20 July 2011
Continued Operation of Y-12 Megadeath Complex
[Federal Register Volume 76, Number 139 (Wednesday, July 20, 2011)]
[Notices]
[Pages 43319-43324]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2011-18312]
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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
National Nuclear Security Administration
Record of Decision for the Continued Operation of the Y-12
National Security Complex
AGENCY: Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration.
ACTION: Record of decision.
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SUMMARY: The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) of the
U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is issuing this Record of Decision
(ROD) for the Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12) in Oak Ridge,
Tennessee based on information and analyses contained in the Final
Site-Wide Environmental Impact Statement for the Y-12 National Security
Complex, DOE/EIS-0387 (Y-12 Final SWEIS, Y-12 SWEIS or 2011 Y-12 SWEIS)
issued on March 4, 2011; comments on the Draft and Final Y-12 SWEIS;
and other factors, including costs, security considerations and the
missions of NNSA. The 2011 Y-12 SWEIS analyzes the potential
environmental impacts for ongoing and reasonably foreseeable future
operations
[[Page 43320]]
and activities at Y-12, including alternatives for changes to site
infrastructure and levels of operation. Five alternatives are analyzed
in this Y-12 SWEIS: (1) No Action Alternative (maintain the status
quo); (2) Uranium Processing Facility (UPF) Alternative; (3) Upgrade-
in-Place Alternative; (4) Capability-sized UPF Alternative; and (5) No
Net Production/Capability-sized UPF Alternative. Both the Draft and the
Y-12 Final SWEISs identified the Capability-sized UPF Alternative
(Alternative 4) as NNSA's preferred alternative. NNSA has decided to
select Alternative 4, to continue operation of Y-12, and to construct
and operate one new facility--a Capability-sized UPF. A separate
decision may be made at a later date regarding whether to construct and
operate a Complex Command Center (CCC).
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For further information on the 2011 Y-
12 SWEIS or this ROD, or to receive a copy of this SWEIS or ROD,
contact: Ms. Pam Gorman, Y-12 SWEIS Document Manager, U.S. Department
of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration, Y-12 Site Office,
P.O. Box 2050, Oak Ridge, TN 37831, (865) 576-9903. For information on
the DOE National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) process, contact: Ms.
Carol M. Borgstrom, Director, Office of NEPA Policy and Compliance (GC-
54), U.S. Department of Energy, 1000 Independence Avenue, SW.,
Washington, DC 20585, (202) 586-4600, or leave a message at (800) 472-
2756. Additional information regarding DOE NEPA activities and access
to many DOE NEPA documents, including the 2011 Y-12 SWEIS, are
available on the Internet through the DOE NEPA Web site at: http://nepa.energy.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background
Y-12 is one of three primary installations on the DOE Oak Ridge
Reservation (ORR) in Oak Ridge, Tennessee. The other installations are
the Oak Ridge National Laboratory and the East Tennessee Technology
Park (formerly the Oak Ridge K-25 Site). As one of the NNSA production
facilities, Y-12 is the primary site for enriched uranium processing
and storage, and one of the manufacturing facilities for maintaining
the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile. Y-12 is unique in that it is the
only source within the NNSA nuclear security enterprise for certain
mission critical nuclear weapons components. Y-12 also dismantles
weapons components, safely and securely stores and manages special
nuclear material (SNM), supplies SNM for use in naval and research
reactors, and dispositions surplus materials. Y-12 nuclear
nonproliferation programs play a critical role in securing our nation
and the world and combating the spread of weapons of mass destruction
by removing, securing, and dispositioning SNM, and down-blending
weapons-grade materials to non-weapons forms suitable for use in
commercial reactors. Y-12 also conducts nondefense-related activities
including: environmental monitoring, remediation, and decontamination
and decommissioning activities of the DOE Environmental Management
Program; managing waste materials from past and current operations;
supporting the production of medical isotopes; and developing highly
specialized technologies to support the capabilities of the U.S.
industrial base.
NNSA prepared the 2011 Y-12 SWEIS and this ROD pursuant to the
regulations of the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) for
implementing NEPA (40 CFR parts 1500-1508) and DOE's NEPA Implementing
Procedures (10 CFR part 1021).
