BRINGING BACK
THE EBO 4

EXERCISE GOOD
HOPE V

ATE TEST FIRES
THE INGWE

US & IRAN
IN HORMUZ
AFRICAN IMPLICATIONS
Land Forces Africa 2012 is the only content-rich platform for leaders in the defence and security industry to discuss the collaboration and streamlining of landward military operations in Southern Africa and further abroad, to counteract internal and external threats, symmetrical and asymmetric.

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**28 – 30 May 2012**

Gallagher Convention Centre

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**ISSN 0379-6477**

After numerous deployment over recent years that involved peace support, peace enforcement combat operations the Australian Defence Force is now engaged in radical restructuring of the Army. The focus is now on the provision of three regular force manoeuvre brigades that will have amphibious capability. These three brigades will be supported by six reserve brigades and all nine will include the component parts that in the past were found in what were classed as Light Brigades, Motorized Brigades and mechanized brigades. Each of the Regular brigades will be linked with two of the reserve formations perhaps not so different from the present South African Army structure.

Experience gained over recent years with numerous deployments to curb violent unrest on the island nations of the Pacific and to active operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have played a major role in this restructuring process. What is of interest is the increasing focus on an amphibious capability and the purchase of two landing helicopter dock (LHD) ships as an addition to an already existing ability. The Australian Army is similar to the South African Army in regular manpower which provide their three brigades, but they are able to provide their ORBAT with six Reserve Force brigades. This is something that warrants investigation, one obvious reason is the way that they implement the reservist system.

The suggestion that should the situation require the deployment of a peacekeeping force in Syria that South Africa would be prepared to participate and supply troops for such a mission will have come as a surprise to many. While it is generally accepted that the South African Defence force is under funded it has been able to undertake all its tasking and project the country’s image most successfully playing a major African military role in Africa. It has the ability to apply an African solution to an African problem. In Southern Africa South Africa has helped to develop the African Union brigade from the defense forces of the region and together they have created a brigade which is an example of joint cooperation. The brigade has a working command and control structure that works as shown by the recent joint exercise undertaken by the air force of the regional countries regional countries and which showed a high standard of serviceability of a mixed aircraft component. Perhaps the experience that has been gained by this brigade could be used and developed by the military office of the African Union. This offer to consider deployment of South African troops outside of Africa could be seen as an indication of a flexible foreign policy.

The recent Reserve Force conference in Pretoria raised a number of questions that the system faces and not for the first time. It is now time that action be taken to address them. Of prime importance is the need for supportive employment for the reservists and it was stated that the Post Office was one employer who provided both support and understanding. It should not need much thinking or effort to approach the other departments of state. At least to give some advantage to those who have completed the two years of voluntary service when seeking employment.
SITREP
A summary of defence reports

**EBO TRUST SET TO RETURN EBO 4 FROM ANGOLA**

The Ebo Trust, under the management of its chairperson, Maj Gen (Ret) G. Opperman, is set to begin the excavation and identification of four South African Defence Force (SADF) personnel killed in Ebo during part of Operation Savannah. A several-year project will soon see the servicemen interred at the Wall of Remembrance within the grounds of the Voortrekker Monument, Pretoria. The team sets out for Angola in May.

The servicemen were killed in two separate incidents during the Ebo attack. Capt DJ Taljaard, 2nd Lt KA Williamson, and 2nd Lt EB Thompson were shot down by Angolan anti-aircraft fire while on a reconnaissance flight over enemy lines. Their Cessna 185 crashed on 25 November 1975 and the bodies were never located. Both pilots and Capt Taljaard were killed either during the initial attack and subsequent crash landing, or on the ground. The details on their deaths have not yet been confirmed.

Angola officials point to one of the deceased SADF members’ suspected burial site.

“Through a favourable relationship enjoyed by South African President Zuma and Angolan President Dos Santos, the process of identifying the soldiers’ likely burial locations and facilitating their return to South Africa has been accelerated.”

The 23 November 1975 Battle at Ebo, which resulted in Trooper Lombard was killed.

The Eland 90mm Armoured vehicle in which Trooper Lombard was the driver.
Trooper N Lombard was the driver of his Eland armoured car (Panhard 90mm armoured vehicle manufactured under licence in South Africa) and was killed when it was hit by an Angolan 75mm shell.

Through a favourable relationship enjoyed by South African President Zuma and Angolan President Dos Santos, the process of identifying the soldiers’ likely burial locations and facilitating their return to South Africa has been accelerated somewhat. Within Ebo, local Angolans have been highly supportive of the project, with the local Mayor and other authorities actively offering their support to Opperman and his team. What remains to be done is a 5 May trip to Angola, where the team of forensic anthropologists and archaeologists shall exhume the bodies, identify and transport them to South Africa, where further DNA tests will be conducted to confirm each individual’s remains. Following that, the interment into the SADF Wall of Remembrance is scheduled to occur during the 3 June SADF Commemoration Day ceremonies.

The ceremony will represent the return of the last of all deceased SADF personnel from Angola, closing an important chapter in the former defence force’s history and bringing closure to friends and family of the deceased servicemen.

**SANDF RESERVE FORCE STRATEGIC WORK SESSION**

Under the co-ordination of the Chief of the Defence Force Reserves, Maj Gen Roy Andersen hosted the SANDF Reserve Force Strategic Work Session at the St George Hotel in Gauteng, South Africa, from 16-18 February.

The work session is held every four years and is designed to take stock of Reserve Force achievements and objectives for the future. The 2012 work session highlighted the achievements of the Reserve Forces so far, including the deployment in 2011 of around 15000 reserves on operations, as well as the significant response to university recruitment drives held in targeted provinces.

The session was visited for a part of the duration by the Minister of Defence, Lindiwe Sisulu, as well as visiting American and British officers invited to the event. The Reserve Force has a tightly-knit relationship with the New York National Guard, and has resulted in visits by both SANDF Reserve Force members and US National Guard servicemen to their respective sister institutions across the Atlantic.

