S. O. Training Syllabus--SECRET

Colonel Donovan

No. 42

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: JUN 2001
Lt. Col. Huntington, Jr.  
Colonel Huxton

SO - Organization Progress

By way of keeping you advised of what I am doing in the way of organization I wish to report as follows:

1. I have obtained the consent and support of the Principal Officials and Heads of Geographic Desks of SA/B to a program of close cooperation between the two units involving the following:

   a. The use of common Geographic Desks on which will be placed representatives of S.O.

   b. The working out of a training program which will be combined to the point where the students become SI or SO specialists.

   c. The pooling of information through the use of a common "Reporting Board".

2. Colonel Grooker, Commandant of the British Canadian School, has agreed to spend a part of each week with us as "Advisory Director of Training". He, Dr. Baker, and Captain Brewer have evolved a Training Syllabus and a set of instructions for the Geographic Desks, a numbered copy of which is attached hereto.

3. It has been agreed by all concerned (including, as I understand, Colonel Donovan and yourself) that the SO Training Program should look to quality rather than quantity production. Our British friends and visitors are in thorough accord with this program. We are consequently currently attempting to find four or five country house establishments (of the type of Dr. Baker's) where our various courses can
be installed and operated.

4. By reason of the change in Training Program and Training Objective the areas heretofore in use will be unsuited to our needs. It is believed that some of them and their equipment, however, may be useful for Guerrilla Training. I would suggest, in this connection, that the Winterizing Program heretofore authorized be held in abeyance until Colonel Goodfellow has decided whether or not he wishes to utilize the areas in question.

5. We have projected an SO Headquarters and Field Organization and attach hereto numbered copies of Charts 1 to 4 inclusive indicating our preliminary ideas on organization.

6. Since it is evident that SO Personnel (certainly Administrative Personnel and Heads and Assistants of Missions) must largely be commissioned personnel of the Army or Navy, we have asked for an increased allotment and Procurement Objective for the SO Section. It is believed that the Allotment and Procurement Objective requested is the minimum required to meet SO needs as best we can visualize them at the moment. They will only suffice, however, in the event we are able to transfer to Theater Commanders the personnel of our various Missions as they are sent to the Field, thus creating vacancies with which to meet the needs of new projects as they materialize. A separate memorandum is being sent you on this subject.

7. Our progress with respect to Missions and Projects under discussion and a report concerning Missions already in the Field will be made the subject matter of a separate memorandum. We are currently in the process of familiarizing the Geographic Desks with Projects on hand.

8. We will separately report on the question of "Production and Supply", which is a matter of vital concern to this Section.

E. C. Huntington, Jr.
Lt. Col., A.U.S.

Copy No. 43 attached
Copy No. 42 attached
cc to Colonel Donovan
Copy No. 41 attached
To all Country Section Heads

Further to our conversations at the meeting held on Wednesday, August 26, 1942, we are enclosing herewith some notes which we feel may be of value concerning various aspects of subversive work. We are also enclosing a copy of a proposed syllabus of training which, if proposed, will be available as soon as the training schools are set up.

The papers enclosed are not in any way intended as being a directive or as being static. We merely put them forward as being a basis for thought and discussion. We shall look upon it as a favor if we could have your reactions, comments and advice at a meeting on Wednesday, September 2, 1942 at 5:00 P.M.

R. M. Brooker
Lieutenant-Colonel
Advisory Director of Training
Below are set out all the subjects which will be available to students in each of the training schools under our command. It must be borne in mind that all training programs will be flexible and programs in each school will be based on the actual requirements of the group in training, as specified by the geographic desks concerned. This is merely to make it clear that the complete subjects available are shown although there will be cases where students naturally will not require training in all of the subjects mentioned.

A. Preliminary Training School.
   2. Map Reading.
   4. Military terms and elementary tactics.
   5. Field craft.
   6. Morse Code and use of the Morse Key (including an aptitude test for possible capacity as a W/T operator). Blinker and semaphore.
   7. Scouting and Patrolling.
   8. Weapons Training (Small arms).
   10. Simple Explosives (no devices).
   11. First Aid - Health - Field Dressings, Diet, etc.

Course to last approximately three weeks.
B. On completion of preliminary training, those students which require any or all of the following training, will be sent to the appropriate schools under Colonel Goodfellow's command:

1. Para-military training.
2. Aquatic Training.
3. Parachute Training.

C. Advanced Training School

1. Introduction
2. Security aspect of subversive activity.
3. Organization of an information service.
4. Cover.
5. Objects and methods of a counter espionage organization.
6. The arrival and the first 48 hours.
7. Descriptions.
8. Observation and surveillance.
9. House searches and raids.
11. Use and types of influences.
13. Handling of Agents.
15. Internal communications.
15(a) Morse Code, Key, blinker and semaphore.
16. External Communications.
17. Establishment and organization of headquarters.
19. Selection and survey of targets.
20. Makeup and disguises.
22. Landing of Agents by parachute and selection of landing grounds and reception committees.
23. Interrogation.
25. Defensive Measures.
26. Intelligence Reports.
27. The Nazi Party and its organization.
28. Organization of the German Auslands.
29. Organization of the German Police.
30. German counter espionage.
31. Propaganda and political subversion.
32. Propaganda Reconnaissance.
33. Fundamental technical propaganda principles.
34. Propaganda Production.
36. Subversive propaganda to enemy forces.
37. Codes and cyphers.
38. Secret inks.
39. Railways.
40. Field craft.
41. Guerrilla warfare.
42. Demolitions and devices.
43. Close Combat - Advanced.
44. Weapons Training - Advanced (Small arms).
45. Map reading and use of the compass.
46. Wire tapping and listening devices (including construction).
47. Outdoor practical exercises.
48. Lock picking and Burglary.
49. Periods for Revision, Problems and Discussion, also the writing of a Thesis.
50. First Aid - Health - Field Dressings, Diet, etc.

Course to last approximately four weeks.

