKE:  When I say "stay around," I mean not

   2   discharged, remain on call.

   3            THE COURT:  They will be on telephone call.  They

   4   will call in.

   5            All right.  Let's all think about that and I will not

   6   respond to the alternates' question today.  We'll take a

   7   five-minute recess.

   8            (Recess)

   9            THE COURT:  There's something of while we're

  10   researching the question of the alternate jurors and the jury

  11   in the penalty phase, the jury has to sign a statement.  We

  12   have an anonymous jury, so we have to work out the mechanics.

  13   And I think what I would propose is the jurors sign a

  14   statement giving their juror numbers and then there be one

  15   other attestation which we do with 12 copies, each one signs

  16   one, and then seal it.

  17            MR. COHN:  Your Honor, I would just think if we

  18   consider having them sign it, put their number next to their

  19   signature, seal the original and give us a redacted version.

  20   I don't know why that would make me happier at first blush.

  21            THE COURT:  Think about that.  They don't, I think,

  22   know each other's name.  I don't know if they all sign -- it's

  23   a mechanic, but we should be prepared and explore it.  We may

  24   have lots of time.  The jury is deliberating in the first

  25   phase, but one never knows.


   1            Mr. Ruhnke, would you check with the think tank on

   2   the death penalty and see whether there is any actual

   3   experience with respect to alternates?

   4            MR. RUHNKE:  Yes, your Honor.

   5            THE COURT:  I appreciate that.

   6            (Jury present)

   7            THE COURT:  Mr. Fitzgerald, you may continue.

   8            MR. FITZGERALD:  Thank you.

   9            Now let's talk about the defendant Mohamed Odeh and

  10   again another example of how it is, if you take a puzzle, you

  11   knock out all the pieces and the picture is gone, each little

  12   piece may not look like it's enough, but I tell you in the

  13   end, when we review the evidence, it is clear that Mohamed

  14   Odeh participated in the charged conspiracies and it is clear

  15   that he participated in the bombing.

  16            Now, Mr. Wilford and Mr. Ricco indicated that the

  17   government waved the flag, "Waved the flag, we're Americans.

  18   He's not.  Convict him."  If there's any doubt in your mind,

  19   the only thing we'll wave in this courtroom is the evidence.

  20   If we meet the burden, as I submit we have, and we'll show

  21   you, convict; and if we don't, acquit.  We don't want the bar

  22   of justice to be any different in this case.  In fact, it's

  23   more important in this case that we follow justice.

  24            I'll talk to you about justice in the end.

  25            Mr. Ricco and Mr. Wilford made comments that


   1   sometimes the government shaded the truth or twisted a word or

   2   didn't tell you things because it didn't fit our theory or

   3   twisted the facts.  I submit to you, we'll review how it was

   4   that everyone dealt with the facts as we go through this.

   5            I also submit to you that the Odeh defense, in part,

   6   set up what's called a strawman, like a scarecrow out there,

   7   like a fake argument sometimes, things we didn't prove, that

   8   we never tried to prove, we never claimed to prove.

   9            Did anyone ever tell you we would prove Odeh picked

  10   the time of the bombing or bought the truck?  No.  And you

  11   know what?  We didn't prove we did.  We didn't prove Odeh

  12   bought the truck.  We didn't prove Abu Hafs bought the truck.

  13   We didn't prove that a lot of people bought the truck because

  14   we proved somebody else did.

  15            But what we have to do is focus on the evidence and

  16   how it fits together.  Yesterday Mr. Ricco did two

  17   comparisons.  He compared Odeh at the beginning to both

  18   Sikander, the government witness, and to Kherchtou.  And let's

  19   talk about those two comparisons because they illustrate an

  20   important point.

  21            What did we hear about Sikander?  We heard that he

  22   delivered money for al Qaeda secretly.  That's not quite

  23   right.  Sikander told you he received money from Wadih El Hage

  24   and Harun and others from the person who was his

  25   brother-in-law, and he told you he didn't know what al Qaeda


   1   was.

   2            You were told that Sikander cleaned the house to get

   3   rid of PETN.  I submit to you the evidence shows that Sikander

   4   didn't know what the house was being used for beforehand.  So

   5   why don't we do something, why don't we compare what Odeh did

   6   with what Sikander did, beginning to end.

   7            Odeh, a trained member, a sworn member of al Qaeda

   8   since 1992, he went to the camps.  He was trained in military.

   9   He was trained in explosives.  He received advanced training.

  10   He received religious training.  He made a bayat and he swore

  11   an oath.

  12            Sikander does not know what al Qaeda was, never went

  13   anywhere near Afghanistan.  Odeh, involved with al Qaeda in

  14   Somalia.  Sikander, never been to Somalia.  Odeh knew Abu

  15   Ubaidah as a military commander.  Sikander knew him as a

  16   brother-in-law in that secret life Ubaidah had with other

  17   family which you know about.


  19            (Continued on next page)








   1            MR. FITZGERALD:  (Continuing) Sikander, he rented 43

   2   Runda Estates in his real name.  Odeh checked into the Hilltop

   3   Hotel under a fake name.  Remember, Odeh is a man who can

   4   handle the truth?  Well, in August of 1998, he wasn't Odeh.

   5   He was Abu Basit Awad, a merchant from Yemen.  He checked into

   6   the Hilltop Hotel.  A person with a Kenyan identity card goes

   7   to the hotel.  Think about that.  Whatever he knows, he knows

   8   he doesn't want his real name on that register.

