7 May 2001
Source: http://www.senate.gov/~armed_services/hearings/2001/e010501.htm

Senators Roberts (Chairman), Smith, Santorum, Allard, Hutchinson, Collins, Landrieu, Kennedy, Byrd, Lieberman, Nelson (FL), and Dayton


Meeting of the


Tuesday, May 1, 2001
2:30 p.m.
Room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building
To receive testimony on the U.S. military's capabilities to respond to
domestic terrorist attacks involving the use of weapons of mass destruction.

Mr. Robert J. Lieberman
Deputy Inspector General
Department of Defense

Lieutenant General Russell C. Davis, USAF
Chief, National Guard Bureau

Major General Michael D. Maples, USA
Director of Military Support
Office of the Chief of Staff of the Army

Major General Bruce M. Lawlor, USA
Commander, Joint Task Force Civil Support
U.S. Joint Forces Command

MAY 1, 2001






MAY 1, 2001

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:

I appreciate the opportunity to be here today to discuss the Department of Defense effort to bolster this nation's homeland defense by fielding Weapons of Mass Destruction - Civil Support Teams (WMD-CSTs). My testimony will focus primarily on the results of my office's audit last year of WMD-CST program management, which are presented in our report of January 31, 2001: http://www.dodig.osd.mil/audit/reports/fy01/01-043pt1.pdf (818KB)

Audit Background and Timing

Chemical and biological defense has been an audit coverage emphasis area for us throughout the past decade, as the threats posed by these and other so-called asymmetrical weapons received increased recognition and the Department of Defense reacted with numerous research, acquisition and organizational initiatives. Before the WMD-CST audit, our reviews focused generally on the warfighters, preparedness to operate in contaminated environments on the battlefield.

Presidential Decision Directive 39, issued in June 1995, and the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996 directed various measures to enhance homeland defense against terrorists armed with weapons of mass destruction. A DoD Tiger Team subsequently recommended establishing National Guard teams to assist the emergency first responders, such as local fire departments and hazardous material response units, in case of known or suspected WMD incidents. The focus of these teams, which were initially termed rapid assessment, identification and detection units, was to be on identifying what WMD material or agent was involved. The Tiger Team estimated that an initial complement of 10 teams could be operational by FY 2002. In January 1998, the Deputy Secretary of Defense tasked the Army to establish the Consequence Management Program Integration Office (COMPIO) to implement the Tiger Team recommendations. COMPIO adopted a very aggressive schedule, planning to field 10 teams by January 2000.

The National Defense Authorization Act for FY 1999 mandated that:

A reserve component rapid assessment element team and any Reserve assigned to such a team, may not be used to respond to an emergency... unless... the team, or that Reserve, possesses the requisite skills, training and equipment to be proficient in all mission requirements.

In addition, the Act required that the proficiency of each team be certified by the Secretary of Defense. Congress did not specify a schedule for WMD-CST certification and fielding, but authorized an additional 17 teams in FY 2000 and 5 more in FY 2001, for a total of 32.

Recognizing the growing DoD and congressional interest in homeland defense, we decided in December, 1999 to review the WMD-CST program. We briefed National Guard, Department of the Army and office of the Secretary of Defense officials on the results of our review frequently during calendar year 2000. Most of the fieldwork was completed by September 2000.

Audit Results

It was apparent from the outset of the audit that the planned January 2000 initial operational capability date had been unrealistic; the WMD-CSTs were not operationally ready and the program lacked good management controls. On the other hand, we were highly impressed by the professionalism and dedication of the leaders and members of the initial 10 WMD-CSTs.

The program's slippage and cost growth are in no way attributable to the 10 teams. Those problems stem from what we candidly characterized as ineffective management by COMPIO and inadequate oversight by the Department before the audit brought numerous issues to their attention last summer.

In its initial stages, the WMD-CST program is basically a system acquisition program requiring intensive upfront planning because it supports a new mission. Until recently, however, it was not managed within the Army acquisition program structure or by trained acquisition corps personnel. Instead, COMPIO operated as an essentially autonomous entity with no effective oversight to ensure that sound acquisition practices were followed. COMPIO regularly bypassed or inadequately coordinated with DoD and Army centers of expertise in acquisition, logistics, testing, doctrine, training, medicine, communications and chemical/biological defense. The result was flawed acquisition and sustainment planning. our report discusses the many deficiencies evident during the audit in the WMD-CST program. For illustrative purposes, I will mention just a few examples.

First, doctrine for employing WMD-CSTs was incomplete and coordination between COMPIO and the Joint Forces Command and Army doctrine developers was very poor. Absence of approved doctrine obviously creates considerable risk of premature or otherwise faulty decisions on training, equipment, manning and mission readiness certification.

Second, coordination with the Federal law enforcement community, a vital player in Consequence Management, needed improvement to ensure that WMD-CST mission definition and doctrine did not conflict with law enforcement agencies' plans and prerogatives.

