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CHAPTER 4. SAFEGUARDING COMSEC FACILITIES SECTION 1. GENERAL 50. PURPOSE. National Communications Security Instruction (NACSI) 4008, Safeguarding COMSEC Facilities, dated March 4, 1983, prescribes standards for safeguarding COMSEC Facilities. NACSI 4008 is implemented for all USAF supported COMSEC accounts by Air Force Regulation AFR 56-6, same subject, dated November 3, 1986, all FAA COMSEC accounts are required to comply with the policies and procedures established in these directives. This chapter identifies specific requirements for which compliance is mandatory. 51. REFERENCED PUBLICATIONS. Appendix 5, to this order contains a reference listing of NACSI'S, NTISSI'S, and AFR's that are to be maintained by all FAA COMSEC accounts. The publications listed below pertain specifically to areas covered in this chapter. a. NACSI No. 4005, Safeguarding and Control of Communications Security Material, dated October 12, 1979. This NACSI is implemented in USAF publication AFR 56-13, same subject, dated July 28, 1987. b. NACSI No. 4009, Protected Distribution Systems, dated December 30, 1981. Implemented by USAF publication AFR 56-19, same subject, dated November 3, 1986. c. NTISSI No. 4004, Routine Destruction and Emergency Destruction of COMSEC Material, dated March 11, 1987. Implemented by USAF publication AFR 56-5, same subject, dated August 28, 1987. d. NCSC-9, National COMSEC Glossary, dated September 1, 1982. 52. BACKGROUND. a. National standards for safeguarding COMSEC facilities are necessary to ensure the integrity of the classified COMSEC material contained therein. b. The principal threats which such safeguards must defend against are: (1) Unauthorized access to or observation of classified COMSEC material. (2) Tampering with or TEMPST exploitation of, COMSEC and associated telecommunications equipment. (3) Clandestine exploitation of sensitive communications within a secure telecommunications facility (e.g. "bugging"). SECTION 2. PHYSICAL SECURITY STANDARDS 53. PHYSICAL SECURITY STANDARDS FOR FIXED COMSEC FACILITIES. a. Application. For the purposes of this order, unless specifically stated otherwise, all FAA COMSEC facilities are considered as "fixed." Should questions arise concerning the application of the physical security standards prescribed by this order to a specific facility they shall be addressed through the servicing security element to Manager, Investigations and Security Division, ACO-300, Washington, D.C., for resolution. b. Standards. All FAA COMSEC secure telecommunications facilities will be designated as CLOSED Areas in accordance with Order 1600.2C and will comply with the physical security standards specified in this section and Appendix 3. c. Special Security Requirements. Users of COMSEC equipment should be aware of special security requirements that may apply to the system they are using. NSA publishes these special doctrinal guidance documents as NACSI's in the 8000 series. The USAF implements the 8000 series NACSI's as AFSAL's and publishes and distributes them as specialized COMSEC publications in the COMSEC Material Control System (CMCS). These documents are indexed in AFKAG-13 and are available on request to all COMSEC custodians. d. Security/Engineering Approval. (1) The manager of the office or activity in which a secure telecommunications facility is located is responsible for ensuring that design and construction plans are coordinated through the servicing security element with ANC-120 and ACO-300 prior to implementation. This includes engineering and construction plans and specifications for proposed secure telecommunications facilities and ancillary terminal equipments, as well as plans for the reengineering or modification of existing facilities. Failure to do this will result in automatic loss of certification for the secure telecommunications facility. (2) Specifications and associated drawings must be submitted through the servicing security element to ACO-300 and to ANC-120. Subsequent to a review of the plans and specifications, a joint determination will be made by ANC-120 and ACO-300 either approving the plans or identifying corrective actions that must be taken. 54. INSTALLATION CRITERIA. FAA facilities which generate, process, or transfer unencrypted classified information by electrical, electronic, electromechanical, or optical means shall conform to the guidance and standards in NACSI 4009, NACSIM 5100A, and NACSIM 5203 with regard to protected wireline distribution systems. Questions concerning security requirements shall be addressed through the servicing security element to ACO-300 for resolution. Questions relevant to engineering and construction standards should be coordinated through the appropriate regional/center Airway Facilities channel and forwarded in writing to ANC-120, with an information copy to ACO-300 and the servicing security element. 55. FACILITY APPROVALS, INSPECTION, AND TESTS. a. Approval to Hold Classified COMSEC Material. Each FAA facility must be approved by the servicing security element before the facility may hold classified COMSEC material. Such approval shall be based on an inspection by the servicing security element which determines that the facility meets the physical safeguarding and other requirements of this order. (1) The servicing security element will advise the facility manager by letter of the approval or disapproval of the facility with an information copy to ACO-300. The facility will retain a copy of the approval letter in its COMSEC file. (2) After initial approval, each FAA facility holding classified COMSEC material shall be reinspected in accordance with provisions of FAA Order 1650.7B as they pertain to Category 1 facilities. The facility shall also be reinspected and the approval reviewed, when: (a) There is evidence of penetration or tampering, (b) Alterations are made which significantly change the physical characteristics of the facility, (c) The facility is relocated or the facility is reoccupied after being temporarily abandoned. b. Approval to Operate Secure Telecommunication Facilities. In addition to the requirement for physical security approval to hold classified COMSEC material, FAA secure telecommunications facilities require the following inspections and tests: (1) General COMSEC Inspection. ACO-300 is responsible for conducting a general COMSEC inspection of secure telecommunications facilities prior to initial activation where practicable, but in any case within 90 days after activation. Thereafter reinspection is required at intervals of no greater than 18 months. At a minimum, the inspection shall assess secure operating procedures and practices, handling and storage of COMSEC material, routine and emergency destruction capabilities, compliance with installation (Red/Black) criteria, and obvious technical security hazards. (2) Technical Surveillance Countermeasures Inspections. TSCM inspections are conducted by ACO-300 in accordance with provisions of Order 1600.12C. (a) COMSEC custodians shall send requests for TSCM inspections of new secure telecommunications facilities through the appropriate servicing security element to ACO-300 in accordance with procedures required by Order 1600.12C. Requests will be appropriately classified and should be submitted at least 90 days before the projected activation date for the facility. (b) After the initial TSCM survey ACO-300 will schedule subsequent surveys. (c) Requests for TSCM support shall be submitted when any of the conditions exist that are described in subparagraphs 5b(2)(a), (b), and (c), Annex A to NACSI 4008/AFR 56-6. (3) TEMPEST Inspections and Tests. Visual TEMPEST inspections and, where determined to be necessary by ANC-120, instrumented TEMPEST tests shall be conducted at secure telecommunications facilities in accordance with requirements specified in subparagraphs 4b(3)(a) and (b), Annex A to NACSI 4008/AFR 56-6. Written requests for instrumented TEMPEST test support should be submitted by the office or activity manager or COMSEC custodian through appropriate region/center channels to ANC-120 with an information copy to ACO-300. c. Daily Security Check. (1) Continuously Manned Facility. In a continuously manned facility, a security check shall be made at least once every 24-hours. This shall be a visual check to ensure that all classified COMSEC information is properly safeguarded, and that physical security protection system/devices (e.g., door locks and vent covers) are functioning properly. (2) Facilities that are Not Continuously Manned. In a facility which is not continuously manned, the security check shall be conducted at least every 24 hours if the facility is in operation for 24 hours or more and prior to departure of the last person and shall include additional checks to ensure that the facility entrance door is locked and that, where installed, intrusion detection systems are activated. Where a facility is unmanned for periods greater than 24 hours (e.g., during weekends and holidays) and the facility is not protected by an intrusion detection system that has been approved by ACO-300, a check shall be made at least once every 24 hours to ensure that all doors to the facility are locked and that there have been no attempts at forceful entry. d. Activity Security Checklist. FAA secure telecommunications facilities will use Standard Form (SF) 701, Activity Security Checklist, to record the daily security check. The national stock number for the SF 701 is 7540-01-213-7899. The form is available from the GSA. In facilities which operate continuously, at the end of each shift, the person responsible (shift supervisor, for example) makes the security check. The daily security check may be a part of, but not a substitute for, the daily (or shift) inventory of COMSEC material. NOTE: If in a continuously operating facility the security container is not unlocked it will not be opened solely to inventory the contents. An inventory will be conducted when the container is opened. 56. INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEMS. Intrusion detection systems used to protect COMSEC information must be specifically approved for that purpose by ACO-300 prior to installation. When approved alarm systems replace permanent guards, they must be used with an immediate guard response which will not exceed 5 minutes under any condition. 57.-60. RESERVED. SECTION 3. ACCESS RESTRICTIONS AND CONTROLS 61. UNESCORTED ACCESS. a. General. Unescorted access to FAA offices/activities handling, storing, or processing classified COMSEC material will be limited to: (1) FAA government civilian or military personnel who are U.S. citizens and whose duties require such access and, if the material is classified, who have been granted a security clearance equal to or higher than the classification of the COMSEC material involved. (2) Normally, these individuals will have regular duty assignments in the facility. The individuals must meet all requirements of the FAA Formal Cryptographic Access (FCA) Program as specified on Chapter 2 of this order. (3) The names of all such individuals shall appear on a posted formal access list. (4) Official visitors whose names do not appear on the access list may also be granted unescorted access by the COMSEC custodian or the facility manager having responsibility and authority for the COMSEC operations, provided the visitors require such access and meet the access requirements of NACSI 4005 and this order to include verification of the fact that the individuals have received a cryptographic access briefing and have a current signed cryptographic access authorization. All such visits shall be recorded on the visitor register (FAA Form 1600.8 or equivalent). (5) No individual will be allowed unescorted access to an FAA COMSEC facility who has not received a cryptographic access briefing and signed a cryptographic access authorization. b. Access Controls and Procedures for Secure Telecommunications Facilities. The following controls and procedures will be used to control access to secure telecommunications facilities: (1) Entrance controls will be established to prevent entry by persons not listed on the authorized entrance list. Facilities using the locked-door system must have a buzzer system and a way to challenge and identify persons before they enter. (2) Entrance doors to FAA facilities shall be equipped with a fish-eye viewing device to permit identification of persons seeking admittance. (3) If guards are assigned, station them immediately outside the entrance. Regardless of the control system used, entry procedures must ensure identification of persons seeking entry so as to prevent viewing of activities within the facility before entry is permitted. (4) Unrestricted entry to the secure telecommunications center will be limited to persons whose names appear on an official posted entrance list. The authorized entrance list must contain the names of all persons regularly assigned duties within the secure telecommunications facility and those others whose duties require them to have frequent access. All personnel on the authorized entrance list must have received a cryptographic access briefing and must have a current signed Cryptographic Access Certificate on file which is verified by the custodian or the manager having responsibility for the COMSEC operation. In addition, each individual on the list must have a valid clearance equal to or higher than the COMSEC information being given access to. It is the COMSEC custodian's responsibility to verify the clearance for each individual on the authorized entrance list. Custodians should consult with the servicing security element to determine the most effective method to verify clearance information and cryptographic access authorization data for each facility. (5) The following statement will be placed on the authorized entrance list, certifying that all persons listed thereon have been granted access to classified COMSEC information and that a security clearance is on file for each person: "ALL PERSONNEL LISTED HEREON HAVE BEEN GRANTED ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED COMSEC INFORMATION AND APPROPRIATE DOCUMENTATION IS ON FILE." By affixing his or her signature to this statement the custodian affirms that he or she has personally verified with the facility or activity personnel officer, or the servicing element, that each individual on the authorized access list has: (a) A current Form 1600.54, Notification of Personnel Security Action, on file; (b) A clearance equal to the highest classification level of COMSEC material to which he/she will have access. (c) Received a cryptographic access briefing and has signed a current Cryptographic Access Certification as required by this order. (6) On the authorized entrance list, the COMSEC custodian will specifically designate those persons, by name, who may authorize admittance to others not on the list. The number of persons authorized to admit others in this manner shall be kept to a minimum. Usually, the facility manager having responsibility and authority over the COMSEC operation, and the custodian may authorize admittance. (7) The authorized entrance list will be signed and dated by the COMSEC custodian. It is the custodian's responsibility to ensure that the list is current at all times. (8) An FAA Form 1600-8, Visitor Register, will be maintained to record the arrival and departure of all persons whose names do not appear on the authorized entrance and access list. Completed FAA Form 1600-8, shall be maintained on file by the custodian for a period of two calendar years, after which they may be destroyed. c. Access Control for Administrative/Monitor Accounts. FAA administrative and monitor accounts do not require the stringent security measures required for secure telecommunications facilities. (1) Administrative/monitor accounts are those which hold only general COMSEC publications or serve as issue points for codes and authentication systems. This type of account requires adequate storage facilities and inventory controls. However, they may be located within general office space if measures are taken to exclude unauthorized and uncleared personnel and prevent viewing of COMSEC material when in use. (2) The custodian must closely control access to an administrative account's holdings; access must be limited to persons within the immediate working area who have a need-to-know and others whose duties require frequent access. The requirements for granting access and certification or verification thereof are the same as for secure telecommunications facilities. 62. ESCORTED ACCESS. a. Uncleared visitors. Uncleared visitors may be authorized admittance by the custodian, or the manager having operational responsibility for the COMSEC facility, provided effective security precautions are taken to preclude unauthorized access to classified information. These visitors shall be under continuous escort by an individual whose name appears on the access list. All such visits shall be recorded in the visitor register. b. Repairmen. When uncleared repairmen are admitted to perform maintenance on commercially contracted information- processing equipment which is connected to circuits protected by cryptographic equipment, the escort shall be a cryptorepair person or other technically qualified individual who is capable of recognizing acceptable and proper repair procedures for that type of equipment. This is a means to control attempts at malicious action against the involved COMSEC equipment or installation. 63. VISITOR REGISTER. a. Requirement. A visitor register, FAA Form 1600.8, will be maintained at the COMSEC facility entrance area to record the arrival and departure of authorized visitors. b. Procedure. The visitor register shall contain the following information for each individual. (a) Date and time of arrival and departure. (b) Printed name and signature of visitor. (c) Purpose of visit. (d) Signature of individual admitting visitor. c. Disposition. Records of authorized visitors shall be retained in the custodian's files for a period of two calendar years, after which they may be destroyed. 64. NO-LONE ZONES. a. Facilities which produce or generate key (in any form) distribution centers, and depots and other logistic activities which store or distribute large quantities of keying material shall employ no-lone-zone restrictions within all areas in which these activities take place. b. Refer to AFR 56-1, paragraph 3-5, for restrictions on single person access. c. The majority of FAA COMSEC facilities handling or processing COMSEC material at the SECRET level or below will not have a need for institution of no-lone-zone measures. Custodians having questions concerning no-lone-zone applications should direct them to ACO-300 through their servicing security element. 65. GUARD SERVICES. a. Purpose. FAA facilities requiring the services of a secure telecommunications facility may for various reasons not be able to have a COMSEC resource in-house. This would be the case for example, if a secure telecommunications facility were being reengineered and it was necessary to take the facility off-line for a period of time. When this situation occurs, the FAA facility may enter into an agreement with another U.S. Government or military secure telecommunications facility to receive and transmit their classified and operational messages until the facility circuits are operational. This is referred to as "guarding." b. Requirement. The FAA manager having operational authority and responsibility for a secure telecommunications facility will inform ANC-120 and ACO-300, through appropriate regional channels to include the servicing security element, of a requirement for "guard" service prior to making arrangements for such support. Only secure telecommunications facilities operated by U.S. Government or military personnel will be used for guarding for classified FAA telecommunications. Contractor operated secure telecommunications facilities will not be used. 66.-70. RESERVED. SECTION 4. PROTECTION OF UNATTENDED COMSEC EQUIPMENT 71. GENERAL. a. Noncontinuously Manned Facility. In a noncontinuously manned facility, unattended COMSEC equipment shall be protected as prescribed in this section during periods when the facility is not manned. b. Construction. A facility which meets the construction requirements of Appendix 6 provides sufficient protection, under normal circumstances, for unattended, unkeyed COMSEC equipment installed in an operational configuration. The requirements for the protection of COMSEC equipment in secure telecommunications facilities which normally operate unmanned for extended periods of time are covered in Annex C, NACSI 4008/AFR 56-6, under "Unattended, Fixed Secure Telecommunications Facilities." 72. PROTECTION REQUIREMENTS. a. General. In some situations there may be significant technical or operational reasons to locate communications and associated COMSEC equipments in unattended sites. Any requirement for FAA activities to locate COMSEC equipment at unattended sites must be submitted through the servicing security element to ACO-300 for approval prior to implementation. The request for approval will be submitted in writing, by the custodian or facility manager having authority over the COMSEC assets and will include the measures to be taken to satisfy the safeguarding requirements listed in subparagraph b, below. b. Safeguards. Paragraph IID, Annex C to NACSI 4005/AFR 56-13 establishes the following safeguard requirements: (1) The site must be located in an area firmly under U.S. control. (2) Cryptonets whose keying variables are held in COMSEC equipments located at unattended sites must be kept as small as possible, with unique keying material used on each link terminated at an unattended site where feasible. (3) COMSEC equipment not in use may not be stored at an unattended site. All COMSEC equipments located at unattended sites must be operationally required as on-line, standby or back-up items to terminate an active circuit. (4) Keying material other than that which is electrically or physically held in the COMSEC equipments may not be stored at unattended sites. (5) The FAA manager responsible for operation of the unattended site must arrange for timely guard force response to investigate incidents involving threats to the COMSEC equipment at the site. Response planning should be conducted in coordination with the servicing security element. The servicing security element will advise the manager on effective security planning and will provide investigative support when necessary. The FAA custodian responsible for the COMSEC material must be knowledgeable of these arrangements. (6) The FAA manager responsible for operation of the unattended site must ensure that inspections of the sites are conducted to verify that the COMSEC equipments have not been tampered with. The inspections should be at random and at irregular intervals without excessive delay between the intervals. 