7 March 2006
Source: Digital transcript purchased from Exemplaris.com. Files digitally signed by reporter.

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                        UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                            ALEXANDRIA DIVISION
     UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,     .       Criminal No. 1:01cr455
          vs.                      .       Alexandria, Virginia
                                  .       March 6, 2006
     ZACARIAS MOUSSAOUI,           .       2:00 p.m.
    a/k/a Shaqil, a/k/a           .
     Abu Khalid al Sahrawi,        .
                    Defendant.     .
     .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .
                          TRANSCRIPT OF JURY TRIAL
                        UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
                                  VOLUME I-A
                                  DAVID J. NOVAK, AUSA
                                   DAVID RASKIN, AUSA
                                  United States Attorney's Office
                                   2100 Jamieson Avenue
                                  Alexandria, VA 22314
                                   KENNETH P. TROCCOLI
                                  Assistant Federal Public Defenders
                                   Office of the Federal Public
                                   1650 King Street
                                  Alexandria, VA 22314

 1   APPEARANCES:  (Cont'd.)
                                  P.O. Box 903
 3                                 107 East Washington Street
                                  Middleburg, VA 20118
 4                                   and
                                  ALAN H. YAMAMOTO, ESQ.
 5                                 643 South Washington Street
                                  Alexandria, VA 22314-3032
 8                                 U.S. District Court, Fifth Floor
                                  401 Courthouse Square
 9                                 Alexandria, VA 22314
10                                   and
                                  KAREN BRYNTESON, FAPR, RMR, CRR
11                                 Brynteson Reporting, Inc.
                                  2404 Belle Haven Meadows Court
12                                 Alexandria, VA 22306

 1                         P R O C E E D I N G S
 2                            (Defendant and Jury in.)
 3             THE COURT:  Mr. Spencer, are you ready for the opening
 4   statement on behalf of the government?
 5             MR. SPENCER:  I am, Your Honor.  Thank you very much.
 6   Your Honor, may it please the Court --
 7             THE COURT:  Everybody have their notebooks?  Yes?
 8                       OPENING STATEMENT
 9                        BY MR. SPENCER:
10             Thank you, Your Honor.
11             September 11th, 2001 dawned clear, crisp and blue in the
12   northeast United States.  In lower Manhattan in the Twin Towers of
13   the World Trade Center, workers sat down at their desks tending to
14   e-mail and phone messages from the previous days.
15             In the Pentagon in Arlington, Virginia, military and
16   civilian personnel sat in briefings, were focused on their
17   paperwork.
18             In those clear blue skies over New York, over Virginia,
19   and over Pennsylvania, in two American Airlines jets and in two
20   United Airlines jets, weary travelers sipped their coffee and read
21   their morning papers as flight attendants made their first rounds.
22             And in fire and police stations all over New York City,
23   the bravest among us reported for work.  It started as an utterly
24   normal day, but a day that started so normally and with such
25   promise, soon became a day of abject horror.  By morning's end,

 1   2,972 people were slaughtered in cold blood.
 2             And that clear, blue sky became clouded with dark smoke
 3   that rose from the Trade Towers of New York, from the Pentagon in
 4   Virginia, and from a field in rural Pennsylvania.  And within a
 5   few hours out of that clear, blue sky came terror, pain, misery,
 6   and death, and those 2,972 never again saw their loved ones, never
 7   again gave their kids a goodnight kiss.  That day, September 11th,
 8   2001, became a defining moment, not just for 2,972 families, but
 9   for a generation.
10             Killers were among us that day and for more than just
11   that day.  Those killers had lived among us for months, planned
12   for years to cut our throats, hijack our planes, and crash them
13   into buildings to burn us alive.
14             On that day, September 11, 2001, a group of cold-blooded
15   killers from distant lands capped their plan, their conspiracy, to
16   kill as many innocent Americans as possible.  Those killers, part
17   of the terrorist group al Qaeda, came up with their plan, trained
18   for it, practiced it, worked on it, kept it secret, and then
19   carried it out, hijacking four commercial planes on September 11
20   and crashing them on purpose to kill as many Americans as they
21   could.
22             One of the people in that plan, one of the conspirators
23   is among us still, right here in this courtroom today.  That man
24   is the defendant, Zacarias Moussaoui.  He is a loyal al Qaeda
25   soldier, as were the other al Qaeda murderers.  He trained to

 1   kill, as did the other murderers.  He did his part, as did the
 2   other murderers, and he succeeded, as did the other murderers,
 3   including their leader, Usama Bin Laden.
 4             Moussaoui's part in the end was to lie to allow his
 5   al Qaeda brothers to go forward with a plot to kill Americans.  He
 6   lied so that the plot could proceed unimpeded, and that's exactly
 7   what he did.  He lied and nearly 3,000 people perished.  Moussaoui
 8   stands before you today, an admitted terrorist, a convicted
 9   terrorist, a proud and unrepentant terrorist.  He pled guilty, as
10   the Court has already told you, on April 22nd, 2005 to all charges
11   against him in this case.
12             He is guilty.  This trial is to decide what his
13   punishment shall be.
14             On that day, September 11th, 2001, Moussaoui was a
15   member of al Qaeda.  On that day Moussaoui was part of the plot to
16   hijack planes and crash them into U.S. buildings to kill as many
17   U.S. Americans as possible.  Moussaoui trained with al Qaeda as
18   part of the plot.  Moussaoui traveled to the U.S. as part of the
19   plot.  Moussaoui took flight training as part of the plot.
20   Moussaoui purchased short-bladed knives, all part of the plot, all
21   financed by al Qaeda as part of the plot.  He was in the thick of
22   it.
23             And then he got arrested.  He was arrested on August
24   16th, 2001 in Minnesota where he was training on a Boeing 747
25   simulator as part of the plot.  But even though he was in jail on

 1   September 11th, 2001, Moussaoui did his part.  He did his part as
 2   a good, loyal al Qaeda soldier, he lied so that his brothers could
 3   go forward with their plan.
 4             When he was arrested and questioned by federal agents,
 5   Moussaoui lied to them.  And with that lie, his part, he caused
 6   the deaths of nearly 3,000 people, the destruction of the Trade
 7   Towers in New York, part of the Pentagon in Arlington, Virginia,
 8   and four commercial aircraft.
 9             And he rejoiced in the death and destruction, because he
10   knew he had done his part to kill Americans, and that the plot had
11   succeeded.  Now, he caused the deaths by lying to federal agents
12   about what he was doing in the U.S., and his lies permitted his
13   al Qaeda brothers to go forward, and that's what they did.  That's
14   exactly what happened.
15             Had Moussaoui just told the truth on August 16th and
16   17th, 2001, it would all have been different, and those 2,972
17   people, or at least some of them, would be alive today.
18             Now, this trial has been divided into two parts.  In the
19   first part of this trial you will be asked to decide whether
20   Moussaoui is eligible for the death penalty, whether he intended
21   to cause and caused deaths on September 11th.
22             If you decide that he is eligible for the death penalty,
23   then we will have a second part of this trial, and in that second
24   part, you will hear about what happened on September 11th and what
25   the effect has been on the victims.  And then you will decide

 1   whether the defendant, Moussaoui, should be executed.
 2             In the first part of the trial we will prove to you why
 3   Moussaoui lied and what effect those lies had.  We will prove that
 4   he lied intentionally so his co-conspirators, his al Qaeda
 5   brothers, could go forward with their murderous plot.  And, ladies
 6   and gentlemen, you will see there is really no dispute about that.
 7   He has admitted that.  He has told us that's why he did it, and
 8   the other evidence will bear it out.
 9             Second, I will show you that Moussaoui lied, his lies
10   had their intended effect, that he succeeded and that his lies
11   caused nearly 3,000 deaths, because had he not lied to the agents
12   in August of 2001, had he told us then what he told us in April of
13   2005, the U.S. government would have stopped those deaths, or at
14   least some of them, and those people would be alive today.
15             When he was arrested on August 16th and 17th, 2001, this
16   man knew that there was a ticking bomb in the United States.  He
17   knew there was a plot about to unfold where jets would be hijacked
18   and flown into buildings.  He knew it because he was part of the
19   plot.
20             And he lied to allow the plot to go forward.  His lies
21   provided the operational security to allow his brothers to go
22   forward and kill on that horrific September morning.
23             The arrest and the lies.  In August 2001 Moussaoui was
24   arrested in Minnesota by federal agents.  He attracted the
25   attention of agents because he was at the Pan Am International

 1   Flight Academy, training on a Boeing 747 simulator, and he stood
 2   out because he barely knew how to fly a single engine airplane,
 3   and the other students learning how to fly a 747 were all
 4   experienced, with long aviation backgrounds.
 5             He didn't have that.  The agents suspected that he was a
 6   foreign terrorist here up to no good, and they confronted him with
 7   that.  And he lied.  He said no, it is a dream of mine to fly a
 8   Boeing 747 simulator.  I'm just a tourist here in the United
 9   States.  I'm not a terrorist.  Those are lies.
10             They asked him about the source of his money that he
11   used to pay for the expensive simulator training.  He said:  Oh,
12   that money came from a business in England called NOP.  Again,
13   false.  That money came from al Qaeda.
14             He told these lies instead of telling the truth, saying
15   that he was from al Qaeda, that he was here to kill by hijacking
16   planes, and that there were others in the United States in a plot
17   about to unfold.
18             Now, what Moussaoui really knew.  What he said in August
19   2001 was a lie.  We know it is a lie and even he has now admitted
20   it is a lie.  Years after he lied, he admitted in this very
21   courtroom that he is a terrorist.  On April 22nd, 2005, he pled
22   guilty to every one of the six charges against him in this case.
23   Three of those charges, as the Court has told you, carry a
24   potential sentence of death.
25             When he stood before this Court and admitted his guilt,

 1   he signed a written Statement of Facts.  That is an extremely
 2   important document in this case.  In that Statement of Facts he
 3   told us some of what he knew about the plot, the plot to hijack
 4   planes and kill Americans.
 5             If you look at the screen I am going to read you some of
 6   the most important parts of those admissions and they will also
 7   come up on the screen for you to follow along.  Paragraph 4:
 8   Moussaoui became a member of al Qaeda and pledged loyalty, a term
 9   known as bayat, to Bin Laden, whom he called his father in Jihad.
10             Paragraph 7:  Al Qaeda members conceived of an operation
11   in which civilian commercial airliners would be hijacked and flown
12   into prominent buildings, including government buildings, in the
13   United States.  To effect this attack, al Qaeda associates entered
14   the U.S., received funding from abroad, engaged in physical
15   fitness training, and obtained knives and other weapons with which
16   to take over airliners.  Some al Qaeda associates obtained pilot
17   training, including training on commercial jet simulators, so they
18   would be able to fly hijacked aircraft into their targets.
19             Paragraph 9:  Moussaoui knew of al Qaeda's plan to fly
20   airplanes into prominent buildings in the U.S., and he agreed to
21   travel to the U.S. to participate in the plan.  Bin Laden
22   personally selected Moussaoui to participate in the operation to
23   fly planes into American buildings and approved Moussaoui
24   attacking the White House.  Bin Laden told Moussaoui, "Sahrawi,
25   remember your dream."  "Sahrawi," Ladies and Gentlemen, is a war

 1   name that Moussaoui used in al Qaeda.
 2             An al Qaeda associate provided Moussaoui with
 3   information about flight schools in the United States.
 4             Paragraph 12:  On February 23rd, 2001 Moussaoui traveled
 5   to Norman, Oklahoma where he attended the Airman Flight School and
 6   received training as a pilot of smaller planes.  In summer 2001 an
 7   al Qaeda associate directed Moussaoui to attend training for
 8   larger jet planes.
 9             Paragraph 13:  While in Oklahoma, Moussaoui joined a gym
10   and bought knives.  Moussaoui selected certain knives because they
11   had blades short enough to get past airport security.
12             Paragraph 14:  In early August 2001, an al Qaeda
13   conspirator using the alias Ahad Sabet, wire transferred money
14   from Germany to Moussaoui in Oklahoma so Moussaoui could receive
15   additional flight training.
16             In August 2001 -- this is paragraph 15 now -- Moussaoui
17   trained on a Boeing 747-400 simulator at the Pan Am International
18   Flight Academy in Eagan, Minnesota.  Moussaoui told an al Qaeda
19   associate that he would complete training before September 2001.
20             And paragraph 16:  After his arrest, Moussaoui lied to
21   federal agents to allow his al Qaeda brothers to go forward with
22   the operation to fly planes into American buildings.
23             The Statement of Facts is a startling document.  It
24   tells us what Moussaoui knew.  It tells us what Moussaoui did.
25   And it is all the government needed to know to stop 9/11.  And we

 1   will show you how.
 2             But Moussaoui didn't give this information in August
 3   2001.  Instead, he lied, even after he was arrested, to allow his
 4   al Qaeda brothers to go forward.  He lied, he told the agents none
 5   of this vital information, he told the agents none of what he
 6   later told the Court, and he and his terrorist conspirators killed
 7   people.
 8             Thus, the Statement of Facts is the focus of the first
 9   part of this trial.  The information shows that Moussaoui's lies
10   killed the 9/11 victims as surely as if he had been at the
11   controls of one of the four planes on that day.
12             The part of the 19 hijackers who died on September 11th,
13   who killed innocent Americans, their part was to hijack the planes
14   and fly them and kill Americans.  Moussaoui's part, as it turned
15   out, was to lie so they could go forward.  With the information in
16   Moussaoui's Statement of Facts from April 2005, the United States
17   Government would have stopped the September 11th attacks, or at
18   least saved some lives, in two ways.
19             One, offensively.  The FBI and other government agencies
20   would have unraveled and discovered the plot.  Two, the FAA, the
21   Federal Aviation Administration, if they had that information,
22   would have tightened airport security and stopped the hijackers
23   from getting on the planes that day.
24             Now, because Moussaoui's lies are the focus of the first
25   part of this case, we will not be concentrating our proof and our

 1   efforts on what role Moussaoui would have had had he not been
 2   arrested on August 16th.  In other words, you are not going to
 3   learn what plane he would have been on if he hadn't been arrested,
 4   but make no mistake, the evidence will show you that Moussaoui was
 5   training to hijack a commercial jet and fly it into the White
 6   House as part of the plot, and he has admitted that much.  And the
 7   rush to get him to jet simulator school and finished with his
 8   training before September 2001 tells you all you need to know,
 9   that he was supposed to be in that plot.
10             And that was a plot, after all, that was still in flux
11   as of that time he was arrested.  After all, none of the 19
12   hijackers on September 11th had yet reserved or purchased their
13   tickets for September 11th on August 16th, the date Moussaoui was
14   arrested.
15             What is important for this part of this trial is the
16   role Moussaoui played after he was arrested, whether he disclosed
17   the unfolding plot, the ticking bomb, or whether he lied to cover
18   it up.  And he chose the latter, and the murders flowed from that.
19             Here is some of what you will hear in the evidence in
20   this case.
21             You will hear some brief background about al Qaeda, what
22   the organization is, how it operates, and that it is dedicated to
23   killing Americans.  You will hear from an FBI special agent named
24   Michael Anticev from New York.  He has devoted his professsional
25   career to battling al Qaeda.

 1             He will tell you that al Qaeda is headed by Usama Bin
 2   Laden and that Bin Laden, by the mid-1990s, had devoted his
 3   followers to killing Americans in the greatest number they could
 4   find, anywhere in the world they could be found.
 5             Next, you will hear about the 9/11 plot.  You will hear
 6   about this plot from FBI Special Agent Jim Fitzgerald.  He will
 7   summarize for you what the FBI has learned from the largest
 8   criminal investigation in its history.
 9             You will hear how the hijackers came to the U.S. and
10   lived among us while they plotted the hijackings and the killings.
11   You will hear how they lived under their real names, entered the
12   U.S., took flight lessons, worked out in gyms and fitness training
13   facilities, trained in the martial arts, bought small knives and
14   box cutters.
15             You will hear how they were funded from al Qaeda from
16   abroad, how they trained in jet simulators.  You will learn that
17   the 9/11 plot was complex, requiring years of training and
18   practice, and requiring strict operational security.  And,
19   remember, it was Moussaoui's lies that provided that operational
20   security.
21             You will also hear, of course, about Moussaoui during
22   this trial.  Moussaoui was born in France.  He is of Moroccan
23   descent.  He is 37 years old.  He joined al Qaeda, pledged loyalty
24   to Bin Laden, used several war names in al Qaeda, and trained at
25   the al Qaeda terrorist training camps in Afghanistan.

 1             On al Qaeda business he traveled to Pakistan and
 2   Malaysia, and in the fall of 2000 he sent e-mails asking about
 3   pilot training to the Airman Flight School in Norman, Oklahoma.
 4   In February 2001 Moussaoui entered the U.S., flying from London to
 5   Chicago to Oklahoma City.  When he came into the United States he
 6   brought with him over $30,000 in cash.
 7             He enrolled at the Airman Flight School in Oklahoma in
 8   late February, 2001.  He was an interested and good student in
 9   ground school, but once he got in the air, he didn't have much of
10   a knack for flying an airplane.  He also told people there various
11   stories about what he was doing in flight school and what he was
12   going to do afterwards.
13             None of them, not surprisingly, was true.  He told
14   nobody that he was an al Qaeda operative, he was part of a plot to
15   hijack planes and fly big jets into buildings to kill Americans.
16   By May 2001 Moussaoui had dropped out of Airman Flight School, out
17   of single engine plane training, and was looking around to get
18   himself into jet simulator school as soon as possible.  He was
19   also interested in global positioning systems and small knives.
20             By July 2001 Moussaoui had secured for himself a spot at
21   the Pan Am International Flight Academy in Eagan, Minnesota.  He
22   obtained, on July 31st, his training schedule from that simulator
23   school, and the training schedule had him finished with his
24   training on August 20th.
25             On August 2nd and 4th, Moussaoui received from Germany

 1   via Western Union wire transfer a total of about $14,000.  It was
 2   sent to him by an al Qaeda conspirator using the fake name, the
 3   alias, Ahad Sabet.  The sender of the money was really Ramzi Bin
 4   al-Shibh, an al Qaeda operative who had tried to get into the
 5   United States to become a hijacker, but whose visas to enter the
 6   United States were repeatedly rejected.
 7             Once Moussaoui received the money from al Qaeda from
 8   Germany by wire transfer, he bought several small-bladed knives
 9   and he told his Oklahoma roommate, Hussein al-Attas, that the
10   knives would be easy to hide.  Moussaoui then drove from Oklahoma
11   to Eagan, Minnesota, home of the Pan Am Flight School, where he
12   paid $6,800 in cash for the 747 simulator training.
13             Once there, Moussaoui attracted the attention of the
14   flight instructors.  The other students learning on a Boeing 747
15   simulator were either commercial aircraft pilots looking to move
16   to larger aircraft or military jet pilots looking to get an
17   airline job.  Moussaoui had no such background.  He could barely
18   fly a single engine propeller plane, having just over 50 hours in
19   the air in that kind of plane.
20             The school called the local FBI, and Special Agent Harry
21   Samit of the Minneapolis FBI, himself a pilot, knew something was
22   wrong.  Agent Samit, and an INS agent named John Weess, arrested
23   Moussaoui when they noticed that he had overstayed his visa.  They
24   arrested him as an illegal alien, and he has been in jail ever
25   since.