The process for preparing the 2011 Y-12 SWEIS began on November 28,
2005, when NNSA published a Notice of Intent (NOI) in the Federal
Register (70 FR 71270), announcing its intent to prepare this Y-12
SWEIS. NNSA distributed the Draft Y-12 SWEIS in October 2009. The
public comment period for the Draft Y-12 SWEIS began on October 30,
2009, with publication of the Environmental Protection Agency's Notice
of Availability in the Federal Register (74 FR 56189). That notice
invited public comment on the Draft Y-12 SWEIS through January 4, 2010.
During the comment period, two public hearings were held in Oak Ridge,
Tennessee, on November 17 and 18, 2009. At the first hearing, NNSA
announced an extension of the comment period until January 29, 2010.
That announcement was formalized with a notice in the Federal Register
on December 28, 2009 (74 FR 68599). Following issuance of the Draft
SWEIS, NNSA determined that a Haul Road was needed to support UPF
construction. The Final SWEIS also includes information and analysis of
a Haul Road extension corridor for the UPF, including a detailed
Wetlands Assessment that was prepared in accordance with 10 CFR part
1022. This Assessment is contained in Appendix G of the Final SWEIS.
Comments received on the Haul Road and Wetlands Assessment were
addressed in the Final SWEIS.
Alternatives Considered
The No Action Alternative (Alternative 1) for the 2011 Y-12 SWEIS
is the continued implementation of the 2002 ROD (67 FR 11296), which
was based on the Final SWEIS for the Y-12 National Security Complex
(DOE/EIS-0309), and modified by subsequent NEPA decisions. Four action
alternatives are considered in this SWEIS in addition to the No Action
Alternative: UPF Alternative (Alternative 2); Upgrade-in-Place
Alternative (Alternative 3); Capability-sized UPF Alternative
(Alternative 4); and No Net Production/Capability-sized UPF Alternative
(Alternative 5). The four action alternatives differ in that:
Alternative 2 involves a new, fully modernized manufacturing facility
(the UPF) optimized for safety, security and efficiency; Alternative 3
involves upgrading the existing facilities to attain the highest level
of safety, security, and efficiency possible without constructing new
production facilities; and both Alternatives 4 and 5 involve
constructing a UPF that would be approximately 10 percent smaller than
the UPF assessed for Alternative 2. Alternatives 4 and 5 would also
result in reductions in the production capability level at Y-12 to
support the requirements of a smaller stockpile. Alternative 4 analyzes
a production capability level equivalent to approximately 80
secondaries and cases per year and Alternative 5 analyzes a production
capability level equivalent to approximately 10 secondaries and cases
per year. The construction and operation of a CCC, which would provide
a new Emergency Services Complex for Y-12 is analyzed for Alternatives
2-5.
Preferred Alternative
As discussed in Section 3.6 of the Y-12 Final SWEIS, NNSA
identified the Capability-sized UPF Alternative (Alternative 4) as its
preferred alternative in both the Draft and the Final Y-12 SWEIS.
Environmentally Preferable Alternative
Considering the many environmental facets of the alternatives
analyzed in the Y-12 Final SWEIS, and looking out over the long term,
NNSA believes that the No Net Production/Capability-sized UPF
Alternative (Alternative 5) would be the environmentally preferable
alternative. Replacing older, inefficient facilities with new
facilities that incorporate modern safety, security and efficiency
standards, would improve Y-12's ability to protect human health and the
environment. Modernizing and
[[Page 43321]]
replacing older facilities with more energy efficient and
environmentally-protective facilities would minimize environmental
impacts compared to the No Action and Upgrade in Place Alternatives.
Under Alternative 5, NNSA would minimize the use of electricity and
water, improve health and safety for workers and the public, streamline
operations through consolidation, and reduce the resource consumption
``footprint'' of Y-12. Operating at a reduced production level would
minimize the volume of all classes of waste generated at Y-12. NNSA
notes that the Capability-sized UPF Alternative (Alternative 4) would
result in environmental benefits of a similar nature as those
associated with Alternative 5, but to a slightly reduced extent due to
the higher level of operations associated with Alternative 4.