Third, undue reliance was placed on external evaluations (EXEVALs), a unit level training event, to demonstrate the mission readiness of WMD-CSTs. What was actually needed was a rigorous program of operational test and evaluation. Not only do EXEVALs lack the discipline and reliability of formal testing, but every WMD-CST lacked key personnel, equipment, or both when the EXEVALs were staged. For example, none of the teams had received the Mobile Analytical Laboratory System (MALS) van, 9 of 10 teams lacked communications reachback capability, and all of them had personal protective equipment shortages. WMD-CST personnel identified numerous issues to us that normally would have been identified in realistic testing and resolved.

Fourth, training programs and materials were inadequate. Again, lack of approved doctrine and vague mission definition were factors.

Fifth, WMD-CST equipment chosen by COMPIO was generally different from standard items already in military inventories. We saw no compelling reason for COMPIO to buy nonstandard equipment that considerably complicates the logistics support requirements for WMD-CSTs, as well as posing testing and training issues.

Many of the problems identified by the audit could be considered symptoms of an immature acquisition program that was not ready for a full-scale production or deployment decision. Although the WMD-CST program was not managed or controlled using acquisition milestone criteria, the certification requirement in the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 1999 provided equivalent "check and balance." of course, certifications are effective controls only when certification criteria are meaningful. We reported, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense agreed, that the certification criteria developed by the Army for WMD-CSTs were considerably less rigorous than Congress intended and simply not prudent from the standpoint of soldier safety and DoD credibility.

Department of Defense Corrective Action

The Office of the Secretary of Defense agreed with our findings and took action to implement our recommendations, which were:

We have been gratified by the responsive actions taken over the past several months in response to the issues raised by the audit. I can report to you today that implementation of all of our recommendations is either complete or ongoing. My staff and I have been working closely with senior Office of the Secretary of Defense, Army and National Guard Bureau officials to move those agreed-upon actions forward. The increased involvement of the National Guard Bureau in this program is particularly welcome. In summary, I commend the Department for taking the audit findings seriously and undertaking the thorough review that we suggested to get this program back on track.

The full text of our Report No. D-2001-043, Management of National Guard Weapons of Mass Destruction-Civil Support Teams, January 31, 2001, is available on the web:

http://www.dodig.osd.mil/audit/reports/fy01/01-043pt1.pdf (818KB)

Again, thank you for the opportunity to participate in this important hearing.

This concludes my statement.







MAY 1, 2001


The National Guard routinely contributes to the national mission for civil support by activating a state-level military response in 50 states, 3 territories and the District of Columbia. The National Guard is proud to provide a geographically dispersed, community-based response to combat the varying types of asymmetric threats which directly challenge the security of the homeland. In this role, the National Guard leverages the inherent capability within each state's National Guard for emergency management, response, and recovery operations for any emergency.

Emerging asymmetric threats, such as single or multiple weapons of mass destruction terrorism attacks within the United States, present the high-end of terrorism that clearly challenges the safety of this nation, and warrants a unified response by the Department of Defense (DoD) in support of the civil authority.

In response to these emerging threats, the National Command Authority has directed the establishment of dedicated, mission-tasked organized forces within the DoD to support the civil authority in preparing for and conducting consequence management operations.

The National Guard welcomes the opportunity to continue its historical role in homeland defense when we were given the mission to support civil authorities in managing the consequences of a weapons of mass destruction (WMD) event. We appreciate the trust of the Congress and the American people in asking us to form the civil support teams (CSTs). Once again, when our nation called, the National Guard willingly stepped forward.

In light of a recent DoD Inspector General (DoD IG) Audit Report, my comments will focus on the National Guard Civil Support Teams, and the National Guard's role in support of an incident commander during and after a domestic emergency resulting from a Weapons of Mass Destruction event. With respect to the issues, we are confident that our first 10 National Guard CSTs have met all established training requirements, are competent, capable, and have been supplied with the appropriate equipment. However, there remain concerns with the mobile analytical laboratory.

Whenever safety related concerns are raised, we have addressed these findings to ensure a continuous process of improvement is followed. For example, the safety of the Mobile Analytical Laboratory System (MALS) was an issue raised in the audit. To address the viability and safety of the MALS we have asked the U.S. Army Test and Evaluation Command (ATEC) to conduct an independent assessment of the system, and we are working with the U.S. Army Soldier Biological Chemical Command to do just that.

Our overall perspective on the issues discussed within the DoD Audit Report is that the audit helps us clarify and focus upon key issues that are critical to the successful fielding of the CSTs. For the past two years, the National Guard has embarked upon an aggressive program to organize, man, train, equip, and exercise teams in WMD consequence management operations. We have done so at an extremely rapid pace and with substantial high-level oversight. This has been a collaborative effort. We have successfully fulfilled our mandate by leveraging the experience, knowledge, and lessons learned from hundreds of organizations, and from subject matter experts within the DoD and the civilian community.