 1             On August 16th and 17th those agents interviewed
 2   Moussaoui.  And we will talk about that a little bit later.
 3             The information that Moussaoui knew, that he admitted to
 4   knowing when he pled guilty here, is shocking and it is also
 5   credible and specific.  Had he not lied and revealed the basic
 6   facts of why he was actually taking 747 simulator training, the
 7   FBI and other government agencies would have put out an all out
 8   press, every agent available on the case to find out about the
 9   existing and pending al Qaeda plot to hijack planes inside the
10   United States, to find the ticking bomb somewhere hidden in the
11   country.
12             The response from the U.S. government, as I said, would
13   be both offense, the FBI looking for the hijackers, and defense,
14   the FAA changing airline security to not let people on planes with
15   small knives or box cutters.
16             Now, in this case you will hear a lot about the
17   terrorist threat situation in the summer of 2001.  What you need
18   to know about that summer as it unfolded was that there was a high
19   terrorist threat or a high threat environment.  The U.S.
20   intelligence agencies knew that al Qaeda would like to strike
21   America, but the intelligence suggested that the threat would come
22   outside the United States, not inside, and it didn't indicate a
23   specific strike against American aviation.
24             You will also learn more generally that for intelligence
25   to be useful or valuable, it should be credible, specific, and

 1   timely, and Moussaoui's information, what he finally told us in
 2   April 2005, was all that and would have been more in August 2001.
 3   It was specific, a suicide hijacking plan by al Qaeda using
 4   short-bladed knives.  It was credible, he was a Muslim
 5   fundamentalist who admitted he had been to Pakistan, who was right
 6   then in jet simulator school, inexplicably.  And it was timely, as
 7   the judge has already told you, it was about three weeks before
 8   that morning of September 11th.
 9             Put simply, Moussaoui's information would have put the
10   threat environment through the roof.  And every available resource
11   would have been put to finding that ticking bomb, and perhaps,
12   more important, it would have focused the search.  You will see
13   that intense efforts have been undertaken before to discover and
14   stop the plot.
15             This has happened before.  For instance, in late 1999
16   the FBI and other intelligence agencies stumbled on to a plot and
17   were warned of a plot to bomb Los Angeles International Airport
18   and elsewhere.
19             Intense, specific efforts prevented these things.
20   Without Moussaoui's specific information in August 2001, the FBI
21   and the U.S. government was left with generally high threats but
22   nothing specific enough to direct the investigation.  No one knew
23   there was going to be an attack inside the U.S.   No one knew it
24   was going to be taking over airplanes, commercial airplanes with
25   primitive weapons like box cutters and short-bladed knives.

 1             And no one knew why Moussaoui was training on a 747
 2   simulator, and perhaps most important, no one knew that there were
 3   others doing exactly the same thing, preparing to kill people on
 4   September 11th.
 5             You will hear Minnesota FBI Agent Harry Samit.  He tried
 6   hard and in vain to get more information from Moussaoui and about
 7   Moussaoui in August 2001.  He could not get a search warrant to
 8   search Moussaoui's belongings, neither a criminal search warrant
 9   nor a search warrant under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
10   Act or FISA.  But Agent Samit had a hunch about Moussaoui, and
11   unfortunately that hunch turned out to be correct.
12             Agent Samit interviewed Moussaoui for about three and a
13   half hours over two days, August 16th and 17th, 2001.  He did not,
14   however, get the information that we got in April 2005 during
15   Moussaoui's guilty plea.  He got instead a series of lies.
16             What Agent Samit did get was sent dutifully to FBI
17   headquarters in Washington, and on to the CIA and the FAA.  And
18   had Moussaoui told the truth, the FBI would have put every
19   available agent on the case and found the plot.
20             You will hear in the case from former FBI official Mike
21   Rolince, who in August 2001 was the head of the FBI's
22   International Terrorism Section.  Mike Rolince was also there
23   during the Millennium threat in 1999, and there in the summer of
24   2001 when the threat environment was generally high but not
25   specific.

 1             Like the discovery of the Millennium plot, Moussaoui's
 2   information would have led to an all-out effort by the FBI.  One
 3   of the primary agents involved in terrorism investigations for the
 4   FBI and in the investigation of 9/11 is former FBI Special Agent
 5   Aaron Zebley.  Mr. Zebley will describe the investigation into the
 6   9/11 attacks.  He will also take you through in some detail how
 7   the 9/11 plot could have been discovered had the FBI received
 8   Moussaoui's true information.
 9             Using leads from the Statement of Facts, from that
10   information, Agent Zebley will take you to 11 of the 19 hijackers.
11   And Zebley will show you how those 11 hijackers could have been
12   found using three paths, using standard law enforcement
13   techniques, like financial information records and phone records.
14             First, when the agents arrested Moussaoui in August
15   2001, they knew he had paid in cash for the expensive jet
16   simulator training, so they asked him about the source of his
17   funding.  He lied.  He said he got his funding from associates in
18   England and from a business called NOP.
19             This, of course, was false.  It really came from an
20   al Qaeda conspirator using an alias who sent it via Western Union.
21   The English information sent the agents off on a false trail
22   toward England.  When Moussaoui did admit the truth in April 2005,
23   it was obvious he had gotten it by Western Union.
24             If you look at the screen you will see Western Union
25   records that show a transfer from Germany to Moussaoui in

 1   Oklahoma.  If we look at the next slide, please, Gerard, we will
 2   look at the corresponding transfer -- can you switch the document
 3   order on that, Gerard -- corresponding transfer from the United
 4   Arab Emirates, UAE, to the man using the false name Ahad Sabet in
 5   Germany.  Contained within the records from that transfer from the
 6   United Arab Emirates to Germany, which later went from Germany to
 7   Moussaoui, is the contact cell phone number of the caller.  That
 8   number, 050-520-9905, comes back to a UAE cell phone.  The sender
 9   of that money from the UAE, again, gave that as a contact number.
10             Using standard law enforcement techniques, specifically,
11   finding phone records, the FBI can tell what numbers in the United
12   States called that UAE cell phone number that funded Moussaoui for
13   the jet simulator training.
14             Mr. Zebley will explain how the FBI got this information
15   after 9/11 and how the FBI could have gotten this information in
16   August 2001 had Moussaoui not lied.  There are nine U.S. numbers
17   that called that UAE cell phone, it turns out.  They all come back
18   to prepaid calling cards.
19             The next logical step is to see whether those calling
20   cards were used to call any numbers within the United States.
21   When you trace that back, you come to nine U.S. numbers total that
22   were called.  Eight of those numbers come back to hijackers.  And
23   if you look at that chart on the bottom you will see even just on
24   the initial round, that three of those come back to some of the
25   9/11 hijackers.

 1             From those eight numbers the FBI can continue on and get
 2   the name and location and address of five hijackers, including
 3   addresses where some of the hijackers were staying until August
 4   30th, 2001, and from tracing this even further up the path of
 5   investigation, you can readily get to six more hijackers.
 6             Second, the second avenue that Mr. Zebley will describe
 7   relates to flight schools.  In August 2001 Moussaoui lied to the
 8   agents.  They asked him about his associates.  He named a
 9   gentleman named Atif Ahmed in England.  When Moussaoui told the
10   truth during his guilty plea in April 2005, he admitted that his
11   al Qaeda associates gave him something besides money, they gave
12   him information about flight schools in the United States.
13             In Moussaoui's belongings that he left in Oklahoma is a
14   two-page list from a German aviation magazine listing United
15   States flight schools.  Agents finally were able to get this after
16   September 11th with a search warrant.  They would have gotten it
17   early, mid-August, had Moussaoui not lied.
18             The two-page list has 19 U.S. flight schools.  It is a
19   simple manner for the FBI to send an agent to each of these flight
20   schools and ask whether any of the students stand out.  Four of
21   these flight schools are in Florida, where the phone records show
22   there were hijackers.  Two of these flight schools have Arabic
23   notation written by hand in the margin.
24             If you go to those flight schools and you ask if any
25   students, any foreign students stand out, and you will hear this

 1   from employees of those flight schools and you will see it in the
 2   flight schools' records, two of these flight schools, Huffman
 3   Aviation and Florida Flight Training Center, there are students
 4   who would stand out, Mohamed Atta, Marwan al-Shehhi, and Ziad
 5   Jarrah; three of the four pilot hijackers from September 11th.
 6             Florida Flight Training Center even has the records for
 7   a hijacker who couldn't get into the United States, Ramzi Bin
 8   al-Shibh, who applied several times for a U.S. visa and was
 9   rejected, went so far as to apply to Florida Flight Training
10   Center.
11             He would have come and been a pilot hijacker, except he
12   couldn't get into the United States.  Bin al-Shibh even lists his
13   contact number on that application, in Germany, 49-40-718-99042.
14   That information is written somewhere else.  That is written in
15   the notebook that Moussaoui had with him in Minnesota.
16             An employee from FFTC, Florida Flight Training Center,
17   will even tell you that she knew that Bin al-Shibh was related,
18   was connected with Ziad Jarrah, one of the hijackers, because
19   Jarrah went so far as to come and try to get Bin al-Shibh's
20   deposit back to FFTC after Bin al-Shibh's visa was denied.
21             Next, there is another list of flight schools in
22   Moussaoui's belongings.  It is a list of Pan Am facilities.
23   Remember that Moussaoui was training at the Pan Am International
24   Flight Academy in Eagan, Minnesota.  This is a list found in his
25   duffel bag that he left behind in Oklahoma that agents were

 1   finally able to get to after September 11th, and they would have
 2   gotten there before had Moussaoui told the truth, not lied.
 3             The 13 schools on this, eight of them feature jet
 4   simulators.  The FBI canvassed these schools after 9/11, could
 5   have done it before 9/11, if Moussaoui hadn't lied.  One of these
 6   schools, Arizona Aviation, an employee from that school will come
 7   in, Peggy Chevrette, she will tell you in her experience, one
 8   student stood out, one student stood out because he didn't have
 9   the requisite aviation background to be taking simulator training
10   on a Boeing 747.  That student, Hani Hanjour, the fourth pilot
11   hijacker.
12             Thus, had Moussaoui told the truth and not lied, the FBI
13   quickly would have been on to all four pilot hijackers who
14   hijacked planes and crashed them to kill Americans on September
15   11th.
16             The final avenue that Mr. Zebley will describe involves
17   another item recovered from Moussaoui's belongings after September
18   11th, again would have been discovered before September 11th had
19   he not lied.  This is a letter, a false cover letter stating that
20   Moussaoui is the marketing representative for a Malaysian company
21   called Infocus Tech, owned by someone named Yazid Sufaat.  This
22   letter is signed by someone named Yazid Sufaat.
23             Had Moussaoui not lied, FBI agents would have had this
24   letter and investigated Yazid Sufaat.  A rudimentary investigation
25   of Yazid Sufaat connects him not only to Moussaoui, but also to

 1   another one of the 9/11 hijackers named Khalid al-Midhar.  Now,
 2   Midhar was a name that had already been given to the CIA and the
 3   FBI in that summer, and a little bit before, in 2001.  The FBI got
 4   the name al-Midhar and another 9/11 hijacker named Nawaf al-Hazmi
 5   in August of 2001.
 6             But nothing connected those two gentlemen to an aviation
 7   plot.  Had the FBI had this letter and the corresponding
 8   information, it would have connected al-Midhar and al-Hazmi to the
 9   9/11 hijackers, to Moussaoui, and Sufaat, and thus to an aviation
10   plot by al Qaeda.
11             Those are the avenues of investigation that Mr. Zebley
12   will describe to you.  Had the FBI pursued them using standard law
13   enforcement techniques, in mid-August, they would have gotten to
14   the hijackers.  What you are left with if you follow these paths
15   is 11 of the 19 hijackers and two of their addresses.
16             That's a summary sheet of where that investigation leads
17   you.  It includes all four pilot hijackers:  Atta, al-Shehhi,
18   Hanjour, and Ziad Jarrah.  But finding and arresting some of the
19   hijackers is only half the battle.  The other half is not letting
20   named hijackers on to airplanes and not letting anyone on a plane
21   with a short knife or a box cutter.
22             The FAA is responsible for commercial airline security
23   in the United States.  Where the FBI would be the offense looking
24   for the plot, had Moussaoui not lied, the FAA would be the
25   defense.  The FAA routinely sends out security information to U.S.

 1   airlines and airports.  They do it all the time and they did it in
 2   the summer of 2001.
 3             In the summer of 2001 there was an elevated threat
 4   environment, as they say, but you will see that the threats were
 5   directed toward threats outside the United States, aviation
 6   outside the United States, and the FAA security at that point was
 7   focusing on its traditional fears, one, people smuggling bombs
 8   onboard airplanes and, two, a traditional hijacking where
 9   hijackers take over an aircraft and negotiate the return of the
10   airplane and the passengers and crew in exchange for some demands.
11             Had Moussaoui told the truth instead of lying, the FAA
12   would have known about the plot to hijack airplanes using
13   primitive weapons, short-bladed knives and box cutters.  The FAA
14   would have done three definite things in response.  One, the FAA
15   would have received from the FBI that list of 11 hijackers, put
16   them on a no-fly list, they are not on a plane, and that includes
17   all four of the hijackers trained to fly commercial jets with some
18   aviation training on 9/11.
19             But even if the FBI didn't get the name and didn't get
20   to the FAA, there is a simple solution, and that is had the FAA
21   known of the plot, they would not have let anyone on a plane with
22   a short-bladed knife or a box cutter.  If Moussaoui had not lied
23   and said what he was doing and what we knew he knew, because he
24   told us in April 2005, the FAA would have changed the gate
25   security.

 1             That would have kept the hijackers from getting on the
 2   planes with the weapons you will learn that they used to hijack
 3   the planes and kill Americans.
 4             Also, had Moussaoui not lied, the FAA would have changed
 5   the focus of its gate security in another important respect.  The
 6   FAA had in September 2001 and still has today a program called
 7   CAPPS, and that acronym stands for Computer Assisted Passenger
 8   Preselection System.  It is a computer program to select
 9   potentially dangerous passengers and select them for additional
10   security before boarding a commercial flight.
11             Before 9/11, anyone selected by the CAAPS system
12   couldn't check their bag on to a plane until they themselves
13   boarded the plane.  Why?  Because the FAA before 9/11 was
14   concerned about people smuggling explosives in checked luggage
15   onto planes.
16             They weren't concerned at that point about people taking
17   over a plane with a primitive weapon.  Traditionally the thinking,
18   in addition, was that someone smuggling a bomb on a plane wouldn't
19   get on the same flight.  Even so, on the morning of 9/11, ten of
20   the 19 9/11 hijackers were selected by the CAAPS system, but
21   because many of them didn't have checked luggage and because that
22   wasn't the method they used to destroy aircraft, made little
23   difference.
24             If you look at this next slide here, that shows some of
25   the hijackers going through gate security, the hijackers of

 1   American Airlines 77 at Dulles Airport.  The next slide shows you
 2   Nawaf and Salem al-Hamzi, brothers, hijackers, they had been
 3   selected for CAAPS screening and they were getting their carry-on
 4   bag swabbed for explosive residue as part of the secondary
 5   screening there.
 6             Had Moussaoui not lied and admitted the basics of the
 7   plot, the CAAPS security screening would have been changed to look
 8   not for explosives but for small knives and box cutters, and that
 9   would have prevented the terrorists from getting on the plane and
10   getting on the plane with the weapons they used to turn those
11   aircraft into weapons to kill Americans.
12             There are specific and definite examples of when the FAA
13   has responded to terrorist threats to prevent harm from those
14   threats.  An example is from 1995, the FAA took specific defensive
15   measures known as the Bojinka plot, which was intended to blow up
16   U.S. airliners flying over the Pacific.  In the end, had Moussaoui
17   admitted in August 2001, instead of lying, what he told us in
18   April 2005, it would have been a very straightforward effort for
19   the FAA to keep those hijackers and to keep anyone with a knife or
20   a box cutter off a plane.
21             Now, what Moussaoui admitted in April 2005 is shocking.
22   It is shocking for all of us to have somebody come into a
23   courtroom like this one, stand up, proudly admit that he is a
24   terrorist, and say that he has devoted his life to killing
25   Americans.  It is shocking to hear someone embrace evil.