   9            Odeh went to the Hilltop Hotel and saw Abdel Rahman,

  10   a bomb trainer from Afghanistan.  What do you think he thought

  11   when he saw a bomb trainer, someone who trains people to make

  12   bombs in a hotel he checked into under a false name?  He told

  13   Mustafa that an operation is coming, a big operation.

  14            And something else that wasn't discussed yesterday.

  15   Odeh learned that the Hilltop Hotel in August 1998, that the

  16   people back in Kandihar, and you know who that is, Bin Laden

  17   and the rest, have relocated.  Why?  Because they expect the

  18   United States Navy to retaliate with planes and missiles.  As

  19   a thinking man, as any person, when the US Navy wants to

  20   retaliate, something big is happening and it's not against

  21   Eritrea, it's not against Somalia, it's not against anything

  22   but it's against America.  Sikander, he didn't change his

  23   appearance during the time in August 1998.  Odeh shaved.

  24   Sikander, he stayed in Nairobi while Odeh hightailed it out of

  25   town, getting out of town the night before the bombing.


   1            You know what, I am going to use very few exhibits,

   2   try to use very few exhibits.  But the flight.  The flight

   3   becomes important sometimes and one exhibit I would like to

   4   draw your attention to, if we may have 355, page 2 on the

   5   screen -- 355 page 1 first.  Sorry.  It is something from that

   6   fellow Ali Mohamed, from his house in California, the trainer,

   7   the guy who did surveillance, the guy you heard a fair amount

   8   about.  Look at the top.  The idea of working.  He says there

   9   were four main groups, HQ -- presumably headquarters.  It's

  10   got a word next to it, foreign language, maybe it's Arabic.

  11   Then INF, information, with a word with the number 3 in the

  12   middle.  Prepare.  EXCU, Tanfeez.

  13            The reason I am boring you with those funny sounding

  14   words is to make sure you understand what is at the bottom of

  15   page 2.  Under the title 4, the execution group, how to carry

  16   out an operation.  Look at number 8, if we could blow up

  17   number 8, enlarge No. 8.  24 hours before the Tanfeez, all the

  18   following three groups will evacuate Qota 3.  If you look on

  19   the first page it appears to be translated as sector.  24

  20   hours before the operation, basically these people get out of

  21   town:  Al Qeada, al Mal3mut, al Tageez.  Headquarters,

  22   information and preparation.

  23            In Odeh's own statement, Government's Exhibit 6, he

  24   talks about how there were two groups, the preparation group

  25   and the execution group.  The preparation group were the


   1   people who gathered the information, who looked at the target

   2   to see what it was made of, to figure out what would be used

   3   to attack it.  That is coming from a man who himself is an

   4   architect and engineer.  I submit to you when we talk about

   5   the sketches, one of the things he is used for, his expertise

   6   isn't in advising how to build a bomb, though he can do that

   7   and he can help, but also how to place the bomb against a

   8   building to do the damage.  We will talk about that.  But

   9   again, 24 hours ahead of time, Odeh is getting out of town.

  10   Organizational, that's the way they work.  Twenty-four hours

  11   before, people split.  And of course Odeh had that sketch in

  12   his house, which we will talk about, and Odeh and Sikander

  13   didn't.

  14            How about Kherchtou?  Mr. Ricco told you yesterday in

  15   regard to Mr. Kherchtou, and I will quote, page 52 -- sorry to

  16   welcome him back with a quote.  Kherchtou said that he was in

  17   Kenya in August of 1998, that he went out looking for his

  18   friend Harun, and he said he ultimately found Harun, that they

  19   spent some time together.  These were within days of the

  20   bombing.  He said Harun has some guys around him that he never

  21   saw before.  That's what his testimony said.  I didn't know

  22   these guys that were around Harun.  So it wasn't Saleh, must

  23   have been some other guys.  Wasn't Mohamed Odeh, the bomb

  24   consultant, because he knows Mohamed Odeh.  He knows him as

  25   Marwan, the guy he believes was in Somalia.  You can point out


   1   over there and say I saw Mohamed Odeh running around with

   2   Saleh a couple of days before the bombing.

   3            The point is, if Kherchtou sees Harun with other

   4   people and knows the defendant Odeh and didn't recognize him,

   5   then Odeh is not with Harun.  The problem with that is, it

   6   didn't happen.  The clear testimony is that Kherchtou came to

   7   Nairobi twice:  June of 1998 and August of 1998.  When he came

   8   in June he was outside a mosque and he ran into Ahmed Tawhil,

   9   the tall one, and Harun.  Harun said he was busy for a little

  10   while, and then Harun took him in a truck and drove him

  11   around, and they went to the airport.

  12            Then, when Kherchtou came back, it is August 1998,

  13   and it is within days of the bombing.  And what Kherchtou told

  14   you is, he went to look for Tawhil before the bombing and

  15   couldn't find him.  He left him a note.  Then he ran into

  16   Sikander and said can you get me in touch with Harun?

  17   Sikander picked up the phone, called Harun's house, and the

  18   wife said he's not home, he's taking his family to the

  19   airport.  Later he's told don't bring that guy by, we don't

  20   want him around.  Harun never saw Kherchtou in the days before

  21   the bombing.  Harun wouldn't see Kherchtou in the days before

  22   the bombing.

  23            Two points.  If Kherchtou didn't see Harun, he didn't

  24   see who Harun was with, so he can't say one way or the other.

  25   Secondly, Harun did meet with Odeh.  Odeh told you that,


   1   Government's Exhibit 6.  Remember he saw him at the hotel.

   2   Harun and Saleh, and you can read it, were going out to do a

   3   small job, and he said Odeh, a small job is not something

   4   trivial like shopping.  So Harun would expose himself, show

   5   himself in August 1998 to Odeh, but not to Kherchtou.

   6            Let's compare Odeh and Kherchtou.  Kherchtou said he

   7   learned, and one of the ways he learned that Al Qaeda was

   8   involved in actions against America in Somalia was because he

   9   was in Nairobi helping people to get to Somalia.  He never

  10   went there, but he spoke to the people who were going to

  11   Somalia, whereas Odeh, Odeh is in Somalia.  Kherchtou left Al

  12   Qaeda before the August 1996 declaration of jihad that says

  13   we're at war with the American military.  Odeh admitted he

  14   heard that, he knew about that, and he stayed in.  The leader

  15   of the group he belongs to declares public war on America, he

  16   doesn't leave.  He's not a conscientious objector.  He's not

  17   saying this is wrong.  He stays in from 1996 forward.  He's

  18   paid through the day of the bombing as a member of Al Qaeda.

