19 June 2003
Source: http://usinfo.state.gov/cgi-bin/washfile/display.pl?p=/products/washfile/latest&f=03061802.plt&t=/products/washfile/newsitem.shtml


US Department of State
International Information Programs

Washington File
_________________________________

18 June 2003

Wolfowitz Says Four Factors to Guide U.S. Military Transformation

(Recent Iraqi operations demonstrate some of these characteristics) (6170)

Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz says the U.S. armed forces
seek to capitalize on four attributes that will be key to 21st-century
combat successes -- knowledge, speed, precision and lethality.

"These attributes were demonstrated anew in the recent major combat
operation in Iraq," Wolfowitz said June 18 in testimony before the
House Armed Services Committee. The committee is examining U.S.
military global commitments and whether current defense policies,
expenditures and force structures are adequate for those missions.

He cited the extensive use of small Special Operations forces and
advanced intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities as
indicative of the power of knowledge on the modern battlefield. And he
said U.S. forces arrived in the region around Iraq in less than half
the time required for Operation Desert Storm -- the first war with
Iraq in 1991 after Iraq invaded Kuwait.

Wolfowitz said it took three months to move massive ground troops into
position for the recent hostilities in Iraq, compared with seven
months in 1990-91, illustrating the U.S. ability to capitalize on
speed in moving troops around the world.

In the first Persian Gulf war approximately 8 percent of air-dropped
munitions were precision-guided, as compared to about 66 percent in
the most recent military operations, he said, which points to a
dramatic increase in precision weapons while using only one-seventh
the number of bombs that were used in 1991.

"Coupled with an air campaign that emphasized the destruction of Iraqi
ground forces to a far greater degree than in Desert Storm, about 25
percent of the total ground combat forces used in Desert Storm
conducted rapid, simultaneous operations in OIF [Operation Iraqi
Freedom] that defeated Iraqi forces across the depth of the
battlespace," he said.

The consequence of these kinds of advances in warfare, Wolfowitz said,
allowed the United States and its allies to use about one-half the
forces in about one-half the time, while using about one-seventh the
munitions to reach "a far more ambitious objective as compared to
Desert Storm."

Following is a transcript of Wolfowitz's remarks:

(begin transcript)

STATEMENT BY
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE PAUL WOLFOWITZ 

BEFORE THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

HEARING ON U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE IN IRAQ: IMPLICATIONS FOR GLOBAL
DEFENSE POSTURE

JUNE 18, 2003

Introduction

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: You have provided our
Nation with great bipartisan support and strong leadership, and our
relationship with the Committee and its staff has truly been
outstanding.

Thank you very much for this opportunity to address some of the most
important defense challenges before us as we collaborate to continue
to protect the United States and advance our security interests in
this dangerous era.

U.S. Defense Strategy

Long before September 11th, 2001, the Department's senior leaders ---
civilian and military --- began an unprecedented degree of debate and
discussion about the strategic direction of the Defense Department. In
those discussions, we took account of our current and projected
circumstances and agreed on the urgent need for significant changes in
U.S. Defense Strategy.

Changing circumstances in the world included:

-- Increasing asymmetric threats from adversaries seeking to avoid
U.S. strengths and target our vulnerabilities;

-- Growing challenges from anti-access capabilities, including WMD,
missiles, and quiet diesel submarines;

-- An "arc of instability" extending from the Western Hemisphere into
North Africa and the East Asian Littoral and encompassing ungoverned
areas that are breeding grounds for terrorism;

-- Threats requiring immediate military response and not limited to a
single area;

-- The increased importance of knowledge, precision, speed, lethality,
and surprise in the conduct of 21st-century military operations; and

-- The longer-term potential for a military competitor.

This depiction is strikingly different from that of the Cold War, when
large armies faced each other in Central Europe, and when North Korea,
Iraq, and others equipped themselves with large armored forces.