D. S.I. Specialist School
2. Organization of enemy armies.
3. Identifications of enemy forces and equipment.
4. Censorship methods.
5. Questioned documents.
7. Rating of sources.
8. Reporting of army, navy and air information.
10. Morse Code, Key, blinker and semaphore.

Duration of the course dependent on requirements.

E. S.O. Specialist School
1. Industrial Sabotage, general and particular according to requirements.
2. O.S.S. special cyphers.
3. 96-hour or longer specific assignments in the home field.
4. Morse Code, Key, blinker and semaphore.

Length of course varied according to requirements.
F. Field Operations School

The work of this school will consist of revision and practice exercises to as near as possible actual conditions, varied to suit the individual cases.

Suggestions to Geographical Decks

It is suggested as of paramount importance that the contact officer of the country section concerned shall visit his agents at least twice at each stage of their training. It will be up to the country section contact officer to decide at what period, after his students have started advance training, to discuss with them in detail their individual cover and on the necessary requirements that go with it, such as clothes, papers, etc., etc.

It is absolutely essential that the officer undertaking this work should be absolutely in the confidence of the students and to have, himself, already undergone the complete training.

It is very strongly recommended that as soon as the schools are set up and ready to start functioning, the first pupils to take the course should be those officers envisaged as being the contact officers of the various country sections. Very great importance is attached to this as it has been found from constant experience that when a student has undergone complete training and a contact officer has not, there is, to say the least, considerable divergence in point of view and lack of understanding which is almost invariably fatal to the confidence of the student.
1. GENERAL

Our organization constitutes a major weapon of warfare and is the only weapon which will continue on, even if all else fails.

Therefore our organization must be successful.

Many organizations have in the past been unsuccessful for one or more of the following reasons:

A. Penetration
B. Bad Security
C. Insufficient attention to quality as opposed to quantity.
D. Inefficiency

Ours must therefore be an organization for the elite only and it must be felt by every individual in the organization that it is a privilege to be in it.

We will therefore consider a few facts of what constitutes our business.

2. SECURITY

A. General

Security means the protection of the individual and of the organization as a whole from the enemy.

Security is a constant factor and therefore the security angle must be considered in connection with every act of an individual or operation of the organization as a whole.

There is only one way to consider a security problem and that is to put oneself in the other person's shoes and ask oneself in every case WHAT DOES THE ENEMY WISH TO ACHIEVE IN THIS CONNECTION AND HOW WOULD HE BEST SUCCEED IN DOING SO. Clearly, his three main objectives in connection with our organization are as follows:

i. To penetrate our organization and so obtain details which will enable him to neutralize all our activities.

ii. Failing penetration to obtain the identity of our agents either when they are recruited during their period of training, or in the field.
B. **Securing of Information**

Information in our business is not property of the individual but the property of the organization as a whole. This includes all our representatives overseas.

Leakage of information can take place in two ways, both of which are equally bad. First of all wittingly and secondly, unwittingly.

i. Wittingly- The way to cause leakage of information wittingly is by carelessness in the recruiting stage and to allow the enemy to penetrate the organization.

ii. Unwittingly- The way to prevent information getting out unwittingly is to obey the fundamental principle of using one man for one job and limiting his knowledge to that which is necessary for him to perform his/her particular job.

C. **Personal Security Measures**

i. Have a good cover story - Cover does not mean only the guise you assume to be able to do your work. Every act you do in this business must have cover.

ii. Avoid being conspicuous - Being conspicuous in our business means any thoughts, words or deeds which do not tally with our cover - personal idiosyncrasies, behavior, dress, habits, associates, contravention of rules and regulations.

iii. Use Discretion - Avoid carelessness in your work. Outside the organization, or with persons inside the organization who do not need to know. In deciding how much or how little to tell a person, always ask yourself "Does he need to know this in order to do his job"? This is the only standpoint from which to decide. Unguarded replies or "hush-hush" attitude. Have a simple statement ready and stick to it. As organizer keep full plan to yourself. Collaborators should know their own job only. Seniority in an individual does not necessarily mean discretion.

iv. Communications - Telephone letters telegraph. Where they must be used take the utmost precaution.

v. Documents - Don't carry incriminating documents - burn waste paper and carbons - don't leave letters about. Always select what papers and letters you are going to carry.

YOUR LIFE MAY NOT BE IMMEDIATELY AT STAKE BUT SOMEBODY ELSE'S MAY BE EVERY MINUTE OF EVERY HOUR.
D. Know Your Enemy.
   i. Enemy C.E. Methods and Personnel.
   ii. Local C.E. Methods
   iii. Agents Provocateurs
   iv. Local Restrictions

E. Planning for Emergency
   i. Be tidy and orderly – protection in case of search.
   ii. Danger Signals
   iii. All clear signals – always consider as far as possible in advance every possible emergency that might arise and forstall it with plans made in advance.

SELF PROTECTION AND GOOD PLANNING PROTECTS THE INDIVIDUAL AND THUS THE ORGANIZATION AS A WHOLE.

3. RECRUITING STAGE.
   Steps must be taken to assure the bona-fides of every potential agent by –

   A. Check up his record with all available sources.
   B. A close study of the man's own character and story, namely that any person recruited in this organization should undergo a thorough interrogation covering his whole life before he is recruited.
   C. Recruits should be given Christian names at the outset by which they should be referred to throughout training or operations.
   D. Under no circumstances should a person of this organization have two names, if they wish to take a false name they must do so consistently and under all circumstances.

4. INFORMATION
   Two kinds of information - negative and positive
   The secret of good protection and good operation is first and last good information.
   A. Every individual in this organization is an informant and must consider themselves as such. It is the duty of every individual to train himself/herself in powers of observation. To do this select things or persons which you like or dislike or which are neutral and analyze your feeling.
B. Take advantage of care less talk at all times.
C. Disgruntled or non-security minded personnel.
D. Make false statements to elicit correct replies.
E. Affecting ignorance and thus encouraging others to air their knowledge.
F. Building up an informative service.

