18 November 2010

Strategic Influence of the Improvised Explosive Device

From: "Stinson, Jayne" <Jayne.Stinson[at]ag.gov.au>
Date: Thu, 18 Nov 2010 19:35:12 +1100
Subject: O'CONNOR: Speech: The Strategic Influence of the Improvised Explosive Device [SEC=UNCLASSIFIED]

UNCLASSIFIED

THE HON BRENDAN O CONNOR MP
MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS AND JUSTICE

The Strategic Influence of the Improvised Explosive Device

Australian Bomb Data Centre Conference Dinner, National Press Club, Canberra

Thursday, 18 November 2010

I d like to acknowledge the traditional owners of this area, the Ngunnawal people. We recognise their elders past and present, and their connection to this land.

Also here tonight are Australian Federal Police Assistant Commissioner, Steve Lancaster, National Manager Counter Terrorism; Representatives from fifteen partner nations; ladies and gentlemen. 

In 2008, Lieutenant General Metz of the United States Army and a commander of the Multi National Corps in Iraq said:

The IED is a strategic weapon and it s got to be dealt with as a strategic weapon.

He went on to explain that the real strategic value of the Improvised Explosive Device, or IED, particularly in the context of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, is its potential to wear down the will of its targets, in this case, both United States troops and the American public s support for the war efforts.

While this is obviously phrased in military parlance, by a soldier to a military audience, it nevertheless rings true across the breadth of government activity and across international borders. 

It s self-evident that IEDs pose a tactical threat to our soldiers in theatres abroad.

From Australia s perspective, more than half of our fatalities and over two-thirds of our wounded battle casualties across operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have been caused by IEDs. 

Aside from the obvious operational threat of IEDs, the continuing, effective proliferation of their use also manifests itself in a range of strategic issues.

The strategic influence of IEDs can be palpable and direct. An attack on the aviation sector, one of the preferred targets of terrorists, creates a devastating psychological impact on civilian populations, again highlighting the value of IEDs as a strategic weapon as observed by Lieutenant General Metz.

However there are also more indirect strategic issues that could be regarded as either products or enablers of the proliferation and use of IEDs.

Tonight I d first like to discuss how the use of IEDs can have both direct and indirect strategic consequences before briefly talking about Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) threats.

At this dinner we have assembled what might be defined as a strategic audience.

We have police officers from state jurisdictions and from international partner countries. Similarly we have soldiers, sailors and crew from the Australian Defence Force and the armed forces of allied countries.

We have government representatives from policy groups such as the Attorney-General s Department and security experts from the Office of Transport Security and Australia Post. We also have departmental officials from our international partners.

Academic representatives who help us understand the threat of IEDs from a societal, science and technology perspective are also represented in the audience. With our industry partners they can assist to deliver solutions to counter this threat.

Collectively you all help to underpin the security of systems essential to the function of the nation state. All of you are working toward countering the threat of IEDs. 

In the past, the term  IED would have to have been explained in full. It is sad that today it has entered common language, being reported almost daily in the media, along with terms such as  suicide bomber , vehicle borne and remote controlled .  Indeed the emergence of the acronym IED itself is an indicator of its strategic influence.  

As Minister for Home Affairs and Justice I have responsibility for the Australian Federal Police, which includes the Australian Bomb Data Centre hosting us here tonight.

Two weeks ago, the Centre was involved in the analysis of the threat of IEDs detected in air cargo.

With information provided by the UK Bomb Data Centre, the Centre, like other centres around the world, assisted its government in understanding what potential threat was posed by the incident and whether it highlighted vulnerabilities here in Australia, particularly in the aviation environment.

When describing the threat posed by the recent  Printer IED British Prime Minister David Cameron highlighted the influence of the IED when he said:

A package that started in Yemen, that landed in Germany, that landed in Britain en route to America, it just shows how united and determined we have to be to defeat terrorism.

And, can I say, this conference, this networking dinner, helps to build this unity.

As I mentioned previously, the aviation sector continues to be a target of terrorists worldwide precisely for the psychological shock that could be inflicted as a result of an attack.

As everyone here would know, IEDs are often the weapon of choice. The Printer IED threat perfectly illustrates the potential of IEDs to have direct strategic influence.