Before we published our new Defense Strategy, terrorists attacked the
United States. That attack largely confirmed the strategic direction
and planning principles that we developed, particularly our emphases
on uncertainty and surprise. And it confirmed our focus on preparing
for asymmetric threats, and on the consequent need to respond with
agility in unfamiliar places around the world.

No one could have anticipated in the summer of 2001 that the United
States would be basing forces at Karshi-Khanabad, Uzbekistan, or
conducting a major military operation in Afghanistan.

Nevertheless, on October 7, 2001, just 20 days after the President
gave the order to start planning, we were at war in Afghanistan, a
place for which we had no pre-existing warplan of any kind; just 12
days later, on October 19, 2001, our first Special Operations Forces
were deployed in Afghanistan; on November 9, 2001, Mazar-e-Sharif fell
to our forces, followed by Kabul on November 13, 2001.

This astounding chain of events amply demonstrates both the
unpredictability of this new era and the extraordinary speed with
which events can unfold.

The September 11th attacks also highlighted the unprecedented
destructive power of terrorists and the vulnerability of the U.S.
homeland to 21st-century threats.

The new U.S. Defense Strategy that we outlined in the September 30,
2001 Quadrennial Defense Review [QDR] Report stipulates four defense
policy goals:

-- Assure allies and friends. 

-- Dissuade military competition. 

-- Deter aggression and coercion forward by increasing capabilities
for swift military action within and across critical regions.

-- Defeat any adversary, if deterrence fails.

Among the new directions set in the QDR, three stand out.

First, the senior civilian and military leaders agreed that we had to
measure risk in multiple dimensions, and that we could not simply
judge the defense program on how it addressed near-term warfighting
risks. A new framework was required, one that would bring the full
range of risks into view.

We identified four categories of risk:

-- Force management risks dealing with how we sustain our people,
equipment, and infrastructure;

-- Operational risks dealing with the ability of our forces to
accomplish their warfighting missions in the near-term;

-- Future challenges risks dealing with the investments and changes
needed today to permit us to deal effectively with military challenges
in the future; and

-- Institutional risks involving remedying inefficient processes and
excessive support requirements that jeopardize our ability to use
resources efficiently.

The approach we adopted in light of this framework sought to balance
risks in all of these categories, and avoid extreme solutions that
would lower risks in some areas while raising other risks to
unacceptable levels. While reasonable people may differ on specific
decisions regarding our investments and budgetary decisions, it is
important that we understand the need to balance among the different
risks that we confront.

Second, to confront a world of surprise and uncertainty, we shifted
our planning from the "threat-driven" model that has guided our
thinking in the past to a "capabilities-based" approach for the
future. In this new era, it is very difficult to predict precisely who
our adversaries will be and when or where they might threaten us. But
we can hope to identify the asymmetric capabilities that an adversary
might threaten to use against our vulnerabilities, and to highlight
our own asymmetric advantages for defeating whoever chooses to
challenge the U.S. militarily.

Third, we shifted from a force planning construct that focused on two
major theater wars in two specific regions in the near term to a
richer, more detailed, and more productive force planning construct
derived from the Defense Strategy that addresses challenges we may
face over time.

A New Approach to Planning U.S. Forces

The new force planning construct, elaborated in the 2001 QDR Report,
guides the shaping and sizing of U.S. forces to:

-- Defend the United States;

-- Deter aggression and coercion from a forward posture in critical
regions;

-- Swiftly defeat aggression in two overlapping major conflicts, while
preserving for the President the option to call for a decisive victory
in one of those conflicts—including the possibility of regime change
or occupation; and

-- Conduct a limited number of smaller-scale contingency operations.

In changing from the two Major Theater War approach, we did not go to
a one-war, or one-and-a-half war approach, or a strategy of
"win-hold-win." What we proposed is something entirely different.

The new approach shifts the focus of planning from optimizing for
conflicts in two particular scenarios -- Northeast Asia and Southwest
Asia -- to building a portfolio of capabilities that is robust across
the spectrum of possible force requirements.