5. COVER
   A. General
   B. Essential details.
      Name - history - documents - clothes - behaviour
      (money-associates-table manners-tastes-local
      conditions-slang-mannerisms).

6. COUNTER ESPIONAGE -
   A. The C.E. Organization does not set out to catch
      people, rather than to make them catch themselves
      by becoming conspicuous or to prevent subversive
      activity occurring in any area at all.
   B. This work is achieved by -
      i. Preventative control measures - control of
         identity - movement - action - communications -
         publicity.
      ii. Detective measures - informant service -
         security lists - snap controls - penetration -
         surveillance - censorship - radio interception -
         etc.

7. PLANNING -
   Success in our business depends on good planning
   as it is essential -
   A. To retain the initiative at all times, e.g., in
      recruiting or in an emergency.
   B. To maintain the element of surprise.
   C. To make a necessary get-a-way.
      Plans are necessary for every isolated operation
      e.g. a journey, recruiting, contacting, active
      operation, etc.

8. RECRUITING -
   Recruiting is a very vital operation and requires
firstly - good information. Secondly - successful and careful planning.

A. Survey of the locality - state of local opinion - industries - occupations.

B. Consideration of types needed - insiders - specialists - cutouts - boîtes aux lettres - accommodation addresses - couriers - collectors of imported material - stores of material - headquarters - women.

i. Survey of potential agents - It is from ranks of an informant service that first recruits are most likely to be drawn, many of the remainder will be indicated to you by the same means.

ii. Put quality first - a bad agent will jeopardize your organization. Get full information about a potential agent before approaching him e.g. interests, weaknesses, character, religion, politics, nationality, etc.

iii. Approach to potential agents - Get to know your man.

Self Introduction

Introduction by mutual friend

iv. Coming down to business - Change your line of appeal to suit the case, e.g. for a priest, based on religious grounds, etc.

Let any concrete suggestions come from him in the first stages.

Test reactions thoroughly before coming out into the open.

Sound by half-suggestions.

Leave yourself a way out in the event of a refusal.

From the first give him an impression that we are part of a powerful and well organized body - prestige counts heavily.

DO NOT TRY TO BUY PEOPLE.

9. HANDLING THE AGENT -

A. Agents require firm handling.

B. Every agent wishes to feel, even though he has not met him, that he has a "CHIEF". If an agent only deals with the deputy of a chief, the deputy must have latent qualities as a leader. If he has this it does not matter how far the agent may be removed from the fountain of authority, the deputy symbolizes the chief.
C. The whole of our organization ultimately depends on the agent and what he can achieve in the field. Build up the morale of your man for all you are worth. Never keep people hanging about, always give them definite orders, e.g. "take a fortnight's leave".

D. Never interview an agent without previously studying his documents and always have a few personal facts about him at your disposal. However short the time you give him let him feel he has your attention.

E. Don't forget the best agents can be highly temperamental - moody - cautious - courageous - timid-daring and adventurous. To handle them aright the employer must have the patience and understanding of an impresario if he is to keep his dancers doing their stuff for the public night in and night out.

F. Fix details of salary and expenses immediately after recruiting.

G. Consider grading agents.

H. Discuss every eventuality and what you are prepared to do about it, openly and frankly. Suggestions must come from you, e.g. illness, dependents, pensions, death, commissioned rank, etc.

I. Train the agents in security immediately before they leave on a course, etc.

J. The greatest safeguard against blackmail and all forms of indiscipline is to foster in your agents that they are working for an immensely powerful organization which can be benevolent to loyalties and ruthless with rebels.
1. RECRUITMENT -

The first stage towards implementing any plan is to find the personnel to carry it out. The best method is undoubtedly to recruit agents with a view to their carrying out part of the plan, but this is often a counsel of perfection, and it is more often a case of selecting whatever talent is available. In that case the plan has often to be modified or even a minor one built around the agent.

The preliminary interrogation of the recruit by the prospective employer will be a guide as to his capacity and into what place in the plan he is most likely to fit as well as his reliability -

The employer will have to depend largely on his judgment and knowledge of human nature to assess the value of these two important points.

2. TYPES OF AGENTS -

Various types of agents will be required, such as -

A. Organizers of:
   I. Sabotage
   II. Political subversion and propaganda.
   III. Intelligence

B. Wireless Operators

C. Couriers

D. Operators.

It is evident that it is useless to recruit, train and despatch agents unless there is a ground organization in the country to use them. Every effort must therefore be made to find good organizers first - men who can recruit and direct a service. It is indeed arguable whether it is worth while to recruit the rank and file, e.g. couriers and operators in this country. The organizer should be able to find most of these in the country itself and train them. This gets over the question of 'cover' and the difficulties of getting the men to their posts. We will, however, want a certain number of men with technical qualifications - e.g. in W/T transmission, demolitions etc.

3. QUALIFICATIONS -

A good organizer needs many qualifications, which we will divide into Personal and Technical.

A. Personal.

i. Must have courage, resource and determination.
ii. Must have powers of leadership and also of organization.

iii. Must be intelligent and capable of quick decisions.

iv. Must inspire his men with confidence.

v. Must have a flair for underground work and therefore able to protect himself against the country's C. E. service.

A very prominent or striking personality has its dangers but may be worth it on balance.

B. Technical.

i. Must be able to pass as a national of the country if his cover demands it.

ii. Must have a good 'story' to account for his absence and return.

iii. Must be able to find means of existing, e.g. a job, in occupied territory.

iv. Must know intimately the country in which he is operating.

v. Must be young enough and fit enough to land by parachute or by boat, if those are the means which he must use.

vi. Must possess a sound technical knowledge of whatever branch he is to organize - e.g. explosives, demolitions, propaganda, intelligence, etc.

