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23 October 2010 Previous: http://cryptome.org/0002/clsid-list-06.htm http://cryptome.org/0002/clsid-list-05.htm
CLSID Shit List 7A sends: Before scrolling through this updated list, I recommend reading CLSID Shitlist Beyond. http://cryptome.org/0002/clsid-beyond.htm _________________________________________ What (A) told us is true, the registry is not the only place to hunt down viruses, spyware, or other malware infections. Taking snapshots of the system and using a utility that tracks any changes does help filter out hidden rogue activity, good point. An inbound/outbound firewall would also help catch anything trying to establish a remote connection. I'm surprised others have taken interest to these shit lists ; these help me to thwart registry infection, while finding more ways to improve stability and defense. Also working with several computers, I've practiced editing and researching registry. Not only finding infected CLSIDs but what files/programs may depend on them, whether those files/programs can be trusted, or if they exist for third parties, or at times, perhaps stable. The truth is I happen to be better detecting something abnormal or rogue inside the registry than I am finding the proper software that can be trusted. Hard copy backups are smart, that helps alot. I am familiar with common techniques some people use. People sometimes use an unregistered computer, with basic system defense. No updating (which should NEVER be trusted), no emailing, no logging into accounts linking to personal identity. One computer I use now is always offline. As (A) stated before, "someone who's trying to keep a normal Windows system secure and non-invasive has to watch a lot more than just CLSIDs." That's true. Keep in mind, when I use the term "bleach", this does not mean "delete". What I have stumbled across after deleting infected files, is the fact they can re-surface, same as deleting an infected CLSID. (NOT referring to the system32 files meant to re-surface for protection.) Bleaching the CLSID keeps the CLSID inside the registry without data, no strings no value, without the permission set. ... That cannot be fixed unless you stand by the computer to reprogram it. That can be a pain in the ass, sometimes that won't work either. When it's bleached, it's dead with ONLY the physical owner holding the bones to reincarnate it. Learn how to bleach here: http://ht.ly/19nj0Z One problem I have trouble with is finding the proper software I can trust. Most of the freeware now days is corrupt, that also goes for most of the anti-spyware people pay for in the stores. GARBAGE! I best stick with what I study here, and that is unnecessary, unstable registry. _________________________________________
The registry looks more complex than it is, however it IS very sensitive!
The benefit of using these guides help average folks protect their computers
from exploitation. MMC Plugable Internet Protocol Updated HKCR\CLSID\{3C5F432A-EF40-4669-9974-9671D4FC2E12} HKCR\CLSID\{43136EB5-D36C-11CF-ADBC-00AA00A80033} HKCR\CLSID\{7F1899DA-62A6-11D0-A2C6-00C04FD909DD} HKCR\CLSID\{ADE6444B-C91F-4E37-92A4-5BB430A33340} HKCR\CLSID\{B708457E-DB61-4C55-A92F-0D4B5E9B1224} HKCR\CLSID\{D6FEDB1D-CF21-4BD9-AF3B-C5468E9C6684} HKCR\CLSID\{F1E752C3-FD72-11D0-AEF6-00C04FB6DD2C} HKCR\CLSID\{F7A4F1DA-96C3-4BCF-BEB3-1D9FFDE89EE9} Here are all those MMC Node Manager CLSIDs. HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\NODEMGR.AppEventsDHTMLConnector {ADE6444B-C91F-4E37-92A4-5BB430A33340} HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\NODEMGR.ComCacheCleanup {F7A4F1DA-96C3-4BCF-BEB3-1D9FFDE89EE9} HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\NODEMGR.MMCDocConfig {F1E752C3-FD72-11D0-AEF6-00C04FB6DD2C} HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\NODEMGR.MMCProtocol {3C5F432A-EF40-4669-9974-9671D4FC2E12} HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\NODEMGR.MMCVersionInfo {D6FEDB1D-CF21-4BD9-AF3B-C5468E9C6684} HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\NODEMGR.MMCViewExt {B708457E-DB61-4C55-A92F-0D4B5E9B1224} HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\NODEMGR.NodeInitObject {43136EB5-D36C-11CF-ADBC-00AA00A80033} HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\NODEMGR.ScopeTreeObject {7F1899DA-62A6-11D0-A2C6-00C04FD909DD} The Node Manager belongs to Cisco. These CLSIDs help cache messages inside a system. The three Cisco ports are located on ports 130 - 132; cisco-fna, cisco-tna and cisco-sys. These CLSIDs have been bleached and tested on both wireless and wired internet connections, both separate systems. Node Manager is not required. The Node Manager can be exploited by third parties and can be used to bypass security. Safe to bleach. There are rumors that MMC runs with a trojan rootkit. Hacked RDNs FOUND [DO NOT BLEACH THESE] FlashBroker HKCR\CLSID\{0BE09CC1-42E0-11DD-AE16-0800200C9A66} The two hacks are "Everyone" and "Anonymous Logon" Right click, go to the permission set. Remove both RDNs listed above! Click "Apply" then click OK. NEXT RDN HACKS Follow the same procedure above. Do not bleach! IFlashBroker2 HKCR\Interface\{DDF4CE26-4BDA-42BC-B0F0-0E75243AD285} HKCR\TypeLib\{FAB3E735-69C7-453B-A446-B6823C6DF1C9} Once fixed in HKCR, they are stable in HKLM. BitBucket Hacker Hacks "Everyone" RDN HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\ Explorer\BitBucket [SAFE TO BLEACH] HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\ Explorer\NetworkCrawler [SAFE TO BLEACH] HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\ Explorer\RemoteComputer [SAFE TO BLEACH] HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\ WindowsUpdate [SAFE TO BLEACH] HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\ NetCache [SAFE TO BLEACH] "Power Users" and "CREATOR OWNER" RDNs Hacked [DO NOT BLEACH!] HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Rpc Right click, go to the permission set. Remove both RDNs listed above! Click "Apply" then click OK. FIVE RDNs TO DISABLE! GO TO HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT, HKEY_CURRENT_USER, HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE, HKEY_USERS, AND HKEY_CURRENT_CONFIG. MAKE SURE "Power Users", "CREATOR OWNER", "EVERYONE" "Anonymous Logon" AND "RESTRICTED" ARE TAKEN OFF OR DISABLED. LEAVE THE OTHER RDNs ALONE! WSecEdit Security Manager is a malicious trojan that presents security risks to the compromised computer. Modifies security settings automatically. WSecEdit Security Manager Class HKCR\CLSID\{011BE22D-E453-11D1-945A-00C04FB984F9} WSecEdit RSOP Security Settings Class HKCR\CLSID\{1B6FC61A-648A-4493-A303-A1A22B543F01} WSecEdit Security Configuration Class HKCR\CLSID\{2AABFCD0-1797-11D2-ABA2-00C04FB6C6FA} WSecEdit Local Security Settings Class HKCR\CLSID\{2E8EA1E5-F406-46F5-AF10-661FD6539F28} WSecEdit Security Configuration Class HKCR\CLSID\{5ADF5BF6-E452-11D1-945A-00C04FB984F9} WSecEdit Security Manager Class HKCR\CLSID\{5C0786ED-1847-11D2-ABA2-00C04FB6C6FA} WSecEdit Security Settings Class HKCR\CLSID\{5C0786EE-1847-11D2-ABA2-00C04FB6C6FA} WSecEdit Extension Class HKCR\CLSID\{803E14A0-B4FB-11D0-A0D0-00A0C90F574B} WSecEdit Local Security Settings Class HKCR\CLSID\{CFF49D53-EE51-49F2-A807-7E3DF4EA36E3} WSecEdit RSOP Security Settings Class HKCR\CLSID\{FE883157-CEBD-4570-B7A2-E4FE06ABE626} HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\WPDSp.WPDServiceProvider {77F7F122-20B0-4117-A2FB-059D1FC88256} HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\Wsecedit.Extension {803E14A0-B4FB-11D0-A0D0-00A0C90F574B} HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\Wsecedit.LS {CFF49D53-EE51-49F2-A807-7E3DF4EA36E3} HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\Wsecedit.LSAbout.1 {2E8EA1E5-F406-46F5-AF10-661FD6539F28} HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\Wsecedit.RSOP {FE883157-CEBD-4570-B7A2-E4FE06ABE626} HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\Wsecedit.RSOPAbout.1 {1B6FC61A-648A-4493-A303-A1A22B543F01} HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\Wsecedit.SAV {011BE22D-E453-11D1-945A-00C04FB984F9} HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\Wsecedit.SCE {5ADF5BF6-E452-11D1-945A-00C04FB984F9} WECAPI2 CLSIDs