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31 December 2011
NRC Reactor AP1000 Design Certification Amended
31 December 2011 NRC Reactor AP1000 Design Certification Amended
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[Federal Register Volume 76, Number 251 (Friday, December 30, 2011)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 82079-82103]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2011-33266]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
10 CFR Part 52
RIN 3150-AI81
[NRC-2010-0131]
AP1000 Design Certification Amendment
AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
ACTION: Final rule.
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SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or Commission) is
amending its regulations to certify an amendment to the AP1000 standard
plant design. The amendment replaces the combined license (COL)
information items and design acceptance criteria (DAC) with specific
design information, addresses the effects of the impact of a large
commercial aircraft, incorporates design improvements, and increases
standardization of the design. This action is necessary so that
applicants or licensees intending to construct and operate an AP1000
design may do so by referencing this regulation (AP1000 design
certification rule (DCR)), and need not demonstrate in their
applications the safety of the certified design as amended. The
applicant for this amendment to the AP1000 design is Westinghouse
Electric Company, LLC (Westinghouse).
DATES: The effective date of this rule is December 30, 2011. The
incorporation by reference of certain material specified in this
regulation is approved by the Director of the Office of the Federal
Register as of December 30, 2011. The applicability date of this rule
for those entities who receive actual notice of this rule is the date
of receipt of this rule.
ADDRESSES: You can access publicly available documents related to this
action (see Section VI. Availability of Documents) using the following
methods:
NRC's Public Document Room (PDR): The public may examine
and have copied, for a fee, publicly available documents at the NRC's
PDR, O1-F21, One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville,
Maryland 20852.
NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System
(ADAMS): Publicly available documents created or received at the NRC
are available online in the NRC Library at http://www.nrc.gov/reading
-rm/adams.html. From this page, the public can gain entry into ADAMS,
which provides text and image files of the NRC's public documents. If
you do not have access to ADAMS or if there are problems in accessing
the documents located in ADAMS, contact the NRC's PDR reference staff
at 1-(800) 397-4209, (301) 415-4737, or by email to
pdr.resource@nrc.gov.
Federal Rulemaking Web site: Public comments and
supporting materials related to this final rule can be found at
http://www.regulations.gov by searching on Docket ID NRC-2010-0131. Address
questions and concerns regarding NRC dockets to Carol Gallagher;
telephone at (301) 492-3668; email: Carol.Gallagher@nrc.gov.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Ms. Serita Sanders, Office of New
Reactors, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-
0001; telephone at (301) 415-2956; email: serita.sanders@nrc.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Background
II. Summary of Analysis of Public Comments on the AP1000 Proposed
Rule
A. Overview of Public Comments
B. Description of Key Structures of the AP1000 Design
C. Significant Public Comments and Overall NRC Responses
III. Discussion
A. Technical Evaluation of Westinghouse Amendment to the AP1000
Design
B. Changes to Appendix D
C. Immediate Effectiveness of Final Rule: Provision of Actual
Notice to Southern Nuclear Operating Company
IV. Section-by-Section Analysis
A. Scope and Contents (Section III)
B. Additional Requirements and Restrictions (Section IV)
C. Applicable Regulations (Section V)
D. Issue Resolution (Section VI)
E. Processes for Changes and Departures (Section VIII)
F. Records and Reporting (Section X)
V. Agreement State Compatibility
VI. Availability of Documents
VII. Voluntary Consensus Standards
VIII. Finding of No Significant Environmental Impact: Availability
IX. Paperwork Reduction Act Statement
X. Regulatory Analysis
XI. Regulatory Flexibility Act Certification
XII. Backfitting and Issue Finality
XIII. Congressional Review Act
I. Background
Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), Part 52,
``Licenses, Certifications, and Approvals for Nuclear Power Plants,''
Subpart B, presents the process for obtaining standard design
certifications. Section 52.63, ``Finality of standard design
certifications,'' provides criteria for determining when the Commission
may amend the certification information for a previously certified
standard design in response to a request for amendment from any person.
The NRC originally approved the AP1000 design certification in a
final rule in 2006 (71 FR 4464; January 27, 2006). The final AP1000 DCR
incorporates by reference Revision 15 of the design control document
(DCD) (ADAMS Accession No. ML053460400), which describes the AP1000
certified design. During its initial certification of the AP1000
design, the NRC issued a final safety evaluation report (FSER) for the
AP1000 as NUREG-1793, ``Final Safety Evaluation Report Related to
Certification of the AP1000 Standard Design,'' in September 2004 (ADAMS
Accession No. ML043570339) and Supplement No. 1 to NUREG-1793 (ADAMS
Accession No. ML053410203).
From March 2006 through May 2007, NuStart Energy Development, LLC
(NuStart) \1\ and Westinghouse provided the NRC with a number of
technical reports (TRs) for pre-application review of a possible
amendment to the approved AP1000 certified design, in order to: (1)
close specific, generically applicable COL information items
(information to be supplied by COL
[[Page 82080]]
applicants/holders) in the AP1000 certified standard design; (2)
identify standard design changes resulting from the AP1000 detailed
design efforts; and (3) provide specific standard design information in
areas or for topics where the AP1000 DCD was focused on the design
process and acceptance criteria. TRs typically addressed a topical area
(e.g., redesign of a component, structure or process) and included the
technical details of a proposed change, design standards, analyses and
justifications as needed, proposed changes to the DCD, and
Westinghouse's assessment of the applicable regulatory criteria (e.g.,
the assessment of the criteria in 10 CFR part 52, Appendix D, Section
VIII, ``Processes for Changes and Departures''). The NRC identified
issues associated with the TRs and engaged Westinghouse in requests for
additional information and meetings during the pre-application phase to
resolve them.
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\1\ The NuStart member companies are: Constellation Generation
Group, LLC, Duke Energy Corporation, EDF-International North
America, Inc., Entergy Nuclear, Inc, Exelon Generation Company, LLC,
Florida Power and Light Company, Progress Energy, and Southern
Company Services, Inc.
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On May 26, 2007, Westinghouse submitted, via transmittal letter
(ADAMS Accession No. ML071580757), an application to amend the AP1000
DCR. The application included Revision 16 of the DCD (ADAMS Accession
No. ML071580939). This application was supplemented by letters dated
October 26 (ADAMS Accession No. ML073120415), November 2 (ADAMS
Accession No. ML073090471), and December 12, 2007 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML073610541), and January 11 (ADAMS Accession No. ML080150513) and
January 14, 2008 (ADAMS Accession No. ML080220389). The application
noted, in part, that:
(1) Generic amendments to the design certification, including
additional design information to resolve DAC and design-related COL
information items, as well as design information to make corrections
and changes, would result in further standardization and improved
licensing efficiency for the multiple COL applications referencing the
AP1000 DCR that were planned for submittal in late 2007 and early 2008.
(2) Westinghouse, in conjunction with NuStart, has been preparing
TRs since late 2005. These TRs were developed with input, review,
comment, and other technical oversight provided by NuStart members,
including the prospective AP1000 COL applicants. Submittal of these TRs
to the NRC was initiated in March 2006. The TRs contain discussion of
the technical changes and supplemental information that is used to
support the detailed information contained in the DCD.
In Attachment 2 to the May 26, 2007, application, Westinghouse
identified the criteria of 10 CFR 52.63(a)(1) that apply to the changes
described in each TR and associated COL information items, if
applicable.
On January 18, 2008, the NRC notified Westinghouse that it accepted
the May 26, 2007, application, as supplemented, for docketing (Docket
No. 52-006) and published a notice of acceptance (ADAMS Accession No.
ML073600743) in the Federal Register (73 FR 4926; January 28, 2008). On
September 22, 2008, Westinghouse submitted Revision 17 to the AP1000
DCD. Revision 17 contained changes to the DCD that had been previously
accepted by the NRC in the course of its review of Revision 16 of the
DCD. In addition, Revision 17 proposed changes to DAC in the areas of
piping design (Chapter 3), instrumentation and control (I&C) systems
(Chapter 7) and human factors engineering (HFE) (Chapter 18).
The NRC issued guidance on the finalization of design changes in
Interim Staff Guidance (ISG) DC/COL-ISG-011, ``Finalizing Licensing-
basis Information,'' (ADAMS Accession No. ML092890623), which describes
various categories of design changes that should not be deferred and
those that should be included in the DCR.
By letter dated January 20, 2010, Westinghouse submitted a list of
design change packages that would be included in Revision 18 of the
AP1000 DCD (ADAMS Accession No. ML100250873). A number of subsequent
submittals were made by Westinghouse to narrow the focus of those
design changes to the categories of changes that should not be
deferred, as recommended by DC/COL-ISG-011.
Revision 18 to the AP1000 DCD (ADAMS Accession Nos. ML103480059 and
ML103480572) was submitted on December 1, 2010, and contains both
proposed changes previously described in the design change packages and
changes already accepted by the NRC in the review process of Revision
17 to the AP1000 DCD.
In the course of its ongoing review of the amendment application,
the NRC determined that changes from information in Revision 15 to the
DCD were needed. In response to NRC questions, Westinghouse proposed
such changes. Once the NRC was satisfied with these DCD markups, they
were documented in the advance safety evaluation report (SER) as
confirmatory items (CIs). The use of CIs is restricted to cases where
the NRC has reviewed and approved specific DCD proposals. With the
review of Revision 18, the NRC has confirmed that Westinghouse has made
those changes to the DCD accepted by the NRC that were not addressed in
Revision 17 to the AP1000 DCD. For the final rule, the NRC has
completed the review of the CIs and prepared a FSER reflecting that
action. The CIs were closed based upon an acceptable comparison between
the revised DCD text and the text required by the CI. As further
discussed later, Revision 19 is the version being certified in the
final rule.
In order to simplify the NRC's review of the design change
documentation, and to simplify subsequent review by the NRC's Advisory
Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS), the design changes pursuant to
DC/COL-ISG-011 are reviewed in a separate chapter (Chapter 23) of the
FSER. This chapter indicates which areas of the DCD are affected by
each design change and the letters from Westinghouse that submitted
them. In some cases, the NRC's review of the design changes reviewed in
Chapter 23 may be incorporated into the chapters of the FSER where this
material would normally be addressed because of the relationship
between individual design changes and the review of prior DCD changes
from Revisions 16 and 17 of the DCD.
The Westinghouse Revision 18 DCD includes an enclosure providing a
cross-reference to the DCD changes and the applicable 10 CFR
52.63(a)(1) criteria. Revision 17 provides a similar cross-reference
within the September 22, 2008, Westinghouse letter for those changes
associated with the revised DCD. Revision 16, on the other hand, uses
TRs to identify the DCD changes and lists the corresponding applicable
10 CFR 52.63(a)(1) criteria via Westinghouse letter, dated May 26, 2007
(Table 1). Revision 19 has a cross-reference similar to Revisions 17
and 18.
As of the date of this document, the application for amendment of
the AP1000 design certification has been referenced in the following
COL applications:
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.
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Vogtle, Units 3 and 4......... Docket No. 05200025/6. 73 FR 33118.
Bellefonte Nuclear Station, Docket Nos. 05200014/5 73 FR 4923.
Units 3 and 4.
Levy County, Units 1 and 2.... Docket Nos. 05200029/ 73 FR 60726.
30.
Shearon Harris, Units 2 and 3. Docket Nos. 05200022/3 73 FR 21995.
Turkey Point, Units 6 and 7... Docket Nos. 05200040/1 74 FR 51621.
[[Page 82081]]
Virgil C. Summer, Units 2 and Docket Nos. 05200027/8 73 FR 45793.
3.
William States Lee III, Units Docket Nos. 05200018/9 73 FR 11156.
1 and 2.
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II. Summary of Analysis of Public Comments on the AP1000 Proposed Rule
A. Overview of Public Comments
The NRC published the proposed rule amending the AP1000 DCR in the
Federal Register on February 24, 2011 (76 FR 10269). The public comment
period for the proposed rule closed on May 10, 2011. The NRC received a
large number of comment submissions for the proposed rule (AP1000
rulemaking) from members of the public, non-governmental organizations,
and the nuclear industry. A comment submission means a communication or
document submitted to the NRC by an individual or entity, with one or
more distinct comments addressing a subject or an issue. A comment, on
the other hand, refers to statements made in the submission addressing
a subject or issue.
The NRC received more than 13,500 comment submissions, which appear
to be variations of two letters with largely similar content. These
comment submissions also contained approximately 100 separate comments.
The NRC also received 66 additional comment submissions containing over
100 comments. Finally, the NRC received four ``petitions'' to suspend
or terminate this rulemaking, which are being treated as public
comments. The petitions set forth approximately 39 comments. As stated
in the proposed rule, ``Comments received after May 10, 2011 will be
considered if it is practical to do so, but assurance of consideration
of comments received after this date cannot be given.'' The NRC
determined that it was practical to consider comment submissions
received on or before June 30, 2011. Five of the comment submissions
were received after the 75-day comment period closed, and the NRC has
addressed these late-filed comment submissions as part of this final
rule (the numbers above reflect those late-filed comments, which were
deemed practical to consider). These late comment submissions consisted
of one petition, two submissions requesting the NRC to reconsider
comments made during the initial AP1000 DC rulemaking, and two
submissions with supplemental information to support suspending this
rulemaking. The NRC also received several comment submissions after
June 30, 2011. The NRC deemed that it was not practical to consider, in
this rulemaking, comments received after June 30, 2011 and, therefore,
does not provide responses to those comments. The NRC has briefly
reviewed them to ensure that they contain no health and safety matters.
There were several commenters in favor of completing the AP1000
rulemaking, while some were unconditionally opposed to completing the
proposed amendment to the AP1000 design. The vast majority of
commenters favored delaying (in some fashion) the AP1000 amendment
rulemaking until lessons are learned from the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear
Power Plant (Fukushima) accident that occurred on March 11, 2011, and
the NRC applies the lessons learned to U.S. nuclear power plants,
including the AP1000 design.
Before responding to specific comments based upon the Fukushima
Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant Event, the NRC is providing this discussion
about the ongoing actions underway in response to this event. The
Commission created a Near-Term Task Force (NTTF) to conduct an analysis
of the lessons that can be learned from the event. The task force was
established to conduct a systematic and methodical review of NRC
processes and regulations to determine whether the NRC should make
additional improvements to its regulatory system. The NTTF issued a
report (ADAMS Accession No. ML111861807) evaluating currently available
technical and operational information from the event, and presented a
set of recommendations to the Commission. The task force concluded that
continued operation and continued licensing activities do not pose an
imminent risk to public health and safety. Among other recommendations,
the NTTF supports completing the AP1000 design certification rulemaking
activity without delay (see pages 71-72 of the report).
In an August 19, 2011, Staff Requirements Memoranda (SRM) (ADAMS
Accession No. ML112310021), the Commission set forth actions related to
the NTTF report together with a schedule for the conduct of those
actions. Two of those actions have been completed and are documented in
the following reports: ``Recommended Actions to Be Taken Without Delay
from the Near-Term Task Force Report,'' September 9, 2011 (SECY-11-
0124) (ADAMS Accession No. ML11245A127) and ``Prioritization of
Recommended Actions To Be Taken In Response to Fukushima Lessons
Learned,'' October 3, 2011 (SECY-11-0137) (ADAMS Accession No.
ML11269A204).
The NTTF recommendations relevant to the AP1000 design
certification are limited to: Seismic and flooding protection
(Recommendation 2); mitigation of prolonged station blackout
(Recommendation 4); and enhanced instrumentation and makeup capability
for spent fuel pools (Recommendation 7). The task force concluded that,
by the nature of its passive design and inherent 72-hour coping
capability, the AP1000 design has many of the features and attributes
necessary to address the Task Force recommendations, and the NRC
concludes that no changes to the AP1000 DCR are required at this time.
Moreover, even if the Commission concludes at a later time that some
additional action is needed for the AP1000, the NRC has ample
opportunity and legal authority to modify the AP1000 DCR to implement
NRC-required design changes, as well as to take any necessary action to
ensure that holders of COLs referencing the AP1000 also make the
necessary design changes.
The NRC organized the comments on the AP1000 amendment into the
following subject areas: Fukushima-related, shield building,
containment, severe accident mitigation design alternative (SAMDA),
spent fuel, environmental, other AP1000 topics, and general concerns.
Some comments opposed the AP1000 rulemaking until purported shield
building flaws are corrected. Many comments opposed completing the
AP1000 rulemaking for reasons outside the scope of this rulemaking. For
example, many comments opposed the completion of the AP1000 rulemaking
until there is resolution of high level radioactive waste storage
issues.
Due to the large number of comments received and the length of the
NRC responses provided, this section of the statement of considerations
(SOC) for the final rule amending the AP1000 design certification only
provides a summary of the categories of comments with a general
description of the resolution of those comments. A detailed description
of comments and the NRC's response is contained in a comment response
document, which is available electronically through ADAMS Accession No.
ML113480018.
[[Page 82082]]
B. Description of Key Structures of the AP1000 Design
This section is provided to help readers understand the issues and
the NRC's responses. The following is a brief description of the three
design features that were commented on, and a summary of the design
changes that are being approved by the AP1000 amendment.
Containment
The containment vessel is a single steel pressure vessel, inside
which is located the reactor vessel with the nuclear fuel, the steam
generators, the refueling water storage tank, and various equipment for
power generation, refueling, and emergency response, and supporting
electric power, control, and communications equipment.
The steel containment building stands independently inside the
shield building. The containment's primary purpose is to retain
pressure up to the maximum ``design pressure'' should an accident occur
in which the reactor vessel or associated equipment releases reactor
coolant into the containment atmosphere. The containment also acts as
the passive safety-grade interface to the ultimate heat sink.
The primary containment vessel prevents the uncontrolled release of
radioactivity to the environment. The AP1000 primary containment
consists of a cylindrical steel shell with ellipsoidal upper and lower
heads. The steel thickness is increased in the transition region where
the cylindrical shell enters the foundation concrete to provide
additional margin in consideration of corrosion.
Safety-related coatings are applied to both the interior and
exterior surfaces of the containment vessel. These coatings have
several functions. For the exterior surface, the corrosion-resistant
paint or coating for the containment vessel is specified to enhance
surface wetability and film formation, as well as for corrosion
protection. Wetability and film formation are important to the passive
cooling function. For the interior containment surfaces, the coatings
are designed to remain intact within the zone-of-influence of any
postulated pipe break (or to result in settling of any resultant
debris) to facilitate heat transfer to the containment vessel and for
corrosion protection. Periodic inspections are required of the
containment internal and external surfaces and of the coatings on those
surfaces.