Environmental Impacts of Alternatives
NNSA analyzed the potential impacts of each alternative on: Land
use; visual resources; site infrastructure; traffic and transportation;
geology and soils; air quality and noise; greenhouse gases; water
resources; wetlands; ecological resources; threatened and endangered
species; cultural resources; socioeconomics; environmental justice;
human health and safety; waste management; facility accidents; and
intentional destructive acts. NNSA also evaluated the potential impacts
of each alternative as to irreversible and irretrievable commitments of
resources, and the relationship between short-term uses of the
environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term
productivity. In addition, NNSA evaluated the impact of potential
accidents at Y-12 on workers and surrounding populations. These
analyses and results are described in the Summary and chapters 4 and 5
of the SWEIS. In a classified appendix, NNSA evaluated the potential
impacts of intentional destructive acts that might occur at Y-12.
Comments on the Final Site-Wide Environmental Impact Statement
NNSA distributed more than 500 copies of the Y-12 Final SWEIS to
Congressional members and committees, the State of Tennessee, local
governments, other Federal agencies, non-governmental organizations,
and individuals. Additionally, the Y-12 Final SWEIS is, available
electronically via the Internet at http://nepa.energy.gov.
Following publication of the Y-12 Final SWEIS in March 2011, and
prior to issuing this ROD, NNSA received three comment documents
related to the Y-12 Final SWEIS. Two of the three documents were
submitted by the Oak Ridge Environmental Peace Alliance (OREPA) on
April 1, 2011 and April 4, 2011, and the third was submitted on April
4, 2011 by the following organizations: Southwest Research and
Information Center, Tri-Valley CAREs, Friends of the Earth, Nuclear
Watch of New Mexico, Fernald Residents for Environmental Safety and
Health, Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, JustPeace, Cumberland Countians
for Peace and Justice, Network for Environmental and Economic
Responsibility, and Nukewatch. The Appendix to this ROD identifies the
comments contained in these three documents and provides NNSA's
responses. NNSA has concluded that none of the comments received
necessitate further NEPA analysis.
Decision
NNSA has decided to select the Capability-sized UPF Alternative
(Alternative 4). Under this Alternative, NNSA will continue to operate
Y-12 to meet the stockpile stewardship mission critical activities
assigned to the site. NNSA will also construct and operate a
Capability-sized UPF at Y-12 adjacent to the Highly Enriched Uranium
Materials Facility (HEUMF) and consolidate its enriched uranium
operations. This new facility is described in Section 1.4.4 of the Y-12
Final SWEIS. NNSA will reduce the production capability level of
facilities that support NNSA's stockpile stewardship mission to a level
that equates to approximately 80 secondaries and cases per year
(compared to a capability level that equates to 125 secondaries and
cases per year for Alternatives 1, 2, and 3 and a capability level that
equates to 10 secondaries and cases per year for Alternative 5). This
alternative also includes continuing operations related to other NNSA
National Security Programs, such as Nonproliferation, Global Threat
Reduction Initiatives, and support to Naval Reactors. Under this
alternative, activities conducted at Y-12 under non-NNSA Programs such
as the Complementary Work/Work for Others Program, Environmental
Management Programs, Non-defense Research and Development Program and
Complementary Work/Technology Program would also continue. These
programs, their missions and their major activities are described in
Chapter 2 of the Final Y-12 SWEIS. Additionally, NNSA has decided, for
the time being, to defer making a decision regarding the construction
and operation of the CCC. At an appropriate time, a separate decision
will be made regarding whether to construct and operate a CCC.
Basis for Decision
NNSA's decisions are based on its mission responsibilities and its
need to sustain Y-12's ability to operate in a manner that allows it to
fulfill its existing responsibilities in an environmentally sound,
timely, and fiscally prudent manner. National security policies require
NNSA to maintain the nation's nuclear weapons stockpile as well as its
core technical competencies and capabilities. Y-12's operations support
a wide range of scientific and technological capabilities for NNSA's
national security missions, including nonproliferation.
The benefits of implementing the Capability-sized UPF Alternative
include reliable, long-term, consolidated enriched uranium processing
capability for the nuclear security enterprise with modern technologies
and facilities; improved security posture for SNM; reduced accident
risks; improved health and safety for workers and the public; improved
operational efficiency; and reductions in the cost of operating and
maintaining key site facilities. The UPF will replace multiple aging
facilities with a modern facility that will be synergistic with the new
HEUMF to provide a robust SNM capability and improve responsiveness,
flexibility, and efficiency of operations.