 1             But it is also shocking because it lays out the
 2   information that necessarily would have saved lives on September
 3   11th.  But it did not.  And the reason it did not is because a
 4   loyal al Qaeda soldier did his part.  He did his part because when
 5   he could not pilot a plane to kill Americans, he made sure by
 6   lying that his al Qaeda brothers did.
 7             This man, the terrorist Moussaoui, did his part.  He did
 8   his part and he came in here later and told us all why, so that
 9   his al Qaeda brothers could go forward and kill Americans.
10   Moussaoui lied so that murders could follow.  He intended to kill
11   Americans and he did.
12             Moussaoui acted by lying, and 2,972 people died.  They
13   were brutally murdered.  He lied so his al Qaeda brothers could
14   commit those murders and those people were killed.  They were
15   because of Moussaoui's actions.
16             Hold him accountable for causing those horrible deaths.
17   Thank you.
18             THE COURT:  Mr. MacMahon?
19                       OPENING STATEMENT
20                       BY MR. MAC MAHON:
21             May it please the Court, Your Honor, ladies and
22   gentlemen of the jury, counsel, my name is Edward MacMahon.  I'm
23   an attorney who has been appointed to represent Mr. Moussaoui in
24   this case.  And I'm here with some other lawyers, all court
25   appointed, that will be in the case and you will hear from them as

 1   well, they are Ken Troccoli, Jerry Zerkin, there is Anne Chapman,
 2   and Alan Yamamoto as well.
 3             Ladies and gentlemen, when we first got together in this
 4   case, Mr. Moussaoui introduced himself to you by proclaiming that
 5   he was al Qaeda and that we were all Americans.  And on this
 6   point, and it may be the only one, I wholeheartedly agree with
 7   him.  But his statement caused me to pause and to reflect upon who
 8   we are as a people compared to al Qaeda.
 9             And in this case you will hear a lot about al Qaeda.
10   Mr. Spencer just told you that.  You will hear a lot about its
11   structure, its goals, and how it puts things together and how it
12   makes operations work.  And you will learn and, ladies and
13   gentlemen, we all know that al Qaeda is a fanatic Islamic-based
14   terror group, and we all know that their favorite weapon is
15   suicide terrorism.
16             Now, what we call suicide, they call martyrdom.  And
17   martyrdom is something special to an al Qaeda member.  It is just
18   what they yearn for.  They live so that they can die.  Found in
19   the luggage of Mohamed Atta were specific instructions for the
20   real 9/11 hijackers as to what to do and what to expect during
21   what they called the attack that was to come.
22             Copies of this were found in two other people's luggage,
23   whose pictures Mr. Spencer just showed you, but nowhere in any of
24   the belongings of Mr. Moussaoui.  I will read you a few portions
25   of what was in this document.  "When the storming begins, strike

 1   like heroes who are determined not to return to this world.
 2   Glorify Allah because this cry will strike terror in the hearts of
 3   the infidels."  He said, "strike above the necks, strike all the
 4   mortals, and know that paradise has been adorned for you with the
 5   sweetest things, and the nymphs wearing their finest are calling
 6   out to you, come hither, come hither, followers of Allah."
 7             It ends, "when the time of truth and the zero hour
 8   arrives, rip open your clothes and embrace death for the sake of
 9   Allah."
10             Ladies and gentlemen, Mr. Spencer is exactly right.
11   This is very disturbing.  But you need to keep this in mind as you
12   hear this case.  The thought of death did not deter any of the
13   September 11th hijackers, and it won't deter any of their
14   followers as well.
15             And who are we?  We're a nation that's governed by laws
16   and the Constitution.  We try to provide equal justice to
17   everyone.  Our Constitution guarantees to all defendants the right
18   to a jury trial.  And that is why you are here, as a check against
19   the abuse of government power, with roots in the law as far back
20   as the Magna Carta.  And for serving we all thank you and
21   appreciate your time.
22             Our Constitution also requires that persons charged with
23   capital offenses, even admitted al Qaeda terrorists, be provided
24   with court-appointed lawyers when they can't afford them.  It is
25   said that our justice system can only be judged by how it treats

 1   the poorest, the most despicable person who is charged with the
 2   most heinous of crimes.  And if that is the case, then Moussaoui,
 3   the man behind me in the prison jumpsuit that he will wear for the
 4   rest of his life, poses the ultimate test to our legal system.
 5             This defendant has admitted to many things.  But he has
 6   not admitted any involvement in the September 11th attacks.  But
 7   make no doubt, ladies and gentlemen, those attacks and the events
 8   that preceded them are the crux of this case.  They form the
 9   entire heart of this case.
10             What the Statement of Facts contains is mostly
11   historical admissions of a general nature about al Qaeda and its
12   training and other plans that Moussaoui, as an admitted al Qaeda
13   member, was in a position to know, including, yes, the existence
14   of a plane's operation.  The reason Mr. Spencer declines to tell
15   you that he is going to prove what role Moussaoui played in the
16   9/11 attacks is because there is no evidence to support it.
17             There is no evidence as to what he did in these attacks,
18   and the government would surely come forward with that evidence if
19   it existed.  And you will learn that before September 11th,
20   al Qaeda was preparing many operations that involved killing
21   Americans, and that many involved hijacking aircraft.  And of
22   those plots, the 9/11 plot was only one of them.  The Statement of
23   Facts that Moussaoui has signed contains no admission of
24   involvement in or knowledge of the attacks that occurred on
25   September 11th.  Moussaoui certainly wasn't sent over here to tell

 1   a lie, ladies and gentlemen.
 2             Now, the judge asked you early in this process if you
 3   could fairly judge an admitted member of al Qaeda.  And this was a
 4   very difficult question.  Admit to yourself, as we go through this
 5   process, ladies and gentlemen, that it will be difficult to judge
 6   your sworn enemy fairly and impartially, especially when he sits
 7   here in the courtroom with us.
 8             We all know where we were when we learned about the
 9   attacks.  We remember the shock and horror of that day.  We
10   remember the immense and senseless loss of life that occurred, as
11   we watched, and all of us remember the incredible bravery of the
12   police and the firemen.  And we all cried that day.  And we will
13   again before this case ends, I promise you.
14             And we also know that the pain and losses suffered by
15   all of the victims will never be remedied or reduced in any way by
16   anything we do in this case.  And we have all been affected by the
17   war on terror that followed the attacks, but this trial cannot be
18   viewed by you as jurors as part of the war on terror.  This is a
19   court of law, not a battlefield, ladies and gentlemen.
20             And I say to you today that we must give this man a fair
21   trial.  No matter who he is, what he thinks of us, or what he
22   represents, this is because of who we are and what we stand for as
23   a people and as a nation, ladies and gentlemen.  And it is for
24   this reason and many others that this trial is much more about us
25   and who we are than it even is about him anymore.

 1             So judge Moussaoui only for what he has done, on the
 2   facts and the law.  You cannot judge him to get revenge for the
 3   victims or for what happened on September 11th or some substitute
 4   for Usama Bin Laden.
 5             And you must not judge him as a scapegoat for government
 6   officials who made errors before September 11th.  To do so would
 7   certainly provide you an easy way to resolve the issues posed in
 8   this case.  But that's the wrong approach, ladies and gentlemen.
 9   And I submit that it will lead you to the wrong verdict.
10             So let's look at what the evidence will be, as to
11   actually what Moussaoui did, who he is, and in conjunction with
12   events actually occurring in our country before September 11th.
13   Moussaoui has pled guilty to three crimes that expose him to the
14   death penalty.  That's why we're here.  But he has not admitted
15   involvement in the attacks or that he had any knowledge about the
16   date, the time, the targets or even the operatives in the attacks.
17             That information isn't set forth in the Statement of
18   Facts, and you will hear no evidence that would support a finding
19   in that regard.  Moussaoui has admitted that he lied to the FBI
20   when he was arrested, and those lies and the effect that they have
21   had on our government as a whole are the central issues, that's
22   the crux of what's happening in this portion of the case, and the
23   issue is whether Moussaoui's lies to the FBI in August of 2001
24   directly caused the deaths that so tragically occurred on 9/11,
25   just 25 days after his arrest.

 1             I say to you that the answer to that question is no.
 2   The evidence in the case will show that nothing Moussaoui did or
 3   said, even a lie, caused anyone to die that day.
 4             Now, there will be evidence that Moussaoui, as a sworn
 5   member of al Qaeda, was aware generally that Bin Laden was
 6   determined to attack in the United States.  And there will be
 7   plenty of evidence that Moussaoui was training for some attack
 8   that involved aircraft.  And there will be even more evidence of
 9   Moussaoui's stated intention to harm.  He has admitted to all of
10   that.
11             But there will be little evidence, ladies and gentlemen,
12   that Moussaoui ever had the means or the opportunity to do
13   anything.  You will hear that he told someone of a dream he had
14   had to attack the White House with an airplane.  But those words
15   were not matched by any action.  Mr. Spencer said Moussaoui was a
16   bad pilot.  Ladies and gentlemen, he couldn't fly an airplane at
17   all.  You will hear that from their witnesses.
18             He talked in Oklahoma of wanting to kill infidels, but
19   you didn't -- he didn't harm a soul when he was free in our
20   country or even before.  That, ladies and gentlemen, is Zacarias
21   Moussaoui in a nutshell, sound and fury, accomplishing nothing.
22             I will not tell you in this case that Moussaoui
23   wouldn't, if asked, have boarded a plane with the intention of
24   martyring himself, on September 11th or any other day, but the
25   evidence will be that he was intentionally isolated from the real

 1   hijackers in the United States.  You will hear evidence that
 2   Moussaoui was totally useless to al Qaeda, a headache, obnoxious
 3   to everyone he encountered, and on that subject you will hear a
 4   lot of evidence, ladies and gentlemen.
 5             You will hear from Faiz Bafana, a Muslim fundamentalist,
 6   who met Moussaoui in the year 2000.  He will say that Moussaoui
 7   was, and I quote, "cuckoo in the head," that they were all
 8   relieved when he left Malaysia and was out of their hair.  They
 9   even paid his ticket to get rid of him.
10             Now, many facts in this case will be undisputed.  It is
11   undisputed that Moussaoui was in federal custody on September
12   11th, where he had been for 25 days, and that before September
13   11th, no one in al Qaeda ever even learned that Moussaoui had been
14   arrested.  No one ever tried to call and find him.  No one called
15   to warn him to flee.  And he never even tried to tell anyone that
16   he had been arrested.  So whatever role the government may say
17   that Moussaoui played in the attacks, it was obviously so
18   inconsequential that the attacks went forward in his absence and
19   entirely without his participation.
20             How?  Because the evidence will show that Moussaoui
21   wasn't part of the plot and was ignorant of its details.  Now, you
22   will hear sufficient evidence to support Moussaoui's plea to the
23   conspiracies in the indictment, but you will hear no evidence that
24   will support a verdict beyond a reasonable doubt that any lie
25   Moussaoui told in August of 2001 caused anyone to die.

 1             And the evidence will be, as Mr. Spencer alluded a
 2   little bit to you, that in the summer of 2001 our government was
 3   fully aware that Bin Laden was planning some terror attack in the
 4   United States, that it would likely involve a hijacking, and that
 5   there were al Qaeda members already in the United States.
 6             You will learn this evidence through official government
 7   documents and by stipulation, ladies and gentlemen.  You will
 8   learn from the director of the Central Intelligence Agency, George
 9   Tenet, that in the summer of 2000 the threat level of terrorism
10   was so high that his hair was literally on fire.
11             And in this case the defense will show you the truth of
12   how the government reacted to these threats.  And you will learn
13   precisely what steps, meager as they were, ladies and gentlemen,
14   that were actually taken to defend our country.  The defense will
15   show you how the entire government acted, not just the FBI.
16             And we will show you how the National Security Agency,
17   the Pentagon, the whole Department of Defense, the Central
18   Intelligence Agency and even the White House reacted to these
19   threats.  And I want to stress to you, ladies and gentlemen, and,
20   please, don't forget this when I tell you this, we do not mean by
21   placing this information before you in this court to suggest that
22   the government is on trial or that our government is responsible
23   for the attacks of September 11th.
24             The government did not cause 9/11.  It was al Qaeda, Bin
25   Laden, Mohamed Atta, and the real hijackers who were responsible

 1   for the events of that day, not our government.  But the sad truth
 2   in this case, ladies and gentlemen, is that our government did
 3   not, before September 11th, act in the manner that we all wish it
 4   would have or the aggressive manner that we have now come to
 5   expect today in the middle of the war on terror.
 6             You cannot assume that our government would have acted
 7   the same way before 9/11 as it has since.  You cannot look at this
 8   case through post-9/11 glasses as that view is distorted by
 9   hindsight and tragedy.
10             The government's theory that Moussaoui's lies directly
11   caused death 25 days later is entirely speculative.  And, yes, it
12   is speculative in part because Moussaoui did not in August of 2001
13   provide the information that you saw on the Statement of Facts.
14   And as a result we will never know, sadly, what could have
15   happened in the 25 days between Moussaoui's arrest and the
16   attacks.
17             Equally as important is the fact that the government's
18   case for death is unrealistically premised upon the hope that it
19   would have conducted a flawless investigation, today we learned
20   directly into the United Arab Emirates, in 25 days that would have
21   followed Moussaoui's arrest, and that no one involved in the
22   ensuing investigation would have made any errors in judgment or
23   mistakes after learning of Moussaoui's lies.
24             But that belief, ladies and gentlemen, is not consistent
25   with the human experience, and it is contrary to your common

 1   sense.  People have always made mistakes and errors of judgment.
 2   Seriously, who in this room has not?  And unfortunately, ladies
 3   and gentlemen, that's what happened in our country before
 4   September 11th.  That is the truth.
 5             The evidence will show you that for over 18 months our
 6   government did not even look for two of the real hijackers who
 7   they knew were in the United States, and federal agencies didn't
 8   even share critical information about them, arguing instead to
 9   protect their own turf.
10             Ladies and gentlemen, I regret to tell you that the only
11   real search that our government ever conducted for two of the
12   hijackers in the 18 months occurred as the government combed the
13   smoldering wreckage of the Pentagon searching for remains.  And
14   the government plainly failed to appreciate the significance of
15   the threat that Moussaoui posed, and the clues that they did
16   obtain by arresting him, no matter what lies he told, his presence
17   at a flight simulator facility should have given the government
18   valuable clues as to Bin Laden's plans involving hijackings and
19   otherwise, even though it would not have led them to 9/11, and the
20   government surely failed to understand the threat that Bin Laden's
21   budding suicide squadrons posed to aircraft in our country, which
22   was a new threat that required new thinking and new protections.
23             The best evidence of what could have happened in the 25
24   days that followed Moussaoui's lies can be most accurately
25   determined by learning how the government actually reacted to and

 1   processed information at that exact same time and in that exact
 2   same environment, not looking backwards through some rear-view
 3   mirror.  And that evidence, ladies and gentlemen, which is the
 4   truth, forms the defense in this case.
 5             What the government wants you to believe is only a
 6   dream.  And its most seductive quality is that we all wish it had
 7   come true, but it is only a dream.  Our entire country has changed
 8   since 9/11.  But that does not mean as a matter of fact or law
 9   that the aggressive investigative tactics employed since 9/11
10   would have been employed before, and you cannot find that beyond a
11   reasonable doubt and, thus, find that Moussaoui's lies caused a
12   death.
13             Ladies and gentlemen, you must not accept such obvious
14   speculation as fact in a court of law, and I submit to you that no
15   one, no one should be executed on such flimsy evidence, even an
16   admitted al Qaeda member.
17             Now, the attacks of September 11th did not occur in a
18   vacuum.  We had been under attack from al Qaeda and its Muslim
19   fundamentalist allies since at least 1993 when the World Trade
20   Center was attacked by Muslims affiliated with Usama Bin Laden.
21             In 1995 a plot to blow up airliners over the Pacific
22   Ocean was disrupted in the Philippines.  Mr. Spencer mentioned
23   that to you.  It is Operation Bojinka.  It was masterminded by two
24   of the men who had been involved with the bombing of the World
25   Trade Center in 1993.

 1             And one of those men was named Khalid Sheikh Mohammed.
 2   He was also the mastermind of the 9/11 attacks.  His identity, his
 3   terror connections, all of this was known to our government at
 4   least as early as 1995.  Remember his name, ladies and gentlemen,
 5   write it down if you must.  You are going to hear it a lot, Khalid
 6   Sheikh Mohammed.  He is also referred to sometimes as KSM.
 7             One of the people involved in Project Bojinka told
 8   authorities that he intended to hijack a plane and crash it into
 9   the Central Intelligence Agency's headquarters as part of a
10   martyrdom mission.  You will hear substantial additional evidence
11   that our government knew that Muslim fundamentalists were
12   intending to use commercial aircrafts as weapons.
13             So you will hear in this case that as early as 1995,
14   and, at best, by 1998, our government knew that Muslim
15   fundamentalists were trying to kill Americans here in our country
16   by hijacking airliners and crashing planes into prominent
17   buildings as part of suicide missions.
18             But the reality of this threat never resulted in any
19   significant concrete actions by the government, which continued to
20   act as if the next hijacking might come from a Cuban who wanted a
21   free ride home or a bank robber who wanted a parachute over the
22   Pacific Northwest.
23             In the old days, so long as everyone capitulated to the
24   hijackers' demands, the passengers would be safely released and
25   could go home to their loved ones.  But by 1998 those days were

 1   over.  Bin Laden had declared war on us and everybody in
 2   government knew that civil aviation was his preferred target.
 3             The evidence in this case will be that every measure
 4   taken after September 11th to protect airline passengers could
 5   have been taken before, and the government and the airlines'
 6   inability to adapt to the new threat of suicide hijackings was the
 7   fundamental weakness most plainly exploited by the real hijackers
 8   on September 11th.
 9             But it wasn't from a lack of warnings or from notice.
10   In 1998 Usama Bin Laden declared war against the United States.
11   And to make sure we were all watching, he did it on ABC News.  Our
12   embassies in Africa were bombed by suicide attackers sent by Bin
13   Laden, and massive casualties ensued.
14             Later that year one of the bombers was apprehended and
15   he confessed.  He openly admitted that the person that sent him to
16   Africa to kill was a Saudi Arabian man named Khallad,
17   K-h-a-l-l-a-d.  Remember his name, Khallad, it will come up a lot.
18   Khallad was a killer and our government knew it in 1998 and they
19   began to track him.
20             In the fall of 2000 Muslim fundamentalists drove a
21   suicide boat into the USS Cole as it refueled in Yemen.  There was
22   a grievous loss of life by our sailors.  And the mastermind of the
23   coal attack?  Khallad, ladies and gentlemen, something our
24   government soon learned.
25             And in this time period al Qaeda was very busy planning

 1   new attacks against the United States.  From the sanctuary of
 2   Afghanistan, Bin Laden planned to attack our country using
 3   aircraft as weapons.  His plan?  To hijack planes and fly them
 4   into prominent buildings.  And there were other plans to hijack
 5   planes in Asia and on the West Coast of the United States, in
 6   addition to the East Coast.
 7             There were many terror plots and many involved hijacking
 8   commercial aircraft, including plans to free a jailed Muslim
 9   leader in the United States.  So in 1999 and 2000 Bin Laden began
10   to move operatives into the United States and into Asia as well.
11             In late December of 1999 our government learned that
12   Usama Bin Laden's operatives were traveling from the Middle East
13   and Asia to Malaysia.  Our government was there to watch but that
14   was all they did.
15             They were watched and their passports and visas
16   obtained.  In January of 2000, the CIA learned that two of the men
17   were Khalid al-Mihdhar, a different person from Khallad, Khalid
18   al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi, two men whose picture Mr. Spencer
19   just showed you.
20             The CIA learned that at least one of them had a visa to
21   come to our country to land in Los Angeles, California in January
22   of 2000.  Nawaf al-Hazmi was on the same flight.  Remember their
23   names, Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Midhar, ladies and gentlemen,
24   these men were aboard the plane that crashed into the Pentagon and
25   the story of the many instances in which our government failed to

 1   search for them, much less even keep them off of airplanes is
 2   particularly disturbing.
 3             The truth is that we tracked these men in Malaysia but
 4   as soon as they got to the United States, nobody even bothered to
 5   look for them.  Soon the CIA learned that the third man on the
 6   Malaysian trip was Khallad, the same person who plotted the
 7   bombing of the Cole and the embassies.
 8             Khallad, our government says in e-mails that you will
 9   see in this case, was a major league killer.  Did alarm bells go
10   off?  Did the government launch a massive manhunt for Khallad's
11   lieutenants in the United States?
12             You know the answer.  I already told you where these two
13   men were finally found.  But according to the government's case,
14   it was the information found in Moussaoui's notebook or in the
15   Statement of Facts that would have led them to these two men
16   before September 11th.
17             Ladies and gentlemen, you didn't lose your common sense
18   when you became a juror.  The truth is the government made no
19   effort to find two known killers in our country for over 18 months
20   and 17 of them preceded Moussaoui's arrest.
21             And instead of a flawless search that uncovers phone
22   numbers and phone cards and immediately finds out who people are,
23   what actually happened was a perfect example of bureaucratic
24   in-fighting and outright blunders.  Some people in our government
25   understood the risk and, in fact, you will see that many were

 1   quite prophetic.  They predicted that people would die in this
 2   country because of the bureaucracy.  And they were correct.  They
 3   said this in the summer of 2001, sadly, I tell you, to deaf ears,
 4   and sometimes nothing happened for the worst of reasons.
 5             The evidence will be that in late August of 2001 a high
 6   government official told the rookie FBI agent tasked to try to
 7   find Khalid al-Midhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi specifically not to seek
 8   credit card information from the Saudi airlines, the airline upon
 9   which these two had recently traveled and which is owned by our
10   supposed ally.
11             Why?  That government official said she didn't think it
12   was prudent to ask.  You as jurors will be able to see how this
13   occurred and what could have happened in the search for two known
14   killers in our country had a more or less prudent approach been
15   taken.
16             And the agents that searched for al-Hazmi and Midhar
17   were asked to locate them for an interview before 9/11.  Before
18   9/11, the FBI wanted to interview Khallad's friends roaming freely
19   in our country.  And you'd expect -- the government expects you to
20   believe that Moussaoui held all the clues to finding these men and
21   you will see right through that.
22             You will learn that before September 11th there
23   essentially was no "no fly list" in our country that would have
24   kept two known killers off of planes.  And these men weren't even
25   added to the feckless list that existed.