**SAAF EXPLAINS THE CAUSE OF THREE A109 CRASHES**

The three A109 Light Utility Helicopter crashes in recent years caused by mechanical failure and pilot error, but all technical problems have been resolved, the chief of the South African Air Force has said.

Lieutenant General Carlo Gagiano reacting to the incident involving three August 109 Helicopters, said “All problems have been identified and rectified,” noting that “Air Force technicians went through all the A109’s systems and checked all
parts to isolate the problems. Since entering service around five years ago, the A109 fleet has been subject to several engineering changes.”

The three helicopters crashed as follows:
May 12, 2009, an A109 crashed into Woodstock Dam, near Bergville in KwaZulu-Natal.3 Crew Killed (Lieutenant Simon Baloyi, 27, Flight Sergeant Moné Zuidmeer, 32, and Captain Bongani Mdluli, 34). Gagiano said the crash was judged to be caused by pilot error, as it is ‘dangerous’ flying over flat water that reflects the sky.

Two helicopters were damaged in November and December 2010, without casualties. On December 15, 2010, an A109 made an emergency landing near Ballito on the KwaZulu-Natal north coast while assisting the police and Business Against Crime. “During the flight, the pilot lost control of the helicopter and had to execute an emergency landing. There were no serious injuries reported, but the commander of the aircraft and a civilian were taken to the Ballito Hospital for observation,” the SANDF said. The rotorcraft was carrying a crew of two and two passengers.


Gagiano said that the cause of one of the 2010 crashes was due to tail rotor failure while the other crash was caused when a swash plate control rod broke, but that all mechanical problems have been solved.

**ZIMBABWEAN POLICE COMMISSIONER’S CONTRACT EXTENDED – DEFENCE FORCES TO FOLLOW**

Mugabe recently extended the terms of office of all service chiefs. Police Commissioner-General Augustine Chi-huri’s term of office has been extended to 2014. The length of the extension of the terms of Commanders of the Zimbabwe Defence Forces General Constantine Chiwenga, Zimbabwe National Army Commander Lieutenant General Philip Valerio Sibanda, Air Marshal Perrance Shiri and Commissioner of Prisons Retired Major General Paradzai Zimondi will be announced when their current ones expire.

The reappointments followed a meeting of Principals to the Global Political Agreement (GPA) on 8 February 2012. However, while Zanu-PF insists that all the Principals agreed to the reappointments, there is confusion, with the three leaders issuing conflicting statements on the issue. While Tsvangirai and Arthur Mutambara said the principals agreed Chiwuri was now working in an acting capacity until the principals decided on his future, President Mugabe insists the issue is resolved because his contract was extended to 2014.

Tsvangirai’s spokesperson, Luke Tamborinyoka, dismissed Charamba’s pronouncement as “utter rubbish”. Mutambara concurred, saying: “We stick to the content of our press conference yesterday (Wednesday). We have documented records of our meeting of principals done by the Chief Secretary to Cabinet (Dr Mischek Sibanda).”

If he is reappointed, this will be the 14th time that Chiwuri’s contract has been renewed since his first term expired in 1997. Chiwuri took over as acting commissioner from Henry Mukurazhizha in 1991 before assuming the position on a full time basis in 1993. Before the GPA meeting, Tsvangirai met with Mugabe in their usual weekly meetings where, according to minutes of their meeting which were leaked to the media, they agreed to defer the appointment of Chiwuri until the PSC had been regularised. But Charamba released his own statement later announcing the extension of Chiwuri’s tenure, in a move widely seen as a slap to both Tsvangirai and Mutambara.

Analysts said that Mugabe’s position, as captured by Charamba’s statement, juxtaposed against Tsvangirai and Mutambara’s stances that Chiwuri was now an acting police commissioner general could lead to a complete breakdown of the government of national unity.

**SENEGALESE MILITARY PERSONNEL TO VOTE IN 2012**

Military personnel have been allowed to vote in Senegal’s 26 February presidential elections, which will see incumbent, Abdoulaye Wade, aiming for a third term.

This is only the second election where Senegalese army and paramilitary corps have been allowed to vote since independence in 1960. In the previous elections, observers believed that the majority of officers and soldiers, who dressed in civilian clothes when voting, could have voted for Wade.

Since the beginning of 2012, Senegal has been beset with pre-election violence thus far with numerous groups opposing Wade’s run for a third term. Wade holds that changes to the country’s constitution, which was altered in 2001 to include a presidential two-term limit, does not apply to him since his first term fell under the previous ruling.

Violence has been on the increase in Senegal as the elections approach, with the youth especially taking exception to what they see as Wade manipulating a system that will ultimately see his son assume power. Among these groups are Y’en a marre (which means ‘fed up’ in French) and the June 23 Movement (M23), a movement that grew out...
of the 23 June 2011 protests to Wade’s attempt to hold a constitution changing referendum. Prominent opposition candidate, and music icon, Youssou N’Dour’s presidential hopes were dashed, along with a number of other opposition candidates at the end of January, just before Wade was given the go-ahead to run for a third term. This has left Wade with only 13 disparate opponents.

**MEND THREATENS SOUTH AFRICAN INVESTMENTS IN NIGERIA**

The Movement of the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) has resumed hostilities in Nigeria. Not only have they taken to targeting various pipelines and foreign facilities in the oil-rich south, but they recently threatened to bomb South African investments in their country. This decision follows an alleged interference by President Jacob Zuma in the organisation’s mandate. In this regard, Henry Okah, a former leader of MEND, is currently on trial in South Africa for terrorist attacks during Nigeria’s Independence Day celebrations in 2010. MEND further claims that Zuma has become a trusted crony of Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan, which shall lead only to unfortunate consequences.

**MEND issued the following warning through its spokesperson, Jomo Gbomo:**

In the dark days to come, MTN, SACOIL and other South African Investments will pay a heavy price for the interference of Jacob Zuma in the legitimate fight for justice in the Niger Delta by its people. The South African president has reduced himself to the position of a “hired thug” for Goodluck Jonathan.