As the interface to the ultimate heat sink (the surrounding
atmosphere), the primary containment is an integral component of the
passive containment cooling system. The exterior of the containment
vessel provides a surface for evaporative film cooling and works in
conjunction with the natural draft airflow created by the shield
building baffle and chimney arrangement to reduce the pressure and
temperature of the containment atmosphere following a design-basis
accident (DBA). The source of water for the evaporative cooling is the
passive containment cooling water storage tank, located at the top of
the shield building.
Design changes within the scope of the amendment with respect to
the containment vessel are certain details about coatings with respect
to long-term core cooling capability and the calculated peak accident
pressure (from correction of errors). Other changes included addition
of a vacuum relief system to provide protection for external pressure
events.
Shield Building
The shield building performs multiple functions (e.g., to provide a
biological shield to high-energy radiation, to support the primary
containment cooling water storage tank on the roof, to shield the steel
containment from high-velocity debris that may be generated by
tornadoes or other natural phenomena, to protect the containment from
aircraft impact, and to function as a ``chimney'' to enhance airflow
over the primary steel containment to remove heat from the containment
and reduce containment pressure in the event that post-accident cooling
of the containment would be necessary). While other designs have
included shield buildings of reinforced concrete, with the exception of
the AP600 design, they did not perform cooling functions. The shield
building is not intended to be a pressure retaining structure or to
mitigate the effects of a containment failure. The shield building
construction is primarily a steel-concrete composite module wall, with
a reinforced concrete roof and reinforced concrete where the wall meets
the foundation. The wall is appropriately reinforced and sized where
the composite wall module joins the reinforced concrete sections and as
appropriate to accommodate seismic loads and aircraft loads. This
design is new to the amendment; previously the structure was all
reinforced concrete.
The shield building and the containment are designed with a gap, or
annulus, that ensures that both the shield building and steel
containment are physically separate, excluding their foundation, and
are considered to be ``freestanding.'' In the shield building, air
flows from the environment through openings in the shield building
wall. The air then flows down along an interior baffle, turns toward
the steel containment vessel, and then rises alongside the steel
containment vessel where it absorbs heat. This heated air naturally
rises and is then exhausted through the chimney located in the center
of the primary containment cooling water storage tank.
Design changes to the passive containment cooling system and shield
building principally involve the redesign of the shield building to a
steel-composite design, with related changes to air inlet sizing,
height of the building, and gratings above the chimney opening. Revised
safety analyses were performed to confirm adequate containment pressure
control, capability of the shield building to withstand external events
(tornado, seismic), as well as aircraft impact assessment. The shield
building functions to protect the containment and facilitate passive
containment cooling were not changed in the current amendment.
Spent Fuel Pool
The spent fuel pool (SFP) is a safety-related structure that is
housed in the auxiliary building, which provides protection from
aircraft impact or other external hazards.
For the first 72 hours after loss of normal SFP cooling, including
response to a station blackout (SBO) event, the SFP relies upon the
natural heat capacity of the water in the pool to absorb the heat from
spent fuel elements, and boil the water in the pool. Thus, the safety-
related means of heat removal for 72 hours is by heat-up of the volume
of water in the pool and in safety-related water sources such as the
cask washdown pit. The AP1000 design (as initially certified) included
safety-related water level indication with readout and alarm in the
main control room. A nonsafety-related spent fuel pool cooling system
is also installed. Onsite, protected sources of water are available for
up to 7 days, controlled from areas away from the pool. During high
heat load conditions in the pool, two sources of alternating current
(ac) power are required to be available. Water can be sprayed into the
pool from two nozzle headers on opposite sides of the pool. A cross-
connection also exists to the residual heat removal system. Those
design features needed to provide make-up water after 72 hours and up
to 7 days, such as the passive containment cooling water ancillary
storage tank, and ancillary diesel generators, are protected from
external hazards including the
[[Page 82083]]
safe-shutdown earthquake (SSE), tornado, and flooding.
Design changes within the scope of the current amendment are the
number of fuel assemblies stored, the rack designs for new and spent
fuel storage, the criticality analysis for spent fuel in the pool
(including use of boron material attached to the storage cells),
installation of spray headers, and credit for additional water sources
for pool makeup.
C. Significant Public Comments and Overall NRC Responses
Comment: Many comments noted the NRC staff nonconcurrence on the
shield building design and requested that the NRC should reconsider the
views expressed in the nonconcurrence.
NRC Response: The NRC disagrees with these comments. Professional
opinions may vary, and the NRC has mechanisms in place for making
differing views known.
NRC employees can choose to exercise the nonconcurrence process as
a way of communicating their views and ensuring their opinions are
heard by NRC management. The NRC staff individual who authored the
nonconcurrence used this open process to express concerns regarding the
safety of the AP1000 shield building design. The specific concerns and
staff response to the nonconcurrence are publically available (ADAMS
Accession No. ML103370648).
The NRC concluded that the AP1000 shield building design is safe,
meets the Commission's regulations, and provides reasonable assurance
that the building will remain functional under design-basis loads. The
comments did not offer new information on the matters related to the
nonconcurrence nor did they include a rationale showing the NRC's
resolution of the technical matters raised in the nonconcurrence to be
incorrect. No change was made to the final rule, DCD, or environmental
assessment (EA) as a result of these comments.
Comment: One comment noted that the spent fuel racks' design in
Revision 18 increased the density. The higher density fuel pools
require boron shields between stored assemblies to reduce the risk of
criticality. The comment stated that such re-racking introduces
potential partial loss of cooling water, possible fire of spent fuel
assemblies, and release of large inventories of cesium-137 and other
radionuclides.
NRC Response: The NRC agrees that, under the proposed amendment of
the AP1000 DCR, the capacity of the spent fuel pool racks would be
increased from 619 to 889 (rather than 884 as asserted by the comment)
fuel assemblies, and that the increased density of fuel assemblies
being stored in the spent fuel pool requires the use of boron shields
as part of the amendment.
However, the NRC disagrees with this comment's assertion that the
increased capacity and density would introduce potential loss of
cooling water, resulting in a possible fire of spent fuel assemblies
and large releases of radionuclides. The comment did not explain how
increased fuel capacity and concomitant increase in density of the
spent fuel pool would ``introduce'' potential loss of cooling water as
compared with the capacity and density described in DCD Revision 15.
The NRC does not believe that the increased capacity and density leads
to a new (previously un-described or unconsidered) way of losing spent
fuel pool cooling water. The NRC evaluated the proposed increase in
fuel assembly capacity and density, and the effectiveness of the
Westinghouse-proposed boron shields to ensure against re-criticality of
the spent fuel stored in the spent fuel pool. The AP1000 DCD Revision
18 SFP criticality analysis was reviewed following the guidance found
in NUREG-0800 Section 9.1.1, Revision 3, ``Criticality Safety of Fresh
and Spent Fuel Storage and Handling,'' to ensure that the applicant is
in compliance with the applicable regulations (General Design Criterion
62, ``Prevention of Criticality in Fuel Storage and Handling,'' and 10
CFR 50.68, ``Criticality Accident Requirements''). These requirements
are generally performance-based with limitations on the reactivity
values, and as such, there are no specific physical design requirements
such as minimum geometric spacing which must be met. The AP1000 SFP
criticality analysis demonstrates that, with the proposed storage
arrangement of the SFP, the reactivity requirements are met, and no
regulations are violated. Therefore, the NRC determined that that the
AP1000 spent fuel pool storage arrangement is acceptable. No change was
made to the rule, the DCD, or the EA as a result of this comment.
Comment: Several comments stated that given the recent event at the
Fukushima plant in Japan, the 75-day comment period is not adequate and
should be extended.
NRC Response: The NRC disagrees with this comment, and believes
that the 75-day public comment period, which is consistent with most
other NRC technical rulemakings, is adequate. The Commission
established a NTTF to review relevant NRC regulatory requirements,
programs, and processes, and their implementation, and to recommend
whether the agency should make near-term improvements to its regulatory
system. The public comment period for the proposed rule on the AP1000
design certification amendment closed on May 10, 2011, and the NTTF
issued its report (ML111861807) on July 12, 2011. The NTTF considered
the AP1000 design certification amendment in its report and noted that
it has passive safety systems. By nature of their passive designs and
inherent 72-hour coping capability for core, containment, and spent
fuel pool cooling, the AP1000 designs have many of the design features
and attributes necessary to address the NTTF recommendations. The NTTF
supports completing the AP1000 design certification rulemaking
activities without delay.
The NRC believes that the AP1000 final rulemaking can and should
proceed without extending the public comment period because: (i) The
NRC has determined that the AP1000 design certification amendment meets
current regulations; (ii) the NRC will provide an opportunity for the
public to provide input on NTTF recommendations, and (iii) if the NRC
imposes additional requirements on the AP1000 design, existing
regulations already define the process for doing so. No change was made
to the rule, the DCD, or the EA as a result of this comment.
Comment: One comment questioned whether the NRC endorsed NQA-1-1994
for work performed for the AP1000 project, where the NRC documented
that NQA-1-1994 adequately meets the NRC requirements in the Code of
Federal Regulations, and whether the Westinghouse's AP1000 design meets
the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B.
NRC Response: The NRC has, in application-specific requests for NRC
approval of quality assurance programs, approved the use of NQA-1-1994
as an acceptable method to meet the requirements of Appendix B to 10
CFR Part 50. The NRC's approvals of NQA-1-1994 have been documented in
NRC SERs on those requests.
The NRC believes that the AP1000 design meets the requirements of
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B. By letter dated February 23, 1996 (ADAMS
Accession No. ML11280A309), the NRC issued a safety evaluation report
approving Revision 1 of the Westinghouse Quality Systems Manual
(Westinghouse Quality Assurance (QA) Manual). The Westinghouse QA
Manual is based upon the guidance in NQA-1-1994. The NRC found that the
Westinghouse QA Manual meets all the
[[Page 82084]]
requirements of Appendix B. In addition, the NRC concluded in its FSER
for the amendment that Revision 5 of the Westinghouse Quality Systems
Manual, as described in the AP1000 Design Control Document, Revision
17, meets the criteria of Appendix B with respect to AP1000 quality
assurance. No change was made to the final rule, the DCD, or the EA as
a result of this comment.
Comment: Several comments claimed the containment design was flawed
because the containment cooling method includes convective air flow and
because the steel containment could be subject to corrosion. As a
result, they state that Westinghouse has not satisfactorily proved that
the thin steel containment shell over the reactor would be effective
during severe accidents.
NRC Response: The NRC considers these comments to be outside the
scope of the rulemaking amending the AP1000 DCR. These features of the
AP1000 design that demonstrate that the containment shell would be
effective during severe accident conditions, as well as resistant to
corrosion have already been certified with Revision 15. The proposed
amendment to the AP1000 design does not propose any modification to
these features and, therefore, the comment is outside the scope of this
rulemaking.
The NRC considers a single metal containment vessel to be
acceptable if it meets the requirements of the American Society of
Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section
III, Subsection NE. This part of the ASME Code contains requirements
for the material, design, fabrication, examination, inspection,
testing, and overpressure protection of metal containment vessels. Many
such vessels are in use at operating nuclear power plants. The AP1000
containment is designed to meet ASME requirements for a pressure of 6.9
kPa (59 psi) and a temperature of 149 degrees C (300 degrees F). Its
thickness includes an allowance for corrosion that may occur over the
60-year design life of the plant.
The AP1000 containment building has an additional function--
transferring heat from containment to the atmosphere. The staff has
reviewed the applicant's analysis, which shows that the containment
building and the shield building, working as a system, would transfer
heat to the atmosphere during severe accidents as well as design-basis
earthquakes. Experiments were conducted to demonstrate that these
predictions are based upon physical phenomena that can be relied upon
to work even when there is no ac power. In short, Westinghouse has
demonstrated that the containment building is robust and will perform
its safety functions effectively if a severe accident occurs at an
AP1000 plant.
The commenters did not offer any basis for Westinghouse to revise
its design or for the NRC to revise its evaluation. No change was made
to the final rule, the DCD, or the EA as a result of these comments.
Comment: Many comments stated that Westinghouse has not proven that
the reactor could be properly cooled in conditions similar to those at
Fukushima.
NRC Response: The NRC considers these comments to be outside the
scope of the rulemaking amending the AP1000 DCR. The Fukushima event
involved an extended SBO (loss of offsite and onsite ac power).
Westinghouse has shown that the AP1000 includes design features that
keep the reactor properly cooled under these conditions. The features
of the AP1000 design ensuring that the reactor can be properly cooled
in an extended SBO are already part of the certified design for the
AP1000, and are not being changed or modified by this final rule
amending the AP1000 design. Therefore, these comments are out of scope
for this rulemaking.
In addition, even if these comments are assumed to be within the
scope of the rulemaking, the NRC disagrees with the comment. If a
severe accident occurs, seriously damaging the core, the AP1000
containment can be adequately cooled for 3 days--even if a loss-of-
coolant accident (LOCA) occurred and without any ac power--because the
AP1000 containment is cooled by gravity-fed water from a tank located
at the top of the containment. After 3 days with no ac power, only a
small ``ancillary'' generator is needed. This generator is used to
power a small pump that re-fills the tank that supplies water to the
outside surface of the containment. The generator could be brought to
the site; however, in an AP1000 design, two such generators are
installed in a seismically qualified structure (along with fuel and
supporting equipment). After 1 week, the containment can be cooled
indefinitely as long as fuel for at least one ancillary generator is
provided and there is water to replenish the water tank above the
shield building, as discussed in the DCD.
These comments did not present any basis that would support an NRC
determination that the AP1000 design is deficient in this regard. No
change was made to the final rule, the DCD, or the EA as a result of
these comments.
Comment: Some comments stated that there are significant unresolved
technical issues related to Revision 19 changes and that the NRC has
not fully disclosed its analysis of these weaknesses, and the existence
of such weaknesses is evidenced by the concerns identified by Dr. Susan
Sterrett, Mr. Arnie Gundersen of Fairewinds Associates, and Dr. John
Ma.
NRC Response: The NRC disagrees with this comment. As discussed in
more detail in the comment response document, the NRC concludes these
issues were either resolved as part of the initial AP1000 rulemaking,
or are resolved as part of this rulemaking. Elsewhere in this notice,
NRC discusses the Revision 19 changes and summarizes the response to
the other technical issues.
Comment: Many comments expressed views that nuclear power plants
are too expensive or too dangerous, or that alternative energy sources
should be pursued.
NRC Response: The NRC considers these comments to be outside the
scope of the rulemaking amendment the AP1000 DCR. The NRC has concluded
that the AP1000 design meets its regulatory requirements, and the
comments do not offer any basis that this is not supported. Other
issues about expense or alternative energy sources are outside the
scope of the rulemaking amending the AP1000 DCR. A design certification
rule is not an NRC license or authorization for construction or
operation. No change was made to the final rule, the DCD, or the EA as
a result of these comments.
Comment: Many comments expressed concerns about nuclear waste.
NRC Response: These comments address matters that are outside the
scope of the rulemaking amending the AP1000 DCR. These comments do not
address whether the AP1000 design changes, as reflected in the
amendment application and evaluated in the NRC's SER and EA, meet the
applicable NRC requirements. No change was made to the final rule, the
DCD, or the EA as a result of these comments.
III. Discussion
A. Technical Evaluation of Westinghouse Amendment to the AP1000 Design
Westinghouse's request to amend the AP1000 design contained several
classes of changes. Each class is discussed below:
Editorial Changes
Westinghouse requested changes to the AP1000 DCD to correct
spelling,
[[Page 82085]]
punctuation, grammar, designations, and references. None of these
changes make substantive changes to the certified design, and NUREG-
1793, ``Final Safety Evaluation Report Related to Certification of the
AP1000 Standard Design,'' Supplement 2 (SER) does not address these
changes.
Changes To Address Consistency and Uniformity
Westinghouse requested changes to the currently-approved AP1000 DCD
(Revision 15) to achieve consistency and uniformity in the description
of the certified design throughout the DCD. For example, a change to
the type of reactor coolant pump (RCP) motor is evaluated in Chapter 5
of the SER on the application for the AP1000 amendment; Westinghouse
requested that wherever this RCP motor is described in the DCD, the new
description of the changed motor be used. The NRC reviewed the proposed
change (to be used consistently throughout the DCD) to ensure that the
proposed changes needed for uniformity and consistency are technically
acceptable and do not adversely affect the previously approved design
description. The NRC's bases for approval of these changes are set
forth in the SER for the AP1000 amendment.
Substantive Technical Changes to the AP1000 Design (other than
those needed for compliance with the AIA rule)
Among the many technical changes to the currently-approved DCD
Revision 15 that are proposed by Westinghouse for inclusion in Revision
19 of the AP1000 DCD, the NRC selected 15 substantive changes for
specific discussion in this final rule document, based on their safety
significance:
Removal of HFE DAC from the DCD.
Change to I&C DAC and Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and
Acceptance Criteria (ITAACs).
Minimization of Contamination.
Extension of Seismic Spectra to Soil Sites and Changes to
Stability and Uniformity of Subsurface Materials and Foundations.
Long-Term Cooling.
Control Room Emergency Habitability System.
Changes to the Component Cooling Water System (CCWS).
Changes to I&C Systems.
Changes to the Passive Core Cooling System (PCCS)--Gas
Intrusion.
Integrated Head Package (IHP)--Use of the QuickLoc
Mechanism.
Reactor Coolant Pump Design.
Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) Support System.
SFP Decay Heat Analysis and Associated Design Changes.
Spent Fuel Rack Design and Criticality Analysis.
Vacuum Relief System.
The NRC evaluated each of the proposed changes and concluded that
they are acceptable. The NRC's bases for approval of these changes are
set forth in the FSER for the AP1000 amendment and are summarized in
Section XII, ``Backfitting and Issue Finality,'' of this document, as
part of the discussion as to how each of the 15 changes satisfy the
criteria in 10 CFR 52.63(a).
Changes To Address Compliance With the AIA Rule
Westinghouse requested changes to the AP1000 design in order to
comply with the requirements of the AIA rule, 10 CFR 50.150. The NRC
confirmed that Westinghouse has adequately described key AIA design
features and functional capabilities in accordance with the AIA rule
and conducted an assessment reasonably formulated to identify design
features and functional capabilities to show, with reduced use of
operator action, that the facility can withstand the effects of an
aircraft impact. In addition, the NRC determined that there will be no
adverse impacts from complying with the requirements for consideration
of aircraft impacts on conclusions reached by the NRC in its review of
the original AP1000 design certification. The NRC's bases for approval
of these changes are set forth in the FSER for the AP1000 amendment. As
a result of these changes, the AP1000 design will achieve the
Commission's objectives of enhanced public health and safety and
enhanced common defense and security through improvement of the
facility's inherent robustness to the impact of a large commercial
aircraft at the design stage.