 1             But armed with the information that our government
 2   provided in the year of 2000, the government of Thailand added
 3   Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Midhar to their no fly list, but not
 4   the United States.
 5             Another pre-9/11 fact of life for our government was
 6   something known as the wall.  Now, most of you don't know what the
 7   wall is, and it is complicated, but I will tell you it generally
 8   was -- it is gone now -- an artificial barrier that kept
 9   intelligence investigations from being -- intelligence
10   investigators from sharing information with criminal prosecutors
11   and sometimes vice versa.
12             Now, in this case you will hear evidence from many high
13   persons in our government who testified before the September 11th
14   Commission, without having the idea of getting Moussaoui the death
15   penalty in mind.  Listen to the attorney general of the United
16   States describe the wall and its effect on the defense of our
17   country before September 11th, ladies and gentlemen.
18             (Video excerpt played and transcribed as follows:)
19             "JOHN ASHCROFT:   But the simple fact of September 11th
20   is this.  We did not know an attack was coming because for nearly
21   a decade our government had blinded itself to its enemies.  Our
22   agents were isolated by government-imposed walls, handcuffed by
23   government-imposed restrictions, and starved for basic information
24   technology.  The old national intelligence system in place on
25   September 11th was destined to fail.

 1             "The single greatest structural cause for the September
 2   11th problem was the wall that segregated or separated criminal
 3   investigators and intelligence agents.  Government erected this
 4   wall, government buttressed this wall, and before September 11th,
 5   government was blinded by this wall."
 6             (End of video excerpt played.)
 7             MR. MAC MAHON:  Folks, it is in this time period,
 8   February 2001, that Moussaoui comes to the United States.  He
 9   lands in Chicago on his way to Norman, Oklahoma, to obtain flying
10   lessons, which he had been seeking for over a year.  He is all by
11   himself.  He has no al Qaeda companion, that too will be
12   undisputed in this case, as will the fact that Moussaoui was never
13   in the physical presence of a single real 9/11 hijacker, ever.
14             It will be undisputed that he never placed or received a
15   single phone call to or from a real hijacker, that he never
16   traveled with them on their surveillance flights, and the evidence
17   will be that when Moussaoui arrived, all four of the 9/11 pilots
18   had already been in the United States for at least nine months and
19   some much longer than that.  All had already received their pilot
20   licenses for over a year and had begun to train on flight
21   simulators.
22             Ladies and gentlemen, when Moussaoui came to the United
23   States, the plot was very far advanced.  It didn't need any more
24   pilots.
25             Almost all of them came to the United States in pairs

 1   and accompanied by other al Qaeda members.  All of them, except
 2   Moussaoui, lived with at least one other real hijacker in the
 3   United States.  And the muscle hijackers, meaning the non-pilot
 4   hijackers, began to arrive later that summer, almost always in
 5   pairs, and all of them from Saudi Arabia.
 6             Now, in addition to living together, the real hijackers
 7   shared bank accounts and phone cards and went to gyms together.
 8   The evidence in this case will be that they traveled and trained
 9   together and flew together, and they prepared together in teams
10   for what was to come; their death, in teams, as part of a scripted
11   hijacking that required precise and precision teamwork.
12             Moussaoui did not train with them because he wasn't on
13   the team.  And, ladies and gentlemen, there will be no evidence
14   that Moussaoui was the 20th hijacker, as he became popularly
15   known.  The evidence will show that there was a real 20th
16   hijacker, who was sent to the United States on August 4th, 2001,
17   by Khalid Sheikh Mohammed.
18             The evidence will show that the 20th hijacker was
19   Mohamed al-Kahtani, and he was turned away at the Orlando Airport
20   by an alert customs agent while Mohamed Atta, the real ring leader
21   of the 9/11 plot, waited outside the terminal for his final
22   accomplice to arrive.
23             The government has stipulated to that.  And you will
24   hear a lot about Mohamed al-Kahtani.  Ladies and gentlemen, he was
25   the 20th hijacker and Moussaoui wasn't.  Now the government can

 1   only speculate as to why Moussaoui was here.  And that's why they
 2   don't even try to tell you what they think he was doing here.
 3             He once said he was here as part of a hijacking plot
 4   designed to free a Muslim fundamentalist jailed in connection with
 5   prior plots.  That man is known as the blind sheikh.  You will
 6   hear evidence of many plots, all merely conceptual, designed to
 7   free the blind sheikh, that required the same sort of training
 8   that Moussaoui was receiving.
 9             But the evidence in this case will be entirely clear to
10   you that Moussaoui was totally uninvolved with the 9/11 plot.
11   There will be no evidence that he knew the names, the phone
12   numbers, the locations of any of the real hijackers and no
13   evidence that he knew the date or the targets or the timing of the
14   impending attacks.
15             In fact, the evidence will be that the real hijackers
16   did not even begin to select the date for the attack until August
17   25, 2001 at the earliest.  That -- we know that because that's
18   when they began to buy airline tickets for September 11th.  And
19   you will know that Moussaoui had been in jail by that time for ten
20   days and the so-called search for al-Midhar and al-Hazmi was just
21   beginning.
22             Here is some more information about Moussaoui and his
23   actions in our country.  As I told you, Moussaoui landed in
24   Chicago in February of 2001.  He openly declared $32,000 in cash.
25   Ladies and gentlemen, that's a lot of cash for a student pilot to

 1   carry, much less declare.  He goes to Airman Flight School in
 2   Norman, Oklahoma.  Has the government ever heard of Airman Flight
 3   School before, ladies and gentlemen?
 4             Before 9/11, you will learn, that Airman Flight School
 5   had hosted other al Qaeda members as flight students.  Our
 6   government knew all of this before September 11th because one and
 7   maybe two Airman Flight School graduates were already cooperating
 8   with our government before September 11th.
 9             And Moussaoui is everything but discreet.  You will hear
10   no witness in this case describe Moussaoui as discreet.  He makes
11   a scene at the local mosque.  He is quite public with his
12   fundamentalist beliefs.  His first day at the mosques, he takes
13   posters off the wall because he doesn't think the people are good
14   Muslims.  He is the most obvious person they could have had at the
15   mosque.
16             Every person who came into contact with Zacarias
17   Moussaoui in our country remembers him.  He goes to a local bank
18   with a person from the flight school.  Ladies and gentlemen, he
19   doesn't even know this person, he hasn't met them.  And what does
20   he do?  He unloads $32,000 in cash from all possible locations on
21   his body right at the bank and makes his deposit.  He then pays
22   for his flight training with more wads of cash.  And then he fails
23   miserably to learn to fly.
24             You will hear that instructors wouldn't fly with him,
25   and that he argued with people and blamed others for his failures.

 1   He couldn't fly at all.  Any plan that involved Moussaoui as a
 2   pilot was destined to fail.  Moussaoui couldn't get the student
 3   license that many people get in a week.
 4             Meanwhile, as Moussaoui is flunking flight school,
 5   al-Midhar and al-Hazmi are actually preparing the 9/11 attacks.
 6   And the drum beat for our intelligence agencies warning of a Bin
 7   Laden-sponsored attack in the United States escalates.
 8             In that summer the National Security Agency alone issued
 9   33 separate warnings that an attack was coming.  An alert FBI
10   agent named Ken Williams wrote a report that said he had
11   determined that large numbers of fundamentalist Muslim young males
12   were obtaining flight training in the United States.
13             This report is known as the Phoenix Memorandum.  And you
14   will hear that an FBI agent tasked with assisting the Moussaoui
15   investigation in August of 2001 actively read the Phoenix
16   Memorandum on two occasions, and even printed a copy for her
17   files, but that agent saw no significance to the warnings
18   contained in that memo.
19             And, ladies and gentlemen, her reading the memo twice
20   was all that anyone in Washington, D.C. ever did with the Phoenix
21   Memorandum until after September 11th, 2001.  And the CIA
22   repeatedly warned that summer that Bin Laden was preparing to
23   attack and it labeled the coming attacks as potentially
24   catastrophic.
25             The CIA warned there could be mass casualties and

 1   spectacular attacks.  One report from June 30 of 2001 is titled
 2   Terrorism, Bin Laden Planning High Profile Attacks.  There were
 3   many more, and you will see many of them.
 4             In July of 2001 the FBI alerted its field offices to be
 5   on the alert for potential terror attacks from Muslims and asked
 6   them to form evidence recovery teams.  And on August 6th, 2001,
 7   just as Moussaoui was leaving Oklahoma for Minnesota, the
 8   President of the United States himself was briefed by the director
 9   of the Central Intelligence Agency about the threat posed by
10   al Qaeda in our country.
11             That briefing, ladies and gentlemen, which you will see
12   in evidence in this case, is called Bin Laden Determined to Strike
13   in the United States, and it is a startling document.  The
14   President was told about the plot to bomb the Los Angeles Airport
15   by Muslim fundamentalists.  And if an FBI agent comes up before
16   you and testifies that it was something done in Washington that
17   prevented the Millennium plot, you will know that that is
18   completely untrue.
19             The evidence in this case will be that the Millennium
20   plot was stopped by one alert customs official who searched Ahmed
21   Ressam in Washington.  And that person hadn't received a warning
22   from the FBI or anything whatsoever.  What you will hear from that
23   is typical Washington, taking credit for something they had
24   nothing to do with.
25             And the briefing warns ominously, ladies and gentlemen,

 1   of hijackings, August 6th, 2001.  It says that the World Trade
 2   Center is a target.  It names Khalid Sheikh Mohammed's nephew by
 3   name.  It says there are active al Qaeda cells in the United
 4   States.
 5             And when you see this document, ladies and gentlemen, on
 6   the second page it will say, and I read to you, "the FBI has
 7   information that there are suspicious activities in this country,
 8   consistent with preparation for hijackings," August 6th, 2001.
 9             The FBI claims they are performing 70 full field
10   investigations of known al Qaeda members in our country on August
11   6th, 2001, but the evidence will be, sadly, that the government
12   did nothing with this information.  And the truth is, and the
13   evidence will show, that on September 10th, 2001, the Justice
14   Department was seeking to lay off terror agents and reduce the
15   funding for those who remained.
16             There was no plan to give the FBI new powers, more
17   personnel or resources before 9/11.  The plan was the opposite.
18   And the attorney general of the United States, you will hear, had
19   even ordered the FBI director that summer to not even bother to
20   brief him on terrorism matters.  That's the truth, ladies and
21   gentlemen.
22             And the evidence in this case will be that it was only
23   the catastrophe of September 11th that caused the bureaucracy to
24   awake from its complacency and enact the necessary security
25   measures in our country.  No event, including lies told by some

 1   strange Muslim loner in Minnesota, would have accomplished that.
 2             Listen to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice discuss
 3   this issue at the 9/11 Commission.
 4             (Video excerpt played and transcribed as follows):
 5             "CONDOLEEZZA RICE:  I can tell you that I think the best
 6   antedote to what happened in that regard would have been many
 7   years before to think about what you could do, for instance, to
 8   harden cockpits.  That would have made a difference.  We weren't
 9   going to harden cockpits in the three months that we had a threat
10   spike.
11             "The really difficult thing for all of us, and I'm sure
12   for those who came before us as well as for those of us who are
13   here, is that the structural and systematic changes that needed to
14   be made, not on July 5th or not on June 25th or not on January
15   1st, those structures and those changes needed to be made a long
16   time ago, so that the country was, in fact, hardened against the
17   kind of threat that we faced on September 11th.  The problem was
18   that for a country that had not been attacked on its territory in
19   a major way in almost 200 years, there were a lot of structural
20   impediments to those kinds of attacks.  Those changes should have
21   been made over a long period of time."
22             (End of video excerpt played.)
23             MR. MAC MAHON:  Now, ladies and gentlemen, in August of
24   2001, as Mr. Spencer told you, Moussaoui went to Minnesota.  He
25   again unloads wads of cash from his belt and from his pants to pay

 1   for flight simulator training at a school for experienced pilots
 2   whose charges are covered by the airlines.
 3             Now, Moussaoui has admitted obtaining money from abroad
 4   in August of 2001, yet at this time you will hear he still had
 5   sufficient money in his bank account in Oklahoma to pay for all
 6   the flight simulator training he wanted.  In this case you will
 7   hear a lot of evidence of Moussaoui's continual requests for
 8   money.  It was a recurring theme.
 9             And this is important, ladies and gentlemen, because you
10   will see that at this same time the real hijackers were sending
11   money back to al Qaeda so that it could be used in the next plot.
12   And Moussaoui did make calls to an al Qaeda member in Europe.
13   That shouldn't surprise you.  He is an admitted member of
14   al Qaeda.
15             And the cumulative duration of all these calls is long
16   enough to be asked to go get flight simulator training, as he has
17   admitted, and wait for further orders, but too short, you will
18   see, for any operational information, which al Qaeda would never
19   have conducted on a telephone anyway.  You will learn that in this
20   case.
21             And in Minnesota, Moussaoui is so obviously out of place
22   that he attracts immediate attention.  He asks absurd questions
23   about the operation of a 747.  Ladies and gentlemen, he doesn't
24   even know that the cabin is pressurized when the plane flies.  He
25   asks if the door can be opened at 40,000 feet.  Everyone can see

 1   he is not a serious pilot.  Even then, it is only because of a tip
 2   from an alert citizen that Moussaoui is arrested and the FBI moves
 3   in and arrests Moussaoui on an immigration charge.
 4             Now, Moussaoui does have a companion in Minnesota.  He
 5   has traveled from Oklahoma to Minnesota with a person he met in
 6   Oklahoma named Hussein al-Attas.  Moussaoui met this young man at
 7   the mosque in Oklahoma, and you will hear Mr. Attas's deposition
 8   in this case.
 9             But al-Attas is not an al Qaeda member.  And on this
10   point the government will agree.  But he did provide the FBI all
11   the information it needed in August of 2001.  Al-Attas told the
12   FBI on August 16th, 2001 that Moussaoui was a Muslim
13   fundamentalist who often spoke of the greatness of martyrdom and
14   loved Jihad.
15             He told the FBI that Moussaoui was planning something
16   but that he, Hussein al-Attas, didn't know what it was.  Ladies
17   and gentlemen, first day, this is what happened on the first day.
18   On that same day, Special Agent Harry Samit questions Moussaoui.
19   Samit believed from the first moment that he met Moussaoui that
20   Moussaoui was a Muslim fundamentalist, not a serious flight
21   student, and not even a pilot.
22             He knew that day that Moussaoui was -- and I will
23   paraphrase Agent Samit here -- a Muslim fundamentalist bent on
24   using his flight training for some terrorist plot.  Harry Samit
25   wrote that the first day.  Agent Samit didn't believe a single one

 1   of Moussaoui's obviously false statements and he wrote that day
 2   that Moussaoui was a terrorist.
 3             He will tell you that Moussaoui wasn't even a good liar,
 4   that Harry Samit could tell the difference between Moussaoui's
 5   true statements and his obviously false ones.  And then Harry
 6   Samit wrote to literally every one of his superiors that Moussaoui
 7   was a terrorist.  He tried to warn the Secret Service.  He tried
 8   to warn the FAA.  He did everything humanly possible to obtain a
 9   search warrant over the next 25 days, but sadly, ladies and
10   gentlemen, he was stimied by his superiors in Washington at every
11   turn.
12             THE COURT:  Mr. MacMahon, your time is just about up.
13             MR. MAC MAHON:  Thank you, Your Honor.  I am almost
14   done.
15             Samit and his fellow agents knew what they had found.
16   For example, in Samit's first written communication, he even got
17   the charges right.
18             How did the government and the FBI react to Samit's
19   concerns?  After all, he was an experienced agent.  But a series
20   of legal errors and misjudgments occurred that you will hear about
21   in detail, and the bottom line is that headquarters didn't think
22   there was any basis to search Moussaoui, much less arrest him for
23   anything.
24             But more agencies than the FBI got involved in the
25   action.  On August 23rd, 2001, the director of Central

 1   Intelligence was briefed about Moussaoui.  Folks, it takes a lot
 2   to get your name on the front page of a personal briefing to the
 3   director of the Central Intelligence Agency, but Moussaoui did it.
 4             Look at this document, which is one of the documents
 5   given to the director of Central Intelligence.  It even has Bin
 6   Laden's picture on it, ladies and gentlemen.  The CIA held
 7   successive briefings about Moussaoui and here what they looked
 8   like in order.
 9             August 27th, 2001, the deputy director of operations;
10   August 28th, 2001, the executive director of the CIA; August 30,
11   the director of Central Intelligence; September 4th, the executive
12   director of the CIA; and September 10th, the deputy director of
13   operations.  And there were other missed opportunities as well.
14             French authorities in late August of 2001 provided
15   information from a reliable source about Moussaoui that should
16   have proven to even the most ardent of doubters that Moussaoui was
17   an al Qaeda member.  Mr. Spencer told you they had evidence that
18   Moussaoui went to Pakistan.  Ladies and gentlemen, they had
19   evidence that Moussaoui went to Afghanistan where Bin Laden trains
20   his terrorists and they had that information before 9/11 and they
21   did nothing with it.
22             THE COURT:  Mr. MacMahon, you are way over now.
23             MR. MAC MAHON:  Let me wrap up, Your Honor.
24             Moussaoui could have told Bin Laden -- the FBI that Bin
25   Laden was determined to strike the United States and that al Qaeda

 1   intended to hijack planes, but the government already knew that
 2   much and more.  And who is to say that any government official
 3   would have believed anything that Moussaoui said anyway and
 4   launched the flawless investigation the government claims it would
 5   have launched, even then without the clues obtained in this, what
 6   we were just told is the largest criminal investigation of our
 7   history to provide the road map.
 8             Remember, the government didn't even look for two of the
 9   hijackers.  Can the government really prove beyond a reasonable
10   doubt that it could have unraveled the 9/11 plot in 25 days in
11   late August or early September of 2001 had Moussaoui not lied?
12             In closing, ladies and gentlemen, I say to you that the
13   facts of this case will not support that verdict and the
14   government will not prove to you beyond a reasonable doubt that
15   anything Moussaoui did caused a death on September 11th.
16             We know that Moussaoui is an admitted al Qaeda member
17   and that he yearns for martyrdom, ladies and gentlemen, but now
18   the only way he can achieve that dream and then live on as some
19   smiling face on a recruiting poster for Usama Bin Laden is by your
20   verdict.  Please don't make him a hero, ladies and gentlemen.  He
21   just doesn't deserve it.
22             Thank you very much.
23             THE COURT:  All right.  We have now completed the
24   opening statements.  We will take a 20-minute midafternoon break
25   and begin then with the presentation of the government's evidence.