The South African Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) has noted that it will investigate these threats. Clayson Monyela, spokesperson for the department declared that “it is matter we’ll look into definitely: terrorism has to be rooted out.” Moreover, DIRCO seems confident in the capabilities of Nigerian authorities as Monyela stated that they have “always been responsive to acts that are unlawful.”

In addition to threats by MEND, the Islamic terrorist organisation Boko Haram, which operates mainly in northern Nigeria, has further threatened to attack all telecommunication corporations operating in the state.

“In addition to threats by MEND, the Islamic terrorist organisation Boko Haram, which operates mainly in northern Nigeria, has further threatened to attack all telecommunication corporations operating in the state.”

This includes the likes of MTN, Airtel, Glo and NCC. Boko Haram claims that these entities aided the arrest of its top members by providing Nigerian security agents with the call logs of key leaders in the organisation.

**Boko Haram has issued the following warning:**

No matter what we cannot be deterred.
The technology of military paint is often overlooked in examining a system and its effectiveness in combat. Historically military paint has progressed to the point where simply adding a daub of whitewash during winter is wholly unsatisfactory for modern wartime equipment. Combining the correct chemicals and compounds necessary for a paint coating that will not only provide good camouflage for vehicles, but also remain durable through all weather and combat conditions and ensure a consistent look and level of concealment throughout units.

The SA Army are currently provided by a rather obscure (outside of the industry at least) paint manufacturer call Varcol. Varcol has been providing high-grade paints and coatings in South Africa for thirty years, and took over the provision of paint for the SA Army when national paint giant Plascon withdrew its business from the military sphere. The paint coating virtually all systems in the Army, from passenger vehicle to Ratel, has been provided by Varcol and adhere to the strictest standards.

Military Specification or “milspec” paint is not easy to make. It must conform to a very strict balance of colour, gloss and infrared value. Achieving this balance is incredibly demanding, as altering "Varcol has been providing high-grade paints and coatings in South Africa for thirty years, and took over the provision of paint for the SA Army when national paint giant Plascon withdrew its business from the military sphere."
the colour can affect the other two properties in the paint. The benefit of utilising the water-based, South African-manufactured paint is obvious: it's vastly cheaper than European or American counterparts, yet provides the same (and potentially better) quality. Providing paint for a vastly cheaper price while still maintaining its quality should be a significant consideration for any international defence company or national military seeking to source new paint providers for their products or systems.

The military paint by Varcol is manufactured to British Military specifications, which by extension implies a rudimentary NATO specification. The paint is also strictly tested both in-house by technicians and through the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research, or CSIR. The CSIR ensure that the randomly-tested samples match the criteria of RSA-MIL-SPEC 42 through rigorous testing at their own Pretoria facilities.

There is a common misconception that Africa lacks a sophisticated defence industry beyond the offerings from Denel and other larger manufacturers, but this is patently untrue. The provision of world-class military paint is a capability provided in Africa, by Africans, for a vastly reduced price.

**REUTECH’S RSR 210N AIR/SEA SURVEILLANCE RADAR COMPLETES FINAL QUALIFICATION**

Electronicon A.S. a Norwegian defence equipment supply company was contracted in December 2007 by the Norwegian Defence Logistics Organisation (NDLO) to supply five RSR 210N X-Band air/sea surveillance radars. This contract was awarded for radar systems to be applied aboard the Aegis-equipped Fridtjof Nansen-class frigates of the Royal Norwegian Navy with primary role as helicopter control radar and additional supplementary surveillance capabilities. Reutech Radar Systems, a South African radar development and manufacturing company was contracted by Electronicon A.S. as the major sub-supplier into the program.

To date RSR 210N has been installed aboard KNM Otto Sverdrup, KNM Roald Amundsen and KNM Fridtjof Nansen with the balance of the five systems on schedule for delivery later this year and early next year.

A significant milestone was reached with the successful completion of the Final Qualification Review following Sea Acceptance Trials in Norwegian waters at the end of June this year. As part of the run-up to these trials, several engineering trials were conducted, often executed under adverse weather and sea state conditions. The trials collectively proved the system's ability to provide the ship with a high performance supplementary air/sea surveillance capability as well as to provide high accuracy helicopter position reporting even under complex clutter conditions encountered in the Norwegian landward, littoral and open sea environments.

These trials comprised extensive accuracy measurements, near and far range detection performance of both air and sea targets as well as the system's ability to classify targets as surface, fixed wing or helicopter. Sustained performance in the presence of electronic counter-measures has confirmed the status of RSR 210N as a true naval radar.

The successful completion of the Final Qualification Review establishes RSR 210N’s operational standing aboard principal warships of a leading NATO navy.

*Source: Reutech*

**ATE FIRES INGWE FROM EC 635**

20 January 2012

Advanced Technologies and Engineering Co. (Pty) Ltd successfully completed the first airborne firing of the INGWE missile from the EC635 helicopter at the De Wet Weapons range near Bloemfontein.
during December 2012. The guided missile capability development forms part of the second phase of the Stand Alone Weapons System (SAWS) development programme contracted to ATE by European helicopter manufacturer Eurocopter. ATE’s CEO, Willie van Biljon, praised the effort from the development team in achieving this major milestone.

“The successful firing of the INGWE missile demonstrates the pinpoint accuracy capability of the SAWS and EC635 helicopter”, stated Mark R. Henning, Eurocopter’s programme manager for the Danube Programme. The first phase of the SAWS Programme comprising the qualification of the ballistic capability using the FN Herstal HMP–400 12.7mm machine gun, Nexter NC-621 20mm cannon and FZ-233 70mm rocket launcher was completed during the last quarter of 2011. The qualification of the guided missile (INGWE) capability is planned for completion during the first quarter of 2012. The SAWS will allow light and medium helicopters to perform in a range of missions, including:

• Surveillance and armed reconnaissance
• Airborne Command and Control
• Close Air Support
• Maritime patrol, littoral warfare (anti-piracy), Coast Guard
• Counter insurgency
• Anti-terrorism
• Potential for light ASuW and ASW

The SAWS typically comprises:

• A core element including a Mission & Firing Control Computer, together with controls and components to interface the crew and the platform.
• A choice of sensors: FLIR, TV, HUD, HMSD.
• A choice of guided weapons providing the necessary flexibility for a given mission.
• A choice of unguided weapons.