The old construct envisioned a force that was ready to defeat two
adversaries at the same time, marching on their capitals and occupying
their countries.

The new approach would still enable the United States to prevail in
overlapping conflicts. However, the emphasis is on speed and
delivering early combat power to overmatch the enemy, rather than
deliberate military responses to enemy aggression built up over time.
And speed is a necessary quality of our military capabilities, given
the types of challenges we may face.

We do not want our forces in warfighting theaters to have to wait
until reinforcements arrive to blunt effectively an enemy's attack.
Rather than trading space for time --- with the losses that implies
for both ourselves and our allies --- and waiting for reinforcements
to recover lost ground, we want our forces to have the capabilities to
defeat attacks immediately.

By removing the requirement to maintain a second win-decisive force,
the new force planning construct gives us more flexibility in
planning, both for a wider array of near-term contingencies and for
investing in key capabilities for the future that buy us additional
speed and early combat power.

This force planning construct is not simple --- but the scope and
variety of missions that the Armed Forces must prepare for and conduct
on a daily basis are not simple either.

In the summer of 2001, during the QDR, we considered options that
would have traded force structure for greater investments in future
military capabilities.

After much analysis and instructive deliberations in the summer of
2001, we concluded that it would have been a mistake to reduce our
force structure. After we outlined our conclusion in the QDR Report
that the current force structure would be the baseline from which we
would develop a transformed force, we initially were criticized for
being too conservative.

We think that events since that time have vindicated our conclusion.

As we said in the QDR, the force that we are sustaining is about the
right size for the broad range of scenarios that we face.

Our challenge is to re-shape the force, realign its posture, and
manage our force—including sustaining the high quality of our
personnel, our most valuable asset -- in such ways that we maximize
the combat power of our existing forces.

If we increase our end-strength, we will not be able to make the
investments needed to make our joint force more capable. Without
commensurate increases in non-personnel spending, the quality of life
and investment per service member would suffer if end-strength alone
increased. We thus would put our people needlessly at risk and expose
them unnecessarily to vulnerabilities.

Rather, the forces that we have need to be modernized and transformed.
We have made great strides to date, as the effects of our recent
military operations have made clear. But we have much more to do.

The preliminary lessons learned from Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)
suggest that U.S. forces, on a per unit basis, achieved a level of
combat power that is at least several multiples greater than even the
enormously capable forces that we deployed in Operation Desert Storm a
decade ago. Nonetheless, it is my estimation that we have yet to fully
realize the potential of what our forces could be in the future.

Our transformation seeks to capitalize on force attributes that we
think are the key to 21st-century combat successes: knowledge, speed,
precision, and lethality. These attributes were demonstrated anew in
the recent major combat operation in Iraq:

-- Knowledge. The extensive use of small Special Operations units and
ISR [intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance] (e.g., three times
the number of JSTARS sorties in OIF [Operation Iraqi Freedom] compared
to Desert Storm, and greatly increased satellite capabilities)
connected together by new communications links vastly improved our
forces' knowledge of the location and disposition of enemy forces
before and during OIF.

-- Speed. U.S. forces arrived in theater in less than half the time
(three months, compared to seven in Desert Storm), shortening the
preparatory phase of OIF and generating more velocity for military
operations.

-- Precision. In Desert Storm, around 8 percent of air-dropped
munitions were precision-guided as compared to about 66 percent in
OIF. As a result, we used only one-seventh the number of bombs in OIF
that we used in Desert Storm, but 20 percent more precision bombs. And
that understates the increased effectiveness, because a large number
of the precision bombs used in OIF were directed at targets that were
located with precision by our ground forces.

-- Lethality. Coupled with an air campaign that emphasized the
destruction of Iraqi ground forces to a far greater degree than in
Desert Storm, about 25 percent of the total ground combat forces used
in Desert Storm conducted rapid, simultaneous operations in OIF that
defeated Iraqi forces across the depth of the battlespace.

