NARRATIVE ACCOUNT OF THE ORGANIZATION AND ACTIVITIES
OF THE DOGWOOD PROJECT

BY

December 5, 1944

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P.K./mg:gh
TO: Major Lee M. Sharrar  
Executive Officer  
FROM: [Redacted]  
DATE: 5 December 1944  
SUBJECT: "Dogwood Project, Istanbul Mission"

1. I attach herewith a narrative account of the organization and activities of the DOGWOOD Project as I remember it at this time.

2. The report has been written without recourse to files or notes so I have had no way to check errors in fact. Many of the statements contained therein are subject to correction or controversy, but they are true to the best of my knowledge and belief and in accord with my memory.

3. The report is submitted as an original with one carbon copy together with a chart of the chain organization which has been copied from a photographic copy of my original chart in Istanbul. All rough draft copies are to be destroyed after proofreading and no copies have been retained.
A. Introduction

1. The following account has been written entirely from memory without recourse to notes and without access to files. Much of the material herein contained may be highly controversial, and such statements should be considered only as the personal opinion of the writer. Without access to files I cannot state how many reports each agent turned in or his percentage of error. I will try to give, however, my personal estimate of each man's evaluation, his loyalty to the Allied cause or his Axis affiliations. The report starts with a simple narrative, as best I remember, explaining the organization and expansion of an enterprise known as the Cereus-Dogwood Show. It started out as "Cereus".

Section II

A. Preliminary Discussions with Dogwood

1. During the second week of July 1943, Mr. McFarland arranged for [XXX] and myself to meet secretly a contact that had been turned over to him jointly by Mr. Robert Parker of the OWI and [XXX] of the British ISLD. The contact was [X] a Czechoslovakian engineer who had been a resident of Istanbul for something more than fifteen years. Mr. McFarland arranged the meeting and then withdrew, leaving [XXX] and myself to question and converse with [X]. [XXX] later took the name of Mr. Dogwood, we will refer to him hereafter by that name). Mr. McFarland did not see Dogwood again until late December.

2. During that first meeting Dogwood explained in some detail
his activities in Turkey—that he had been a resident engineer for some fifteen years, exclusive representative of various

His references were satisfactory and [redacted] had been assured by Mr. McFarland that Dogwood came to us with a clean bill of health from the British and from the OWI.

3. During our conversations it developed that Dogwood had worked for more than a year with [redacted] of the British Services and that he had done this work without pay. It later developed that [redacted] who was absent from Turkey at the time of our first conversation, had gone to England to discuss the future plans of his own department and returned to Turkey with a major's commission for Dogwood in the British Army. At the time of our conversation, however, even the possibility of this was unknown to Dogwood and to us; and Dogwood had advised the British that since they had no permanent status for him in their organization, he was leaving their services and would try to work with the Americans. Mr. McFarland's statement that Dogwood came to us with a clean bill of health led us to believe that this change met with the approval of the British ISLD.

4. It also developed that Dogwood had done intelligence work for the Czech organization from Jerusalem to Istanbul. He knew, for example, Colonel Kompost who headed the Czech Deuxieme Bureau in Jerusalem. He also knew the Czech representative
in Turkey, but because of some personal clash did not care to work with him, and we found later that the feeling was mutual.

5. During our original conversations which took place on two succeeding afternoons, Dogwood demonstrated that he knew quite a lot about the intelligence business and its secret systems of communications. He showed us several devices which were exceedingly clever and very effective, and [redacted] and myself were impressed with his command of the economic, social and political and even military status in Central Europe.

B. Decision to Organize Separate Group

6. After we had concluded our conversations with Dogwood, [redacted] and myself discussed the entire proceedings in private. I took the stand that Dogwood was exceedingly able, clever, shrewd, calculating and cunning, and that his loyalty to the Allied cause was perfectly genuine. [redacted] maintained, however, that Dogwood was too good, and that in his estimation he was a German spy playing the boldest of games in an attempt to penetrate our own secret service or services. Since I had heard all the facts and all the discussions which prompted [redacted] opinion, it was easy for me to fall in line with his conviction; and we decided then and there that perhaps Dogwood was too dangerous. I reported this opinion to Mr. McFarrland who said that he had no opinion on the subject whatsoever, that the British had cleared him, and that we would have to make up our own minds as to whether to use him or not. Mr. McFarrland then departed for Cairo. After a series of long discussions [redacted] decided that it might be worthwhile to try Dogwood, so we agreed to take him on. We radioed Mr. McFarrland in Cairo for his control and budget and received his
approval to go ahead.

7. We decided to establish Dogwood as a special cell having no relation whatsoever to Mr. McFarland's headquarters except that broad matters of policy would be decided by Mr. McFarland and that all reports of an intelligence character would be submitted to Mr. McFarland's office and to no other agency or branch. In the meantime I spent several days with Dogwood in his own private office where he maintained and conducted his engineering business. He had three staff members at that time, one a young Greek technician by the name of [redacted] a stenographer and secretary, [redacted] and a confidential assistant who took the name of Gladiola.

8. None of these staff members ever heard the name of McFarland until many months later, with the possible exception of Gladiola. No one ever heard of the OSS. They did not know where Mr. McFarland's office was located and had no contact whatsoever with any members of McFarland's staff except by social accident. [redacted] was clever, and I now regard him as one of the best technical helpers we had. [redacted] was a person of exceptional ability. She could read, write and speak fluently English, French, German, Turkish, Greek, Spanish, and some Czech and Polish. With one stenographic helper she took care of all the volume of material that came through Dogwood's office. Gladiola was [redacted]

I took the entire Dogwood staff with me to the new location.

9. Excessive crowding in Istanbul made a search for office space
difficult, but through ________ in Istanbul, and ________ I found a suitable office we could take over as cover. The name of the firm was ________ I have never had any reason to suspect that ________ inadvertently uncovered our activities even to his wife, and he gave us help wherever we needed it.

10. The firm ________ and since the conditions of war stopped all their ________ business the staff had been reduced to one person who maintained the office and marked time until the end of the war. This man was ________ who had worked ________ continuously for twenty-three years. He lived in the village of ________ and I found that he was an extremely pious man with an admirable wife and family, a member of the local ________ I arranged the office in such a way that ________ had a small room entirely apart from any of the activities that went on, and he was unable to see the visitors who came and went; but as time went on we became convinced of his loyalty to the Allied cause and of his complete discretion so we put him on our own payroll and delegated him to handle ________ translations and to be our cashier. He handled all the funds which I secured from McFarland's office.
for the operations of Dogwood's enterprise.

11. Included in Dogwood's organization but not in any way included in his engineering business.

C. Communications Laboratory

12. I found that these two men had invented the communication devices that Dogwood had shown us during our first meeting with him. Their skill in microscopy and microphotography as adjunct of their laboratory work made them key people in our communications systems. I established both of them in a laboratory which was separate from the Dogwood office and located on the ground floor of my own office. We used the laboratory to devise and handle secret ciphers, to give special training to people going to the field, to microphotograph documents and intelligence material, and to produce communication devices for our own use and for the use of Mr. McFarland's office whenever they needed it. was known as Narcissus, but we
never bothered to give a flower name.

D. I spent as little time as possible in the office, but I tried to appear at least once a day. went to McFarland's office only very seldom. All policy contacts with that office were made by myself, but after a certain length of time acted as courier and always took the weekly reports under seal to McFarland's headquarters. Of the entire organization and myself were the only ones who knew the location of McFarland's office and no one in McFarland's office, not even McFarland himself, knew the location of our establishment.
A. Activities of the Organization

15. By the time the Dogwood Show was established in its own office a month had passed, and we had outlined a program to obtain military intelligence and economic, political, industrial and medical information about the Axis countries. We found that most of the German technical journals were highly restricted in their circulation, and that they were no longer available to subscribers, but through a special arrangement with Von Papen the Turkish Government received regularly one copy of each of the important German technical magazines and papers. These documents were sent to the University of Istanbul technical library and were available only to a certain restricted few. However, through Narcissus we were able to secure the copies as they arrived, take them clandestinely to our laboratory, photograph them and return them by the next morning. From them we were able to obtain a mass of information mostly of interest to R&A but as time went on our work grew to such an extent that we did not have the staff or time to take care of all of it. About this time we received a request from Washington headquarters stating that the penetration of Central Europe from Sweden, Switzerland and England had not been successful and asking us to see if we could do anything about it. Thus the penetration of Axis countries became the sole interest of the Dogwood Show. We were not concerned with Roumania or Bulgaria, even though they were Axis partners, or Greece, Yugoslavia, or Albania which were occupied countries. Our activities centered around Hungary, Austria and Germany, and Czechoslovakia to some extent. Our problem was to establish some kind of communication exchange inside Germany and to secure the services of people who could travel in and
out. We could have used Turks as any Turk could apply for a visa to go straight to Berlin, but since Turks, with hardly an exception, were loyal first to Turkey and perhaps second to Germany, we were afraid to trust them with any such missions. We always felt that they would tell all they could find out to the Turkish Secret Police to protect themselves. Therefore Axis people were the only ones that we felt willing to use. We concentrated our efforts on Anti-Nazi Central Europeans in Istanbul and with a few key people built our various chains of their personal contacts. The risk of penetration by Axis agents was fairly high, but as long as we managed to keep independent chains in water-tight compartments and to keep the entire organization in ignorance of McFarland’s office and OSS we did not feel that penetration of our group by the Gestapo would be of any serious consequence as they could find out nothing that would be of Number I value to German Intelligence. We felt that we had practically nothing to lose and much to gain.