AP1000 Design Control Document Changes Since Revision 18
Introduction
The NRC staff's (staff's) review of DCD Revision 18 (ADAMS
Accession No. ML103260072) identified a few areas where the DCD wording
should be revised for clarity, to resolve internal inconsistencies, or
to provide updated versions of referenced technical reports. In
addition, three technical issues were noted: a load combination for the
shield building, the method used to evaluate tank sloshing, and
containment peak pressure analysis error correction. As a result of
these activities, Westinghouse submitted Revision 19 of the DCD on June
13, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11171A315), and this is the version of
the DCD that is being certified by this final rule. The NRC has
determined that none of the changes from Revision 18 to Revision 19 of
the DCD require an additional opportunity for public comment. These
changes, which are organized into five subject areas, are discussed
below.
The NRC has also determined, in its review of Revision 19, that
three of the five subject areas must be identified as Tier 2* matters
in the Section VIII of the final rule. The NRC has determined that none
of the three new Tier 2* designations in Section VIII.B.6 of the rule
require an additional opportunity for public comment. The bases for the
NRC's determinations are set forth below.
DCD Structural Design Information and Shield Building Tier 2*
Information
Revision 18 of the DCD moved some design details regarding
structures, including the shield building, from supporting Westinghouse
documents into the DCD itself. Some of the details were marked as Tier
2*, based upon initial NRC staff comments. For example, information
about penetrations was brought out of TR-9 into the DCD, and the shield
building structural description was added to Section 3.8.4 in Revision
18.
The advanced final safety evaluation report (AFSER) included a
confirmatory item to verify that the DCD appropriately reflected all
necessary details regarding the structural design and shield building,
and clearly showed which design details were to be Tier 2* (see AFSER
Section 3.8.4 under ADAMS Accession No. ML103430502). The staff was
able to close the confirmatory item after Westinghouse submitted
Revision 19 of the DCD by verifying the appropriate structural details
were in the DCD and the design details were identified as Tier 2*.
These DCD revisions enhanced the description of the design and were not
a result of changes to the design itself. Westinghouse report GLR-603,
submitted on March 28, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML110910541), was the
nonproprietary version of the report that presented shield building
information to be made Tier 2*, in addition to the DCD information
separately added to Section 3.8 and Appendix 3H. The scope of the
report was materials, connection details, and tie bar spacing.
Use of steel composite modules was the heart of the revised shield
building design, including the NRC's determination that existing
consensus standards are not techinically applicable in all respects to
the analysis for such modules. This was a key factor in the NRC
conclusion that design details about the shield building are Tier 2* so
[[Page 82086]]
that any future changes to that information by the COL would receive
prior staff review and approval. The staff considered the existing rule
language as it relates to Tier 2* designation for structural
information. For example, the existing rule includes use of ACI-349,
definition of critical locations and thicknesses, nuclear island
structural dimensions, and design summary of critical sections. Some of
the critical sections are within the shield building, and ACI-349 was
part of the design criteria. However, the staff concluded, during the
course of final rule preparation, that the rule would be more clear if
the use of steel composite module details that are designated in the
DCD as Tier 2* was explicitly stated in the final rule (at Section
VIII.B.6.c) and requested that Westinghouse designate this information
at Tier 2* in Revision 19 of the DCD. Westinghouse included this change
in Revision 19. As a result of the Tier 2* markings, a conforming
change is being made to the final rule language to Section VIII.B.6.c
about the categories of Tier 2* information that would expire at fuel
load.
The NRC does not believe that the DCD changes or the designation of
this information as Tier 2* in the final rule require re-noticing. The
material was publicly available in referenced reports, the staff's
intention that the composite steel module design be designated Tier 2*
was clear at the time of the public comment period, and there were no
comments regarding the extent of Tier 2* inclusion in Revision 18.
Implementation of Revision 18 Commitments for the Shield Building
Load Combinations for Shield Building
In the NRC staff's follow-up to an apparent editorial error in a
table in the Westinghouse shield building report, the staff determined
that Westinghouse had not documented in its calculations the numerical
combination of the loads for external temperature conditions (minus 40
degrees F) and a safe-shutdown earthquake (SSE). On April 12, 2011, the
staff requested Westinghouse to document in the shield building report
the numerical combination of loads for extreme ambient thermal loads
and SSE loads, as specified in DCD Table 3.8.4-1 for steel structures
and Table 3.8.4-2 for concrete structures. See meeting summary dated
May 17, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML111440298). By letter dated June
15, 2011, Westinghouse responded to this request (ADAMS Accession No.
ML111950098), and concluded that the current design is acceptable when
the load combinations are explicitly analyzed. The analysis results are
discussed in detail in Revision 4 of the shield building report.
Changes were made to the DCD to reflect the results of this load
combination analysis, but the changes did not involve any changes to
the methodology or the design of the shield building. The specific DCD
changes were the addition of Section 3.8.4.5.5 to discuss the load
combination analysis, and updating of tables of results in Appendix 3H.
No change to the language of the AP1000 DCR in 10 CFR part 52, Appendix
D was made as a result of the DCD changes.
The NRC does not believe these DCD changes require re-noticing
because Revision 18 of the DCD stated that the design would be verified
using the required load combinations, and these load combinations had
previously been approved by the NRC for use in AP1000 analyses similar
to those for the shield building elements requiring reanalysis. There
was no change to the methodology or the actual design of the shield
building was needed, and there was no change to the language of the
AP1000 DCR. The also NRC notes that the June 16, 2011 ``petition''
(filed by John Runkle) that requested the NRC terminate the rulemaking
specifically raised the three technical issues in Revision 19,
including the load combination topic.
Passive Containment Cooling Water Storage Tank
During the analysis of the thermal plus earthquake load combination
for the passive containment cooling water storage tank (located on top
of the shield building), Westinghouse determined that it had not
performed an analysis of hydrodynamic loads using an equivalent static
analysis as stated in Westinghouse's response (ADAMS Accession No.
ML102650098) to an action item from the NRC's shield building report
review (documented in AFSER Chapter 3, ADAMS Accession No.
ML103430502). Instead, the analysis had been done by response spectrum
analysis. Both the equivalent static method and the response spectrum
method had previously been approved by the NRC for use in the AP1000
design for structural analyses as described in Revision 18 of the DCD.
This issue was discussed in a May 17, 2011, public meeting (see meeting
summary dated May 26, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML111430775)). In
response, Westinghouse performed the analysis with the equivalent
static method and presented the results in the revised shield building
report and in DCD Revision 19 as follows. The use of the equivalent
static method for the tank is discussed in Section 3.7 and Appendix 3G,
and a table and figure were added to Appendix 3H. The revised shield
building report included the results of the load combination for the
containment cooling water storage tank using the equivalent static
analytical method, which demonstrated that the design remained adequate
when evaluated using the equivalent static analytical method. No change
to the language of the AP1000 DCR in 10 CFR Part 52, Appendix D was
made as a result of the DCD changes.
The NRC does not believe these DCD changes require renoticing.
Revision 18 of the DCD stated that the design would be verified through
the use of the equivalent static method, and that method had been
previously approved by the NRC for AP1000 analyses equivalent to that
peformed for the containment cooling water tank. No change to the
actual design of the tank was needed, and there was no change to the
language of the AP1000 DCR. The NRC also notes that one of the
petitions (dated June 16, 2011) that the NRC is responding to in the
comment response document specifically raised this issue and the NRC
has provided an answer similar to that described above.
Debris Limits
In its December 20, 2010, letter on long-term core cooling (ADAMS
Accession No. ML103410348), the ACRS concluded that the regulatory
requirements for long-term core cooling for design-basis accidents have
been adequately met, based on cleanliness requirements specified in the
amendment. In particular, the amount of latent debris that might be
present in the containment is an important parameter. The ACRS further
stated that any future proposed relaxation of the cleanliness
requirements will require substantial additional data and analysis. In
their January 24, 2011, (ADAMS Accession No. ML110170006) report on the
Vogtle COL application, which references the AP1000 design, the ACRS
recommended that the containment interior cleanliness limits on latent
debris should be included in the Technical Specifications (TSs) for the
Vogtle plant.
In a letter dated February 23, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML110590455), Westinghouse proposed DCD markups to designate
information in Section 6.3 including debris sources such as latent
debris (and the amount of fiber) as Tier 2*. Revision 19 of the DCD
includes changes to mark selected information as Tier 2*.
[[Page 82087]]
The NRC made a conforming change to the final rule language to
provide a new item as Section VIII.B.6.b(7), ``Screen design
criteria,'' for this new type of Tier 2* information. The NRC believes
that inclusion of debris limits in the AP1000 DCD as Tier 2*
information, rather than including such limits in each plant
referencing the AP1000, represents a better regulatory approach for
achieving the intent of the ACRS. Inclusion of debris limits in the
AP1000 and its designation as Tier 2* would ensure that there is
consistency across all referencing plants with repect to debris
control, and ensures NRC regulatory control of any future relaxations
of the limits, as discussed in the staff's March 3, 2011, response to
the ACRS (ADAMS Accession No. ML110350198).
The NRC does not believe that this change to the DCD marking or to
the final rule language requires renoticing because the ACRS letter,
the staff response, and the Westinghouse letter, were all publicly
available during the comment period, and the public had a fair
opportunity to comment on this matter. In this regard, the staff notes
that the April 6, 2011, ``petition'' (filed by John Runkle) that
requested the NRC to suspend the AP1000 amendment rulemaking, included
discussion about this topic with specific reference to the ACRS letter
(ADAMS Accession No. ML11108A077). Numerous other comment submissions
pointed to this petition as part of their comments. This lends support
to the NRC's view that the public had adequate notice and an
opportunity to comment on this matter. In addition, the inclusion of
debris limits as Tier 2* represents a new limitation, not present in
the prior revisions of the AP1000 DCD, which will require a referencing
COL holder to use debris limits as specified in the AP1000 DCD. Given
that the designation of the debris limits as Tier 2* represents a new
restriction agreed to by Westinghouse, a matter on which the NRC
received public comment, the staff does not believe that an additional
opportunity for public comment need be provided on the inclusion of
debris limits in Revision 19 of the DCD and the designation of those
limits as Tier 2*.
Heat Sinks and Containment Pressure Analysis
In its December 13, 2010, letter on the AP1000 design
certification, the ACRS identified an error in the previously certified
Revision 15 of the DCD (ADAMS Accession No. ML103410351) concerning the
containment cooling analysis. The error affected the time at which
steady-state film coverage is achieved on the exterior of the
containment vessel. In a February 5, 2011, letter, the NRC staff agreed
with the ACRS, and indicated that Westinghouse agreed that the error
existed and should be corrected. The letter also indicated that the NRC
staff would monitor Westinghouse's corrective actions and review any
needed revisions to the DCD (ADAMS Accession No. ML103560411).
In the course of correcting the steady-state film coverage error,
after the proposed rule was published, Westinghouse identified other
errors and modeling updates in supporting analyses that affected the
calculated post-accident peak containment pressure (the highest peak
pressure in the event of a large break loss-of-coolant accident). The
net impact of correcting the steady-state film error and the subsequent
Westinghouse-identified errors and modeling updates was an increase in
calculated peak containment pressure from 57.8 psig to 59.2 psig, which
would have exceeded the 59 psig post-accident peak containment pressure
acceptance criterion in the existing AP1000 DCR.
Therefore, as part of the revised analysis to account for all the
identified errors, Westinghouse relied upon a limited number of
existing structural elements (gratings) within the containment as heat
sinks, in order to remain within the 59 psig post-accident peak
containment pressure acceptance criterion. Westinghouse's revised
analysis used the NRC-approved methodology in the existing AP1000 DCR
containment pressure calculation, and the method for crediting heat
sink capacity as described in Westinghouse documents WCAP-15846
(proprietary) and WCAP-15862 (nonproprietary) ``WGOTHIC Application to
AP600 and AP1000,'' Revision 1, March 2004, which are incorporated by
reference in the previously certified Revision 15 of the DCD. In
addition, the Westinghouse-revised analysis used the NRC-approved 59
psig post-accident peak containment pressure acceptance criterion in
the existing AP1000 DCD, Revision 15.
The staff safety evaluation of the Westinghouse revised analysis is
included in Sections 23.X and 23.Y of the FSER (ADAMS Accession No.
ML112061231). Table 6.2.1.1-10 of Revision 19 of the DCD includes the
credited elements. The ACRS reviewed the Westinghouse corrections, and
agreed that Westinghouse's revised analysis continues to demonstrate
that the containment will be able to withstand the post-accident peak
containment pressure (ADAMS Accession No. ML11256A180), and that the
reevaluated pressure is based on a sufficiently conservative
methodology. The final AP1000 rule language designates this ``heat sink
data for containment analysis'' by adding it as a new Tier 2* item in
Section VIII.B.6.b(8). The NRC decided to control any future changes to
the credited elements by designating the material as Tier 2* because
the geometry and location of the heat sinks could impact their
effectiveness.
The NRC does not believe that the revisions to Table 6.2.1.1-10 of
Revision 19 of the DCD require renoticing for several reasons. The
gratings to be credited as heat sinks were already part of the approved
AP1000 design and were not part of the proposed amendment to the AP1000
DCR described design. Thus, the actual DCD did not involve any new
design elements being added. The use of heat sinks as part of the
containment pressure calculation and the method for crediting heat sink
capacity were described in the DCD Revision 15. The criterion for
evaluating the acceptability of the change continues to be the
calculated post-accident peak containment pressure of 59 psig.
Therefore, the revised Westinghouse analysis did not involve the use of
any previously unapproved design methodologies or acceptance criteria;
the methodology used and the acceptance criterion (59 psig post-
accident peak containment pressure) is in the already-approved AP1000
DCR. Finally, crediting of the gratings as heat sinks in the revised
analysis did not introduce any new safety issues not previously
addressed. Therefore, the NRC does not believe that opportunity for
public comment need be provided on the rule language change.
The NRC does not believe that the designation of the heat sink as
Tier 2* requires renoticing. As discussed above, the Tier 2* change is
a direct result of the Westinghouse revised analysis that does not
warrant an additional opportunity for public comment. The designation
of this information as Tier 2* adds a new limitation, not present in
the prior revisions of the AP1000 DCD, which limits a referencing
combined license applicant/holder to alter the heat sink information
for the grating and all other heat sinks credited in the containment
peak pressure analysis. Given that the designation of the heat sink
information as Tier 2* represents a new restriction agreed to by
Westinghouse, the staff does not believe that opportunity for public
comment need be provided on the Westinghouse revised analysis and the
designation of the heat sink information as Tier 2*.
[[Page 82088]]
B. Changes to Appendix D
1. Scope and Contents (Section III)
The purpose of Section III is to describe and define the scope and
contents of this design certification and to set forth how
documentation discrepancies or inconsistencies are to be resolved.
Paragraph A is the required statement of the Office of the Federal
Register (OFR) for approval of the incorporation by reference of Tier
1, Tier 2, and the generic TSs into this appendix. The NRC is updating
the revision number of the DCD that is incorporated by reference to the
revision Westinghouse provided to the NRC in its application for
amendment to this DCR. In this final rule, the revision of the DCD that
is incorporated by reference is Revision 19.
The effect of this incorporation by reference is that the
incorporated material has the same legal status as if it were published
in the Federal Register and in NRC's regulations at 10 CFR part 52.
This material, like any other properly issued regulation, has the force
and effect of law. The AP1000 DCD was prepared to meet the technical
information contents of application requirements for design
certifications under 10 CFR 52.47(a) and the requirements of the OFR
for incorporation by reference under 1 CFR part 51. One requirement of
the OFR for incorporation by reference is that the applicant for the
design certification (or amendment to the design certification) makes
the generic DCD available upon request after the final rule becomes
effective. Therefore, paragraph A identifies a Westinghouse
representative to be contacted to obtain a copy of the AP1000 DCD.
The AP1000 DCD is electronically accessible under ADAMS Accession
No. ML11171A500, at the OFR, and at www.regulations.gov by searching
under Docket ID NRC-2010-0131. Copies of the generic DCD are also
available at the NRC's PDR. Questions concerning the accuracy of
information in an application that references Appendix D will be
resolved by checking the master copy of the generic DCD in ADAMS. If a
generic change (rulemaking) is made to the DCD by the revision process
provided in Section VIII of Appendix D, then, at the completion of the
rulemaking process, the NRC would request approval of the Director,
OFR, for the revised incorporation by reference and revise its copies
of the generic DCD, provide a revised copy to the OFR, and notify the
design certification applicant to change its copy. The Commission
requires that the design certification applicant maintain an up-to-date
copy of the master DCD under Section X.A.1 of Appendix D because it is
likely that most applicants intending to reference the standard design
will obtain the generic DCD from the design certification applicant.
Plant-specific changes to and departures from the generic DCD will be
maintained by the applicant or licensee that references Appendix D in a
plant-specific DCD under Section X.A.2 of Appendix D.
The NRC is also making a change to paragraph D. Paragraph D
establishes the generic DCD as the controlling document in the event of
an inconsistency between the DCD and the design certification
application or the FSER for the certified standard design. The revision
renumbers paragraph D as paragraph D.1, clarifies this requirement as
applying to the initial design certification, and adds a similar
paragraph D.2 to indicate that this is also the case for an
inconsistency between the generic DCD and the amendment application and
the NRC's associated FSER for the amendment.
2. Additional Requirements and Restrictions (Section IV)
Section IV of this appendix sets forth additional requirements and
restrictions imposed upon an applicant who references this appendix.
Paragraph A sets forth the information requirements for these
applicants. Paragraph A.3 requires the applicant to physically include,
not simply reference, the proprietary information (PI) and safeguards
information (SGI) referenced in the AP1000 DCD, or its equivalent, to
ensure that the applicant has actual notice of these requirements. The
NRC revised paragraph A.3 to indicate that a COL applicant must
include, in the plant-specific DCD, the sensitive unclassified non-
safeguards information (SUNSI) (including PI) and SGI referenced in
AP1000 DCD. This revision addresses a wider class of information
(SUNSI) to be included in the plant-specific DCD, rather than limiting
the required information to PI. The requirement to include SGI in the
plant-specific DCD would not change.
The NRC also added a new paragraph A.4 to indicate requirements
that must be met in cases where the COL applicant is not using the
entity that was the original applicant for the design certification (or
amendment) to supply the design for the applicant's use. Paragraph A.4
requires that a COL applicant referencing Appendix D to 10 CFR Part 52
include, as part of its application, a demonstration that an entity
other than Westinghouse is qualified to supply the AP1000 certified
design unless Westinghouse supplies the design for the applicant's use.
In cases where a COL applicant is not using Westinghouse to supply the
AP1000 certified design, this information is necessary to support any
NRC finding under 10 CFR 52.73(a) that the entity is qualified to
supply the certified design.