In combination, these kinds of advances enabled a force about one-half
the size to achieve in about one-half the time using about one-seventh
the munitions -- a far more ambitious objective as compared to Desert
Storm.

What are the lessons to be learned from this dramatic operational
military success? An experienced, multi-disciplinary joint team stood
up by the Commander of Joint Forces Command, Admiral Ed Giambastiani,
has been working since even before combat operations commenced to help
us understand the lessons to be learned so as to inform our broader
decision-making. This team was embedded in the combatant and component
headquarters and had unencumbered access and movement within the
warfighting theater.

While their analysis of the operation and understanding of its
implications is still preliminary, they have made four key
observations:

1. The U.S. military applied "overmatching power" to achieve combat
success. Overmatching power uses the element of surprise and swift,
focused action to achieve operational military goals. As General
Franks has said, "Speed kills --- it kills the enemy." In OIF, we
determined the time and place of attack, rapidly established air and
sea supremacy, and used networked precision fires in unprecedented
fashion to enable a lighting fast advance across the depth of
operational maneuver. Our military actions exploited a reduced
footprint in theater, integrated information operations, rapid strike
and maneuver, and economy of force to achieve the rapid collapse of
the enemy's regime. In short, overmatching power focuses on the
desired outputs --- the goals and military effects we are trying to
achieve --- rather than the inputs -- marshalling large numbers of
forces and personnel that may not be applied at the right time and
place.

2. Similarly, we focused on applying capabilities to achieve
operational effects instead of simply flowing additional combat forces
into the theater. Leveraging information technologies and extensive
use of Special Operations Forces, we achieved a new level of coherence
in the application of military capabilities, backed effectively by
other instruments of national power. By conducting simultaneous
operations on multiple fronts with great speed, focusing on the core
combat actions that would contribute to victory, and minimizing
in-theater footprint, this capabilities emphasis enabled us to use our
forces more effectively.

3. Our approach to OIF reflected the concept of the "battlespace,"
replacing the concept of the "battlefield."

-- On previous battlefields, we massed forces and achieved jointness
by deconflicting rather than integrating forces, and conducted
relatively symmetrical attrition warfare.

-- In this joint air, land, sea battlespace --- which also includes
space and the electromagnetic spectrum -- we massed information and
knowledge, used smaller formations that employed both lethal and
non-lethal force in rapid and asymmetric ways, and conducted
effects-based operations directed by flexible, dynamic command and
control relationships. This synergistic battlespace makes each of our
military service members more powerful in the effects they can achieve
and confers greater protection from the enemy.

4. Taken together, Admiral Giambastiani's team is suggesting that the
basic building blocks of a transformed force should include:

-- Increasingly capable networked command-and-control and
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance architectures;

-- More numerous and increasingly lethal and survivable small combat
formations;

-- Precision weapons and precision ISR, including the precision ISR
that can sometimes only be provided by brave fighters on the ground
who are networked to longer-range strike capabilities;

-- Smaller and faster initial footprints with rapid follow-on forces;

-- "Pressure" on adversaries applied by all elements of our national
power;

-- Mutually supporting lethal and non-lethal joint fires;

-- Collaborative and virtual information environments;

-- Simultaneous military operations; and

-- Effects-based operations.

Once completed, we will use Joint Forces Command's analyses to inform
our planning and budget decisions for transformation, the need for
which has been reinforced by recent experience. Another
order-of-magnitude improvement is needed in the capabilities of our
joint force to deal effectively with the many uncertain and dangerous
challenges that are in our future.

Applying the Defense Strategy

We in the Department are aligning all of our activities and programs
with the new Defense Strategy. One area that I would like to describe
in some detail for you is our re-examination of our global military
"footprint" --- in particular, our forces, bases, and infrastructure
abroad.