We envision the National Guard CSTs mission to have operational authority, operational readiness and sustainability. The CST mission is: to assess a suspected WMD event in support of a local incident commander, to advise civilian responders regarding appropriate actions, and to facilitate the arrival of additional state and federal military forces to support validated requests for assistance. Our task is to help save lives, prevent human suffering, and mitigate property damage. Today we are manned, trained, and equipped to perform this mission (with 10 initial teams, each consisting of 22 highly skilled, full-time members of the Army and Air National Guard).

With respect to our detailed analysis of the DoD IG Audit Report, we categorized issues into six clear-cut areas concerning the National Guard's CST initiatives: program management, doctrine, certification, training, equipment/safety, and standardization. All of the issues noted have received our full attention and have been satisfactorily addressed. A brief overview of each area will provide insight into particular issues within each.

Civil Support Team Program Management

The issue of program management of the CSTs must be viewed in the context of the dynamic process that the Army and the National Guard undertook to establish a new, congressionally mandated capability, and have it fully operational in less than two years. The development and management of the program along with the subsequent capabilities of the CSTs, enables the National Guard to execute its stated civil support mission. Many programmatic issues have been and are still being resolved with regard to the proper institutional placement of the CST management requirements; however, the teams have been and continue to be managed in a manner that allows them to execute the mission for which they were designed.

With the design, implementation, and institutionalization of a DoD program as unique and complex as the CSTs, a distinct historical record has evolved. In this instance, the history indicates the dynamic nature of the establishment of the CSTs; the high level of interest from the executive and legislative branches of government, and the relatively recent desire to institutionalize the functions initially assigned to the Army's Consequence Management/Program Integration Office. As the CSTs are further integrated into the DoD infrastructure, the National Guard will continue to provide the program management functions that make the CSTs a mission capable consequence management asset to first responders.

Operational management issues mentioned in the audit are complex as they follow our concept of a tiered response in employing local, state, and federal response forces. These forces deter, prepare for, respond to, and manage the consequences of a mass casualty event, attack, or situation. Our CSTs have a unique state-federal relationship. While all CSTs receive federal funds and are trained and evaluated to federal standards, each remains, first and foremost, a state asset, under the command and control of the governor of the state in which they are located. It is this very unique state-oriented capability of the CSTs that is often misunderstood, considered unnecessary, and perceived as a duplication of efforts to other U.S. military rapid response units. We believe the dual relationship is a strength that enables the CSTs to provide a vital link between the local civilian first responders, with whom they know and train, and the federal response force.

Civil Support Team Doctrine

A compressed method of doctrine development and concurrent CST fielding was employed to meet the congressional intent of fielding the teams in a short period of time.

Doctrinal issues will continue to evolve as we implement a management structure within the National Guard to execute DoD policy relative to our civil support mission. The National Guard Civil Support Program does have doctrine relating to the CSTs. Initially, an express method of doctrine development was employed concurrent with CST fielding. This was done to meet the congressional intent of fielding the CSTs as quickly as possible.

Early in this process, we sought and received assistance from state and local agencies and organizations representing first response groups. Experts from these organizations provided assistance in developing operational concepts, refining requirements, writing doctrine, determining equipment sets, and developing and delivering training to the CSTs. We are collaborating with the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) on this issue. The final CST doctrine handbook was developed following the Army's DTLOMS model. It also complies with Chapter 5 of How the Army Runs: A Senior Leader Reference Handbook, 1997-1998.

The CST doctrine handbook has been approved by TRADOC and, in the near future will be placed in their digital library for public access. We have provided input regarding CST doctrine for the revision of Joint Publication 3-07.7, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Domestic Support Operations, which has been submitted to the J-3 staff for approval. Both of these documents include guidance to the proponents for both joint and service doctrine that will ensure the dual state and federal nature of the CSTmission is adequately addressed.

The NGB will continue to be actively involved in the development of CST- related doctrine in coordination with the appropriate, joint agencies. We will work with the Army's Joint Task Force-Civil Support to identify operational concepts and plans as a part of the development process.

Civil Support Team Certification

Based on the certification process/criteria developed and approved by the Army, the CST commanders have equipped and trained the units to the established standards. Certification standards were directed in a December 22, 1999 and subsequent February 11, 2000, messages from the Army's Director of Military Support (DOMS). The three operational criteria for CST certification are:

To accomplish this, the commanders have outfitted their units according to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, United States Army approved table of distribution and allowance and have outlined their training according to the mission training plan and the Fiscal Year 2001 training requirements list. Currently, seven of the original 10 CSTs have a USR readiness rating of C-1 and the other three have a USR readiness rating of C-2.