73.-77. RESERVED. SECTION 5. PROTECTION OF LOCK COMBINATIONS 78. PURPOSE. a. General. The requirements of this section apply to combination locking devices for FAA COMSEC facility doors and security containers which hold classified, telecommunications security (TSEC) nomenclatured material. b. Collateral Classified Materials. Combinations to FAA security containers which are used to store only collateral classified material that is not accountable under the COMSEC Material Accounting System (CMCS), may be controlled in accordance with this section or the requirements of Order 1600.2C. If a container is used to store both collateral and TSEC nomenclatured material the protection requirements of this section will apply. 79. PROTECTION REQUIREMENTS. a. Selection of Combinations. Each lock must have a combination composed of randomly selected numbers. This combination shall not deliberately or accidentally duplicate a combination selected for another lock within the facility and shall not be composed of successive numbers, numbers in a systematic sequence, nor predictable sequences (e.g., birthdates, social security numbers, and phone numbers). b. Changing Combinations. A lock combination shall only be changed by a cleared individual having a need-to-know for the information safeguarded by the lock. Combinations must be changed: (1) When the lock is initially placed in use. (The manufacturer's preset combination shall not be used.) (2) When any person having authorized knowledge of the combination no longer requires such knowledge (e.g., through transfer or loss of clearance). (3) When the possibility exists that the combination has been subjected to compromise. (4) At least annually. c. Classification of Combinations. Lock combinations shall be classified the same as the highest classification of the information protected by the locks. For a security container, this is the highest classification of the information held in the container; for a facility door, it is the highest classification of the information held in the facility to which the door controls access including that information stored in containers. 80. ACCESS TO COMBINATIONS. a. Access to the combination of a lock used to protect COMSEC material shall be limited to individuals who are authorized access to the material in accordance with NACSI 4005/AFR 56-13, and Chapter 2 of this order. b. Where a container is used to store future editions of keying material, access to the combination shall be further restricted to the COMSEC Custodian and the Alternate Custodian(s). Where this restriction cannot be applied because others must have access to the container for current editions of keying material or other material, future editions of keying material shall be stored separately in a locked strongbox which can be opened only by the Custodian and the Alternate Custodian(s). The strongbox shall be kept in the security container. Exceptions may be made in operational areas to allow shift supervisors access to the next future edition of keying material, but not to later future editions. c. Access to combinations for security containers used to store Top Secret keying material will be controlled in accordance with requirements of NTISSI 4005, and Appendix 7. 81. RECORD OF COMBINATIONS. a. Standard Form 700. The Standard Form (SF) 700, Security Container Information, NSN: 7540-01-214-5372, will be used to record the current combination to COMSEC containers. Parts 2 and 2A of each completed copy of SF 700 shall be classified at the highest level of classification of the information authorized for storage in the security container. A new SF 700 must be completed each time the combination to the security container is changed. b. Emergency Access. To provide for ready access to secured material in emergencies, a central record of lock combinations shall be maintained in a security container approved for storage of the highest classified combination. The combination to this container shall be restricted to persons with proper clearance and need-to-know. Provision must be made for access to the record of combinations in case of an emergency. c. Packaging Requirements. Combinations to FAA COMSEC containers will be packaged and handled as follows: (1) The SF 700 Part 2 and 2A containing the combination will be assigned a classification equal to the highest category of classified material stored within the container. In addition to the classification, the SF 700 will be annotated to reflect the following: (a) The identity of the container (reference paragraph 191, chapter 8, Order 1600.2C). This will include the container, room, and building number. (b) The date the combination was changed. (c) The responsible persons authorized access to the combination. (2) Safe combination will be maintained within COMSEC channels. This will not prevent storing combinations in FAA areas outside the secure communications facility or vault. For combinations up to and including Secret a properly filled out SF 700 should be forwarded to the servicing security element monitor account through COMSEC channels. Proper packaging is required and delivery should be accomplished by courier. Persons who have access to the security containers which house COMSEC combinations must have a clearance level equal to or above that required for access to security containers or vaults for which the combinations have been recorded, and must meet FAA FCA Program requirements specified in Chapter 2 of this order. For storage outside the secure communications facility or vault the COMSEC custodian will require an SF 154 hand receipt for the combination and will maintain the current SF 154 receipt(s) in the COMSEC file. (3) For storage outside the secure telecommunications facility or vault, a combination storage location shall be chosen which allows ready access in an emergency but which is restricted to persons with proper clearance and need-to-know. Top Secret combinations do not have to be recorded with the Top Secret Control Office (TSCO) since they are controlled within COMSEC channels. Top Secret combination must be controlled however in accordance with NTISSI 4005, and Appendix 7. d. Prohibition. It is specifically prohibited for individuals to record and carry, or store insecurely for personal convenience, the combinations to facilities or containers in which COMSEC material is stored. Also, records of such combinations may not be stored in electronic form in a computer. 82.-86. RESERVED. SECTION 6. NONESSENTIAL AUDIO/VISUAL EQUIPMENT 87. PERSONALLY OWNED EQUIPMENT. Personally owned receiving, transmitting, recording, amplification, information-processing, and photographic equipment (e.g., radios, tape recorders, stereos, televisions, cameras, magnetic tape and film) shall not be permitted in FAA secure telecommunications facilities. 88. GOVERNMENT OWNED EQUIPMENT. Government-owned or leased (or company owned-or leased in the case of contractor-operated facilities) receiving, transmitting, recording, amplification, video, and photographic equipment (e.g., radios, music systems, TV monitors/cameras, and amplifiers) which are not directly associated with secure telecommunications operations or information processing activities may be used in secure telecommunications facilities provided approval for their use is granted by the FAA facility chief or manager having responsibility for and authority over COMSEC operations on a case-by-case basis, subject to the following: a. The Government-owned equipment in FAA telecommunications facilities must be subjected to and pass all the same technical and TEMPEST security requirements that mission-essential equipment must pass. b. Equipment must be reinspected or tested each time it is removed and then returned to the facility. c. The manager responsible for approving the location of the equipment in the secure telecommunications facility will also be responsible for ensuring that a record of the latest approval and inspection/test is maintained in the secure telecommunications facility, and a copy provided to ACO-300 through the servicing security element. d. The reinspection/test and record requirements do not apply to approved portable telephone "beepers" and two-way radios carried by visiting key personnel on official duty, if approved by the COMSEC custodian. 89.-94. RESERVED. SECTION 7. STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES (SOP) 95. REQUIREMENT. a. Requirement. Each FAA COMSEC secure telecommunications facility shall have a written COMSEC SOP. b. Procedure. The COMSEC custodian will prepare and maintain in a current status a written SOP which shall contain provisions for the secure conduct of facility operations and for the safeguarding of COMSEC material, for example the SOP should include procedures for: (1) Cryptographic operations. (2) Local accountability of COMSEC material. (3) Obtaining COMSEC maintenance support. (4) Controlling access to the COMSEC area. (5) Storage. (6) Routine and emergency destruction. (7) Reporting of insecurities. c. Coordination. The custodian will require all persons associated with the day-to-day operations of the secure telecommunications facility to familiarize themselves with the SOP initially and signify by their initials that they have reread the SOP at least once every 3 months thereafter. 96. EMERGENCY PLAN. As an adjunct to its SOP each FAA Plan COMSEC facility shall have a current emergency plan prepared in accordance with guidance contained in NTISSI 4004/AFR 56-5. The plan shall be written, and, as a minimum shall be structured to address the following concerns: a. Coordination with the overall facility/activity emergency contingency planning staff. COMSEC emergency/contingency and destruction planning should be an integral part of the overall facility plan. b. Fire reporting and initial fire fighting by assigned personnel. c. Assignment of on-the-scene responsibility for ensuring protection of the COMSEC material held. d. Procedures for securing or removing classified COMSEC material and evacuation of the area(s). e. Protection of material when admission of outside firefighters into the secure area(s) is necessary. f. Assessment and reporting of probable exposure of classified COMSEC material to unauthorized persons during the emergency. g. Post-emergency inventory of classified COMSEC material and reporting of any losses or unauthorized exposure to the servicing security element. 97.-101. RESERVED. |
CHAPTER 5. SAFEGUARDING AND CONTROL OF COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY MATERIAL 102. GENERAL a. Purpose. This chapter specifies minimum safeguards and establishes standard criteria for the protection and control of Communications Security (COMSEC) material in accordance with guidelines set forth in National Communications Security Committee document NCSC-1, Safeguarding COMSEC Material. The NCSC has been replaced by the National Telecommunications and Information Systems Security Committee (NTISSC). The U.S. Air Force implementing directive is AFR 56-13, Safeguarding and Control of Communications Security Material, dated July 28, 1986. b. Scope. Controls for safeguarding COMSEC material apply to access, use, production, development, transportation, storage, accounting, and disposition. Safeguards and control criteria for COMSEC material are specified herein in the following categories: (1) Keying material marked "CRYPTO" (e.g., key lists, key cards, codes, authenticators, one-time pads, CRIBS, rotors, keying plugs, tapes, keyed microcircuits, etc.). (2) Crypto-equipment (including communications and information processing equipment with integral cryptography) and components thereof which embody the principles or logic of a cryptosystem, including COMSEC computer software and firmware. NOTE: "Firmware" refers to software that is permanently stored in a hardware device which allows reading and executing the software but not writing or modifying it. (3) Other COMSEC material of the following types: (a) General COMSEC instructional documents, TEMPEST information, COMSEC equipment operating maintenance manuals, changing call signs and frequency systems, brevity lists, and keying material not marked "CRYPTO." (b) Crypto-ancillary material (including equipment or software designed specifically to facilitate efficient or reliable operation of crypto-equipment, or designed specifically to convert information to a form suitable for processing by crypto-equipment). 103. DEFINITIONS. For the purposes of this order the following terms shall have the meanings set forth below: a. Communications Security (COMSEC). Communications security (COMSEC) means protective measures taken to deny unauthorized persons information derived from telecommunications of the United States Government related to national security and to ensure the authenticity of such communications. Such protection results from the application of security measures (including cryptosecurity, transmission security, emissions security) to electrical systems generating, handling, processing, or using national security or national security related information. It also includes the application of physical security measures to communications security information or materials. b. Telecommunications. Telecommunications means the transmission, communication, or processing of information, including the preparation of information, by electrical, electromagnetic, electromechanical, or electro-optical means. c. National security. National security means the national defense and foreign relations of the United States. 104. HANDLING KEYING MATERIAL. Keying material marked "CRYPTO" must be handled within the COMSEC Material Control System (CMCS). This is a unique system set up for producing, transmitting, storing, accounting for, and destroying COMSEC material including International Pact Organization (IPO) material. All nomenclatured COMSEC material (except material handled through publication distribution channels; such as National COMSEC Instructions (NACSI), National COMSEC/EMSEC Information Memoranda (NACSEM) and National COMSEC Information Memoranda (NACSIM)), is controlled within the CMCS throughout its life. The system requires that all COMSEC material be handled only between COMSEC custodians through established channels. Classified COMSEC material never enters the regular document distribution and control system. 105.-109 RESERVED. SECTION 1. GENERAL INFORMATION APPLICABLE TO ALL COMSEC MATERIAL 110. RESPONSIBILITY FOR SAFEGUARDING COMSEC MATERIAL. a. Managers of FAA facilities and offices which use or handle COMSEC material are responsible for safeguarding and controlling all COMSEC material provided to or produced by their facility or office, and for establishing procedures which include the following: (1) A Central Office of Record (COR). For the FAA the U.S. Air Force Cryptologic Support Center, AFCSC/MMIC, San Antonio, Texas 78243-5000, is the Central Office of Record. (2) Establishment and Disestablishment of COMSEC Accounts. Directive guidance for the establishment and disestablishment of FAA COMSEC accounts is contained in AFKAG-2 and this order. b. COMSEC Custodian. The COMSEC Custodian is the properly appointed individual who manages and controls the accountable COMSEC material in the CMCS charged to his/her activity. The custodian's responsibilities include: (1) Receiving, storing, amending, accounting for inventorying, and issuing COMSEC material charged to his/her account and destroying or transferring of material when it is no longer required. (2) Ensuring that appropriate COMSEC material is readily available to properly authorized individuals whose duties require its use. (3) Advising user and supervisors, as appropriate, of the required protection and procedures which must be provided COMSEC material issued to them for use, including the authorized procedures for destruction or disposition of such material when it is no longer required. (4) Reporting insecurities in accordance with AFKAG-2 and NTISSI 4003, COMSEC insecurities fall into three categories, cryptographic, personnel and physical. Specific examples of each type are provided in NTISSI 4003, Reporting COMSEC Insecurities. c. Individual Users. Individuals involved in the use of COMSEC material are personally responsible for: (1) Safeguarding and proper employment of all material he or she uses or for which he or she is responsible. (2) Reporting to proper authorities any occurrences, circumstances, or acts which could jeopardize the security of COMSEC material. 111. TRANSPORT OF COMSEC MATERIAL. a. Department of Defense Courier Service, State Department Diplomatic Courier Service, or departmental couriers are the preferred means of transporting COMSEC material. b. Use of commercial passenger aircraft for the transportation of current or superseded keying material is normally prohibited. c. FAA employees are not authorized to transport current or superseded key material for any reason without specific prior approval of the servicing security element in regions and centers, and ACO-300 in Washington Headquarters. In addition, the employee must have a valid courier letter in accordance with the provisions of Order 1600.2C. The courier letter must be signed by the employee's facility or office manager. Before signing the letter it is the manager's responsibility to ensure that the employee has received a briefing on his or her responsibilities as a courier as required by Order 1600.2C. 112. COURIER RESPONSIBILITIES. a. Couriers are responsible for ensuring the integrity of COMSEC material in their custody at all times. Couriers will retain their letter of authorization in their possession at all times while actually transporting key materials. b. Couriers transporting material into foreign countries must ensure that material is not subject to inspection by unauthorized personnel. In no case will U.S. COMSEC material be permitted to enter foreign distribution channels unless it has been authorized for release by the proper U.S. authorities. c. In cases where the bulk of the material to be transported, or the physical configuration of the conveyance will not allow for the courier to keep the material on his person or in view at all times, arrangements should be made with the carrier to effect a "last-in-first-out" procedure that will ensure the material is given the most protection possible, and not left unattended at loading docks, cargo storage areas, baggage areas, railways platforms, etc. 113. OPEN DISPLAY OF COMSEC MATERIAL AND INFORMATION. The open or public display of U.S. Government or foreign COMSEC material and information at nongovernmental symposia, meetings, open houses, or for other nonofficial purposes is forbidden. This prohibition includes discussion, publications, or presentation of COMSEC information for other than official purposes. Any requests for the public or nonofficial display or publications of COMSEC information, including Freedom of Information Act requests, will be referred through ACS-300 to the Director, National Security Agency. 114. DESTRUCTION. Appendix 8 Routine Distribution and Emergency Protection of COMSEC Material, contains criteria and procedures for secure destruction of COMSEC material. FAA COMSEC custodians will ensure that destruction requirements set forth in this order and AFKAG-2 are followed. 115. REPORTING INSECURITIES. a. General. Requirements for reporting COMSEC insecurities are specified in NTISSI 4003. The USAF implementing regulation for NTISSI 4003 is AFR 56-12. b. Requirements. (1) Insecurities associated with FAA COMSEC activities will be reported in accordance with NTISSI 4003 or AFR 56-12. Information copies of reports of COMSEC insecurities will be provided through COMSEC channels to the servicing security element and to ACS-300. (2) The servicing security element will conduct an investigation of reported insecurities and submit four copies of FAA Form 1600-32 (Report of Investigation) to the Manager, Investigations and Security Division, ATTN: ACO-300. c. Classification of Insecurity Reports. Reports of COMSEC insecurities and associated investigative reports shall be classified according to content in accordance with provisions of NTISSI 4002 and NTISSI 4003. If there is doubt about the correct classification assistance should be requested from the servicing security element or ACO-300. If there is doubt as to whether a report should be classified or unclassified, handle and safeguard it as classified until a final determination is made in accordance with provisions of chapter 4 in Order 1600.2C. 116. EVIDENCE OF TAMPERING. All instances where COMSEC material displays evidence of tampering shall be promptly reported to Director, National Security Agency, ATTN: S-213, in accordance with provisions of NTISSI 4003 and AFR 56-12. Information copies of the report shall be provided to the servicing security element and ACO-300. 117. ALTERATION OF COMSEC MATERIAL. No modifications or changes in classification or markings or alterations of any kind shall be made to COMSEC material without prior approval of the NSA. Requests of this nature from FAA COMSEC activities will be submitted through COMSEC channels to AFCSC, ATTN: AFCSC/MMI, with information copies to the servicing security element and ACS-300. AFCSC will coordinate with the NSA as required. 118. CLEARANCE REQUIREMENTS FOR GUARDS. Those guards whose duties include responsibility for access and protection of classified COMSEC material will be appropriately cleared. Those guards whose duties are primarily area control (gate guards, building security) need not be cleared when they are used to supplement other security measures and will not normally have access to classified information. All guards must be responsible and trustworthy personnel and instructed concerning their responsibilities. Foreign guards may be used for control only. Questions concerning clearance requirements for FAA guard personnel should be coordinated with the appropriate servicing security element. 