Recently, we have been focusing significant attention on realigning
our global military footprint, an essential component of our broader
efforts to underwrite the new Defense Strategy and protect our
Nation's security.

We are seeking to rearrange our military footprint overseas in two key
ways:

-- Tailoring the mix of our military capabilities stationed or
deployed in key regions to the particular conditions of each region;
and

-- Strengthening our capabilities for prompt global military action
anywhere in the world and at any time, to complement our regional
military presence.

As we do so, we are trying both to make the most efficient use that we
can of the rotation base of military personnel that provides the
forces needed for overseas deployments and to reduce the strain on our
men and women in uniform caused by long deployments away from home.

Particularly important to our global realignment is the work being
done by the U.S. Combatant Commander in Korea, General Laporte, to
apply the Defense Strategy to the real-world choices that we face on
the Korean peninsula.

The proposals we have been working through with our ally, the Republic
of Korea, will provide us with greater immediate deterrent capability
and, if deterrence fails, a more robust capability to respond swiftly
and more flexibly to an attack. They also will enable us to make more
efficient use of our military manpower by better aligning our
rotational policies with the circumstances we face.

Our proposed changes include:

-- Relocating forces back from the demilitarized zone (DMZ) that
separates the two countries;

-- Significantly reducing the heavy concentration of U.S. forces in
downtown Seoul; and

-- Enabling our forces to begin responding effectively immediately,
rather than falling back and waiting for reinforcements.

In addition, as General Laporte recently announced in South Korea, we
plan to make substantial investments over the next four years to
further strengthen deterrence on the Korean peninsula and our
warfighting capabilities in East Asia.

Enhancements under this plan will strengthen our capabilities to deter
and defeat North Korean aggression through investments in better
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; command and control;
operational combat capabilities; and more rapid reinforcement and
employment.

Our plans envision over 150 enhancements and include fielding of
unmanned aerial vehicles, command and control upgrades, Army aviation
deployments, and a range of mobility improvements.

-- Taken as a whole, these changes will make the forces that we could
bring to bear in a Korean contingency more capable, and they will
strengthen our ability to employ our forces on very rapid timelines.

-- No longer will our forces be based near the DMZ as a political
"trip wire" as they did throughout the Cold War. They will have far
greater flexibility and ability to maneuver.

-- These changes will reduce the prospect of having to fight to
recover initial losses of territory in such a conflict, while putting
us in a better position to help protect Korean lives and property.

We also expect our South Korean allies to increase investments in
their large and capable ground forces, which would play a crucial role
in defeating any North Korean attack.

-- When all of these changes are implemented, the result will be a
more potent military contribution to the combined defense of South
Korea.

It is important that the changes we make should be the product of
close consultation with our allies and should preserve and reinforce
the U.S. ability to meet our alliance commitments. Bilateral
discussions on the details and timelines of our proposals are ongoing.

Consonant with our plans to increase our combat power to deter North
Korea, we believe that South Korea needs to spend more than its
current 2.7 percent of GDP to strengthen its defense capabilities.
South Korea's substantial economic development over the last few
decades has made it capable of sharing even more of the defense burden
than it already does.

Given the strength of the Korean economy and the nature of the enemy
that it is facing, it would be appropriate for South Korea to increase
defense spending significantly and invest those funds in key
transformational capabilities.

Current Operations and Military Capabilities

Now, having discussed our new Defense Strategy and how we are applying
that new strategy in particular to the dangers on the Korean
peninsula, I would like to discuss our current operations in Iraq and
our efforts to effectively manage the associated defense risks.

We are devoting military forces and other assets commensurate with the
importance of the mission and the conditions on the ground in Iraq. In
some ways, winning the peace in Iraq is more challenging than winning
the war; but the stakes in success are large as well.

We currently have approximately 146,000 U.S. military personnel
operating in Iraq and additional personnel in other countries in the
region (e.g., the Gulf states) supporting those operations.