All 10 units have successfully completed their external evaluations, and all 10 commanders have assessed their units and deemed them operationally ready to complete their mission. As I noted earlier, there are some unresolved concerns with the mobile analytical laboratory systems (MALS). As a result, there is a degradation of the teams' ability to accomplish a few mission tasks. These tasks, specifically related to the biological assess component of their mission, do not hinder the teams' ability to perform the critical functions of planning, preparing, and coordinating for a weapon of mass destruction event.

Additionally, the external evaluations are the accepted method used to assist commanders in assessing the level of training and proficiency in their units. The NGB believes that training is the responsibility of the unit commander. It is the commander who is responsible, and must attest to the unit's readiness.

These types of refresher training are in addition to external evaluations that will be conducted as deemed necessary by the respective unit commander.

Civil Support Team Training

Drawing upon the collective knowledge and expertise of organizations involved in providing trained expertise in fields related to the CSTs mission, a deliberate process was used to identify and develop a comprehensive training program for the CSTs. The training strategy (developed by the CoMPIO and approved by Director of Military Support (DOMS)) was developed in consultation with subject matter experts in both the military and civilian communities. These subject matter experts were drawn from the agencies listed in the Army's response. All were key organizations involved in developing and presenting training to the CSTs.

The Director of Military Support provided individual and collective training guidance to the Commander, U.S. Forces Command (FORSCOM) and the CSTs in a memorandum dated September 14, 1998. It was designed to allow the CST commanders flexibility in meeting the unique training needs of their teams, while providing a basis for the commitment of resources. Selection of training curriculum involved evaluating the U.S. Army Soldiers and Biological Chemical Command's (SBCCOM) compendium of WMD courses and programs of instruction to leverage existing courses to the greatest extent possible. Over 300 courses were examined. As new equipment and additional capabilities are developed for the CSTs, additional training will be developed.

The CST training program is very comprehensive, with each member receiving an average 600 hours of initial individual instruction beyond basic MOS qualification. The training program consists of three phases: institutional (which focuses on individual training such as branch qualification and specialty training and includes the 600 hours mentioned above), collective (which focuses on collective mission essential tasks and the conduct of training exercises), and sustainment training (includes advanced courses, refresher training, and team training).

The first 10 CSTs have exercised with all of their equipment and have submitted requests for certification, which at this time, have not been granted. The Army's Maneuver Support Center and FORSCOM conducted lanes training (at Fort Leonard Wood, MO) for all of the initial 10 CSTs. This training was conducted at the request of the TRADOC Commanding General and at the direction of the DOMS. The training course is the result of a formal training review of the initial 10 teams' institutional training, which recommended combining three of the already completed courses into one course, The WMD Emergency Assessment and Detection Course (EADC). Five iterations of this course were conducted for the 17 Fiscal Year 2000 CSTs and newly hired members of the original 10 teams at Fort Leonard Wood, MO during the summer of 2000.

Military Occupational Specialty Qualification

Approximately 65 CST-assigned personnel received some of their training from the USACMLS compressed three-week Nuclear, Chemical and Biological (NBC) noncommissioned officer course instead of the standard 16-week NBC noncommissioned officer course. The USACMLS does not award certification of MOS qualification because personnel did not attend the 16-week course.

Members of the CSTs receive structured individual and collective training. Each member is assigned to a position as specified by a paragraph and line number in the unit's table of distribution and allowance. Required training courses relative to each of these positions have been established. Each CST fields two survey teams consisting of three members each. Survey team members must be MOS 54B or 3E9 (the Air Force qualification code equivalent) qualified and can obtain that qualification by attending the 54B 20/30-R course taught by the Army school system battalion or by attending the course taught by the USACMLS.

There are not enough 54B/3E9 MOS qualified personnel in the labor market to meet the hiring needs of the CSTs. Approximately 35 otherwise qualified applicants were hired for the survey team member positions that had to attend 54B/3E9 training. These individuals attended a specifically developed 54B 20/30-R (Reclassification Course) during November and December 1999. This particular program of instruction was taught at Fort Leonard Wood, MO, and consisted of courses taught by an Army school system battalion. The main difference was that the instructors used for this program of instruction were certified instructors from the USACMLS and the CSTs, not from the Army school system battalion. The instructors used were at least as well qualified as those habitually used for the standard and abbreviated courses taught by the Army school system battalion. This course had the prior approval of the USACMLS, and the students were issued certificates of completion by the USACMLS Assistant Commandant, which indicates they received the equivalent of the 54B 20/30 course taught by the Army school system battalion. No team member is less qualified than if he or she had a MOS issued by the USACMLS.

During December 2000 and January 2001, a series of three more courses were taught at Fort Leonard Wood, MO for approximately 70 personnel. However, these courses only provided individual skill training (54B MOS, Phase 1) for new CST members. These personnel will receive hands-on equipment training (54B MOS, Phase 2) from the Army school systems battalions, from May to September 2001, which will complete their MOS training.