Updated WECAPI2.FpStructureModification.1 HKCR\CLSID\{F6FD0A00-43F0-11D1-BE58-00A0C90A4335} WECAPI2.FpStructureElement.1 HKCR\CLSID\{F6FD0A01-43F0-11D1-BE58-00A0C90A4335} WECAPI2.FpFile.1 HKCR\CLSID\{F6FD0A0E-43F0-11D1-BE58-00A0C90A4335} WECAPI2.FpMetaInfo.1 HKCR\CLSID\{F6FD0A0F-43F0-11D1-BE58-00A0C90A4335} WECAPI2.FpFolder.1 HKCR\CLSID\{F6FD0A11-43F0-11D1-BE58-00A0C90A4335} WECAPI2.WebExtenderClient.1 HKCR\CLSID\{F6FD0A13-43F0-11D1-BE58-00A0C90A4335} HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\WECAPI2.FpFile {F6FD0A0E-43F0-11D1-BE58-00A0C90A4335} HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\WECAPI2.FpFolder {F6FD0A11-43F0-11D1-BE58-00A0C90A4335} HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\WECAPI2.FpMetaInfo {F6FD0A0F-43F0-11D1-BE58-00A0C90A4335} HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\WECAPI2.FpStructureElement {F6FD0A01-43F0-11D1-BE58-00A0C90A4335} HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\WECAPI2.FpStructureModification {F6FD0A00-43F0-11D1-BE58-00A0C90A4335} HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\WECAPI2.WebExtenderClient {F6FD0A13-43F0-11D1-BE58-00A0C90A4335} This vulnerability lets remote users execute arbitrary scripts inside compromised systems. Windows Explorer includes a preview pane (web view), which displays information on some types of files when they become selected. The preview pane is implemented via an HTML resource file (in webvw.dll). Scripts can be injected to execute malicious threats to the system, even used to spy on remote users. Microsoft claims WebView is safe. It is not safe. WebViewCoord Class HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\CLSID\{7A707490-260A-11D1-83DF-00A0C90DC849} WebViewCoord Class HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\CLSID\{BCFD624E-705A-11d2-A2AF-00C04FC30871} HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\WebViewCoord.WebViewCoord HKLM\SOFTWARE\Classes\WebViewCoord.WebViewCoord {7A707490-260A-11D1-83DF-00A0C90DC849} HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\WebViewFolderIcon.WebViewFolderIcon HKLM\SOFTWARE\Classes\WebViewFolderIcon.WebViewFolderIcon {e5df9d10-3b52-11d1-83e8-00a0c90dc849} SharedTaskScheduler Spyware HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\ Explorer\SharedTaskScheduler [Links {8C7461EF-2B13-11d2-BE35-3078302C2030}] [Part of Component Categories conditional cache daemon.] Component Categories conditional cache daemons HKCR\CLSID\{8C7461EF-2B13-11d2-BE35-3078302C2030} HKCR\CLSID\{DC651A43-0720-4a2b-9971-BD2EF1329A3D} HKCR\CLSID\{E56829C9-2D59-11d2-BE38-3078302C2030} !DO NOT BLEACH RANDOM SHELL EXTENSIONS! *THESE ARE SAFE TO BLEACH* THESE KEEP TRACK OF WHAT YOU DO ON YOUR SYSTEM. *Fusion Cache* {1D2680C9-0E2A-469d-B787-065558BC7D43} *Microsoft History AutoComplete List* {00BB2764-6A77-11D0-A535-00C04FD7D062} *Microsoft Multiple AutoComplete List* {00BB2765-6A77-11D0-A535-00C04FD7D062} *WebCheckWebCrawler* {08165EA0-E946-11CF-9C87-00AA005127ED} ONLY THOSE FOUR LISTED ABOVE ARE SAFE TO BLEACH! OTHERS CAN BE FOUND HERE: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\ CurrentVersion\Shell Extensions\Approved DON'T SCREW AROUND! SHELLS ARE SENSITIVE. Windows NT Abusive Vulnerabilities HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\ Network\World Full Access Shared Parameters HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\ CurrentVersion\Network\Location Awareness HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\ CurrentVersion\Time Zones HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\ CurrentVersion\WOW\WowFax |