  19   Kherchtou leaves before Bin Laden issues the February 1998

  20   fatwah against civilians and military.  Odeh heard about that.

  21   He didn't quit the group.  He didn't say this is wrong.  He

  22   stayed in.

  23            Kherchtou told you he understood the enemies were the

  24   United States and the West.  Odeh stayed in the group that

  25   publicly stated our enemy is America.  In fact, interesting,


   1   if you look at 1600A-T, the declaration of jihad, one of the

   2   things I forgot to bring out, in the first page or so of text,

   3   when Bin Laden is warming up he blames America for everything,

   4   including what is happening in Eritrea, Ogaden, Somalia.  He

   5   says America is seen as being behind everything.  You don't

   6   have to conclude that it's Eritrea and Somalia or America,

   7   because in Al Qaeda, America is behind everything they

   8   perceive wrong.  America can't go to feed the poor in Somalia,

   9   it's colonization.

  10            Back to the Kherchtou/Odeh comparison.  Kherchtou,

  11   let's look at 1993 when the apartment is used for

  12   surveillance.  We don't know whether the apartment is in his

  13   real name or his fake name.  It is not in evidence.  Odeh at

  14   the hotel is using a fake name.  Kherchtou, when he sees

  15   someone coming to the apartment with surveillance training,

  16   bingo, thinks maybe surveillance.  What does Odeh think when

  17   he walks into the Hilltop Hotel and sees his trainer and bomb

  18   maker from Afghanistan?  What is this man suddenly doing in

  19   Nairobi, particularly when Odeh even admits, even by his own

  20   statement, which we will go through, and it is a dance, by his

  21   own statement he knows about the fatwahs.  He's had a

  22   conversation in the spring of 1998 with Mustafa Fadhl, with

  23   the prospect of an operation that has to be discussed.  This

  24   Mustafa Fadhl is saying I am against operations in Kenya

  25   because I like Kenyans, but Saleh is for them.  He's been told


   1   it's an emergency, he's been told that all of Al Qaeda has to

   2   leave by August 6 -- not soon, by a date.  Out of town by

   3   Thursday, August 6.  And he shows up in a hotel.  Whatever

   4   he's thinking, he's not putting his Kenyan i.d. card down

   5   there.  He is coming as Abu Basit Awad, and he sees his

   6   trainer in bomb making, who doesn't like the nightlife, is

   7   staying out all night.

   8            When Kherchtou is in the apartment in 1993, the

   9   people in Al Qaeda in Kenya are staying.  In 1998, when Odeh

  10   is at the Hilltop Hotel, everyone is going.  Odeh is told in

  11   1998 that whatever is going on, something is going to happen

  12   soon to Mustafa Fadhl, and then from Saleh, the US Navy is

  13   expected to retaliate.  You'd have to be that cartoon

  14   character Mr. Magoo -- remember him, big glasses, everything

  15   goes on around him, he sees nothing -- even by his own

  16   account.  But he's a smart man.  He's an educated man.  He's a

  17   thinking man.  He knew what was going on.  He didn't have to

  18   figure it out.

  19            In 1998, what's going on with Kherchtou?  In 1998

  20   Kherchtou is in Nairobi, no longer an Al Qaeda member.  Harun

  21   won't see him and he's checking into a hotel under his real

  22   name.  Odeh sees Harun, fake name, getting out of town before

  23   the bomb hits.

  24            Let's speak briefly about Odeh in Somalia.  Just one

  25   comment.  Recognize in his own statement what Odeh said,


   1   focusing on who they are fighting against, not who they are

   2   fighting with.  He said, reading from page 7 of Government's

   3   Exhibit 6 -- and if I forget to say this, one thing on which I

   4   will wholeheartedly agree with Mr. Ricco and Mr. Wilford, read

   5   Government's Exhibit 6 from beginning to end.  I submit to you

   6   it backs up what the government says many, many different

   7   ways.  It says here, it was, however, unacceptable for US

   8    armed troops to be in Somalia.  Bin Laden and Al Qaeda

   9   considered this colonization.  Odeh was asked if Bin Laden

  10   would have attacked civilian workers like he attacked

  11   soldiers.  Odeh said no, but Bin Laden supported the attacks

  12   in Mogadishu.  Whatever is going on in Somalia, he understands

  13   that Al Qaeda is against America.

  14            He saw, by the way, he saw, Odeh admits, Saleh, Abu

  15   Mohamed el Masry, this fellow, in Somalia on his way up to

  16   Mogadishu.  He saw Abdel Rahman, the bomb maker, in Somalia on

  17   his way up to Mogadishu.

  18            Let's talk about the fool.  I submit to you Odeh is

  19   playing a fool.  Can you believe this?  A sworn member of Al

  20   Qaeda.  Where do we get that he is a fool or that people in Al

  21   Qaeda think he's a fool?  The thread, the half thread that

  22   comes from is the fact that Wadih El Hage in Texas, on August

  23   20, 1998, smirks.  He smirks when he gives an answer to Agent

  24   Miranda, which is, he's a fool, caught with a Yemeni passport

  25   he didn't look like.  Does that mean the whole organization


   1   always thought he was a fool?  Where does that come from?

   2   Where is there any suggestion that Odeh wasn't a full-fledged

   3   member of Al Qaeda, that he was going around saying I'm

   4   against this, I'm going to do something to stop this, and that

   5   these people thought he was a fool?

   6            The fool and other theories are wishful thinking.  We

   7   all have a part of us inside that wishes Odeh wasn't part of

   8   this.  We all wish no one was part of this.  We all wish it

   9   never happened.  But it was, and it did.  Where is the fool?