In addition to my portfolio responsibility for the AFP, I also have oversight of the Australian Customs and Border Protection Service.

And, as Australian members of the audience are no doubt aware, a key issue that both of these agencies are helping to address is people smuggling.

Organised, transnational criminal elements are profiting on the misery of people desperate to escape dire situations in their home countries.

This results in challenges to the integrity of our national border. However, there would not be an opportunity for these criminal groups if there were not drivers pushing people from their countries of origin. 

Consider Afghanistan, a source country of many people seeking asylum. It is there that the IED, used by the Taliban as part of its attempt to destabilise the government, creates an environment from which people want to escape - an environment I personally witnessed when I visited AFP officers involved in our capacity-building programs there. 

This is a perfect example of how the use of IEDs creates a strategic issue in an indirect manner. The issues of border integrity for a country thousands of kilometres away, as well the impact of irregular movement on many countries in between, is an indirect product of the extensive and effective use of IEDs in Afghanistan.

At this point I d like to take the opportunity to thank the Royal Malaysian Police and Indonesian National Police for their efforts in countering people smuggling and thank both of these countries for their ongoing support in addressing this issue. Their assistance is greatly appreciated by the Australian Government.

In mentioning the situation in Afghanistan, I d also like to take a moment to acknowledge Australia s role in countering IEDs and, in particular, Brigadier Phil Winter's efforts over the past four years as the Commander of the Australian Defence Force's Counter IED Task Force.

I m especially pleased that someone so experienced has joined us as its new Director, noting that today marks his third day in the job. Welcome Phil. 

Countering the effects of illicit drugs is another one of my responsibilities which involves both the AFP and Customs and Border Protection.

Last month we had a major success with the third largest seizure of cocaine in Australian history. It is this drug, and the massive revenues it attracts, that helped to coin the term narco-terrorism and, in particular, cocaine's association with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia or the F.A.R.C.

A key weapon of the F.A.R.C. was the IED, something that our guest from the Colombian National Police would be acutely aware of. 

Just three weeks ago both Customs and Border Protection and the AFP were again successful with a massive seizure of heroin, the fifth largest in Australian history.

While, it remains to be seen what the source region of that heroin is, the Australian Illicit Drug Data Centre, which I had the pleasure of opening in February of this year, informs us that a significant proportion of heroin seized at the border originates from Afghanistan.

It is claimed that a doctrine of the Taliban is "the poppy is our economy".  

Therefore, a heroin market in Australia, as part of a global market, helps to fund the Taliban in Afghanistan. This, in turn, can help to fund the procurement of weapons including explosives and IED components.

Again, this is a good example the strategic influence of IEDs in so much as the transnational, organised crime of drug trafficking, a strategic threat to most countries represented here tonight, is enabling the widespread and continuing use and of IEDs in Afghanistan.

I hope that these examples have helped to illustrate the strategic influence of the IED.

While these examples are drawn from within my area of ministerial responsibility, my ministerial colleagues in Defence, Foreign Affairs and Infrastructure and Transport also deal with issues influenced by the IED.

These examples also highlight the international nature of security threats and the importance of partnerships.    

If the IED is the strategic weapon of today, let us consider potential strategic weapons of tomorrow.

I note that today, in a first for the ABDC Conference, there was a break out day for discussion on CBRN threats.

I d like to note the efforts of the Australian CBRN Data Centre in running this day.

Whilst the term IED has entered common usage, so too has white powder, anthrax and  dirty bomb.  

If my previous examples of the breadth of influence of the IED rate it as a strategic weapon, consider the breadth of influence of CBRN. 

The response to this threat is complex. It is a multi-faceted threat and so, in addition to those agencies involved in countering the threat of IEDs, it also involves specialists in the areas of health, agriculture, environmental protection, fire and hazardous materials and many others.

Finally, I wish to acknowledge that, in countering the strategic effects of this weapon, there are soldiers and police officers who step forward each day to deal with this threat at the tactical level. 

These people could be Australian diggers, soldiers of other Coalition nations or police officers of the countries, states, territories and cities represented here tonight.

Those of you who serve us in countering this threat, I thank you.

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