By John Reynolds

DENEL LAND SYSTEMS SHOWS GI-30: 30MM CAMGUN

As part of its development contract for South Africa’s new generation infantry combat vehicle, Denel Land Systems (DLS) is progressing well with the development of its GI-30: 30mm CamGun. The GI-30 is a unique externally driven electro-mechanical cannon, utilising a drum-cam to cycle the breech to chamber rounds and extract spent cartridges, thus minimising gasses in the confines of a turret and facilitate for controlled firing rate. DLS designed the GI-30 to fire link-less 30mm x 173 ammunition through a dual feeder – a world-first for this kind of weapon. As a single-shot weapon, GI-30 is also unique for its sniper mode of operation. It is fired from a closed breech position, which offers more accurate fire due to no movement taking place immediately before the round is fired. Another unique feature of the GI-30 is that of ‘next round selection’. Having two feeders with general ammunition on the right-hand and specialist types in the other feeder, the weapon allows the operator to select a specific round, without first firing off or ejecting an unwanted round. Ammunition is replenished from the supply inside the turret. With an eye on specific requirements laid down by the client (the South African Army), DLS designed the weapon with a 3-round burst-shoot mode at 60 rounds per minute, for both general and specialised ammunition. Empty cartridge shells are ejected to the left side of the weapon. So far, DLS conducted a number of test qualifications of the weapon using SAPHEI, APFSDS (Armoured Piercing Fin-Stabilised Discarding Sabot) and TPT (Target Practice Type) ammunition types. With its double baffle muzzle-brake, the GI-30 has a single recoil mechanism. In its application as envisaged in the SA Army, the weapon will have an effective range of 4000m.

All in all, the development of GI-30 is part of an Armscor contract signed during 2007 for the ‘Badger’ Infantry Combat Vehicle. Successful milestones have thus far been reached with the development phase of the ‘Badger’ ICV.

As a state-owned-enterprise, DLS is a landward defence system solutions business. Its primary focus is to provide products to the South African National Defence Force (SANDF), for which it acts as a prime contractor. It also serves the international customers as a world-class systems integrator and subsystem supplier.

NAVANTIA & VEECRAFT MARINE SIGN MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

February 2012. – Spanish shipbuilder Navantia and South African shipbuilder VeeCraft Marine have signed a
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) for the construction in South Africa of Navantia’s Avante class Inshore & Offshore Patrol Vessels. Navantia was invited in June 2011 to submit information for the construction of these vessels for the South African Navy in terms of Project Biro, and both companies are gearing themselves up for the possibility of new business that may flow therefrom. The MOU is indicative of Navantia’s serious intention of offering vessels with cutting edge technology to the SA Navy whilst at the same time working hand in hand with local industry in the construction of these vessels.

**INTERNATIONAL INDUSTRY NEWS**

**US - ISRAEL ARROW WEAPON SYSTEM COMPLETES SUCCESSFUL FLIGHT TEST**

The Israel Missile Defense Organization and the U.S. Missile Defense Agency completed a successful test of the cooperative U.S.-Israel Arrow Weapon System (AWS) over the Mediterranean Sea today. Data collected from the flight test will be used to verify functionality of the Block 4 AWS. The success of the test is the final test before delivery of the Block 4 Arrow Weapon System. This was a major milestone in the development of the Arrow Weapon System and provides confidence in operational Israeli capabilities to defeat the developing ballistic missile threat.

*Source: Missile Defense Agency (MDA)*

**1ST FLIGHT OF TORNADO PRODUCTION AIRCRAFT WITH ASSTA 3.0**

The first ASSTA 3.0 production aircraft performed its functional maiden flight at Cassidian’s Manching site on 8 February. Over the next few months, a concerted effort will be made to finalise and certify the ASSTA 3.0 software. The first Tornados upgraded will then be delivered to the German Air Force in mid-2012 as planned.

*Source: Cassidian*

**COLUMBIAN NAVAL INDUSTRY GROWS STRONGER**

“A.R.C. 20 de Julio”, joins the National Navy fleet. 1000 direct work posts and 1500 indirect work posts generated by Cotecmar through the construction of this vessel. The delivery of the “A.R.C. 20 de Julio” vessel by Cotecmar to the Colombian Navy consolidates the reemergence of an industry that, until recently, was not too widely known in Colombia.

*Source: Cotecmar*

**ERNST & YOUNG TO DELIVER RIZZO SUPPORT**

Ernst & Young (E&Y) has teamed with Babcock to win a contract to provide support to the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) in delivering a blueprint to ‘Rebuild Navy Engineering Capability’, following the Rizzo Report.

One of the key strategic actions recommended in Paul Rizzo’s ‘Plan to Reform Support Ship Repair and Management Practices’ report, published in July 2011, was that “Navy Engineering should be rebuilt and reorganised to reduce fragmentation, increase authority, clarify accountability, and enable the Head of Navy Engineering to fulfil his role as the Technical Regulatory Authority.” The report continues: “It should be led by a 2-star Navy Officer to give weight to this important technical and compliance function.”

*Source: Babcock International*

**NEW USAF X-PLANE, THE X-56A UAV**

In exclusive coverage, Aviation Week has revealed a new U.S. Air Force X-plane, the X-56A Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV), which will test active flutter suppression and gust load alleviation--vital technologies that will propel the development of slender, lightweight, high-aspect-ratio wings for future transports and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance UAVs. Designed by Lockheed Martin’s Skunk Works, the X-56A flying wing will also be flown by NASA and is considered the future of high-altitude, long-endurance (HALE) reconnaissance aircraft.