4. SOURCES OF RECRUITMENT

Considerable attention must naturally be paid to the recruitment of persons of a Foreign Origin in the Army Forces, for one expects to find there the younger and more virile elements, but we must not expect these elements to last forever.

There are, however, other circles which, if they do not provide agents from their own ranks, can often find them for us, such as:

A. Financial and business circles.

B. Religious organizations, e.g. certain monastic orders.

C. Shipping Industry, e.g. sailors.

D. Educational establishments for emigrants.

E. Emigrants to U. S. A.

F. Persons of dual nationality.

G. Members of racial minorities.
5. **DIVIDED LOYALITIES**

Considerable difficulties over the question of divided loyalties may arise, particularly in the case of potential agents who have been some time out of their country and do not therefore know the actual conditions obtaining there. A man will very often say "I am quite prepared to go back to Rutania to do all I can against the Enemy, but I will do nothing which will hurt my country or her people." Very understandable, but rather a large reservation. It may be possible during the training period in this country to agree on a programme which he is prepared to carry out, but once he arrives in Rutania, circumstances may arise to cause him to change his mind. It will also be impossible to feel that he will carry out blindly subsequent orders which may be sent him.

6. **ENLISTMENT**

When a time has come to enlist a man he should be asked if he is willing to undertake a difficult and dangerous task, making clear the risks involved and the kind of training, without revealing the actual plan or work to be undertaken.

After the period of preliminary training the organization should settle with the agent the terms on which he will be engaged. THE EMPLOYER MUST BE CERTAIN THAT ANY PROMISES MADE CAN BE FULFILLED, as any disappointment in this direction is likely to shake the faith of the Agent - e.g. Commission in the Army, etc.

It is most important that the employer should consider in what currency he will pay the Agent, and make necessary arrangements.

It is expected that each Agent should receive pay in the currency of his Country, and a stipulated dollar allowance whilst the Agent is in the U.S.A. or Country other than his own. The rate of pay should be increased automatically should the purchasing power of a currency fluctuate.

7. **HANDLING**

From the very first tentative approaches the agent must feel that he is dealing with a powerful, well-organized body. AS HE CAN ONLY JUDGE OF THIS FROM HIS IMPRESSIONS OF THE PERSONS HE CONTACTS, IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT THE PERSONALITIES OF THE RECRUITER AND THE COUNTRY SECTION CONTACT OFFICER SHOULD CARRY CONFIDENCE AND CONVICTION. The slightest sign of amateurishness or hesitation will be quickly noted and the result may be serious. Prestige counts very heavily in any secret society, and an agent is not going to risk his neck for an organization with which he has not the fullest confidence.
OPERATION OF AGENTS

1. DUTIES OF EACH ORGANIZER

   THE DUTIES MUST BE CLEAR TO HIM BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE; NO CHANGE SHOULD BE MADE IN THEM DURING HIS ABSENCE.

   They may include some or all of the following:

   A. Passive Resistance.
   B. Propaganda.
   C. Sabotage.
   D. Organization of a secret guerilla army and basic preparations for an eventual rising.
   E. Intelligence Work.

2. DIVISION OF DUTIES

   The organizer's duties should be divided by geographical area, by group, e.g. miners, protestants socialists, or by type of work, e.g. propaganda, sabotage. The type of organizer can then be selected especially suited for each class of work. Security will benefit if the groups under each organizer are kept entirely separate; the possible bad security of one will not jeopardize others.

   Each organizer must be responsible to one employer only, who must not expect him to do the work of another.

   All these points can be decided before the organizer's departure.

3. ESSENTIAL NEEDS -

   A. Security.

      This is the most important assistance that employers can give.

      i. Making sure that outsiders do not suspect the existence of a secret organization.

      ii. Giving to persons inside the organization only the minimum information necessary for efficiency.

      iii. Keeping all groups as nearly separate as possible.

      iv. Making sure that "bad" agents are suitably dealt with.
B. Adequate supplies of money.

This must be sent promptly to organizers. It is impossible to control their expenses except by comparing them, over long periods, with the results obtained.

C. Adequate Material

Not in excessive quantities, but must be sent as soon as required. The organizer is the best judge of what he requires. He should not be sent what he does not ask for.

D. Reserve Agents.

They should be available to be put at the disposal of the organizer as soon as he asks for them.

E. Advice

This must always be quite clearly distinguished from orders.

F. Orders

They are often best given in the form of advice or of "instructions". Organizers should not be ordered to co-operate with third parties against their better judgment, nor to attempt tasks which they deem too risky. In this the organizers opinion merits particular respect. It must not be forgotten that no regular discipline can exist to enforce obedience. Orders must be clear and brief. They can be general, negative or positive.

i. General orders are equivalent of standing orders and cover the organizer's duties, territory.

ii. Negative orders refer to what he may do, e.g. discontinuation or postponement of plans.

iii. Positive orders must be carefully given, if possible, with reasons. The organizer must not think that the employer is indifferent to his safety.

4. HASTE AND BOther

THE ORGANIZER MUST NOT BE BOtherED TO PRODUCE TOO EARLY RESULTS, UNNECESSARY EXPLANATIONS, ETC. The fewer messages he must send, the more secure is his position. He need not tell his employer more than the minimum necessary for efficiency, nor reveal his cover.
5. SOURCES OF INFORMATION

Must be available to employer. Facts bearing on security must be sent to the organizer at once. He must be posted with news about his successes. He must not be overburdened with unnecessary details. He should not be notified of new orders or changes of plans until they are finally approved.

6. ALL INFORMATION ABOUT EACH GROUP

This must be available to the employer, so that he will not impose upon it tasks for which it is unfit.

7. CO-ORDINATION

Coordination between the work of groups in different areas and/or trades etc., is vital. By diverting the attention of and by straining the enemy's C.E., it helps security. The co-ordination of the activities of groups also increases their effectiveness, e.g. simultaneous acts of sabotage are worth more than single.