3. Applicable Regulations (Section V)
The purpose of Section V is to specify the regulations applicable
and in effect when the design certification is approved (i.e., as of
the date specified in paragraph A, which is the date of publication of
this rule in the Federal Register). The NRC is redesignating paragraph
A as paragraph A.1 to indicate that this paragraph applies to that
portion of the design that was certified under the initial design
certification. The NRC is further adding a new paragraph A.2, similar
to paragraph A.1, to indicate the regulations that would apply to that
portion of the design within the scope of this amendment, as approved
by the Commission and signed by the Secretary of the Commission.
4. Issue Resolution (Section VI)
The purpose of Section VI is to identify the scope of issues that
were resolved by the Commission in the original certification
rulemaking and, therefore, are ``matters resolved'' within the meaning
and intent of 10 CFR 52.63(a)(5).
Paragraph B presents the scope of issues that may not be challenged
as a matter of right in subsequent proceedings and describes the
categories of information for which there is issue resolution.
Paragraph B.1 provides that all nuclear safety issues arising from the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (the Act), as amended, that are associated
with the information in the NRC's FSER related to certification of the
AP1000 standard design (ADAMS Accession No. ML112061231) and the Tier 1
and Tier 2 information and the rulemaking record for Appendix D to 10
CFR part 52, are resolved within the meaning of 10 CFR 52.63(a)(5).
These issues include the information referenced in the DCD that are
requirements (i.e., ``secondary references''), as well as all issues
arising from PI and SGI, which are intended to be requirements.
Paragraph B.2 provides for issue preclusion of PI and SGI.
The NRC revised paragraph B.1 to extend issue resolution to the
information contained in the NRC's FSER (Supplement No. 2), Appendix 1B
of Revision 19 of the generic DCD, and the rulemaking record for this
amendment. In addition, the NRC revised paragraph B.2 to extend issue
[[Page 82089]]
resolution to the broader category of SUNSI, including PI, referenced
in the generic DCD.
The NRC also revised paragraph B.7, which identifies as resolved
all environmental issues concerning severe accident mitigation design
alternatives (SAMDAs) arising under the National Environmental Policy
Act of 1969 (NEPA) associated with the information in the NRC's final
EA for the AP1000 design and Appendix 1B of the generic DCD (Revision
15) for plants referencing Appendix D to 10 CFR part 52 whose site
parameters are within those specified in the SAMDA evaluation. The NRC
revised this paragraph to identify all resolved environmental issues
concerning SAMDA associated with the information in the NRC's final EA
for this amendment and Appendix 1B of Revision 19 of the generic DCD
for plants referencing Appendix D to 10 CFR part 52 whose site
parameters are within those specified in the SAMDA evaluation.
Finally, the NRC is revising paragraph E, which provides the
procedure for an interested member of the public to obtain access to
SUNSI (including PI) and SGI for the AP1000 design in order to request
and participate in proceedings, as identified in paragraph B, involving
licenses and applications that reference Appendix D to 10 CFR part 52.
The NRC is replacing the current information in this paragraph with a
statement that the NRC will specify at an appropriate time the
procedure for interested persons to review SGI or SUNSI (including PI)
for the purpose of participating in the hearing required by 10 CFR
52.85, the hearing provided under 10 CFR 52.103, or in any other
proceeding relating to Appendix D to 10 CFR part 52 in which interested
persons have a right to request an adjudicatory hearing. The NRC will
follow its current practice of establishing the procedures by order
when the notice of hearing is published in the Federal Register (e.g.,
Florida Power and Light Co., Combined License Application for the
Turkey Point Units 6 and 7, Notice of Hearing, Opportunity To Petition
for Leave To Intervene and Associated Order Imposing Procedures for
Access to Sensitive Unclassified Non-Safeguards Information and
Safeguards Information for Contention Preparation (75 FR 34777; June
18, 2010); Notice of Receipt of Application for License; Notice of
Consideration of Issuance of License; Notice of Hearing and Commission
Order and Order Imposing Procedures for Access to Sensitive
Unclassified Non-Safeguards Information and Safeguards Information for
Contention Preparation; In the Matter of AREVA Enrichment Services, LLC
(Eagle Rock Enrichment Facility) (74 FR 38052; July 30, 2009)).
In the four currently approved design certifications (10 CFR part
52, Appendices A through D), paragraph E presents specific directions
on how to obtain access to PI and SGI on the design certification in
connection with a license application proceeding referencing that DCR.
The NRC is changing this because these provisions were developed before
the terrorist events of September 11, 2001. After September 11, 2001,
Congress changed the statutory requirements governing access to SGI,
and the NRC revised its rules, procedures, and practices governing
control and access to SUNSI and SGI. The NRC now believes that generic
direction on obtaining access to SUNSI and SGI is no longer appropriate
for newly approved DCRs. Accordingly, the specific requirements
governing access to SUNSI and SGI contained in paragraph E of the four
currently approved DCRs will not be included in the DCR for the AP1000.
Instead, the NRC will specify the procedures to be used for obtaining
access at an appropriate time in the COL proceeding referencing the
AP1000 DCR. The NRC will include the new rule language in any future
amendments or renewals of the currently existing DCRs, as well as in
new (i.e., initial) DCRs. However, the NRC will not initiate rulemaking
to change paragraph E of the existing DCRs, in an effort to minimize
unnecessary resource expenditures by both the original DCR applicant
and the NRC.
5. Processes for Changes and Departures (Section VIII)
The purpose of Section VIII of this appendix is to set forth the
processes for generic changes to, or plant-specific departures
(including exemptions) from, the DCD. The Commission adopted this
restrictive change process in order to achieve a more stable licensing
process for applicants and licensees that reference this DCR. The
change processes for the three different categories of Tier 2
information, namely, Tier 2, Tier 2*, and Tier 2* with a time of
expiration, are presented in paragraph B.
Departures from Tier 2 that a licensee may make without prior NRC
approval are addressed under paragraph B.5 (similar to the process in
10 CFR 50.59). The NRC is modifying Section VIII to address the change
control process specific to departures from the information required by
10 CFR 52.47(a)(28) to address the NRC's AIA requirements in 10 CFR
50.150. Specifically, the NRC revised paragraph B.5.b to indicate that
the criteria in this paragraph for determining if a proposed departure
from Tier 2 requires a license amendment do not apply to a proposed
departure affecting information required by 10 CFR 52.47(a)(28) to
address 10 CFR 50.150. In addition, the NRC redesignated paragraphs
B.5.d, B.5.e, and B.5.f as paragraphs B.5.e, B.5.f, and B.5.g,
respectively, and added a new paragraph B.5.d. Paragraph B.5.d requires
an applicant or licensee who proposed to depart from the information
required by 10 CFR 52.47(a)(28) included in the final safety analysis
report (FSAR) for the standard design certification to consider the
effect of the changed feature or capability on the original assessment
required by 10 CFR 50.150(a). The FSAR information required by the AIA
rule, which is subject to this change control requirement, includes the
descriptions of the design features and functional capabilities
incorporated into the final design of the nuclear power facility and
the description of how the identified design features and functional
capabilities meet the assessment requirements in 10 CFR 50.150(a)(1).
The objective of the change controls is to determine whether the design
of the facility, as changed or modified, is shown to withstand the
effects of the aircraft impact with reduced use of operator actions. In
other words, the applicant or licensee must continue to show, with the
modified design, that the acceptance criteria in 10 CFR 50.150(a)(1)
are met with reduced use of operator actions. The AIA rule does not
require an applicant or a licensee implementing a design change to redo
the complete AIA to evaluate the effects of the change. The NRC
believes it may be possible to demonstrate that a design change is
bounded by the original design or that the change provides an
equivalent level of protection, without redoing the original
assessment.
Consistent with the NRC's intent when it issued the AIA rule, under
this section, plant-specific departures from the AIA information in the
FSAR would not require a license amendment, but may be made by the
licensee upon compliance with the substantive requirements of the AIA
rule (i.e., the AIA rule acceptance criteria). The applicant or
licensee is required to document, in the plant-specific departure, how
the modified design features and functional capabilities continue to
meet the assessment requirements in 10 CFR 50.150(a)(1), in accordance
with Section X of Appendix D to 10 CFR part 52. Applicants and
[[Page 82090]]
licensees making changes to design features or capabilities included in
the certified design may also need to develop alternate means to cope
with the loss of large areas of the plant from explosions or fires to
comply with the requirements in 10 CFR 50.54(hh). The addition of these
provisions to Appendix D to 10 CFR part 52 is consistent with the NRC's
intent when it issued the AIA rule in 2009, as noted in the SOC for
that rule (74 FR 28112; June 12, 2009).
Paragraph B.6 of Appendix D to 10 CFR Part 52 provides a process
for departing from Tier 2* information. The creation of, and
restrictions on changing, Tier 2* information resulted from the
development of the Tier 1 information for the ABWR design certification
(Appendix A to 10 CFR part 52) and the ABB-CE [ASEA Brown Boveri--
Combustion Engineering] System 80+ design certification (Appendix B to
10 CFR part 52). During this development process, these applicants
requested that the amount of information in Tier 1 be minimized to
provide additional flexibility for an applicant or licensee who
references these appendices. Also, many codes, standards, and design
processes that would not be specified in Tier 1, but were acceptable
for meeting ITAAC, were specified in Tier 2. The result of these
actions was that certain significant information only exists in Tier 2
and the Commission did not want this significant information to be
changed without prior NRC approval. This Tier 2* information was
identified in the generic DCD with italicized text and brackets (see
Table 1-1 of the AP1000 DCD Introduction for a list of the Tier 2*
items). Although the Tier 2* designation was originally intended to
last for the lifetime of the facility, like Tier 1 information, the NRC
determined that some of the Tier 2* information could expire when the
plant first achieves full power (100 percent), after the finding
required by 10 CFR 52.103(g), while other Tier 2* information must
remain in effect throughout the life of the facility. The factors
determining whether Tier 2* information could expire after the first
full power was achieved were whether the Tier 1 information would
govern these areas after first full power and the NRC's determination
that prior approval was required before implementation of the change
due to the significance of the information. Therefore, certain Tier 2*
information listed in paragraph B.6.c would cease to retain its Tier 2*
designation after full power operation is first achieved following the
NRC finding under 10 CFR 52.103(g). Thereafter, that information would
be deemed to be Tier 2 information that would be subject to the
departure requirements in paragraph B.5. By contrast, the Tier 2*
information identified in paragraph B.6.b would retain its Tier 2*
designation throughout the duration of the license, including any
period of license renewal.
The NRC is revising certain items designated as Tier 2*. As
discussed in the proposed rule, the Commission is adding an item to
Section VIII.B.6.b for reactor coolant pump type. In addition, a new
item was added to paragraph B.5.b for RCP type. The NRC determined that
certain specific characteristics of the RCP were significant to the
safety review and that prior approval of changes affecting those
characteristics would be required. This Tier 2* designation does not
expire.
In the final rule, two additional items are being added to Section
VIII.B.6.b. First, in its December 20, 2010, letter on long-term core
cooling, the ACRS concluded that the regulatory requirements for long-
term core cooling for designbasis accidents have been adequately met,
based on cleanliness requirements specified in the amendment. In
particular, the amount of latent debris that might be present in the
containment is an important parameter. The ACRS further stated that any
future proposed relaxation of the cleanliness requirements will require
substantial additional data and analysis. In their January 24, 2011,
report on the Vogtle COL application, which references the AP1000
design, the ACRS recommended that the containment interior cleanliness
limits on latent debris should be included in the TSs. In a letter
dated February 23, 2011, Westinghouse proposed DCD markups to designate
information in Section 6.3 including debris sources such as latent
debris (and the amount of fiber) as Tier 2*. The NRC believes this is a
better approach to achieving the intent of the ACRS for regulatory
control of any future relaxations of the limits and would thus require
prior NRC approval, as discussed in the staff's March 3, 2011, response
to the ACRS. Revision 19 includes DCD changes to mark selected
information as Tier 2*. No changes to the content itself were made. The
NRC made a conforming change to the final rule language to provide a
new item as Section VIII.B.6.b(7), entitled ``Screen design criteria,''
for this new type of Tier 2* information.
The second change, which was also discussed in the December 13,
2010, ACRS letter report on the DC amendment, concerned an error ACRS
identified in the previously certified Revision 15, concerning the
containment cooling analysis. The error affected the time at which
steady-state film coverage is achieved on the exterior of the
containment vessel. In the corrected analysis, the calculated peak
containment pressure for a LOCA increases somewhat, but remains below
the design pressure. In the course of reviewing the correction of the
error for the peak containment pressure, after the proposed rule was
published, Westinghouse identified other errors in supporting analyses
that affect the calculated post-accident peak containment pressure. The
net impact is an increase in calculated peak containment pressure in
the event of a large break LOCA (the highest peak pressure) of about
0.3 psi. As part of the revised analysis for all of the changes,
Westinghouse relied upon a limited number of structural elements within
the containment as heat sinks for the peak pressure analysis in order
to maintain margin to the design limit. The NRC's safety evaluation is
included in the FSER. Table 6.2.1.1-10 of Revision 19 of the DCD
includes the credited elements. The final rule language designates this
``heat sink data for containment analysis'' by adding it as new Tier 2*
in Section VIII.B.6.b(8). Because the geometry and location of the heat
sinks could impact their effectiveness, the staff decided to control
any future changes to the credited elements by designating the material
as Tier 2*.
As discussed in the proposed rule, the NRC is clarifying some of
the Tier 2* designations for structural requirements, with respect to
Tier 2* information that expires at first full power operation. The
item on human factors engineering (HFE) moved from paragraph B.5.b to
paragraph B.5.c, with the effect that the Tier 2* designation on that
information expires after full power operation is achieved rather than
never expiring. In the final rule, an additional item (paragraph
B.6.c(16)) is added to provide Tier 2* designation for certain details
about the steel composite modules (as identified within the DCD); the
designation expires at first full power operation. The NRC concludes
that the details are the key elements of this unique design, and
therefore warrant Tier 2* regulatory control.
The NRC also concluded that the Tier 2* designation is not
necessary for the specific Code edition and addenda for the American
Society of Mechanical Engineers Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (ASME
Code), as listed in item VIII.B.6.c(2). At the time of the initial
certification, the NRC determined that this information should be Tier
2*.
[[Page 82091]]
Subsequently, 10 CFR Part 50 was modified to include provisions in 10
CFR 50.55a(b)(1)(iii) to provide restrictions in the use of certain
editions/addenda to the ASME Code, Section III, that the NRC found
unacceptable. In addition, 10 CFR 50.55a(c)(3), (d)(2) and (e)(2), for
reactor coolant pressure boundary, Quality Group B Components, and
Quality Group C Components, respectively, provide regulatory controls
on the use of later edition/addenda to the ASME Code, Section III,
through the conditions NRC established on use of paragraph NCA-1140 of
the Code. As a result, these rule requirements adequately control the
ability of a licensee to use a later edition of the ASME Code and
addenda such that Tier 2* designation is not necessary. Thus, the Tier
2* item in paragraph B.6.c(2) for ASME Code was modified to be limited
to ASME Code piping design restrictions as identified in Section
5.2.1.1 of the AP1000 DCD and to include certain Code cases, including
Code Case N-284-1, as discussed in Section 3.8.2.2 and other Code cases
as designated in Table 5.2-3 of the DCD (Code Case N-284-1 is the only
case currently specified in Appendix D to 10 CFR Part 52). The NRC
retained the Tier 2* designation for applying ASME Code, Section III,
Subsection NE to containment design, by moving this provision to the
end of Section VIII.B.6.c(14). Section 3.8.2.2 of the DCD identifies
the specific edition and addenda for containment design (2001 Edition
of ASME Code, Section III, including 2002 Addenda) with the Tier 2*
markings.
6. Records and Reporting (Section X)
The purpose of Section X is to set forth the requirements that
apply to maintaining records of changes to and departures from the
generic DCD, which would be reflected in the plant-specific DCD.
Section X also sets forth the requirements for submitting reports
(including updates to the plant-specific DCD) to the NRC. Paragraph A.1
requires that a generic DCD and the PI and SGI referenced in the
generic DCD be maintained by the applicant for this rule. The NRC
revised paragraph A.1 to replace the term ``proprietary information,''
or PI, with the broader term ``sensitive unclassified non-safeguards
information,'' or SUNSI. Information categorized as SUNSI is
information that is generally not publicly available and encompasses a
wide variety of categories. These categories include information about
a licensee's or applicant's physical protection or material control and
accounting program for special nuclear material not otherwise
designated as SGI or classified as National Security Information or
Restricted Data (security-related information), which is required by 10
CFR 2.390 to be protected in the same manner as commercial or financial
information (i.e., they are exempt from public disclosure). This change
is necessary because the NRC is approving PI and security-related
information. This change also ensures that Westinghouse (as well as any
future applicants for amendments to the AP1000 DCR who intend to supply
the certified design) are required to maintain a copy of the applicable
generic DCD, and maintain the applicable SUNSI (including PI) and SGI--
developed by that applicant--that were approved as part of the relevant
design certification rulemakings.
The NRC notes that the generic DCD concept was developed, in part,
to meet OFR requirements for incorporation by reference, including
public availability of documents incorporated by reference. However,
the PI and SGI were not included in the public version of the DCD. Only
the public version of the generic DCD is identified and incorporated by
reference into this rule. Nonetheless, the SUNSI for this amendment was
reviewed by the NRC and, as stated in paragraph B.2, the NRC considers
the information to be resolved within the meaning of 10 CFR
52.63(a)(5). Because this information is in the nonpublic version of
the DCD, this SUNSI (including PI) and SGI, or its equivalent, is
required to be provided by an applicant for a license referencing this
DCR.
In addition, the NRC is adding a new paragraph A.4.a that requires
the applicant for the AP1000 design to maintain a copy of the AIA
performed to comply with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.150(a) for the
term of the certification (including any period of renewal). The NRC
added a new paragraph A.4.b that requires an applicant or licensee who
references this appendix to maintain a copy of the AIA performed to
comply with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.150(a) throughout the
pendency of the application and for the term of the license (including
any period of renewal). The addition of paragraphs A.4.a and A.4.b is
consistent with the NRC's intent when it issued the AIA rule in 2009
(74 FR 28112; June 12, 2009).
C. Immediate Effectiveness of Final Rule; Provision of Actual Notice to
Southern Nuclear Operating Company
The NRC is making this final rule immediately effective, and is
also providing notice of this final rule (including the NRC-approved
DCD, Revision 19) to Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNOC). Under a
provision of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 553(d),
there ordinarily must be a 30-day waiting period before a new rule is
effective, subject to certain exceptions, including ``good cause:''
The required publication or service of a substantive rule shall
be made not less than 30 days before its effective date, except: (1)
A substantive rule which grants or recognizes an exemption or
relieves a restriction; (2) interpretive rules and statements of
policy; or (3) as otherwise provided by the agency for good cause
found and published with the rule.