*Source: Aviation Week*

“Designed by Lockheed Martin’s Skunk Works, the X-56A flying wing will also be flown by NASA and is considered the future of high-altitude, long-endurance (HALE) reconnaissance aircraft.”
NATICK USES EFFICIENT AIRDROP TESTING

Drop zone testing options for the Airdrop Technology Team at Natick Soldier Research, Development and Engineering Center have been used to ensure Science and Technology research projects stay on schedule and within budget.

Commercial drop zones such as Skydive Arizona and Red Lake are ideal facilities for Airdrop’s preliminary testing.

“We started using these drop zones a lot for early parts of the cargo drop programs and tests,” said Steve Tavan, Airdrop Technology Team research leader. “I am allocated a budget and have a defined schedule, as are lots of my other colleagues.”

“If I had to do everything at the most stringent testing level, I don’t even think it would happen, because we’re working on cutting-edge technology,” Tavan explained. “It’s all new and different, so it has to be checked out thoroughly.”

The Airdrop Technology Team has been improving airdrop capabilities at an ever-increasing rate over the last 10 years. The goal of the Army and Air Force is to reduce the risk of ground fire by flying higher and farther away from the intended airdrop system impact points.

Within the past six years, Airdrop’s focus has been precision landing.

“We have a lot of Soldiers out there in austere bases,” Tavan said. “We have lots of places where men and women are in combat situations and might not be able to get supplies through any other means than from the air.”

The Airdrop Technology Team has been improving airdrop capabilities at an ever-increasing rate over the last 10 years. The goal of the Army and Air Force is to reduce the risk of ground fire by flying higher and farther away from the intended airdrop system impact points. Within the past six years, Airdrop’s focus has been precision landing.

“Within the past six years, Airdrop’s focus has been precision landing.”

“The goal of the Army and Air Force is to reduce the risk of ground fire by flying higher and farther away from the intended airdrop system impact points. Within the past six years, Airdrop’s focus has been precision landing.”

JAPAN ORDERS AIRBORNE LASER MINE DETECTION SYSTEMS

The Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force has purchased four helicopter-mountable, laser mine detection. This is the first direct commercial sale of Northrop Grumman Corporation’s (NYSE:NOC) Airborne Laser Mine Detection System (ALMDS) to an international navy.

The mine detection system is laser-based and utilizes streak tube imaging light detection and ranging (LIDAR) to detect, classify and localize near-surface moored sea mines. With high area coverage rate capability, the system transmits a fan-shaped beam of laser light that detects, classifies, and localizes near-surface moored sea mines.
light to establish its swath width, and then relies on the forward motion of the helicopter to sweep the light over the water in a “push broom” manner.

Source: Northrop Grumman Corporation (NYSE:NOC)

BABCOCK TESTS AWD TORPEDO LAUNCHER

Testing of the Mk32 Mod 9 torpedo launchers is underway at Babcock’s Techport Australia premises. Two Mk32 Mod 9 torpedo launcher assemblies will be mounted in magazine compartments, port and starboard, on each of the three Hobart class AWDs. The system is made up of three main components; a launcher, an air charging panel and a torpedo loading tray. The air charging panel and loading tray have been designed by Babcock to meet the requirements of the AWD Alliance.

Source: Babcock International

RHEINMETALL RELEASES 2011 SALES FIGURES

• Consolidated sales up 12% to €4,454 million
• Growth in Automotive and Defence sectors
• Earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) up 19% to €354 million
• Earnings before taxes (EBT) increases by 29% to €295 million

Rheinmetall AG, based in Düsseldorf, achieved significant growth in sales and earnings in fiscal 2011. Preliminary consolidated earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) reached a new high at €354 million. Sales generated in the fiscal year total €4,454 million according to preliminary figures. Rheinmetall had recently forecast sales of €4.4 billion and EBIT between €340 million and €360 million.

Rheinmetall has expanded the sales volume in both sectors and reports growth of approximately 12% in fiscal 2011 compared with the previous year’s figure of €3,989 million. There has been an even higher rise in earnings: EBIT climbed by €57 million from the €297 million figure achieved the previous year – an increase of 19%. Hence, the EBIT margin in the Group has improved from 7.4% (2010) to 7.9% in fiscal 2011. The Rheinmetall Group also achieved a new record in earnings before taxes (EBT) of €295 million. EBT is up €66 million or 29% year-on-year.

The Automotive sector excelled, with a very pleasant development in sales combined with a particularly positive growth in earnings. Automotive has boosted sales by €331 million or 17% to €2,313 million (2010: €1,982 million). The sector achieved an increase in EBIT of €70 million or 86%, which now totals €151 million (2010: €81 million).

In the year under review, sales in the Defence sector increased by 7% or €134 million to €2,141 million (2010: €2,007 million). At €223 million, EBIT is slightly down on the previous year’s figure of €234 million. With an EBIT margin of 10.4% the Defence sector has again reached a high level. Rheinmetall will publish its final figures for fiscal 2011 on March 21, 2012.

GD AND BAE DEMONSTRATE 81MM PRECISION MORTAR ROUND

General Dynamics Ordnance and Tactical Systems, a business unit of General Dynamics (NYSE: GD), and BAE Systems (LSE: BA) have successfully demonstrated a tactical version of their 81mm Roll Control Guided Mortar (RCGM) at Yuma Proving Grounds, Ariz., in January.

Sixteen rounds were tested in total, all of which guided to within an average miss distance of approximately seven meters from the target at ranges from 980 meters to 4,000 meters.