 1             (Recess from 3:35 p.m. to 3:55 p.m.)
 2                                 (Defendant and Jury in.)
 3             THE COURT:  Before you call your first witness,
 4   Mr. Spencer, in an order that I issued last week, I indicated that
 5   we have to enable trial counsel to get out of the courtroom during
 6   the midmorning and midafternoon breaks before the spectators,
 7   because there's too much of a crowd at the elevators.  I want that
 8   order enforced.
 9             That means that when I announce the midmorning and the
10   midafternoon break, no one leaves the courtroom until counsel do.
11   Counsel have to move quickly, but if we have people who think they
12   can race out of here before the lawyers, they will lose their
13   passes to be in this courtroom.
14             All right.  Mr. Spencer?
15             MR. SPENCER:  Thank you, Your Honor.  We propose to
16   begin, Your Honor, by offering into evidence the Statement of
17   Facts signed by the defendant on April 27.  It's been marked as
18   Government Exhibit 1.  And I ask permission to publish that to the
19   jury, Your Honor, by reading it and by displaying it on the
20   screen.
21             THE COURT:  I assume there's no objection since this is
22   punished in part during opening statement.
23             MR. MAC MAHON:  No objection, Your Honor.
24             THE COURT:  Exhibit 1 is in evidence.
25             (Government Exhibit No. 1 was received in evidence.)

 1             MR. SPENCER:  May I read the paragraphs, Your Honor?
 2             THE COURT:  Yes.
 3             MR. SPENCER:  Thank you.  "Statement of Facts:  If this
 4   case were to go to trial, the government would prove the following
 5   facts beyond a reasonable doubt:
 6             "1:  Al Qaeda was an international terrorist group
 7   dedicated to opposing the United States with force and violence.
 8   Usama Bin Laden was the founder and head of al Qaeda.  The
 9   leadership of al Qaeda included Abu Hafs al-Masri, who served as
10   the head of al Qaeda's military committee.
11             "Since 1996, al Qaeda maintained headquarters in
12   Afghanistan.  Members of al Qaeda pledged bayat to Usama Bin Laden
13   and al Qaeda.  Al Qaeda associated with other terrorist groups.
14             "Paragraph 2:  Usama Bin Laden and al Qaeda declared a
15   jihad against the United States.  Bin Laden and members of
16   al Qaeda issued fatwahs indicating that violent attacks on the
17   United States and its citizens were both proper and necessary and
18   that Muslims should kill Americans, including civilians, anywhere
19   in the world, anytime.
20             "Paragraph 3:  Usama Bin Laden and al Qaeda provided and
21   supported training camps and guesthouses in Afghanistan, including
22   camps known as al-Farooq and Khalden.  These camps were used to
23   instruct members and associates of al Qaeda and its affiliated
24   groups in the use of firearms, explosives, chemical weapons, and
25   other weapons of mass destruction.

 1             Paragraph 4:  Defendant Zacarias Moussaoui, who also
 2   used the names Abu Khalid al-Sahrawi and Shaqil, became a member
 3   of al Qaeda and pledged bayat to Bin Laden, Moussaoui's father in
 4   jihad.
 5             "Paragraph 5:  Moussaoui trained at al Qaeda's Khalden
 6   Camp in Afghanistan.
 7             "Paragraph 6.  Moussaoui managed an al Qaeda guesthouse
 8   in Kandahar.  This was a position of high respect within al Qaeda.
 9   Moussaoui communicated directly with Bin Laden and Abu Hafs
10   al-Masri.
11             "Paragraph 7:  As part of its conspiracy to attack the
12   United States, al Qaeda members conceived of an operation in which
13   civilian commercial airliners would be hijacked and flown into
14   prominent buildings, including government buildings, in the United
15   States.  To effect this attack, al Qaeda associates entered the
16   United States, received funding from abroad, engaged in physical
17   fitness training, and obtained knives and other weapons with which
18   to take over airliners.  Some al Qaeda associates obtained pilot
19   training, including training on commercial jet simulators, so they
20   would be able to fly hijacked aircraft into their targets.
21             "Paragraph 8:  Bin Laden personally approved those
22   selected to participate in the operation, who were willing to die
23   in furtherance of their religious beliefs and al Qaeda's agenda.
24             Paragraph 9:  Moussaoui knew of al Qaeda's plan to fly
25   airplanes into prominent buildings in the United States, and he

 1   agreed to travel to the United States to participate in the plan.
 2   Bin Laden personally selected Moussaoui to participate in the
 3   operation to fly planes into American buildings and approved
 4   Moussaoui attacking the White House.  Bin Laden told Moussaoui:
 5   "Sahrawi, remember your dream."
 6             "Paragraph 10:  An al Qaeda associate provided Moussaoui
 7   with information about flight schools in the United States.  In
 8   September 2000, Moussaoui, who was in Malaysia, contacted the
 9   Airman Flight School in Norman, Oklahoma, via e-mail, seeking
10   flight training.  Moussaoui intended to use his training as a
11   pilot in furtherance of al Qaeda's plan to use planes to kill
12   Americans.
13             "Paragraph 11:  Moussaoui trained in knife fighting in
14   Afghanistan.
15             "Paragraph 12:  On February 23, 2001, Moussaoui traveled
16   from London to Chicago and then onto Norman, Oklahoma, where he
17   attended the Airman Flight School and received training as a
18   pilot.  At the Airman Flight School, Moussaoui received training
19   as a pilot of smaller planes.  In summer 2001, an al Qaeda
20   associate directed Moussaoui to attend training for larger jet
21   planes.
22             "Paragraph 13:  While in Oklahoma, Moussaoui joined a
23   gym and bought knives.  Moussaoui selected certain knives because
24   they had blades short enough to get past airport security.
25             "14:  In early August 2001, an al Qaeda conspirator

 1   using the alias of Ahad Sabet, wire transferred money to Germany
 2   to Moussaoui in Oklahoma so Moussaoui could receive additional
 3   flight training.
 4             "Paragraph 15:  In August 2001, Moussaoui traveled to
 5   Minnesota where he trained on a Boeing 747-400 simulator at the
 6   Pan Am International Flight Academy in Eagan, Minnesota.
 7   Moussaoui told an al Qaeda associate that he would complete
 8   simulator training before September 2001.
 9             "Paragraph 16.  On August 16, 2001, Moussaoui was
10   arrested in Minnesota by agents of the INS and the FBI.  At the
11   time of his arrest, Moussaoui possessed the following items:  Two
12   knives, flight manuals for the Boeing 747 Model 400, a flight
13   simulator computer program, fighting gloves and shin guards, a
14   piece of paper referring to a hand-held global positioning system,
15   software that could be used to review pilot procedures for the
16   Boeing 747 Model 400, and a hand-held aviation radio.
17             "After his arrest, Moussaoui lied to federal agents to
18   allow his al Qaeda brothers to go forward with the operation to
19   fly planes into American buildings.  Specifically, Moussaoui
20   falsely denied being a member of a terrorist organization and
21   falsely denied that he was taking pilot training to kill
22   Americans.  Instead, Moussaoui told federal agents that he was
23   training as a pilot purely for his personal enjoyment and that,
24   after completion of his training, he intended to visit New York
25   City and Washington, D.C. as a tourist.

 1             "17:  On September 11th, excuse me, 2001, al Qaeda
 2   operatives used force and violence to hijack American Airlines
 3   Flight 11, bound from Boston to Los Angeles, and crashed it into
 4   the North Tower of the World Trade Center in New York City,
 5   destroying the building and killing thousands of people.
 6             "Paragraph 18:  On September 11, 2001, al Qaeda
 7   operatives used force and violence to hijack United Airlines
 8   Flight 175, bound from Boston to Los Angeles, and crashed it into
 9   the South Tower of the World Trade Center in New York City,
10   destroying the building and killing thousands of people.
11             "Paragraph 19.  The World Trade Center was a complex of
12   buildings owned by the Port Authority of New Jersey/New York which
13   was constructed for the purposes of housing businesses engaged in
14   interstate and foreign commerce.  As a result of the crashes of
15   American Airlines Flights 11 -- Flight 11 and United Flight 175,
16   approximately 2,830 people died in or around the World Trade
17   complex.  Among those killed at the World Trade Center, the dead
18   included 343 firefighters from the New York Fire Department, 37
19   law enforcement officers from the Port Authority of New Jersey/New
20   York, and 23 law enforcement officers from the New York City
21   Police Department.
22             "World Trade Center Towers I (North Tower) and II (South
23   Tower) were completely destroyed, as were other buildings in the
24   World Trade Center complex.  The destruction of these buildings
25   resulted in the disruption of interstate and international

 1   commerce for those businesses located in the World Trade Center
 2   complex.
 3             "Additionally, the offices of the U.S. Secret Service,
 4   the U.S. Customs Service, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and
 5   Firearms, and the Department of Housing and Urban Development, all
 6   of which were housed in the World Trade Center complex, were
 7   destroyed.
 8             "On September 11, 2001, al Qaeda operatives used force
 9   and violence to hijack American Airlines Flight 77, bound from
10   Virginia to Los Angeles, and crashed it into the Pentagon, a
11   United States government building, damaging the building and
12   killing 189 people, many of whom were United States government
13   employees, including employees of the United States Department of
14   Defense, engaged in their official duties.
15             "Paragraph 21:  On September 11, 2001, al Qaeda
16   operatives used force and violence to hijack United Airlines
17   Flight 93, bound from Newark to San Francisco, which then crashed
18   in Somerset County, Pennsylvania, killing all onboard.
19             "All four airplanes identified above were flying in the
20   special aircraft jurisdiction of the United States at the time
21   that they were hijacked and all were completely destroyed.  Seen
22   and agreed, 20th Hijacker, Zacarias Moussaoui, Defendant, Zacarias
23   Moussaoui, a/k/a Abu Khalid al Sahrawi, a/k/a Shaqil."
24             And this is dated April 22, 2005.
25             Your Honor, I now will offer for admission Government

 1   Exhibit ST01, which is a large stipulation entered between defense
 2   counsel, defendant, and the United States.  I believe it's
 3   stipulated, Your Honor.  We're just going to enter it into the
 4   record.  I would like to read attachments A through F, which list
 5   the number of victims at each site.
 6             MR. MAC MAHON:  Your Honor, if I may, with respect to
 7   the stipulation, I'm not sure that we had understood that it was
 8   going to be admitted along these ways.  We weren't going to read
 9   the names of the victims in this phase of the case.  We stipulated
10   that the deaths occurred.  There's no question about that.
11             MR. SPENCER:  I'm not trying to read the names, Your
12   Honor.  I want to read the number at each of the various
13   locations.
14             THE COURT:  Just the number --
15             MR. SPENCER:  Correct.
16             THE COURT:  -- at each location?
17             MR. SPENCER:  Yeah.
18             THE COURT:  All right, I'll permit that.
19             MR. SPENCER:  Thank you, Your Honor.  From Flight 11, 87
20   victims; from United Flight 175, 60 victims; at the World Trade
21   Center, 2,601 victims; from American Airlines Flight 77, 59
22   victims; at the Pentagon, 125 victims; and from United Airlines
23   Flight 93, 40 victims.
24             THE COURT:  All right.
25             MR. SPENCER:  Has ST-1 been admitted into evidence, Your

 1   Honor?
 2             THE COURT:  Is there an objection to it going in as a
 3   package?
 4             MR. ZERKIN:  The entire stipulation, Your Honor, there
 5   are stipulations that we have made as to certain matters being
 6   authentic, for example, that we have not agreed to relevance, so I
 7   don't think the entire thing can go in.
 8             THE COURT:  All right.  Well, at this point, since
 9   there's an objection, what I'm going to do is not admit it at this
10   point.  Mr. Spencer, if there are particular stipulations within
11   it that you need in terms of questioning the next -- your first
12   witness, you'll need to identify the stipulation by number and
13   then we'll see whether there's going to be a problem or not.
14             MR. SPENCER:  Your Honor, it was our understanding that
15   this had been stipulated to.  I'm not quite sure I understand what
16   the objection is.
17             THE COURT:  Well, can't we move on with the witness?
18             MR. SPENCER:  Very well.
19             THE COURT:  And then we will address that afterwards.
20   Are you ready to call your first witness?
21             MR. SPENCER:  We are, Your Honor.
22             THE COURT:  Mr. Raskin?
23             MR. RASKIN:  The government calls Michael Anticev.
25             THE COURT:  Go ahead.

 1             MR. RASKIN:  May I proceed, Your Honor?
 2             THE COURT:  Yes, sir.
 3             MR. RASKIN:  Thank you.
 4                            DIRECT EXAMINATION
 6   Q.   Can you state your name and spell it for the record, sir?
 7   A.   It's Michael Anticev, A-n-t-i-c-e-v.
 8   Q.   Where are you currently employed?
 9   A.   With the FBI.
10   Q.   And what office are you employed at with the FBI?
11   A.   In the New York office.
12   Q.   How long have you worked for the FBI?
13   A.   Almost 15 years now.
14   Q.   And how much of that time have you spent in the New York
15   office?
16   A.   The entire time.
17   Q.   Are you assigned to a particular unit or division in the New
18   York office?
19   A.   I'm assigned to the Counterterrorism Divsion.
20   Q.   And has counterterrorism investigation been the principal
21   focus of your work at the FBI for virtually your entire 15 years
22   with the FBI?
23   A.   For approximately 13 of those years.
24   Q.   Did there come a time when you were assigned to the
25   investigation of Usama Bin Laden?

 1   A.   Yes.  That would have been in the middle of 1996.
 2   Q.   And tell us the circumstances.  How was it that you were
 3   assigned to the case?
 4   A.   Our supervisor called several of us into the office, it was
 5   three of us, and said that we were going to be working this
 6   six-month investigation into terrorist financier named Usama Bin
 7   Laden.
 8   Q.   You said that was a six-month investigation?
 9   A.   That was the projection then.
10   Q.   It became a much longer investigation than that, did it not?
11   A.   That's correct.
12   Q.   At the time that you were assigned to the Bin Laden matter,
13   what did you know about Usama Bin Laden?
14   A.   Very little other than the fact that he was a money person
15   out there from Saudi Arabia.
16   Q.   Trace the evolution of the Bin Laden investigation in the New
17   York office up until the September 11 attacks.
18   A.   Well, we started the investigation in 1996.  We caught our
19   first big break in December -- or also around the same time, in
20   the middle of 1996, until we brought a cooperating witness over to
21   New York in December of 1996, and that person was named Jamal
22   al-Fadl, and he provided a lot of information and background into
23   al Qaeda.
24             THE COURT:  I'm sorry, could you spell that name,
25   please?

 1             THE WITNESS:  J-a-m-a-l, al-Fadl, a-l hyphen F-a-d-l.
 3   Q.   Now, I'm going to ask you a couple questions about Jamal
 4   al-Fadl in a second, but you said when the Bin Laden case -- well,
 5   withdrawn.
 6             When you were assigned to the Bin Laden case, it had
 7   three agents.  How many agents worked on the Bin Laden matter in
 8   New York at the time of the September 11 attacks?
 9   A.   Up until that time, we had two squads working Bin Laden in
10   excess of 50 agents and detectives and task force personnel.
11   Q.   Now, you told us about Jamal al-Fadl, and you said that was
12   the first big break.  Tell us how he became a cooperating witness
13   with the FBI.
14   A.   Well, he was one of the original al Qaeda members.  He was
15   the third person to give bayat to Bin Laden and join al Qaeda, and
16   when the group moved to Sudan, he was working in some of the
17   businesses, and a point in time came where he stole some money
18   from Bin Laden and went on the run, and that's when he approached
19   the U.S. government and started to become a cooperating witness
20   for us.
21   Q.   And that was about the end of 1996?
22   A.   It was middle and end of 1996.
23   Q.   Tell us what a cooperating witness is.
24   A.   Well, a cooperating witness is someone who comes into an
25   agreement with the government whereby they're going to provide

 1   testimony and truthful background into an investigation.
 2   Q.   Now, what was your -- after '96, what was your principal
 3   responsibility in the Bin Laden case?
 4   A.   Once he came in, my primary focus was to debrief and take
 5   care of Jamal al-Fadl and to bring family members of his into the
 6   country and basically deal with him and debrief him.
 7   Q.   And debriefing means interviewing, correct?
 8   A.   Right.
 9   Q.   Now, approximately how many times have you interviewed Jamal
10   al-Fadl regarding al Qaeda and Usama Bin Laden over the years?
11   A.   Well over a hundred.
12   Q.   Now, other than him, how many other sworn members of al Qaeda
13   have you had the opportunity to interview since that time in '96?
14   A.   Since that time, I would say over a dozen sworn members.
15   Q.   Now, in addition to sworn members of al Qaeda, have you also
16   had the opportunity to interview other like-minded individuals who
17   might be considered associates of the al Qaeda organization?
18   A.   Yes, I have.
19   Q.   Approximately how many of them?
20   A.   Approximately the same number, 12 to 15 or so.
21   Q.   And have you also reviewed reports of interviews conducted by
22   your colleagues or other law enforcement personnel interviews of
23   al Qaeda members and associates?
24   A.   Yes, I have.
25   Q.   Now, you said Jamal al-Fadl left al Qaeda in approximately

 1   1996.  Have the interviews you've conducted included individuals
 2   who have been active participants in al Qaeda since that time in
 3   '96?
 4   A.   Yes.
 5   Q.   And approximately how many of those types of individuals have
 6   you interviewed?
 7   A.   I would say approximately ten.
 8   Q.   How many al Qaeda members or associates who were active in
 9   al Qaeda during the years 2000 and 2001 have you interviewed?
10   A.   Probably the same number.
11   Q.   Now, have you also participated in the prosecution of members
12   and associates of al Qaeda?
13   A.   Yes, I have.
14   Q.   And approximately how many prosecutions have you been
15   involved in?
16   A.   Well, with prosecutions, indictments, and hearings, probably
17   about 20 or 22 people, individuals.
18   Q.   Have you reviewed evidence in those cases?
19   A.   Yes, I have.
20   Q.   Have you actually participated in trials?
21   A.   Yes, I have.
22   Q.   What type of evidence have you reviewed that was involved in
23   any of these trials that you participated in?
24   A.   All sorts of documents and physical evidence, such as toll
25   records, pocket litter, which might have telephone numbers;

 1   manuals, all sorts of evidence.
 2   Q.   And was that evidence seized from al Qaeda members?
 3   A.   From members, yes.
 4   Q.   Do you have a security clearance?
 5   A.   Yes, I do.
 6   Q.   Have you reviewed secure information, classified information
 7   regarding al Qaeda and Bin Laden?
 8   A.   Yes, I have.
 9   Q.   Have you also reviewed open source or non-classified
10   information regarding those topics?
11   A.   Yes, I have.
12   Q.   What kind of materials, open source materials have you
13   reviewed?
14   A.   Newspaper articles, books, magazines, et cetera.
15   Q.   Over the years, have you had meetings with your colleagues in
16   New York and other law enforcement personnel in the United States
17   regarding Bin Laden and al Qaeda?
18   A.   Yes, I have.
19   Q.   What about law enforcement officers and officials from other
20   countries?
21   A.   Yes.
22   Q.   Now, on September -- after -- withdrawn.
23             In the wake of the September 11 attacks, how did your
24   role as an al Qaeda investigator change?
25   A.   It changed because of the size and the magnitude of what

 1   happened.  The entire investigation was shifted down to
 2   Washington.
 3   Q.   And prior to September 11, the focus of -- withdrawn.
 4             Prior to September 11, the principal investigating
 5   office of al Qaeda and the Bin Laden case was the office in New
 6   York, the FBI office in New York?
 7   A.   That's correct.
 8   Q.   Have you had any personal involvement in prosecuting this
 9   case against Zacarias Moussaoui?
10   A.   No, I haven't.
11             MR. RASKIN:  Your Honor, at this time, the government
12   offers Agent Anticev as an expert or summary witness on matters
13   involving al Qaeda.
14             MR. MAC MAHON:  No objection to the expert testimony,
15   Your Honor.  I'm not sure about the summary testimony.
16             THE COURT:  Well, I think either one probably is going
17   to be the same in this situation, but we'll see where it's going.
18   I will accept the witness as a, as an expert based upon his
19   personal involvement in so many investigations and the number of
20   years he's been doing it.
21             And, ladies and gentlemen, let me try to explain to you
22   just very briefly, we normally don't allow witnesses who testify
23   in court to give opinions about issues.  We make an exception for
24   people who are deemed to be experts, and these are people who
25   either because of formal training or experience become expert in

 1   an area that the average juror would not have -- probably not have
 2   much knowledge about, and the experts are called to testify to
 3   assist the jury in understanding information.
 4             Now, you are the ultimate triers of fact.  It is up to a
 5   jury to accept as much or as little of any witness's testimony,
 6   including that of an expert, but I will treat this witness as an
 7   expert.
 8             In terms of summary witnesses, a summary witness is
 9   sometimes offered to, again, if there's a large volume of data, it
10   saves the jury and the Court time, rather than bringing every
11   little piece of data in, to have a witness who is an expert really
12   in that quantum of information, to summarize it for the jury.  And
13   so in -- and this witness is in sort of a hybrid role and unless
14   there is an objection, we'll hear his testimony in that respect.
15             MR. MAC MAHON:  We're fine to hear him as an expert,
16   Your Honor.  We've reviewed his credentials.
17             THE COURT:  All right.  Mr. Raskin?
18             MR. RASKIN:  That's fine with us.  Thank you, Judge.
20   Q.   Agent Anticev, tell us what al Qaeda is.
21   A.   Well, al Qaeda is basically an umbrella organization with
22   many smaller or other terrorist organizations or groups underneath
23   that, almost like a parent corporation or a large corporation with
24   many subsidiaries.
25   Q.   Who found -- who was the founder of al Qaeda?