16. One of the first dependable contacts we made was a friend of Dogwood who became known as Periwinkle. He was an Austrian by birth, He was clever and very personable and I think that his value to lay in his ability to meet people and make them like him. He had extensive connections all through
Austria and hundreds of people knew him and liked him. Most of our good contacts came to us through Periwinkle although for some length of time I did not know that he was responsible. Dogwood was apparently content to let us think the contacts were his own. Periwinkle advised us one day that one of his oldest friends from Vienna, later called Stock, had arrived in Istanbul and that since his friend was a man of extensive contacts in the German war industrial machinery we should arrange to see him at once.

Periwinkle arranged for me to meet Stock in a closed summer hotel and I had five meetings with him. During these meetings Stock told me about his connections -- operators of seven rubber and buna manufacturing plants scattered from Duisberg to Krakow -- and he told me in great detail about the German V-1 and V-2 weapons. This was in September of 1943. Stock gave fuel and construction details about the V-2, its exact size, its speed, range and the location of various plants which were engaged in manufacturing or assembling the weapons. He included Penemunde. This material was sent through the Cairo office and before long we received a letter of commendation from London for this information and we found out later that they excoriated their British Istanbul office for not giving them the information before we did. On the basis of those reactions we decided that Stock was 100% sincere. Subsequent events showed that Stock's information was about 92 per cent right. Since these reports established our confidence in Stock and Periwinkle we let them go ahead and expand that particular cell and to work up later the Cassia program for Austria.
He was a member of the Secret Committee of Fourteen -- a group of able and experienced Austrian politicians who had organized for the day when it would be possible to throw the Nazis out of Austria and reestablish an Austrian government.

Cassia built up his own intelligence and sabotage chain by appointing as warehouse managers men whom he trusted implicitly. These various warehouse men could report directly to Cassia through codes which they had devised concerning any military movements or combat intelligence that came their way. It was an extensive and dangerous organization -- dangerous for the personnel.

SECRET
Section IV

A. Organization of the Austrian Freedom Movement

17. While the negotiations with Cassia were proceeding, Dogwood started work on organizing an Austrian Freedom Movement, which had been in the minds of several of our affiliates. Cassia himself, although he was unaware of the Istanbul movement along those lines, was devoting much of his time inside Austria to the promotion of such an organization. Hyacinth, Magnolia, Correopsis and Crocus had all done some preliminary work on the Freedom Movement, but their activities had never been coordinated. So Dogwood brought them together and we prepared in our office a complete outline of what the Austrian Freedom Movement should do and how it should be promoted. It can be seen on the accompanying chart that these various people belong to different and non-related flower chains. Yet they were all known to each other as personal acquaintances (with the exception of Cassia) long before any of our chains were organized. Stock also came into the picture a little later, and he acted as liaison officer between Cassia and Periwinkle. Dogwood also acted as direct contact. Plans for extensive sabotage within Austria and organization for propaganda outside Europe were the chief concern of Cassia, for his plans fell in very closely with the Freedom Movement which Dogwood and Correopsis had cooked up.

18. Magnolia and Gardenia, operating as one chain with the part-time assistance of Correopsis, were in direct contact with the German Ambassador von Papen. This chain was inactive most of the time, but there was one occasion when we did do some work directly with the German Ambassador. This is known to General
Donovan only.

19. Hyacinth, who as noted above was interested in the Austrian Freedom Movement, was also the Istanbul head of the Camelia chain and acted as our liaison in that entire matter. Whether or not information about the Austrian Freedom Movement crossed over either to the German Ambassador or to Camelia through the dual contacts just explained is unknown to me, but the very nature of the Austrian Freedom Movement was such that knowledge of its existence by Camelia or by von Papen would have no harmful consequences. It turned out later that the captured German generals at Stalingrad formed a German Freedom Movement in Moscow under the direction of the Soviets, and grew to such proportions that the Movement maintained its own broadcasting program and published in German a weekly newspaper which was an excellent piece of propaganda.

20. At the same time that the Austrian Freedom Movement was gaining a little momentum in Istanbul, and while the Stock-Cassia program was developing, two other major problems started to take shape. They were the Camelia and Jasmine enterprises. I will explain the second first.

B. The Jasmine Enterprise

21. In the early part of September the Assistant Military Attache called me to his office to interview one of his visitors and, at the same time, I met the man later known as Gerbera. Gerbera had gone first to Walter Birge, the American Consul in Istanbul and suggested that he would like to work with the Americans. He believed that he could be of considerable use and could obtain some help from us. Birge told him that he had no authority to engage in that type of activity and sent him to our Military Attache. There Gerbera was told that the
Military Department had no funds with which to conduct such operations so a meeting was arranged with me. I found that Gerbera was the director of the Jewish Underground in Istanbul and that for some time he had been running an intelligence business in and out of Europe, particularly Poland. Gerbera was [REDACTED] years of age, was very active, very smart, and acknowledged to be very trustworthy. He made a very good impression on me. He explained his business was principally the smuggling into Germany of gold coins which could be turned over to Jews in Central Europe to assist them in getting to Turkey or some other neutral country. To do this work he had employed over a period of time a man we called Trillium. Trillium was acknowledged to be an untrustworthy double-crossing rat, and we all accepted it at the start; but he was extremely skillful at his business and was using his missions to make himself a fortune on the side and to work for various agencies. He was also a full-time agent for the Hungarian Deuxième Bureau, working as a spy directly under the Hungarian General Staff. The Hungarian Staff had not more confidence in him than we have, but Trillium was able to do certain things and by means of bribery he had bought his way through the German Gestapo in such a way as to permit him to carry on his person into Axis territory from time to time as much as seventy-five pounds weight of gold coin. It is also my unsubstantiated belief that Trillium bought diamonds on the Turkish black market which he would smuggle into Germany for his own profit and which were probably broken into industrial diamonds for aircraft production. Gerbera's purpose in meeting me was to persuade us to work with him and use the same man either as a courier or as a source of military intelligence, perhaps
intelligence, perhaps order of battle. It turned out later, and I still do not know whether or not Gerbera knew this, that Trillium was anxious to make contact with us.

22. The original negotiations with Trillium were conducted by Seager and Gerbera under the direction of Dogwood. I never saw Trillium until months later and then he met me under the name of Percy Fredericks. Shortly after the meeting with Gerbera we drew up a questionnaire covering some general information about the big triangle of the Bulgarian Airport located at Plovdiv, Pleven and Gorna-Orjeshovica near Tarnovo. Since this information was already in the hands of the British, we thought we could check Trillium's sincerity. The questionnaire asked for information concerning troop movements and requested that Trillium set up a small group of people who could report on railway traffic coming into Sofia from the north and its dispersal along the Aegean and Black Seas. We gave Major Seager twelve hundred lira to be turned over to Trillium for incidental expenses on his next trip, and Seager passed on seven hundred lira retaining five hundred against the time when Trillium should return with what we might consider valuable information. These preliminary meetings were attended by Trillium, Seager, Dogwood and Gerbera, but Dogwood did manage to see Trillium alone for a few minutes. With those arrangements, Trillium left for Budapest.