  10   Does the fool make any sense?  Does it make any sense that

  11   they would take the fool and say OK, here's the fool, let's

  12   lure him to Nairobi, let's bring him to the hotel where the

  13   people in charge of the bombing are hanging out.  Let's keep

  14   him around.  Let's make sure he sees Abdel Rahman, the bomb

  15   maker, let's make sure he sees Saleh, the mastermind.  Let's

  16   make here he sees Harun.  Let's not just send him out of town.

  17   Let's bring him and have him stay and wait until August 6 and

  18   get on the plane with all the other people who are bombers.

  19   Not only that, when we fool him, he won't be fooled enough

  20   that he won't use a fake number name in the hotel, and we will

  21   tell him things anyway.  We will tell him an operation is

  22   coming.  We will tell him it's urgent.  We will tell him it's

  23   an emergency condition.  We will tell him that the people in

  24   Kandihar have relocated and that US planes are coming to

  25   retaliate.


   1            No, he's no fool.  Wadih El Hage's smirk in Texas

   2   didn't leave him there so that they could trick him to go back

   3   to Afghanistan.

   4            Let's talk about more wishful thinking.  The

   5   conscientious objector.  Why was he thought to be a fool?  We

   6   have heard about a lot of people who have nothing to do with

   7   Al Qaeda:  Siraj Wahhaj, Martin Luther King, Gandhi.  Wow.

   8   Where did that come from?  When he said what the bayat was,

   9   that was his state of mind.  When al-Fadl explained what he

  10   thought was Islamically correct, what bayat was, that's his

  11   state of mind.  Then we get Siraj Wahhaj, someone who has

  12   nothing to do with Al Qaeda.  Comes in from Bedford

  13   Stuyvesant, where his jihad is a real struggle to do good.  He

  14   lectures all over the world.  He goes to Harvard, he goes all

  15   over.  He doesn't lecture in Al Qaeda.  He goes to Congress to

  16   give an opening prayer.  Al Qaeda wants to blow up Congress,

  17   not address it.  What does Siraj Wahhaj have to do with anyone

  18   in Al Qaeda?  They don't listen to Siraj Wahhaj.  They are

  19   still following Ibn al Tamiyeh.  You can blow up a building.

  20   Those who deserve to die, they die.  Those that are innocent,

  21   God will take care of them.

  22            Odeh in his statement talks about how the bombing was

  23   a mistake, it was a blunder.  Khobar, the bombing in Khobar

  24   was a hundred times better.  Do you think Gandhi, Nelson

  25   Mandela or Martin Luther King talk about which bombing is


   1   better?  No, because Wahhaj says no bombing.

   2            Statement.  Let's talk about the statement, and I do

   3   urge you to take a look at it.  But I think in looking at the

   4   statement, let's place everything as much as we can in

   5   context.  The question was raised why did Odeh talk.  I submit

   6   to you, paint the picture.  OK.  It's Nairobi.  It's August

   7   15, 1998.  The bombing was a little more than a week before.

   8   What position is Odeh in?  What do you know from the evidence

   9   alone is in his mind?  In 1997, Al Qaeda thought that the guy

  10   with the leg missing, Madani al Tayyib, Abu Fadhl al Makkee, a

  11   Bin Laden confidante, was talking.  He believed he was talking

  12   to America.  You know that Odeh knows about that because he

  13   says he thinks he took all Bin Laden's money, and he says Al

  14   Qaeda, we want to kill him.  He's an informant.  In his mind,

  15   true or not, al Tayyib, an important member of the network,

  16   has talked.

  17            What do you know besides that?  We will come back to

  18   the documents later that show Wadih El Hage's house was

  19   searched.  Word got out through Al Qaeda.  So he's thinking

  20   OK, we know that much.  He is caught in Pakistan redhanded.

  21   He shows up just before the bombing happens, traveling under a

  22   fake name, this close to making it through.  Remember, his

  23   passport worked at the Kenyan airport.  His passport worked at

  24   the first checker.  It was the second checker that caught him.

  25   He was this close to getting through.  Now he's thinking OK,


   1   I'm on a plane back to Kenya.  I left Kenya the night before

   2   the bombing.  I'm Al Qaeda, people in Al Qaeda, a person named

   3   Madani al Tayyib has talked, I'm back here and I'm looking at

   4   the FBI.  What do they know?

   5            I submit to you one thing he didn't have the benefit

   6   of when he landed in Nairobi was the benefit of the judge's

   7   charge tomorrow.  He didn't have an explanation of the

   8   conspiracy law, so he didn't know if what he said when he

   9   tried to dance with the truth about the bombing would make him

  10   guilty of conspiracy or not.  I submit, what he is going to

  11   do, he is going to say what do I have to do to explain?  I

  12   have to explain why I left, why I left in a different name.  I

  13   have to explain the Hilltop Hotel.  He can talk.  He can talk

  14   about most of the people who are now in Afghanistan.  They got

  15   through.  Operation is over, save myself.

  16            You also know from his own statement that back in

  17   Afghanistan people were trained in counterinterrogations.  You

  18   know he spoke English.  You were shown a letter the other day

  19   in handwriting that he wrote in English.  His English is

  20   coherent.  When you read Government's Exhibit 6, small

  21   detail -- that's the statement.  Odeh talks about how he had

  22   piles.  That was an expression in quotes, in English.

  23   Hemorrhoids.  You are pretty comfortable with the English

  24   language if you can pick that word out.  That's a foreign

  25   language, and you can pick that word out.