8. COMMUNICATIONS

Communications with agents is normally by W/T. It is essential that a second line be maintained. No matter how efficient the first, it may break down. The second should be dormant but ready to replace it instantly, otherwise the whole organization will probably collapse.

Messages should never be sent the same way as material. This is a danger to the security of the recipient.

9. THE PRINCIPLES OF RELATIONSHIP

The principals of relationship between employer and organizer are similar to those between organizer and collaborator. The organizer is, however, largely dependent for information upon his employer alone. His means of communication with subordinates are slow and uncertain.

10. IDEAL

The whole organization should be like the human body. The movements of the limbs, although un-connected, are perfectly co-ordinated by the brain as the centre.
1. **A CHIEF OR LEADER** -

   Whether an agent is in contact with the chief of the organization or not, ENTITLED to feel there is ONE.

   If agent only deals with a deputy of the chief; Deputy must have latent qualities of a leader. If he has this, it does not matter how far agent may be removed from fountain of authority. Deputy symbolizes "the chief".

   Important - especially in early stages of agent's employment - that he should, as far as possible, only have ONE Deputy to deal with.

   Example - Agent "A" of Lapland, Deals with Mr. Jones. Knows Mr. Jones has immediate superior Mr. X, head Lapland section, who is responsible to the chief. Do not introduce Mr. Brown if Mr. Jones temporarily away. Do not break chain of authority.

2. **FIRM-HANDLING** -

   Every agent, however individualistic, appreciates FIRM-HANDLING. Especially if he feels that it is humane or just. Must feel he is under a form of discipline every bit as strict as that IMPOSED on a man in any first class fighting service.

   Agents entitled to have a sense of "esprit de corps". Owing to the nature of "Our Business", more difficult to establish than say in a fighter squadron. Yet it can be done. Up to the employer.

   It should be as difficult for a man to get into "our business" as it is for a man to get into the Combat Air Force as a pilot.

3. **CLEAR DIRECTION AS TO THE GENERAL PURPOSE AND POLICY OF THE ORGANIZATION** -

   A. Deal with fully at Finishing School.

   B. Continue to pump it in.

   C. From employer, agent expects to get a sense of being a member of a large, well-organized and important concern.

4. **CLEAR DIRECTION AS TO HIS INDIVIDUAL ROLE** -

   From the moment an agent is engaged or selected as being suitable for advanced training, he should have some idea as to how and where it is proposed to use him. An agent should never be "led up the garden path". Tell agents the hard side of "our business" and any particularly difficult task or condition. An agent expects, in "exceptional cases" to be able freely to decline a task suggested by his employer without penalization.
5. **CUT AND DRIED FINANCIAL TERMS**

From the outset there should be no vagueness in the agent's mind as to:

A. What he is to be paid in the U.S.A.

B. What he is to be paid when in the field.

C. When and how payment is to be made.

It is essential that agents should be paid promptly on the day arranged. If an agent abroad expects money to be paid into a certain account in USA on a given date, it must be remitted. A delay of a day may justly sour an agent.

D. What expenses he is entitled to charge.

Define these liberally, rather than stingily and do not worry about petty overcharging on the part of certain men. If you do not agree any so; do not bicker. **Make it a rule NOT to have any money disputes with agents.**

E. His limits of expenditure in the field in the event of communications for instruction being cut.

Remember you may be cut off from the agent. Give him reasonable rope with which to cope with unforeseen possibilities of attacking the enemy.

F. Payment in the event of imprisonment.

Remember that agents, if caught even in neutral countries, may be exposed to long terms of civil imprisonment, (five to ten years). Men will act with much more determination if they know they will be "looked after" while doing time.

G. Pension in the event of permanent disablement or loss of health in carrying out duties, and

Pensions to dependents in the event of:-

i. Death in the field.

ii. Proved and posted as missing.

iii. Execution.

It is most important that you have full authority for any commitments you undertake, from Higher Authority. Agents must feel that they have real security (or none at all) in these matters.

**REMEMBER THAT YOU, MR. JONES, OF THE LAPLAND SECTION MAY BE KILLED, SENT TO THE SOUTH POLE, OR LOSE YOUR MEMORY.** "SO MAKE A NOTE ON YOUR AGENT'S RECORDS OF WHAT HAS BEEN PROMISED THEM."
6. **SALARY**

It is sometimes a good plan to allow an agent to draw only, say 70% of his pay. The balance is placed on deposit. This from the agent's point of view is not compulsory saving. Every six months, he should be allowed to draw half the sum out - blow it - if he wishes. The remainder stays on deposit. In this way, over a year or two, a fair sum is accumulated. This will help to keep the agent interested in his employer. Especially if he knows that, on honourable termination of his contract, he will draw the sum in full.

When an agent goes abroad, giving him three or six months' salary in advance is not much use from his point of view if he is expected to use it for expenses. Always differentiate between salary and expenses in favour of the agent.

In general look after agents who are temporarily ill; in reasonable financial difficulties (you will seldom be employing men of the Y. M. C. A. class); in family misfortune. It is better that they should come to you than to go elsewhere.

Increase in Salary. Arrange to give a satisfactory agent an increase in salary, say, every three months (life is not always very long in the service) or make up for each agent a table of graded pay. E.g. Grade I (basic) - Dollar; Grade II - Dollar; Grade III - Dollar. Such arrangements buck the agents up, make them strive to earn the higher pay not only for the sake of the money but also for the kudos. Don't forget that kudos means a lot to a good agent.

7. **TERMINATION OF CONTRACT**

Lay down carefully what notice of this change an agent will get and what notice he must give.

8. **LIMITS OF PERSONAL INITIATIVE**

An agent expects his personal initiative in the field to be (fairly) clearly defined as to how much freedom he has got for action, how much he must wait on instructions from headquarters, etc.

9. **COVER**

Inexperienced agents expect their employers to arrange cover. It is most important that enormous attention is given to the subject on the part of the employer, for it is the quickest way of getting an agent's confidence.
10. DOCUMENTS, PASSES, INFORMATION, EQUIPMENT, ETC.