23. Upon Trillium's return to Istanbul about four weeks later we got in touch with him through Gerbera and another meeting was arranged with Seager. Dogwood and Gerbera were also present, and it developed during the talks that Trillium had not brought back the information we requested. His excuse was that he had just been too busy on this trip, and that since
his expenses were paid by his regular affiliate, he did not feel that he should keep the seven hundred lira, and he immediately returned them. It also developed during the conversation, so Dogwood tells me, that Trillium apparently had information he did not wish to divulge in the presence of Gerbera or Seager, so Dogwood quietly arranged with Trillium in the Czech language to meet him alone later that evening, Czech being unknown to Gerbera or Seager. The subsequent meeting between Dogwood and Trillium lasted all night and during that interview, Dogwood found out that Trillium wanted to bypass the other two, that he was a regular agent of the Hungarian General Staff, and that the Staff had sent him to contact the Americans who were engaged in high level secret activities. During that meeting Trillium said that the General Staff wanted to send a Hungarian officer to contact us with a view to establishing a permanent liaison, and that Hungary would be glad to receive an American in exchange to act as liaison officer under cover in Budapest. This may have been prompted by the Regent, but the only named principal was the Hungarian Chief of Staff. It may have been done to feel out the American with reference to separate peace terms.

From that time forward all of our dealings were directly with Trillium, and he said he would bring back with him on his next trip a representative of the Hungarian Staff.

24. Contemporary with the above negotiations, we received through Hyacinth our first communications from a member of the OKW in Berlin whom we called Camelia. I do not think that this communication was instigated by the High Command, but I believe it came directly from the anti-Hitler secret group that was gradually taking form in the German Army. Camelia's first communi-
communication came through Hyacinth who was an old personal friend and in whom we had and still have high confidence.

C. The Camelia Enterprise

25. Camelia was a colonel in the OKW who was said to be directly in charge of all the occupation troops in France concerning some feature of their activities. He was exceedingly cautious and in his first communication explained the need for the greatest care and secrecy in all of our negotiations. He explained that he had sent through an American group in Switzerland a message by one of his agents which was to be coded and sent to America in the most secret code the Americans had. I do not know which American group he gave this communication to, but the message was intercepted on its way out of Switzerland in a code to which the Germans already had the complete key. The Germans promptly decoded the message and laid its full translation on Camelia's desk which just happened to be their regular procedure. Camelia was the man to whom this intercept would naturally come so he was able to suppress it and save his subordinate and himself, but it was a very narrow squeak. Camelia's first communication told us that he would come to Istanbul provided we could bring to Istanbul to meet and identify him either Dorothy Thompson, General Smuts, or Alexander Kirk, the American Minister to Egypt. All of these people were old friends of Camelia's in Berlin and in them he had the utmost confidence. Furthermore, they had known him well enough to identify him.

26. The only one available to us was Kirk, and for various reasons we did not wish to bring him into this negotiation; but since he was the only one, we got in touch with him to see if he could
come to Istanbul. We thought at that time the request was rather futile since Kirk could not come to Istanbul without the permission of the State Department and Ambassador Steinhart, that he could not come incognito as Camelia suggested, and that he probably wouldn't come anyhow. The latter turned out to be correct as Kirk flatly refused. In the meantime, through Hyacinth, we tried our best not to stop negotiations entirely hoping that if Camelia would come to Istanbul he would talk to someone else besides Kirk and we were quite ready to accept him on Hyacinth's identification.

27. By the time Kirk's refusal had reached us, it was the fifteenth of November and we found ourselves with three major projects approaching a workable state. Those three projects were identified as Cassia, Camelia and Jasmine.

28. Trillium had come back and had brought with him Jasmine, but on that trip, Jasmine was not contacted by Dogwood or by any of our organization (I believe the British contacted him). He sent word to us, however, that he would be glad to work provided he could satisfy himself that he was dealing with the right people. He was not content to deal with any run-of-the-mill group of secret agents since he represented the Hungarian General Staff and negotiations would be of a higher political level, so we devised and agreed to the following scheme. We would broadcast from Algiers radio by shortwave during one of the regular French programs a certain message addressed to Trillium. If Jasmine intercepted that message in Budapest, he would know that he was negotiating with the right people since it would be impossible for any other group to get that particular message sent out of Algiers radio.
Jasmine agreed that if he received that message, he in turn, the following day, would broadcast from the regular Budapest station, standard broadcast, during a certain news program, some reference to the Izmir Fair which had closed about a week previously and was no longer in the news. The message we were to send was in French, "Message pour Trillium. Sincérite avant Tout", and without delay we sent a signal to McFarland in Cairo explaining the details and asking him to get it put on the Algiers radio. This was done at the proper time and I picked up the signal myself at Istanbul. It was also heard in Budapest, because for the next two nights running a proper reference to the Izmir Fair was broadcast by Budapest radio.

29. In the meantime, Jasmine had returned to Budapest and the Austrian Freedom Movement had continued to develop. One of its members had written a series of short propaganda talks in German which we thought would be excellent for a broadcasting program from Algiers. So I gathered up the propaganda script together with a recording of the voice of their author and made arrangements to fly to Algiers and try to put the author on the air as one of our regular features. I also wanted to clarify our relationship and arrange for future coded messages to be broadcast into central Europe by station Hippo. I left immediately, and upon my arrival in Cairo met General Donovan learning for the first time about the coming Mena House Conference which took place shortly before the Teheran Conference. After going over the entire Jasmine picture as well as the Cassia pictures with General Donovan, he took up the matter with the Joint Chiefs of Staff who had just arrived in Cairo. He arranged to have me visit the planning board at the Mena
House to discuss the possibilities of Jasmine and the assumption that Jasmine's agents might penetrate our organization. Our joint opinion after those discussions was that Jasmine might turn out to be a German agent or a plant, but that since he could learn nothing from us of prime military importance, we stood to lose nothing and we might gain much. I then flew to Algiers and made tentative broadcasting arrangements with Hazeltine, the head of the Algiers Psychological Warfare Board. I returned to Cairo and back to Istanbul, arriving there December 8.
Section IV

A. Urgency of December Meetings

30. Upon arrival I found the Dogwood office in pretty much of an uproar over the urgency of two or three projects. Our Austrian Freedom Movement, which had been viewed with mild disapproval by Moerland's office, was showing more signs of merit, and word had reached us that our State Department was feeling out certain Germans in Ankara, not related to our group, concerning the establishment of a Freedom Movement. Dogwood felt that we had missed the boat. Also, word had been received that Cassie was making arrangements to come to Istanbul in the very near future. We would have to have something for him. Furthermore, Jasmine and Trillium were about to make an appearance and Hyacinth informed us that Camelia was on his way down. Our chief worry was Camelia, for he had refused to talk to anyone except Kirk and we had been unable to bring Kirk to Istanbul. The immediate problem was to find someone to whom Camelia would talk. We were in such a hurry that I neglected to register with the Turkish police either my return from Cairo or my departure for Ankara which took place immediately. This forced me to waste more time in police court under a charge of failing to register. However, I got to Ankara as quickly as possible and got hold of General Tyndall, our Military Attache to Turkey. We tried to figure out some way of sending a plane for Kirk or sending Camelia to Cairo in another plane. Because of Turkish regulations and military restrictions neither plan would have worked, so Tyndall finally
agreed to come to Istanbul and hold himself available if Camelia would talk to him.

31. Camelia arrived December 17 and Hyacinth persuaded him to see Tyndall. The meeting took place and lasted about an hour and a half, but apparently Camelia got cold feet. Whereas he talked to Tyndall most of the hour and a half the sum total of his remarks was zero. He spent the time talking of the importance of the plan which he represented and the need for the greatest possible security since it involved many people of high rank in the German Army. By the time Tyndall arrived at the meeting Camelia had prepared a page and a half letter addressed to Mr. Kirk which he asked Tyndall to send for him. The letter was a personal greeting and a series of disguised hints concerning the importance of Camelia's trip, but there was nothing of interest to us. The letter was later delivered to Kirk and he replied with an unsigned note stating that he saw no reason for them to renew their former acquaintance. This reply was never passed on to Camelia.

32. After Camelia returned to Germany we found out from Hyacinth that Camelia's alleged plan was to suggest a separate peace with the English and Americans in return for which the Camelia group in the Wehrmacht would withdraw key troops by military order from the French coast. This would allow the Anglo-British invasion to enter France with the least possible trouble. The withdrawal of German SS and pro-Nazi troops would permit the Anglo-Americans to march in from the West and occupy Germany against token resistance yet enough resistance to insure the military defeat of the German Army which Camelia thought necessary to prevent further outbreak of the European War. At the same time the Wehrmacht would muster
its strongest forces against the Russians and would guarantee to hold a line running from Tilsit to Lwow. It was the opinion of Camelia that the Eastern Front could be held on that line, and perhaps recent events substantiate his opinion. A third part of the Camelia plan was to assassinate Hitler, and the persons involved were Rundstedt, Liszt, Halder, von Beck (perhaps Kluge) and a person who had been the former burgomeister of Berlin named Goerdeler. The attempt of July 21, 1944 proves Camelia's sincerity.