Significant improvements in operation and maintenance costs and
operational efficiency can be expected from a new Capability-sized UPF.
These improvements include plans for installing new, reliable equipment
which is expected to, greatly reduce the need for major corrective
maintenance (e.g., less than half of the existing casting furnaces are
normally available because of reliability problems). In addition,
security improvements will be an integral part of the new facility,
reducing the number of personnel required to protect material. It is
also expected that the inventory cycle can be greatly reduced because
of more effective means of real-time inventory controls. A more
efficient facility layout is expected to decrease material handling
steps and reduce intra-plant transfers.
With the consolidation of SNM operations, incorporation of integral
security systems, and the 90 percent reduction of the protected area,
the security posture will be greatly improved under the Capability-
sized UPF Alternative. The use of engineered controls to reduce
reliance on administrative controls and personal
[[Page 43322]]
protection equipment to protect workers will improve worker health and
safety. In addition, use of new technologies and processes may
eliminate the need for some hazardous materials, reduce emissions, and
minimize wastes. Cost savings and cost avoidances are expected to
include the following:
Savings from consolidation related to right-sizing of
facilities/footprint, more efficient operations, and simplification of
SNM movement;
Operating and maintenance cost reductions of approximately
33 percent from current operations;
Reducing the footprint of the Perimeter Intrusion
Detection and Assessment System (PIDAS) protected area by 90 percent
(from 150 acres to about 15 acres), which will allow better
concentration of the protective force over a smaller area; and
Reducing the number of workers required to access the
protected area, which will improve the productivity of workers assigned
to non-SNM activities that are currently located in the protected area.
By reducing the size of the PIDAS, it is forecast that approximately
600 fewer employees will have to enter the PIDAS. An improvement in
efficiency of up to 20 percent in non-SNM operations, including
environmental clean-up projects, could be realized by avoiding the
access requirements and restrictions of the PIDAS. Projects that
support non-SNM operations will be less expensive because of improved
productivity.
Mitigation Measures for the Capability-sized UPF Alternative
(Alternative 4)
As described in the 2011 Y-12 SWEIS, Y-12 operates in compliance
with environmental laws, regulations, and policies within a framework
of contractual requirements. Many of these contractual requirements
mandate controls and actions intended to protect human health and the
environment as well as limit and mitigate potential adverse
environmental effects. Examples include the Environment, Safety, and
Health Manual, Integrated Safety Management System, emergency plans,
pollution prevention and waste minimization programs. NNSA and Y-12
will continue to impose contractual requirements for actions necessary
to comply with these or similar controls.
Mitigation measures are included in the UPF project design and are
integral components of the project to be implemented during the
construction project with all necessary funding provided by the
project. Mitigation measures specific to the UPF project include the
wetlands and stream mitigations described in Section 4.3 of Appendix G.
Other mitigation measures are identified in the Y-12 Final SWEIS
(Chapter 5) and NNSA will impose all mitigation commitments associated
with the Capability-sized UPF Alternative by including these measures
in all appropriate contractual documents and providing oversight to
ensure that the commitments are met. Monitoring of project activities
will occur through NNSA oversight which ensures fulfillment of imposed
requirements so that potential conditions adverse to quality, security,
safety health, and environment are promptly identified and actions are
taken to correct the conditions and prevent recurrence.
Thomas P. D'Agostino,
Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration.
Appendix to the Y-12 SWEIS ROD
Following publication of the Final Site-Wide Environmental
Impact Statement for the Y-12 National Security Complex, DOE/EIS-
0387 (Y-12 Final SWEIS or 2011 Y-12 SWEIS) in March 2011, and prior
to issuing of this Record of Decision (ROD), the National Nuclear
Security Administration (NNSA) received three comment documents
related to the Y-12 Final SWEIS. These comments were received
outside of the public comment period established by NNSA for
consideration of the SWEIS. However, NNSA endeavors to consider all
public comments where reasonably practicable, even when not
obligated to do so by the requirements of NEPA and the DOE and CEQ
regulations.