 1   A.   That would be Usama Bin Laden.
 2   Q.   And approximately what time was -- what period of time was
 3   al Qaeda founded during?
 4   A.   It was during the late '80s, 1988-89 time frame.
 5   Q.   What does the term "al Qaeda" mean?
 6   A.   It means the base.
 7   Q.   The base, b-a-s-e?
 8   A.   That's correct.
 9   Q.   And what was Usama Bin Laden's title or position in the
10   al Qaeda organization?
11   A.   Well, he was the emir or the leader of the group or the
12   organization.
13   Q.   Over the years since its inception, where has al Qaeda been
14   headquartered?
15   A.   Well, it was formed in Afghanistan, in 1988-89 time frame,
16   and then in 1991, they moved their headquarters to Khartoum,
17   Sudan, and from there in the spring-summer of 1996, they moved out
18   of Sudan and back into Afghanistan.
19   Q.   Now with Mr. Wood's assistance, I would like you to look at
20   what's been marked for identification as Government Exhibit OG6.
21   A.   Okay.
22   Q.   Have you got it?
23   A.   Um-hum.
24   Q.   What is it?
25   A.   It's a map.

 1   Q.   And just tell us generally what is it a map of?
 2   A.   It's covering Asia and the horn of Africa and the Middle
 3   East.
 4   Q.   And would it assist you in describing the various locations
 5   where al Qaeda has had its headquarters to use that map and
 6   display it?
 7   A.   To display it how?
 8   Q.   Well, I'll display it.
 9   A.   Okay.
10   Q.   But would it assist you in your testimony to have the map?
11   A.   Sure.
12             MR. RASKIN:  Your Honor, we offer Government Exhibit OG-
13   6 as a map.
14             THE COURT:  Any objection?
15             MR. MAC MAHON:  No, Your Honor.
16             THE COURT:  All right, it's in.
17             (Government Exhibit No. OG-6 was received in evidence.)
19   Q.   Okay.  Agent Anticev, can you see that on your screen?
20   A.   Yes, I do.
21   Q.   Okay.  And I believe if you'd take your finger, you can make
22   a yellow mark on the map, but why don't you show us where it was
23   that al Qaeda started its organization in '89 and '90.
24   A.   In '88 and '89, it starts over in the Afghan and Pakistani
25   border over there, and then in 1991, they moved their headquarters

 1   to Sudan, which I just pointed out, and then in the spring-summer
 2   of 1996, they relocated back to Afghanistan.
 3   Q.   Okay.  And I think we can make it bigger.  This is
 4   Afghanistan there and Sudan down there; is that right?
 5   A.   That's correct.
 6   Q.   Okay.  Now, keeping the map up on the screen, tell us over
 7   the years what attacks al Qaeda has perpetrated against United
 8   States interests.
 9   A.   Okay.
10   Q.   And if you would, just make reference to the areas on the
11   map.
12   A.   Okay.  Well, in the 1992 time frame, there was an attack in
13   Yemen against a hotel that was housing U.S. soldiers on their way
14   to Somalia.  No U.S. personnel were killed, but two, I believe,
15   Austrian tourists were killed during that bombing.  Then the
16   following year, October of 1993, down in Somalia, which I just
17   pointed -- well, okay, in Somalia, was an attack against U.S.
18   forces that were there for Operation Restore Hope in which 18
19   servicemen were killed.
20             And then in -- in August 7 of 1998, there were two
21   bombings of the U.S. embassies, one in Kenya, in Nairobi, and one
22   in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, that resulted in the deaths of 224
23   people, with thousands injured.
24             And then from that we had the Cole, bombing of the USS
25   Cole in which 17 sailors, that was once again back in Yemen, in

 1   the port while it was refueling.  And then the events of 9/11.
 2   Q.   Now, you mentioned bombing of embassies in East Africa.  Just
 3   tell us a little bit more about what those -- what happened in
 4   those attacks.  When were they?  How did they happen?
 5   A.   Well, on the morning of August 7, 1998, al Qaeda carried out
 6   two attacks at approximately 10:30 local time -- I think the
 7   bombings were actually ten minutes apart -- where they drove up
 8   bomb trucks to the American embassy in Nairobi and also to the
 9   American embassy in Dar es Salaam, and then blew them up.
10   Q.   And did your office in New York investigate that case?
11   A.   Yes, we did.
12   Q.   And just tell us a little bit about how the investigation
13   progressed.
14   A.   Well, it progressed with a lot of agents from, initially from
15   the Washington field office over here in Washington and the New
16   York office responding to the sites, and the investigation
17   continued.  The amount of personnel involved expanded tremendously
18   to I believe at one point to a couple hundred people, and then
19   when the investigation came back to New York, we had increased our
20   manpower from one squad to two.
21   Q.   Who was arrested in connection with those attacks?
22   A.   Well, there were several individuals.  There was for the
23   bombing itself, there was al-Owhali, Khalfan Khamis Mohamed.  For
24   the conspiracy part of it, there was Wadih el-Hage.  There was
25   from the conspiracy Ali Mohammed, Ihab Ali, and then several

 1   others.
 2             MR. RASKIN:  Now, Your Honor, I can spell those for the
 3   record.  I believe Ms. Thomson has the names, but if you'd like, I
 4   can spell them.
 5             THE COURT:  Well, they ought to be spelled because
 6   jurors are taking notes, and some of them may want to have these
 7   names for their records.
 8             MR. RASKIN:  I'll be happy to spell them.  Mohamed
 9   Rashed Daoud al-Owhali is M-o-h-a-m-e-d, second name, R-a-s-h-e-d,
10   third name, D-a-o-u-d, last name, a-l hyphen O-w-h-a-l-i.
11             Khalfan Khamis Mohamed, K-h-a-l-f-a-n, second name,
12   K-h-a-m-i-s, last name, M-o-h-a-m-e-d.
13             I believe Wadih el-Hage was also mentioned, which is
14   W-a-d-i-h, e-l H-a-g-e.  Ihab Ali, I-h-a-b A-l-i.  And I believe
15   Ali Mohamed, A-l-i M-o-h-a-m-e-d.
16             THE WITNESS:  I'd like to add one more, and that's Odeh,
17   O-d-e-h.
19   Q.   And they were prosecuted in the -- in -- by the New York
20   office of the FBI?
21   A.   Four individuals were prosecuted in the New York office at
22   the Southern District of New York, and that was Odeh, al-Owhali,
23   Wadih el-Hage, and Khalfan Khamis Mohamed.
24   Q.   I'm going to ask you a few questions about the structure of
25   al Qaeda.  What was the command and control structure of that

 1   organization?
 2   A.   Well, it was built like any other corporation or
 3   organization, where you had a majlis, m-a-j-l-i-s, al-shura, a-l
 4   hyphen s-h-u-r-a, which would be a consultative committee or a
 5   council, and that was Bin Laden and the upper echelon.  And then
 6   if you charted it out, you had many different committees and
 7   groups underneath that, such as a fatwah committee, a military
 8   committee, a finance committee, procurement, indoctrination, many
 9   organizations and departments.
10   Q.   Now, what did the military committee do?
11   A.   Well, they were in charge of conducting military operations,
12   terrorist operations, and training their individuals.
13   Q.   You also mentioned a fatwah committee.  Before I ask you what
14   they did, tell us what a fatwah is, f-a-t-w-a-h.
15   A.   A fatwah is just basically a religious ruling.
16   Q.   And are particular individuals qualified to issue those
17   religious rulings?
18   A.   Yes.  That will be an Islamic scholar.
19   Q.   What did the fatwah committee do?
20   A.   They would issue decrees or fatwahs on behalf of the group.
21   Q.   Did al Qaeda also have a media committee?
22   A.   Yes, they did.
23   Q.   What did the media committee do?
24   A.   They would just get their message out to the public.
25   Q.   And when you say "they," do you mean al Qaeda's message?

 1   A.   Al Qaeda.
 2   Q.   What does it mean to take bayat, b-a-y-a-t?
 3   A.   That means just to give allegiance to Bin Laden and the
 4   group.
 5   Q.   Was that a requirement of al Qaeda?
 6   A.   It was a requirement; however, it seemed through our
 7   investigations that some individuals actually did not give bayat
 8   to Bin Laden.
 9   Q.   You mentioned that Bin Laden was the emir of al Qaeda.  I'm
10   going to ask you some questions about who some of the other
11   leaders of that organization were over the years.
12             Who was the original -- withdrawn.
13             Who was originally in charge of the military committee?
14   A.   That would have been Abu Ubaidah al-Banshiri.
15   Q.   A-b-u, U-b-a-i-d-a-h, a-l-B-a-n-s-h-i-r-i for the record.
16   A.   Correct.
17   Q.   Tell us who Abu Ubaidah al-Banshiri was.
18   A.   Well, he was an Egyptian national who was head of Bin Laden's
19   military committee, and in 1996, in a ferry boat accident while
20   crossing over on Lake Victoria, the ferry actually sank, and he
21   drowned.
22   Q.   Who replaced him as head of the military committee?
23   A.   That would have been Mohammed Atef, whose a/k/a was Abu Hafs
24   al-Masri.
25   Q.   And for the record, that's M-o-h-a-m-m-e-d, second name,

 1   A-t-e-f, and the alias is Abu, A-b-u, Hafs, H-a-f-s, el, e-l,
 2   Masri, M-a-s-r-y.
 3             Tell us who Abu Hafs al-Masri was, and when did he
 4   become head of the military committee?
 5   A.   Well, he became head of the military committee after the
 6   death of Abu Ubaidah.  They were both actually members of the EIJ,
 7   or the Egyptian Islamic Jihad.  Abu Hafs was also -- he was an
 8   Egyptian national, and I believe he was a police officer before
 9   joining up with al Qaeda.
10   Q.   Is Abu Hafs currently deceased?
11   A.   We believe so.
12   Q.   And why is it that you believe so?
13   A.   There's indication that he was killed at the start of the war
14   in Afghanistan in a bombing, in a U.S. raid.
15   Q.   Now, who was Mamdouh Mahmud Salim?  For the record,
16   M-a-m-d-o-u-h, second name, M-a-h-m-u-d, Salim, third name,
17   S-a-l-i-m.  Who was that?
18   A.   Well, he also goes by the name of Abu Hajer al-Iraqi, which
19   would be his -- the war name or al Qaeda name, and he was head of
20   the fatwah committee and also in charge of indoctrination, and
21   also for procurement of communications equipment for the group.
22   Q.   Now, you mentioned the phrase "war name," w-a-r name, with
23   respect to the name Abu Hafs al-Masri -- I'm sorry, Abu Hajer
24   al-Iraqi.  Explain that in a little more detail, please.
25   A.   Well, the group didn't want to use individuals' real names

 1   because they wanted to keep that secret, so that when the people
 2   traveling back to their home countries, they wouldn't be
 3   discovered by law enforcement or by security services, so they
 4   used aliases.
 5   Q.   What does the word "Abu" mean in Arabic?
 6   A.   It means "father of."
 7   Q.   And taking the name Abu Hajer al-Iraqi, tell us what the rest
 8   of that name means.
 9   A.   Hajer comes from one of his children, and al-Iraqi just means
10   the Iraqi.
11   Q.   Now, you mentioned the Egyptian Islamic Jihad.  Tell us what
12   that organization was and what its relationship was to al Qaeda.
13   A.   Well, like the name says, it's an Egyptian jihad group that
14   was run by an individual named Ayman al-Zawahiri, and they were
15   looking to overthrow the Egyptian government.  They eventually
16   aligned themselves very closely with al Qaeda, whereby al-Zawahiri
17   became the second in charge of al Qaeda today.
18   Q.   And for the record, Ayman al-Zawahiri is A-y-m-a-n
19   a-l-Z-a-w-a-h-i-r-i.
20             Now, did Ayman al-Zawahiri ultimately take a position
21   with the al Qaeda leadership?
22   A.   He became second in charge.
23   Q.   Are you familiar with the name Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman?
24   A.   Yes, I am.
25   Q.   For the record, that's S-h-e-i-k-h, second name O-m-a-r,

 1   third name A-b-d-e-l, last name R-a-h-m-a-n.
 2             Sorry, who is that?
 3   A.   He was a spiritual leader of el Gamaa Islamia, another
 4   Egyptian fundamentalist group.
 5   Q.   El Gamaa Islamia, first name e-l G-a-m-a-a, Islamia,
 6   I-s-l-a-m-i-a.  What was the relationship between that group and
 7   al Qaeda?
 8   A.   Like EIJ, or Egyptian Islamic Jihad, el Gamaa Islamia also
 9   fell under the al Qaeda umbrella.
10   Q.   And Abdel Rahman was a spiritual leader of that group?
11   A.   That's correct.
12   Q.   What was his relationship with Bin Laden, and did he have a
13   position within al Qaeda?
14   A.   Well, I'm not sure if he personally had a position within
15   al Qaeda, but the group did.
16   Q.   Was Rahman arrested by United States authorities?
17   A.   Yes, he was.
18   Q.   And what was he arrested for?
19   A.   He was arrested for conspiracy to bomb various landmarks up
20   in New York City back in 1993.
21   Q.   And is he currently incarcerated?
22   A.   Yes, he is.
23   Q.   Are you familiar with an individual by the name of Khalid
24   Sheikh Mohammed, for the record, K-h-a-l-i-d, second name,
25   S-h-e-i-k-h, last name, M-o-h-a-m-m-e-d?

 1   A.   Yes, I am.
 2   Q.   Who is he?
 3   A.   Well, he was involved with a bomb plot to blow up 12 U.S.
 4   airliners over the South Pacific, along with Ramzi Yousef and Wali
 5   Khan, and then he masterminded 9/11.
 6   Q.   Now, this bomb plot to blow up 12 airliners, tell us when
 7   that was and where, where that occurred.
 8   A.   Okay.  That happened -- it would have occurred over the, over
 9   the, over Southeast Asia, over the ocean in the end of 1994-'95
10   time frame.
11   Q.   Now, was that plot to blow up airlines ever consummated?
12   A.   No, it wasn't.  It was thwarted, and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed
13   was indicted, Ramzi Yousef was found guilty of that crime, as well
14   as the World Trade Center, the first bombing, and so was Wali
15   Khan.
16   Q.   Okay.  I'm going to slow you down a little bit.  Tell us who
17   Ramzi Yousef is, R-a-m-z-i Y-o-u-s-e-f.
18   A.   He was also involved with the Manila air plot is what we
19   called it up in New York, and he was also the mastermind behind
20   the first World Trade Center bombing of February 26, 1993.
21   Q.   And how many individuals -- well, withdrawn.
22             Was Ramzi Yousef arrested for that?
23   A.   Yes, he was.
24   Q.   Was Khalid Sheikh Mohammed ever arrested for that?
25   A.   No, he wasn't.

 1   Q.   When Khalid Sheikh Mohammed was involved with the two
 2   incidents you just -- withdrawn.
 3             When Khalid Sheikh Mohammed was involved in this Manila
 4   air plot, in terms of your investigation at the FBI, was Khalid
 5   Sheikh Mohammed formally a member of al Qaeda?
 6   A.   To the best of our recollection --
 7             MR. MAC MAHON:  Excuse me, Your Honor, objection.  I'm
 8   not sure I understand the question.  Is he asking whether Khalid
 9   Sheikh Mohammed was a member of al Qaeda in 1995?  Did he learn
10   something later?  So I think the question is unclear, and I'd
11   object.
12             MR. RASKIN:  I'll ask the question again.
13             THE COURT:  Go ahead.  I'll sustain the objection.
15   Q.   When did the FBI determine that -- withdrawn.
16             Is al Qaeda -- is Khalid Sheikh Mohammed involved with
17   al Qaeda, and if so, how?
18             MR. MAC MAHON:  Well, Your Honor, that question is far
19   beyond the scope of what we're talking about and gets into areas
20   that we don't want to talk about in this case, but the questions I
21   thought were leading up to 9/11, so if the question was what about
22   before 9/11, I would have no objection.
23             THE COURT:  I think some of this background is actually
24   unnecessary.  I think, Mr. Raskin, you need to get it more pointed
25   as to what's at issue in this case, all right?