Course Development

A new three-week course, WMD Emergency Assessment and Detection Course (EADC), required of all CST personnel, is a DoD and TRADOC approved course, developed in cooperation with USACMLS because MOS qualification courses did not cover CST specific equipment. The EADC combined new equipment training, the NBC Recon/Survey course and the initial portion of lane training into one course. Additionally, simulated training scenarios, guidance on specific tasks, and task sequencing were incorporated into the EADC course.

Training Equipment and Training Aids

The NGB is aware that insufficient cross training could degrade capability, therefore, cross training is accommodated at every opportunity. It is embedded in every exercise a team conducts, both unilaterally and in conjunction with the first responder community. Additionally, team training occurs as part of CST day-to-day operations. Team members learn their individual roles as they relate to the section in which they are assigned and to the team's overall mission. The CST members are not traditional Guardsmen, because of their mission; they are in a full-time, active-duty status and are on-call around the clock for 365 days a year. The CSTs are the only units in the National Guard with this capability and commitment. WMID specific training is obtained from a variety of sources including formal classroom training, distance learning technology, and practical application at federal and state proponent schools.

The training CSTs received complies with Army standards. Cross training of team members occurs during lane training where individual and institutional training are integrated for the entire team. Lane training is conducted at Fort Leonard Wood, MO. The training regime has been finalized and approved; however, the regime continues to evolve as lessons learned are incorporated. As funding is programmed, training will be handed off to the proponents and it will be fully institutionalized. The institutionalization of training is dependent on adequate programmed funding.

Civil Support Team Equipment and Safety

Mobile Analytical Laboratory System (MALS)

The NGB has been continuously working to ensure that the MALS performs successfully. The MALS, designed and developed by SBCCOM, has undergone test plans, quality assurance procedures, and peer review and independent reviews. It adequately accommodates the mission need for a functional laboratory by providing the CSTs with an analytical platform for performing identification of chemical, biological, and radiological materials. The NGB is continuously working to ensure MALS performance. An operational test of the complete system is being conducted by the ATEC under the auspices of SBCCOM.

Information System Accreditation

The National Security Agency through the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) provides accreditation for the system in accordance with the Defense Information Technology Security Certification and Accreditation Process and established Army policy. Interim accreditation has been in place since the UCS was fielded. A message from the Commander of INSCOM, dated, March 12, 2001, gives all the CSTs interim approval to operate the UCS through June 11, 2001. Permanent accreditation is expected on June 1, 2001.

Reachback Infrastructure

The reachback system has been repeatedly demonstrated and works to specification. The CST reachback system was developed by the (DTRA). This system is fully capable. DTRA can provide both automated tools and a 24-hour, 7-day a week operations center for support the CSTs. This system is accepted and regularly used by many organizations throughout DoD.

The NGB continues to work with DTRA and Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division to improve communication protocols and take full advantage of the reachback capabilities of the CSTs. Currently, the CSTs are specifically trained in communications protocol, to include reachback functions with DTRA.

Radio Frequency Assignment

It has been noted that the radio frequencies assigned to the CSTs has insufficient range for conducting operations. This issue has been resolved. The CSTs currently have three frequencies assigned in UHF. National wide frequencies were granted to the CSTs on 28 March 2000. The teams work with their state chain-of-command to establish standard procedures, as they do during normal disaster response operations. The frequencies are standardized among the teams with a permanent 5kHZ TACSAT channel available for domestic consequence management response. There are two national high frequency radio networks and a 24-hour, on-call frequency manager in place to support the CSTs.

Standardization of Equipment

We are in the process of establishing a lessons-learned system to support the Civil Support Team mission. The National Guard Civil Support Team has established a number of working groups to address numerous issues. The Civil Support Team mission support has an Equipment Technical Working Group, which is a technical body consisting of civil support team members, National Guard Bureau, and acquisition specialists. The Equipment Technical Working Group is also involved with equipment standardization issues. It provides management oversight and gives direction to equipment acquisition recommendations. Modifications and ideas must be presented to the working group before they are reviewed or funded. This is a centralized process that the states are top follow before making any equipment modifications. Equipment standardization and interoperability are ongoing issues that are continuously worked by the National Guard Bureau Civil Support Office.


As the National Guard fulfills its Homeland Security role, four important considerations must be addressed. The first is that while the National Guard may lead on certain homeland security mission areas, we must not separate the National Guard from our traditional war-fighting missions.

Second, from its inception, the National Guard has always had a federal and a state mission. We have always accepted and executed our responsibilities for either of these missions, but we must grant the same stature to the defense of the homeland, as the support we provide to combatant commanders.

Next, "calling out the National Guard" brings with it the will of the American people. Our ties with the states and communities across our country are binding, and we must not fail in our mandate to defend this country from our enemies, both foreign and domestic.