Consistent with the APA, 10 CFR 2.807 provides that the NRC may make a
rule effective in less than 30 days after publication in the Federal
Register upon making the good cause finding as noted in the third
exception listed in 5 U.S.C. 553(d). For the following reasons, the NRC
has determined that good cause exists for making this design
certification rulemaking immediately effective.
Good cause can be demonstrated by any number of circumstances. Here
the circumstances demonstrate that the basis for the 30-day waiting
period--to allow those regulated by a new rule time to conform their
activities to it--is absent. Several sources of guidance on Section
553(d) support the NRC's good cause finding for this rulemaking.
Specifically, in the legislative history of the 30-day provision,
the final report of the House Committee on the Judiciary offered the
following explanation of the ``good cause'' exception in 5 U.S.C.
553(d)(3):
[The purpose of the 30-day delay is to] afford persons affected
a reasonable time to prepare for the effective date of a rule or
rules or to take any other action which the issuance of rules may
prompt * * *. Many rules * * * may be made operative in less than 30
days * * * because the parties subject to them may during the
usually protracted hearing and decision procedures anticipate the
regulation. (Senate Document (S. Doc. No.) 79-249, Administrative
Procedure Act: Legislative History 259-60 (1946))
Additional guidance is found in the Attorney General's Manual on the
APA, which provides:
The requirement of publication not less than thirty days prior
to the effective date may be shortened by an agency `upon good
[[Page 82092]]
cause found and published with the rule'. This discretionary
exception was provided primarily to take care of the cases in which
the public interest requires the agency to act immediately or within
a period less than thirty days. Senate Hearings (1941) pp. 70, 441,
588, 650, 812, 1506. Where the persons concerned request that a rule
be made effective within a shorter period, this circumstance would
ordinarily constitute good cause. Also, it is clear from the
legislative history that for good cause an agency may put a
substantive rule into effect immediately; in such event, the
requirement of prior publication is altogether absent, and the rule
will become effective upon issuance as to persons with actual
notice, and as to others upon filing with the Division of the
Federal Register in accordance with section 7 of the Federal
Register Act. Senate Hearings (1941) pp. 594, 599, 1340, 1455. (U.S.
Department of Justice, Attorney General's Manual on the
Administrative Procedure Act 37 (1947) (emphasis added))
In light of this background, the NRC believes that there is good cause
for making this final rule amending the AP1000 DCR immediately
effective.
On May 27, 2011, one of the first COL applicants to which this
amended AP1000 DCR would potentially apply, SNOC, submitted a ``white
paper'' that set forth alternatives to making the final AP1000 rule
effective 30 days after publication (ADAMS Accession No. ML11152A189).
Thereafter, SNOC submitted a July 20, 2011, letter (ADAMS Accession No.
ML11210B421), indicating that making the certified design rule
immediately effective would serve important policy objectives.\2\
SNOC's letter thus requested Commission action. During the Vogtle
uncontested, or ``mandatory,'' hearing held by the Commission on SNOC's
applications for a COL and a limited work authorization (LWA), SNOC
reiterated its request that the NRC issue the COL and LWA immediately
upon Commission affirmation of the final rule amending the AP1000 DCR.
Transcript of Vogtle COL Mandatory Hearing at 22-23, 350 (September 27,
2011; ADAMS Accession No. ML11305A228).
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\2\ The letter by SNOC, requesting that the final rule amending
the AP1000 DCR be made effective before 30 days after Federal
Register publication, was filed on the docket for the Vogtle
Electric Generating Plant, Units 3 and 4 (Docket Nos. 52-025-COL and
52-026-COL) (Vogtle). SNOC's request is more appropriately addressed
in this rulemaking proceeding to amend the AP1000 DCR.
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Here, SNOC, which is likely to use (and be bound by) the AP1000 DCR
in the short-term if the Commission otherwise authorizes issuance of
the COL, wishes the rule be made immediately effective. Given SNOC's
longstanding awareness of and participation in the AP1000 rulemaking,
it does not need the 30-day waiting period to come into compliance with
the final rule. Under the Attorney General's Manual, supra, at 37,
SNOC's request that the rule be made effective in a shorter time period
constitutes good cause to waive the 30-day waiting period. As noted
previously, the extensive process for consideration of this design
certification rulemaking would clearly constitute a situation where
``the parties subject to [the regulation] may during the usually
protracted hearing and decision procedures anticipate the regulation.''
S. Doc. No. 79-249, Administrative Procedure Act: Legislative History
259-60 (1946). In fact, that ``anticipation'' is clearly manifested in
SNOC's use of the design certification rulemaking, as well as use by
other applicants for COLs referencing the AP1000 DCR, which would occur
only after the completion of a public process that includes NRC
adjudicatory processes for each COL application. The determination of
good cause regarding the effective date of the final AP1000 rule is
separate from, and does not prejudge, the licensing determinations that
are otherwise required in the COL proceedings.
Finally, the NRC is providing actual service of the final AP1000
rule (including the NRC-approved DCD, Revision 19) to SNOC concurrently
with the NRC's transmission of the final rule to the OFR for
publication.\3\ Thus, either before, or simultaneous with, any issuance
of a COL for Vogtle (and any other COL application referencing the
AP1000, upon request), SNOC (and any other COL applicant referencing
the AP1000, upon request) will have actual notice of the requirements
of the final AP1000 rule and Revision 19 of the DCD for which their
NRC-licensed activities under the COL must conform.
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\3\ The NRC would also provide actual notice of the final AP1000
rule to any other COL applicant upon request. On the date of the
transmission of the final rule package to the OFR, the NRC will
issue an announcement of its transmission and make the final rule
package as transmitted to the OFR available on the NRC Web site.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The immediately effective rule cannot be used by anyone until the
agency has made the necessary health and safety findings and completed
the environmental review processes that necessarily precede the
issuance of a COL relying on the design certification rulemaking. Each
finding necessary under the Atomic Energy Act would have been made
through public rulemaking and the NRC's adjudicatory processes that
serve to allow consideration of public input before the agency issues
its determination on an application referencing the AP1000. The rule
itself does not force anyone to take action immediately based on its
effective date because it does not compel, but rather permits, action.
Therefore, from the standpoint of regulatory efficiency, delaying
issuance of a licensing decision when the decision is ready to be
issued is not in the public interest, whether the decision is to deny
or grant the requested license.
On October 14, 2011, counsel for several organizations who were
previously admitted as Joint Intervenors in the contested portion of
the Vogtle COL proceeding indicated that they would be adversely
affected by the issuance of an immediately effective rule. Letter from
Mindy Goldstein, Counsel for Southern Alliance for Clean Energy,
Georgia Women's Action for New Directions, and Center for a Sustainable
Coast (Goldstein Letter) (ADAMS Accession No. ML11287A054).\4\ The
Goldstein Letter states that SNOC has requested a waiver of 10 CFR
2.807 during the uncontested hearing, which the letter states is an
improper forum, and that waiver of 10 CFR 2.807 would not afford them
time to prepare for issuance of the Vogtle COL or LWA. The Goldstein
Letter states that a waiver of 10 CFR 2.807 is required to be submitted
under 10 CFR 2.335. The Goldstein Letter explains that when the DCR
becomes effective, a COL and LWA will be issued, resulting in a nuclear
power plant that will affect all persons located near the site. The
Vogtle Joint Intervenors believe the 30-day effective period is
necessary to determine whether they wish to appeal the rule and seek a
stay of construction.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Because the Goldstein Letter was submitted in response to
SNOC's request, which is being considered in this AP1000 design
certification rulemaking, the NRC is, in its discretion, considering
the Goldstein Letter here as well. Therefore, the NRC need not
address the matters raised in the Goldstein Letter with respect to
SNOC's compliance with the adjudicatory requirements in 10 CFR
2.335.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
First, a waiver of 10 CFR 2.807 is not required to make a rule
immediately effective; a rule can be made immediately effective
pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 2.807. The Commission in this
rulemaking has determined to use the good cause exception to the 30-day
effective date for the rulemaking and thus, is acting consistently with
the provisions of 10 CFR 2.807 rather than waiving its provisions.
Second, as noted previously in the discussion of the legislative
history of the 30-day effective date provision, the primary purpose of
the 30-day requirement is to allow affected persons time to comply with
the new rule. The final rule amending the AP1000 design
[[Page 82093]]
certification is focused on the conduct of regulatory activities
licensed by the NRC. But, the Vogtle Joint Intervenors are neither
current NRC licensees who must comply with the final rule amending the
AP1000 rule, nor applicants for NRC licenses referencing the final
AP1000 rule. Thus, the final AP1000 rule imposes no substantive legal
obligations on them. The NRC does not believe that the Goldstein Letter
describes any legally-cognizable harm within the scope of protection
afforded to third parties by the APA's 30-day waiting period provision.
That an immediately effective AP1000 rule may facilitate issuance of a
COL for the Vogtle plant does not appear to adversely affect the rights
or capability of any public stakeholder to do what they would otherwise
do if the AP1000 rule were made effective 30 days after publication in
the Federal Register. Whether the AP1000 rule is immediately effective
or not does not change any public stakeholder's legal rights or
options; it merely affects the timing of asserting such rights or
exercising those options.
Further, the Commission is not aware of any regulatory history
indicating that the purpose of the 30-day effective date is tied to or
affects appeal rights. Regardless of the immediate effectiveness of the
rule, the Vogtle Joint Intervenors may seek legal action on the
immediately effective rule in Federal court, or they may file an
appropriate motion in the Vogtle COL proceeding if they satisfy the
requirements in 10 CFR Part 2 to reopen the record and submit late-
filed contentions. See 10 CFR 2.309, 2.326. Thus, an immediately
effective AP1000 rule does not foreclose, or render moot, challenges to
the rule, including stay remedies. For these reasons, the NRC concludes
that making the final AP1000 rule immediately effective would not
adversely affect these organizations or any other public stakeholders.
In sum, the NRC finds good cause for making the final rule amending
the AP1000 DCR immediately effective upon publication in the Federal
Register. Therefore, the NRC is making the final rule immediately
effective. In addition, there is sufficient reason to provide prompt
actual notice of this final rule (including the NRC-approved DCD,
Revision 19) to SNOC (and potentially to any other combined license
applicant referencing the amended AP1000 DCR in its application).
IV. Section-by-Section Analysis
The following discussion sets forth each amendment to the AP1000
DCR being made in this final rule. All section and paragraph references
are to the provisions in the amendment to Appendix D to 10 CFR part 52,
unless otherwise noted.
A. Scope and Contents (Section III)
The NRC is amending Section III, Scope and Contents, to revise
paragraph A to update the revision number of the DCD, from Revision 15
to Revision 19, approved for incorporation by reference by the Office
of the Federal Register; update the contact information of the
Westinghouse representative to be contacted should a member of the
public request a copy of the generic DCD; and update other locations
(e.g., the NRC's PDR) where a member of the public could request a copy
of or otherwise view the generic DCD.
The NRC is revising paragraph D to establish the generic DCD as the
controlling document in the event of an inconsistency between the DCD
and either the application or the FSER for the certified standard
design. This clarification further distinguishes between the conflict
scenarios presented in paragraphs D.1 (for the initial certification of
the design) and D.2 (for Amendment 1 to the design).
B. Additional Requirements and Restrictions (Section IV)
The NRC is amending Section IV, Additional Requirements and
Restrictions, to set forth additional requirements and restrictions
imposed upon an applicant who references Appendix D to 10 CFR part 52.
Paragraph A sets forth the information requirements for these
applicants. The NRC is revising paragraph A.3 to replace the term
``proprietary information'' with the broader term ``sensitive
unclassified non-safeguards information.''
The NRC is also adding a new paragraph A.4 to indicate requirements
that must be met in cases where the COL applicant is not using the
entity that was the original applicant for the design certification (or
amendment) to supply the design for the applicant's use.
C. Applicable Regulations (Section V)
The NRC is revising paragraph A to distinguish between the
regulations that were applicable and in effect at the time the initial
design certification was approved (paragraph A.1) and the regulations
that are applicable and in effect as of the effective date of the final
rule (paragraph A.2).
D. Issue Resolution (Section VI)
The NRC is amending Section VI, Issue Resolution, by revising
paragraph B.1 to provide that all nuclear safety issues arising from
the Act that are associated with the information in the NRC's FSER
(NUREG-1793), the Tier 1 and Tier 2 information (including the
availability controls in Section 16.3 of the generic DCD), and the
rulemaking record for Appendix D to 10 CFR Part 52 are resolved within
the meaning of 10 CFR 52.63(a)(5). These issues include the information
referenced in the DCD that are requirements (i.e., secondary
references), as well as all issues arising from SUNSI (including PI)
and SGI, which are intended to be requirements. This paragraph is
revised to extend issue resolution beyond that of the previously
certified design to also include the information in Supplement No. 2 of
the 2011 FSER (Supplement 1 supported the initial certification) and
the rulemaking record associated with Amendment 1 to the AP1000 design.
The NRC is revising paragraph B.2 to replace the term ``proprietary
information'' with the broader term ``sensitive unclassified non-
safeguards information.''
Paragraph B.7 is revised to extend environmental issue resolution
beyond that of the previously certified design to also include the
information in Amendment 1 to the AP1000 design and Appendix 1B of
Revision 19 of the generic DCD.
A new paragraph E is added to allow the NRC to specify at the
appropriate time the procedures for interested persons to obtain access
to PI, SUNSI, and SGI for the AP1000 DCR. Access to such information is
for the sole purpose of requesting or participating in certain
specified hearings, such as (1) the hearing required by 10 CFR 52.85
where the underlying application references Appendix D to 10 CFR Part
52; (2) any hearing provided under 10 CFR 52.103 where the underlying
COL references Appendix D to 10 CFR part 52; and (3) any other hearing
relating to Appendix D to 10 CFR Part 52 in which interested persons
have the right to request an adjudicatory hearing.
E. Processes for Changes and Departures (Section VIII)
The NRC is revising Section VIII to address the change control
process specific to departures from the information required by 10 CFR
52.47(a)(28) to address the NRC's AIA requirements in 10 CFR 50.150.
Specifically, the NRC is revising the introductory text of paragraph
B.5.b to indicate that the criteria in this paragraph for determining
if a proposed departure from Tier 2 requires a license amendment do not
apply to a proposed departure affecting information required
[[Page 82094]]
by 10 CFR 52.47(a)(28) to address aircraft impacts.
In addition, the NRC is redesignating paragraphs B.5.d, B.5.e, and
B.5.f as paragraphs B.5.e, B.5.f, and B.5.g, respectively, and adding a
new paragraph B.5.d. Paragraph B.5.d requires an applicant referencing
the AP1000 DCR, who proposes to depart from the information required by
10 CFR 52.47(a)(28) to be included in the FSAR for the standard design
certification, to consider the effect of the changed feature or
capability on the original 10 CFR 50.150(a) assessment.
The NRC is revising certain items designated as Tier 2*. As
discussed in the proposed rule, the NRC is adding an item to Section
VIII.B.6.b for RCP type. In addition, a new item is added to paragraph
B.5.b for RCP type. The NRC determined that certain specific
characteristics of the RCP were significant to the safety review and
that prior approval of changes affecting those characteristics would be
required. This Tier 2* designation does not expire.
In the final rule, two additional items are added to Section
VIII.B.6.b. Section VIII.B.6.b(7) provides Tier 2* designation for
certain analysis assumptions related to latent debris and the effects
on screens and fuel assemblies in post-LOCA conditions where debris is
transported to the recirculation sump and into the in-containment
refueling water storage tank. Finally, new paragraph VIII.B.6.b(8) is
added to include the containment heat sinks credited in the peak
pressure analysis. The Tier 2* designation for the requirements in this
section of the rule does not expire.
As discussed in the proposed rule, the NRC is clarifying some of
the Tier 2* designations for structural requirements, with respect to
Tier 2* information that expires at first full power operation. The
item on HFE moved from paragraph B.5.b to paragraph B.5.c, with the
effect that the Tier 2* designation on that information expires after
full power operation is achieved rather than never expiring. In the
final rule, an additional item (paragraph B.6.c(16)) is added to
provide Tier 2* designation for certain details about the steel
composite modules (as identified within the DCD); the designation
expires at first full power operation.
Finally, the NRC also concluded that the Tier 2* designation was
not necessary for the specific Code edition and addenda for the ASME
Code as listed in paragraph VIII.B.6.c(2). Thus, the item in paragraph
VIII.B.6.c(2) for ASME Code was modified to be limited to piping and
welding restrictions identified in Section 5.2.1.1, and to include
certain Code cases, N-284-1 is discussed in Section 3.8.2.2 and other
code cases designated as Tier 2* are listed in Table 5.2-3. The NRC
retained the Tier 2* designation for applying ASME Code Section III to
containment design, by moving this provision to the end of Section
VIII.B.6.c(14). Section 3.8.2.2 identifies the specific edition and
addenda for containment design (2001 Edition of ASME Code, Section III,
including 2002 Addenda).
F. Records and Reporting (Section X)
The NRC is amending Section X, Records and Reporting, to revise
paragraph A.1 to replace the term ``proprietary information'' with the
broader term ``sensitive unclassified non-safeguards information.''
Paragraph A.1 is revised to require the design certification amendment
applicant to maintain the SUNSI, which it developed and used to support
its design certification amendment application. This would ensure that
the referencing applicant has direct access to this information from
the design certification amendment applicant, if it has contracted with
the applicant to provide the SUNSI to support its license application.
The AP1000 generic DCD and the NRC-approved version of the SUNSI would
be required to be maintained for the period that Appendix D to 10 CFR
part 52 may be referenced.
The NRC is also adding a new paragraph A.4.a, which requires
Westinghouse to maintain a copy of the AIA performed to comply with the
requirements of 10 CFR 50.150(a) for the term of the certification
(including any period of renewal). This provision, which is consistent
with 10 CFR 50.150(c)(3), would facilitate any NRC inspections of the
assessment that the NRC decides to conduct.
Similarly, the NRC is adding a new paragraph A.4.b, which requires
an applicant or licensee who references Appendix D to 10 CFR Part 52 to
maintain a copy of the AIA performed to comply with the requirements of
10 CFR 50.150(a) throughout the pendency of the application and for the
term of the license (including any period of renewal).
V. Agreement State Compatibility
Under the ``Policy Statement on Adequacy and Compatibility of
Agreement States Programs,'' approved by the Commission on June 20,
1997, and published in the Federal Register (62 FR 46517; September 3,
1997), this rule is classified as compatibility ``NRC.'' Compatibility
is not required for Category ``NRC'' regulations. The NRC program
elements in this category are those that relate directly to areas of
regulation reserved to the NRC by the Act or the provisions of this
section. Although an Agreement State may not adopt program elements
reserved to the NRC, it may wish to inform its licensees of certain
requirements by a mechanism that is consistent with the particular
State's administrative procedure laws. Category ``NRC'' regulations do
not confer regulatory authority on the State.