   1            Let's talk about in communicado, meaning being cut

   2   off from the world.  During the trial when they wanted it to

   3   look that Odeh was cut off, Mr. Ricco asked Agent Anticev,

   4   wasn't Mr. Odeh held in communicado?  Well, I guess so, I

   5   didn't see him with friends, no.  But you know in the Kenyan

   6   jail at least one person for a time had a magazine,

   7   Al-'Owhali.  But you know what, when Government's Exhibit 6

   8   gets up there with Odeh explaining what the mistake in the

   9   bomb is, understand you have to explain that somehow

  10   information came in from the outside to explain those

  11   statements.  But let's be fair.  You can assume that he wasn't

  12   vacuum sealed from August 7 to when the interview happens.  He

  13   is dealing with Pakistani officials, in their custody.  He is

  14   dealing with Kenyan officials, in their custody.  He is with

  15   the FBI.  Could someone have said do you know how many were

  16   killed?  Could one have shown him a headline?  You know that

  17   Agent Anticev wanted to show him the pictures of the people

  18   who were killed.  He said he refused to see them.  Could he

  19   have said look, there were over 200 people, mostly Kenyans,

  20   killed?  Sure.  The relevance isn't just that he knew that a

  21   bunch of people were killed and that they were Kenyans, it was

  22   his response.

  23            Let me show you what I mean.  Two very important

  24   points.  The first has to do with what he figured out.  When

  25   we go to the sketch later, you remember, with what Ken Karas


   1   called a blast cone -- and there is no expert testimony, but

   2   whatever you want to call it, it's a blast.  You read here it

   3   says Odeh further stated that the position of the pickup was a

   4   mistake and the back of the truck where the explosives were

   5   held should be facing the embassy.  Odeh stated that if the

   6   cab of the pickup was between the explosives and the embassy,

   7   at least 60 percent of the shock wave would be diverted.  Odeh

   8   stated that the errant shock wave hit the wrong building.

   9   Then it goes on.  It says Odeh again stated that the truck had

  10   to back up to the embassy in order to prevent the cab from

  11   acting as a hindrance to the shock wave, thereby preventing

  12   the surrounding building from being pounded.

  13            Two important points why.  You learned that the

  14   physics was wrong, which tells you that that's not the

  15   understanding of Don Sachtleben or Dr. Lloyd or any other

  16   expert.  But that is his understanding of physics whenever he

  17   learned what happened, oh my god, the blast wave went in the

  18   wrong direction.  And lo and behold, in the greatest

  19   coincidence in the world, that sketch is sitting in his house

  20   when he is saying it.  It is the mistaken physics of

  21   describing how the blast works that is important, and that is

  22   in his mind.

  23            The second thing.  Going back to Gandhi and Nelson

  24   Mandela and Martin Luther King and Siraj Wahhaj who tries to

  25   follow them, let me tell you something else.  Look at what


   1   this says.  Odeh stated that the operation conducted against

   2   Khobar was a hundred times better than Nairobi.  You know,

   3   they don't get into comparing which bombing is better.  They

   4   don't do bombings.  What does he say?  And this goes to Mr.

   5   Ricco's point yesterday about a question I asked of Agent

   6   Anticev:  Was Mr. Odeh concerned about the Americans being

   7   killed?  And he criticized the question that was asked where

   8   Agent Anticev says well, he specifically didn't say that.  And

   9   Mr. Karas argued when you put the statement up next to the

  10   sketch, you see what happened?  But look through the

  11   statement, read it first word to last word.  Not only is there

  12   no expression, no specific expression of remorse for Americans

  13   being killed, but there are two giant indications that what he

  14   wanted was the Americans killed, not the Kenyans.  When he was

  15   asked the hypothetical questions -- again, hypothetical is not

  16   a 4-letter word.  It just means a question, what if.  Lots of

  17   hypothetical questions were asked by defense counsel of

  18   witnesses, including El Hage.  Would you do an operation

  19   against the United States in Saudi Arabia?  Yes, if it were

  20   Islamically correct.  Not no.  Would you do an operation

  21   against the United States in Kenya if no Kenyans were killed?

  22   The answer no, because I like Kenya and Kenyans.  Would you do

  23   an operation against the United States in some other country,

  24   like Tanzania, if no Kenyans were killed?  Yes, if Islamically

  25   correct.  Killing Kenyans, off the chart in his answers.


   1   Americans, Khobar was a hundred times better.  He's not

   2   against bombings.

   3            Look at this.  Odeh further stated that the position

   4   of the pickup was a mistake and the back of the truck should

   5   be facing the embassy.  Skipping ahead, Odeh stated that the

   6   errant shock wave hit the wrong building.  I suggest to you

   7   when he says there is a wrong building, there's a right

   8   building.  The right building is the embassy it should face.

   9   The right building is what should have been blown up.  The

  10   right building is where the Americans are.  He made a

  11   decision.  He made a decision to participate in a bomb plot

  12   that was directed against the Americans.

  13            They all knew there was a risk to Kenyans and that

  14   didn't stop them, and maybe they are upset later that they

  15   screwed up and more Kenyans died than should have, but they

  16   made that choice and it's too late to go back on it now.  But

  17   in this case, if you read this statement and you read how he

  18   answers the hypotheticals and you read how he answers the

  19   question and you read what it says here, it's a screw-up, they

  20   hit the wrong building.  You figure out what it is that they

  21   wanted to hit, the right building where the Americans are.

  22            Taping interviews.  Why don't I pick this point in

  23   time to talk about taping.  You have heard about it from a

  24   bunch of different counsel.  You know what, when Miranda

  25   didn't write notes for the first half of the interview, why


   1   didn't you take notes.  Second half of the interview, you

   2   wrote notes, why didn't you tape?  Then, if you are going to

   3   tape, why not videotape so you can see a smirk.  Now, coming

   4   ahead to Mr. Cohn, Agent Gaudin, how maybe it is he who told

   5   Mr. Mwaka Mula about where he was sitting?  So you better

   6   videotape not just the person being questioned but you better

   7   videotape the person questioning.  Are you going to videotape

   8   the meals?  Should we learn that maybe the Kenyan handmaidens

   9   are doing something when the agents aren't around?  You better

  10   film when he is walking to the bathroom too, because if you

  11   do, you will be asked what happened off camera, what happened

  12   in the back of the room, who is making a face, who's making a

  13   gesture, what happened at night.