The tactical configuration of the RCGM used the current UK L41 high explosive mortar round and a six-increment propulsion charge system produced by BAE Systems. The guidance package developed by General Dynamics consists of a GPS receiver, standard M734A1 multi-option fuze components, and the company’s patented Roll-Controlled Fixed Canard (RCFC) control system. This success is the result of a great team including the U.S. Army ARDEC and Yuma Proving Grounds test community. The telemetry and high-speed video coverage from the tests demonstrate, without a question, the maturity and capability of our 81mm RCGM. We are now in a position to offer the U.S., UK and other allies an affordable guided 81mm precision mortar capability in the very near term.”

“The BAE Systems 81mm mortar system is in service with more than 40 countries worldwide, including the U.S. and UK, so we see a large potential market for this low-cost precision round which can be fired from our mortar tube without any modification.”

“The BAE Systems 81mm mortar system is in service with more than 40 countries worldwide, including the U.S. and UK, so we see a large potential market for this low-cost precision round which can be fired from our mortar tube without any modification.” said Ian Anderton, managing director of BAE Systems Global Combat Systems Munitions.
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Land Systems South Africa delivers security. For years, we’ve designed and produced mine-protected and armoured vehicles, mechanical transmission systems, weapons training systems and turrets for the South African National Defence Force and the South African Police, as well as many global customers. But as we build these products, we’re building our communities too. We help create and sustain thousands of jobs at more than 380 businesses in our supply chain and support our workforce and future generations through education, skills improvement and research. Most of all, we’re providing security to the men and women who make the world a safer place for us all.

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The AU Commissioner position had received a dramatic turn of events during the fourth round in mid-February. During a two day closed session, Ping was effectively deprived of the two-thirds majority needed for re-election, in itself a rather unprecedented turn of events, as the fourth round generally only has one nominee on the roster, and the outstanding nations generally rally around him or her. However, with the lack of a two-thirds majority – Ping was short by three – A new commissioner must be elected in six months time, when the election process is resumed.

This turn of events gives new hope to South African Home Affairs Minister, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, who is now back in contention for the top seat. Political leadership of the AU now remains in question for six months, but provides an excellent opportunity for SADC member states to redouble their efforts. For now, however, Ping will remain as Commissioner, along with the commission heads, in order to ensure the operation of the AU during this somewhat unprecedented state of affairs.

There were allegations of intensive French lobbying for the re-election of Ping, which might well have triggered this response during the fourth round of voting. While giving Zuma a second chance at the seat is encouraging for SADC members, there is a very crucial aspect of the AU which SADC states would do well to consider: The Standby Force. The AU Standby Force (ASF) provides a very good opportunity for the SADC Brigade to place a 100 percent African military structure in the AU.

With scepticism rife on French involvement in Ping’s election campaign, the entire Commission has been cast in some doubt. Combined with this, the ASF remains questionable in terms of whether it can actually fulfil its current obligations. The outline of Amani Africa II was widely-publicised throughout the AU, and held a respectable regime of preparations designed at creating a force capable of successfully completing a Scenario 61 exercise. Amani Africa I concluded successfully in October 2010 but was poorly attended by ambassadorial staff. Nonetheless, the initial exercise pointed out the value and potential of interoperability, teamwork, and general multinational co-operation that was achieved through the 200 odd personnel involved. The African Peace and Security
Architecture (APSA) roadmap requires regional brigades to be ready to implement Scenario 6 of the Conflict and Missions Scenarios: But Amani Africa II is somewhat unclear, with very little information forthcoming on the status of the initiating conference held in late 2011 nor of the 1st Joint Field Reconnaissance that was scheduled for February. The cycle is being jointly run with European Union, with the AU command component including officers from Nigeria, Mali, Cameroon, and Ghana. Funded through the EU African Peace Facility, the cycle, while important, has a strong European presence. But without an unambiguous way forward towards the full completion of Amani Africa II, a major question is one of whether the ASF can actually possess Scenario 6 intervention capability by 2015?

Currently the SADC Brigade is the most functional and up-to-date standby force at the AU’s disposal. But its involvement in ASF Brigade command is muted. This should be changed.

With the Eastern and Western battling the rising scourge of terrorism in their regions and the Northern Brigade in an understandable disarray following the Arab Spring, the rational course of action would be to employ the SADC Brigade commanders in the ASF as overall coordinators not only of Amani Africa II, but of current operational responsibility not adequately addressed by the AU as it stands. Johan Potgieter, a senior researcher at the Pretoria-based Institute for Security Studies (ISS) stated in 2010 that “The selection and further development of senior leaders in missions should be seriously considered, as making decisions (any decision) seems to be a general problem.” In this regard, SADC commanders can assist in breaking the paralysis of the ASF if given command in Addis Ababa rather than Gaborone.

On both the political and defence considerations for the AU there are serious obstacles to overcome in considering a SADC Commissioner or SADC Brigade command in Ethiopia. Firstly, the political considerations were a major consideration for the failure by Zuma to gain the Commissioner seat. Political analyst Stephen Friedman noted that the real reason behind this opposition to a SADC Commissioner was due to the concern that with “SADC (and South African) economic infrastructure strength, other countries feared that SA would dominate Africa politically if given a chance.” The common sense reaction to this would be “why not?” If a SADC member state, representing a region which exudes capability, can take the helm of the AU and provide needed direction in an organisation that otherwise lacks this, it should be done.

The same applies in a military context (perhaps more so) in that the SADC Brigade has proven its decision-making ability in military interventions during Exercise Golfinho highlighted SADC readiness and progress along the roadmap towards Scenario 6. At present the SADC Brigade is on track towards this, and remains one of the

“The outline of Amani Africa II was widely-publicised throughout the AU, and held a respectable regime of preparations designed at creating a force capable of successfully completing a Scenario 6 exercise.”