33. Another urgent concern at this time was the Trillium-Jasmine development. On Saturday, December 18, Jasmine arrived and while I was busy with General Tyndall discussing the events of the Camelia meeting, Dogwood sat down and prepared over Saturday and Sunday an outline to cover the points of a discussion to be held with Jasmine Sunday afternoon the 19th at 6:30 in the home of Jacaranda.

34. Here is another point which I have not yet mentioned. When our broadcast messages to Budapest had been answered satisfactorily we sent word to Jasmine through Trillium that if he was sincere, he might get himself appointed Hungarian Military Attache to Turkey. Then we might work together. We did not believe that this could take place, but Jasmine arranged the change and the first word we had of it before it was made public was from Jacaranda, Jasmine's old personal friend. At the time of the Sunday meeting, Jasmine's appointment had been made public.

35. Present at the meeting were Jasmine, Jacaranda, Dogwood and myself. With both Jacaranda and Dogwood acting as cheek interpreters the discussion was conducted in German, French
(which I understood), and Hungarian since Jasmine spoke no English. Most of the talking was done by Dogwood from his script which he had prepared in German and of which I had no English copy. I was not at all satisfied with Dogwood's attitude since his manner was more that of a conquering military leader shouting his terms at a defeated enemy than a negotiator's attempt to implant confidence enough to secure easy information. The sum total of the discussion was that the Hungarians would have to come over to the Allied side in an active way to secure any assistance from the Allies and that the best way to do it was through political and industrial sabotage to start at once. It must be remembered that Hungary was not an occupied country at that time. Jasmine demurred on grounds that Germany was prepared for immediate invasion of Hungary at the first sign of defection.

36. It was obvious to me that Jasmine was not satisfied with Dogwood as a person, first because Dogwood was believed to be part Jewish and second because Dogwood was a Czech. Finally Jasmine inquired as to what steps Anglo-Americans would take to protect Hungary from Russia, and my answer to that was that Russia was one of the United Nations and that no plans would be made with the Hungarians that the Russians would not know about beforehand. He then suggested that Hungary desired a guarantee of her borders of the last thousand years. This statement clarified his dislike for Dogwood, for his remarks referred to Ruthenia which had been filched from Hungary and given to Slovakia. It explained his dislike for the Czechs, misplaced or not. The meeting terminated with Jasmine agreeing to take back to his principals a resume' of our discussions which we prepared.
37. The next few days word came in that Cassia planned to arrive shortly, so we delegated to Stock the responsibility for those arrangements. By this time December 25 had arrived and on that morning I went to the American Hospital with double pneumonia and remained in bed until almost the end of January. The press of affairs got me out of bed at that time, but I had a relapse on February 1 and found myself back in bed under medical care.

38. During the time that the three major projects were in progress other minor affairs were also under way. Azalea had come out of Bulgaria to contact us, apparently sent by the Regent and the Prime Minister after the death of Boris, and he advised us that Bulgaria wanted to get out of the war and would like to deal with the Allies. I made this known to General Donovan in Cairo but was advised by Toulmin that we were to pull all our men off Bulgaria and give the green light to a new American scheme known as Project K.

39. A German Gestapo agent whom we called Plumbago had approached us apparently looking for a soft place to land after the German defeat which he anticipated. He agreed to work with us and wanted to know what we had to offer in exchange. We told him that if he did any good work which we considered satisfactory we would agree to notify the proper authorities at the end of hostilities that Plumbago had worked for us and helped us, but that we would guarantee no consideration for him whatsoever. If the proper authorities later decided to offer him something for his help, that would be their business not ours. He was satisfied with that arrangement. We then arranged to send him back to Berlin with one of our old X-35 radio sets suggesting he tell the Gestapo that he had pene-
penetrated our organization and fooled us into believing that he had come over to our side. We gave him a special cipher which we devised for his use only, not related to any other cipher we were using, and we expected him to turn both radio and cipher over to the Gestapo. Communication details were explained to him and we fully expected, without telling this to Plumbago, that the Gestapo would contact us via the radio and give us erroneous information thinking that we would believe it came from Plumbago. In this way we hoped to find out just what lies the Gestapo would like us to accept. Unfortunately we never made contact.

40. Also going on at this time was an Albanian scheme which we called Nopal. The pretender to the Zog throne was living in Korca, Albania and we had every reason to believe that he was anti-Nazi and anti-Italian. His daughter lived in Istanbul, a personal friend of mine, and his brother lived in Beylerbey across the water from my home. I also knew the brother well, so I was quite pleased when McFarland brought an escaped Albanian to me who wanted to get messages to the man in Korca. In our laboratory we prepared cipher messages and instructions in Albanian and on microfilm and provided my friend in Beylerbey with the necessary secret devices to carry them through German lines. He left on schedule and arrived safely, but up to the time of my departure from Istanbul in September 1944 he had not been able to return. In the meantime his brother in Korca had died. We received news of our courier from time to time but nothing of any importance to intelligence.

41. Early in September 1943 Dogwood brought in Heliotrope and Hybiscus. Heliotrope was an ex-Russian sea captain with Greek citizenship, and Hybiscus was a young Greek wireless operator
who had his own equipment hidden away in Piraeus. They
wanted to help by giving us information about the Germans in
Greece, for a consideration of course, so we agreed to advance
fifty gold sovereigns on a project whereby Hybiscus would
smuggle himself back into Greece, smuggle his portable radio
set to Salonika and broadcast to us military intelligence
about the Germans. Further payments were contingent on his
arrival in Salonika. Apparently the Germans were so well in
control that he never contacted us by radio and never got to
Salonika. Under those circumstances we refused to pay him
any more under our agreement. Hybiscus managed however to
get out of Greece again in a small sailboat and brought us
several written reports. Upon his return to Greece we heard
no more from him.

42. During October 1943 Dogwood got in touch with another Czech
who had spent the last fifteen years in Bulgaria and gave
him the name of Correander. Correander was a hydraulic engi-
neer who had spent much of his time installing water systems
throughout small towns in Bulgaria and in almost every Bulgar-
ian military airport. We set him up in a small temporary
establishment on the other side of town and provided him with
the necessary cartographic materials to produce scale maps of
call Bulgarian airports and many of their major hydro-electric
installations. He spent many weeks doing this and the complete
job was skillfully done and quite voluminous. I am unaware
as to whether that material was of top value to the Fifteenth
Air Force or not. Once that was completed we did not use
Correander until much later.

43. The time I went to the hospital on Christmas day the irons
which we had in the fire were all getting hot at the same time,
therefore I had to turn over the direction of the work to somebody else. McFarland came to the hospital and I explained the situation, whereupon he agreed to take over the direction. Until this time he had never known the details of our organization nor its location although he did know Dogwood since he was the first man who brought him to us. From that time forward I had no administrative responsibilities concerning the Dogwood Show.
Section V

A. Termination of My Services

44. During February 1944 while I was still recovering from my illness, DOGWOOD succeeded in separating me from the DOGWOOD show completely, and he did it in the following way:

45. Up to my illness he had never had contact with MACFARLAND but I had been obliged to turn over the direction of the show to MACFARLAND while I was away. The first I knew of any trouble was when blank got hold of me, unknown to MACFARLAND or DOGWOOD, and related to me some things DOGWOOD said to MACFARLAND in an attempt to eliminate me. His nature was such that he resented any intermediate steps between him and the top authorities, so when the opportunity of making the temporary change permanent presented itself DOGWOOD took the necessary steps. He told MACFARLAND I was impossible to work with, that I was losing my mind if I had ever had any, that it was impossible for him to go on if I were to be there, and that I should be removed. blank was furious about it and excoriated DOGWOOD for saying it and MACFARLAND for giving it any credence. It was apparently the out and out doublecross and quite understandable considering DOGWOOD's vanity and his serious consideration of his own importance. There was no question of his importance, but he took it too seriously. He had built a good chain in Central Europe and had done some good work, and I was extremely reluctant to permit his resignation even though his threat to resign may have been bluff. He told MACFARLAND that I was insecure, that my personal employees were all German agents, that I
was endangering the safety of DOGWOOD and all other members of the flower chain. Some of this information was passed on to me by [REDACTED], the rest by MACFARLAND with whom I had a long talk shortly after these complaints. MACFARLAND had made up his mind, before I saw him, to do exactly what DOGWOOD suggested and to keep me out. [REDACTED] explained to him unknown to me that this was merely a trick on DOGWOOD's part to muscle himself in and keep himself in direct contact with the head of the mission, and that he was doing it because he felt he could get more leniency from MACFARLAND than from me. This I believe was true, and DOGWOOD had found it out during the temporary change. I pointed out to MACFARLAND that he did not have to do it that way, but that I was quite willing to let it pass rather than upset any of the important plans which were going forward—if any. The whole thing was quite understandable to those of us who knew DOGWOOD, but MACFARLAND preferred to do as DOGWOOD suggested.