119. STORAGE REQUIREMENTS. a. General. Storage means the use of security containers, vaults, alarms, guards, etc., to protect COMSEC information during nonworking hours or when it is not under the direct and continuous control of properly cleared and authorized personnel. FAA managers and custodians responsible for COMSEC operations will ensure that the requirements of this paragraph as well as the more detailed standards and criteria in appendix 11 of this order are complied with. Servicing security elements will assist COMSEC custodians in implementing these requirements. b. Storage Requirements. For each vault or container used to store classified COMSEC material: (1) Designate the level of classified material authorized for storage therein but do not show this designation externally. (2) Assign a number or symbol for identification purposes. Place the number or symbol in a conspicuous location on the outside of the vault or container. (3) Prepare a General Services Administration/ Information Security Oversight Office (GSA/ISOO) Form SF-700 (Security Container Information Form) for each security container and vault door. On this form identify the names, addresses and home telephone numbers of persons to be notified if the container is found insecure. Post part 1 of the SF-700 conspicuously on the inside of the locking drawer of each security container, and on the inside of each vault door. Refer to chapter 8 in Order 1600.2C. Even though more than four persons may know the combination, only those persons to be notified need be listed on part 1. For ordering purposes the NSN for the GSA/ISOO SF-700 form is 7540-01-214-5372. (4) Security containers or vaults used to store COMSEC information shall be located in areas not accessible to general traffic, which are locked or otherwise protected during nonworking hours. (5) Security containers or vaults used to store keying material of any classification must never have been drilled to gain access unless the drilled parts are replaced with new or repaired combination locks or drawer heads. This also applies to SECRET and TOP SECRET COMSEC material other than keying material. When containers have been drilled to gain access and have been repaired and inspected to ensure acceptable safeguarding capabilities/(reference chapter 8 in Order 1600.2C), they may be used to store COMSEC material including International Pact Organization (IPO) other than keying material, classified no higher than CONFIDENTIAL. 120. OTHER COMSEC INFORMATION. a. General. Classified COMSEC information not specifically covered by this order shall be safeguarded in accordance with requirements of Order 1600.2C, National Security Information. b. Requirement. FAA COMSEC accounts will receive classified documents such as NACSIS, NTISSIs, AFRs, etc., that are not controlled within the CMCS. Documents of this type are referred to as "collateral classified" and will not have a register number and will not be listed on inventories provided by AFCSC. Because these documents are distributed through COMSEC channels they will normally be delivered directly to the custodian and will not be placed under control at the facility security control point (SCP). It is the custodian's responsibility to ensure that documents of this type are placed under control in accordance with provisions of Order 1600.2C. Normally, this means returning documents classified SECRET or higher, to the facility/activity SCP, having them logged in, and then signed back to the COMSEC custodian. Reference chapter 7, in Order 1600.2C. c. Location of SCP. The security control point (SCP) function for a facility/activity should not be collocated with the COMSEC secure telecommunications facility, in order to ensure separation between the document control functions of the SCP and the CMCS responsibilities of the custodian and alternate. 121. DISPOSITION OF COMSEC MATERIAL. a. General. After COMSEC material has been issued to an account or user it cannot be transferred or destroyed without specific prior approval. The term "disposition" as used in this paragraph means the transfer (return to AFCSC or transfer to another FAA account or to an account of another department or agency) or destruction of COMSEC material. Refer to AFKAG-2, chapters 5 and 6. b. Requirements. When material on hand excess to requirements is to be returned to AFCSC or is to be shipped to another account to meet operational requirements, specific disposition instructions must be furnished as follows: (1) ACO-300 is the approval authority to transfer to another FAA account. (2) AFCSC gives authority: (a) To transfer to an account of another department or agency or return to account 616600. (b) For destruction. c. Request. Requests for disposition instructions will be routed through the servicing security element with an information copy to ACS-300. d. Exception. The above rules do not apply to crypto-equipment. AFCSC gives advance approval for all movement of crypto-equipment (AFKAG-2). To meet contingencies and emergencies, ACO-300 in coordination with ANC-120 may approve the relocation of FAA assets and then notify AFCSC. 122. PAGE CHECKS OF COMSEC PUBLICATIONS. a. General. The integrity of COMSEC material must be ensured so that all material produced must be accounted for and maintained at the lowest possible exposure rate. Although in most cases FAA COMSEC custodians have free access to the secure telecommunications facility (TCF) they support, keying material issued to the secure TCF is considered to be outside the COMSEC material control environment because of the exposure factor. When material is issued by the custodian, the receiver, whether the actual user or an intermediary, is considered to be a user. A local courier is not considered to be a user because, until material is sighted for by line item, the material is still accountable within the CMCS. b. Requirements. A page check of all classified COMSEC publications is mandatory on certain occasions, both to satisfy security requirements and to ensure usability. Page checks are to be made by first consulting the list of effective pages on the cover of the document and ensuring that each page is exactly as described. The page check is recorded on the record of page checks page; or, if the publication has no record of page checks page, record the page check on the record of amendments page or on the front cover. The date checked, signature, and organizational identification of the person making the check are required. Page checks will be made: (1) On receipt of classified COMSEC material from any source. (2) During change of custodian. (3) When entering an amendment or changes which adds, deletes, or replaces pages or affects page numbers (COMSEC Users Guide - AFR 56-10). (4) At least annually. (5) Before destruction. The page check conducted before a document is destroyed does not have to be recorded. Sealed keying material, whether sealed with the original production wrapping or sealed by the custodian according to Annex B, paragraph IIE3b, NACSI 4005/AFR 56-13, does not require page check before destruction. c. Exceptions to Page Check Requirements. The following are exceptions to page check requirements listed in paragraph 122b: (1) Check one-time pads that are sealed on the edges as individual pages are used. No separate record of page check is required. A page check of one-time pads that are not sealed on the edges is required only on issue to a user. (2) Keycards and keylists enclosed in protective or restrictive wrappers should be retained within these wrappers for as long as possible. (3) One-time tape does not require a segment check. d. Additional page checks. FAA custodians are authorized to conduct additional page checks as needed. 123. DAILY OR SHIFT INVENTORY REQUIREMENTS. A daily or shift inventory is required for: a. Legend 1 COMSEC material. Equipments are identified by the suffix CA to the national stock number (NSN). b. Legend 1 International Pact Organization COMSEC material; that is North Atlantic Treaty Organization. c. Legend 2 COMSEC material. Equipments are identified by the suffix CS to the NSN. d. Legend 3 COMSEC material. Material whose accountability has been dropped between AFCSC and the FAA COMSEC account. e. Legend 5 COMSEC material. Material which has not been placed into effect (reserve or contingency material). 124. COMSEC ACCOUNT RECORD FILE. Each FAA COMSEC account shall maintain an account record file consisting of six folders as required by AFKAG-2. A description of these files follows: a. Folder 1. Accounting reports and an AFCOMSEC Form 14: (1) File authenticated copies of all accounting reports in numerical sequence by the account's voucher number. (2) Maintain an AFCOMSEC Form 14 in the front of the folder. (3) Classify this folder a minimum of CONFIDENTIAL. b. Folder 2. AFCOMSEC Form 3. This folder contains the current records appointing and rescinding the COMSEC custodian and alternate custodians for the COMSEC account. AFCOMSEC form 9 also shall be retained in this folder. c. Folder 3. General accounting correspondence. File copies of correspondence about COMSEC distribution and accounting (such as disposition instructions, procedure changes, and tracer actions). Classify this folder equal to the highest classification of the correspondence therein. d. Folder 4. Mail and courier package receipts. File package receipts for classified COMSEC material transmitted or received through Armed Forces Courier Service, other officially designated couriers, or the U.S. Postal Service. e. Folder 5. Hand receipts. File signed copies of hand receipts for COMSEC material issued to users. Destroy the receipt according to the instructions in AFKAG-2. f. Folder 6. Local destruction reports. Keep reports as instructed in Situation E4, AFKAG-2. 125.-129. RESERVED. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY PUBLIC AVAILABILITY TO BE DETERMINED UNDER 5 U.S.C. 552 |
CHAPTER 6. CONTROLLED CRYPTOGRAPHIC ITEMS (CCI) 130. PURPOSE AND BACKGROUND. a. The Controlled Cryptographic Item (CCI) category applies to specified, unclassified, secure telecommunications and information handling equipments and associated cryptographic components. The intent is to promote the broad use of secure telecommunications and information handling equipments for the protection of national security (classified), and other sensitive information which should be protected in the national interest. b. Secure telecommunications and information and handling equipments and associated cryptographic components which are designated "Controlled Cryptographic Item" or "CCI" use a classified cryptographic logic; it is only the hardware or firmware embodiment of that logic which is unclassified. The associated cryptographic drawings, logic descriptions, theory of operation, computer programs, and related cryptographic information remains classified. c. Procedures for controlling CCI secure telecommunications and information handling equipments and associated cryptographic components are required to guard against preventable losses to an actual or potential enemy. (1) In keeping with the spirit of expanded use of these equipments, minor lapses in carrying out control procedures shall be referred to the responsible manager as a matter of administrative discretion. FAA employees can be held liable for the loss, damage, or destruction of Government property caused by their negligence, willful misconduct, or deliberate unauthorized use. (2) More serious infractions of CCI control procedures may constitute sabotage, loss through gross negligence, theft, or espionage that would be punishable under various sections of the United States Code or the Uniform Code of Military Justice. 131. DEFINITIONS. a. Controlled Cryptographic Item (CCI). A secure telecommunications or information handling equipment, or associated cryptographic components, which is unclassified but controlled. Equipments and components so designated shall bear the designator "Controlled Cryptographic Item" or "CCI". b. Secure Telecommunications and Information Handling Equipment. Equipment designed to secure telecommunications and information handling media converting information to a form unintelligible to an unauthorized intercepter and by reconverting the information to its original form for authorized recipients. Such equipment, employing a classified cryptographic logic, may be stand-alone-crypto-equipment, as well as telecommunications and information handling equipment with integrated or embedded cryptography. c. Crytopgraphic Component. The hardware or firmware embodiment of the cryptographic logic in a secure telecommunications or information handling equipment. A cryptographic component may be a modular assembly, a printed circuit board, a microcircuit, or a combination of these items. d. Access. The ability or opportunity to obtain, modify, or use. External viewing of a CCI does not constitute access. 132. CONTROL REQUIREMENTS. The following subparagraphs set forth the minimum requirements for controlling unkeyed CCI equipments and components utilized by the FAA. Where such equipments and components contain classified key they shall be protected in accordance with the requirements of Chapter 5 of this Order. Also, depending upon the application, other more stringent requirements may be prescribed. a. Access. A security clearance is not required for access to unkeyed CCI equipments and components. However, access shall normally be restricted to U.S. citizens whose duties require such access. Access may be granted to permanently admitted resident aliens who are U.S. Government civilian employees or active duty or reserve members of the U.S. Armed Forces whose duties require such access. ACO-300 may grant waivers to permit non-U.S. citizens unescorted access to installed CCIs, regardless of the release status of the CCI, under conditions listed below: NOTE: The approval of the National Managers must be obtained by ACO-300 through AFCSC/SRMP before allowing such access by non- U.S. citizens in Communist block or other countries listed in the Attorney General Criteria Country List. Such requests shall be routed through the servicing security element to ACO-300 together with complete justification and explanation of operational need. (1) Unkeyed CCI's: (a) Such access is in conjunction with building maintenance, custodial duties, or other operational responsibilities normally performed by such personnel unescorted in the area now containing the CCIs before their installation; and (b) The CCI is installed within a facility which is a U.S.-controlled facility or a combined facility with a permanent U.S. presence, as opposed to a host nation facility, even through the primary staffing is by host nation personnel; and (c) The servicing security element has determined that the risk of tampering with the CCI which could result in compromise of U.S. information, classified or unclassified but sensitive, is acceptable in light of the local threat and vulnerability and the sensitivity of the information being protected and indicated by its classification, special security controls, and intelligence life; and (d) Such access is not prohibited by Department of State policies and procedures applicable to FAA operation in a given geographic area. (e) The system doctrine for the CCI does not specifically prohibit such access. (2) Keyed CCI's. In addition to all of the requirements for unkeyed CCIs, the following apply for unescorted access or use by foreign personnel: (a) The foreign personnel are civilian employees of the U.S. Government or assigned to a combined facility; and (b) The CCI remains U.S. property, a U.S. citizen is responsible for it, and the presence of such installed CCIs is verified at least monthly; and (c) The communications to be protected are determined to be essential to the support of FAA or combined operations; and (d) FAA and other U.S. users communicating with such terminals are made aware of the non-U.S. citizen status of the CCI user; and (e) Only U.S. personnel with classified U.S. keys may key CCI's. Authorized foreign personnel may key CCIs with allied keys or unclassified keys. (3) Special Security Requirements. If a CCI is to be installed and operated in a foreign country at a facility which is either unmanned or manned entirely by non-U.S. citizens, additional special security measures, such as vault areas, locking bars, safes, alarms, etc., are required. Should an installation of this nature be required to support FAA operations it must be approved in advance by ACO-300 after coordination with AFCSC/SRM on a case-by-case basis. (4) Moving CCI's. CCI's will not normally be moved from an environment where the tampering risk presented by non- U.S. citizen access is acceptable to a more sensitive environment where the risk is not acceptable. If such action is an operational necessity, it must receive the prior approval of the FAA servicing security element and in overseas areas the cognizant representative of the Department of State for the particular geographic area. All such CCI's must be examined for signs of tampering by qualified COMSEC maintenance personnel. Any evidence of tampering shall be reported as a COMSEC incident and immediate action will be taken to remove the CCI from operational use pending notification from the Director, National Security Agency. b. Courier. Authorized FAA employees and contractor employees (U.S. citizens) may courier CCI equipment and components. Requirements for courier authorization are specified in FAA Order 1600.2C, National Security Information. (1) Authorized persons may transport CCI aboard both Government and commercial aircraft, either handcarried or as checked baggage. If it is checked as hold baggage on commercial airliners, it must be packaged in a container which is sealed in a manner that will detect unauthorized access to the enclosed material, such as tamper-detections tape, wire seals, etc. (2) CCI can be subjected to X-ray inspections; however, if airport security personnel require physical inspection, the inspection must be limited to external viewing only. To avoid unnecessary delays and searches by airport personnel, prior coordination with the servicing security element shall be accomplished to ensure that airport personnel are informed in a timely manner of the transfer of CCI material. c. Storage and Transportation. (1) General. Store and transfer CCI equipment and components in a manner that affords protection at least equal to that which is normally provided to weapons, computers, electronics equipment, etc., and ensures that access and accounting integrity is maintained. (2) Storage. Handle CCI's in connection with warehouse functions provided they are under direct supervision of an individual who meets the access requirements of this chapter. (3) Transportation. (a) General. Ship CCI equipments and components by a traceable means in accordance with the following: 1 Within CONUS: a Commercial carrier providing DOD Constant Surveillance Service (CSS) (NOTE: Contact the Transportation Officer of the nearest Defense Contract Administration Service Management Area (DCASMA) office for information concerning the carriers servicing the specific geographic area. CSS is not available overseas. b U.S. registered mail provided the mail does not at any time pass out of U.S. control. c Authorized FAA or contractor courier. For contractor couriers, the authorization to act as a courier or escort for CCI equipment and components may be granted by the servicing FAA security element in accordance with FAA Order 1600.2C. d Diplomatic courier service. 2 Outside CONUS: In foreign countries where there are two or more FAA facilities where FAA personnel are stationed, foreign nationals who are employed by the FAA may transport CCI's provided: a There is a signature record that provides continuous accountability for custody of the shipment from pickup to ultimate destination, and b There is a constant U.S. presence (for example, a U.S. person accompanies a foreign driver in couriering the material), or c The material is contained in a closed vehicle or shipping container which is locked and has a shipping seal that will prevent undetected access to the enclosed material. d. Accounting. (1) Within the FAA, CCI equipments shall be delivered to a primary FAA COMSEC account. (2) The COMSEC Custodian shall initially receipt for the CCI equipment, and will be responsible for ensuring that before further distribution is made the individual CCI items are entered into the Property Management System for the using facility, Region, or Center as appropriate. NOTE: The custodian should coordinate with the responsible property management officer to ensure that the requirements of this order are met. (3) CCI equipments shall be accounted for by serial number. CCI components, installed in this equipment, do not require separate accountability. Spares or other uninstalled CCI components shall be accounted for by quantity. (4) The accounting system must provide the following: (a) Establish a central point designated by the Property Management Officer for the using facility, region or center for control of CCI equipments. (b) The identification of CCI equipment and components which are lost. (c) Individual accountability in order to support prosecution in cases which involve infractions that would be punishable under the United States Code or the Uniform Code of Military Justice. (5) The manager having property management responsibility for the using facility region or center shall ensure that procedures are followed to permit entering CCI equipment into the Property Management System data base in such a way that equipments can be accurately inventoried when necessary. 133. INVENTORIES. a. CCI equipments shall be inventoried at least annually. This includes uninstalled CCI equipments. An inventory should also be accomplished whenever there is a change of personnel responsible for the safekeeping or accounting of an organization's holdings of CCI equipments and components. Reports of inventory shall be submitted to the central control point established for control of CCI equipments. Inventory records shall be maintained current for as long as the using facility, region or center maintains CCI assets. b. Inability to reconcile an organization's holdings of CCI equipments and components with the record of accountability at the established central control point shall be reported as an insecurity in accordance with this order and AFR 56-12. 134. REPORTING INSECURITIES. a. Users of CCI must be familiar with the criteria that constitutes an insecurity as specified in AFR 56-12. b. All insecurities involving CCI equipments or components shall be reported through COMSEC channels in accordance with the following: (1) Keyed equipment. Report insecurities involving keying material according to AFR 56-12. (2) Unkeyed equipment. Insecurities involving unkeyed CCI equipments shall be reported in accordance with AFR 56-12 and applicable FAA property management directives concerning the responsibilities for safeguarding and protection of high value U.S. Government property. 135. ROUTINE AND EMERGENCY DESTRUCTION. a. The routine and emergency destruction procedures of AFR 56-5 apply to CCI equipments and components. b. Routine destruction of CCI equipment and components by FAA users is not authorized. Equipment that is inoperative or no longer required shall be reported to the FAA servicing security element with a request for disposition instructions. The servicing security element will be responsible for coordinating all such requests with ACO-300 prior to any disposition of the equipment. 136-144. RESERVED. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY PUBLIC AVAILABILITY TO BE DETERMINED UNDER 5 U.S.C. 552 |