Finally, the men and women serving on our CSTs are fully trained and capable of performing their mission. They have proven themselves ready through extensive training, and comprehensive exercises and evaluations. We all want to take the next steps and move this program forward for the American people.

Thank you for the opportunity to speak with the committee on this most critical subject. We welcome the opportunity to return and report on our progress at the earliest convenience of the committee. Thank you for your interest.





Mr. Chairman, distinguished Senators of the committee:

I appreciate the opportunity to appear before this committee and to comment on the Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams (WMD-CSTs). The interest and support of this subcommittee for the WMD-CST program is much appreciated. The WMD-CSTs that have been established in the National Guard will provide the nation an important capability in the event of a domestic Weapons of Mass Destruction event.

In January 1998, Defense Reform Initiative Directive #25 directed the Secretary of the Army, as the Department of Defense Executive Agent for Military Support to Civil Authorities, to lead efforts within the Department of Defense to improve military support for response to incidents involving Weapons of Mass Destruction. The Department of Defense Plan, "Integrating National Guard and Reserve Component Support for Response to Attacks Using Weapons of Mass Destruction," was approved for Fiscal Year 1999 implementation as specified in Program Budget Decision (PBD) 712. The Secretary of the Army was further directed to establish the Consequence Management Program Integration Office (CoMPIO). The missions and functions of the Consequence Management Program Integration Office and the WMD-CSTs were broadly described in Defense Reform Initiative Directive #25. The Secretary of the Army established the Consequence Management Program Integration Office in January 1998, subordinate to the Director of Military Support.

Congress authorized and funded the formation of ten WMD-CSTs in October 1998. Over the next 18 months, the Department of Defense, through the Consequence Management Program Integration Office, organized, trained, and equipped ten WMD-CSTs, while simultaneousl, developing the doctrine, training programs, and the specialized equipment required to support the mission requirements of these unique assets. Consistent with Congressional legislation and approved Department of Defense plans, special management and parallel processes of development were employed in order to field the teams and provide for their availability as rapidly as possible. Throughout the developmental process, CoMPIO worked with experts from federal, state and local agencies and conducted program status reviews to maintain visibility of program decisions.

In January 1999, individuals assigned to the WMD-CSTs began an extensive training program to prepare them both individually and collectively. At the same time, acquisition of specialized equipment required by the teams was initiated. Throughout 1999, the teams and team Members improved their professional capabilities by participating in numerous established courses and programs, completing institutional training in June of 1999. In July of 1999, the teams began to receive equipment and to conduct new equipment training. Collective training lanes for the teams were completed in August 1999, and the teams began preparing for external evaluations of their proficiency levels that were administered in February and March of 2000. Thus, in a period of approximately 18 months, ten WMD-CSTs were organized, trained and equipped.

Beginning in April of 2000, the commanders of the WMD-CSTs began to request certification. Their requests were endorsed by their respective State Adjutants General and the Chief of the National Guard Bureau before being forwarded to the Department of the Army. These commanders have reported that the teams and all assigned personnel possess the skills, training and equipment to be proficient in all mission requirements.

At the same time that the WMD-CSTs were being fielded, trained, equipped, and evaluated, the DoD Inspector General conducted an audit of the program. The Army received a proposed draft audit report and met with members of the DoD Inspector General to understand the basis for the initial findings and to offer additional information if required. The requests for certification were held by the Army in order to consider the initial observations of the audit.

The Army was provided a copy of the draft Inspector General audit on October 12, 2000. The Army provided a detailed response on December 7, 2000. The Army concurred with several of the audit findings, particularly those related to program review and the institutionalization of the CoMPIO functions within the Department of Defense. The Army response offered substantive comments on each observation, finding and recommendation, providing additional information and noting those observations that the Army believed had already been addressed by the program's established processes during the period between the time the observations were made and the date the draft report was received.

Also on December 7, 2000, based upon the recommendations previously received from commanders, and having given additional detailed consideration to the status of personnel, training and equipment for each team, the Under Secretary of the Army forwarded his recommendation that seven WMD-CSTs be certified. Recommendations for the other three teams have been held pending resolution of readiness concerns and completion of the current program review.

In June 2000, the Department of Defense formed Process Action Teams to realign the organizational placement of CoMPIO's functions within the Department. On November 9, 2000, the Deputy Secretary of Defense specified that the Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Army for Military Support would serve as the Program Manager for the WMD-CSTs and directed the Secretary of the Army to prepare a detailed transition plan consistent with a proposed realignment that would institutionalize the functions of the CoMPIO. The Secretary of the Army submitted a transition plan on November 27, 2000.