Experienced and inexperienced agents expect these to be provided by the employer - out of a hat. The nearer an employer can get to doing so, the better for all.

11. BUILDING UP OF STORY - CLOTHES ETC.

Agents rightly expect every help and advice on these matters from their employers. Time is never wasted in working out every point in minute detail. Much time should be allowed for rehearsals, fittings, etc.

IF YOU, MR. JONES OF THE LAPLAND SECTION CANNOT GIVE THE TIME FOR THIS, PUT A JUNIOR ON, BUT EXPLAIN TO THE AGENT THAT THE MAN PUT ON IS JUNIOR TO YOU, THAT YOU WILL GO OVER ALL FINAL DETAILS AND THAT THE AGENT CAN AT ALL TIMES APPEAL TO YOU.

12. CONFIDENCE -

An agent expects the confidence of his employer. He will be hurt if he feels he is being spied upon or not trusted.

Tell agents frankly that throughout their service they will be constantly checked up for security reasons, by other branches of your organization, and that if you have to restrict their liberty (which you must be careful not to do unduly) it is for their protection as much as anything else.

13. WATER-TIGHT COMPARTMENTS -

An employer's agents have a right to be kept in water-tight compartments. Do not mix them up; they will not like it. Never thrust a sub-agent on an agent unless he agrees beforehand. It is often wiser to let the agent pick his own sub-agents.

14. ORGANIZATION OF ESCAPE -

An experienced agent expects as much time to be given to the problem of the "get-away" or return as to the outward journey and an inexperienced agent will be given confidence by this.

Agents must feel that they are of real value to the employer and that he wants to see them again on the completion of their mission, etc.
INTERROGATION

It is obvious that a person who has been more or less recently in an area in which one of own agents is operating or may in the future be operating, is in possession of information of the highest value to the organization. In addition in a few rare cases it is possible to recognize in some of these escapees potential agents for the field in which case they can be snapped up before they get enmeshed in some other organization from which it will prove difficult and probably impossible to extract them.

The great principle to remember is that all information may be of value, provided that it is sufficiently reliable and sufficiently detailed. In interrogating escapees, it is helpful to imagine that one is an agent about to operate in the district from which the escapee has just arrived; what, in that case would you want to know about it? With that in mind it should be possible, in dealing with a reasonably intelligent person, to secure a complete picture of the whole of the district and of the inhabitants and their activities. An agent supplied with information secured by such interrogation should be able to arrive at his destination and be able to settle in as though he had been there for months.

Before an escapee is interviewed by a member of this organization he has already been severely vetted by and probably interrogated by .......... Clearly, there is nothing to be gained and much to be lost by going over all this ground again; it is therefore most desirable to consult the .......... reports well before beginning an interrogation. Not only does one save an immense amount of time, but one has a pretty clear idea of what sort of information one is likely to secure. The word interrogation is not ideal to describe the type of interview which takes place, since it implies first a hostile subject, and second an attitude on the part of the interrogator seeking were to break down a story and then build one up. In our case, neither of these conditions applies, in the first place escapees are always most eager to help, and in the second we are not concerned with trying to catch him out or secure some information which he is trying to conceal. Therefore, the approach is entirely different.

To secure the type of information in which we are interested, there is obviously no system of question and answer that can be applied; the only way is to get the subject to talk and keep talking, and all the interrogator has to do is to direct the conversation along the lines likely to show the best yield. To do this is not difficult to a certain extent. It is sufficient to start off on any subject at all in a perfectly friendly and informal manner, and to show interest; from that point, once the ice is broken the subject will go
on and on. The job of the interrogator is to get all the details possible, either by interrupting with a direct question when necessary, or by coming back to a given point later. There is, however, one drawback to this system; a long conversation conducted on the lines of allowing the subject to talk on a variety of topics is likely to entail the omission of many points unless the interrogator has a very clear idea of what he is after.

On the other hand it will probably be found preferable to allow an escape to discuss points as they occur to him rather than to follow any rigid system, since much will come to his mind by simple association of ideas which might otherwise be lost; it is therefore most essential that the interrogator must be able to come back to any point which in his opinion might profitably be elaborated.

The attached questionnaire is intended only to give interrogators a general idea of the information they should be able to provide after an interview. It is not in any way intended to set out a system to be followed in the actual interrogation. In addition it may not be out of place to point out that no one person is likely to be able to provide information on all these headings, nor even on very many of them. But an interrogation must not be considered as concluded till the interrogator has satisfied himself that the subject has no information to supply on any of these points, nor indeed on any other that may be of interest. To every question the answer to be of value must be detailed; where persons are concerned, their names, addresses and occupations should be given if possible; if they are persons who might be especially contacted or especially avoided, a description will be useful. Similarly, if there is any question of contacting organizations likely to be useful, details should be provided of how to establish contacts. On matters concerned with administration, e.g. the application for food coupons every possible detail concerning the place and the times, the best officials to see, the degree of strictness of control should be secured. In short, let it be repeated; if you were going to work in the field what would you have to find out after your arrival?
QUESTIONNAIRE

N.B. Answers to these and other questions MUST be precise, they MUST be extremely detailed, and they MUST be based on first-hand knowledge.

1. **Enemy Administration, especially local.**
   1. Where are the local H.Q. of the German civil administration? Police and Gestapo? Who are the most important members of the personnel? Where do they live? What is the strength of these bodies? What is the attitude towards them of the indigenous administration, and of the civil population? From whom and where do the German authorities take their orders?

2. What is, and where are the H.Q. of the local indigenous administration? Who are the officials and where do they live? How did they come to be appointed? What is their attitude to the Boche? To what extent do they collaborate, and is their collaboration sincere or unwilling, and for what reasons and to what extent? Who among them do not collaborate? What is the general attitude of the administration to quisling government, to the free forces, to USA? What is the attitude of the population to the administration?