As discussed below, the comments raised in the three documents
were largely similar to, and in many cases identical to comments
that were submitted on the Draft Y-12 SWEIS, and to which NNSA
responded in the Y-12 Final SWEIS. Listed below is a summary of the
major comments contained in these three documents, along with NNSA's
response to these comments.
Comment 1. The 2011 Y-12 SWEIS is not a site-wide EIS and
focused almost exclusively on two proposed DOE actions--construction
of a new Uranium Processing Facility (UPF) and the construction of a
Complex Command Center (CCC).
Response. The 2011 Y-12 SWEIS provides a comprehensive analysis
of the current environmental situation at Y-12, and of ongoing and
reasonably foreseeable future operations and activities at existing
and proposed facilities. The SWEIS includes an analysis of all
proposed actions and reasonable alternatives ripe for analysis and
decisionmaking. The SWEIS was prepared by NNSA in accordance with
the requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and
the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the Council on Environmental
Quality (CEQ) NEPA regulations. In preparing the 2011 Y-12 SWEIS,
NNSA used current and well-documented, well-known scientific models
and data to analyze potential environmental impacts. Consequently,
NNSA disagrees that the 2011 Y-12 SWEIS is not a site-wide EIS.
In addition to analyzing all current, ongoing and reasonably
foreseeable operations and activities at Y-12 that support NNSA's
stockpile stewardship and nonproliferation missions, the 2011 Y-12
SWEIS includes an analysis of constructing and operating a UPF at Y-
12 in accordance with NNSA's decision to pursue such a facility in
the ROD (73 FR 77644) for the Complex Transformation Supplemental
PEIS (SPEIS) (DOE/EIS-0236-S4). The SWEIS includes an analysis of
constructing and operating a CCC at Y-12 because NNSA is considering
this facility as a replacement for existing facilities that house
equipment and personnel for the plant shift superintendent, fire
department, and emergency operations center. Analyzing reasonably
foreseeable project-specific actions in a SWEIS, such as the
construction and operation of a UPF or CCC, is appropriate. (See
comment-response 2.F on page 3-11 of Volume II of the Y-12 Final
SWEIS).
Comment 2. Because NNSA's activities are part of the ``nuclear
security enterprise,'' NNSA needs to conduct an updated
``nonproliferation assessment'' to reassess whether the activities
addressed by the Y-12 Final SWEIS are still consistent with U.S.
nonproliferation policy.
Response. As discussed above, the Y-12 Final SWEIS was prepared
by NNSA in accordance with the requirements of NEPA and the DOE and
CEQ regulations. Notwithstanding the fact that this comment is
beyond the scope of NEPA considerations for a site-wide EIS, NNSA
believes that its activities, including those considered in the Y-12
Final SWEIS, are fully consistent with current U.S. nuclear weapons
policies and treaty obligations, including the 2010 Nuclear Posture
Review (NPR), (U.S. Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review
Report (2011), available at http://www.defense.gov/npr).
An extensive discussion of current nonproliferation and national
security policies is included in Section 1.5 of the Y-12 Final
SWEIS. The NNSA's nonproliferation mission is actively supported at
Y-12. Y-12 participates in developing and implementing domestic and
international programs and projects aimed at reducing threats, both
internal and external, to the United States from the proliferation
of nuclear weapons, weapons technologies, and weapons usable
materials.
Comment 3. The Y-12 Final SWEIS fails to fully describe and
analyze environmental impacts of excavation, soil characterization,
transportation or disposal associated with the UPF.
Response. The Y-12 Final SWEIS includes an analysis of the
impacts of the UPF construction, including soil disturbance,
transportation, and disposal. Soil disturbance and disposal is
addressed in Section 5.1.2 and 5.5.2. Transportation of soil is
addressed in Section 5.4.1.2. (See comment-response 12.T.13 on page
3-52 of Volume II of the Y-12 Final SWEIS).