We are pleased that the number and capability of coalition forces
pledged to contribute to the current operations in Iraq is growing.

Mr. Chairman, today marks only 90 days since the start of major combat
operations in Iraq. It is only seven weeks since President Bush
announced the end of major combat operations -— and I emphasize the
word "major." As we expected and planned for, smaller combat
operations in Iraq continue, even as we work with Iraqis to establish
stable and secure areas throughout Iraq.

It is important to realize that the process of stabilizing Iraq is not
a uniform process. We have made great progress in some areas of the
country, but we continue to face an adaptive and determined enemy,
though conventionally defeated, that is nevertheless intent on killing
Americans and Iraqis --- and disrupting the establishment of order in
Iraqi society and the process of recovery. A regime that employed tens
of thousands of thugs and war criminals does not simply disappear
overnight. But these are not the typical guerillas: Because they
abused, tortured, and killed scores of their own people for decades,
in most areas of the country they do not benefit from the support of a
sympathetic population. We will continue our work to eliminate these
surviving elements of the Saddam regime -- and the foreigners who have
joined their lost cause. We will eliminate them --- but it will take
time. How long this phase of the war will last is, of course,
difficult to predict.

But, even as smaller combat operations continue in some parts of Iraq,
we can chart real progress in stabilizing the country. For example, in
the South, the country's second largest city, Basra, with a population
of almost 1.3 million people, most of them Shi'a and overwhelmingly
grateful to be free of Saddam's tyranny, is now stable.

In Northern Iraq, including the two large cities of Mosul and Kirkuk,
with a combined population of more than 2.5 million, Major General
Dave Petraeus and the 101st Air Assault Division have made significant
progress towards a stable situation.

And in Baghdad, there is progress to report. While the security
situation still imposes restrictions on our ability to move freely,
Baghdad is not a city in anarchy: Shops are open and the city is
bustling with traffic. Power and water and other basic services also
have been restored.

Our success in rooting out Ba'athist remnants, disarming them, and
pre-empting any efforts on their part to reorganize will ease the
security situation. With the success of these smaller combat
operations we will be able to be more successful in the conduct of our
overall stability operations. And we are making progress in standing
up Iraqi security forces that can deal with more conventional
challenges to law and order.

An essential element of our efforts to secure Iraq is the work we are
doing to reform and strengthen the Iraqi police as a functional and
productive institution in Iraqi civil society. One of our principal
challenges is that the old Iraqi police need to be replaced or
retrained. Their leadership was corrupted by the old regime, and they
were trained to raid people's homes at night rather than conduct
street patrols. We are making progress in this endeavor with each
passing day. In Baghdad, for example, there are now some 8,000 police
officers back at work and 2,000 on patrol. Eighteen police stations
and three police divisions are operating 24 hours a day, and 23 out of
42 police stations are scheduled to reopen by the end of this month.
We are seeing similar trends in other major cities in Iraq.

We are also making progress in enlisting other nations, including some
who were not members of the original coalition, to contribute to
stabilization and peacekeeping operations. The responsibility for
helping the Iraqi people to stand on their own feet and build a new
and free Iraq needs to be a shared responsibility.

The United Kingdom and Poland have made public their intention to lead
peacekeeping divisions staffed by coalition countries, and including
some countries that did not join the coalition initially but now think
it appropriate to contribute based on the UNSCR and other actions.
Among the countries that have publicly indicated their willingness to
participate are Spain, Italy, the Netherlands, Slovakia, Denmark,
Ukraine, and Hungary. We expect a number of other countries similarly
to announce their participation in these peacekeeping divisions in the
coming days.

In addition to our continuing operations in Iraq, we are sustaining
other deployments consistent with U.S. Defense Strategy, including:

-- Stability operations in Afghanistan, involving around 10,000 U.S.
military personnel;

-- A range of other deployments associated with the war on terrorism
in the Horn of Africa and elsewhere;

-- Defending the United States homeland from attack;

-- Maintaining a strong deterrent posture throughout Asia; and

-- Other operations, including continuing rotational deployments in
the Balkans and Sinai.

Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers, General Pace, the Secretaries of
the Military Departments, the Service Chiefs, and our Combatant
Commanders are working together to ensure that we are managing our
forces' deployments in Iraq and elsewhere during this period as
effectively as possible, with due regard in particular to both
operational and force management risks.

-- While it is true that our current operations in Iraq constitute a
new and important military commitment, the elimination of the threat
of aggression posed by Saddam Hussein's regime has also relieved us of
a substantial threat.

Nonetheless, we still must balance the need to recover from the
demands of combat in Iraq with the need to continue to meet the many
challenges to U.S. interests that confront us in this dangerous era.

Our management focus seeks to ensure that the individual Services'
plans to reset their forces mesh well with one another and with our
overall Defense Strategy, policies, and posture needs in the immediate
post-combat period.

In addition, as coalition contributions grow, and as we help stand up
effective Iraqi security forces, our military level of effort in Iraq
will diminish.

Moreover, the Department of Defense, with the help of the Congress,
can make progress in key areas -- most importantly, rationalizing our
personnel policies so that military personnel are performing core
military duties; reducing and realigning our domestic base
infrastructure; and changing our overseas military footprint -- so
that our ability to meet these challenges will be significantly
strengthened.

We live in a dangerous and uncertain world, one in which we could be
confronted with a crisis or contingency requiring the deployment of
U.S. military forces for combat operations on relatively short notice.

For example, while we are striving to seek a diplomatic solution with
our allies in the region to the threat presented by North Korea's
program to develop nuclear weapons, it is important that we maintain a
strong deterrent capability against possible North Korean aggression.

No one should have any doubts about our capabilities for dealing with
such adventurism: If North Korea were to attack South Korea or Japan,
the United States and its allies have the military capabilities to
defeat North Korea, using all of the means at our disposal, including
the enormously improved strike capabilities that the world has just
seen in Iraq and earlier in Afghanistan.

A war in Korea would be costly and destructive, but there can be no
question of its outcome: We would vanquish the North Korean military
and ensure its aggressive rulers could never again threaten their
neighbors and the stability of the region.

Managing the Force

Of course, an important element of our ability to deal with such
crises while sustaining our current commitments is the mobilization of
our Reserve component forces and the other force management measures
we have taken.

We currently have about 210,000 Reservists mobilized, about 18 percent
of the Reserve component force of 1.2 million, in support of
Operations Noble Eagle, Enduring Freedom, and Iraqi Freedom.

Cognizant of the force management risks associated with over-use of
the Reserve component, our policies strive to balance those risks
against the operational risks presented by threats such as North
Korea.

In doing so, we have tried to minimize the burden on families,
employers, and communities through a variety of support programs.

Despite such efforts, the recent mobilization has highlighted
shortages in some capabilities that stress the Reserve component ---
intelligence, military and security police, special operations, and
other areas.

We are actively exploring possible solutions to redress Active and
Reserve force mix imbalances, including:

-- Improving volunteerism to provide trained, ready individual
reservists and units;

-- Expanding the use of "reach-back" to reduce the footprint in
theater;

-- Streamlining the mobilization process to improve responsiveness;
and

-- Redistributing specific capabilities between and within the Active
and Reserve components.

Some rebalancing is being addressed in the FY04 defense budget, but
more can be done. As we further develop our strategy, we will consult
with the Congress on this important issue.

Another tool we have used to help us manage the commitments of our
military forces has been stop-loss authority.

As you know, during the national emergency declared by the President
in support of Operation Enduring Freedom and extending to Operation
Iraqi Freedom, the Military Departments have used stop-loss authority
to involuntarily extend the tours of selected Service members beyond
their date of separation.