  14            Another thing.  You had to bring all these cameras

  15   everywhere you went?  How practical is that?  They don't tape

  16   here in the United States.  Whatever you think of the policy,

  17   it's not done differently.  Down the block when you do an

  18   interview, it's not taped.  It wasn't like they were treating

  19   it differently.

  20            Another thing, when you talk to people, don't you

  21   want to get information?  Don't you think it's a little

  22   intimidating to say hey, I would like to know what you know

  23   and stick a video camera in your face?  You were all

  24   voir-dired, questioned as jurors.  Do you think you would have

  25   felt more comfortable if there was a video running?


   1            MR. COHN:  Objection.

   2            THE COURT:  Overruled.

   3            MR. FITZGERALD:  I also submit to you that there are

   4   tapes in this case, and that's where the transition is.  There

   5   are tapes in this case that Wadih El Hage would prefer were

   6   not there and there is a tape in this case that the Odeh team

   7   does not want to deal with.  They mentioned it once yesterday.

   8   That is Government's Exhibit 710-96.  Remember, that's the

   9   letter to his wife.  Let's set the stage about Government's

  10   Exhibit 710-96, because that exhibit is very, very important,

  11   because it shows you something.  Like Somalia, when the people

  12   in Al Qaeda knew back in 1993 that Al Qaeda is against

  13   America, whoever they are with, 710-96 shows you something

  14   about Odeh in 1997, long before he is checking into the

  15   Hilltop Hotel as Abu Basit Awad.  It's a series of tapes,

  16   letters on tape to his wife.  You can figure out the date is

  17   probably, very clearly the first two weeks in September.  I

  18   will tell you briefly how.

  19            During the letters there is side A of the tape and

  20   side B of the tape.  At the end of side A, Odeh says it is

  21   September 9, 1997.  Then you turn over to side B.  You may

  22   think people can sometimes do side B first instead of side A.

  23   That happens.  During the letter, letter 3 of which this is an

  24   excerpt -- all the letters are in 710-96 -- he writes about

  25   how he left home on March 18, 1997, and then he says it's been


   1   almost six months.  Take six months from March 18 and you are

   2   at September 18, 1997.  With the thing on the other side

   3   saying September 7, you are in September 1997.

   4            Mr. Ricco talked about this letter briefly and said

   5   it had to do with something happening in Somalia.  Let's see

   6   how that can't be true.  What is going on in September 1997

   7   that is going to upset Odeh and the people he knows?  Three

   8   things are going on.  All three involve America.  Two involve

   9   Kenya as well.  None involve Somalia.  The three things going

  10   on, Madani al Tayyib, Abu Fadhl al Makkee, the guy with part

  11   of his leg missing, has defected, they think.  He is talking

  12   to the British, the Americans, the Saudis, and Harun is having

  13   a panic attack.  That's America, that's happening somewhere

  14   else.  You will see in the letter, the reference is something

  15   happened in Kenya.

  16            If you look at 300A-T, the security report written by

  17   Harun, he writes about how five terrorists reported in the

  18   paper are arrested in Kenya.  They think the Americans are

  19   behind it, that America is behind going around grabbing the

  20   Mujahideen in Kenya.  That report Madani al Tayyib is

  21   cooperating, they think, and there are arrests in Kenya that

  22   the Americans are behind.

  23            The next thing that happens, Wadih El Hage gets

  24   stopped at the airport, his house gets searched, and he

  25   leaves.  You know Harun has a panic because Wadih El Hage


   1   tells you Harun was hiding in Kenya.  Kherchtou tells you he

   2   runs to the Sudan.  Didn't come back to Kenya until May of

   3   1998.  There is that panic.  The arrest in coastal Kenya that

   4   the Americans are perceived as being behind, and the American

   5   search of Wadih El Hage's home.

   6            My beloved wife.  Something happened which you may

   7   have heard of or you are aware of some of its details.

   8   September 1997.  Some kind of distress crisis has happened to

   9   few brothers where you are.  She is in Kenya.  He is in

  10   Somalia.  The problem is in Kenya.  They had some problems.

  11   These problems were expected.  They were not farfetched.  One

  12   expected these problems to happen today before tomorrow and

  13   yesterday before today.  But we had no idea the nature of

  14   these problems and their magnitude.  We heard the news about

  15   something that had happened which may compel us to stay here

  16   in our locations without moving, due to the difficulty of the

  17   situation where you are.  He is in Somalia, she is in Kenya.

  18   And also due to the inability to get to you using the way, or

  19   any of the ways that could take me to you.  So it has been

  20   decided that we have to stay here and not to move.  It goes on

  21   to say, thank God for your letters that have been reassuring.

  22   Harun also said good news about you when he came over.

  23            So he is getting messages from Harun in September

  24   1997 and what is on Harun's brain?  Madani al Tayyib, the

  25   arrests in Kenya, Wadih El Hage's search.


   1            The letter goes on.  Remember, this is the Americans

   2   and the Kenyans perceived as working together.  Odeh tells you

   3   that he has no problem with the Kenyans.  He likes Kenyans.

   4   It says here, but may God fight against the enemies.  They

   5   neither sleep nor rest, and they don't let anybody rest.

   6   Anyhow, this is the way it should be.  If they let us rest we

   7   will not let them rest.  So they certainly have their time and

   8   we have ours.  This time may have been theirs, but not all

   9   times will be theirs.  We will never allow that.  And may God,

  10   the master of universe to respond twentyfold to one of theirs.