 1             MR. RASKIN:  Okay.
 2             THE COURT:  I'll sustain the objection.
 3             MR. RASKIN:  Your Honor, I'm going to move on to just
 4   show the jury some pictures of some of the individuals we just
 5   looked at.
 6             THE COURT:  All right.
 7             MR. RASKIN:  And with Mr. Wood's assistance, I would ask
 8   that the witness take a look at Government Exhibits AQ-100,
 9   OL-140.48.
10             THE COURT:  Whoa, whoa.  Do that one again.  AQ-100?
11             MR. RASKIN:  AQ-100, OL-140.48, AQ-105, AQ-106, AQ-107,
12   and AQ-108.
13             THE COURT:  Are there any objections to those exhibits?
14             MR. MAC MAHON:  I think they've been stipulated to, Your
15   Honor, if I'm correct.
16             MR. RASKIN:  Yeah, I believe they have.
17             THE COURT:  All right, then those five exhibits are in.
18             (Government's Exhibits Nos. AQ-100, OL-140.48, AQ-105,
19   AQ-106, AQ-107, and AQ-108 were received in evidence.)
20             MR. RASKIN:  Okay.  And if we could show them on the
21   screen?
23   Q.   And, Agent Anticev, as we go through these, can you just tell
24   us who these people are?
25   A.   Sure.  That's Usama Bin Laden.

 1   Q.   Okay.  OL-140.48?
 2   A.   That's Abu Hafs al-Masri, or Mohammed Atef.
 3   Q.   AQ-105?
 4   A.   Starting from the left side of the photograph or the right
 5   side of Usama Bin Laden in the middle, that's Ayman al-Zawahiri,
 6   Usama Bin Laden in the middle by the microphone, and to his left
 7   or on the right side of the picture if you're looking at it is
 8   Mohammed Atef, or Abu Hafs al-Masri.
 9   Q.   And 106?
10   A.   That's Mamdouh Mahmud Salim, a/k/a Abu Hajer al-Iraqi.
11   Q.   107?
12   A.   That's Khalid Sheikh Mohammed.
13   Q.   And what was his role in the 9/11 attacks?
14   A.   He was the mastermind of the 9/11 attacks.
15   Q.   108?
16   A.   That's Sheikh Omar Abdul Rahman, also referred to as The
17   Blind Sheikh.
18             MR. RASKIN:  Okay.  Thank you, Gerard.
20   Q.   Agent Anticev, give us just a little background on what
21   al Qaeda's objectives have been over the years and what its
22   position has been with respect to the United States.
23   A.   Well, basically it was to continue the global jihad after
24   they defeated the Soviet Union in Afghanistan.  They also wanted
25   to overthrow several Arab governments for not being perfectly

 1   Islamic or abiding by their interpretation of extremism, such
 2   countries as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Libya, etc., and also, they
 3   wanted to influence and change U.S. foreign policy as -- with some
 4   of the things that we were involved with in the Middle East or in
 5   Africa, such as Somalia and Saudi Arabia.
 6   Q.   What was al Qaeda's position with respect to the fact that
 7   U.S. forces were present in the -- in Saudi Arabia in advance of
 8   the Gulf War?
 9   A.   Well, they were very opposed to that because Saudi Arabia is
10   the land of the two holy sites for Islam, being Mecca and Medina,
11   and they were not happy with the fact that there were infidel or
12   non-believers of Islam forces in that country.
13   Q.   Now, did there come a time when Usama Bin Laden declared war
14   against the United States for these reasons and others?
15   A.   Yes.
16   Q.   When was that?
17   A.   That would have been in the mid-'90s.
18   Q.   And how was it that Usama Bin Laden and al Qaeda declared war
19   against the United States?
20   A.   Well, in the early '90s, they did it amongst themselves, at
21   private meetings or in the camps, where the fatwah committee would
22   issue fatwahs, you know, looking to get the U.S. forces or
23   attacking U.S. forces to get them removed from Somalia and from
24   Saudi Arabia, and as time progressed, they issued a public fatwah
25   as well, stating that it was okay to -- for al Qaeda to attack

 1   military and civilian targets.
 2   Q.   Now, let's take a look at that fatwah.  And at this point,
 3   Your Honor, I'm going to read a stipulation.  I'm reading from the
 4   stipulation which is marked ST No. 1, and specifically paragraph
 5   12 on page 14.  Government Exhibit AQ-93 is an authentic copy of a
 6   fatwah that Usama Bin Laden endorsed under the banner of the
 7   Islamic -- "International Islamic Front for Jihad on the Jews and
 8   Crusaders," which appeared on February 23, 1998, in the Arabic
 9   daily newspaper Al Quds al-Arabi, which is published in London,
10   England.
11             Government Exhibit AQ-93T is a fair and accurate
12   translation of this article, and pursuant to that stipulation,
13   Your Honor, the government would offer AQ-93 and AQ-93T.
14             THE COURT:  Any objection?
15             MR. MAC MAHON:  No objection, Your Honor.
16             THE COURT:  All right, both exhibits are in, 93 and 93T.
17             (Government's Exhibits Nos. AQ-93 and AQ-93T were
18   received in evidence.)
20   Q.   Now, with Mr. Wood's assistance, I'd like you to take a look
21   at those two exhibits, Agent Anticev.  And if we could bring AQ-93
22   up on the screen.
23             Agent Anticev, is that the fatwah as it appeared in the
24   Al Quds daily newspaper?
25   A.   Yes, it is.

 1   Q.   Let's take a look at the English language translation, which
 2   is 93T as in Tom.  And if we could zoom in on the first paragraph,
 3   please?
 4             Agent Anticev, there are a number of names listed there
 5   as individuals who endorsed this fatwah.  Can you tell us what the
 6   first three are?
 7   A.   The first one is Sheikh Usamah Bin-Muhammad Bin-Laden.  The
 8   second one is Ayman al-Zawahiri, and the third one is Abu-Yasir
 9   Rifa'i Ahmad Taha.
10   Q.   Now, we've heard the first two names, Bin Laden and
11   al-Zawahiri.  Who is Taha?
12   A.   He's the leader of el Gamaa Islamia.
13   Q.   Is that the group that Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman was a part
14   of?
15   A.   That's correct.
16   Q.   And who are the two others who endorsed this fatwah?
17   A.   The other two are Sheikh Mir Hamzah and Fazlul Rahman.
18   Q.   Are any of the five individuals who endorse this fatwah Islam
19   scholars based on your investigation as an FBI agent?
20   A.   To the best of my knowledge, no.
21   Q.   Now, we're going to take a look at a couple of portions of
22   this fatwah in a second, but tell us just generally who are the
23   targets of this fatwah?
24   A.   Americans, both civilians and military.
25   Q.   Now, if we can drop down the page to the fourth paragraph

 1   from the bottom that begins "first," right there, read for us the
 2   paragraph that begins "first"?
 3   A.   "First, for over seven years, the United States has been
 4   occupying the lands of Islam in the holiest of places, the Arabian
 5   Peninsula, plundering its riches, dictating to its rulers,
 6   humiliating its people, terrorizing its neighbors, and turning its
 7   bases in the peninsula into a spearhead through which to fight the
 8   neighboring Muslim peoples.
 9   Q.   Going to the next page, about halfway down there's a
10   paragraph that begins "on that basis."  And if we can pull that
11   up?  Read that sentence and the following paragraph for us,
12   please.
13   A.   Sure.  "On that basis and in compliance with God's order, we
14   issue the following fatwah to all Muslims:  The ruling to kill the
15   Americans and their allies -- civilians and military -- it is an
16   individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in
17   which it is possible to do it, in order to liberate the al Aqsa
18   Mosque and the Holy Mosque (Mecca) from their grip and in order
19   for their armies to move out of the lands of Islam, defeated and
20   unable to threaten any Muslim.  This is in accordance with the
21   words of almighty God and fight the pagans all together as they
22   fight you all together and fight them until there is no more
23   tumult or oppression and there prevail justice and faith in God."
24   Q.   And just drop down to the last paragraph and read that for
25   us, please.

 1   A.   "We -- with God's help -- call on every Muslim who believes
 2   in God and wishes to be rewarded to comply with God's order to
 3   kill the Americans and plunder their money wherever and whenever
 4   they find it.  We also call on Muslim Ulema, leaders, youths, and
 5   soldiers to launch the raid on Satan's U.S. troops and the devil's
 6   supporters allying with them, and to displace those who are behind
 7   them so that they may learn a lesson."
 8             MR. RASKIN:  Thank you, Agent.
 9             Now, Your Honor, at this point we would like to play a
10   videotape that I'm going to offer pursuant to a stipulation of the
11   parties.  It's about 20 minutes long, and I would propose that if
12   we are going to switch the camera to the closed circuit, that we
13   do so for that video.
14             THE COURT:  All right.  We'll try to get this on the
15   closed circuit so that people at the offsite locations can see it.
16             MR. RASKIN:  I'll read the stipulation, Your Honor.  It
17   is again in Government Exhibit ST-1, paragraph 14, on page 14,
18   "Government Exhibit AQ-81 is an authentic copy of a videotape of
19   an interview conducted by representatives from ABC News with Usama
20   Bin Laden in Afghanistan on May 28, 1998, portions of which aired
21   on ABC News on June 10, 1998, and a complete transcript of which
22   later appeared on the ABC News website."
23             Government Exhibit AQ-81T is a fair and accurate
24   translation of that interview.  Government Exhibit 81DVD is a
25   digital video disk containing excerpts of the videotaped interview

 1   contained in Government Exhibit AQ-81 and the accompanying
 2   translations from Government Exhibit 81T.
 3             THE COURT:  All right.  So just so we're clear for the
 4   record, then AQ-81 is the entire tape.
 5             MR. RASKIN:  Correct.
 6             THE COURT:  81T is a translation of the entire tape.
 7             MR. RASKIN:  Correct.
 8             THE COURT:  81DVD are selected excerpts from 81.
 9             MR. RASKIN:  Selected excerpts, and what I'm going to
10   ask Mr. Wood to hand the witness is AQ-81T.1, which is a
11   translation, a document translation that will go with the
12   excerpts, which is not in the stipulation, but it is just a
13   shortened version of 81T.
14             THE COURT:  Is there any objection to that from the
15   defense?
16             MR. MAC MAHON:  There's no objection, Your Honor.
17             MR. RASKIN:  In addition, Your Honor, I'll note that the
18   video we are playing will have the translation from 81T.1 running
19   on the screen as the audio and video are playing.
20             THE COURT:  The reason why I've gone through that
21   exercise, Ladies and Gentlemen, is at the end of the case, you get
22   for your deliberations in the jury room all the evidence that's
23   been admitted into evidence, all right?  That means you will have
24   81, 81T, 81T.1 and 81DVD.  As a practical matter, what's being
25   shown to you in court today is just this 81DVD, with the 81T.1

 1   translation running underneath it like a scroll.  Do I have it
 2   right?
 3             MR. RASKIN:  That's correct.
 4             THE COURT:  Okay.
 5             MR. RASKIN:  Now, just one question before we go to the
 6   videotape -- well, let me offer it into evidence.
 7             THE COURT:  There was no objection.  All four of those
 8   exhibits are in, correct?
 9             MR. MAC MAHON:  That's correct, Your Honor.  We have no
10   objection.
11             THE COURT:  All right, that's fine.
12             (Government's Exhibits Nos. AQ-81, AQ-81T, AQ-81T.1 and
13   AQ-81DVD were received in evidence.)
14             MR. RASKIN:  And the one we'll be playing for the
15   record, Your Honor, is 81DVD?
16             THE COURT:  Got it.
18   Q.   The first question -- well, this is an ABC News interview.
19   Tell us who the interviewer is?
20   A.   The interviewer is John Miller and he's interviewing Usama
21   Bin Laden.
22   Q.   And just so we're clear as to what languages are going to be
23   spoken in the actual video, tell us, please.
24   A.   Well, John Miller asks the question in English.  It then goes
25   to a translator who translates for Usama Bin Laden.  He responds

 1   in Arabic.
 2   Q.   And the Arabic is not translated back to Miller?
 3   A.   That's correct.  It's not translated back.
 4   Q.   Okay.  The first question is regarding a fatwah.  Is that the
 5   same fatwah that you just read to the jury?
 6   A.   Correct.
 7             MR. RASKIN:  Okay.  And Gerard, and if we can go to the
 8   videotape then, please?
 9             (Videotape played and Government's Exhibit No. 81T.1
10              copied verbatim into the record as follows:)
11             "MR. MILLER:  Mr. Bin Laden, you've issued a fatwah
12   calling on Muslims to kill Americans where they can, when they
13   can.  Is that directed at all Americans, just American military,
14   just Americans in Saudi Arabia?
15             BIN LADEN:  Praise be to Allah.  As we mentioned before,
16   Allah ordered us in this religion to uphold the truth to purify
17   Muslim land of all nonbelievers, and especially the Arabian
18   Peninsula where the Ka'ba is.  After World War II, the Americans
19   became more aggressive and oppressive, forcing itself on others,
20   especially in the Muslim world.
21             We are surprised this question is coming from Americans.
22   Each action will solicit a similar reaction.  Reciprocal
23   punishment is required to keep your evil away from Muslims, Muslim
24   children and women.  American history does not distinguish between
25   civilians and military, and not even women and children.  They are

 1   the ones who used the bombs against Nagasaki and Hiroshima.  Can
 2   these bombs distinguish between infants, children, women and
 3   military?  American does not have a religion that will prevent it
 4   from destroying all people.
 5             Your situation with Muslims in Palestine is shameful and
 6   disgraceful.  If there is any shame left in America.  Sabra and
 7   Shatilla massacre, was a symbol of cooperation between Zionist and
 8   Christian forces against Muslims.  Houses were demolished over the
 9   heads of children also by testimony of relief workers in Iraq, the
10   Americans led sanctions that resulted in the death of over 1
11   million Iraqi children for no reason.  All of this is done in the
12   name of American interests.  The only reason is your intransigence
13   and your desire to take other people's money and to steal Muslims'
14   oil under misguided terms, saying that it is part of America's
15   vital interests.  We believe that the biggest thieves in the world
16   today is America, and the biggest terrorists are the Americans.
17   The only way for us to fend off these assaults is use similar
18   means.
19             We do not differentiate between those dressed in
20   military uniforms and civilians; they are all targets in this
21   fatwah.  Especially since American officials have stated after the
22   Khobar bombing that there was a lack of information and all
23   American civilians were asked to gather information on Muslims and
24   observant Muslim youth and to convey to the security section in
25   the embassy.

 1             The fatwah is general and includes all that share or
 2   take part in killing of Muslims, assaulting holy places, or those
 3   who help the Jews occupy Muslim land.
 4             MR. MILLER:  Ramzi Yousef was a follower of yours.  Do
 5   you remember him?  Did you know him?
 6             BIN LADEN:  Ramzi Yousef, after the World Trade Center
 7   bombing, became a well-known Muslim personality, and all Muslims
 8   know him.  Unfortunately, I did not know him before the incident.
 9             I remember him as a Muslim who defended Islam from
10   American aggression on Muslim lands.  He took this effort to let
11   the Americans know that their government assaults Muslims to
12   insure Israeli interests, to insure Jews.
13             America will see many youths that will follow Ramzi
14   Yousef.
15             MR. MILLER:  You have been painted in America as a
16   terrorist leader, to your followers you are a hero, how do you see
17   yourself?
18             BIN LADEN:  As I said before, we do not worry about what
19   America says.  We look at ourselves and our brethren as
20   worshippers of Allah who created us to worship Him and follow His
21   books and prophets, peace be upon Him, I am one of Allah's
22   worshippers, I worship Allah, as he ordered, which includes
23   carrying out the Jihad to raise Allah's word and evict the
24   Americans from all Muslim lands all over.
25             MR. MILLER:  No one expected the Mujahedeen to beat the

 1   Russians in Afghanistan.  That came as a surprise to everyone.
 2   What do you see as the future for American involvement in the
 3   Mid-East and taking on groups like yours?
 4             BIN LADEN:  NATO that America created, we know it spent
 5   $455 billion American dollars in improving weaponry to protect
 6   Europe and America from Russia.  And they did not fire a single
 7   shot.  Allah stood with the Muslims, the Afghani Mujahedeen, and
 8   those who fought with them from other Muslim countries.  We fought
 9   against the Russians and the Soviet Union until, not to say we
10   defeated them, but Allah defeated them and then became
11   nonexistent.  There is a lesson to learn from this for he who
12   wishes to learn.  The Soviet Union entered in the last week of
13   1979, in December, and with Allah's help, their flag was folded
14   December 25 a few years later and thrown in the trash, and there
15   was nothing left to call Soviet Union.  We are sure of Allah's
16   victory and our victory against the Americans and the Jews as
17   promised by the prophet, peace be upon Him.  "Judgment day shall
18   not come until the Muslims fight the Jews, where the Jew will hide
19   behind trees and stones, and the tree and the stone will speak and
20   say 'Muslim, Allah's worshipper, behind me a Jew, come and kill
21   him,' except for al-Gharaad tree, which is a Jewish plant."
22             We are sure of our victory.  Our battle with the
23   Americans is larger than our battle with the Russians.  The
24   Americans made a very stupid mistake that no one has made before.
25   They attacked the greatest Muslim symbol, the Kibla of 1,200

 1   million people.  The reaction was very encouraging by all classes,
 2   especially the Muslim scholars and the youth.
 3             We predict a black day for America and the end of the
 4   United States as united states, and will be separate states, and
 5   they will retreat from our land and collect the bodies of its sons
 6   back to America.  Allah willing.
 7             MR. MILLER:  Do you think the Saudi government wants the
 8   American military to stay?
 9             BIN LADEN:  This does not make a difference, since
10   American repression, boastfulness and greed still exist.  They
11   came by the approval of government.  It does not make a difference
12   if the government wants you to stay or leave because you will not
13   leave by their words.  You will leave when the youth send you the
14   wooden boxes and the coffins and you will carry in it the corpses
15   of American troops and the American civilians.  This is when you
16   will leave.  The decision makers beyond taking you out are the
17   Muslim masses in the Muslim world who defending the Muslim lands.
18   Allah willing we will win.
19             MR. MILLER:  Describe the situation when your men took
20   on the American forces in Somalia.  Were you there?
21             BIN LADEN:  After Allah honored us with victory in
22   Afghanistan and justice prevailed and the killings of those who
23   slaughtered millions of Muslims in the Muslim republics.  It
24   cleared from Muslim minds the myth of superpowers.  The youth
25   ceased from seeing America as a superpower.  After leaving

 1   Afghanistan, they headed for Somalia and prepared for a long
 2   battle, thinking that the Americans are like the Russians, but
 3   they were surprised when the Americans entered with 30,000 troops
 4   and collected more troops from the world, 5,000 from Pakistan,
 5   5,000 from India, 5,000 from Bangladesh, and also from Egypt,
 6   Senegal and others like Saudi.
 7             The youth were surprised at the low morale of the
 8   American soldiers and realized more than before that the American
 9   soldier is a paper tiger.  And after a few blows he ran in defeat,
10   and America forgot about all the hoopla and media propaganda after
11   leaving the gulf war and destroying infrastructure and destroying
12   baby formula factories, all civilian factories, bridges and dams
13   that help planting food.  America presented itself as the world
14   leader, and the leader of the new world order, and after a few
15   blows, they forgot about this title and left dragging their
16   corpses and their shameful defeat and stopped using such titles.
17   And the politicians in America learned that this name is larger
18   than them and that they are not fit for it.
19             When this took place I was in Sudan, and this great
20   defeat against America pleased me very much, the way it pleased
21   all Muslims.  Allah willing, the next victory will be in Hijaz and
22   Najd, Saudi Arabia will make the Americans forget the horrors of
23   Vietnam and Beirut.
24             MR. MILLER:  The American people by and large do not
25   know the name Bin Laden, but they soon likely will.  Do you have a