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**Scenario 1. AU/Regional military advice to a political mission.**

**Scenario 2. AU/Regional observer mission co-deployed with UN mission.**

**Scenario 3. Stand-alone AU/Regional observer mission.**

**Scenario 4. AU/Regional peacekeeping force (PKF) for Chapter VI and preventive deployment missions.**

**Scenario 5. AU PKF for complex multidimensional PK mission-low level spoilers (a feature of many current conflicts).**

**Scenario 6. AU intervention for example in genocide situations where the international community does not act promptly.”**
only regional forces with the potential to achieve that AU milestone by 2015. The true value in this regard is in the sense of a SADC-led ability to expand decision-making and training efficiency throughout the ASF. It would certainly stand in good stead in the reformation of the Northern Brigade, particularly when considering South African experience in the problems of post-conflict reorganisation of a state defence force.

Ultimately the AU is presented with a golden opportunity to step away from external pressures, political and military, and select both a Commissioner and a command that is based on the ability to make decisions and steer the organisation forward. If political envy of SADC economic power can be put to the wayside in the interests of a common good, then all African parties involved in the ASF and beyond stand to benefit.

“...If a SADC member state, representing a region which exudes capability, can take the helm of the AU and provide needed direction in an organisation that otherwise lacks this, it should be done.”

John Stupart has a Masters degree in Strategic Studies and works as an author for a major defence publication. He has presented work on North and Eastern African strategic issues and has written his thesis on piracy in the Gulf of Aden.

African Union soldiers can be best-prepared for ASF deployments through a sound command structure in Ethiopia.
**SOUTH AFRICA – GERMAN NAVAL EXERCISES: EXERCISE GOOD HOPE V**

As part of South Africa’s bi-lateral military commitments and agreements, the country engages regularly in bi- or multi-lateral military exercises with a number of countries. According to the South African Navy (SAN), the SAN has always sought to benchmark itself with and take its rightful place amongst the major navies of the world and regular exercises are conducted with foreign navies.

Exercise Good Hope is a large-scale bi-national and joint exercise between the SAN, the South African Air Force (SAAF) and the German Navy and takes place off the waters of South Africa on a bi-annual basis. The first phase will take place between 29 February and 10 March, whilst the final phase will take place between 11 and 25 March 2012. Both Durban and Simon’s Town will be used during this later phase.

A German navy frigate is thus due in South Africa at the end of February to partake in Exercise Good Hope V, a series of naval and air exercises between Germany and South Africa. This series of exercises, the fifth to be conducted in South African waters between the two countries, is also the largest undertaken by the German Task Force Group outside of its NATO obligations.

As the planning of the exercise provides for a major part of the exercise top be conducted in the Mozambique channel, Mozambican observers were due to embark on board the SAS Isandlwana for the first stage of the exercise.

**FOCUS GOOD HOPE V: ANTI-PIRACY**

Factors such as financial constraints and, more importantly, the threat of piracy off the African East Coast, have combined to focus the exercise on a real-life scenario that has grabbed the headlines and constitutes a major concern for governments from Somaliland to Mozambique and South Africa. Exercise Good Hope V will be conducted off the coast of Mozambique and the aim is to conduct exercises that will facilitate the sharing of expertise in general and anti-piracy operations in particular. The SAN will utilise their frigate currently involved with anti-piracy operations in the Mozambique Channel (Operation Copper). The German Navy will also be utilizing a vessel that is returning from Operation Atalanta, the European Union’s Naval Force counter-piracy operation in the Gulf of Aden and Somali Basin.

The fifth South Africa - German Naval exercise will see a deepening inspection of counter-piracy capabilities in the Mozambican Channel. Good Hope V has the potential for showcasing African maritime capability in an ocean space dominated by foreign Navies.

“This series of exercises, the fifth to be conducted in South African waters between the two countries, is also the largest undertaken by the German Task Force Group outside of its NATO obligations.”
represented by FGS Lübeck, a frigate which also carries two Sea Lynx Mk 88 helicopters and a marine boarding team. In January the Lübeck forced Somali pirates to release an Indian dhow with 15 Indian mariners held as hostages and the ship would thus be able to impart valuable practical experience and lessons learned during the exercise.

The SAN will participate with two frigates, SAS Isandlwana in Mozambique and SAS Amatola in South Africa. A Super Lynx Mk 64 helicopter configured for surface search is embarked on the Isandlwana, whilst the SAAF will provide a C-47 TP maritime patrol Dakota in Mozambique. SAS Queen Modjadji 1 will be the submarine component and boarding teams consisting of Special Forces and Maritime Reaction Squadron personnel will assist.

"Exercise Good Hope V should thus have been seen by Mozambique as an opportunity for its naval officers and sailors to learn valuable lessons and perhaps even lay the groundwork for tangible and direct future assistance by Germany and the EU in expanding its naval capacity."

POTENTIAL FRICTION
It would appear, however, that there appears to be some confusion regarding the continuation of South Africa’s anti-piracy operation in the Mozambique Channel. The SAN, with the aid and support of Mozambique, has maintained a forward station at the port of Pemba since early 2011, under Operation Copper.

The naval presence generally consists of a frigate supported by a C-47TP Dakota reconnaissance aircraft of the SAAF. A SAN submarine has also been on patrol in the region. Navy frigate SAS Isandlwana replaced SAS Mendi on station in December 2011. South African parliamentary authorisation for the anti-piracy mission expires on March 31 this year and senior Navy personnel stated that SAS Isandlwana is due to return to South African waters shortly as the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between South Africa and Mozambique covering South Africa’s assistance in anti-piracy patrols was not yet in place and consequently the Navy will cease to operate in the Mozambican Channel until such time as the MoU had been signed.

This will impact on the first part of Exercise Good Hope V, as it is supposed to be conducted in the far south as in the Mozambique channel are beyond the scope of control by the limited Mozambique naval assets. The SAN is currently thus performing duties that Mozambique cannot perform and would not seem to be able to perform anytime soon. Exercise Good Hope V should thus have been seen by Mozambique as an opportunity for its naval offi-
Homeland Defence in Operations Other Than War (OOTW) is a challenging business with many facets that determine the manner in which such a defence is given effect. The legal framework within which Homeland Defence may take place is complex given the various threat types and the remedies available to deal with them. The complexity is exacerbated in an international arena by agreements, different cultures and political agendas to serve national interests. The allocation of resources is problematic as there are always shortages and the application thereof is hampered by organisational and technical interoperability issues. Several important factors that impact Homeland Defence are indicated in Figure 1.