Soil characterization information is contained in detail in the
referenced Wetland and Sensitive Species Survey Report for Y-12:
Proposed Uranium Processing Facility, November 2009, which is a
reference for the
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Wetlands Assessment (Appendix G of the Y-12 Final SWEIS). (See
comment-response 12.T.20 on page 3-54 of Volume II of the Y-12 Final
SWEIS). Potential impacts related to excavation, soil
characterization, transportation and disposal are also considered in
the state Aquatic Resource Alteration Permit application. During
project execution, characterization of soils excavated and managed
for the UPF will be conducted as described in Section 4.0 of the
Wetlands Assessment utilizing MARSSIM (Multi-Agency Radiation Survey
and Site Investigation Manual) processes. (See comment-response
12.T.23 on page 3-55 of Volume II of the Y-12 Final SWEIS). In
planning for the Haul Road Extension Corridor and wetland
development, no contaminated soil is anticipated. Walk-over
radiological surveys have been done and sampling for site
characterization is being performed according to MARSSIM and U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency requirements. Historical land use in
the region is also known which lends support to NNSA's expectation
that no contamination will be encountered on the project.
Nevertheless, the potential exists for contaminated soils and
possibly other media to be encountered during excavation and other
site activities. Prior to commencing ground disturbance, NNSA would
survey potentially affected areas to determine the extent and nature
of any contaminated media and required remediation in accordance
with the procedures established under the site's environmental
restoration program and in accordance with appropriate requirements
and agreements. As discussed in Section 5.5.2 of the Y-12 Final
SWEIS, the potential for additional soil contamination from project
activities would be minimized by complying with waste management
procedures specified in DOE Order 435.1, Radioactive Waste
Management, and DOE Order 450.1A, Environmental Protection Programs.
Comment 4. The Y-12 Final SWEIS provides inadequate analysis of
seismic risks and steps taken to ameliorate risks.
Response. Seismology is addressed in Sections 4.5.3 and 5.5.1 of
the Y-12 Final SWEIS. As discussed in those sections, Y-12 lies at
the boundary between seismic Zones 1 and 2, indicating that minor to
moderate damage could typically be expected from an earthquake. Y-12
is traversed by many inactive faults formed during the late
Paleozoic Era. There is no evidence of capable faults (surface
movement within the past 35,000 years or movement of a recurring
nature within the past 500,000 years) in the immediate area of Y-12,
as defined by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC's) ``Reactor
Site Criteria'' (10 CFR part 100). The nearest capable faults are
approximately 300 miles west of Y-12 in the New Madrid Fault zone.
Based on the seismic history of the area, a moderate seismic risk
exists at Y-12. However, this should not negatively impact the
construction and operation of facilities at Y-12. All new facilities
and building expansions would be designed to withstand the maximum
expected earthquake-generated ground acceleration in accordance with
DOE Order 420.1B, Facility Safety, and accompanying safety
guidelines. (See comment-response 12.E on page 3-33 of Volume II of
the Y-12 Final SWEIS.)
The Y-12 Final SWEIS also considers potential impacts that could
be caused by earthquakes and other natural phenomena (see Section
D.9). Table D.9.3-1 identifies the accidents that were considered
for the major operations at Y-12. The accidents analyzed in detail
for the Y-12 Final SWEIS bound any impacts that would be associated
with earthquakes and other natural phenomena. This is due to the
fact that the accidents analyzed in detail in the SWEIS would be
expected to result in greater radiological releases than reasonably
foreseeable accidents caused by natural phenomena, including seismic
activity. (See comment-response 12.M.1 on page 3-39 of Volume II of
the Y-12 Final SWEIS.)
Comment 5. NNSA failed to provide adequate public comment
opportunity for wetlands proposal announced after close of the Draft
SWEIS comment period.
Response. NNSA has never intended to proceed with the proposed
action without public comment and compliance with applicable
permitting processes and regulations. The need for the Haul Road
Extension Corridor and associated potential impacts to wetlands were
not identified until after the Draft SWEIS was released for public
comment in October 2009. NNSA issued a separate Notice of Proposed
Wetlands Action and Wetlands Assessment (Appendix G of the Y-12
Final SWEIS) in June 2010 in compliance with 10 CFR Part 1022, and
provided an 18 day public comment period. In addition, Y-12 has
fully complied with the process of obtaining permits for the Haul
Road Extension Corridor which is intended to help to identify and
resolve environmental impact issues and/or concerns that State or
Federal agencies may have. The permitting processes also included
public comment periods. The public was given a 30 day comment period
for each of the permitting processes conducted by the Tennessee
Department of Environment and Conservation (TDEC) and the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers (USACE). Full, detailed project plans and design
drawings for the proposed Haul Road Extension Corridor were also
available through the USACE and TDEC in addition to the abridged
summaries provided in their respective public notices. (See comment-
response 12.T.2 on page 3-47 of Volume II of the Y-12 Final SWEIS.)