45. **Needless to say** DOGWOOD's charges were not true. He was irked by the restraint which I put on his purely political projects, and he felt hampered by my insistence that any political project or help given to Axis underground movements would have to be paid for by those groups with military, combat, economic or industrial intelligence and that if we did not get such intelligence we would give no help nor would we be concerned in any way. Perhaps these restrictions took the props out from under promises which DOGWOOD may have made with Axis contacts without my knowledge, and he needed a more lenient hand to bolster his personal reputation among the people he deemed important. Regarding the security angle, his charges were pretty absurd as my people were quite
loyal and made a positive effort to protect my cover.

46. After my talk with MACFARLAND I went to DOGWOOD's office to inquire into the nature of his remarks and he appeared very crestfallen and embarrassed and assured me he had not said many of the things I repeated and that he had not meant in any way to change the administration of our project. However, I decided that it had been changed and was content to let it stand that way for a while. [Redacted] was furious at DOGWOOD and was all for separating him right then, but he accepted my suggestion that we let it ride as it was.
47. About this time I discussed with MACFARLAND the possibility of preparing for a possible invasion of the Balkans and the establishment of a team under our office and under my direction to be concerned only with the gathering of secret documents in occupied Axis territory. We had the idea that many documents which could throw light either on war history or war guilt could be found among the private papers of prominent people in occupied countries, and that much of it might be burned but that a lot would remain because of hurried departures. I therefore planned a trip to Cairo, Algiers, Caserta and Bari for the purpose of finding out what those stations had been thinking along those same lines, or what they had done. I also wished to reestablish and amplify our communications arrangements with Algiers radio. I left Istanbul on the 28 of February for that purpose. I made my inquiries in the places mentioned and in Naples, but found that practically nothing had been done and nothing was in progress along those lines. I did make the communications arrangements with the Psychological Warfare Board in Algiers, and we drew up a document with one copy for the PWB, one copy for MAGNOL in Algiers, one copy for KAYLOR, communications officer in Cairo, and the original for Istanbul. I later found that the Cairo copy had been burned and that the Istanbul copy had been lost as of July 1944 and has never come to light. Failure of the Istanbul office to put the program into effect or acknowledge it at once was the cause of more confusion at Algiers and I do not think our system ever went into effect. It was also the cause of considerable
strife and trouble in the Istanbul office as it resulted in the departure without orders of Mr. Cox of the code room. He apparently left because of lack of security incident to their failure to use the agreement. This trouble in the code room was contemporary with the departure from Istanbul of Major Wickham and Lt. Ullmer.

48. At about this time I was still in Cairo waiting for a re-entry visa to return to Turkey. The day I left Istanbul the Turkish Government had passed new regulations to the effect that any person leaving the country would have to have his reentry visa approved by Ankara before he could return. This meant that the Turkish Embassy in Cairo could not give me a visa until my application had been forwarded to the capital and a favorable reply received. This procedure took six weeks, and although I had applied for my visa before I left Cairo for Algiers I did not receive my reentry permit until the 25 of April.

49. Upon my return to Istanbul in May I found that the scheme for the collection of pertinent documents was still pending and two or three weeks later we received a cable from Washington stating that the project had been killed. I continued to run my laboratory and to work with and O'Connor on troubles which had arisen on the Dogwood project during my absence.

50. I found that the Jasmine and Cassia chains had been broken up by the arrest in Hungary of the principals involved, with the result that the imaginations of our Istanbul staff had run wild. They assumed from the start that the Hungarians had told on the Austrians and vice versa or that Dogwood had
disclosed everything to TRILLIUM who had in turn turned in both chains and that the Gestapo knew all about our plans. This was pure imagination, the result of judgments formed without having the proper facts. In the meantime, accusations flew back and forth, everyone was guilty and every employee of DOGWOOD's chain was a spy in our camp.

51. None of this was true. The arrest of CASSIA was not related to the arrest of JASMINE's group in any way whatsoever. TRILLIUM probably was the key man in the Hungarian difficulty but it could have been PINK. The chances are that the original leak occurred in the Hungarian foreign office which we found out later was a party to our deal with the Hungarian General Staff. KALLAY is said to have known about it. It is my honest opinion that even KADAR himself was surprised at the turn of events. The fact that CASSIA was allowed to continue his business from the Gestapo hotel in Vienna practically proves that the Gestapo had no evidence against him. It was thought for a while that CASSIA's secretary had betrayed him by inadvertently disclosing something on her various secret rounds. I do not believe that this was so. Of course I don't know and never will know exactly what DOGWOOD told TRILLIUM or how much TRILLIUM knew. I don't believe that DOGWOOD took him into his confidence since he knew from the start that TRILLIUM was untrustworthy and an opportunist. CASSIA could know nothing of the Hungarian operations and neither could STOCK. JACARANDA never knew anything about CASSIA until CASSIA's arrest in Budapest. JACARANDA did have contact with IRIS. If JACARANDA had been shadowed professionally, he could have led his followers
only to TRILLIUM, JACARANDA, PINK or his personal family and friends. Yet it is from JACARANDA that we have proof—if there is such a thing—that IRIS is also the infamous Gestapo chief known as Dr. SCHROEDER. Upon one occasion when JACARANDA was taken from jail to Gestapo headquarters for questioning, he got a fleeting glimpse of IRIS leaving the inner sanctum and IRIS immediately scurried out of sight in hopes that JACARANDA had not seen him.

52. By now WISNER and KINGSLLEY had arrived as Chief of S-I and Executive Officer, respectively, and they came apparently with instructions to reorganize rather than abandon the mission. They advised me in a secret meeting that they had some special jobs that they would like to have me perform and that I should hold myself under cover away from the main office pending the completion of their plans. On July 21 the assassination attempt was made on Hitler’s life and the Germans started picking up the high-level members of our CAMELIA scheme. I was asked by WISNER if I would take over the operation of a new group composed of STOCK and PERIWINKLE. I agreed to do so, and WISNER said he would let me know. This never came to pass. On August 2 Turkey broke relations with the Axis which meant that any under-cover work that I might do or had been doing was finished. I therefore started liquidating my own setup and I returned to the United States by my own volition, feeling that I was of no more use in Turkey. I left Istanbul September 14, but I had told PERIWINKLE and JACARANDA that I hoped to return after the fall of Hungary perhaps with a plan for all of us to go to Budapest. Subsequent events have shown that perhaps this plan is not feasible.
Section VII

53. I found upon my arrival at headquarters that certain branches of this organization, particularly S-I, looked upon the entire Istanbul Mission as an exceedingly futile, badly run and stupid project. I am definitely included in their feeling of distaste and some of them, Colonel Aldrich in particular, have been doing some indiscriminate talking to the effect that all I did was loaf around and live off the fat of the land. Had I not heard this before about others I might feel crestfallen, but I do not. I know the circumstances of the Istanbul Mission better than they, and it is a sad commentary that those who are doing most of the talking are those who know the least about it. Just for the record, if I were idle at any time in Istanbul, it was by order and if it appeared that I lived off the fat of the land, it was because the others hadn't the wit to live as well. Unfortunately most members of the mission were not accustomed to living abroad and were inexperienced when it came to establishing themselves properly. I look upon this as one of the causes of their disappointment concerning the work of the mission, since they never had a proper base from which to conduct any negotiations. My establishment was small and thoroughly in keeping with the status of [redacted] under which cover I remained in Turkey. The only charge which was made about the others and which has apparently not been placed at my door is the charge about keeping four or five mistresses in various places.

54. More complications stemmed from the British. They spread the rumour all the way to Washington that MACFARLAND had
become a dope fiend, and that the man in charge of the DOGWOOD Show, meaning myself, was directly responsible for all the leaks about our work to the German High Command. They advised our Washington office that I had deliberately brought in German Gestapo agents to help penetrate our organization and that the Germans were paying me fat sums of money for my invaluable services to the Fuehrer. These reports would be hilarious were it not for the suspicion that S-I believes them. I was also told by one of my British friends, when he had drunk a little more than was good for him, that certain sections in our own X-2 believed the reports to be true. MACFARLAND's actions lead me to think that he, too, may have believed them. The reports are not only lies but stupid ones at that.