CHAPTER 7. SECURE VOICE SECTION 1. GENERAL 145. PURPOSE. This chapter provides guidelines for use by the COMSEC custodian when dealing with the third generation or "user friendly" Secure Telephone Units; i.e., STU-III's, that are used to transmit classified information. 146. TYPES AND MODELS OF STU-III. a. Type I. These terminals are Controlled Cryptographic Items (CCI). Type I STU-III terminals may be used to secure classified information, or unclassified but sensitive, voice or data communications when keyed with an appropriate level of keying material. STU-III terminals are considered keyed when keying material has been loaded and an authorized Crypto Ignition Key (CIK) is inserted. When keyed, Type I STU-III terminals must be safeguarded to the same classification level that the keying material being used is authorized to protect. When the terminals are unkeyed, they are considered as high value property and are to be protected as CCI in accordance with provisions of NTISSI 4001, Controlled Cryptographic Items, NTISSI 3013, Operational Security Doctrine for the secure Telephone Unit III (STU-III) Type 1 Terminal, AFSAL 4001A, Air Force COMSEC Publication Controlled Cryptographic Items and this order. b. Type II. Type II terminals may only be used with unclassified keying material. Use of these terminals is not addressed in this chapter. 147. DEFINITIONS. a. Authentication Information. Information which identifies a STU-III terminal. Authentication information is specified for each STU-III key ordered and is included as a part of the key. Each terminal's authentication information is displayed on the distant terminal during a secure call. Authentication information includes: (1) Classification level - the highest classification level authorized for an individual STU-III terminal. During a secure call, the clearance level displayed on each terminal is the highest level common to both terminals, and is the authorized level for the call. (2) Identification of the using organization (e.g., FAA HQ, Wash. DC). (3) Expiration date of the terminal's key. (4) Foreign access to the terminal, where appropriate (e.g. CAN, US/KOR, US/NATO). b. Authorized Person. A person who meets the access requirements of NTISSI/AFSAL No. 4001, Controlled Cryptographic Items, (AFR 56-20 when published), and this directive, and who has adequate clearance if classified material is involved. c. Crypto-Ignition Key (CIK). A key storage device (KSD) which contains a portion of STU-III key(s) in encrypted form. Insertion of the CIK into the terminal(s) for which it was created allows the terminal(s) to be used in the secure mode; withdrawal disables the secure mode. d. CIK Information. Split portions of an encrypted STU-III key, a part of which resides in the CIK, the other in the terminal. e. Interoperable CIK. A single CIK which may be programmed to work in more than one terminal. f. Key. Information (usually a sequence of random binary digits) used to initially set up and to periodically change the operations performed in a crypto-equipment for purposes of encrypting or decrypting electronic signals; for determining electronic counter countermeasures (ECCM) patterns (e.g., for frequency hopping or spread spectrum); or for producing other keys. NOTE: Key replaces the terms "variable," "key(ing) variable," and "cryptovariable". g. Keyed Terminal. A terminal which has been keyed, in which the CIK is inserted. h. Key Encryption Key (KEK). A key that is used in the encryption and/or decryption of other keys for transmission (rekeying) or storage. i. Key Storage Device (KSO). The name given to the physical device that can be used as a fill device and also as a CIK for all Type 1 terminals. It is a small device shaped like a physical key and contains passive memory. When it is used to carry key to Type 1 terminals it is termed a fill device; when it is used to protect key that has been loaded into Type 1 terminals, it is termed a CIK. j. Master CIK. A CIK which may be used to create additional CIKs for a terminal as they are required, up to the terminal's maximum. k. Micro-KMODC. An MS-DOS compatible personal computer with a custom hardware/software configuration which, when connected to a Type 1 terminal, may be used to electronically order and receive STU-III keys. 1. Unkeyed Terminal. A terminal which contains no keys or one which has been keyed but from which the CIK has been removed and properly secured. m. User Representative. A person formally designated to order keys for STU-III terminals. n. U.S. Controlled Space. An area, access to which is physically controlled by authorized U.S. Government personnel. 148.-150. RESERVED. SECTION 2. EXCEPTIONS 151. REQUESTS FOR EXCEPTION. Requests for exception to any of the provisions of this chapter must be submitted prior to implementation to the Emergency Operations Staff, ADA-20, who is Controlling Authority for the FAA STU-III Program. 152.-153. RESERVED. SECTION 3. COMSEC CUSTODIAN DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES 154. GENERAL. The COMSEC Custodian handling STU-III key performs those responsibilities normally associated with handling and controlling other COMSEC material as specified in this order. The COMSEC Custodian is responsible for initial receipt of key, for storage until issued to a user, and for all accounting until the key is "destroyed." Although the COMSEC Custodian may be the person who actually keys terminals and creates the associated CIK's, he or she may instead issue the key to authorized users, who load the key and create CIK's. COMSEC Custodians are also responsible for the preparation of a number of control and accountability reports. 155. RECEIPT OF KEY. The COMSEC Custodian will receive the key from the Key Management System (KMS) in the form of a key storage device, KSD-64A, used as a fill device. The following applies: a. Fill Device Labels. Each fill device will have an attached card label. The card label will be removed by the COMSEC Custodian when the key in the fill device is loaded into a terminal. The fill device card label contains space for the COMSEC Custodian to write the serial number of the terminal, the name of the each user, and the serial number of each KSD-64A that is used as a CIK for the terminal. It is important that a local record be maintained of the terminal serial number as it relates to the key material identification (KMID) number (or Registration Number) binding. b. Fill Device Packaging. Fill devices will be shipped from the KMS packaged in heat sealed plastic bags. Packaged fill devices will be placed in boxes with shipping papers (SF-153 COMSEC Material Report). The boxes will be double wrapped in accordance with appropriate COMSEC standards. A copy of the SF-153 COMSEC Material Report must be signed by the COMSEC Custodian and returned as the receipt for the key. c. Incoming Inspection. The procedures for incoming inspection are as follows: (1) Inspect the package. If any tampering is evident, submit a COMSEC incident report. (2) Take inventory of the package contents against the shipping papers. (3) If all is in order, fill in the appropriate blocks, sign the enclosed receipt and return it to the KMS/Central Accounting Office (CAO). (4) If all is not in order, call the KMS immediately, note the discrepancy on the SF-153, and send it to the KMS/CAO. d. Storage and Protection of Key. Fill devices stored by a COMSEC Custodian prior to loading into a terminal should remain sealed in the plastic bag. The storage of the fill devices must be in accordance with procedures prescribed by this order for the storage of classified COMSEC keying material. 156. ACCOUNTING FOR KEY. The COMSEC Custodian plays a critical role in accounting for STU-III key. The Custodian is supported by the STU-III CAO and the cognizant Central Office of Record (COR). a. STU-III Type I Key. The STU-III Type I operational and Type I seed key is accounted for by registration number Accounting Legend Code 1 (ALC-1). All test key is unclassified and assigned ALC-4 (i.e. after receipt at the user COMSEC account, they are locally accountable). NOTE: TOP SECRET Type I operational key requires two person integrity handling in accordance with National doctrine, unless a specific exemption has been granted by the controlling authority (ADA-20) with approval of the National Manager (NSA). b. Reports. In addition to complying with all cognizant COR rules and requirements, the COMSEC Custodian is responsible for submitting the following reports directly to the KMS/CAO: (1) Key Receipts. An SF-153 COMSEC Material Report will be included in each key order shipped from the KMS. The Custodian must verify that all listed devices were received and then fill in the appropriate blocks, sign the SF-153, and return the original to the KMS/CAO. (2) Transfer Reports. The sending COMSEC Custodian must generate an SF-153 Transfer Report whenever STU-III key is shipped between COMSEC accounts. A copy of the report must be sent to the KMS/CAO. The receiving Custodian must receipt for the keys and send a copy of the receipt to the KMS/CAO. Only STU-III key should be listed on Transfer Reports sent to the KMS/CAO. Transfer reports for other types of key and for COMSEC equipment should be sent to the appropriate COR (for FAA accounts the COR for COMSEC materials other than STU-III is normally the US Air Force Cryptologic Support Center (USAFCSC), Kelly Air Force Base, TX). (3) Destruction Reports. The COMSEC Custodian must generate and submit an SF-153 Destruction Report to the KMS/CAO when Type I operational key is loaded into a terminal or zeroized. Destruction Reports generated for key loaded in a terminal will contain the signature of the Custodian or alternate and the serial number of the STU-III terminal in the Remarks Column (Block 13). Destruction Reports for TOP SECRET Type I operational key require two signatures, that of the Custodian or alternate and a witness. Destruction Reports for zeroized key require two signatures. Do not mix STU-III key destruction reports with other key transactions. Destruction Reports are not required for Type I seed key successfully loaded into a STU-III terminal since the electronic conversion call to the KMS results in the automatic generation of a Key Conversion Notice (KCN) which serves as the Destruction Report. The KSD-64A should not be physically destroyed by breaking or smashing the device as this does not guarantee destruction of the key material in the device. For approved destruction procedures refer to the current STU-III Key Management Plan and the servicing security element. (4) Possession Reports. Possession Reports are used when a shipment of key material is received without any accompanying paperwork. The receiving Custodian should generate an SF-153 Possession Report and submit it to the KMS/CAO and other locations as directed by his COR. Do not mix STU-III key Possession Reports with other key Possession Reports. 157. NOTICES FROM THE KMS/CAO. a. Key Conversion Notices. When Type 1 seed key is loaded into a terminal, the user must call the KMS to obtain (convert it to) the Type I operational key. The KMS/CAO generates a Key Conversion Notice which is sent to the accountable COMSEC Custodian informing him or her of the KMID numbers of seed key converted to operational key. This notice indicates the serial number of the terminal into which the seed was loaded, the KMID, and the date of conversion. The Custodian should verify that this is the terminal in which the key was loaded in order to maintain accurate records. Additionally, this notice must be used by the COMSEC Custodian to ensure that all seed keys listed have, in fact, been converted. Any discrepancies must be immediately reported as a COMSEC incident. Delay in reporting constitutes a reportable COMSEC incident. The KCN also documents any Type 1 operational key that has been rekeyed before notification of a destruction is received at the KMS/CAO. b. Tracers. When a key shipment has been sent via registered mail to a COMSEC account and the SF-153 key receipt is not returned to the KMS/CAO within 30 days, or when key is sent by DCS to a COMSEC account and the SF-153-30 key receipt is not returned within 45 days, the KMS/CAO will send a Tracer Report to the Custodian to determine if the key has been received. If the Custodian has received the key, the key receipt should have the applicable blocks filled in and should be submitted to the KMS/CAO. If the key has not been received, the Custodian should immediately contact the KMS/CAO for instructions. 158.-160. RESERVED. SECTION 4. KEYING OF TERMINALS 161. INITIAL KEYING OF TERMINALS. a. Procedures for the initial keying of terminals differ slightly depending on the type of key. A separate procedure for each type of key (seed and operational) is described below. These procedures may vary if a master CIK is desired and may vary among terminal vendors. For detailed information on the specific key loading procedures for terminals, see the vendor's key loading instructions. b. CIK's are created for a terminal during the key loading procedure. Therefore, the user organization must decide if a master CIK should be created to allow CIK's to be programmed at a later time, or decide the number of regular CIKs needed for each terminal prior to loading the key. The STU-III permits creation of a master CIK, which allows additional CIKs to be created at a later time. 162.-163. RESERVED. SECTION 5. ACCOUNTABILITY 164. CRYPTO IGNITION KEY HANDLING AND LOCAL ACCOUNTING. To operate in the secure mode, a CIK must be inserted into a terminal and turned. This paragraph discusses the accountability requirements prescribed for CIK's in terms of guidance in the STU-III doctrine and factors that affect both the accounting procedures and the number of CIK's required for an organization. It is understood that each user organization will disseminate any detailed or clarifying doctrinal guidance. a. Local Accountability Requirements. (1) CIK's are locally accountable. This means that a local record of the CIK's and the persons to whom CIK's for each terminal are issued should be maintained. The COMSEC Custodian or an authorized user should record the serial number of the STU-III terminal, the KSD-64A serial numbers, and the name of each terminal user in the appropriate spaces on the back of the fill device card. Each card is perforated so that it can be detached and retained by the Custodian or an authorized user in a 3x5 card file. (2) Taking a periodic inventory of the CIK's for each terminal is encouraged. (3) When loss of a CIK is locally reported, the Custodian or the authorized user can disable use of that CIK on the appropriate terminal. (4) Local guidance to terminal users concerning CIK accountability should be formulated and distributed appropriately. b. Crypto Ignition Key Management. There are a number of factors that affect the management and control of CIK's to include those listed below. (1) Multiple Terminal Users. Each user activity or office must determine how many people will be allowed to use a terminal, which method(s) of multiple use will be allowed, and how many CIK's are required. The methods for supporting multiple users of a terminal are as follows: (a) Shared CIK'S. A single CIK can be shared among a number of users. During normal duty hours, this CIK can be left in the terminal if the terminal is located in a secure area where no unauthorized person could gain access to the terminal. (b) Multiple CIK'S. STU-III terminals will support up to eight CIK's for each key. The identification information displayed during a secure call will be the same for each of the eight CIK'S, and any of the eight CIK's can be used to operate the terminal. These CIK's can be issued to several users. (c) Multiple Key Sets per Terminal. STU-III vendors offer terminals which can be filled with more than one key at a time. (2) Multiple Terminals per Crypto Ignition Key. STU-III vendors offer a feature which will allow a single CIK to be associated with more than one terminal (an "interoperable" CIK). This feature requires a single CIK to be programmed by each terminal with which it is to be used. The use of multiple terminals per CIK complicates local accountability and security procedures, but permits greater flexibility for the user. (3) Master Crypto Ignition Keys. STU-III's contain a master CIK feature which allows additional CIK's to be created at a later date. However, the total number of CIK's per key stored in a terminal may never exceed eight. 165.-166. RESERVED. SECTION 6. REKEYING 167. ELECTRONIC REKEYING. The STU-III KMS provides for electronic rekeying of Type I terminals through a rekey call to the KMS. (The Type 2 terminals cannot be electronically rekeyed.) During this process, the terminals identification information is not changed. Only the terminal's cryptographic information is changed. The KMS supports electronic rekey over the public telephone networks (1-800 service and regular commercial networks) and the DOD AUTOVON network. The situations in which electronic rekeying is performed are: a. Initial Keying. When a terminal is physically keyed with Type 1 seed key, a call to obtain Type I operational key is necessary. When a terminal is physically keyed with Type I operational key, a call to the KMS rekey number is strongly recommended to obtain a current copy of the Compromised Key List (CKL) and the Compromise Information Message (CIM). b. Scheduled Rekeying. The terminal user is required to call the KMS for an electronic rekey at least once each year. Some terminals display the key expiration date automatically each time the CIK is inserted. c. When Rekey Notification is Received from the KMS. A universal rekey notification to call for a rekey will be promulgated by mail or AUTODIN to all COMSEC Custodians. The COMSEC Custodians will be responsible for directing each of their terminal users to call for a rekey. In addition, the STU-III KMS has the capability to use the CIM message to notify STU-III terminals via the terminal display to call for a rekey. (In those circumstances where a terminal user cannot call for an electronic rekey when such a notice is received, the terminal will have to be physically rekeyed.) NOTE: Electronic rekeying is performed by placing a secure call to the KMS through toll-free 800 service, AUTOVON, or direct dial lines. The rekey telephone numbers are listed in the STU-III User's Manual. 168.-170. RESERVED. SECTION 7. PHYSICAL SECURITY 171. UNKEYED TERMINAL - TYPE 1. In the unkeyed mode, the terminal can be used to place only unsecured, unclassified calls which are not sensitive. An unkeyed terminal must be protected in accordance with the requirements of NTISSI/AFSAL 4001, and chapter 6 of this order. 172. KEYED TERMINAL. When the terminal is keyed, it may be used in the secure mode by authorized persons only. The terminal must be afforded protection commensurate with the classification of the key it contains as required by NACSI 4005/AFR 56-13, and Chapter 5, of this order. When persons in an area are not cleared to the level of the keyed terminal, it must be under the operational control and within view of at least one appropriately cleared, authorized person. 173. TERMINAL DISPLAY. Proper use requires strict attention to the authentication information displayed on the terminal during each secure call. When two terminals communicate in the secure mode, each terminal automatically displays authentication information of the distant terminal. The information displayed indicates the system capacity, and does not authenticate the person using the terminal. Therefore, users must use judgement in determining need-to-know when communicating sensitive but unclassified or classified information. If the display fails the terminal must not be used in the secure mode. a. Authentication. Authentication information is representative of the distant terminal and should match the distant user. If there is question as to the validity of this information, sensitive but unclassified and classified information should not be communicated, even though voice recognition may be possible. b. Display. When the display indicates that the distant terminal's key has expired, this could be an indication of unauthorized system access. If the period is excessive (e.g. more than two months), users should not exchange sensitive unclassified or classified information. c. Classification Level. Users must adhere to the classification level indicated on the terminal display. Because of the interoperability among terminals of different classification levels, the display may indicate a level less than the actual classification of either terminal's own key(s) (e.g., when a SECRET terminal calls a CONFIDENTIAL terminal, "CONFIDENTIAL" is displayed on both terminals as the approved level for the call). Therefore users must observe the display with each call and limit the level of information accordingly. d. System Testing. During system testing, authentication information on the display may vary, as required for the test; however, the display will always indicate that the call is for TEST purposes only. Classified information may not be transmitted during system tests. 