VI. Availability of Documents
The NRC is making the documents identified below available to
interested persons through one or more of the following methods, as
indicated. To access documents related to this action, see the
ADDRESSES section of this document.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Document PDR Web ADAMS
------------------------------------------------------------------------
SECY-11-0145, ``Final Rule--AP1000 X X ML112380823
Design Certification Amendment''.......
AP1000 Final Rule Environmental X X ML113480019
Assessment.............................
AP1000 Final Rule Public Comment X X ML113480018
Response Document......................
SECY-11-0002, ``Proposed Rule--AP1000 X X ML103000397
Design Certification Amendment''.......
AP1000 Proposed Rule Federal Register X X ML103000412
Notice.................................
AP1000 Proposed Rule Environmental X X ML103000415
Assessment.............................
NUREG-1793, Supplement 2 to Final Safety X X ML112061231
Evaluation Report for Revision 19 to
the AP1000 Standard Design
Certification (publicly available).....
NUREG-1793, Final Safety Evaluation X X ML043570339
Report Related to Certification of the
AP1000 Standard Design, September 2004.
NUREG-1793, Supplement 1 to Final Safety X X ML053410203
Evaluation Report Related to
Certification of the AP1000 Standard
Design.................................
[[Page 82095]]
Emergency Petition to Suspend All X X ML111040355
Pending Reactor Licensing Decisions and ML111110862
Related Rulemaking Decisions Pending
Investigation of Lessons Learned From
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station
Accident, April 14-18, 2011............
AP1000 Design Control Document (DCD), X X ML11171A315
Revision 19, Transmittal Letter........
AP1000 DCD, Revision 19 (Public Version) X X ML11171A500
Redacted Version of Dissenting View on X X ML103370648
AP1000 Shield Building Safety
Evaluation Report With Respect to the
Acceptance of Brittle Structural Model
to be Used for the Cylindrical Shield
Building Wall, December 3, 2010........
AP1000 Containment Cleanliness--DCD X X ML110590455
Markup for Revision 19, February 23,
2011...................................
Interim Staff Guidance DC/COL-ISG-011, X X ML092890623
``Finalizing Licensing-basis
Information''..........................
Design Changes Submitted by X X ML100250873
Westinghouse, Revision 18..............
AP1000 Technical Reports (Appendix)..... X X ML103350501
TR-3, AP1000 Standard COL Technical X X ML110691050
Report Submittal of APP-GW-S2R-010,
``Extension of Nuclear Island Seismic
Analysis to Soil Sites,'' Revision 5,
February 28, 2011......................
TR-26, ``AP1000 Verification of Water X X ML102170123
Sources for Long-Term Recirculation
Cooling Following a LOCA,'' Revision 8.
TR-34, APP-GW-GLN-016, ``AP1000 X X ML063250306
Licensing Design Change Document for
Generic Reactor Coolant Pump,''
Revision 0, November 17, 2006..........
TR-54, ``Spent Fuel Storage Racks X X ML101580475
Structure and Seismic Analysis,''
Revision 4.............................
TR-65, ``Spent Fuel Storage Racks X X ML100082093
Criticality Analysis,'' Revision 2.....
TR-97, ``Evaluation of the Effect of the X X ML11168A041
AP1000 Enhanced Shield Building Design
on the Containment Response and Safety
Analysis,'' Revision 3.................
TR-98, AP1000 COL Standard Technical X X ML071010536
Report Submittal of APP-GW-GLN-098,
``Compliance with 10CFR20.1406,''
(Technical Report Number 98), Revision
0, April 10, 2007......................
TR[dash]103, ``Fluid System Changes,'' X X ML072830060
Revision 2.............................
TR-108, AP1000 Standard COL Technical X X ML072750137
Report Submittal of APP-GW-GLN-108,
``AP1000 Site Interface Temperature
Limits,'' Revision 2, September 28,
2007...................................
TR-111, AP1000 Standard COL Technical X X ML071500563
Report Submittal of APP-GW-GLN-111,
``Component Cooling System and Service
Water System Changes Required for
Increased Heat Loads,'' Revision 0, May
25, 2007...............................
TR-134, AP1000 Standard COL Technical X X ML073120415
Report Submittal of APP-GW-GLR-134,
``AP1000 DCD Impacts to Support COLA
Standardization,'' Revision 0, October
26, 2007...............................
AP1000 Standard COL Technical Report X X ML073610541
Submittal of APP-GW-GLR-134, ``AP1000
DCD Impacts to Support COLA
Standardization,'' Revision 1, December
12, 2007...............................
AP1000 Standard COL Technical Report, X X ML080220389
APP-GW-GLR-134, ``AP1000 DCD Impacts to
Support COLA Standardization,''
Revision 3, January 14, 2008...........
NRC Acceptance Review of AP1000 Design X X ML073090471
Certification Amendment Application,
November 2, 2007.......................
AP1000 Piping DAC/Component COL X X ML080150513
Information Item 3.9-2 Acceptance
Issue, Revision 16, January 11, 2008...
AP1000 License Report APP-GW-GLR-603, X X ML110910541
Revision 0, ``AP1000 Shield Building
Design Details for Select Wall and RC/
SC Connections''.......................
AP1000 Design Control Document (DCD), X X ML103480059
Revision 18, Transmittal Letter........
Westinghouse AP1000 DCD, Revision 18 X X ML103480572
(public version).......................
Advanced Final Safety Evaluation Report X X ML103260072
for Revision 18 to the AP1000 Standard
Design Certification (publicly
available).............................
AP1000 DCD Transmittal Letter, Revision X X ML083220482
17.....................................
AP1000 DCD, Revision 17................. X X ML083230868
AP1000 DCD Transmittal Letter, Revision X X ML071580757
16.....................................
AP1000 DCD, Revision 16................. X X ML071580939
NRC Notice of Acceptance, Revision 16... X X ML073600743
AP1000 DCD, Revision 15................. X X ML053460400
December 13, 2010, ACRS Letter to X X ML103410351
Chairman (Report on FSER to AP1000 DCD)
December 20, 2010, ACRS Letter to X X ML103410348
Chairman (Long-Term Core Cooling)......
January 19, 2011, ACRS Letter to EDO X X ML110210462
(Aircraft Impact)......................
January 24, 2011, ACRS Letter to EDO X X ML110350282
(Containment interior cleanliness
limits on latent debris in Technical
Specifications)........................
EDO response to January 24, 2011 ACRS X X ML110480429
Letter.................................
May 17, 2011, ACRS Letter to EDO........ X X ML11144A188
Regulatory History of Design X X ML003761550
Certification..........................
Commission Memorandum and Order, CLI-11- X X ML11252B074
05, September 9, 2011..................
Commission Memo and Order on Petitions X X ML112521039
to Suspend adjudicatory, licensing, and
rulemaking activities..................
ABWR Final Rule......................... X X ML111040636
ABWR Proposed Rule...................... X X ML102100129
Request for ACRS to Waive review of the X X ML112420188
AP1000 DCR final rule..................
ACRS Waiver of review of AP1000 DCR X X ML11266A070
final rule.............................
Design Report for the AP1000 Enhanced X X ML111950098
Shield Building........................
SER Approving Rev. 1 of the Westinghouse X X ML11280A309
Quality Systems Manual.................
ACRS Letter on AP1000 Long-Term Cooling. X X ML103410348
ACRS Letter on Staff's review of Vogtle, X X ML110170006
including discussion of containment
interior cleanliness...................
Staff's response to ACRS' January 24, X X ML110350198
2011, Letter...........................
Petition to Suspend AP1000 DCR X X ML110970673
Rulemaking.............................
Green Ticket for Runkle Petition........ X X ML11108A077
ACRS letter on AP1000 DCD Revision 19 X X ML11256A180
and Staff's Review.....................
Petition to Suspend AP1000 DCR X X ML111110851
Rulemaking.............................
Emergency Petition...................... X X ML111110862
Petition to Terminate the Rulemaking on X X ML11171A014
Design Certification of the AP1000.....
[[Page 82096]]
AP1000 Proposed Rule Package (Rule, FRN, X X ML103000394
and EA)................................
ISG-01, ``Seismic Issues Associated with X X ML081400293
High Frequency Ground Motion''.........
Green Ticket Containing Letter from X X ML110680273
Congressman Markey.....................
Cover letter for Response to Congressman X X ML11080A015
Markey, August 15, 2011................
Near-Term Task Force Review of Fukushima X X ML111861807
SRM responding to Near-Term Task Force X X ML112310021
Report and Recommendations.............
Response to Congressman Markey Letter... X X ML112450407
Revision 19 to the AP1000 Design Control X X ML11256A180
Document and the AP1000 Final Safety
Evaluation Report......................
Advanced Final Safety Evaluation Report, X X ML103430502
Section 3.8.4..........................
Presentation Slides ``AP1000 Shield X X ML111440298
Building Design,'' Meeting with NRC
Staff, May 17, 2011 (Proprietary and
Non-Proprietary).......................
Summary of a Category 1 Meeting With X X ML111430775
Westinghouse Electric Company Regarding
AP1000 Shield Building Design
Methodology, May 17, 2011..............
G20100734/LTR-10-0528/EDATS: SECY-2010- X X ML103560411
0595--Ltr. Said Abdel-Khalik re: Report
on the Final Safety Evaluation Report
Associated with the Amendment to the
AP1000 Design Control Document.........
Transmittal of WEC Shield Building X X ML102650098
Action Item 21.........................
White Paper--Requirements for COL and X X ML11152A189
LWA Issuance, Relative to the
Finalization of Standard Design
Certification Rulemaking...............
G20110559/LTR-11-0429/EDATS: SECY-2011- X X ML11210B421
0429--Ltr. Stephen E. Kuczynski re:
Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Units
3 and 4 Combined License Application--
Final Standard Design Certification
Rulemaking for LWA-B Request...........
Order (Adopting Proposed Transcript X X ML11305A228
Corrections, Admitting Post-Hearing
Responses, and Closing the Record of
the Proceeding)........................
Southern Nuclear Operating Company's X X ML11287A054
Request to Waive the Requirements of 10
CFR 2.807..............................
------------------------------------------------------------------------
VII. Voluntary Consensus Standards
The National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995,
Public Law 104-113, requires that Federal agencies use technical
standards that are developed or adopted by voluntary consensus
standards bodies unless using such a standard is inconsistent with
applicable law or is otherwise impractical. In this final rule, the NRC
is approving an amendment to the AP1000 standard plant design for use
in nuclear power plant licensing under 10 CFR parts 50 or 52. Design
certifications (and amendments thereto) are not generic rulemakings
establishing a generally applicable standard with which all parts 50
and 52 nuclear power plant licensees must comply. Design certifications
(and amendments thereto) are NRC approvals of specific nuclear power
plant designs by rulemaking. Furthermore, design certifications (and
amendments thereto) are initiated by an applicant for rulemaking,
rather than by the NRC. For these reasons, the NRC concludes that the
National Technology Transfer Advancement Act of 1995 does not apply to
this final rule.
VIII. Finding of No Significant Environmental Impact: Availability
The Commission has determined under NEPA, and the Commission's
regulations in subpart A, ``National Environmental Policy Act;
Regulations Implementing Section 102(2),'' of 10 CFR part 51,
``Environmental Protection Regulations for Domestic Licensing and
Related Regulatory Functions,'' that this DCR is not a major Federal
action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment
and, therefore, an environmental impact statement (EIS) is not
required. The basis for this determination, as documented in the final
EA, is that the Commission has made a generic determination under 10
CFR 51.32(b)(2) that there is no significant environmental impact
associated with the issuance of an amendment to a design certification.
This amendment to 10 CFR part 52 does not authorize the siting,
construction, or operation of a facility using the amended AP1000
design; it only codifies the amended AP1000 design in a rule. The NRC
will evaluate the environmental impacts and issue an EIS as appropriate
under NEPA as part of the application for the construction and
operation of a facility referencing this amendment to the AP1000 DCR.
In addition, as part of the final EA for the amendment to the AP1000
design, the NRC reviewed Westinghouse's evaluation of various design
alternatives to prevent and mitigate severe accidents in Appendix 1B of
the AP1000 DCD Tier 2. According to 10 CFR 51.30(d), an EA for a design
certification amendment is limited to the consideration of whether the
design change, which is the subject of the proposed amendment renders a
SAMDA previously rejected in the earlier EA to become cost beneficial,
or results in the identification of new SAMDAs, in which case the costs
and benefits of new SAMDAs and the bases for not incorporating new
SAMDAs in the design certification must be addressed. Based upon review
of Westinghouse's evaluation, the NRC concludes that the proposed
design changes: (1) Do not cause a SAMDA previously rejected in the EA
for the initial AP1000 design certification to become cost-beneficial;
and (2) do not result in the identification of any new SAMDAs that
could become cost beneficial.
The NRC prepared a final EA following the close of the comment
period for the proposed standard design certification. With the
issuance of this final rule, all environmental issues concerning SAMDAs
associated with the information in the final EA and Appendix 1B of the
AP1000 DCD Tier 2 will be considered resolved for plants referencing
Amendment 1 to the AP1000 design whose site parameters are within those
specified in SAMDA evaluation. The existing site parameters specified
in the SAMDA evaluation are not affected by this design certification
amendment.
The final EA, upon which the NRC's finding of no significant impact
is based, and Revision 19 of the AP1000 DCD are available as discussed
in Section IV, Availability of Documents. The NRC sent a copy of the EA
and final rule to every State Liaison Officer and no comments were
received.
IX. Paperwork Reduction Act Statement
This final rule contains new or amended information collection
requirements that are subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995
(44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.). These requirements were approved by the
Office of Management and Budget, approval number 3150-0151.
[[Page 82097]]
The burden to the public for these information collections is
estimated to average 3 hours per response, including the time for
reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and
maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the
information collection. Send comments on any aspect of these
information collections, including suggestions for reducing the burden,
to the Information Services Branch (T-5F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by Internet electronic mail
to INFOCOLLECTS.RESOURCE@NRC.gov; and to the Desk Officer, Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0151), Office of
Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503.
Public Protection Notification
The NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to
respond to, a request for information or an information collection
requirement unless the requesting document displays a currently valid
OMB control number.
X. Regulatory Analysis
The NRC has not prepared a regulatory analysis for this final rule.
The NRC prepares regulatory analyses for rulemakings that establish
generic regulatory requirements applicable to all licensees. Design
certifications are not generic rulemakings in the sense that design
certifications do not establish standards or requirements with which
all licensees must comply. Rather, design certifications are Commission
approvals of specific nuclear power plant designs by rulemaking, which
then may be voluntarily referenced by applicants for COLs. Furthermore,
design certification rulemakings are initiated by an applicant for a
design certification, rather than the NRC. Preparation of a regulatory
analysis in this circumstance would not be useful because the design to
be certified is proposed by the applicant rather than the NRC. For
these reasons, the Commission concludes that preparation of a
regulatory analysis is neither required nor appropriate.
XI. Regulatory Flexibility Act Certification
Under the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, 5 U.S.C. 605(b), the
Commission certifies that this final rule will not have a significant
economic impact upon a substantial number of small entities. The final
rule provides for certification of an amendment to a nuclear power
plant design. Neither the design certification amendment applicant, nor
prospective nuclear power plant licensees who reference this DCR, fall
within the scope of the definition of ``small entities'' set forth in
the Regulatory Flexibility Act, or the size standards established by
the NRC (10 CFR 2.810). Thus, this rule does not fall within the
purview of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.
XII. Backfitting and Issue Finality
The NRC has determined that this final rule meets the requirements
of the backfit rule, 10 CFR 50.109, and the requirements governing
changes to DCRs in 10 CFR 52.63(a)(1).
The final rule does not constitute backfitting as defined in the
backfit rule (10 CFR 50.109) with respect to operating licenses under
10 CFR Part 50 because there are no operating licenses referencing this
DCR.
Westinghouse requested many changes to the currently approved
AP1000 DCD Revision 15 to correct spelling, punctuation, or similar
errors, which result in text that has the same essential meaning. The
NRC concludes that these Westinghouse-requested changes, which are
editorial in nature, neither constitute backfitting as defined in 10
CFR 50.109(a)(1), nor are these changes inconsistent with the issue
finality provisions of 10 CFR 52.63 or 10 CFR 52.83. The backfitting
and issue finality provisions were not meant to apply to such editorial
changes in as much as such changes would have insubstantial impact on
licensees with respect to their design and operation, and are not the
kind of changes falling within the policy considerations that underlie
the backfit rule and the issue finality provisions of 10 CFR 52.63 and
10 CFR 52.83.
Westinghouse also made proposed changes to Revision 15 of the
AP1000 DCD, which the NRC understands were the result of requests to
Westinghouse from COL applicants referencing the AP1000 design, to
achieve consistency in description and approach in different portions
of the DCD. In the absence of a generic change to the AP1000, the
referencing COL applicants stated to Westinghouse and the NRC that each
would likely take plant-specific departures to address the
inconsistency. While this could result in more consistency within any
given COL application, it would result in inconsistencies among the
different referencing COLs, which is inconsistent with the overall
standardization goal of 10 CFR part 52. Accordingly, the NRC concludes
that the Westinghouse-requested changes to the AP1000 to address
consistency do not constitute backfitting under the backfit rule (in as
much as they are voluntary) and are not otherwise inconsistent with the
issue finality provisions of 10 CFR 52.63 and 52.83.
Westinghouse also proposed numerous substantive changes to the
AP1000 design described in Revision 15 of the DCD, including, but not
limited to, minor component design details, replacement of a design
feature with another having similar performance (e.g., turbine
manufacturer, power for the auxiliary boiler), and changes allowing
additional capability for operational flexibility (e.g., liquid waste
holdup tanks, unit reserve transformer). Westinghouse included within
its application a detailed list of each DCD content change and the
basis for concluding that one or more of the criteria in 10 CFR
52.63(a)(1) are satisfied for each change.
In the course of the NRC review of the technical changes proposed
by Westinghouse, the NRC considered the basis offered by Westinghouse
and made conclusions about whether the criteria of 10 CFR 52.63(a) were
satisfied. These conclusions are included in the chapters of the FSER
under ADAMS Accession No. ML112061231. The NRC concluded that all of
these changes met at least one of the criteria in 10 CFR 52.63(a) and
are not otherwise inconsistent with the issue finality provisions of 10
CFR 52.63 and 52.83. Fifteen of the most significant changes are
discussed below, to show that each of the 15 substantive changes to the
AP1000 certified design meet at least one of the criteria in 10 CFR
52.63(a)(1)(i) through (a)(1)(vii) and, therefore, do not constitute a
violation of the finality provisions in that section.