The Deputy Secretary of Defense approved a Program Budget Decision on February 14, 2001, that superceded Defense Reform Initiative Directive #25 and directed the disestablishment of CoMPIO. On February 22, 2001, CoMPIO was formally disestablished. Personnel assigned to the former CoMPIO formed the Program Transition Office to support the Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Army for Military Support in the process of transitioning CoMPIO programs and activities throughout the Department of Defense. The Acting Secretary of the Army assigned WMD-CST program functions to the Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Army for Military Support, and the Chief of the National Guard Bureau has been assigned to be the Army proponent for the Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams.

The Army and the National Guard are fully supportive of the comprehensive ongoing Department of Defense review of the WMD-CST program, and the review of the status of the teams to resolve any remaining concerns to enable the certification process to proceed. The Army remains committed to ensuring that the WMD-CSTs are properly manned, equipped, trained, and are proficient in all mission areas in order to perform their vital consequence management role in a safe and reliable manner.

Thank you for the opportunity to appear here today.








01 MAY 2001


Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the Committee, thank you for inviting me to address you today. Joint Task Force - Civil Support is a standing joint task force headquarters under the command of the United States Joint Forces Command. It is located at Ft. Monroe, Virginia. It focuses exclusively on providing military support to the lead federal agency during the aftermath of a domestic Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, or high yield Explosive (CBRNE) event. The command came into being on 1 October 1999. The implementation plan called for it to be organized and ready to assume its CBRNE consequence management (CoM) mission on 1 April 2000. We met that target deadline. Today we are mission capable and working hard to address the challenges associated with domestic CBRNE consequence management. I would like to take a few moments to update you on our present status.


Deputy Secretary Paul Wolfowitz signed interim policy guidance on 28 March 2001 for "Department of Defense Consequence Management Support to Domestic Incidents Involving Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and High Yield Explosives (CBRNE-CM)." This policy guidance provided that DoD will maintain JTF-CS as a standing headquarters and that its "principal focus shall be to plan for and operationally integrate DoD support to the Lead Federal Agency responsible for the U.S. Government's consequence management efforts during a domestic CBRNE incident." In addition, the JTF-CS Charter, approved by CINCUSJFCOM on 17 January 2001, provides that, when directed, JTF-CS will deploy to the vicinity of a CBRNE incident site and provide command and control (C2) of designated responding DoD forces to provide military assistance in support of the lead federal agency (LFA) to save lives, prevent injury and provide temporary critical life support. The charter calls for us to deploy only upon order of the Secretary of Defense and only in support of a civilian lead federal agency. I would like to briefly review both parts of the JTF-CS mission.


The Federal Response Plan (FRP) is the organizational construct under which JTF-CS will respond to a domestic CBRNE emergency. It outlines how the Federal Government implements the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act to assist state and local governments when a major disaster or emergency overwhelms their ability to respond effectively. Under the Federal Response Plan, federal response operations are organized into 12 Emergency Support Functions (ESF's). Ten separate federal agencies have been designated as primary agencies for the 12 ESF's. Designation as a primary agency means that the agency so designated is responsible for managing the federal response as it pertains to that particular functional area. The Department of Transportation, for example, is the primary agency for matters pertaining to federal transportation assistance to state and local authorities under the FRP. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers is responsible for ESF #3, public works. In addition, the FRP tasks DoD with providing support to each of the other primary agencies responsible for directing the federal effort within the other ESF's. This presents JTF- CS with a considerable challenge as we are required to understand the procedures employed by each of the 10 federal agencies and the type of support each is likely to request so that we might support them as they carry out their primary agency responsibilities.

To facilitate our planning processes and to ensure the primacy of the federal agencies we support, we have organized within JTF-CS a special liaison directorate and assigned officers from that directorate liaison duties with each of the 10 federal agencies. These liaison officers are responsible for learning the processes; and procedures unique to their agency and for working with the agency to identify potential requirements for DoD assistance for CBRNE scenarios. We believe this liaison initiative is working very well.

The demand for domestic CBRNE consequence management planning has been greater than was foreseen at the time of the JTF-CS stand up. In the 18 months, since our inception, we have quietly performed CBRNE consequence management contingency planning for several domestic special events. Each of these plans has been crafted to support a lead federal agency - normally the Federal Emergency Management Agency, but not always. Our most recent effort was in support of the National Capitol Police in conjunction with the President's State of the Union Address. Planning for these real world special events has provided JTF-CS with extremely valuable experience and has been more important than any other single factor in developing and improving our capabilities.

In addition to planning for real world events, JTF-CS conducts quarterly training exercises that focus on planning and deployment for specific types of CBRNE incidents. To date we have conducted such exercises in each of the 5 areas with which we are concerned: chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and high yield explosive events. We have learned to create a base plan for the most dangerous event and prepare branches and sequels for other possible incidents. By doing so, we have reduced our response planning time considerably.