55. Some of the circumstances which made the work of the Istanbul main office difficult were first that the chief of mission did not pay enough attention to the morale of his staff; second, that when he requested staff members and equipment which had to come through the Cairo office, the most able members and the best equipment stayed in Cairo while Istanbul got the leftovers; third, the office was not organized in such a way as to do its work quietly and expanded to such size that it could not remain hidden if it wished. I believe one of the minor mistakes made by X-2 in Istanbul was that the X-2 representative established his offices in the mission headquarters. I always felt that X-2 should be entirely apart and strictly undercover. This was impossible in the main office since the State Department, OWI, the Military and Naval Attaches were all more or less parties to what
was going on in MACFARLAND's office. My own enterprise was
kept under some sort of cover the entire time although I
would be the last to deny that the cover was full of holes
by the time August 1944 rolled around. In my own opinion
MACFARLAND's office should never have attempted to stay
under cover but that it should have separated its various
enterprises into small offices scattered over Istanbul with
carefully worked out secret liaisons. Furthermore, they
should never have mixed the work of groups interested in
occupied countries with the groups that were concentrating
on Axis countries themselves. There is a distinct and dif-
ferent approach to each. Liaison with the British should
have been performed by only one person. But probably the
greatest handicap was the difficulty of communications with
headquarters. Good communications should have been esta-
blished in Turkey before the mission arrived, or certainly
before it ever started to work.
SECTION I

1. When and under what circumstances was the Dogwood Chain created?
   Covered in report.

2.
3. By whom and under what circumstances were the agents recruited?

Agents were recruited only by our own key men and every recruit had to have the unanimous approval of LOGWOOD and myself. The recruits were presented as a rule by LOGWOOD, WB. WINKLE, STOCK, HYACINTH, JACARANDA and MAGNOLIA. [Redacted] and I would approve recruits recommended by those people since we had confidence in them and we ourselves were unable to make a thorough check from a C-E standpoint. To protect ourselves against error in this respect we kept our show secret from MACFARLAND's office.

4. What were the several chains running out of Istanbul into Central Europe and especially Hungary?

See Chart. Each chain is shown in its relationship to LOGWOOD and to other chains. The connecting lines represent contact or liaison. At the bottom of the chart is a large group of independent agents or sources completely unrelated to each other or to other chains, and responsible only to LOGWOOD. Some of them I knew, most I did not. We only knew the activities of the CAMELLIA, MAGNOLIA, HYACINTH, JACARANDA and STOCK chains. I am not fully aware of the activities of the PRIMROSE, OLEANDER, LAVANDER and MIGNONETTE groups since they were established after my authority ceased. I do know, however, that LAVANDER was concerned with German propaganda and OLEANDER with South German industrial intelligence. PRIMROSE was a very wealthy manufacturer of
with branches and factories all
over the world. LOTUS gathered all types of inform-
ation through a chain of Chinese throughout Central
Europe, and NAPOL was the escaped Albanian Patriot,
head of the Albanian penetration scheme.

5. Sketches of agents belonging to the several chains.
I shall not attempt to describe more than the key
members of the chain. I don't feel that I knew the
others well enough.

(a) DOGWOOD. DOGWOOD is a Czech,

He is shrewd, clever, determined
but not excitable and is a horse for work.

He is... ponderous in his manner and
somewhat opinionated and pedantic. He is vain in a
German way, and is impressed by people of position or
political power. His vanity is probably his weakest
point especially when hooked up to his mild reverance for what we call a big shot. He is brainy and thorough which is best illustrated by the following:

He never actually resented authority, but he was exceedingly put out when anyone interferred with his own plans or crossed him up in matters of policy. He is hard to handle. Perhaps he was a little too trustworthy, but that was probably based on his fallibility born of personal vanity.

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(b) PERIWINKLE. PERIWINKLE was an Austrian (See report). He is as I have said connected and his popularity was based on his outstanding ability to meet people and make them like him. He is about years old, excellent company with a host of interesting friends who all like him, and yet he is not outstandingly brilliant or brainy. In my opinion he is perfectly sincere and honest, good-natured to a fault and a good man to have around.

(c) STOCK. STOCK is a jovial Austrian of unquestioned executive ability, well-connected with prominent Austrian families and very much a responsible person. His rating for veracity is the highest of all our agents and the material that he was able to give us was of great strategic importance. He is smart and honest in what he was doing. He never expected any funds for his services. He looks like an Englishman and dresses like one, and I judge that he is about years old, complexioned, about weighs something like pounds, interested in good food and wines, was our best source of Austrian jokes and humor. He had an eye for women and vice-versa. Never a dull moment when he and PERIWINKLE got together.

(d) MAGNOLIA. MAGNOLIA is a very active and learned German economist.
He is tall, very engaging, jovial and friendly. Speaks only German and a smattering of Turkish and French.

He is a personal friend of Franz von PAPEN, and has been for many years, yet he seldom contacted the German ambassador except through Dr. MARCHIONINI, von PAPEN's personal physician. He has been a resident and he is outstandingly anti-Nazi. His friendship for von PAPEN can be explained by the fact that the German Ambassador himself is also anti-Nazi (he is not pro-Ally; he is pro-German).

(e) HYACINTH. HYACINTH is a

As a person I evaluate HYACINTH as the very highest type with whom we came into contact. This would hold true whether he were German, Mexican or Hottentot. He lived a very quiet life in an apartment full of fine Persian rugs, every one a museum piece. His wife was a typical hausfrau, a blonde Austrian whose interests were concerned entirely with housekeeping and food. He was closely connected with the old Junker families of Kaiser Wilhelm's Germany, and many of his friends were famous and powerful in their
day. HYACINTH is about the same age as MAGNOLIA --
It was through him that we contacted CAMELIA.
HYACINTH and MAGNOLIA were great personal friends and
both were interested in the Austrian Freedom Movement.
(f) JACARANDA. JACARANDA is a Hungarian
a member of the Austro-Hungarian lesser nobility.

and remained in that position
until Turkey broke off relations with the Axis on August
2. JACARANDA is a loyal Hungarian and is anti-German or
anti-anything which would encourage the independence and
sovereignty of his own country. His family is known to
the Regent Horthy and JACARANDA himself can be called a
personal acquaintance of the Regent. I was the first
one to make contact with JACARANDA and he expressed his
willingness to help the Allied cause. He made two refusals
in connection with his agreement of which the first was his reluctance to work with any Jewish organization, only because all Jews were very closely watched in Hungary; and second, he would take no money for any services he might render. He is of medium height and good company, highly civilized, like a portion of the urben Hungarians, a person of definite culture and taste and his record with proves that he has ability and brains. He is exceedingly cautious and security-minded, and all of our meetings with him were carefully planned and secret. His only household servant, an elderly Greek woman, had been trained to be exceedingly cautious of visitors or of divulging any information about them. He was an old personal friend of JASMINÉ, and was in close contact with all Hungarian officials in Istanbul, and many of the Germans. He always carried out our instructions in detail and showed himself quite able to cope with unforeseen situations which arose. I consider him perfectly trustworthy and loyal. Among the other members of the chain who were personally known to me there are none of enough importance to give a lengthy character sketch. However, the chart lists the persons known to me personally and should any special information be needed about anyone I shall be glad to give whatever I know.

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6. How and by whom and under what circumstances was the Hungarian General Staff contacted? Covered in report.


8. Was there ever any indication that [redacted] might have been in the control of the Germans? Covered in report.

9. Did MacFARLAND ever warn [redacted] or any other staff members against [redacted]? Yes. As soon as the signal was received from Washington, I was notified.

10. When and under what circumstances did MacFARLAND meet [redacted]?
    At the second meeting held in the home of JACARANDA at five o'clock in the morning.