174. USE BY OTHER U.S. PERSONNEL. a. Keyed Type 1 terminals may be used by or under the direct supervision of authorized persons only. When operationally required, authorized persons may permit others not normally authorized to use the keyed terminal (e.g., persons not assigned to the FAA office, service or facility identified in the display and persons whose clearance does not meet the level indicated on the display) under the following conditions: (1) The call must be placed by an authorized person. (2) After reaching the called party, the caller must identify the party on whose behalf the call is being made, indicating their level of clearance. Again, the maximum classification level may not exceed that level which appears on the terminal display. b. Uncleared or otherwise unauthorized persons must not be permitted to overhear classified conversations or to have access to classified or sensitive information transmitted over the terminal. 175. USE BY FOREIGN NATIONALS. NTISSI 4001/AFR 56-20 and Chapter 6 of this order, limit access to CCI equipments to U.S. citizens and permanently admitted resident aliens who are employees of the U.S. Government. For the FAA prior approval of the Manager, Emergency Operations Staff, ADA-20, is required for any exception to this policy. 176. STORAGE. Type 1 terminals must be stored as specified in NTISSI/AFSAL 4001, and Chapter 6, of this order. Foreign nationals who are employed by the U.S. Government at locations described in paragraph 179 below, may handle Type 1 terminals in connection with warehouse functions, provided they are under the direct supervision of an individual who meets the access requirements of NTISSI/AFSAL 4001, and Chapter 6. 177. USE OF THE SECURE DATA MODE. During data transmissions, each Type I terminal must be manned by authorized persons. The data must be sent only after the sending and receiving parties have observed the terminal display and have assured themselves of the appropriateness of the information transfer (i.e., is the sending/receiving party's organization level in the terminal display?). If the terminal is attached to a computer, computer security and system issues should be addressed separately with the servicing security element prior to start of operations. Additional assistance in the area of computer security is available if needed from ACO-340, Washington, D.C. It is important that these issues be addressed because of the inherent interoperability of all STU-III terminals. 178. AFTER HOURS PROTECTION. When authorized persons are not present, the CIK must be removed from the terminal and properly protected as specified in this chapter. Area controls must be sufficient to ensure access and accounting integrity of the terminal. SECTION 8. TRANSPORTATION 179. TYPE I TERMINALS. a. Type 1 terminals must be unkeyed during shipment. In no instance may KSDs containing seed or operational KEK's or CIK's be included in the same container or shipment as Type 1 terminals. b. Type I terminals may be transported by any means that provides continuous accountability and protection against losses and unauthorized access while in transit. These criteria are satisfied by any of the following: (1) FAA courier authorized in accordance with provisions of Order 1600.2C. (2) FAA authorized contractor/company, U.S. citizen courier. (3) U.S. Registered Mail provided it does not at any time pass out of U.S. control and does not pass through a foreign postal system or any foreign inspection. (4) Commercial carriers under constant surveillance service (CSS) in CONUS only. FAA elements may obtain information concerning these services from the General Services Administration (GSA), ATTN: Traffic and Travel Services. (5) U.S. military or military-contractor air service (e.g., Military Airlift Command, LOGAIR, QUICKTRANS) provided the requirements for CSS are observed. (6) U.S. Diplomatic Courier Service (overseas service only). FAA STU-III units intended for overseas installation in FAA facilities or office spaces will be transferred to the Department of State for transportation to the overseas location. All movements of this type will be coordinated through the Manager, Emergency Operations Staff, ADA-20, Washington, D.C. (7) Armed Forces/Defense Courier Service (ARFCOS) outside the 48 contiguous states when no other means of secure transportation is available. 180.-182. RESERVED. SECTION 9. INSTALLATION 183. GENERAL. Type 1 terminals may be installed in U.S. controlled spaces (including vehicles) and in residences of U.S. Government officials. The fundamental purpose of the Type 1 terminal is to provide a readily available, easy to use secure telephone capability for all personnel who have a need to discuss classified or sensitive information. a. Acoustic Security. Local acoustic security is an important consideration. The greatest security threat to telephone conversations is where they are most vulnerable to hostile intercept and exploitation -- during transmission over the telephone network. Therefore, a common-sense approach should be followed on acoustic security for the Type 1 installation. b. Servicing Security Element. Specific provisions for achieving acoustical security should be determined in coordination with the servicing security element for each FAA using organization prior to STU-III installation. The manager or supervisor having responsibility for the STU-III terminal is responsible for ensuring that acoustical security measures are enforced to preclude unauthorized overhearing of classified or sensitive but unclassified telephonic discussions. 184. RESIDENCES. Type 1 terminals installed in residences may be used only by the persons for whom they are installed. All of the security requirements for preventing unauthorized access to classified and sensitive information, and to the keyed terminal must be observed. a. The terminal must be located in an area of the home where family members or other unauthorized persons will not overhear or view classified or sensitive information. b. The CIK must be removed from the terminal following each use and kept in the personal possession of the user, or properly stored. c. If the CIK is stored in the residence and the associated terminal is used to protect classified information, the CIK must be protected in a GSA-approved security container. d. When the terminal is used in the data mode, classified information that is viewed on the screen should be removed as soon as possible, and should not be printed out unless there is appropriate classified storage. e. Installation of STU-III equipments in residences will require the prior approval of the servicing security element and the responsible COMSEC custodian. 185.-186. RESERVED. SECTION 10. MAINTENANCE 187. GENERAL. NTISSI/AFSAL 4001 contains the training requirements which apply to all persons who maintain COMSEC equipment, to include the Type 1 terminal. Authorized maintenance personnel need not be cleared unless they require access to classified COMSEC information to perform terminal maintenance. 188. ACCESS. Maintenance personnel may not have access to a terminal which has been keyed for normal operations. Therefore, any terminal which will be removed or disassembled for repair should first be zeroized. However, if terminal malfunction prevents zeroization, the terminal may be returned, minus the CIK, which must be retained in appropriate storage by authorized persons. When an FAA terminal is removed from an operational area by maintenance personnel the associated KEK's will be zeroized. 189.-190. RESERVED. SECTION 11. PROTECTION OF KEY STORAGE DEVICES 191. GENERAL. When they contain KEK's or CIK information, KSD's must be protected against unauthorized access. When they contain none of the above information, KSDs require no special handling or protection, and their loss is not a reportable insecurity. 192. FILL DEVICES. Fill devices containing KEK's must be safeguarded in accordance with Annex B of NACSI 4005/AFR 56-13, and Chapter 5 of this order. a. Access. An appropriate clearance is required for access to a fill device when it contains a classified operational KEK. Although seed KEK's are handled as UNCLASSIFIED CRYPTO, COMSEC Custodians and users must also be appropriately cleared to receive seed KEK's with classified data. b. Classification and Accountability. See Section 3, of this Chapter. c. Transportation. (1) Within the U.S. Fill devices containing classified operational KEK's should routinely be transported by cleared designated courier or ARFCOS. However, if distribution is to a location which cannot reasonably be served by the above means, or the urgency for delivery precludes their use, operational KEK's classified up through SECRET may be transported by U.S. Registered Mail. Seed KEK's and unclassified operational KEK's may be transported by any means prescribed for transporting classified COMSEC material or by U.S. Registered Mail. (2) Outside of the U.S. Fill devices containing operational KEK's, regardless of classification, must be transported in accordance with arrangements made with the U.S. Department of State Office of Communications Security. Seed KEK's, regardless of clearance data may be transported by any means prescribed for operational KEK'S. (3) Quantity. Normally, up to 50 operational and/or seed KEK's may be shipped in a single package. However, when for emergency reasons classified operational KEK's must be transported by U.S. Registered Mail within the U.S., no more than 25 may be included in a single package. d. Reserve Key. Although there is no prohibition against a COMSEC Custodian holding some level of seed or operational key in reserve for emergency use (e.g., if a terminal fails), that level should be kept to a minimum consistent with operational requirements, in order to limit the exposure of keys in long-term storage. (1) COMSEC Custodians must notify the KMS of damaged, broken, or otherwise unusable fill devices and return them to the KMS for disposition. The devices must be returned at their original classification. (2) A seed or operational key is considered destroyed after it has been loaded in a terminal. Seed KEK's are automatically dropped from central accountability once the terminal has been rekeyed through a call to the KMS. A formal destruction report is not required. (a) COMSEC Custodians must submit a formal destruction report for operational KEKs which have been manually loaded into the terminal, where a call is not made to the KMS for rekeying (a witness to the destruction is not required since the terminal records the identification of the key loaded). (b) Manually loaded operational KEK's not replaced through a call to the KMS or reported destroyed by a destruction report will appear on the COMSEC Custodian's next scheduled inventory. f. Unused KEK(s). An unused KEK which has passed its expiration date should be zeroized (in a Type I terminal) by the COMSEC Custodian. Zeroization must be witnessed by another authorized person (e.g., the alternate custodian) who must also sign the destruction report submitted to the KMS by the COMSEC custodian. Once zeroized, the KSD may then be used as a CIK. 193. CRYPTO-IGNITION KEYS (CIKS). a. General. At least one CIK must be created immediately following the manual loading of a KEK into a terminal. Additional CIK'S, up to the terminal's maximum, may be created at this time; or, if the terminal design supports it, the first CIK may be designated as a master CIK, allowing subsequent creation of additional CIK's as they are required. Since CIK's permit the terminal to be used in the secure mode, they must be protected against unauthorized access and use. The number of CIK's created should be kept to the minimum required for operational necessity. b. Access. CIK's may normally be retained in the personal custody of authorized persons, who must protect them as valuable personal property. Any person who may have unrestricted access to the keyed terminal may retain the CIK. c. Accountability. CIK's should be accounted for locally to minimize insecurities associated with their use. Local accounting includes maintaining a record of all CIK's created along with the names, organizations/locations of the persons to whom they are issued. In addition, the user should verify at least once a year to the COMSEC Custodian that he or she still holds the CIK. Verification of CIK holdings should be in writing from user to COMSEC account in accordance with procedural instruction published by the respective user organizations or the Controlling Authority. d. Transportation. CIK's may be transported by any means prescribed for seed KEKs, or on the person of an authorized user. CIKs must always be shipped separately from terminals. e. Protection in Use. During operational hours the CIK may be left in the terminal so long as authorized persons are present and the terminal is under the continuous visual supervision and physical control of an authorized user. If the area is left unattended, authorized persons are not present, or if for any reason it is not possible for an authorized user to maintain constant visual surveillance and physical control over the terminal, the CIK will be removed from the terminal and maintained in the personal possession of an authorized user. In the event that the CIK is to be kept in the same room as the terminal, the CIK must be afforded protection commensurate with the classification of the keyed terminal (e.g., in a GSA-approved security container for CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET and TOP SECRET). f. Losses. (1) Loss of a CIK must be promptly reported to the responsible COMSEC Custodian, who must initiate immediate action to delete that CIK from all terminals with which it was associated. All losses shall be reported within 72 hours of the loss to the responsible FAA COMSEC Custodian. (2) In the event of the loss of an unkeyed terminal, the associated CIK(s) must be protected at the classification level of the key. Absence of the terminal prevents the erasure of the CIK information in the terminal; therefore, the CIK must be zeroized, or protected at the level of the terminal when keyed. g. Disposition. Once a CIK has been disassociated from a terminal (either through deletion of the CIK from the terminal, or zeroization of the associated seed or operational KEK in the terminal), the CIK requires no special controls and may be retained for further use in the same or other terminals. h. Master CIK. The master CIK should be subject to additional controls to prevent its loss or use to make unauthorized CIK's or unauthorized secure calls. Master CIK's should be kept under the personal control of an authorized person who has been briefed on its sensitivity and the requirements for its control. (1) The master CIK should be maintained in a GSA approved security container except when it is required to create other CIK's or to place secure calls. (2) Storage of the master CIK must be commensurate with the classification of the associated KEK. i. Interoperable CIK. An interoperable CIK may be created for concurrent use with one of the keys in up to four Type 1 terminals. Authentication information associated with the interoperable CIK (i.e., organization and clearance level) must be representative of every person with access to this CIK. If the clearance level varies between terminals, any person with access to the interoperable CIK must be cleared to the highest level of the associated key. While use of an interoperable CIK provides users operational flexibility, COMSEC Custodians should assure that the appropriate accounting is maintained and that losses are acted upon promptly. It is important that the custodian be aware of the status of an interoperable CIK since the terminals in which it is used will probably not be colocated and each terminal may also have other CIK's associated with it. For these reasons, it is recommended that an interoperable CIK remain at all times in the personal possession of a single individual assigned responsibility for its use. 194. PROTECTION AND USE OF THE MICRO-KMODC. The micro-KMODC may be used to electronically order and receive keys. User representatives may order keys, but only appropriately cleared COMSEC Custodians may receive keys. The following guidelines apply: a. Location. There are no restrictions on where the micro-KMODC may be installed. However, during use, controls must be instituted to prevent unauthorized access to the system and its keys. b. Classifications. All classifications of key may be ordered through a micro-KMODC. However, only unclassified operational KEKs, and all seed KEKs regardless of their clearance data, may be received at the micro-KMODC. c. Disks. Floppy disks containing seed and operational KEK's received at the micro-KMODC must be labelled and handled as UNCLASSIFIED CRYPTO material, and must remain under the local control of the COMSEC Custodian. Each KEK on the disk is centrally accountable to the KMS. A receipt is automatically generated for these keys between the micro-KMODC and the KMODC, and the appropriate COR notified. Therefore, a separate possession report is not required. KEK's which remain in the COMSEC Custodian's account, whether on the disk or in a fill device, will be subject to continuous central accounting until converted (seed KEK's) or reported destroyed (operational KEK's). d. Destruction. When the floppy disks will no longer be used for storage of keys, they must be destroyed in accordance with NTISSI 4004/AFR 56-5. 195.-198. RESERVED. SECTION 12. DESTRUCTION AND EMERGENCY PROTECTION 199. GENERAL REQUIREMENT. The provisions of NTISSI 4004/AFR 56-5, must be followed in the disposal and emergency protection of Type 1 terminals and KSD's used as fill devices and CIK'S. 200. RESERVED. SECTION 13. REPORTABLE INSECURITIES 201. INSECURE PRACTICE/COMSEC INCIDENT HANDLING. a. General. With any secure communications system, incidents and compromises of terminals and key are possible. The design of the STU-III terminals and keying concept minimizes the threat of compromised traffic; therefore, compromise recovery is focused on preventing an adversary from posing as a valid user (e.g. a keyed terminal is lost and someone is pretending to be the individual identified by the terminal's key). This paragraph provides an introduction into the compromise recovery feature for Type I terminals. For Type 2 terminals, there is no compromise recovery capability available. b. Compromise Types. The terminal users and COMSEC Custodians are primarily responsible for detecting potential compromises and following through with necessary reporting procedures. These potential compromises are broken into two classes: insecure practices/locally reportable events; and, COMSEC incidents/centrally reportable events. (1) Insecure Practices/Locally Reportable Events. Insecure practices are not in and of themselves COMSEC incidents, but could lead to loss of integrity of the user's information as well as information of other system users. For this reason, insecure practices should be managed locally. Examples of locally reportable events are the loss of a CIK, and failure to rekey a terminal within two months of the end of the cryptoperiod. STU-III doctrine contains a complete listing of insecure practices. Incidents of this type shall be reported to the servicing security element for the region or center concerned. (2) COMSEC Incidents/Centrally Reportable. Centrally reportable events are reported to the NSA by secure phone, AUTODIN, or registered mail. The AUTODIN reports should be sent to: DIRNSA FT GEO G MEADE MD//S2// (Reports of insecurities involving KEK's must include the assigned KEK identification number, whether or not there were any CIK's involved, and whether they were under protection when the insecurity occurred.) The following are examples of centrally reportable incidents: (a) Loss of a master CIK. (b) Failure to zeroize CIK information from a Type I terminal within 72 hours of the loss of a CIK. (c) Failure of the COMSEC Custodian to notify the KMS that a seed KEK listed on the conversion notice still exists in his or her COMSEC account. (d) Use in the secure mode of a terminal whose display is inoperable. (e) Failure to adequately protect or zeroize a CIK that is associated with an unkeyed terminal which is lost. (f) Indication in the terminals display that the distant terminal contains compromised key. 202.-204. RESERVED. SECTION 14. RECORDS RETENTION 205. General. In addition to the normal records which are retained for accounting purposes, certain information must be kept to facilitate the automated Federal Secure Voice System compromise recovery mechanism. The following information must be maintained for each KEK until it is truly destroyed (i.e., finally zeroized from the terminal or overwritten by a new KEK): a. The identification of the terminal into which each KEK was loaded. b. The identification of all CIK's associated with each KEK by terminal. c. The identification of all terminals associated with each CIK, by CIK. NOTE: This information may be recorded on the card which accompanies each fill device or it may be computerized. 206.-208. RESERVED. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY PUBLIC AVAILABILITY TO BE DETERMINED UNDER 5 U.S.C. 552 |
APPENDIX 1. REQUIRED FORMS AND REPORTS Form Number Unit of Title Issue 1. AFCOMSEC Form 3 Sheet Record of Custodian 2. AFCOMSEC Form 9 Sheet Cryptographic Access Certificate 3. AFCOMSEC Form 14 Sheet COMSEC Material Voucher and Package Register 4. AFCOMSEC Form 16 Sheet COMSEC Account Daily- Shift Inventory 5. FAA Form 1600.8 Sheet Visitor Register (Stock No. 0052-00-91 -2000) 6. FAA Form 1600.54 Sheet Notification of Personnel Security Action (Stock No. 0052-00-869 -4000) 7. SF-153 Sheet COMSEC Material Report 8. SF-700 Sheet Security Container Information (NSN: 7540-01-214-5372) 9. SF-701 Sheet Activity Security Check - list. (NSN: 7540-01-213-7899) 10. SF-702 Sheet Security Container Check Sheet NSN 7540-01-213 -7900 (NSN: 7540-01-213-7900) 11. SF-703 Sheet TOP SECRET Cover Sheet (NSN: 7540-01-213-7901) 12. SF-704 Sheet SECRET Cover Sheet (NSN: 7540-01-213-7902) 13. SF-705 Sheet CONFIDENTIAL Cover Sheet (NSN: 7540-01-213-7903) 14. SF-706 Pack TOP SECRET Label (NSN: 7540-01-207-5536) 15. SF-707 Pack SECRET Label (NSN: 7540-01-207-5537) 16. SF-708 Pack CONFIDENTIAL Label (NSN: 7540-01-207-5538) 17. SF-709 Pack CLASSIFIED Label (NSN: 7540-01-207-5540) NOTE: Ordering information for the above forms is as follows: a. FAA Forms: Orders for additional copies of FAA forms should be submitted to the FAA Depot, Mike Monroney Aeronautical Center, ATTN: AAC-434, P.O. Box 25082, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 73125. b. AFCOMSEC forms should be ordered by letter request 60 days before current supply is depleted. Letter request should be sent to HQ ESC/DAPD, San Antonio, TX 78243-5000. Request an estimated 6 month supply. c. Standard forms (SF) should be ordered through normal document acquisition channels from the GSA. If any difficulty is encountered obtaining specific SFs contact the servicing security element for assistance. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Public Availability to be Determined Under 5 U.S.C. 552 |