Comment 6. NNSA inappropriately declares the environmental
impact of wetlands disruption ``not relevant'' to the SWEIS.
Response. Following the requirements of 10 CFR part 1022, NNSA
prepared a Wetlands Assessment (Appendix G of the Y-12 Final SWEIS)
and determined that the information in the Wetlands Assessment does
not reflect a significant impact or substantial change to the SWEIS
and the NEPA process. The Y-12 Final SWEIS includes the potential
impacts related to the Haul Road Extension Corridor Project. The Y-
12 Final SWEIS analyzes all reasonably foreseeable potential
environmental impacts associated with implementation of the
alternatives analyzed in the SWEIS. (See comment-response 12.T.9 on
page 3-50 of Volume II of the Y-12 Final SWEIS.)
Comment 7. The Y-12 Final SWEIS fails to provide adequate
analysis of Alternative 6, proposed by the Oak Ridge Environmental
Peace Alliance (OREPA) and supported by broader public, which
provides a reasonable, unexamined alternative to those considered in
the Y-12 Final SWEIS.
Response. NNSA continues to believe that ``Alternative 6'' is
not a reasonable alternative based on its determination that this
alternative would not support current and reasonably foreseeable
national security requirements.
As discussed in comment-response 9.A on page 3-25 of Volume II
of the Y-12 Final SWEIS, NNSA believes that many of the elements of
``Alternative 6,'' proposed by OREPA, are analyzed in the Y-12 Final
SWEIS. For example, the Y-12 Final SWEIS includes an alternative
(Alternative 3, Upgrade in-Place) that would accomplish all required
dismantlements (and any required assembly) in existing facilities
that would be upgraded. As such, the SWEIS includes an alternative
that recognizes a need for a Stockpile Stewardship mission that can
be achieved through an upgrade in-place to existing facilities.
While NNSA agrees that consolidating operations and upgrading in-
place could render facilities functional for at least another
decade, during which the future of U.S. nuclear force needs could
become more clear, NNSA notes that the recently completed Nuclear
Posture Review specifically concludes that a UPF is a key investment
required to sustain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal.
The SWEIS also includes an alternative that would provide the
minimum assembly/disassembly capacity which NNSA believes would meet
national security requirements, which ``Alternative 6'' does not
satisfy. Under this alternative (Alternative 5--No Net Production/
Capability-sized UPF Alternative), NNSA would maintain the
capability to conduct surveillance and produce and dismantle
secondaries and cases. NNSA would reduce the production capability
level to approximately 10 secondaries and cases per year, which
would support surveillance operations and a limited Life Extension
Program workload; however, this alternative would not support adding
new types or increased numbers of secondaries to the stockpile.
In response to public comments, NNSA added a discussion of
``Alternative 6,'' proposed by OREPA, to Section 3.4 of the Y-12
Final SWEIS. The existing analyses of the individual elements of
``Alternative 6'' that are incorporated in the action alternatives
provide the decisionmaker with the information required to
incorporate any of those elements into decisions for future actions
at Y-12.
Comment 8. DOE's Preferred Alternative does not match the
``purpose and need'' as closely as the less-expensive No Net
Production Alternative.
Response. Section 3.6 of the SWEIS discusses the rationale for
the preferred alternative. (See comment-response 8.A on page 3-24 of
Volume II of the Y-12 Final SWEIS.) NNSA decided that Alternative 4
[[Page 43324]]
was preferred over other alternatives because it represented the
best capacity for meeting current and reasonably foreseeable
national security requirements.
Comment 9. The Y-12 Final SWEIS wrongly declares that the
demolition/disposal of existing facilities arising from relocation
of operations to a new UPF is ``not ripe.''