11. What was the nature of the Hungarian negotiations, chronologically, preliminary to operations? See report.

12. Did MacFARLAND ever confer directly with CASSIA? Yes. CASSIA conferred with him and separately with O'CONNOR.

13. Under what circumstances was a mission despatched to Hungary and what happened to members of this mission after their arrival? We never despatched a mission to Hungary but apparently some other branch or station of OSS did so. I first
heard about it while flying from Bari to Malta about
the first of April. I received a hint that one of my
old friends had been dropped in. The next I heard was
in September 1944 when JACOBAJDA having returned from
93 days imprisonment in Budapest gave me the following
story: Arrangements had been made with KADAR, Chief
of the Hungarian Deuxieme Bureau, to receive three
American officers who would enter Hungary by parachute
on March 15. Arrangements were made to receive them
secretly, that is, unknown to the Germans, and to take
them to the Hungarian General Staff immediately upon
arrival. Signals were arranged and a spot designated.
Due to bad flying weather the trio did not arrive on
March 15, but on that day KADAR received a telephone
call from German Gestapo headquarters in Budapest asking
him what had become of the three parachutists that had
arrived or were due to arrive. This apparently was the
first time that KADAR even suspected that the Germans
knew about it. He replied that the trio had not arrived,
but that the Hungarians were waiting them and expected
to bring them to the Gestapo prior to the telephone call.
KADAR was forced to work with them in case the men were
to arrive. March 16 was also bad for flying but on the
17th the three Americans arrived by parachute at the
appointed place and were met by a welcoming committee
of Hungarian Staff officials and German Gestapo. They
were taken immediately to the Gestapo jail in Budapest
arriving there on March 19. JACARANDA was a prisoner in the same place and witnessed their arrival although he of course had no contact with them. On March 19 Germany invaded Hungary. JACARANDA advised me that the Americans were questioned very carefully for about ten days but they all stuck to the story that they were trying to find Tito's advanced forces and in the bad flying weather had overshot their landing place coming down in Hungary by mistake. This apparently satisfied the Gestapo, for the three prisoners were removed from jail and taken to a prisoner of war camp in accord with the Geneva Convention. I do not know who sent the trio, where they came from or what was the nature of their mission. I do not believe it was connected in any way with JASMINE.

14. Did the Istanbul mission or any of its members know of two separately projected missions into Hungary?
Yes. General Donovan advised me in Cairo that another Hungarian scheme was under way.

15. What were the circumstances of CASSIA's apprehension by the Gestapo?
After the conference mentioned previously CASSIA returned to Vienna and then made a trip to Switzerland, apparently to contact Alan DULLES or one of his associates. After his second return to Vienna, he made arrangements to go to Budapest on a business trip driving over in his own motor car. He went to a hotel where he was accustomed to stay and established himself in the usual fashion.

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without having made any plans whatsoever to contact the Hungarian Underground. The Underground, however, knew of his arrival and the Hungarian leader came to CASSIA's room in the hotel to pay him a visit. As soon as the Hungarian had entered the room, Gestapo agents who had been following him walked in the door and arrested the Hungarian and CASSIA. I am told that the hotel room was thoroughly and completely searched as well as its two occupants but that no incriminating evidence of any kind was found. Nevertheless the two men were held in custody. I do know what happened to the Hungarian, but CASSIA was allowed to return to Vienna in his car under Gestapo guard. He was taken to the same hotel in Vienna where former Chancellor Schussgig is held. This hotel is a Gestapo jail for high level prisoners and to the best of my knowledge, CASSIA is still there. He continues from prison and his staff makes a daily visit to his room to obtain the industrial orders of the day.

16. What is known about movements between Istanbul and Sofia, Budapest and Vienna?

I know very little about JASMINE's movements outside of Istanbul. TRILLIUM may know and perhaps it would appear in his lengthy report made to the British in Syria or Palestine. I have seen mimeographed excerpts from this report but have not read them not have I any way of knowing that the information received from the British contains everything TRILLIUM said to them.
17. Was the approximate dates?

JASMINE was in direct contact with LOCKWOOD, possibly once in November, certainly twice in December and January and perhaps on one other occasion.

18. Did ever show any undue interest in the operations of the Istanbul Mission?

No, he did not. His questions were designed to convince him that he was dealing with the right people. He insisted on some insurance that we could get to our chief of staff and it was at that time that MacPHERSON allowed JACARANDA to see his letter of authority. JASMINE did not see the letter except at a distance and I have it on good authority that JASMINE does not read English or speak it. JACARANDA told him however in German and Hungarian that the authority was legitimate.

19. What were the circumstances leading up to arrest?

JASMINE, TRILLIUM and JACARANDA had arranged to meet at a Budapest coffee shop where they sat for some little time in ordinary conversation. TRILLIUM is said to have left the group at that time and JASMINE and JACARANDA proceeded to JASMINE's quarters. They were sitting there engaged in a social visit when the door flew open and five plainclothes men jumped into the room with pistols drawn. JACARANDA refused to put up his hands thinking that this was a joke being pulled by some of JASMINE's friends and was subjected to rough treatment because of it. The two men were stripped and the room was searched.
and although no evidence whatsoever was found they were taken to the Gestapo jail in Budapest.

20. What interpretation should be given to [redacted] arrest or alleged arrest, release and Gestapo permission to return to Istanbul in early July? JASMINE's arrest and release can be interpreted in various ways. I personally believe he was genuine. Before he made his first trip to Istanbul, he was [redacted] where he had contacted TRILLIUM. After deciding to come to Istanbul to contact us, he covered himself by paying a call on DELIUS whom he knew well and who was the Gestapo chief for all of Bulgaria, headquarters in Sofia. JASMINE explained to DELIUS that he was considering going to Turkey to try to penetrate the Anglo-American groups there. DELIUS knew that JASMINE had [redacted] and had always been friendly with the Americans before we entered the war. DELIUS thought the scheme was a good one and urged JASMINE to go ahead and try it. After his arrest JASMINE was in jail for about two weeks during which time both he and JACARANDA were questioned at great length. During that period JASMINE told the Gestapo that of course he had contacted the Americans, that he had gone to Turkey for that purpose, that if the Gestapo wanted verification all they had to do was to call DELIUS. DELIUS made a trip to Budapest and came to the jail where he advised the Gestapo that JASMINE's statements were absolutely correct and that he, DELIUS, had known all about the scheme before it ever started.
It was on the strength of this that JASMINE was released. JACARANDA however was detained. JASMINE later became

In the meantime word had come to us that JASMINE had been hanged. That information is said to have come over a regular German broadcast, and I understand that the OWI intercepted it. JACARANDA remained in jail for a total of 93 days but was finally released and sent back to Istanbul as a Gestapo agent, having agreed to work for the German service. His mother and sister are still in Budapest, and he was given to understand that they would be hostages if he should not be dependable. His orders from the Gestapo were to send in all the information he would gather in Istanbul on the jealousies, differences of opinion and arguments that might grow up between the Americans, British and Russians.

JASMINE returned to Istanbul and Ankara in July of this year after his release from prison. He either saw LOGWOOD or sent word to him that he had returned on this flying trip to gather up his personal effects and destroy some things which he had in Ankara.

21. What role did JACARANDA play in Istanbul and Budapest?

JACARANDA acted as courier and contact man between Istanbul and Budapest. He was chiefly concerned with the JASMINE project but he also carried messages to and from IRIS. His contact with IRIS was made by ordinary post box or messenger in Budapest, and IRIS sent by the same route material to be brought back to us which had
apparently originated with SYRINGA or [REDACTED]. It was said to be [REDACTED]. In the early spring of this year, JACARANDA did meet IRIS but the exact circumstances are unknown to me.
SECTION II

1. What is known about IRIS, how was he contacted and what role did he play, preliminary to the Istanbul mission's operations into Hungary and Istanbul? IRIS was an old friend of DOGWOOD. The two had gone to school together some twenty years ago and had been more or less friendly and intimate either by mail or by visits for the past twelve years. Early in 1943, before my arrival in Istanbul, IRIS had paid a visit to DOGWOOD in Istanbul. At that time DOGWOOD had had a dinner party at which NARCISSUS was present. I questioned NARCISSUS at some length about IRIS and his relationship to DOGWOOD, and NARCISSUS held the impression that their old friendship was genuine, that they talked about family matters, wives, and relatives, and appeared to be on the best terms of long standing intimacy. This leads me to believe that [REDACTED] must be his right name. The man was described as a big, heavy-set, jolly [REDACTED] JACARANDA told me that IRIS lived outside of Budapest in a very comfortable and attractive country estate. DOGWOOD always said that IRIS was on good terms with German military and Gestapo higher-ups. He explained that IRIS's wife ran his photograph lab and darkroom which may explain the poor quality of the microfilm that IRIS sent out to us. It was definitely the work of an amateur, certainly not done by any Gestapo professional. From all I can gather IRIS worked with DOGWOOD during the year.
when DOGWOOD was affiliated with the British. And the
British, who had originally turned DOGWOOD over to Mac-
FARLAND later regretted their generosity. In December
of 1943 the British complained to MacFARLAND that one
of his agencies, no doubt referring to us, was stealing
British agents, and they tried to persuade MacFARLAND
to provide them with a list of our agents so that they
could see whether or not we were using any of their men.
MacFARLAND wanted to do this, but I persuaded him to
ask the British instead for a list of the agents they
thought we had stolen, and then we would advise them
whether we were using any or not. The British knew
about DOGWOOD, and they knew of his connection with
IRIS, and we always felt that IRIS was the one we had
stolen from them if any. I have reason to believe that
the British thought he was good at that time.
I wish to digress here and add that the British tried
to get one of our agents away from us through who
had formerly been in Vienna during the Dolphuss
trouble and assassination. They approached STOCK.
They apparently guessed that he had furnished us with
the information and data regarding the V-1 and V-2
secret weapons so they approached him with an offer that
he come and work with them. They said they would pay
him more money than we did, but STOCK countered by say-
ing that we had never paid him anything and that he would
not accept money for the work that he was doing.
then told STOCK that he was making a mistake to work with the Americans, that Europe was not our sphere, that after the war we would have no interest or authority in Europe, that the British would be in full control of Austria, that therefore STOCK was a fool not to work with the British and abandon the Americans.