APPENDIX 2. SAMPLE CRYPTOGRAPHIC ACCESS BRIEFING 1. You have been selected to perform duties that will require access to U.S. classified cryptographic information. It is essential that you be made aware of certain facts relevant to the protection of this information before access is granted. You must know the reason why special safeguards are required to protect U.S. classified cryptographic information. You must understand the directives which require these safeguards and the penalties you will incur for the unauthorized disclosure, unauthorized retention, or negligent handling of U.S. classified cryptographic information. Failure to properly safeguard this information could cause serious to exceptionally grave damage, or irreparable injury, to the national security of the United States or could be used to advantage by a foreign nation. 2. U.S. classified cryptographic information is especially sensitive because it is used to protect classified information. Any particular piece of cryptographic keying material and any specific cryptographic technique may be used to protect a large quantity of classified information during transmission. If the integrity of a cryptographic system is breached at any point, all information protected by the system may be compromised. The safeguards placed on U.S. classified cryptographic information are a necessary component of government programs to ensure that our Nation's vital secrets are not compromised. 3. Because access to U.S. classified cryptographic information is granted on a strict need-to-know basis, you will be given access to only that cryptographic information necessary to perform your duties. You are required to become familiar with Order 1600.8C, as well as AFRs 56-10 and 56-13. Sections 641, 793, 794, 798, and 952, Title 18, U.S. Code are contained in attachments 1 through 6 of this appendix. Cited directives and Executive Order 12356 are attached in a briefing book for your review at this time. 4. Especially important to the protection of U.S. classified cryptographic information is the timely reporting of any known or suspected compromise of this information. If a cryptographic system is compromised, but the compromise is not reported, the continued use of the system can result in the loss of all information protected by it. If the compromise is reported, steps can be taken to lessen an adversary's advantage gained through the compromise of the information. 5. You should know that intelligence services of some foreign governments prize the acquisition of U.S. classified cryptographic information. They will go to extreme lengths to compromise U.S. citizens and force them to divulge cryptographic techniques and materials that protect the nation's secrets around the world. You must understand that any personal or financial relationship with a foreign government's representative could make you vulnerable to attempts at coercion to divulge U.S. classified cryptographic information. You should be alert to recognize those attempts so that you may successfully counter them. The best personal policy is to avoid discussions that reveal your knowledge of, or access to, U.S. classified cryptographic information and thus avoid highlighting yourself to those who would seek the information you possess. Any attempt, either through friendship or coercion, to solicit your knowledge regarding U.S. classified cryptographic information must be reported immediately to your servicing security element, or to ACO-300, ATTN: ACO-320, Headquarters, Federal Aviation Administration, 800 Independence Avenue, S.W., Washington, D.C., telephone 202-267-3961. 6. In view of the risks noted above, unofficial travel to certain communist or other designated countries will require the prior approval of your manager and the servicing security element, or ACO-300. It is essential that you contact your manager and the region/center security office, or ACO-300, if such unofficial travel becomes necessary. 7. Finally, you must know that, should you willfully or negligently disclose to any unauthorized persons any of the U.S. classified cryptographic information to which you will have access, you will be subject to administrative and civil sanctions, sanctions, including adverse personnel actions, as well as criminal sanctions under the Uniform Code of Military Justice or the criminal laws of the United States, as appropriate. APPENDIX 2 Attachment 1 Title 18, United States Code Section 641. Public Money, Property or Records. "Whoever embezzles, steals, purloins or knowingly converts to his use or the use of another, or without authority, sells, conveys or disposes of any records, voucher, money, or thing of value of the United States or of any department or agency thereof, or any property made or being made under contract for the United States or any department or agency therefor; "Whoever receives, conceals, or retains the same with intent to convert it to his use or gain, knowing it to have been embezzled, stolen, purloined or converted - shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years or both; but if the value of such property does not exceed the sum of $100, he shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year or both. "The word 'value' means face, par, or market value, or cost price, either wholesale or retail, whichever is greater." APPENDIX 2 Attachment 2 Title 18, United States Code Section 793. Gathering, Transmitting or Losing Defense Information. "(a) Whoever, for the purpose of obtaining information respecting the national defense with intent or reason to believe that the information is to be used to the injury of the United States, or to the advantage of any foreign nation, goes upon, enters, flies over, or otherwise obtains information concerning any vessel, aircraft, work of defense, navy yard, naval station, submarine base, fueling station, fort, battery, torpedo station, dockyard, canal, railroad, arsenal, camp, factory, mine, telegraph, telephone, wireless, or signal station, building, office, research laboratory or station or other place connected with the national defense owned or constructed, or in progress of construction by the United States or under the control of the United States, or of any of its officers, departments, or agencies, or within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, or any place in which any vessel, aircraft, arms, munitions, or any other materials or instruments for use in time of war are being made, prepared, repaired, stored, or are the subject of research or development, under any contract or agreement with the United States, or any department or agency thereof, or with any person on behalf of the United States, or otherwise on behalf of the United States, or any prohibited place so designated by the President by proclamation in time of war or in case national emergency in which anything for the use of the Army, Navy, or Air Force is being prepared or constructed or stored, information as to which prohibited place the President has determined would be prejudicial to the national defense; or (b) Whoever, for the purpose aforesaid, and with like or reason to believe, copies, takes, makes, or obtains, or attempts to copy, take, make, or obtain, any sketch, photograph, photographic negative, blueprint, plant map, model, instrument, appliance, document, writing, or note of anything connected with the national defense; or (c) Whoever, for the purpose aforesaid, receives or obtains or agrees or attempts to receive or obtain from any person, or from any source whatever, any document, writing, code book, signal book, sketch, photograph, photographic negative, blueprint, plan, map, model, instrument, appliance, or note, of anything connected with the national defense, knowing or having reason to believe, at the time he receives or obtains, or agrees or attempts to receive or obtain it, that it has been or will be obtained, taken made or disposed of by any person contrary to the provisions of this chapter; or (d) Whoever, lawfully having possession of, access to, control over, or being entrusted with any document, writing, code book, signal book, sketch, photograph, photographic negative, blueprint, plan, map, model, instrument, appliance, or note relating to the national defense, or information relating to the nation defense which information the possessor has reason to believe could be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation, willfully communicates, delivers, transmits or causes to be communicated, delivered or transmitted or attempts to communicate, deliver transmit or cause to be communicated, delivered or transmitted to receive it, or willfully retains the same and fails to deliver it on demand to the officer or employee of the United States entitled to receive it; or (e) Whoever having unauthorized possession of, access to, or control over any documents, writing, code book, signal book, sketch, photograph, photographic negative, blueprint, plan, map, model, instrument, appliance, or note relating to the national defense, or information relating to the national defense which information the possessor has reason to believe could be used to the injury of the United States or the advantage of any foreign nation, willfully communicates, delivers, transmits, or causes to be communicated, delivered, or transmitted, or attempts to communicate, deliver, transmit or cause to be communicated, delivered, or transmitted the same to any person not entitled to receive it, or willfully retains the same and fails to deliver it to the officer of employee of the United States entitled to receive it; or (f) Whoever, being entrusted with or having lawful possession of control of any document, writing, code book, signal book, sketch, photograph, photographic negative, blueprint, plan, map, model, instrument, appliance, note, or information relating to the national defense, (1) through gross negligence permits the same to be removed from its proper place of custody or delivered to anyone in violation of his trust, or to be lost, stolen, abstracted, or destroyed, or (2) having knowledge that the same has been illegally removed from its proper place of custody or delivered to anyone in violation of its trust, or lost, or stolen, abstracted, or destroyed, and fails to make prompt report of such loss, theft, abstraction, or destruction to his superior officer -- shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both, or (g) If two or more persons conspire to violate any of the foregoing provisions of this section, and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each of the parties to such conspiracy shall be subject to the punishments provided for the offense which is the object of such conspiracy." APPENDIX 2 Attachment 3 Title 18, United States Code Section 794. Gathering or delivering defense information to aid foreign government. "(a) Whoever, with intent or reason to believe that it is to be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of a foreign nation, communicates, delivers, or transmits, or attempts to communicate, deliver, or transmit, to any foreign government, or to any fraction or party or military or naval force within a foreign country, whether recognized or unrecognized by the United States, or to any representative, officer, agent, employee, subject, or citizen thereof, either directly or indirectly any document, writing, code book, signal book, sketch, photograph, photographic negative, blueprint, plan, map, model, note, instrument, appliance, or information relating to the national defense, shall be punished by death or imprisonment for any term of years or for life. (b) Whoever, in time of war, with intent that the same shall be communicated to the enemy, collects, records, publishes, or communicates or attempts to elicit any information with respect to the movement, numbers, description, condition, or disposition of any of the Armed Forces, ships, aircraft, or war materials of the United States or with respect to the plans or conduct, or supposed plans or conduct of any naval or military operations, or with respect to any works or measures undertaken for or connected with, or intended for the fortification or defense of any place, or any other information relating to the public defense, which might be useful to the enemy, shall be punished by death or by imprisonment for any term of years or for life. (c) If two or more persons conspire to violate this section, and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each of the parties to such conspiracy shall be subject to the punishment provided for the offense which is the object of such conspiracy." APPENDIX 2 Attachment 4 Title 18, United States Code Section 798. Disclosure of classified information. "(a) Whoever knowingly and willfully communicates, furnishes, transmits, or otherwise makes available to an unauthorized person, or publishes, or uses in any manner prejudicial to the safety of interest of the United States or for benefit of any foreign government to the detriment of the United States and classified information - (1) concerning the nature, preparation, or use of any code, cipher, or cryptographic system of the United States or any foreign government; or (2) concerning the design, construction, use, maintenance, or repair of any device, apparatus, or appliance used or prepared or planned for use by the United States or any foreign government for cryptographic or communication intelligence purposes; or (3) concerning the communication intelligence activities of the United States or any foreign government; or (4) obtained by the process of communications intelligence from the communications of any foreign government, knowing the same to have been obtained by such processes - shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both. (b) As used in subsection (a) of this section -- The term 'classified information' means information which, at the time of a violation of this section, is for reasons of national security, specifically designated by a United States Government Agency for limited or restricted dissemination or distribution; the terms 'code,' 'cipher,' and 'cryptographic system' include in their meanings, in addition to their usual meanings, any method of secret writing and any mechanical or electrical device or method used for the purpose of disguising or concealing the contents, significance, or meanings of communications; the term 'foreign government' includes in its meaning any person or persons acting or purporting to act for or on behalf of any faction, party, department, agency, bureau, or military force of or within a foreign government, or for or on behalf of any government or any person or persons purporting to act as a government within a foreign country, whether or not such a government is recognized by the United States. The term 'communications intelligence' means all procedures and methods used in the interception of communications and the obtaining of information from such communications by other than intended recipients; The term 'unauthorized person' means any person who, or agency which, is not authorized to receive information of the categories set forth in subsection (a) of this section, by the President, or by the head of a department or agency of the United States Government which is expressly designated by the President to engage in communication intelligence activities for the United States. (c) Nothing in this section shall prohibit the furnishing, upon lawful demand, of information to any regularly constituted committee of the Senate or House of Representatives of the United States of America, or joint committee thereof." APPENDIX 2 Attachment 5 Title 18, United States Code Section 952. Diplomatic codes and correspondence. "Whoever, by virtue of this employment by the United States, obtains from another or has or has had custody of or access to, any official diplomatic code, and without authorization or competent authority, willfully publishes or furnishes to another any such code or matter, or any matter which was obtained while in the process of transmission between any foreign government and its diplomatic mission in the United States, shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both." APPENDIX 2 Attachment 6 Title 50, United States Code Section 783 Offenses. "Communications of classified information by Government officer or employee. It shall be unlawful for any officer or employee of the United States or any department or agency thereof, or of any corporation the stock of which is owned in whole or in major part by the United States or any department or agency thereof, to communicate in any manner or by any means, to any person whom such officer or employee knows or has reason to believe to be an agent or representative of any foreign government or member of any Communist organization as defined in paragraph (5) of section 782 of this title, any information of a kind which shall have been classified by the President (or by the head of any such department, agency, or corporation with approval of the President) as affecting the security of the United States, knowing or having reason to know that such information has been so classified, unless such officer or employee shall have been specifically authorized by the President, or by the head of the department, agency, or corporation by which this officer or employee is employed, to make such disclosure of such information." FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY PUBLIC AVAILABILITY TO BE DETERMINED UNDER 5 U.S.C. 552 |
APPENDIX 3. CRYPTOGRAPHIC ACCESS CERTIFICATE CRYPTOGRAPHIC ACCESS CERTIFICATE (This form is covered by the Privacy Act of 1974) Privacy Act Statement: Authority. Executive Order 9397. Routine and sole use of the SSN is to identify the individual precisely when necessary to certify access to US cryptographic information. While disclosure of your SSN is voluntary, your failure to do may delay certification, and in some cases, prevent original access to US cryptographic information. Section 1 (Type Only) _________________________________________________________________ | Installation | Unit/Office Symbol | Supporting COMSEC | | | | Account Number | | | | | |_________________|_______________________|_____________________| Instructions: Section 2 of this certificate must be accomplished before an individual may be granted access to US cryptographic information. Section 3 will be accomplished when the individual no longer requires such access. This certificate (original) will be made a permanent part of the official records of the person concerned. Section 2. Authorization for Access to US Cryptographic information A. I understand that I am being granted access to US cryptographic information. I understand that my being granted access to cryptographic information involves me in a position of special trust and confidence concerning matters of national security. I hereby acknowledge that I have been briefed concerning my obligation with respect to such access. B. I understand that safeguarding US cryptographic information is of the utmost importance and that the loss or compromise of such information could lead to irreparable damage to the US and its allies. I understand that I am obligated to protect US cryptographic information and I have been instructed in the special nature of this information and the principle for the protection of such information. I acknowledge that I have also been instructed in the rules requiring that I report any unofficial foreign contacts and travel to my appropriate security officer and that, before this briefing, I reported any unauthorized foreign travel or foreign contacts I may have had in the past. I understand that I am subject to and consent to an aperiodic, counterintelligence security polygraph examination. C. I understand fully the information presented at the briefing I have received and am aware that any disclosure of US cryptographic information to unauthorized persons may make me subject to prosecution under the criminal law of the US. I have read this certificate and my questions, if any, have been answered. I acknowledge that the briefing officer has made available to me the provisions of Sections 641, 793, 794, 798, and 952, Title 18, US Code and Executive Order 12356. I understand that, if I disclose to any unauthorized person any of the cryptographic information to which I have access, I may be subject to prosecution under the Uniform Code of Military Justice and/or the criminal laws of the US. I understand and accept that unless I am released in writing by an authorized representative of my appropriate security office, the terms of this certificate and my obligation to protect all cryptographic information to which I may have access apply during the time of my access and at all times thereafter. ACCESS GRANTED THIS ____________ DAY OF _________________ 19 ____ SIGNATURE ______________________ NAME, GRADE, SSN, DOB __________ (Type Only) ________________________________ ________________________________ SIGNATURE OF ADMINISTERING NAME, GRADE, (Type Only) OFFICIAL OFFICIAL POSITION SECTION 3. TERMINATION OF ACCESS TO US CRYPTOGRAPHIC INFORMATION I am aware that my authorization for access to cryptographic information is being withdrawn. I fully appreciate and understand that the preservation of the security of US cryptographic information is of vital importance to the welfare and defense of the US. I certify that I will never divulge any US cryptographic information I acquired, nor discuss with any person any of the US cryptographic information to which I have had access, unless and until freed from this obligation by unmistakable or categorical official notice from competent authority. I have read this agreement carefully and my questions, if any, have been answered to my satisfaction. I acknowledge that the briefing officer has made available to me Sections 641, 793, 794, 798, and 952 of Title 18, US Code, Section 783(b) of Title 50, US Code; and Executive Order 12356. () Administrative REASONS FOR WITHDRAWAL () Suspension (Check One:) () Revocation ACCESS WITHDRAWN THIS __________ DAY OF _________________ 19 ____ SIGNATURE ______________________ NAME, GRADE, SSN, DOB __________ (Type Only) ________________________________ ________________________________ SIGNATURE OF ADMINISTERING NAME, GRADE, (Type or Stamp) OFFICIAL OFFICIAL POSITION FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Public Availability to be Determined Under 5 U.S.C. 552 |