In addition to domestic CBRNE CoM planning, JTF-CS, if ordered, will deploy to the site of a CBRNE incident and assume command and control of designated DoD responding assets. once on site, our mission will be to respond to requests for assistance from the LFA. It is important to note that while we are providing assistance to state and local authorities, we remain a federal military headquarters and our taskings will come from a lead civilian federal agency. In all cases, of course, we remain under DoD control and our chain of command runs from the Secretary of Defense to CINC, U.S. Joint Forces Command to JTF-CS.

The JTF-CS headquarters is ready to rapidly deploy anywhere within the United States, its possessions and territories in response to a CBRNE incident. We have developed this capability through regularly scheduled deployments that are part of our quarterly training exercises and we have recently begun to conduct no notice exercises. We are comfortable that we can meet our target deployment times and through our exercise program we continue to improve our deployment procedures.

Not all civil support operations require deployment of the entire JTF-CS headquarters. Indeed, such a deployment is unlikely except in the event of a catastrophic CBRNE incident. Because of this, we have also developed a minimum footprint concept that permits us to position ourselves to provide civil support to an LFA if needed but without pre-positioning a large DoD forward presence. This concept uses a small number of liaison and communications personnel to maintain situational awareness and establish communications at a potential incident. site while keeping the bulk of JTF-CS at home station ready to respond not only to that site but also to any other site that we may be called upon to support. We are not unmindful that a special event might be used to divert attention from a threat elsewhere and we have planned for that eventuality.


As the purpose of this hearing is to review the status of Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams (CST's), I would like to explain briefly the present relationship between JTF-CS and these teams.

JTF-CS has played virtually no role in CST development. CST assistance is not currently a part of our mission and we neither conduct CST training nor perform any oversight functions with regard to their operational capabilities or readiness. There are several reasons for this. The most important is outlined in the FY 2001 Forces for Unified Commands document. The assignment of Reserve Component forces to a CINC in the Forces For document, in this case the 27 CST's, establishes the assigned CINC's authority to exercise training readiness oversight (TRO) authority over them. This authority enables the CINC to exercise responsibility in five broad categories:

1) provision of guidance to component commanders on operational requirements and priorities to be addressed in military department training and readiness programs,

2) comment on service component program recommendations and budget requests,

3) coordinate and approve participation by assigned Reserve Component (RC) forces in joint exercises and other joint training,

4) obtain and review readiness and inspection reports of assigned RC forces, and

5) coordinate and review mobilization plans.

Traditional Title 10 responsibilities for manning, equipping, training, and sustaining RC forces remain with the services.

It is important to recognize the CINC's TRO authority extends only to those National Guard units that are assigned to his command. In the case of CST's, this has not happened because the CST's are still in the process of certification and the Forces For document stipulates they can not be deployed or assigned until they are certified. In the absence of such assignment, the prevailing legal opinion is that the CINC has no TRO authority. Once the Secretary of Defense certifies CST's as being mission capable as required by the law, they will be assigned to USJFCOM and USPACOM at which time the assigned CINC's TRO authority attaches. All that remains, for that to occur is the Secretary's certification which we anticipate will be completed in the near future.

In the meantime, the CINC is taking measures to ensure standardization of CST's and their interoperability with JTF-CS. He directed that JTF-CS propose a CST Mission Essential Task List that identifies the tasks, conditions, and standards that will standardize the federal CST mission and make them interoperable with JTF-CS. We have forwarded this list and our associated recommendations through the U.S. Joint Forces Command staff to tie promulgated to its Army component and to the NGB.

The CINC also tasked JTF-CS to prepare an outline of the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP's) JTF-CS is using to support special events. Once completed these will be made available to the CST's for their use in supporting 8 special events within their respective states if called upon to do so. The initial draft of that document has been completed and we anticipate turning it over to the U.S. Joint Forces Command staff shortly.

The CINC has also asked us to look at the training program for CST's. The CST training program is doctrinally sound. It was put together very quickly and as with any such program refinements are required as the program matures. However, that notwithstanding, CST members receive some of the best and most comprehensive CBRNE consequence management response training available anywhere. Each soldier goes through approximately 800 hours of individual training conducted not only at DoD schools but also at schools sponsored by the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the National Fire Academy, the Department of Energy, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Following completion of individual training, soldiers are taught to function as a team and to perform mission essential tasks in accordance with conditions and standards published by the U.S. Army Chemical School. U.S. Army Forces Command, the Army component of U.S. Joint Forces Command, conducts external evaluations of each team at the end of its training cycle and assesses its level of proficiency in the tasks that are critical to the performance of its mission. In summary, it is our belief that the CST's are well trained and valuable assets that contribute materially to the accomplishment of the CBRNE consequence management mission.

In conclusion, JTF-CS has made great strides since its inception a year and a half ago. We believe we have established good relations within the interagency and we are confident we can deploy quickly if' called upon to help in time of need.

Thank you for allowing me to speak with you today.