SQLDMO can be used by remote Windows NT users. Unlike general SQL; SQLDMO is safe to bleach. I suggest not bleaching SQLDMO UNLESS you have no use for it or it's causing a problem, for instance a hacker cracking into it. SQLDMO IS safe to bleach, but remember, never start bleaching random SQL CLSIDs or you could end up with system damage. My SQLDMO has been hacked before, I had to bleach it. Not that big a deal, just takes an hour to bleach it all. HKCR\Interface\{10021506-E260-11CF-AE68-00AA004A34D5} HKCR\Interface\{10021516-E260-11CF-AE68-00AA004A34D5} HKCR\Interface\{10021603-E260-11CF-AE68-00AA004A34D5} HKCR\Interface\{10021606-E260-11CF-AE68-00AA004A34D5} HKCR\Interface\{10021E06-E260-11CF-AE68-00AA004A34D5} HKCR\Interface\{10023306-E260-11CF-AE68-00AA004A34D5} HKCR\Interface\{10023316-E260-11CF-AE68-00AA004A34D5} HKCR\Interface\{10023403-E260-11CF-AE68-00AA004A34D5} HKCR\Interface\{10023406-E260-11CF-AE68-00AA004A34D5} HKCR\Interface\{10031206-E260-11CF-AE68-00AA004A34D5} HKCR\Interface\{10041003-E260-11CF-AE68-00AA004A34D5} HKCR\Interface\{10041006-E260-11CF-AE68-00AA004A34D5} HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\SQLDMO.Alert HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\SQLDMO.Alert.8.0 HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\SQLDMO.Application HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\SQLDMO.Application.8.0 HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\SQLDMO.Backup HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\SQLDMO.Backup.8.0 HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\SQLDMO.Backup2 HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\SQLDMO.Backup2.8.0 HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\SQLDMO.BackupDevice HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\SQLDMO.BackupDevice.8.0 HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\SQLDMO.BulkCopy HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\SQLDMO.BulkCopy.8.0 HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\SQLDMO.BulkCopy2 HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\SQLDMO.BulkCopy2.8.0 HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\SQLDMO.Category HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\SQLDMO.Check HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\SQLDMO.Column HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\SQLDMO.Column2 HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\SQLDMO.DatabaseRole HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\SQLDMO.DatabaseRole2 HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\SQLDMO.DBFile HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\SQLDMO.Default HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\SQLDMO.Default2 HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\SQLDMO.DistributionArticle HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\SQLDMO.DistributionArticle.8.0 HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\SQLDMO.DistributionArticle2 HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\SQLDMO.DistributionArticle2.8.0 HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\SQLDMO.DistributionPublisher HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\SQLDMO.DistributionPublisher.8.0 HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\SQLDMO.DistributionPublisher2 HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\SQLDMO.DistributionPublisher2.8.0 HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\SQLDMO.DistributionSubscription HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\SQLDMO.DistributionSubscription2 HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\SQLDMO.FileGroup HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\SQLDMO.FileGroup2 HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\SQLDMO.FullTextCatalog HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\SQLDMO.FullTextCatalog2 HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\SQLDMO.Group HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\SQLDMO.Index HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\SQLDMO.Index.8.0 HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\SQLDMO.Index2 HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\SQLDMO.Index2.8.0 HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\SQLDMO.Job HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\SQLDMO.Job.8.0 HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\SQLDMO.JobSchedule HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\SQLDMO.JobSchedule.8.0 HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\SQLDMO.JobStep HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\SQLDMO.JobStep.8.0 HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\SQLDMO.LinkedServer HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\SQLDMO.LinkedServer.8.0 HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\SQLDMO.LinkedServer2 HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\SQLDMO.LinkedServer2.8.0 HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\SQLDMO.LinkedServerLogin HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\SQLDMO.LinkedServerLogin.8.0 HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\SQLDMO.LogFile HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\SQLDMO.LogFile2 HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\SQLDMO.Login HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\SQLDMO.Login2 HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\SQLDMO.Operator HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\SQLDMO.Operator.8.0 HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\SQLDMO.RegisteredServer HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\SQLDMO.RegisteredSubscriber HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\SQLDMO.RemoteServer HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\SQLDMO.RemoteServer.8.0 HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\SQLDMO.Replication HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\SQLDMO.Replication2 HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\SQLDMO.ReplicationSecurity HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\SQLDMO.ReplicationSecurity.8.0 HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\SQLDMO.Restore HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\SQLDMO.Restore2 HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\SQLDMO.Rule HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\SQLDMO.Rule2 HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\SQLDMO.ServerRole HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\SQLDMO.ServerRole.8.0 HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\SQLDMO.TargetServer HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\SQLDMO.TargetServer.8.0 HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\SQLDMO.TargetServerGroup HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\SQLDMO.TargetServerGroup.8.0 HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\SQLDMO.Transfer HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\SQLDMO.Transfer.8.0 HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\SQLDMO.Transfer2 HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\SQLDMO.Transfer2.8.0 HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\SQLDMO.TransPublication HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\SQLDMO.TransPublication.8.0 HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\SQLDMO.TransPublication2 HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\SQLDMO.TransPublication2.8.0 HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\SQLDMO.Trigger HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\SQLDMO.Trigger2 HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\SQLDMO.User HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\SQLDMO.User.8.0 HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\SQLDMO.User2 HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\SQLDMO.User2.8.0 HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\SQLDMO.View HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\SQLDMO.View2 More junk. Safe to bleach. Microsoft.Update.WebProxy HKCR\CLSID\{650503CF-9108-4DDC-A2CE-6C2341E1C582} System.AccessViolationException HKCR\CLSID\{4C3EBFD5-FC72-33DC-BC37-9953EB25B8D7} HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\System.AccessViolationException {4C3EBFD5-FC72-33DC-BC37-9953EB25B8D7} HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\Sdtclb4ui.CLBDTDispenser {B890AF56-AC8C-11D1-8CB7-00C04FC3261D} HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\OISCTRL.OISClientLauncher {E543A17A-F212-49C0-B63D-BF09B460250E} These CLSIDs are linked with Trojan-Spy.KeyLogger, which captures all user keystrokes, and is designed with rootkit-specific techniques