3. How does the German counter-espionage system operate? Do you know who the local Gestapo men are? Have they any local recruits? If so, are they enlisted under compulsion or are they paid for their services? Are they informants or agents provocateurs? What other pro-German elements are there in the region, and are they being exploited?

4. How far has the counter-Espionage met with success? Have there been arrests of persons suspected of pro-ally sympathies? Have any subversive organizations been discovered? Has anyone likely to have been concerned with any such organization disappeared? Has the Gestapo shown interest in any particular case, or any particular group of individuals? Are there any places or persons known to be watched?

5. How far does the local police etc. collaborate? Is collaboration active, apparent, or reluctant? Who of the local police do and do not collaborate willingly?

6. Is there any organized or unorganized opposition to the present system of administration? If so, what form does it take, and who are the persons, groups or organizations concerned?
II. Enemy system of Security and Control.

1. **CONTROL OF IDENTITY**: What identity papers are required?
   - By whom, when, where and how are they issued?
   - Are they often asked for, e.g. in the street?
   - When and under what conditions are they asked for?
   - Is it possible to secure forged papers?
   - From whom etc., and with what degree of speed, reliability and discretion?
   - Is it possible to secure illicitly real papers? How etc?
   - Are papers changed at any time?
   - Are they ever stamped, signed, punched or otherwise marked after the original issuing?
   - What papers would one normally have in one's possession apart from obligatory identity cards?
   - What are their uses and degree of necessity?
   - Under what circumstances are they necessary?
   - (This applies to such papers as livrets de famille, livrets militaires, documents de demobilization, permis de conduire, cartes d'identite and their equivalents in other countries)

2. **CONTROL OF MOVEMENT**: What are the restrictions on travelling from one area to another?
   - And between different zones?
   - And into non-enemy territory?
   - In each case what are the passes required, and what are the conditions and circumstances of issue?
   - Is it possible to get forged papers?
   - In applying for real papers, what importance is attached to the grounds on which the application is made?
   - What travel controls exist, and by whom are they put into effect in each case?——
     a. On railways
     b. On roads
     c. At ports or on canals
   - What is their degree of efficiency and integrity?
   - How can they be avoided, where, and with the help of whom?
   - Is there any inspection of luggage?
   - Can it be avoided?
   - Are there any snap controls instituted? If so, is it possible to get it off, or can they be known of before they take place? How?
   - In the case of rail travel, what is the procedure on arrival at the destination? Is there any system of registration? Is there a check on passes or luggage?
   - When arriving at any new place, what formalities does one have to observe? Can they be avoided and how?
   - Do hotel proprietors etc. cooperate with the German authorities?
   - Which of them do not, and on what terms?
   - What are the general conditions of travel on the roads and by rail, what are the facilities, and how can they best be utilized?

3. **CONTROL OF RESIDENCE**: Are there any prohibited areas?
   - Are they due to the presence of troops, etc.?
   - How can special permits for residence be obtained?
   - Are there any hotels, flats, offices, houses etc. reserved for the enemy?
   - And any other premises — restaurants, cafes, etc.? 
4. CONTROL OF ACTION:
   a) Food control. What is the system of rationing? How, when and where, by whom are ration cards issued?
      How often are they changed? To what extent are they checked up on? How is it possible to get forged ration cards? Is the coupon system used in addition to the cards? If so how can forged coupons be obtained?
      What is the food situation? What is scarce, and how can scarcities be circumvented? Which dealers have the best supplies of each commodity? Which dealers are prepared to supply food without coupons etc.?
      Is there a black market in the region, what can be obtained there and at what cost? To what degree is it supervised by the enemy authorities?
      Is it possible to eat in restaurants without food cards? If not, are there any exceptions? Which restaurants and places supplying meals are frequented by the various social classes?
   b) Drink restrictions, what are they and how are they applied? What and where are the cafes, what is the attitude of the respective proprietors and by whom are they frequented? Which are known to have attracted the attention of the German authorities?
   c) Vehicles. Is one allowed to have a car? What permits are required, and how and under what conditions are they issued? How is petrol obtained? Are there any alternative forms of fuel, and if so how are they obtained? What are the restrictions on commercial vehicles? Who can such vehicles, what journeys do they make, and to what extent could one count on their complicity? What are the controls on bicycles and how are permits obtained?
   d) Curfew. When is it in force and what restrictions does it imply? How strictly is it observed? Are permits available giving exemption from such restrictions? How obtained? What are the penalties for not observing the curfew? Who are exempt from it?
   e) Wireless. Are sets easily obtained? Is a permit required? Is listening to foreign broadcasts forbidden? If so to what extent is this observed, and what are the penalties?
   f) What are the restrictions on the carrying of cameras, firearms, etc? Do you know of persons possessing firearms illicitly?
5. **CONTROL OF COMMUNICATIONS.**
What are the restrictions on the use of the phone?
Are long distance calls allowed?
Is there any supervision or censorship or known cases of eavesdropping?
Does one have to produce papers before phoning from public places?
Is there any similar control for telegrams?
Are letters censored? In the zone, or only inter-zone?
How can letters be smuggled from one zone to another or out of the country?
Could these means be used for more compromising material?

6. **CONTROL OF THE PRESS.**
What are the local papers, by whom are they published and edited?
What is their general attitude, what groups do they represent?
Do they favour collaboration, and on what lines?
Is this policy freely chosen, or is it forced on them?
What are the private views of the editors, etc?
Would they be prepared to help?
What controls are there by the enemy authorities for the insertion of small ads?
What authority have these papers with the public?
If there is a local wireless station, to what extent is it allowed to broadcast its own programmes?
Who are its officials, and what are their views?