Response. The Integrated Facility Disposition Program (IFDP) is
DOE's program for disposing of legacy materials and facilities at
the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) and Y-12. The IFDP includes
both existing excess facilities (e.g., facilities not required for
DOE's needs or the discharge of its responsibilities) and newly
identified excess (or soon to be excess) facilities. Under the IFDP,
the decontamination and decommissioning (D&D) of approximately 188
facilities at ORNL, 112 facilities at Y-12, and remediation of soil
and groundwater contamination would occur over the next 30 to 40
years. The IFDP will be conducted as a remedial action under the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act (CERCLA). Cleanup and D&D activities conducted under CERCLA are
reviewed through the CERCLA process, which incorporates NEPA values.
The potential impacts of the IFDP are analyzed in the cumulative
impacts section of the SWEIS in chapter 6 (See comment-response 12.P
on page 3-44 of Volume II of the Y-12 Final SWEIS). Although IFDP
D&D activities are expected to commence within the next three to
five years, the major IFDP D&D activities would not take place for
many years (e.g., most likely any D&D activities associated with the
action alternatives in this SWEIS would not take place prior to
approximately 2018). These major D&D activities are to be resolved
under the provisions of CERCLA and are beyond the planning basis for
this SWEIS (See Section 5.16 on page 5-100 of Volume I of the Y-12
Final SWEIS). NNSA believes that the Y-12 Final SWEIS includes an
analysis of all reasonable alternatives and all cleanup/waste
management actions that are required to be included in a NEPA
analysis.
Comment 10. The Tennessee Division of Radiological Health is not
listed as a consulting agency. They should be given an opportunity,
and time, to comment on the Y-12 Final SWEIS before any ROD is
issued.
Response. During the Y-12 SWEIS process, NNSA specifically
invited TDEC to be a cooperating agency in the preparation of the
SWEIS and also requested that other agencies express their interest
in being designated as a cooperating agency in the preparation of
the Y-12 SWEIS (see 70 FR 71270, November 28, 2005). The Tennessee
Division of Radiological Health is part of TDEC. TDEC comments on
the Draft Y-12 SWEIS are contained on page 2-123 of Volume II of the
Y-12 Final SWEIS.
Comment 11. Commentors stated that an article in the Knoxville
News-Sentinel on March 31, 2011, casts new light on the seismic
conditions of current facilities and underscores OREPA's concerns,
first raised in 1994 and repeatedly in the succeeding years, about
the structural integrity of facilities at Y-12 including building
9212. The Y-12 Final SWEIS does not include a thorough assessment of
risks associated with ongoing operations at Y-12 in the ``No Action
Alternative,'' and provides an inadequate evaluation in its accident
scenarios.
Response. The Y-12 Final SWEIS considers potential impacts that
could be caused by earthquakes and other natural phenomena such as
wind, rain/snow, tornadoes and lightning (see Section D.9).
Criticality is also considered. Table D.9.3-1 identifies the
accidents that were considered for the major operations at Y-12. As
shown in that table, the SWEIS considered potential impacts from
earthquakes and other natural phenomena, including wind, flood, and
lightning. The impacts associated with accidents analyzed in detail
for the Y-12 Final SWEIS bound any impacts that would be associated
with earthquakes and other natural phenomena. This is due to the
fact that the accidents analyzed in detail in the SWEIS would be
expected to result in greater radiological releases than reasonably
foreseeable accidents caused by natural phenomena at Y-12.
With respect to potential accidents associated with existing/old
facilities, as discussed in Section 5.14.1.1, the Y-12 Final SWEIS
accident analysis process began with a review of all Y-12
facilities, including Building 9212, with emphasis on building
hazard classification, radionuclide inventories, including type,
quantity, and physical form, and storage and use conditions. For
each of these facilities, the next step was to identify the most
current documentation describing and quantifying the risks
associated with its operation. Current safety documentation was
obtained for all of these facilities. From these documents,
potential accident scenarios and source terms (release rates and
frequencies) associated with those facilities were identified. (See
comment-response 12.M.1 on page 3-39 of Volume II of the Y-12 Final
SWEIS).
[FR Doc. 2011-18312 Filed 7-19-11; 8:45 am]
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