to crack into remote systems, stealing valuable information such as passwords, and login information. Other Trojan-Spy.KeyLogger.sd5 CLSIDs can be found on Shit List 4. EngUKWrdBrk Class HKCR\CLSID\{363F1015-FD5F-4ba8-AC58-29634F378A42} EngUSWrdBrk Class HKCR\CLSID\{80A3E9B0-A246-11D3-BB8C-0090272FA362} FrnFrnWrdBrk Class HKCR\CLSID\{F14E6B48-FBCA-4d32-BD79-7829D4F7E43B} HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\EngUKWrdBrk.EngUKWrdBrk {363F1015-FD5F-4ba8-AC58-29634F378A42} HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\EngUSWrdBrk.EngUSWrdBrk {80A3E9B0-A246-11D3-BB8C-0090272FA362} HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\FrnFrnWrdBrk.FrnFrnWrdBrk HKLM\SOFTWARE\Classes\FrnFrnWrdBrk.FrnFrnWrdBrk Watson subscriber for SENS Network Events HKCR\AppID\{58FC39EB-9DBD-4EA7-B7B4-9404CC6ACFAB} Interactive User HKCR\AppID\{995C996E-D918-4a8c-A302-45719A6F4EA7} HKCR\AppID\{D5978620-5B9F-11D1-8DD2-00AA004ABD5E} HKCR\AppID\{D5978630-5B9F-11D1-8DD2-00AA004ABD5E} HKCR\AppID\{D5978640-5B9F-11D1-8DD2-00AA004ABD5E} HKCR\AppID\{D5978650-5B9F-11D1-8DD2-00AA004ABD5E} ___________________________________________________ ON HKCR\AppID\{9BA05972-F6A8-11CF-A442-00A0C90A8F39} ... ONLY delete the RunAs string value "Interactive User" Leave the rest of the CLSID alone. Same thing goes for HKCR\AppID\{A55803CC-4D53-404c-8557-FD63DBA95D24} ONLY delete the RunAs string value "Interactive User" ___________________________________________________ Interactive User HKCR\AppID\{FFB8655F-81B9-4fce-B89C-9A6BA76D13E7} HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\SENDCMSG.SendConsoleMessageApp.1 {B1AFF7D0-0C49-11D1-BB12-00C04FC9A3A3} HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\SENS Logon Events {D5978630-5B9F-11D1-8DD2-00AA004ABD5E} HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\SENS Logon2 Events {D5978650-5B9F-11D1-8DD2-00AA004ABD5E} HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\SENS Network Events {D5978620-5B9F-11D1-8DD2-00AA004ABD5E} HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\SENS OnNow Events {D5978640-5B9F-11D1-8DD2-00AA004ABD5E} ONLY BLEACH THE LISTED CLSIDs! The Parallel Problems Server (PPServer) provides interactive clients with access to powerful functionality and users of parallel machines access to interactive environments where they can manipulate and visualize large data sets. The PPServer communicates with clients using a simple request-response protocol. A client requests that an action be performed by issuing a command with the appropriate arguments, the server executes that command, and then notifies the client that the action is complete. With the PPServer, MIT have been able to build applications for information retrieval, machine learning, and scientific computing. PPServer Trojan-Dropper.Agent Updated HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\ppDSApp.ppDSApp {2AFA62E2-5548-11D1-A6E1-006097C4E476} HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\ppDSClip.ppDSClip {31C48C31-70B0-11d1-A708-006097C4E476} HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\ppDSDetl.ppDSDetl {31C48C32-70B0-11d1-A708-006097C4E476} HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\ppDSFile.ppDSFile {1D1237A0-6CD6-11d2-96BA-00104B242E64} HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\ppDShowNet.ppDShowNet {5C85DCB0-F967-11D0-81ED-00C04FC99D4C} HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\ppDShowPlay.ppDShowPlay {C0CD59AE-020D-11d1-81F2-00C04FC99D4C} HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\ppDSMeta.ppDSMeta {BB314F91-A010-11d1-A75A-006097C4E476} HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\ppDSOAdv.ppDSOAdv {AE1A5813-5230-11D1-A6E0-006097C4E476} HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\ppDSPropAdv.ppDSPropAdv {8C4EB103-516F-11D1-A6DF-006097C4E476} HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\ppDSView.ppDSView {AE1A5812-5230-11D1-A6E0-006097C4E476} HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\PPServer.PPServerClass {23D1AE30-8023-11D3-8D47-00C04F949D33} |