A. 10 CFR 52.63 Criterion (a)(1)(iv): Provides the Detailed Design
Information To Be Verified Under Those ITAAC, Which Are Directed at
Certification Information (i.e., DAC)
Title: Removal of Human Factors Engineering Design Acceptance
Criteria from the Design Control Document.
Item: 1 of 15.
Description of Change: The ITAAC Design Commitments for HFE are in
Tier 1, Table 3.2-1. In Revision 17 of the AP1000 DCD, Westinghouse
proposed deletion of the Human Factors DAC (Design Commitments 1
through 4) and provided sufficient supporting documentation to meet the
requirements of these ITAAC. Design Commitment 1 pertains to the
integration of human reliability analysis with HFE design. Design
Commitment 2 pertains to the HFE task analysis. Design Commitment 3
pertains to the human-system
[[Page 82098]]
interface. Design Commitment 4 pertains to the HFE program verification
and validation implementation. The information developed by
Westinghouse to satisfy these ITAAC is included in Chapter 19 of the
DCD.
Location within the Safety Evaluation (SER) where the changes are
principally described: The details of the NRC's evaluation of
Westinghouse's design features associated with the HFE DAC are in
Sections 18.7.6 (Design Commitment 1), 18.5.9 (Design Commitment 2),
18.2.8 (Design Commitment 3), and 18.11 (Design Commitment 4) of the
FSER.
Evaluation of the Criteria in 10 CFR 52.63(a)(1): The additional
information included in Tier 2 provides detailed design information on
human factors design that would otherwise have to be addressed through
verification of implementation of the human factors DAC. Therefore, the
changes to the DCD eliminate the need for DAC on human factors and meet
the finality criteria in 10 CFR 52.63(a)(1)(iv).
Title: Change to Instrumentation and Control DAC and Associated
ITAAC.
Item: 2 of 15.
Description of Change: In the proposed revision to DCD Chapter 7,
Westinghouse chose the Common Q platform to implement the Protection
and Safety Monitoring System (PMS) and removed all references to the
Eagle 21 platform. This design change, coupled with the development of
other information about the PMS system definition design phase, was the
basis for Westinghouse's proposed removal of its Tier 1, Chapter 2,
Section 2.5.2, Design Commitment 11(a) Design Requirements phase from
Table 2.5.2-8, ``Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance
Criteria,'' for the PMS.
In its proposed revision to the DCD in Chapter 7, Westinghouse
altered its design for the Diverse Actuation System (DAS) by
implementing it with Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) technology
instead of microprocessor-based technology. Additional information
about the design process for the DAS was added as the basis for
Westinghouse's proposed completion of its Tier 1, Chapter 2, Section
2.5.1, Design Commitments 4(a) and 4(b) Design Requirements and System
Definition phases from Table 2.5.1-4 ``Inspections, Tests, Analyses,
and Acceptance Criteria'' for the DAS.
Location within the Safety Evaluation (SER) where the changes are
principally described: The details of the NRC's evaluation of
Westinghouse's design features associated with I&C DAC and ITAAC are in
Sections 7.2.2.3.14, 7.2.5, 7.8.2, 7.9.2, and 7.9.3 of the FSER.
Evaluation of the Criteria in 10 CFR 52.63(a)(1): Westinghouse
provided additional information that incorporates the results of the
design process implementation for the PMS and DAS (which both support
completion of Design Commitment 11(a) from Table 2.5.2-8 and 4a and 4b
from Table 2.5.1-4, respectively) into the DCD. The additional
information included in Tier 2 provides detailed design information on
I&C design that would otherwise have to be addressed through
verification of implementation of the I&C DAC. Therefore, the changes
to the DCD eliminate the need for DAC on I&Cs and meet the finality
criteria in 10 CFR 52.63(a)(1)(iv).
B. 10 CFR 52.63 Criterion (a)(1)(vii): Contributes to Increased
Standardization of the Certification Information
The changes in the AP1000 amendment generally fall into one of two
categories: (1) Changes that provide additional information or a
greater level of detail not previously available in the currently-
approved version of the AP1000 DCD (Revision 15); or (2) changes
requested by COL applicants referencing the AP1000 who would plan to
include these changes in their application as departures if they were
not approved in the AP1000 DCR amendment. The Commission concludes that
both categories of changes meet the 10 CFR 52.63 criterion of
``contributes to increased standardization.'' The bases for the
Commission's conclusions, including each category of change, are
discussed below.
Additional and More Detailed Information
Westinghouse proposes that the DCD be changed by adding new, more
detailed design information that expands upon the design information
already included in the DCD. This information would be used by every
COL referencing the AP1000 DCR. Incorporating these proposed changes
into the AP1000 DCR as part of this amendment contributes to the
increased standardization of the certification information by
eliminating the possibility of multiple departures. Therefore, these
changes enhance standardization, and meet the finality criterion for
changes in 10 CFR 52.63(a)(1)(vii).
Changes for Which COL Applicants Would Otherwise Request Departures
Westinghouse proposes several changes to its DCD with the stated
purpose of contributing to increased standardization. Westinghouse
represents that these changes were requested by the lead COL applicants
currently referencing the AP1000. The NRC, in meetings with these
applicants as part of the ``Design-Centered Working Group'' process for
jointly resolving licensing issues, confirmed that these applicants
requested these changes and committed to pursue plant-specific
departures from the AP1000 if Westinghouse did not initiate such
changes to the AP1000 DCR. Such departures may be pursued by individual
COL applicants (and licensees) as described in part VIII, ``Processes
for Changes and Departures'' of the AP1000 DCR (Appendix D to 10 CFR
part 52). Incorporating these proposed changes into the AP1000 DCR as
part of this amendment contributes to the increased standardization of
the certification information by eliminating the possibility of
multiple departures. Therefore, all Westinghouse-initiated changes for
the purpose of eliminating plant-specific departures enhance
standardization, and meet the finality criterion for changes in 10 CFR
52.63(a)(1)(vii).
Title: Minimization of Contamination (10 CFR 20.1406(b)).
Item: 3 of 15.
Description of Change: In DCD Section 12.1.2.4, Westinghouse
discussed features incorporated into the amended design certification
to demonstrate compliance with 10 CFR 52.47(a)(6), which requires that
a design certification application include the information required by
10 CFR 20.1406(b), which was adopted in 2007 as part of the general
revisions to 10 CFR Part 52. This regulation requires design
certification applicants whose applications are submitted after August
20, 1997, to describe how the design will minimize, to the extent
practicable, contamination of the facility and the environment,
facilitate decommissioning and minimize the generation of radioactive
waste. The DCD changes are documented in Westinghouse Technical Report
98, ``Compliance with 10 CFR 20.1406'' (APP-GW-GLN-098), Revision 0
(ADAMS Accession No. ML071010536). Westinghouse evaluated contaminated
piping, the SFP air handling systems, and the radioactive waste drain
system to show that piping and components utilize design features that
will prevent or mitigate the spread of contamination within the
facility or the environment. Westinghouse has incorporated
modifications and features such as elimination of underground
radioactive tanks, RCPs without mechanical seals, fewer embedded pipes,
less radioactive
[[Page 82099]]
piping in the auxiliary building and containment vessel, and monitoring
the radwaste discharge pipeline to demonstrate that the AP1000 design
certification, as amended, will be in compliance with the subject
regulation and Regulatory Guidance (RG) 4.21, ``Minimization of
Contamination and Radioactive Waste Generation: Life-Cycle Planning''
(June 2008).
Location within the SER where the changes are principally
described: The details of the NRC's evaluation of Westinghouse's design
features are in Section 12.2 of the FSER.
Evaluation of the Criteria in 10 CFR 52.63(a)(1)(vii): Inclusion in
the DCD of the more detailed information about the features for
minimization of contamination provides additional information to be
included in the DCD for the AP1000 that increases standardization of
the AP1000 design. Thus, the changes meet the finality criterion for
changes in 10 CFR 52.63(a)(1)(vii).
Title: Extension of Seismic Spectra to Soil Sites and Changes to
Stability and Uniformity of Subsurface Materials and Foundations.
Item: 4 of 15.
Description of Change: In AP1000 DCD Tier 2, Sections 2.5.2 and
3.7, Westinghouse extended the AP1000 design to sites with five soil
profiles, ranging from hard rock to soft soil, for Category I
structures, systems, and components. The certified design included only
hard rock conditions. To support the technical basis for the extension,
Westinghouse provided: Seismic analysis methods, procedures for
analytical modeling, soil-structure interaction analysis with three
components of earthquake motion, and interaction of non-seismic
Category I structures with seismic Category I structures. Also, in DCD
Section 2.5.4, Westinghouse extended the AP1000 design with ``Stability
and Uniformity of Subsurface Materials and Foundations,'' where the DCD
presents the requirements related to subsurface materials and
foundations for COL applicants referencing AP1000 standard design. The
site-specific information includes excavation, bearing capacity,
settlement, and liquefaction potential. On February 28, 2011,
Westinghouse submitted Revision 5 to TR-03, ``Extension of Nuclear
Island Seismic Analysis to Soil Sites,'' and summarized the report in
DCD Appendix 3G, to provide more detail about its analyses.
Location within the SER where the changes are principally
described:The details of the NRC's evaluation of Westinghouse's design
features associated with extension of seismic spectra to soil sites are
in Section 3.7 of the FSER. The details of the NRC's evaluation of
Westinghouse's design features associated with stability and uniformity
of subsurface materials and foundations are in Sections 2.5.2 and 2.5.4
of the FSER.
Evaluation of the Criteria in 10 CFR 52.63(a)(1): Westinghouse
submitted a change to the DCD that provides the seismic design and
supporting analysis for a range of soil conditions representative of
expected applicants for a COL referencing the AP1000 design. As a
result, the certified design can be used at more sites without the need
for departures to provide site-specific analyses or design changes,
thus leading to a more uniform analysis and seismic design for all the
AP1000 plants. Including in the DCD the information demonstrating
adequacy of the design for seismic events for a wider range of soil
conditions is a change that provides additional information leading to
increased standardization of this aspect of the design. In addition,
the change reduces the need for COL applicants to seek departures from
the current AP1000 design in as much as most sites do not conform to
the currently approved hard rock sites. Therefore, the change increases
standardization and meets the finality criterion for changes in 10 CFR
52.63(a)(1)(vii).
Title: Long-Term Cooling.
Item: 5 of 15.
Description of Change: DCD Tier 2, Section 6.3.8, describes the
changes to COL information items related to containment cleanliness and
verification of water sources for long-term recirculation cooling
following a LOCA. The COL information item related to verification of
water sources for long-term recirculation cooling following a LOCA was
closed based on Westinghouse TR-26, ``AP1000 Verification of Water
Sources for Long-Term Recirculation Cooling Following a LOCA,'' APP-GW-
GLR-079 (ADAMS Accession No. ML102170123) and other information
contained in DCD Chapter 6. Section 6.3.2.2.7 describes the evaluation
of the water sources for long-term recirculation cooling following a
LOCA, including the design and operation of the AP1000 PCCS debris
screens. DCD Tier 1, Section 2.2.3, includes the associated design
descriptions and ITAAC.
The COL information item requires a cleanliness program to limit
the amount of latent debris in containment consistent with the analysis
and testing assumptions.
Location within the SE where the changes are principally described:
The details of the NRC's evaluation of Westinghouse's design features
associated with long-term cooling in the presence of LOCA-generated and
latent debris and General Design Criteria 35 and 38 are in Subsection
6.2.1.8 of the FSER.
Evaluation of the Criteria in 10 CFR 52.63(a)(1): Inclusion in the
DCD of the design and analysis information that demonstrates adequacy
of long-term core cooling provides additional information leading to
increased standardization of this aspect of the design. Therefore, the
change meets the finality criterion for changes in 10 CFR
52.63(a)(1)(vii).
Title: Control Room Emergency Habitability System.
Item: 6 of 15.
Description of Change: DCD Tier 2, Section 6.4, has undergone
significant revision. Westinghouse redesigned its main control room
emergency habitability system to meet control room radiation dose
requirements using the standard assumed in-leakage of 5 cubic feet per
minute in the event of a release of radiation. The changes include the
addition of a single-failure proof passive filter train. The flow
through the filter train is provided by an eductor downstream of a
bottled air supply. These changes were prompted by Westinghouse's
proposal to revise the atmospheric dispersion factors from those
certified in Revision 15 to larger values to better accommodate COL
sites. As a result, other design changes were needed to maintain doses
in the control room within acceptable limits.
Location within the SER where the changes are principally
described: The details of the NRC's evaluation of Westinghouse's design
features associated with radiation dose to personnel under accident
conditions are in Section 6.4 of the FSER.
Evaluation of the Criteria in 10 CFR 52.63(a)(1): Incorporation of
design changes to the main control room ventilation systems would
contribute to increased standardization of this aspect of the design.
Therefore, the change meets the finality criterion for changes in 10
CFR 52.63(a)(1)(vii).
Title: Changes to the Component Cooling Water System.
Item: 7 of 15.
Description of Change: In Revision 18 to AP1000 DCD Tier 2,
Westinghouse proposed changes to the design of the component cooling
water system (CCWS) to modify the closure logic for system motor-
operated containment isolation valves and install safety-class relief
valves on system supply and return lines. The closure logic would close
the isolation valves upon a high RCP bearing water temperature signal,
[[Page 82100]]
which might be indicative of a RCP heat exchanger tube rupture. This
change would automatically isolate this potential leak to eliminate the
possibility of reactor coolant from a faulted heat exchanger
discharging to portions of the CCWS outside containment.
Location within the SER where the changes are principally
described: The details of the NRC's evaluation of Westinghouse's design
features associated with the CCWS are in Chapter 23, Section V, of the
FSER.
Evaluation of the Criteria in 10 CFR 52.63(a)(1): Westinghouse
included changes to the component cooling water in the DCD. These
changes will contribute to increased standardization of this aspect of
the design. Therefore, the change meets the finality criterion for
changes in 10 CFR 52.63(a)(1)(vii).
Title: Changes to Instrumentation and Control Systems.
Item: 8 of 15.
Description of Change: In AP1000 DCD Tier 2, Sections 7.1 through
7.3, Westinghouse completed planning activities related to the
architecture of its safety related I&C protection system, referred to
as the PMS. Westinghouse also proposed changes to the DCD to reflect
resolution of PMS interdivisional data communications protocols and
methods utilized to ensure a secure development and operational
environment. A secure development and operational environment in this
context refers to a set of protective actions taken against a
predictable set of non-malicious acts (e.g., inadvertent operator
actions, undesirable behavior of connected systems) that could
challenge the integrity, reliability, or functionality of a digital
safety system. The establishment of a secure development and
operational environment for digital safety systems involves: (i)
Measures and controls taken to establish a secure environment for
development of the digital safety system against undocumented, unneeded
and unwanted modifications and (ii) protective actions taken against a
predictable set of undesirable acts (e.g., inadvertent operator actions
or the undesirable behavior of connected systems) that could challenge
the integrity, reliability, or functionality of a digital safety system
during operations.
Location within the SER where the changes are principally
described: The details of the NRC's evaluation of Westinghouse's design
features associated with I&C systems are in Sections 7.1 through 7.3,
and 7.9 of NRC's Chapter 7 FSER.
Evaluation of the Criteria in 10 CFR 52.63(a)(1): Inclusion in the
DCD of the more detailed information about the I&C architecture and
communications provides additional information leading to increased
standardization of this aspect of the design. Therefore, the change
meets the finality criterion for changes in 10 CFR 52.63(a)(1)(vii).
Title: Changes to the Passive Core Cooling System--Gas Intrusion.
Item: 9 of 15.
Description of Change: In AP1000 DCD Tier 1 and Tier 2,
Westinghouse proposed changes to the design of the PCCS to add manual
maintenance vent valves and manual maintenance drain valves, and to
reroute accumulator discharge line connections in order to address
concerns related to gas intrusion. In addition, Westinghouse provided
descriptions of surveillance and venting procedures to verify gas void
elimination during plant startup and operations. These proposed changes
are responsive to the actions requested by Generic Letter 2008-01,
``Managing Gas Accumulation in Emergency Core Cooling, Decay Heat
Removal, and Containment Spray Systems.''
The passive core cooling system (PCCS) provides rapid injection of
borated water, which provides negative reactivity to reduce reactor
power to residual levels and ensures sufficient core cooling flow.
Noncondensible gas accumulation in the PCCS has the potential to delay
injection of borated water, which would impact the moderating and heat
removal capabilities, thus providing a challenge to the primary fission
product barrier and maintenance of a coolable core geometry. As part of
its review, the NRC determined that the proposed changes in the design
of the PCCS were acceptable for providing protection for design-basis
events, such as LOCAs.
Location within the SER where the changes are principally
described: The NRC's evaluation of proposed changes to the DCD
associated with changes to the PCCS is in Chapter 23, Section L, of the
FSER.
Evaluation of the Criteria in 10 CFR 52.63(a)(1): Inclusion in the
DCD of the design and analysis information that provides for venting of
non-condensible gases provides additional information leading to
increased standardization of this aspect of the design. Therefore, the
change meets the finality criterion for changes in 10 CFR
52.63(a)(1)(vii).
Title: Integrated Head Package--Use of the QuickLoc Mechanism.
Item: 10 of 15.
Description of Change: In DCD Tier 2, Section 5.3.1.2, Westinghouse
describes a revised integrated head package (IHP) design. The inclusion
of eight QuickLoc penetrations in lieu of the forty-two individual in-
core instrument thimble-tube-assembly penetrations on the reactor
vessel head is a significant decrease in the number of reactor pressure
vessel (RPV) closure head penetrations for access to in-core and core
exit instrumentation. The QuickLoc mechanism allows the removal of the
RPV closure head without removal of in-core and core exit
instrumentation and, thus, decreases refueling outage time and overall
occupational exposure. This head package design has been installed on a
number of operating plants and, as noted, has several operational and
safety advantages.
Location within the SER where the changes are principally
described: The details of the NRC's evaluation of Westinghouse's design
features associated with the (1) IHP and QuickLoc mechanism are in
Section 5.2.3 of the FSER and (2) radiation protection pertaining to
the addition of the integrated reactor head package and QuickLoc
connectors are in Subsection 12.4.2.3 of the FSER.
Evaluation of the Criteria in 10 CFR 52.63(a)(1): Inclusion in the
DCD of the changes to the IHP would contribute to the increased
standardization of this aspect of the design. Therefore, the change
meets the finality criterion for changes in 10 CFR 52.63(a)(1)(vii).
Title: Reactor Coolant Pump Design.
Item: 11 of 15.