APPENDIX 4. SECURE TELECOMMUNICATIONS FACILITY AND COMSEC ACCOUNT CHECKLIST 1. All items in the checklist apply to COMSEC accounts and COMSEC user facilities unless considered not applicable by the servicing security element or ACS-300 due to specific circumstances. Only those items preceded with an asterisk in parentheses (*) apply to administrative accounts. (*) 2. (Some questions are self contained that is, good management practice dictates an affirmative response to the question, but the question itself is the only authority. General (*) 1. Is a semiannual (or upon change of custodian) inventory of the COMSEC account being performed as required? (AFR 56-10) (*) 2. Have all discrepancies indicated on previous inspection reports (regional/center servicing security element inspections and Headquarters ACS-300 inspections) been corrected? (AFKAG-1) (*) 3. If the answer to (2) is "no" what discrepancies still exist and what action has been taken to correct them? Have timely follow-up actions been taken? (AFKAG-1) (*) 4. Has the COMSEC custodian verified the final clearance of all personnel listed on the COMSEC accounts authorized entrance/access list each month? (AFR 56-6/NACSI 4008) (*) 5. Has the custodian verified that each person on the authorized entrance/access list has complied with all requirements of FAA's Formal Cryptographic Access (FCA) Program to include having received a briefing and having a signed, current Cryptographic Access Certificate on file? (AFSSI 4000, Order 1600.8C) (*) 6. Has the facility manager having responsibility for COMSEC or the COMSEC custodian validated the authorized entrance/access list on a monthly basis? (AFR 56-6/NACSI 4008) (*) 7. Do the COMSEC storage areas of the COMSEC account meet minimum physical security requirements established by National COMSEC Instruction (NACSI) 4008 and Order 1600.8C? (*) 8. Is there documented approval on file certifying that the COMSEC account has been inspected and approved for the storage of classified COMSEC information by the servicing security element for regions/center and by ACS-300 for Washington Headquarters? (AFR 56-6/NACSI 4008, AFR 56-13/NACSI 4005) (*) 9. Are SF 700, Security Container Information, prepared and affixed to the inside of vault doors and the locking drawer of GSA approved safes and containers? (AFR 56-13/NACSI 4005) (*) 10. Are safe/vault combinations changed in accordance with Order 1600.2C to include at least every 12 months or when a person knowing the combination is relieved, transferred, or terminated? (AFR 56-6/NACSI 4008) (*) 11. Does the COMSEC facility have an emergency plan which provides adequate instructions for implementing safeguarding/destruction procedures in the event of an emergency? (AFR 56-10/COMSEC User's Guide, AFR 56-5/NTISSI 4004) (*) 12. Have all assigned personnel including COMSEC custodian and alternates, reviewed and participated in quarterly tests (dry runs) of the emergency plans? (AFR 56-5/NTISSI 4004) (*) 13. Have the COMSEC emergency plans been coordinated with the contingency plans or the facility both initially and whenever significant changes are made? (AFR 56-5/NTISSI 4004, AFR 56-10/COMSEC User's Guide) (*) 14. Have adequate destruction equipment and materials been provided or suitable arrangements made for emergency destruction? (AFR 56-5/NTISSI 4004) (*) 15. Does the account report file contain transfer, destruction, and inventory reports? Are they filed in numerical order by voucher Number? (AFKAG-2) (*) 16. Is the account report file properly classified, with a minimum of CONFIDENTIAL? (AFKAG-2) (*) 17. Does the account properly maintain the AFCOMSEC Form 14, COMSEC Material-Voucher and Package Register? (AFKAG-2) (*) 18. Is the AFCOMSEC Form 3 current and maintained in the account report file? (AFKAG-2) (*) 19. Is the proper disposition made of all COMSEC files and records? (AFKAG-1, AFR 56-10/COMSEC User's Guide) Physical Security (*) 20. Were correct procedures used to identify and admit inspection personnel? Was each person in the inspection party required to sign the FAA Form 1600.8, Visitor Register, upon admittance? (AFR 56-6/NACSI 4008) NOTE: All personnel not listed on the access list must be signed in on FAA Form 1600.8 prior to being granted access to the COMSEC area. 21. Has a way been provided so that persons seeking entry may be identified prior to admission or viewing of COMSEC operations? (AFR 56-6/NACSI 4008, AFR 56-13/NACSI 4005) 22. Are all secure telecommunications facility doors solidly constructed and fitted with approved secure locks? (AFR 56-6/NACSI 4008, AFR 56-13/NACSI 4005) 23. Is the secure telecommunications facility sound proofed and have measures been taken to prevent acoustic interception? (AFR 56-6/NACSI 4008) 24. Is an authorized entrance list posted inside the facility or inside the COMSEC security container (for an administrative facility)? (AFR 56-6/NACSI 4008) 25. Is the authorized entrance list limited to persons assigned and others whose duties may require frequent admittance? (AFR 56-6/NACSI 4008) 26. Are specific persons designated by name to authorize admittance to those persons not on the authorized entrance and access list? (AFR 56-6/NACSI 4008) 27. Are visitors being processed in and escorted within the facility? (AFR 56-6/NACSI 4008) 28. Is a copy of the most current TSCM survey on file? (AFKAG-1, Order 1600.12C) (*) 29. Have the operational STU-III terminals located in offices and residences been inspected within the previous 6 months by technically competent personnel? (*) 30. Is strict accountability maintained for all accountable COMSEC material held? (AFKAG-2, AFR 56-10/COMSEC User's Guide, and AFR 56-13/NACSI 4005) (*) 31. During the periodic inventories prescribed in AFKAG-2, is the material physically sighted, including material on hand receipts to users? (AFKAG-2) (*) 32. Are written directives in effect that ensure all persons who have classified COMSEC material on hand receipt are relieved from accountability before permanent departure? (AFKAG-2) (*) 33. Is a daily or shift inventory made for all COMSEC materials and equipments where applicable? (AFR 56-10/COMSEC User's Guide, AFR 56-13/ NACSI 4005) (*) 34. Is an inventory performed of COMSEC materials stored in a locked safe or other container before closure or locking of the container? (AFR 56-13/NACS1 4005) 35. (U) Is COMSEC and keying material at user activities being destroyed immediately, but no later than 12 hours after supersession? (AFR 56-5/NTISSI 4004) 36. (U) Are COMSEC materials at the COMSEC account being destroyed as soon as possible after supersession, but within the time requirements of AFR 56-5? (AFR 56-5/NTISSI 4004) (*) 37. (U) Is proper documentation being maintained locally for accountable COMSEC materials destroyed before normal reporting to the central office of record (COR)? (AFR 56-5/NTISSI 4004, AFR 56-10/COMSEC User's Guide) (*) 38. (U) Are all assigned personnel familiar with the procedures for reporting possible physical compromises? (AFR 56-10/COMSEC User's Guide, AFR 56-12/NTISSI 4003) (*) 39. (U) Have page checks been made and properly recorded in COMSEC documents as required? (AFR 56-10/COMSEC User's Guide, AFR 56-13/NACSI 4005) (*) 40. (U) Are security checks being performed at the end of each shift or on a daily basis as required? (AFR 56-10/COMSEC User's Guide) (*) 41. (U) Are adequate authorized facilities available to destroy classified waste and are they convenient to each facility or account? (AFR 56-5/NTISSI 4004) (*) 42. (U) Are there appropriate signs displayed to designate the secure telecommunications facility as a CLOSED Area? (Order 1600.8C, Order 1600.2C) NOTE: This item applies to administrative accounts only if operations codes or authentication systems are held for issue to users. (*) 43. (U) Are users given adequate guidance on effective dates, accounting, supersession, destruction, physical security, and reporting of COMSEC insecurities? (AFR 56-10/COMSEC User's Guide, AFR 56-11/COMSEC Duties and Responsibilities) 44. (U) Has the account developed written standard operating procedures (SOP), on handling, controlling and protecting COMSEC assets including inventory and destruction? (AFKAG-1, AFR 56-6/NACSI 4008) 45. (U) Have user accounts developed in coordination with the COMSEC custodian their own written SOPs on the handling, controlling and safeguarding of COMSEC assets to include inventory and destruction? (AFR 56-10/COMSEC User's Guide, AFR 56-6/NACSI 4008) 46. Are all applicable TOP SECRET keying material being handled and protected under Two Person Integrity or is an AFCSC approved waiver on file? Cryptographic Security 47. Are the referenced directives used with appropriate SOPs to report insecurities? (AFR 56-12/NTISSI 4003) 48. Has a training program been initiated to ensure proficiency in all phases of COMSEC operation. Is this training documented? (AFR 56-10/COMSEC User's Guide, AFR 56-11/COMSEC Duties and Responsibilities) 49. Has a specified time been established for circuit changes and is a record kept of the time of last change to ensure the cryptoperiod is not exceeded? (AFKAG-1. AFR 56-5/NTISSI 4004, AFR 56-10/COMSEC User's Guide, AFR 56-13/NACSI 4005) 50. Does the operations section maintain SOPs which list current SPECAT codewords and outline specific procedures for processing and safeguarding these types of messages? (AFKAG-1) 51. If appropriate, have persons been briefed on any special handling procedures required by the originator or recipient of SPECAT messages? (AFKAG-1) COMSEC Management (*) 52. Are all COMSEC materials (initial and resupply) and amendments thereto being received and posted on a timely basis? (AFKAG-2 and AFR 56-11/COMSEC Duties and Responsibilities) (*) 53. When permissible, are extracts made from COMSEC publications rather than requesting increased allowance? (AFR 56-9/NACSI 4004) (*) 54. With reference to 54, above - was controlling authority approval obtained to make extracts? (AFR 56-9/NACSI 4004) (*) 55. Are all items and amounts of COMSEC materials limited to those which are absolutely essential to the efficient operation and mission of the FAA facility being supported? (AFKAG-1, AFKAG-2, AFR 56-10/COMSEC User's Guide, AFR 56-11/COMSEC Duties and Responsibilities, AFR 56-13/NACSI 4005) (*) 56. Are COMSEC holdings surveyed on a continuing basis to determine if items are no longer required or are being received in quantities in excess of requirements? (AFKAG-1, AFKAG-2, AFR 56-10/COMSEC User's Guide, AFR 56-11/COMSEC Duties and Responsibilities, AFR 56-13/NACSI 4005) (*) 57. Has required annual COMSEC indoctrination or training been administered to FAA contractors having access to COMSEC materials or information (training identical to that provided for FAA personnel)? (AFKAG-1, AFR 56-12/NTISSI 4003) (*) 58. Are both the custodian and the alternates familiar with and actively performing their assigned duties and responsibilities? (AFR 56-11/COMSEC Duties and Responsibilities) (*) 59. Are all insecurity reports thoroughly reviewed for accuracy by the COMSEC custodian and the facility or office manager having responsibility for COMSEC before being forwarded through official channels? (AFR 56-12/NTISSI 4003) (*) 60. Has corrective action been taken to prevent the recurrence of COMSEC insecurities? (AFR 56-12/NTISSI 4003) (*) 61. Are insecurity reports being processed in a timely manner? (AFR 56-12/NTISSI 4003) (*) 62. Is the COMSEC custodian conducting user training prior to issue of COMSEC materials and at least annually? (AFR 56-10/COMSEC User's Guide, AFR 56-11/COMSEC Duties and Responsibilities) (*) 63. Is there training documentation available at the account? (AFR 56-10/COMSEC User's Guide, AFR 56-11/COMSEC Duties and Responsibilities) (*) 64. Has the COMSEC custodian made maximum use of the Qualification Training Package (QTP) 491X1-30E, COMSEC Account Management, for training of all assigned personnel not attending the formal COMSEC training course. Is documentation of training on hand in the COMSEC account? (AFR 56-11/COMSEC Duties and Responsibilities) 65. Have all applicable personnel been granted Formal Cryptographic Access (FCA)? Have procedures been established to debrief personnel upon departure (PCS, termination or retirement), and for suspension or revocation of access. (Order 1600.8C) 66. Are all waivers granted to COMSEC accounts or COMSEC responsible personnel current? FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY PUBLIC AVAILABILITY TO BE DETERMINED UNDER 5 U.S.C. 552 |
APPENDIX 5. PUBLICATIONS TO BE MAINTAINED BY ALL FAA COMSEC ACCOUNTS 1. General. The publications listed in paragraph 3, below, are to be maintained in each FAA COMSEC operational and monitor account. 2. Abbreviations. The following abbreviations are used in this Appendix with the associated meanings as shown below. a. AFR - Air Force Regulation. This is an Air Force policy document. The 56-series of AFRs are directives implementing the national COMSEC policy as established by the National Security Agency (NSA). b. NACSI - National Communications Security Instruction. The NACSI is an NSA publication that establishes national COMSEC policies and procedures. c. NTISSI - National Telecommunications And Information Systems Security Instruction. The NTISSI is also an NSA document. NTISSIs are used to promulgate current COMSEC doctrine and frequently will supersede an older NACSI. d. NACSI/AFR or NTISSI/AFR. When the AFR number is also provided on a NACSI or NTISSI it indicates that the Air Force has added its own guidance and interpretation to the basic NSA document. 3. Publication Listing. _________________________________________________________________ Item AFR NO. NSA Reference Subject _________________________________________________________________ 01 56-1 Signal Security 02 56-2 NCSC-9 Communications Security Glossary 03 56-3 NTISSI 4002 Classification Guide for COMSEC 04 56-4 NACSI 6002 Security of Defense Contractor Telecommunications 05 56-5 NTISSI 4004 Routine Destruction and Emergency Protection of COMSEC Material 06 56-6 NACSI 4008 Safeguarding COMSEC Facilities 07 56-7 NACSI 4007 Management of Manual Cryptosystems 08 56-9 NACSI 4004 Controlling Authorities for COMSEC Material 09 56-10 ..... COMSEC User's Guide 10 56-11 ..... COMSEC Duties and Responsibilities 11 56-12 NTISSI 4003 Reporting COMSEC Insecurities 12 56-13 NACSI 4005 Safeguarding and Control of COMSEC Material 13 56-19 NACSI 4009 Protected Distribution Systems 14 56-20 NACSI 4001 Controlled Cryptographic Items 15 ..... NTISSI 4005 Control of TOP SECRET Keying Material 16 AFSAL 4001 NTISSI 4001 Controlled Cryptographic Items 17 ..... NTISSI 3013 Operational Security Doctrine for the Secure Telephone Unit III (STU-III) Type 1 Terminal FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY PUBLIC AVAILABILITY TO BE DETERMINED UNDER 5 U.S.C. 552 |
APPENDIX 6. PHYSICAL SECURITY STANDARDS FOR FIXED COMSEC FACILITIES 1. INTRODUCTION. This appendix sets forth the standards for the physical security safeguarding of fixed FAA COMSEC facilities. It implements the provisions of Annex A, NACSI No. 4008/AFR 56-6. These standards apply to fixed FAA facilities which contain classified COMSEC material and which are devoted principally to normal activities involving these materials (e.g., secure telecommunications, manufacturing, training, maintenance, and storage). Unless reference is made to a specific facility type, these standards apply equally to all FAA fixed COMSEC facilities. 2. LOCATION. FAA fixed COMSEC facilities will be located in an area which provides positive control over access, and is as far as possible from areas which are difficult or impossible to control (e.g., parking lots, ground floor exterior walls, multiple corridors or driveways, or surrounded by other uncontrolled buildings or offices). 3. CONSTRUCTION. A fixed COMSEC facility must be constructed of solid, strong materials to prevent unauthorized penetration and to show evidence of attempts at unauthorized penetration. It must provide adequate attenuation of internal sounds which could divulge classified information through walls, doors, windows, ceilings, air vents and ducts. Maximum physical security is achieved when these facilities are of vault-type construction as specified in Annex E to NACSI No. 4005/AFR 56-13. As a minimum, construction or modification of an area containing a FAA fixed COMSEC facility shall conform to the following requirements. a. Walls, Floor, and Ceilings. Walls, floors, and ceilings shall be of sufficient structural strength to prevent, or show evidence of attempts at, unauthorized penetration. Walls shall be constructed from true floor to true ceiling. Where false ceilings are used, additional safeguards are required to resist unauthorized entry (e.g., installation of an approved intrusion detection system in the area above the false ceiling). b. Doors and Entrance Areas. Only one door shall be used for regular entrance to the facility. Other doors may exist for emergency exit and for entry or removal of bulky items. All doors shall remain closed during facility operations and will only be opened to admit authorized personnel or material. The following standards apply to FAA COMSEC facility doors and entrance areas. (1) Main Entrance Door. (a) Design and Installation. The door must have sufficient strength to resist forceful entry. In order of preference, examples of acceptable doors are: 1 GSA-approved vault doors. 2 Standard 1-3/4-inch, internally reinforced, hollow metal industrial doors. 3 Metal-clad or solid hardwood doors with a minimum thickness of 1-3/4-inches. The door frame must be securely attached to the facility and must be fitted with a heavy-duty/high-security strike plate and hinges installed with screws long enough to resist removal by prying. The door shall be hung so that the hinge pins cannot be removed from the exterior side of the door. (b) Door Lock. The main entrance door to FAA fixed C0MSEC facilities must be equipped with a GSA-approved, built-in, Group 1-R lock. (Note: A GSA-approved Group 1-R lock is a three-position combination lock with a changeable combination, is manipulation proof, and is radiation resistant.) When FAA COMSEC facilities are continuously manned, an electronically actuated lock (e.g., cipher lock or keyless pushbutton lock) may be used on the entrance door to facilitate the admittance of authorized personnel when the facility is operationally manned. Electronic locks do not afford the required physical security protection and may not be used as a substitute for the Group 1-R lock required to secure the facility when it is not manned. 1 If a cipher lock is used, it must be one of the following: a Federal Stock Number (FSN) 6350-957- 4190. This lock is being produced by several manufacturers. FSN 5340-757-0691, manufacturers' part number 152, electric latch release, is also needed. b Simplex Pushbutton Combination Lock, Model NL-A-200-S. This lock is manufactured by Simplex Security Systems, Inc., Collinsville, CT. Note: The knowledge of the combination must be strictly controlled and released only to persons assigned regular duties within the secure telecommunications facility. It is emphasized that this type of lock is used only as a convenience feature and affords no protection from forced or surreptitious manipulation. Pushbuttons must be cleaned at least weekly. 2 A key-operated, pin-and-tumbler, night-latch-type lock may be used for personnel access control during periods when the facility is operationally manned if the following conditions are met: a The lock must be mounted so that it cannot be removed from the outside. b The lock must have a spring-load locking feature. c All keys must be numbered and issued only on hand receipts to provide a written record of all keys. Extra keys will be maintained within the FAA COMSEC facility and will be accounted for on the daily inventory. (2) Other Doors. Other doors (e.g., emergency exit doors and doors to loading docks) must meet the same installation requirements as facility entrance doors but must be designed so that they can only be opened from inside the facility. Approved panic hardware and locking devices (lock bars, dead bolts, knobs, or handles) may be placed only on the interior surfaces of other doors to the facility. (3) Entrance Areas. Entrances to FAA COMSEC facilities shall be equipped with a device which affords personnel desiring admittance the ability to notify personnel within the facility of their presence. A method shall be employed to establish positive visual identification of a visitor before entrance is granted. Additionally, the entrance area shall be designed in such a manner that an individual cannot observe classified activities until access requirements are completed. c. Windows. COMSEC facilities should not contain windows. Where windows exist they will be secured in a permanent manner to prevent them from being opened. Windows will be alarmed and/or barred to prevent their use as an access point. Observation of internal operations of the facility shall be denied to outside viewing by covering the windows from the inside or otherwise screening the secure area from external viewing. (5) Other Openings. Air vents, ducts, or any similar openings which breach the walls, floor or ceiling of the facility shall be appropriately secured to prevent penetration. Openings which are less than 90 square inches shall have approved baffles installed to prevent an audio or acoustical hazard. If the opening exceeds 90 square inches, acoustical baffles shall be supplemented by either hardened steel bars or an approved intrusion detection system. All holes, cracks, and other openings in walls, floors, and ceilings will be permanently filled in or sealed to prevent insertion of surveillance devices. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY PUBLIC AVAILABILITY TO BE DETERMINED UNDER 5 U.S.C. 552 |