III. **Political Layout.**
In whom is the real power vested locally, and how was it obtained?
What is the outward form of this authority?
What is the attitude of this body to the enemy?
What is the extent of collaboration? And what is the feeling behind it?
Is there any form of opposition?
Are there any groups who might ultimately be relied on for opposition?
Who are the local personalities, what are their views and activities?
How far can anti-enemy feeling be identified with pro-

IV. **Enemy Armed Forces.**

1. **Occupation forces.**
What are the units concerned, where are they stationed how strong are they?
Have there been any recent changes?
What is the age and type of the troops?
How reliable and efficient are they?
Are they open to bribery? To what extent, and with regard to what?
What is their morale?
What is their attitude to the population, and vice versa?

2. **Operational and troops in training.**
Same questions as above, but distinction to be drawn as far as possible between troops used for occupation and those on other duties.

3. **Communication and supplies.**
What are the other vulnerable points in the neighbourhood, and how are they guarded? Bridges, culverts, tunnels, viaducts, goods yards, engine sheds, garages? What is the attitude of indigenous employees in such works to the enemy—especially railway workers etc.? What form does the frontier control take? How can it be avoided? What roads and railways are used by the enemy for trans- porting troops and material? What ports are the enemy using and for what purposes?

V. Organized Resistance.
Are there any subversive organizations in existence? How were they founded, when, by whom and with what objects? To what extent are these these bodies organized? Of what groups are they composed? Are there any troops or former troops among their number? Who are the leaders? Are there any sympathizers in high places who do not actively help? What are the meeting places, and how does one contact them? What are their present activities? Have they any arms or other material at their disposal? What are their potential activities? Have any such organizations contacts with others in other districts? In the case of Communists, are they actively pro- rally, or could they in any way be enlisted? What is the attitude of such bodies as the Freemasons Rotaries, etc. Could they be eventually utilized as the basis for a subversive organization? Are there any armed forces of the country in the neighbourhood? If so, what is their attitude and what their potentialities?

VI. Labour Conditions
What is the general situation with regard to employment? Conditions and Wages? Unemployment question? What are the chief local trades and occupation? Which would afford the best cover and give the greatest liberty of movement? Which employers would not be too inquisitive in engaging a man? Are there any whose complicity could be counted on? What are the local labour groups, their strength, attitude and activity? Have the workers suffered curtailment of rights since the occupation? What ramifications of the Communist party are there? What is their attitude since the outbreak of the Russo-German war? To what extent have they any influence in local Labour? Has there ever been any terrorist activity? Are there any local branches of trade Unions? And what attitude do they adopt? To what extent do the workers oppose the enemy? Sabotage, strikes, "go-slow" etc.? Are there any Fascist groups among the workers? Does local Labour depend on any national organization? If so, which and how close is the connection?

VII. Industry.
What factories are there in the neighbourhood, and what do they produce? Which factories engaged in war production for enemy? Who are the employers, etc. and to what extent do they collaborate?
-6-

To what extent are these factories controlled by the
Germans?
Have the native workers been replaced by Germans?
From what sources are supplies obtained, and in what
quantities?
Does this represent a decrease since the Occupation?
What is the output and how does it compare with former
output?
Is there any prospect of any major change in the position
now affected by blockade and by R.A.F. bombings?

VIII. Agriculture.
Has there been a "back to the land" movement? To what extent
has it met with any success?
Has there been any opposition to it in the form of
 sabotage hoarding etc.?
Is there a peasant movement?
Is it influenced by any other workers' organization - e.g.
Communism?
How have the peasants been affected by invasion and
occupation?
Do they collaborate with the occupying forces?
Or do they destroy or hide their produce, leave fields
untilled, kill off the livestock?

IX. Business and Commerce.
What restrictions have been imposed by the enemy?
What have been the reactions?
What are the chief local interests, and who are the chief
personnel?
What is their attitude?
With what official bodies are they in contact?
Do they have any foreign contacts? Or any contacts in
other occupied zones or distant areas?
What is the attitude to the blockade? To enemy pillage?
Has there been any attempt to impede the German war
effort?
Is there any fear of inflation? If so, what measures
are being adopted against it?
To what extent do these elements collaborate?
And to what extent might they aid in subversive activities?

X. Local Tradesmen.
Who are the chief in each line? What is their attitude
and to what extent could one hope for their complicity?
Do they attempt to obstruct the Germans?

XI. Utility Services.
What are the local supplies of Power, Water, Gas, Phone
and telegraph?
Where do cables, pipes, etc. pass, and where are they
most vulnerable?
Have there been any cases of Sabotage?
Do the employees collaborate willingly?
Are such things as power stations guarded? If so, by whom?
To what extent damaged by R.A.F.

XII. Wireless and Propaganda.
Is the B.B.C. or other broadcasts jammed? What are the
best times and wave lengths for listening?
Who listens to the B.B.C. and what is the effect of
What are the chief lines of enemy propaganda, and
what is the reaction to them?
Is news from the B.B.C. widely circulated or discussed?
Is it forbidden to listen to the B.B.C. and what are
the penalties?
Are these reprisals enforced?
Have you ever heard any illicit stations? If so, what
were they and what line did they take?
Do you listen to broadcasts from neutral countries
Reaction on civil morale of R.A.F. activity?

XIII Press

What national papers are most read locally, and what
elements do they represent?
What are the local papers, to whom do they belong, who
are the editors, what views do they hold?
What degree of independence have they?
What changes have they undergone since the Armistice?
By what groups are they read respectively, and what
degree of popularity do they enjoy?
Have they any real influence?
Do they show any signs of opposition to the enemy?
How?
Are there any signs of censorship - e.g. blanks?
Are there any illicit papers or leaflets circulated?
Who are responsible for them?
Are they popular?

XIV. Church, Educational Bodies, etc.

What are the chief local religious and educational
bodies, and who are the leaders?
What is the attitude of these groups to the various
aspects of the war - the occupation, Free forces etc?
Do they ever indulge in any form of propaganda for one
or other side?
Has the Russo-German war had any effect on their views,
especially on the Catholic Church?
Have any of these bodies been favoured by the Germans
at the expense of the others?
Do any of them harbour potential elements of resistance?