 1   message for the American people?
 2             BIN LADEN:  I say that the American people gave
 3   leadership to a traitorous leadership.  This became very clear and
 4   especially in Clinton's government.  The American government is
 5   called the American government, but we think it is an agent that
 6   represents the Israel inside America.  If we look at sensitive
 7   departments in the present government like the Defense Department
 8   or the State Department, or sensitive security departments like
 9   the CIA and others, we find that Jews have the first word in the
10   American government, which is how they exploit America to carry
11   out their plans in the world and especially the Muslim world.
12             The presence of Americans in the land of Al-Haramain
13   (Saudi Arabia) supports the Jews in the prophet's Holy Land, peace
14   be upon Him, and gives them a safe back.  The American government
15   at the time there are millions of Americans living on the street
16   and those living below the standard of living, and in stricken
17   poverty, we find the American government turning towards helping
18   Israel in occupying our land and building settlements in the
19   prophet's Holy Land peace be upon Him.
20             The American government is throwing away the lives of
21   Americans in the land of Al-Haramain (Saudi Arabia) and other
22   places for the interests of the Jews.  The Jews are a people that
23   Allah cited in his holy book the Qur'an as those who attacked
24   their prophets with lies and killings and attacked Mary, may peace
25   be upon her, and accusing her of being a whore.  They are a people

 1   who didn't abstain from killing God's prophets.  How would they
 2   refrain from killing, raping and stealing from humans?
 3             They believe that all humans are animals to be exploited
 4   by them, and found that the Americans are the best created beings
 5   for that use.  The American government is driving America to
 6   destruction and rational people have no doubt that America will
 7   not be a superpower at the turn of the next century.
 8             So, we tell the American people and we tell the mothers
 9   of soldiers, and American mothers in general, if they value their
10   lives and those of their children, to find a nationalistic
11   government that would look after their interests and not the
12   interests of Jews.
13             The continuation of the repression will bring the
14   fighting to America, like Ramzi Yousef and others.  This is my
15   message to the American people to look for a serious government
16   that looks out for their interests and does not attack others,
17   their lands or their money."
18             (End of videotape.)
20   Q.   Agent Anticev, you mentioned before that al Qaeda was an
21   umbrella organization.  Tell us what other groups, jihad groups
22   al Qaeda was affiliated with over the years.
23   A.   Well, there are numerous jihad groups, from various countries
24   throughout the Middle East and other places where you had
25   individuals from Syria, Algeria, Tunisia, Sudan, Bangladesh,

 1   Pakistan, Kashmir, and others.
 2             MR. RASKIN:  And if we could bring up Government Exhibit
 3   OG-6 again.
 4             THE COURT:  This is the map?
 5             MR. RASKIN:  Yeah, it's the map.
 6             THE COURT:  Well, why don't we just keep the -- just ask
 7   your question.
 9   Q.   Was there a particular group -- here it is, just in the nick
10   of time.
11             Was there a particular group in the Southeast Asia area
12   that al Qaeda was affiliated with?
13   A.   Yes, there were.  It was called JIR, Jemaah Islamiyah.
14   Q.   Jemaah Islamiyah, J-a-m-a-a-h, Islamiyah, I-s-l-a-m-i-y-a-h.
15             And what countries did that organization exist in?
16   A.   Well, it covered the area that you circled over there, being
17   Indonesia, Malaysia, also Singapore and the Philippines and even
18   into Australia.
19   Q.   Did al Qaeda also operate training camps?
20   A.   Yes, they did.
21   Q.   And what training did they provide in those camps?
22   A.   They received all types of training, from terrorist training
23   to military training, it would be basic physical fitness to
24   shooting, to learning how to make bombs, trade craft, how to do
25   fraudulent documents, how to -- artillery, how to shoot RPGs, all

 1   kinds of training.
 2   Q.   Generally, where are those camps located?
 3   A.   Generally speaking, they're located in Afghanistan close to
 4   the Pakistan border.
 5   Q.   And I'll ask Mr. Wood to hand you OG-7, which is another map.
 6             THE COURT:  Is there any objection to OG-7?
 7             MR. MAC MAHON:  No, Your Honor.
 8             THE COURT:  All right, that's in.
 9             (Government's Exhibit No. OG-7 was received in
10   evidence.)
12   Q.   If we can bring up OG-7?
13             When you say the border area, I want you to draw on
14   there with your finger where the camps were located.
15   A.   Okay.  Stretching from Kabul down to Kandahar and with
16   another large concentration of camps being south of Kabul, next to
17   an area called Khowst.
18   Q.   Now, if you would, tell us what some of the names of these
19   camps that al Qaeda ran in that area are.
20   A.   He had numerous.  He had Jajee, Jihad Wal, Abu Baqr,
21   al-Siddiq, al-Farooq, Khalden, Tarnak Farms, and others.
22   Q.   Now, tell us, Khalden was one of the camps you mentioned?
23   A.   That's correct.
24   Q.   Tell us what kind of training was provided at Khalden Camp?
25   A.   That was a camp that provided all types of training, covering

 1   physical fitness through advanced training, including explosives,
 2   and again shooting weapons, machine guns, RPGs, et cetera.
 3   Q.   And where with relation to Kabul was the Khalden camp?
 4   A.   It would have been south of Kabul, approximately, generally
 5   in that area.
 6   Q.   Thank you, agent.
 7             Did al Qaeda also -- we can take the map down.
 8             Did al Qaeda also run establishments known as
 9   guesthouses?
10   A.   Yes, they did.
11   Q.   And tell us what a guesthouse was in the al Qaeda context.
12   A.   That would basically be a small private hotel or an inn that
13   was used strictly for al Qaeda members and associates when they
14   were traveling around the world.
15   Q.   What type of activities went on in guesthouses?
16   A.   They would listen to lectures, read jihadist material,
17   indoctrination and other types of training.
18             MR. RASKIN:  Now, Your Honor, at this point there's
19   another video that we'd like to play which is approximately 10
20   minutes long.
21             THE COURT:  That's just about the right time for today.
22             MR. RASKIN:  That's what I figured.
23             THE COURT:  We'll try to again put it on the system so
24   that it can get to the offsite locations.
25             MR. RASKIN:  Right.  And I'll save everybody my reading

 1   the stipulation because I believe it's agreed to, the exhibit is
 2   Government Exhibit 86DVD, and the translation, AQ-86T.1.  It's in
 3   the same format as the last video we watched.
 4             THE COURT:  Any objection?
 5             MR. MAC MAHON:  No objection, Your Honor, thank you.
 6             THE COURT:  All right, it's in.
 7             (Government's Exhibit Nos. AQ-86DVD and AQ-86T.1 were
 8   received in evidence.)
10   Q.   Just before we go to this video, Agent Anticev, have you
11   reviewed it?
12   A.   Yes, I have.
13   Q.   Tell us generally what we're going to see in this video?
14   A.   Basically going to see a training video of al Qaeda members,
15   like a military-style training.  You're also going to see Bin
16   Laden making a statement and a speech.  Then it ends with the USS
17   Cole bombing.
18   Q.   And did this video air on the al Jazeera television network?
19   A.   Yes.
20   Q.   And approximately when did it air?
21   A.   Was it June 21, 2001?
22   A.   That's correct.
23   Q.   Now, on the tape, are there moments when the, the tape
24   fast-forwards and rewinds?
25   A.   Yes.

 1   Q.   Was that on the original?
 2   A.   That was on the original.
 3   Q.   Okay.  It's actually 8 minutes long, and if we could play
 4   86DVD?
 5             (Videotape played and Government's Exhibit No. AQ-86T.1
 6              copied into the record as follows:)
 7             "MEN SINGING:  We challenge with our Koran.
 8             We challenge with our Koran.
 9             Our men are in revolt, our men are in revolt.
10             We challenge with our Koran,
11             We challenge with our Koran.
12             Our men are in revolt, our men are in revolt.
13             We will not regain our homeland,
14             Nor will our shame be erased except through blood and
15   fire.
16             On and on and on it goes.
17             On and on and on it goes.
18             We defend our religion with blood, with blood.
19             We defend our religion with blood, with blood.
20             Our Koran is in our hands.
21             We have ignited the conflict and we challenge our enemy.
22             She told me, "You're aiming at the woods.
23             I told her I am aiming in order to defend this religion.
24             Mother, oh mother, give me the bullets.
25             Load the weapon, so I can shoot the disobedient.

 1             Mother, oh, mother, give me the bullets.
 2             Load the weapon so I can shoot the disobedient.
 3             I am going to strike just like a huntsman, his head,
 4   mother, does not --
 5             Blaze up, oh soldiers of God.
 6             And rise up like flames of fire, like flames of fire.
 7             Do not blame the invading soldiers when they bombard the
 8   villages.
 9             Do not blame the invading soldiers when they bombard the
10   villages.
11             When they run towards death, fearless of the brutality
12   of the tigers.
13             When they run towards death, fearless of the brutality
14   of the tigers.
15             Just like the lions in the jungle, running through the
16   fields and crevices.
17             Just like the lions in the jungle, running through the
18   fields and crevices.
19             I rose to please my God.  I won't be humiliated by the
20   disdainful.
21             I rose to please my God.  I won't be humiliated by the
22   disdainful.
23             I won't be afraid of death or care about my fate, I
24   won't be afraid of death --
25             UNKNOWN MALE:  For their blood that was shed in order to

 1   pleas the monkeys and the pigs, in order to please the United
 2   States and the Jews.  Here we are now, preparing ourselves and
 3   making our voices heard throughout the whole world, that we are
 4   coming and that we are saying with full force, "Oh, land of the
 5   revelation.
 6             MEN REPEATING:  Oh, land of the revelation.
 7             UNKNOWN MALE:  Oh, land of the revelation.
 8             MEN REPEATING:  Oh, land of the revelation.
 9             UNKNOWN MALE:  Oh, land of the revelation.
10             MEN REPEATING:  Oh, land of the revelation.
11             MEN SINGING:  Let us set out for victory,.
12             Trampling on the chains and embarking on the impossible.
13   Let us set out for victory,
14             Trampling on the chains and embarking on the impossible.
15             UNKNOWN MALE SINGING:  Let us eradicate the debauchees
16   from this earth,
17             With the force of raging mountains and great strife.
18             MEN SINGING:  With the determination of a lion and the
19   rumble of thunder,
20             With a fire that can melt iron and with the light of the
21   crescent,
22             With a fire that can melt iron and with the light of a
23   crescent.
24             UNKNOWN MALE SINGING:  Come to me, come to me, oh, lions
25   of redemption,

 1             For what these say and what those say is of no benefit
 2   anymore.
 3             MEN SINGING:  Come to me, come to me, oh, lions of
 4   redemption,
 5             For what these say and what those say is of no benefit
 6   anymore.
 7             UNKNOWN MALE SINGING:  The knolls of Jerusalem have
 8   called their heros,
 9             So where is Ali and where is Bilal?
10             So where is Ali and where is Bilal?
11             MEN SINGING:  Let us set out for victory,
12             Trampling on the chains and embarking on the impossible.
13             Let us set out for victory,
14             Trampling on the chains and embarking on the impossible.
15             UNKNOWN MALE SINGING:  Let us eradicate the debauchees
16   from this earth, with the force of raging mountains and with great
17   strife.
18             MEN SINGING:  With the determination of a lion and the
19   rumble of thunder,
20             With a fire that melts iron and the light of the
21   crescent,
22             With a fire that melts iron and the light of the
23   crescent.
24             UNKNOWN MALE SINGING:  Didn't you hear, my brothers,
25             The nostalgia of the earth and the mourning of the sand?

 1             MEN SINGING:  Didn't you hear, my brothers,
 2             The nostalgia of the earth and the mourning of the sand?
 3             UNKNOWN MALE SINGING:  And the wailing of the minarets
 4   in anguish,
 5             And the moaning of the gravel and the groaning of the
 6   hills?
 7             And the moaning of the gravel and the groaning of the
 8   hills?
 9             MEN SINGING:  Let us set out for victory, trampling on
10   the chains and embarking on the impossible.
11             Let us set out for victory, trampling the chains.
12             BIN LADEN:  The fruit of this training is Jihad for the
13   sake of "there is no God but God."  Your brothers in Palestine are
14   impatiently waiting for you.  They are waiting for you to disturb
15   the United States and Israel, for the land of God is vast and
16   their interests are spread out.  Hence, make your best effort to
17   strike them so that the word of God remains high.
18             CHILDREN SINGIN:  My promise?  (UI) and my brothers --
19             BOY SINGING:  With my Koran and my faith --
20             CHILDREN SINGING:  And with my brothers' glorification
21   [of God]
22             BOY CHANTING:  Islamic!  Islamic!
23             BOYS REPEATING:  Islamic!  Islamic!
24             BOY CHANTING:  [UI]
25             BOYS REPEATING:  [UI]

 1             BOY CHANTING:  Our youth, let us aspire for glory!
 2             BOYS REPEATING:  Our youth, let us aspire for glory!
 3             BOY CHANTING:  And climb the peaks of mountains.
 4             BOY READING:  But the United States came to [UI]
 5   al-Ka'abah and Khubar.  You immigrated to a land where the Nile
 6   flows.
 7             UNKNOWN MALE SINGING:  Tell on my behalf, oh father,
 8   that I am seeking the face of God.  Tell on my behalf, oh father,
 9   that I am seeking the face of God.
10             If the infidels please human beings, my desire is to
11   please God.  If the infidels pleased human beings --
12             UNKNOWN MALE:  [UI] and I am appealing to you and
13   calling you --
14             BOY READING:  [UI] he could not even --
15             BIN LADEN:  [UI] they destroyed, and in Najd, the youth
16   rushed for Jihad, and in Aden they rushed, attacked and destroyed
17   a battle ship that is feared by fear itself.  It increases your
18   fear when it is in anchor and when it sails.  It crosses the sea
19   with pride, arrogance and fake power as it seeks its destination
20   with speed, under great and false delusion in the direction of a
21   boat that is teased by the waves, disappearing at times and
22   reappearing at others as the waves lightly push it around;
23   however, it is light things that one might be fearful and cautious
24   of.  When the two groups came to meet, Muhammad's group (the
25   Prophet's) --"

 1             (End of videotape excerpt.)
 3   Q.   Agent Anticev, I have one follow-up question.  The destroyer
 4   or the warship that we saw at the end of the video, what warship
 5   was that?
 6   A.   That would be the USS Cole.
 7   Q.   And you referred to that earlier as the warship that was
 8   attacked by al Qaeda?
 9   A.   That's correct.
10             MR. RASKIN:  Your Honor, is this a good time to stop?
11             THE COURT:  I think so.  The jury has had a long day and
12   so I'm going to recess court at this time.  Ladies and Gentlemen,
13   please remember my cautions.  There's no question there will be
14   extensive media coverage about today's proceedings, so you must
15   avoid any kind of contact with it.  And, again, you cannot tell
16   your family members or anyone else anything about what you've seen
17   or heard in court today.
18             I think you can see how you're going to need plenty of
19   rest to be able to be a good attentive juror for this case, so
20   that's the best thing you can do.
21             I hope you don't have difficulties tomorrow with your
22   transportation arrangements.  Again, we will understand if there
23   are problems.  It's the first day of doing that.  But hopefully
24   there won't be.  We cannot start, however, until you are all here,
25   so if someone gets stuck in traffic, your colleagues need to know

 1   that we're waiting for you, all right?
 2             We'll stay in session.  I have a couple of mop-up things
 3   to take care of, but we'll let the jury go home for tonight.  If
 4   you just leave your notebooks here, we'll get them back to you
 5   tomorrow morning.  Thank you.
 6                              (Jury out.)
 7             THE COURT:  All right, just a couple of mop-up things.
 8             MR. RASKIN:  Your Honor, may we excuse the witness?
 9             THE COURT:  Oh, I'm sorry, Agent.  You may step down.
10   Thank you.
11             With this particular exhibit, the one we just looked at
12   then, it is only 86DVD and AQ-86.T.1 that are coming in.
13             MR. RASKIN:  That's all we've offered, Your Honor.
14             THE COURT:  That's fine.
15             MR. RASKIN:  Yes.
16             THE COURT:  And there was no objection, so those are in.
17             MR. MAC MAHON:  If I can, Your Honor, we got a little
18   sideways there.
19             THE COURT:  Yes.
20             MR. MAC MAHON:  The things that we've stipulated to,
21   we've stipulated to.  There isn't any remaining objection to the
22   documents that are referenced to or put in the stipulation.
23             THE COURT:  All right.  Well, then let's, so we can
24   finish things up tonight in an orderly fashion, and these exhibit
25   numbers are going to drive us crazy.  No old-fashioned one, two,

 1   three, four, and five.  We'll do it, but it's tough.  Hold on one
 2   second.
 3             All right.  So ST-01, there is no objection to that; is
 4   that correct?  That is the first package of stipulations.
 5             MR. TROCCOLI:  That is correct, Your Honor.
 6             THE COURT:  All right.  So that is now in evidence.
 7             (Government's Exhibit No. ST-01 was received in
 8   evidence.)
 9             THE COURT:  I think, given the complexity of the
10   exhibits in this case, what I want you to do is on Fridays, which
11   will be our mop-up day, to check with Ms. Arnott and make sure
12   that all of our lists are in sync, okay?
13             MR. RASKIN:  Yes, Your Honor.
14             THE COURT:  Is there anything further that we need to
15   address before tomorrow morning?
16             MR. RASKIN:  I don't believe so, Your Honor.
17             THE COURT:  All right.  You know, I didn't tell the jury
18   but it's in all my orders, we start at 9:30, in case there was any
19   question about that, all right?  If there's nothing further then,
20   we'll see you back here at 9:30 tomorrow morning.
21        (Recess from 5:35 p.m., until 9:30 a.m., March 7, 2006.)

 1                      CERTIFICATE OF THE REPORTERS
 2        We certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript of the
 3   record of proceedings in the above-entitled matter.
                                       Anneliese J. Thomson
                                         Karen Brynteson

 1                               I N D E X
 2                                    DIRECT  CROSS  REDIRECT  RECROSS
    Michael Anticev                    86
 6                                EXHIBITS
 7                                           MARKED    RECEIVED
      No. 1                                                77
 9         OG-6                                             95
          AQ-100                                           106
10         AQ-105                                           106
          OL-140.48                                        106
          AQ-106                                           106
12         AQ-107                                           106
          AQ-108                                           106
13         AQ-93                                            109
          AQ-93T                                           109
          AQ-81                                            114
15         AQ-81T                                           114
          AQ-81T.1                                         114
16         AQ-81DVD                                         114
          OG-7                                             124
          AQ-86DVD                                         126
18         AQ-86T.1                                         126
          ST-01                                            135