Description of Change: In AP1000 DCD Tier 2, Subsection 5.4.1,
Westinghouse proposed changes related to the RCP design. These changes
include: Change to a single-stage, hermetically sealed, high inertia,
centrifugal sealless RCP of canned motor design; use of an externally
mounted heat exchanger; and change of the RCP flywheel to bimetallic
construction. These DCD changes are documented in: TR-34, ``AP1000
Licensing Design Change Document for Generic Reactor Coolant Pump,''
APP-GW-GLN-016, November 2006 and in other documentation in response to
NRC inquiries. The supporting documentation includes an analysis
demonstrating that failure of the flywheel would not generate a missile
capable of penetrating the surrounding casing, and, therefore, that
such failure would not damage the reactor coolant pressure boundary.
Location within the SER where the changes are principally
described: The details of the NRC's evaluation of Westinghouse's design
features associated with the RCP design are in Section 5.4.1 of the
NRC's Chapter 5 FSER.
[[Page 82101]]
Evaluation of the Criteria in 10 CFR 52.63(a)(1): Inclusion in the
DCD of the changes to the RCP would reduce the possibility of plant-
specific departure requests by COL applicants referencing the AP1000
DCR. Therefore, the change meets the finality criterion for changes in
10 CFR 52.63(a)(1)(vii).
Title: Reactor Pressure Vessel Support System.
Item: 12 of 15.
Description of Change: The RPV structural support system of the
AP1000 standard design is designed to provide the necessary support for
the heavy RPV in the AP1000 standard design. The original anchorage
design was bolting into embedded plates of the CA04 structural module.
Subsection 3.8.3.1.1 of the AP1000 DCD Tier 2 would be changed to
reflect modifications to the RPV support design. In the revised design,
there are four support ``boxes'' or ``legs'' located at the bottom of
the RPV's cold leg nozzles. The support boxes are anchored directly to
the primary shield wall concrete base via steel embedment plates. This
CA04 structural module is no longer used in the new design. The four
RPV support boxes are safety-related and the design of the RPV
associated support structures is consistent with the safe shutdown
earthquake design of Seismic Category I equipment. Subsections
3.8.3.5.1 and 5.4.10.2.1 of the DCD are modified.
Location within the SER where the changes are principally
described: The details of the NRC's evaluation of Westinghouse's design
features associated with RPV supports are in Chapter 23, Section R, of
the FSER.
Evaluation of the Criteria in 10 CFR 52.63(a)(1): Inclusion in the
DCD of the changes to the RPV supports contributes to the increased
standardization of this aspect of the design. Therefore, the change
meets the finality criterion for changes in 10 CFR 52.63(a)(1)(vii).
Title: Spent Fuel Pool Decay Heat Analysis and Associated Design
Changes.
Item: 13 of 15.
Description of Change: In AP1000 DCD Tier 2, Section 9.1.3,
Westinghouse proposed changes to the SFP cooling system. Westinghouse
proposed to increase the number of spent fuel storage locations from
619 to 889 fuel assemblies and implement the following associated
design changes: (1) Increase in component cooling system (CCS) pump
design capacity, (2) increase in the CCS supply temperature to plant
components, and (3) changes in the CCS parameters related to the RCPs.
The increase in the number of assemblies affects the decay heat
removal/SFP heatup analyses. The supporting bases for these DCD changes
are documented in: TR-111, ``Component Cooling System and Service Water
System Changes Required for Increased Heat Loads,'' APP-GW-GLN-111,
Revision 2, dated May 2007 (ADAMS Accession No. ML071500563); TR-103,
``Fluid System Changes,'' APP-GW-GLN-019, Revision 2, dated October
2007 (ADAMS Accession No. ML072830060); TR-108, ``AP1000 Site Interface
Temperature Limits,'' APP-GW-GLN-108, Revision 2, dated September 2007
(ADAMS Accession No. ML072750137), and TR-APP-GW-GLR-097, ``Evaluation
of the Effect of the AP1000 Enhanced Shield Building on the Containment
Response and Safety Analysis,'' Revision 3, dated June 2011 (ADAMS
Accession No. ML11168A041).
Location within the SER where the changes are principally
described: The details of the NRC's evaluation of Westinghouse's design
features associated with the SFP decay heat analysis are in Section
9.2.2 of the FSER.
Evaluation of the Criteria in 10 CFR 52.63(a)(1): Inclusion in the
DCD of the changes to the SFP decay heat analysis would contribute to
the increased standardization of this aspect of the design. Therefore,
the change meets the finality criterion for changes in 10 CFR
52.63(a)(1)(vii).
Title: Spent Fuel Rack Design and Criticality Analysis.
Item: 14 of 15.
Description of Change: In DCD Tier 2, Section 9.1.2, Westinghouse
proposed changes to the spent fuel racks: (1) To increase the storage
capacity by 270 additional fuel assemblies, and (2) to integrate a new
neutron poison into the rack design. These changes included a different
rack design and associated structural analysis and a revised
criticality analysis. These DCD changes are documented in TR-54,
``Spent Fuel Storage Racks Structure and Seismic Analysis,'' APP-GW-
GLR-033, Revision 4, dated June 2, 2010 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML101580475); and TR-65, ``Spent Fuel Storage Racks Criticality
Analysis,'' APP-GW-GLR-029, Revision 2, dated January 5, 2010 (ADAMS
Accession No. ML100082093).
Location within the SER where the changes are principally
described: The details of the NRC's evaluation of Westinghouse's design
features associated with the spent fuel rack design and criticality
analysis are in Section 9.1.2 of the FSER.
Evaluation of the Criteria in 10 CFR 52.63(a)(1): Inclusion in the
DCD of the changes to the spent fuel rack design and criticality
analysis would contribute to the increased standardization of this
aspect of the design. Therefore, the change meets the finality
criterion for changes in 10 CFR 52.63(a)(1)(vii).
Title: Vacuum Relief System.
Item: 15 of 15.
Description of Change: In Revision 18 to AP1000 DCD Tier 2,
Chapters 3, 6, 7, 9, and 16, Westinghouse proposed a change to the
design of the containment, which adds a vacuum relief system to the
existing containment air filtration system vent line penetration. The
proposed vacuum relief system consists of redundant vacuum relief
devices inside and outside containment sized to prevent differential
pressure between containment and the shield building from exceeding the
design value of 1.7 psig, which could occur under extreme temperature
conditions.
Each relief flow path consists of a check valve inside containment
and a motor operated butterfly valve outside of containment. The
redundant relief devices outside containment share a common inlet line
with redundant outside air flow entry points. The outlet lines
downstream of the outside containment relief devices are routed to a
common header connected to the vent line penetration. The redundant
relief devices inside containment share a common inlet line from the
vent line penetration and have independent discharge lines into
containment.
Location within the SER where the changes are principally
described: The details of the NRC's evaluation of Westinghouse's design
features associated with the addition of the vacuum relief system are
in Chapter 23, Section W, of the FSER.
Evaluation of the Criteria in 10 CFR 52.63(a)(1): Inclusion in the
DCD of the introduction of a containment vacuum relief system would
contribute to the increased standardization of this aspect of the
design. Therefore, the change meets the finality criterion for changes
in 10 CFR 52.63(a)(1)(vii).
Other Technical Changes
The above discussion on selected technical changes is illustrative
of the NRC's consideration of applicability of the finality provisions
to other technical changes proposed from Revision 15 of the DCD, which
are reflected in Revision 19. As noted earlier, Westinghouse provided
its proposed basis for each change as part of the application. The NRC
concludes that the other technical changes meet one or more of the
finality criteria and thus do not constitute a violation of the
finality provisions of 10 CFR 52.63.
[[Page 82102]]
Changes Addressing Compliance With Aircraft Impact Assessment Rule (10
CFR 50.150)
The final rule amends the existing AP1000 DCR, in part, to address
the requirements of the AIA rule. The AIA rule itself mandated that a
DCR be revised, if not during the DCR's current term, then no later
than its renewal to address the requirements of the AIA rule. In
addition, the AIA rule provided that any COL issued after the effective
date of the final AIA rule must reference a DCR complying with the AIA
rule, or itself demonstrate compliance with the AIA rule. The AIA rule
may therefore be regarded as inconsistent with the finality provisions
in 10 CFR 52.63(a) and Section VI of the AP1000 DCR. However, the NRC
provided an administrative exemption from these finality requirements
when the final AIA rule was issued (74 FR 28112; June 12, 2009).
Accordingly, the NRC has already addressed the backfitting implications
of applying the AIA rule to the AP1000 with respect to the AP1000 and
referencing COL applicants.
Conclusion
The amended AP1000 DCR does not constitute backfitting and is
consistent with the finality provisions in 10 CFR part 52. Accordingly,
the NRC has not prepared a backfit analysis or documented evaluation
for this rule.
XIII. Congressional Review Act
In accordance with the Congressional Review Act of 1996, the NRC
has determined that this action is not a major rule and has verified
this determination with the Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs of the Office of Management and Budget.
List of Subjects in 10 CFR Part 52
Administrative practice and procedure, Antitrust, Backfitting,
Combined license, Early site permit, Emergency planning, Fees,
Incorporation by reference, Inspection, Limited work authorization,
Nuclear power plants and reactors, Probabilistic risk assessment,
Prototype, Reactor siting criteria, Redress of site, Reporting and
recordkeeping requirements, Standard design, Standard design
certification.
For the reasons set out in the preamble and under the authority of
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended; the Energy Reorganization
Act of 1974, as amended; and 5 U.S.C. 552 and 553, the NRC is adopting
the following amendments to 10 CFR part 52.
PART 52--LICENSES, CERTIFICATIONS, AND APPROVALS FOR NUCLEAR POWER
PLANTS
0
1. The authority citation for 10 CFR part 52 continues to read as
follows:
Authority: Secs. 103, 104, 161, 182, 183, 186, 189, 68 Stat.
936, 948, 953, 954, 955, 956, as amended, sec. 234, 83 Stat. 444, as
amended (42 U.S.C. 2133, 2201, 2232, 2233, 2236, 2239, 2282); secs.
201, 202, 206, 88 Stat. 1242, 1244, 1246, as amended (42 U.S.C.
5841, 5842, 5846); sec. 1704, 112 Stat. 2750 (44 U.S.C. 3504 note);
Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594 (2005),
secs. 147 and 149 of the Atomic Energy Act.
0
2. In Appendix D to 10 CFR Part 52:
0
a. In Section III, revise paragraphs A and D;
0
b. In Section IV, revise paragraph A.3 and add paragraph A.4;
0
c. In Section V, redesignate paragraph A as paragraph A.1 and add a new
paragraph A.2;
0
d. In Section VI, revise paragraphs B.1, B.2, B.7, and E;
0
e. In Section VIII, revise the introductory text of paragraph B.5.b,
redesignate paragraphs B.5.d, B.5.e, and B.5.f as paragraphs B.5.e,
B.5.f, and B.5.g, respectively, and add a new paragraph B.5.d, and
revise paragraphs B.6.b and B.6.c; and
0
f. In Section X, revise paragraph A.1 and add a new paragraph A.4.
The revisions and additions read as follows:
Appendix D to Part 52--Design Certification Rule for the AP1000 Design
* * * * *
III. Scope and Contents
A. Tier 1, Tier 2 (including the investment protection short-
term availability controls in Section 16.3), and the generic TSs in
the AP1000 Design Control Document, Revision 19, (Public Version)
(AP1000 DCD), APP-GW-GL-702, dated June 13, 2011, are approved for
incorporation by reference by the Director of the Office of the
Federal Register under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. Copies of
the generic DCD may be obtained from Stanley E. Ritterbusch,
Manager, AP1000 Design Certification, Westinghouse Electric Company,
1000 Westinghouse Drive, Cranberry Township, Pennsylvania 16066,
telephone (412) 374-3037. A copy of the generic DCD is also
available for examination and copying at the NRC's PDR, Room O-1F21,
One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland
20852. Copies are available for examination at the NRC Library, Two
White Flint North, 11545 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852,
telephone (301) 415-5610, email LIBRARY.RESOURCE@NRC.GOV. The DCD
can also be viewed online in the NRC Library at http://www.nrc.gov/
reading-rm/adams.html by searching under ADAMS Accession No.
ML11171A500. All approved material is available for inspection at
the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). For
information on the availability of this material at NARA, call (202)
741-6030 or go to http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ibr-
locations.html.
* * * * *
D. 1. If there is a conflict between the generic DCD and either
the application for the initial design certification of the AP1000
design or NUREG-1793, ``Final Safety Evaluation Report Related to
Certification of the Westinghouse Standard Design,'' and Supplement
No. 1, then the generic DCD controls.
2. If there is a conflict between the generic DCD and either the
application for Amendment 1 to the design certification of the
AP1000 design or NUREG-1793, ``Final Safety Evaluation Report
Related to Certification of the Westinghouse Standard Design,''
Supplement No. 2, then the generic DCD controls.
* * * * *
IV. Additional Requirements and Restrictions
A. * * *
3. Include, in the plant-specific DCD, the sensitive
unclassified non-safeguards information (including proprietary
information) and safeguards information referenced in the AP1000
DCD.
4. Include, as part of its application, a demonstration that an
entity other than Westinghouse is qualified to supply the AP1000
design, unless Westinghouse supplies the design for the applicant's
use.
* * * * *
V. Applicable Regulations
A. * * *
2. The regulations that apply to those portions of the AP1000
design approved by Amendment 1 are in 10 CFR parts 20, 50, 73, and
100, codified as of December 30, 2011, that are applicable and
technically relevant, as described in the Supplement No. 2 of the
FSER (NUREG-1793).
* * * * *
VI. Issue Resolution
* * * * *
B. * * *
1. All nuclear safety issues, except for the generic TS and
other operational requirements, associated with the information in
the FSER and Supplement Nos. 1 and 2, Tier 1, Tier 2 (including
referenced information, which the context indicates is intended as
requirements, and the investment protection short-term availability
controls in Section 16.3 of the DCD), and the rulemaking records for
initial certification and Amendment 1 of the AP1000 design;
2. All nuclear safety and safeguards issues associated with the
referenced sensitive unclassified non-safeguards information
(including proprietary information) and safeguards information
which, in context, are intended as requirements in the generic DCD
for the AP1000 design;
* * * * *
7. All environmental issues concerning severe accident
mitigation design alternatives
[[Page 82103]]
associated with the information in the NRC's EA for the AP1000
design, Appendix 1B of Revision 15 of the generic DCD, the NRC's
final EA for Amendment 1 to the AP1000 design, and Appendix 1B of
Revision 19 of the generic DCD, for plants referencing this appendix
whose site parameters are within those specified in the severe
accident mitigation design alternatives evaluation.
* * * * *
E. The NRC will specify at an appropriate time the procedures to
be used by an interested person who wishes to review portions of the
design certification or references containing safeguards information
or sensitive unclassified non-safeguards information (including
proprietary information, such as trade secrets or financial
information obtained from a person that are privileged or
confidential (10 CFR 2.390 and 10 CFR part 9)), for the purpose of
participating in the hearing required by 10 CFR 52.85, the hearing
provided under 10 CFR 52.103, or in any other proceeding relating to
this appendix in which interested persons have a right to request an
adjudicatory hearing.
* * * * *
VIII. Processes for Changes and Departures
* * * * *
B. * * *
5. * * *
b. A proposed departure from Tier 2, other than one affecting
resolution of a severe accident issue identified in the plant-
specific DCD or one affecting information required by 10
CFR52.47(a)(28) to address 10 CFR 50.150, requires a license
amendment if it would:
* * * * *
d. If an applicant or licensee proposes to depart from the
information required by 10 CFR 52.47(a)(28) to be included in the
FSAR for the standard design certification, then the applicant or
licensee shall consider the effect of the changed feature or
capability on the original assessment required by 10 CFR 50.150(a).
The applicant or licensee must also document how the modified design
features and functional capabilities continue to meet the assessment
requirements in 10 CFR 50.150(a)(1) in accordance with Section X of
this appendix.
* * * * *
6. * * *
b. A licensee who references this appendix may not depart from
the following Tier 2* matters without prior NRC approval. A request
for a departure will be treated as a request for a license amendment
under 10 CFR 50.90.
(1) Maximum fuel rod average burn-up.
(2) Fuel principal design requirements.
(3) Fuel criteria evaluation process.
(4) Fire areas.
(5) Reactor coolant pump type.
(6) Small-break loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) analysis
methodology.
(7) Screen design criteria.
(8) Heat sink data for containment pressure analysis.
c. A licensee who references this appendix may not, before the
plant first achieves full power following the finding required by 10
CFR 52.103(g), depart from the following Tier 2* matters except
under paragraph B.6.b of this section. After the plant first
achieves full power, the following Tier 2* matters revert to Tier 2
status and are subject to the departure provisions in paragraph B.5
of this section.
(1) Nuclear Island structural dimensions.
(2) American Society of Mechanical Engineers Boiler & Pressure
Vessel Code (ASME Code) piping design and welding restrictions, and
ASME Code Cases.
(3) Design Summary of Critical Sections.
(4) American Concrete Institute (ACI) 318, ACI 349, American
National Standards Institute/American Institute of Steel
Construction (ANSI/AISC)-690, and American Iron and Steel Institute
(AISI), ``Specification for the Design of Cold Formed Steel
Structural Members, Part 1 and 2,'' 1996 Edition and 2000
Supplement.
(5) Definition of critical locations and thicknesses.
(6) Seismic qualification methods and standards.
(7) Nuclear design of fuel and reactivity control system, except
burn-up limit.
(8) Motor-operated and power-operated valves.
(9) Instrumentation and control system design processes,
methods, and standards.
(10) Passive residual heat removal (PRHR) natural circulation
test (first plant only).
(11) Automatic depressurization system (ADS) and core make-up
tank (CMT) verification tests (first three plants only).
(12) Polar crane parked orientation.
(13) Piping design acceptance criteria.
(14) Containment vessel design parameters, including ASME Code,
Section III, Subsection NE.
(15) Human factors engineering.
(16) Steel composite structural module details.
* * * * *
X. Records and Reporting
A. * * *
1. The applicant for this appendix shall maintain a copy of the
generic DCD that includes all generic changes it makes to Tier 1 and
Tier 2, and the generic TS and other operational requirements. The
applicant shall maintain sensitive unclassified non-safeguards
information (including proprietary information) and safeguards
information referenced in the generic DCD for the period that this
appendix may be referenced, as specified in Section VII of this
appendix.
* * * * *
4.a. The applicant for the AP1000 design shall maintain a copy
of the AIA performed to comply with the requirements of 10 CFR
50.150(a) for the term of the certification (including any period of
renewal).
b. An applicant or licensee who references this appendix shall
maintain a copy of the AIA performed to comply with the requirements
of 10 CFR 50.150(a) throughout the pendency of the application and
for the term of the license (including any period of renewal).
* * * * *
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 22nd day of December 2011.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Annette L. Vietti-Cook,
Secretary of the Commission.
[FR Doc. 2011-33266 Filed 12-29-11; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P