STOCK said in reply that that was a good idea, and that he would come and work with the British at once if [redacted] would provide him with a letter signed by Anthony Eden confirming what [redacted] had just said. This of course stopped the show.

2. When and under what circumstances did TRILLIUM meet LOGWOOD?

Covered by report.

3. Was [redacted] mission to Istanbul, that is [redacted] genuine or may it be considered a German plant?

I believe it was a plant by the Hungarian Chief of Staff and if that is true, I accept it as genuine. It could also have been a German scheme.

4. What is known about the W/T negotiation? And what was the disposition of the W/T sets?

To the best of my knowledge we succeeded in getting only one set into Budapest. TRILLIUM carried it and is said to have delivered it to JASMINE and the Hungarian Staff. We never made contact. After my authority ceased I found out that another set had been sent in but I do not know the circumstances.

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5. It is known that [redacted] met with DELIUS. What interpretation should be given to this matter? See Section I, 19, 20.

6. Did [redacted] meet with any other high-placed German Abwehr officials? Upon one of JASMINE's return visits to Budapest during his negotiations with us he was ordered to a meeting in Bratislava where he says he was questioned at great length by Abwehr and military officials.

7. What were DOGWOOD's relations with [redacted] See 1 above.

8. What connection did [redacted] have with DOGWOOD and other members of the Istanbul Mission? I think DOGWOOD is the only one that saw him. He was JASMINE's man—his chauffeur, I believe. We thought at one time that PINK had turned in JASMINE to the Gestapo, but I don't know that this is true.

9. How often did he travel between Budapest and Istanbul? I don't know.

10. What was the relationship of the X-2 office to the Istanbul Mission and in particular the DOGWOOD Chain? The X-2 office was established as an independent branch at the Istanbul mission and had no relationship with the DOGWOOD chain except through [redacted] had started some C-E operations before [redacted] arrival, and I had extended to [redacted] the freedom of our office for any C-E information that we might have. Our lab was at their disposal and we did some work for them.

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11. Under what circumstances was the DOGWOOD Chain liquidated, its aftermath?

The circumstances under which the DOGWOOD SHOW was liquidated were exceedingly distasteful to me. KINGSLEY had paid a visit to my house to obtain suggestions as to how to handle the matter and I specifically informed him — and he made notes — that it was to everyone's advantage to call a meeting of myself, [REDACTED] and PERIWINKLE to ascertain just what contacts would be lost if DOGWOOD were separated and the chain apparently broken up. PERIWINKLE was in a position to retain all the good contacts for reorganization, and I wished to avoid losing the good men or creating any feeling of animosity among members of the chain who were party to confidential or secret activity. If it were to be liquidated, I urged that it be done in such a way as to leave all members happy and satisfied since the mistreatment of personnel could expose us to trouble. All of these suggestions were promptly disregarded and KINGSLEY and MacFARLAND walked into DOGWOOD's office on August 31, took from DOGWOOD the keys to the safes and files, and advised DOGWOOD that the office was disbanded as of that date without further notice. They agreed to pay DOGWOOD a half month's salary for his separation, which is equivalent to the treatment accorded a domestic servant. All the office had to do to prevent such an unsavory situation was to present a few watches with some notes of appreciation engraved on their backs or to write a few appreciative messages for the unpaid services that most of our personnel had
rendered. The entire procedure left all of DOGWOOD's staff members and key people with a feeling of unfair treatment. DOGWOOD was particularly crushed. Up to the time I left I left Istanbul, however, there had been no dangerous aftermath as the personnel caused no trouble but the reputation of the American Secret Strategic group suffered a bad relapse among those who had been associated with us. The key people are still personally loyal to me since they recognize that I had no part in their dismissal.

12. Who is where; that is, the nature of the dispersion of the DOGWOOD Chain?
HYACINTH, STOCK and some others are in Turkish concentration camps. JACARANDA, MAGNOLIA, PERIWINKLE and NARCISSUS are still unmolested in Istanbul. TRILLIUM, DAHLIA and OLEANDER are in Allied territory and I can't remember much about the rest. PRIMROSE, I believe, has had no trouble. CASSIA is in Vienna. JASMINE, PINK, BEGONIA, COSMOS, IRIS and SYRINGA are in Hungary. GERBERA is in Tel-Aviv, Palestine. HORTENSIA is still in Istanbul as are ORCHID and ALCATHRAZ.

13. How should JACARANDA's request for Allied protection of some ten members of the DOGWOOD Chain be interpreted? What are the merits of each case?
I don't know the merits of JACARANDA's request. The list was given to me the day before I left Istanbul. It is my opinion however that JACARANDA hopes to get some protection for personal friends who had helped him in our work or who had helped the parachute mission.
Two members on the list are JACARANDA's mother and
sister. 

I don't suspect any ulterior motives on the part of JACARANDA.

PERSONALLY KNOWN TO CEREBUS:

JUNIPER  PERIWINKLE  JACARANDA
VANCE     STOCK     GERBERA
DOGWOOD   HYACINTH  JASMINE
GLADIOLA  MAGNOLIA  PRIMROSE
LILY      CORREOPSIS  SALVIA
NARCISSUS  HELIOTROPE  CORREANDER
WERNER    HYBISCUS  LOTUS
NOPAL     HORTENSIA  ORCHID

TOP SE
US

OD

US

VANCE

GLADIOLA

LOTUS

LILY

NARCISSUS

WERNER

IRIS

SYRINGA

JACARANDA

GERBERA

TRILLIUM

JASMINE

PINK

BEGONIA

COSMOS

Meadowsweet

PRIMROSE

JONQUIL

AZALEA

CLEANDER

CLIVIA

DANDELION

SERBIOSA

LARKSPUR

COWSLIP

MIGNONETTE

PLUMBAGO

ON

CALLA

FUCHSIA

CANDNA

BUTTERCUP

COLUMBINE

LANTANA

SNOWBALL

FOXGLOVE

TULIP

CLOVER

TOP SECRET
| ALCATRAZ | HYBISCUS |
| AMBROSIA | IRIS |
| AZALEA | JACARANDA |
| BEGONIA | JACINTH |
| BOUGAINVILLA | JOKUZU |
| BUTTERCUP | LANTANA |
| CALLA | LARKSPUR |
| CAMELLIA | LILAC |
| CANDYTUFT | LOTUS |
| CANYA | MAGNOLIA |
| CARNATION | MEADOWSWEET |
| CASSIA | MIGNONETTE |
| CEREUS | MYRTLE |
| CLIVIA | NARCISSUS |
| CLOVER | NEREA |
| COLEUS | OLEANDER |
| COLEMINE | ORCHID |
| CORRELANDER | PEACOCK |
| CORTECOPSIS | PEA TINKLE |
| COSMOS | PENTANIA |
| COWSLIP | FINE |
| CROCUS | FLAMBOY |
| DAHLIA | FRIMROSE |
| DANDELION | SAGE |
| DAPHNHEUM | SALPIGLOSSIS |
| DOGWOOD | SALVIA |
| FOXGLOVE | SCABIOSA |
| FUCHSIA | SNAPDRAGON |
| GARDENIA | SNOWBALL |
| GINSEBUR | STOCK |
| GLADIOLA | SUNFLOWER |
| GLORIA | SYRINGA |
| HAWTHORN | TRILLIUM |
| HELIOTROPE | TULIP |
| HORTENSIA | VERBENA |
| HYACINTH | ZINNIA |

\[ wn = 24,851 \]