Network Provisioning Service allows automatic provisioning of information about networks on a client machine. Information is downloaded from network providers as XML configuration files. These files are validated against locally stored XML schemas. The Network Provisioning Service can be used to keep the information up-to-date by downloading new content from the network provider on a pre-determined schedule. Network Provisioning Service Class HKCR\CLSID\{116391ee-e1e5-444e-9424-d53b641d3cea} Network Provisioning via XML Class HKCR\CLSID\{2aa2b5fe-b846-4d07-810c-b21ee45320e3} Network Provisioning Service HKCR\AppID\{39ce474e-59c1-4b84-9be2-2600c335b5c6} Network Provisioning Service Client API Class HKCR\CLSID\{61d55f63-98f7-473c-97c7-a08e2f13c955} Remote Desktop Updates Otherwise known as MsTscAx, RPD and IMsRpd HKCR\CLSID\{6AE29350-321B-42be-BBE5-12FB5270C0DE} HKCR\CLSID\{7390f3d8-0439-4c05-91e3-cf5cb290c3d0} HKCR\CLSID\{7584c670-2274-4efb-b00b-d6aaba6d3850} HKCR\CLSID\{7cacbd7b-0d99-468f-ac33-22e495c0afe5} HKCR\CLSID\{9059f30f-4eb1-4bd2-9fdc-36f43a218f4a} HKCR\CLSID\{ace575fd-1fcf-4074-9401-ebab990fa9de} HKCR\CLSID\{d2ea46a7-c2bf-426b-af24-e19c44456399} IMsRdpClient3 HKCR\Interface\{91B7CBC5-A72E-4FA0-9300-D647D7E897FF} IMsRdpClient HKCR\Interface\{92B4A539-7115-4B7C-A5A9-E5D9EFC2780A} IMsRdpClientAdvancedSettings2 HKCR\Interface\{9AC42117-2B76-4320-AA44-0E616AB8437B} IMsRdpClientShell HKCR\Interface\{D012AE6D-C19A-4BFE-B367-201F8911F134} IMsRdpClient6 HKCR\Interface\{D43B7D80-8517-4B6D-9EAC-96AD6800D7F2} IMsRdpClient2 HKCR\Interface\{E7E17DC4-3B71-4BA7-A8E6-281FFADCA28F} IMsRdpClientAdvancedSettings5 HKCR\Interface\{FBA7F64E-6783-4405-DA45-FA4A763DABD0} IMsRdpClientAdvancedSettings4 HKCR\Interface\{FBA7F64E-7345-4405-AE50-FA4A763DC0DE} Microsoft RDP Client Control Updates HKCR\CLSID\{3523c2fb-4031-44e4-9a3b-f1e94986ee7f} HKCR\CLSID\{4eb2f086-c818-447e-b32c-c51ce2b30d31} HKCR\CLSID\{ace575fd-1fcf-4074-9401-ebab990fa9de} HKCR\SoftwareDistribution.MicrosoftUpdate {6e32070a-766d-4ee6-879c-dc1fa91d2fc3} HKCR\SoftwareDistribution.MUClientUIPlugin {3809920F-B9D4-42DA-92E0-E26265E0FB89} HKCR\SoftwareDistribution.WebControl {6414512B-B978-451D-A0D8-FCFDF33E833C} HKCR\SoftwareDistribution.WUClientUIPlugin {AE097EE9-9AB5-4999-95F7-200F862661F9} Steelhead Router Configuration Notify Object HKCR\CLSID\{6E65CBC5-926D-11D0-8E27-00C04FC99DCF} HxDs.Hx Trojan HKCR\Software\Microsoft\HTMLHelp\2.0\LocalReg\CLSID HKCR\Software\Microsoft\HTMLHelp\2.0\LocalReg\HxDs.HxFilters {314111e2-a502-11d2-bbca-00c04f8ec294} HKCR\Software\Microsoft\HTMLHelp\2.0\LocalReg\Hxds.HxPlugIn {314111db-a502-11d2-bbca-00c04f8ec294} HKCR\Software\Microsoft\HTMLHelp\2.0\LocalReg\HxDs.HxRegister {314111bd-a502-11d2-bbca-00c04f8ec294} Queued Component Default Spyware QC Marshal Interceptor Class HKCR\CLSID\{ecabafcb-7f19-11d2-978e-0000f8757e2a} QC Listener Class HKCR\CLSID\{ecabafc3-7f19-11d2-978e-0000f8757e2a} Queued Components Player (QC.ListenerHelper) HKCR\CLSID\{ecabafc4-7f19-11d2-978e-0000f8757e2a} QC.MessageMover HKCR\CLSID\{ecabb0bf-7f19-11d2-978e-0000f8757e2a} Queued Components Recorder (QC.Recorder) HKCR\CLSID\{ecabafc2-7f19-11d2-978e-0000f8757e2a} HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\QC.DLQListener {ecabafca-7f19-11d2-978e-0000f8757e2a} HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\QC.Listener {ecabafc3-7f19-11d2-978e-0000f8757e2a} HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\QC.ListenerHelper {ecabafc4-7f19-11d2-978e-0000f8757e2a} HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\QC.MessageMover {ecabb0bf-7f19-11d2-978e-0000f8757e2a} HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\QC.Recorder {ecabafc2-7f19-11d2-978e-0000f8757e2a} HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\PeerDraw.PeerDraw {10072CEC-8CC1-11D1-986E-00A0C955B42E} HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\PeerFactory.PeerFactory {3050F4CF-98B5-11CF-BB82-00AA00BDCE0B} For all those working on a personal computer, without emailing or sharing, who wish to fortify system security, this is for you ; HKCR\CLSID\{9E56BE60-C50F-11CF-9A2C-00A0C90A90CE} HKCR\CLSID\{9E56BE61-C50F-11CF-9A2C-00A0C90A90CE} (These run C:\WINDOWS\system32\sendmail.dll) |