  11   Thank God we are still alive and we are still capable of

  12   giving and resisting.  But of course the matter will require

  13   time, preparation and thinking.  Again, time, preparation and

  14   thinking to respond twentyfold to something that the enemy did

  15   in Kenya.  Think about that.

  16            Which brings me to the sketches.  Maybe I will try

  17   and do another topic that won't take 10 minutes.  Why don't we

  18   talk about the TNT and the PETN, because I don't want to get

  19   in the middle of the sketch and have to stop.

  20            You know, yesterday it was said, why didn't we tell

  21   you about the fingerprints on the grinder, the grinder from

  22   Tanzania?  Why didn't Karas tell you about that?  After all,

  23   the clothes test positive, TNT and PETN.  There is no PETN in

  24   Nairobi.  Makes sense.  It must have come from the Humsafar

  25   magazine of Fahad who was down in Nairobi with the fingerprint


   1   on the grinder.  There are a couple of problems.  Number one,

   2   you were told about the fingerprint on the grinder.  That

   3   shows that the PETN on Mohamed Odeh's clothing came from the

   4   magazine, the magazine from the grinder from Fahad?  No.  Why

   5   didn't Karas tell you that?  Because it makes no sense.  First

   6   of all, check the record.  The grinder did not test positive

   7   for PETN.  Fact number one.  Number two, let's focus on

   8   Nairobi.  The Nairobi bomb scene, the bomb scene did not test

   9   positive for PETN.  That's the embassy.  But Nairobi did.  43

  10   Runda where the bomb was built, that tested positive for PETN.

  11   The point was, when we said there was no PETN at the bomb

  12   scene, not that there was no PETN, the expert told you, big

  13   bombs often don't leave residue.  When those agents and

  14   investigators were going around the bomb scene bumping into

  15   walls, they weren't getting PETN on them.  It wasn't there.  I

  16   submit to you, the PETN was from Runda Estates.  PETN was used

  17   in Nairobi in making the bomb, and therefore this magazine to

  18   the grinder that didn't have PETN doesn't make sense.

  19            You know that 43 Runda, the search that didn't

  20   contaminate the clothing, the first swab was on the 20th, the

  21   full blown search was days later, and already the clothing is

  22   in FBI custody, taken over by Whitworth.  We will talk about

  23   Whitworth briefly.  Whitworth, Mr. Wilford toward you, that's

  24   the guy that separated out the clothes?  He is not a bomb

  25   expert.  What kind of idiot looks at clothes for stains when


   1   you are trying to find one billionth of a billionth of an

   2   aspirin.  Two things.  Whitworth is a bomb expert.  He

   3   testified at the time he was trained as a bomb expert.  They

   4   used him to collect evidence because he had bomb expertise.

   5   He didn't tell you that he could look and spot PETN and spot

   6   it with the naked eye like a ketchup stain.  He looked for

   7   things that main contain forensic evidence.  He saw a magazine

   8   with indented writing.  You write something in a letter, it's

   9   underneath.  He is looking at it, he is thinking hey, take a

  10   shot.  Maybe it's a laundry list, maybe it's unintelligible.

  11   Check it.  He looked for clothes that were used, clothes that

  12   were soiled, figuring if it is a brand new shirt in a Macy's

  13   bag, that's not worth checking.  So he is looking for a shirt

  14   that is soiled.

  15            One thing.  If you ask for any anything in the jury

  16   room, ask for that shell shirt.  It is still soiled.  It still

  17   smells.  That is not a brand new shirt, he says, somebody

  18   worked in that.  Those pants, let's check that out.  That

  19   sarong or sheet, whatever it is, it looks like something has

  20   been happening with it, let's check it out.  He didn't come to

  21   the stand and say I didn't need to do any more, I looked with

  22   my eyeball and checked out PETN.  He sent it to the lab.  What

  23   does the lab get?  The lab gets positive hits on those things.

  24   He took an educated guess and then it went to the lab.

  25            Another thing about that.  Remember Dr. Lloyd.  He


   1   said two things we will address.  First, he faults the

   2   government for not testing quantity.  Remember, Kelly Mount

   3   told you you can test quantity but the quantity is a sample.

   4   You take a shirt, check this spot because it is microscopic

   5   and you get a concentration.  Maybe there is a lot here and a

   6   little there.  You test a sample, it doesn't tell you the

   7   quantity on the shirt, it tells you the quantity of the

   8   sample.

   9            You know what else Dr. Lloyd tell you?  Why didn't

  10   Kelly Mount check the rest of the clothes in the bag?  Then

  11   you learn she did.  That bag, that famous Nike bag with Odeh's

  12   clothing in it, the bag, no, doesn't test positive.  The

  13   handle?  Doesn't test positive.  The clothes you heard about

  14   that test positive?  They do.  The other ones don't.  It

  15   wasn't mass contamination.  It wasn't people grabbing the bag

  16   and putting PETN on it.  The bag is clean.

  17            Briefly, the green jacket.  Enough of the green

  18   jacket.  OK, the green jacket got missed.  The green jacket

  19   tested negative.  So wherever the PETN came from, it wasn't

  20   jumping off the green jacket.  The money?  OK.  Think for a

  21   moment what they asked Agent Doran.  Bombs going off in two

  22   countries, searches going on all over the place, evidence that

  23   is going to be brought back to America.  You have heard about

  24   lots of searches in Tanzania, lots of searches in Nairobi.

  25   You saw the bomb scene.  You saw the rubble.  Forget about the


   1   people.  All that evidence, all those people in the fall of

   2   1998, Mohamed Odeh is looking for his glasses.  Someone calls

   3   an agent in New York and says can you find Mohamed Odeh's

   4   glasses?  Can you get his money?  Believe it or not, she's not

   5   a computer.  She has to look.  She writes a note to Nairobi.

   6   She doesn't know it's there.  When they check for the money,

   7   you know what they got?  The money in the right amount.