At the high point of the stop-loss program, about 30,000 personnel
were affected. Just last month, the Military Departments began
implementing plans to phase out their stop-loss programs as
operational requirements and force stability allow.

This phase-out period will continue into the first quarter of FY 2004.

Concluding Remarks

Of course, coalition forces are still engaged in military operations
in Iraq and Afghanistan, and our efforts there constitute an important
element of our ability to manage the deployments and operations of
U.S. military forces in other parts of the world.

We will be able to reduce our level of effort in Iraq as the coalition
completes the work of defeating the remnants of Saddam Hussein's
regime and setting the conditions for reconstruction. Our ability to
do so is not calendar-driven but determined in large part by
conditions on the ground, including the level and capability of
coalition contributions; the time and effort needed to recruit and
train effective Iraqi military forces; the level of security in Iraq;
and the external threats Iraq may face. In light of these
uncertainties, it would be speculative to try to state the precise
duration and quantity of our force presence in Iraq. Our forces will
be there for as long as they are needed, and not a day longer.

More broadly, we put a lot of effort into getting the balance right
between our force structure and end-strength on one hand, and our
level of investment in future military capabilities on the other.

We believe this balance enables us to manage the full range of defense
risks effectively to provide for our Nation's security needs. While it
is important to reassess this balance as circumstances abroad change
and as we gain greater understanding of our capabilities and
resources, we must be careful about changing direction too frequently,
as there are real costs in moving resources from one area to another.

The Department is planning on continued, substantial increases in real
defense spending over the next five years. We will continue to seek to
gain maximum efficiency from the resources with which we are provided.
Our ability to do so and to continue to strike the critical balance
between force structure and investments, a balance that is so central
to managing the range of risks that we confront, is contingent upon a
few key parameters.

First, we need the flexibility to manage our civilian personnel
workforce to achieve the goals that we are seeking.

-- We appreciate the forward-looking position that the Committee and
the House have taken on our proposed National Security Personnel
System. The need for the agility that NSPS would provide grows greater
every day with real global commitments and retirements by the baby
boom generation.

-- We want to realign our personnel and the functions they perform
such that we do not have uniformed military personnel engaged in tasks
that are not inherently military.

-- Once we have successfully achieved that goal, it will free up
additional military personnel both to help support our current
commitments and to provide us with the capability to deal with
unforeseen challenges.

-- Our civilian personnel have performed extraordinarily in the war on
terrorism in spite of the rigidities of the current civil service
system. NSPS will remove a good share of that burden --- with a more
flexible and fairer system for hiring, paying, assigning, advancing,
and retaining the right civilians.

-- We believe that the Committee version provides a full set of
flexible tools for employees and managers while protecting fundamental
civil service values. We need to get NSPS in place so that
transformation to a more agile organization can accelerate.

We also need the Congress to help us move forward with another round
of base closures and realignments in 2005.

-- BRAC, as part of our overall effort to transform our global
military posture, is the only means to address comprehensively our
infrastructure requirements and to ensure that the bases and
facilities we maintain support U.S. Defense Strategy.

-- Through base realignments and closures, we will reconfigure our
current infrastructure into one in which operational capacity
maximizes both warfighting capability and efficiency.

-- BRAC also will help the Department eliminate excess physical
capacity --- the operation, sustainment, and recapitalization of which
diverts scarce resources from needed defense capability.

Finally, we need to rearrange our global military footprint, as
discussed earlier, to strengthen our deterrent posture in regions
critical to U.S. interests and gain maximum efficiency out of our
rotation base.

We have a military that has earned the admiration of the world. It is
a product of the bravest and most professional men and women any
country could wish for, armed with capabilities that no country has
ever before been able to place in the hands of its fighting forces. We
need to maintain both of those great strengths into the future as we
confront the new and dangerous challenges of the 21st century. We
appreciate the support that this Committee and the U.S. Congress
continue to give us in that effort.

(end transcript)

(Distributed by the Bureau of International Information Programs, U.S.
Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)