APPENDIX 7. STANDARDS FOR SAFEGUARDING KEYING MATERIAL SECTION 1. PHYSICAL ACCESS, STORAGE AND CONTROLS 1. Basis for Protection. The cryptographic security of transmitted information is based primarily on the proper use of uncompromised keying material. The safeguarding and control of keying materials used to protect national security information are of paramount importance. To ensure that these keying materials are provided the most rigorous and comprehensive handling and protection, they must be distributed through the COMSEC Material Control System. Safeguarding of keying material is achieved procedurally through restrictions and controls governing access, distribution, storage, accounting, use, and disposition. 2. Controls. a. Application. (1) The requirements of this Appendix apply to all hard-copy keying material intended for use to protect telecommunications carrying national security information, or to ensure their authenticity. Such keying material, both classified and unclassified, will be marked "CRYPTO." (2) Additional or differing guidance for certain types of keying material may appear in the handling or operating instructions of affected systems, and will take precedence over the provisions of this appendix and the basic order. (3) Specific guidance concerning controls for keying variables in electronic form will appear in NSA-published system NACSIs and USAF AFSALS. (4) Guidance on handling of maintenance and test key is contained in Annex D, NACSI 4005/AFR 56-13, and in specific handling instructions for the material. In cases of conflict, specific handling instructions for the material will take precedence. b. Access. (1) Government Civilian or Military Personnel Who Are U.S. Citizens. Access to COMSEC keying material other than TOP SECRET may be granted to U.S. citizens whose duties require such access and, if the material is classified, who have been granted a security clearance equal to or higher than the classification of the keying material involved. Access to TOP SECRET COMSEC keying material will be governed by requirements of NTISSI 4005. (2) Contractors and Foreign Nationals. Access by U.S. contractor personnel and by noncitizens is governed by national COMSEC policy directives. Questions concerning such access should be directed to ACS-300 through the servicing security element. (3) Immigrant Aliens. Refer to Annex B, NACSI 4005/AFR 56-13. (4) Need-to-Know. Clearance or rank does not, in itself, entitle any individual to have access to keying material. Each person having access to keying materials must need the material in the performance of his or her duties or responsibilities and be familiar with his or her responsibilities for its protection, use and disposition. c. Storage. Unless appropriately cleared persons are using or otherwise safeguarding keying material, it will be stored in the most secure facilities available. As a minimum, the following storage requirements apply: (1) TOP SECRET. (Refer to NTISSI 4005) (a) TOP SECRET material will be stored in an approved steel security container meeting requirements for two-person integrity controls as specified in NTISSI 4005. The container will be physically located in a room or vault that has an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) installed, and which has been inspected and approved by the servicing security element for TOP SECRET storage. (b) As an alternative to (a) above, TOP SECRET material may be stored in an area that has been approved by the servicing security element as a secure area, and is manned continuously 24-hours a day by personnel holding final clearances authorizing them access to the highest classification of material stored. Two-person integrity controls apply. (c) A Class "A" vault constructed in accordance with the specifications outlined in Annex E, NACSI 4005/AFR 56-13. (d) At user locations, TOP SECRET keying material shall be stored under two-person integrity controls employing two different GSA approved Group 1R combination locks, with no one person authorized access to both combinations. Storage can be in a strongbox within a security container, in a security container within a vault, or in a security container with two combination locks. At least one of the combination locks must be built-in, as in a vault door or in a security container drawer. If a requirement exists for an approved combination padlock the lock selected must be a changeable, three position combination padlock meeting Federal Specification FF-P-110. (2) SECRET. SECRET keying material shall be stored in: (a) Any manner approved for TOP SECRET. (b) An approved steel security safe procured from the General Services Administration (GSA) Federal Supply Schedule. (c) A Class "B" vault constructed in accordance with the specifications outlined in Annex E, NACSI 4005/AFR 56-13. (3) CONFIDENTIAL. CONFIDENTIAL keying material shall be stored in: (a) Any manner approved for TOP SECRET or SECRET. (b) An approved steel security container having a built-in Group 1R, three position, changeable combination lock. (4) UNCLASSIFIED. Unclassified keying material shall be stored in: (a) The same manner as required for TOP SECRET, SECRET, or CONFIDENTIAL. (b) In the most secure manner available to the user. 3. Supplementary Controls and Older Containers. Supplementary controls such as guard forces, alarms, etc., shall be used as determined necessary by the servicing security element to protect security containers and areas against unauthorized access. Security containers which do not meet the prescribed standards may continue to be used until approved containers can be procured, in accordance with provisions of chapter 8, Order 1600.2C. If a nonapproved container is used or open area storage is unavoidable, the classified keying material must be under protection of a guard force, or protected by an alarm system approved by ACO-300, with immediate guard response capability. Frequent and irregular checks should be made of the area. 4. Keyed Equipments. Equipments which must be stored in a keyed condition must be protected in a manner consistent with the classification of the keying variable they contain. Protection provided may never be less than for the classification of the unkeyed condition of the equipment. 5. Split Variables. Security procedures for equipments utilizing split variables will normally be addressed in the handling and security doctrine for the specific system. In most cases, removal of part of a split variable permits the equipment to be handled as if it were unkeyed. SECTION 2. DISTRIBUTION 1. General. COMSEC custodians are responsible for ensuring that keying materials are properly prepared for shipment, that only authorized means of shipment are used, that accounting and transfer reports are submitted on a timely basis, and that packages are examined upon receipt for signs of tampering and possible tampering reported. a. Preparation for Shipment. (1) Wrapping: Keying material will be double-wrapped and securely sealed prior to shipment. (2) Markings: (a) Inner wrapping will be marked with the security classification of the material, "TO" and "FROM" addressees, the COMSEC account number, and the instruction "ATTN: COMSEC Custodian", or "To Be Opened Only By COMSEC Custodian" or equivalent, and the "CRYPTO" marking. (b) Outer wrappings will contain the "TO" and "FROM" addressees and any other notations to facilitate delivery. The outer wrapping of the package shall not reveal whether the package contains classified information or keying material. Material transmitted by State Department diplomatic pouch must indicate that "Courier Accompaniment is Required." b. Methods of Transmittal. (1) Keying materials must be moved in the custody of authorized, and, if classified material is involved, cleared department, service, agency, or contractor couriers, U.S. Diplomatic Courier Service, or Department of Defense Courier Service. Refer to Annex B, NACSI 4005/AFR 56-13. (2) For TOP SECRET keying material, two-person integrity controls shall apply whenever local couriers are used to transport TOP SECRET key material from a user COMSEC account to another user account or location. Refer to NTISSI 4005. Controls shall apply whenever local couriers are used to transport TOP SECRET key material from a user COMSEC account to another user account or location. Refer to NTISSI 4005. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY PUBLIC AVAILABILITY TO BE DETERMINED UNDER 5 U.S.C. 552 |
APPENDIX 8. ROUTINE DESTRUCTION AND EMERGENCY PROTECTION OF COMSEC MATERIAL 1. INTRODUCTION. This appendix implements the provisions of NTISSI Number 4004/AFR 56-5, and establishes standards and procedures for the routine and emergency destruction of COMSEC materials within the FAA. The security that is achieved through the proper use of contemporary U.S. cryptosystems is heavily dependent upon the physical protection which is afforded the associated keying material. Current and superseded keying material is extremely sensitive, since its compromise potentially exposes to compromise all traffic encrypted with it. 2. POLICY. a. Keying Material. Keying material must be destroyed as soon as possible after it has been superseded or has otherwise served its intended purpose. Destruction reports are submitted in accordance with AFKAG-2. b. Defective or Faulty Key Material. As an exception to the stated policy defective or faulty key will not be destroyed. Instead material in these categories will be reported to AFCSC/MMIA, through COMSEC channels, with information copies to DIRNSA/S042, and ACS-300. The material will be held for disposition instructions. c. Superseded or Obsolete Cryptoequipment. Destruction of superseded or obsolete cryptoequipment and its supporting documentation is also required. FAA COMSEC accounts will request disposition instructions from AFCSC/MMIA. d. Waste Paper Material. All waste paper material, whether containing classified information or not, which is removed from the secure telecommunications facility or from the associated teletypewriter equipment area, shall be safeguarded and destroyed as classified waste. Teletypewriter, printer, and typewriter ribbons used to process classified information will also be safeguarded and destroyed as classified material. SECTION 1. PROCEDURES FOR ROUTINE DESTRUCTION OF COMSEC MATERIAL 3. GENERAL. a. Routine Destruction. Routine destruction will normally be accomplished by the COMSEC custodian and the alternate COMSEC custodian(s). However, this restriction should not preclude granting the authority to perform destruction of superseded material to additional appropriately cleared persons, who then certify the destruction to the COMSEC custodian, if such action is required to avoid delay in accomplishing the destruction. The terms "appropriately cleared" and "cleared" mean possession of a security clearance for the highest classification of material to be destroyed. b. FAA COMSEC Activities. In FAA facilities the COMSEC custodian, alternate custodian, or appropriately cleared person designated by the custodian, will accomplish actual destruction in the presence of a cleared witness. c. Requirements. (1) Routine destruction may be accomplished at the using facility by a cleared individual and witness. The issuing COMSEC custodian must be advised by the user, either verbally or in writing, that the user has destroyed the material. Verbal confirmation must be followed up with written confirmation of destruction as soon as possible. For accounting purposes the COMSEC custodian will then consider the material destroyed. In such cases, the COMSEC custodian must brief the user on the necessity for prompt and complete destruction of superseded keying material, and for prompt reporting of any loss of control of material before destruction could be accomplished. (2) Extreme care must be taken not to accidentally destroy COMSEC material. Do not destroy COMSEC material unless one or more of the following conditions exists: (a) The COMSEC custodian has issued instructions to the user. For example, the material is listed on the COMSEC custodian's formal monthly destruction report or in a status document, such as AFKAG-14, as being authorized for destruction. (b) A superseding document authorizes, in its handling instructions, the superseded document to be destroyed. (c) The controlling authority supersedes the document and authorizes its destruction. (d) Emergency destruction plans are in effect. (3) Destruction and witnessing officials for user accounts must be appointed in writing and a copy provided to the COMSEC custodian. (4) The user records destruction of legend 1 and 2 material by preparing two copies of each destruction report (SF 153). Users will send one copy to the COMSEC custodian and retain the other in the user COMSEC account files. 4. SCHEDULING ROUTINE DESTRUCTIONS. a. Keying Material. Keying material designated CRYPTO which has been issued for use should be destroyed as soon as possible after supersession. In any event, the destruction should be accomplished within not more than 12 hours after supersession. Where special circumstances prevent compliance with the 12-hour standard the FAA facility manager having responsibility for COMSEC operations may grant an extension of up to 24 hours. b. Complete Editions of Key Material. Complete editions of superseded keying material designated CRYPTO which are held by a user account shall be destroyed within 5 days after supersession. Every effort must be made by COMSEC personnel however, to destroy the superseded material within the 12 hour period established as the standard. c. Maintenance and Sample Key Material. Maintenance and sample keying material not designated CRYPTO is not regularly superseded and need only be destroyed when physically unserviceable. d. Classified COMSEC Publications. Superseded classified COMSEC publications which are held by a user COMSEC account shall be destroyed within 15 days after supersession. Every effort must be made by COMSEC account personnel to destroy superseded material within the 12 hour standard period. e. Amendment Residue. The residue of entered amendments to classified COMSEC publications shall be destroyed within 5 days after entry of the amendment. f. Compromised Material. Compromised material will be destroyed no later than 12 hours after receipt of disposition instructions. DO NOT destroy the COMSEC material involved in an investigation unless directed by NSA or AFCSC. g. Correspondence. When it has no further value destroy correspondence concerning superseded documents and material. 5. ROUTINE DESTRUCTION METHODS. a. General. The authorized methods for routinely destroying paper COMSEC material are burning, pulverizing or chopping, crosscut shredding, and pulping. Nonpaper COMSEC material authorized for routine destruction must be destroyed by burning, chopping or pulverizing, or chemical alteration. FAA COMSEC custodians are responsible for ensuring that destruction of paper COMSEC material is accomplished using an NSA-approved paper destruction device (some of which are also approved for destruction of printed circuit boards), and employing NSA-approved destruction methods. In addition to the guidance provided in this order, all FAA COMSEC custodians must also be familiar with, and abide by, the requirements for destruction reflected in the following references: (1) NSA-approved paper destruction devices are listed in Annex B, NTISSI 4004/AFR 56-5. (2) NSA-approved destruction methods are explained in Annex C, NTISSI 4004/AFR5 6-5. b. Paper COMSEC Material. The criteria given below apply to classified COMSEC keying material and media which embody, describe, or implement a classified cryptographic logic. Such media include full maintenance manuals, cryptographic descriptions, drawings of cryptographic logics, specifications describing a cryptographic logic, and cryptographic software. Other paper COMSEC material may be destroyed by any means that are listed in Chapter 9, FAA Order 1600.2C that are approved for other paper material of equal classification or sensitivity. (1) When destroying paper COMSEC material by burning, the combustion must be complete so that all material is reduced to white ash, and contained so that no burned pieces escape. Ashes must be inspected and, if necessary, broken up or reduced to sludge. (2) When pulping, pulverizing, or chopping devices are used to destroy paper COMSEC material, they must reduce the material to bits no larger than 5 millimeters (0.197 inches) in any dimension. (3) DO NOT PULP paper-mylar-paper key tape or high wet strength paper (map stock) and durable-medium paper substitute (e.g., TYVEC olefin, polyethylene fiber). These materials will not reduce to pulp, and must be destroyed by burning, pulverizing, chopping or crosscut shredding. (4) When crosscut (double cut) shredders are used to destroy COMSEC material, they must reduce the material to shreds not more than 3/64-inch (1.2 mm) in width and not more than 1/2-inch (13 mm) in length, or not more than 1/35-inch (0.73 mm) in width and not more than 7/8-inch (22.2 mm) in length. c. Nonpaper COMSEC Material. The authorized methods of routinely destroying nonpaper COMSEC material are burning, melting, chopping, pulverizing, and chemical alteration. The material must be destroyed to the extent that there is no possibility of reconstructing classified information by physical, chemical, electrical, optical, or other means. (1) Microforms. Microforms (microfilm, microfiche, or other reduced-image photo negatives), may be destroyed by burning or by chemical means, such as immersion in household bleach (for silver film masters), or acetone or methelyne chloride (for diazo reproductions) for approximately 5 minutes. When destroying by chemical means, film sheets must be separated and roll film must be unrolled. Refer to Annex C, NTISSI 4004/AFR 56-5, for additional methods and guidance. Use caution when destroying by chemical means to avoid potential hazards. Protective clothing and goggles should be worn. (2) Magnetic Media. Magnetic or electronic storage or recording media are handled on an individual basis. Refer to Annex C, NTISSI 4004/AFR 56-5. (3) Plastic Canisters. The objective in destroying plastic canisters used to hold keying material is to disfigure the two large flat surfaces (sides) of the canister. This can be accomplished by inserting the canister inside a zip-lock bag and either puncture or smash the empty canister. An empty canister will shatter. Do not attempt to destroy an empty canister without the noted safety precautions included in the handling instructions. Zip-lock bags are not furnished with the canisters. Adequate safety precautions must be taken to prevent injuries that could. be caused by flying pieces of plastic when the canister shatters. d. COMSEC Equipment and Components. Routine destruction of COMSEC equipment and components is NOT AUTHORIZED. Equipment which is unserviceable and cannot be repaired, or which is no longer required shall be reported to ANC-120, and to ACO-300 through the appropriate region/center servicing security element. Custodians should review and be familiar with the procedures contained in AFKAG-2, USAF COMSEC Accounting Procedures, for returning COMSEC equipment and components. Equipment which is unserviceable or no longer required will be retained until disposition instructions are provided. 6. REPORTING ROUTINE DESTRUCTION. a. General. FAA COMSEC accounts will report routine destruction in accordance with guidance in chapter 6, AFKAG-2. FAA accounts and users must destroy and witness all classified COMSEC material and record the destruction on an SF 153. b. Legend 1 and 2 Material. Users of keycards, keytapes, and keylists will: (1) Use the destruction record provided with the material to record destruction of each day's key settings as soon as possible after supersession but no later than 72 hours. FAA facilities which have a normal Monday through Friday operation are authorized superseded weekend key settings on the Monday following that particular weekend. If the supersession date falls on a non-duty day, return the material on the first duty day thereafter. (2) Return keycard booklet covers or keylist booklets or keytape canisters and records of destruction as well as unused emergency key settings to the issuing FAA custodian or destroy as directed by the custodian no later than 24 hours after monthly supersession. c. Legend 3 or 5 Material. (1) Superseded legend 3 or 5 material must be destroyed as soon as possible after use, but no later than 12 hours after supersession. The 12-hour time limit is authorized for use only when mission requirements preclude immediate destruction. (2) Destroy Secret and Confidential COMSEC material (by appropriately cleared destruction and witnessing officials) and certify destruction on an SF-153. (3) FAA users will retain certificates of destruction (SF 153, COMSEC Material Report, or AFCOMSEC Form 1) for all classified legends 3 and 5 material for a period of 2 calendar years. d. Disposing of Legend 4 Material. Classified or unclassified material is accountable to AFCSC by the accounting number or by the quantity on initial receipt and must be reported to AFCSC when it is transferred or becomes excess. (1) When accounting legend 4 material is no longer needed or superseded, users must return the material, except amendment residue, to the issuing COMSEC account. (2) FAA COMSEC accounts will forward a decrease request for the legend 4 material according to AFKAG-2. (3) The issuing COMSEC account must destroy and witness classified legend 4 COMSEC material. Destruction is recorded on an SF-153. e. Destruction and Witnessing Official. Both the destruction and the witnessing officials must sign all destruction reports subject to the following rules: (1) The FAA COMSEC custodian, or alternate COMSEC custodian in the absence of the custodian, must sign the AFCSC-prepared monthly destruction report. (2) Within FAA COMSEC accounts grade requirements are as specified in chapter 2, of this directive. (3) For FAA COMSEC users, the destruction official will be an appropriately cleared responsible individual. There is no grade requirement specified formally for users, therefore, facility and activity managers having responsibility for COMSEC must use their discretion when appointing responsible individuals, and must ensure that these individuals are trustworthy and knowledgeable. (4) Clearance requirements are: (a) Within FAA COMSEC-accounts, the witnessing official must meet the clearance requirements of the COMSEC material being destroyed. If, for any reason, no one is available who meets this requirement, the COMSEC custodian may waive the clearance requirement for the witnessing official, in which case the witnessing official's examination of the material to be destroyed must be confined to the front cover of the material. (b) For FAA users, the witnessing official must meet the clearance requirements of the material being destroyed. In an emergency, the destruction official may waive the clearance requirement of the witnessing official, subject to the same precautions noted in (a), above. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY PUBLIC AVAILABILITY TO BE DETERMINED UNDER 5 U.S.C. 552 |