   8            I submit to you the clothing is what it is.  The

   9   clothing is clothing that tests positive for TNT and PETN, and

  10   it didn't come from the bomb scene, it didn't come from the

  11   search of Runda, it didn't come from Tanzania.  It came from

  12   exposure by Odeh to someone or some thing contacting, in

  13   contact with PETN and TNT long before there was a mad dash for

  14   Afghanistan.

  15            Your Honor, if we could pick it up tomorrow.

  16            THE COURT:  Ladies and gentlemen, let me give you as

  17   best I can some sense of where we are, and that is, sometime

  18   mid-morning tomorrow closing arguments will be completed and I

  19   will begin my charge to you, which will take some time.  If

  20   you could plan maybe to stay a little past 4:30 tomorrow, that

  21   might be helpful.

  22            Thursday, remember, we start at 1:00.  We will sit

  23   this Friday.  I have the note from the alternate asking a

  24   question about alternates, and I will respond to that

  25   tomorrow.  Have a good evening.  We are adjourned until 10:00


   1   a.m. tomorrow.

   2            (Jury excused)

   3            THE COURT:  Since so much of a point has been made

   4   about the jury reading all of Exhibit 6, I would think Exhibit

   5   6 is a good thing to have 12 copies of.

   6            With respect to this question of what happens to the

   7   alternates, on which I will seek further guidance from

   8   counsel, during the break I was looking at the statute, 18 USC

   9   3593(b).  It says:  "The hearings shall be conducted before

  10   the jury that determined the defendant's guilt or before a

  11   jury impaneled for the purpose of the hearing if the jury that

  12   determined the defendant's guilt was discharged for good

  13   cause."

  14            Then it says:  "A jury impaneled pursuant to

  15   paragraph 2 shall consist of 12 members unless at any time

  16   before the conclusion of the hearing the parties stipulate,

  17   with the approval of the court, that it shall consist of a

  18   lesser number."

  19            I don't think there is a significant likelihood of a

  20   stipulation to a lesser number in a death case where the jury

  21   has to be unanimous before death will be imposed or not.

  22   Heads are being moved in a direction which suggests that that

  23   is correct.

  24            So, as I read the statute, it is before the jury that

  25   determined the defendant's guilt.  It has to be 12 people,


   1   unless, C, the jury that determined the defendant's guilt was

   2   discharged for good cause.  Which leads me, again assuming

   3   there is no precedent for this, compelling precedent for this,

   4   to believe that it makes very good sense to keep the

   5   alternates on tap so that if there comes a time when we have

   6   the penalty phase and we have lost a juror, we can call upon

   7   an alternate and still have a jury of 12, because the

   8   alternative to that, I think, is to impanel an entirely new

   9   jury, and then -- well, you are shaking your head vigorously

  10   yes, Mr. Cohn, but I don't think, if it can be avoided, it's a

  11   very attractive prospect to go through the voir dire process,

  12   which took us a month, slightly less, and to present to an

  13   entirely new jury the background of this case.

  14            So that my inclination, as I say, absent some

  15   compelling precedent otherwise, would be, after the jury has

  16   started, to excuse the alternates, have them on telephone

  17   call, with the understanding that if the jury reconvenes they

  18   rejoin the jury.  And if we then lose a juror, we can still

  19   have the jury of 12, which is compelled by the statute.

  20            If that isn't the case, then I certainly have to

  21   rethink the question of timing, because if we have only 12

  22   jurors and with a prospect that if we lose one juror because

  23   of health or accident or other reason, we have to start all

  24   over again, then you can expect that I will want the penalty

  25   phase to begin just as promptly after the jury verdict as


   1   possible.  There is too much of an investment to run the risk

   2   of starting from scratch, which apart from the time and effort

   3   on everybody's part is contrary to what I understand the

   4   spirit or sense of the statute to be, which is a preference

   5   for having the jury which heard the liability phase hearing

   6   the penalty phase.  Just think of all the arguments which have

   7   been made improperly to this jury which are really directed to

   8   the death penalty that would be wasted if we had to start with

   9   a whole new jury.  I am not pointing anyone out, Mr. Baugh.

  10            (Laughter)

  11            THE COURT:  I will await your further views on the

  12   matter.  I assume you have -- about how much time left?

  13            MR. FITZGERALD:  Again, from the person who predicted

  14   a 9 to 12 month trial, I will be done certainly tomorrow

  15   morning and I am hoping to be done around the mid-morning

  16   break, but certainly the morning.

  17            MR. COHN:  Your Honor, the government got four hours.

  18   It is supposed to be a brief rebuttal.

  19            THE COURT:  No, three and a half hours.  I gave

  20   everyone the amount of time that they requested.

  21            MR. COHN:  I think the government asked for four

  22   hours.

  23            THE COURT:  And so far they have had two.

  24            MR. COHN:  They have used two and a quarter -- two --

  25   that means the mid-morning break, not 1:00.  My summation was


   1   an hour and a quarter, they can't take an hour from my

   2   summation.

   3            THE COURT:  I laid the ground rules down very, very

   4   specifically and I laid them down very specifically just to

   5   avoid this, that I would give everybody the time that they

   6   requested and no more.

   7            MR. COHN:  That's four hours for the government.

   8   That's all I'm saying.  That's what they asked for.

   9            THE COURT:  2:15 to 4:30 with a midafternoon break is

  10   two hours.

  11            MR. COHN:  And tomorrow to 11:30 is an hour and a

  12   half --

  13            THE COURT:  We are adjourned until tomorrow at 10

  14   a.m.

  15            MR. DRATEL:  Is it your Honor's intention to charge

  16   in one session and complete the charge tomorrow?

  17            THE COURT:  I don't know.  I really don't want to

  18   rush it.

  19            MR. DRATEL:  Do you have an idea how late you will

  20   be?

  21            THE COURT:  No.

  22            (Proceedings adjourned until 10:00, Wednesday, May 9,

  23   2001)





























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