Threats and Characteristics

The threats identified come in many guises and are categorised as follows for this discussion:

- Refugees
- Illegal immigrants
- Cross-border criminal activity
- Criminal activity in international territory/waters
- Militia incursions across borders
- Each threat type has unique characteristics and needs to be dealt with differently by the various government agencies in terms of country and international law. Consequently the government agency individuals directly involved need to know what may be done by whom. The perpetrators will also have knowledge of means to circumvent/ delay law enforcement to their advantage. Therefore there is a need for integrated teams of diverse specialists to handle each situation effectively.

Role-players

The key role-players in the RSA context consist of, but are not limited to, the following:

- South African National Defence Force (SANDF)
- Police services
- Customs and Excise
- National Intelligence
- Foreign Affairs
- Port Authorities
- Civil Aviation
- Social Services
- Department of Justice

In the case where neighbouring countries are involved the equivalent counterparts, especially security agencies, also become role-players if cooperation agreements are in place. The presence of many role-players, each with its own function, and culture, which are not well structured and cooperate on a mutual basis only, presents many challenges for command and control efforts to achieve Homeland Defence objectives. These objectives can form a basis for common intent amongst role-players.

Command and Control

Command and Control (C&C) is an ancient issue and the effectiveness thereof depends on many factors. Management or C&C functions in this case typically comprise:

- Setting goals
- Organising (roles, responsibilities)
- Creating business rules (how to)
- Allocating resources
- Monitoring (assessing execution performance, implementing corrective action)
place i.e. Strategic, Operational or Tactical. Understanding C&C, for the purpose of this discussion, is facilitated by the conceptual frame by Alberts and Hayes [1] in Figure 2. The traditional approach to C&C within the security environment is a centralised unitary hierarchical approach w.r.t. to decision-making. This approach is propagated down through the strategic, operational and tactical levels in terms of a hierarchical structure, facilitating very tight control. Organisationally it implies an individual is at the head of the entire organisation. In the case where many role-players are involved in a loose or “round table” organisation cooperation is based on mutual interest or common intent and structured C&C becomes interesting as there is no formal chain of command on an entity needs to be analysed to characterise the entity in terms of attributes and behaviour for quick reference purposes to aid decision makers on a course of action. Given the multiple sources of information and the many role-players involved in Homeland Defence it is logical that a shared SA is required to facilitate the achievement of Homeland Defence objectives. The issue will be about what constitutes shared SA, as role-players tend to jealously guard their information.

**PERFORMANCE CRITERIA**
The effectiveness of the Homeland Defence effort needs to be reflected by performance criteria that reflect the success of all activities, including the application of resources and the inherent efficiencies thereof. This implies a management model and systems to assist in control functions. Setting performance criteria is a

“Situational Awareness (SA) is the crux of any C&C effort, irrespective of the approach. The insight and knowledge obtained from SA is dependent on the assimilation of information and data obtained from multiple sources and the cross correlation thereof.”

or rules amongst role-players as in the traditional case mentioned above. In such a loose arrangement a different approach to C&C is required to facilitate the achievement of common objectives.

**SITUATIONAL AWARENESS**
Situational Awareness (SA) is the crux of any C&C effort, irrespective of the approach. The insight and knowledge obtained from SA is dependent on the assimilation of information and data obtained from multiple sources and the cross correlation thereof. Sense-making plays the key role in achieving situational awareness as cognitive processes are unique to each individual involved. Homeland Defence, as indicated above, is characterised by many role-players who all have information sources and have information that needs to be shared to effect good, agile decisionmaking. The time value of the information is not to be neglected. Information gathered

![Figure 1: Homeland Defence Factors](image-url)
challenge owing to the complexity of the Homeland Defence. The many possible parameters that can be of use require a high degree of correlation in a dynamic environment. The creation of a Homeland Defence Index (HDI) is of interest as this is a means to stochastically measure current performance against that of the past, using many different parameters. The means to measure the parameters must (of course) also be in place. The identification of these parameters is beyond the scope of this discussion.

**ASSET EMPLOYMENT**
Assets include all the material and intellectual means to manage Homeland Defence, gather information, and effect defensive actions. The employment of assets of various role-players needs to be co-ordinated in terms of decisions made in context of the common SA perspective; this implies a level of consensus amongst roleplayers that requires a high level of mutual confidence to achieve real success. The availability of assets, within the means of each role-player and national priorities and objectives, presents a challenge in itself as there will always be a shortage.

**TECHNOLOGY**
The role of technology cannot be under-estimated. Total reliance on technology is not a solution either. Perpetrators of criminal activity also use modern technology to ply their “trade” and consequently Homeland Defence requires modern technology for surveillance, detection and prosecution of offenders. The use of modern Information and Communication Technology (ICT) and technology cannot be under-estimated. Total reliance on technology is not a solution either. Perpetrators of criminal activity also use modern technology to ply their “trade” and consequently Homeland Defence requires modern technology for surveillance, detection and prosecution of offenders. The use of modern Information and Communication Technology (ICT) and a plethora of sensors greatly enable the collection, assimilation, distribution and exchange of information in a secure, fast and efficient manner. This includes the sharing of appropriate information on a massive scale. The implication of modern ICT systems is that business processes are enhanced which enable organisations to become very agile. The mass of relevant information available to decision-makers is in itself, a force multiplier.

**CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS—A NETWORK CENTRIC APPROACH**
The Concept of Operations for Homeland Defence needs to be considered in terms of a Network Centric (or enabled) approach to effectively address some of the characteristics of Joint, Interagency, Inter-department and Multi-national (JI2M) operations from a C&C perspective. Such an approach could go a long way to alleviate the problems that will be encountered with the traditional C&C approach (e.g. long decision lines). The JI2M operations are likely to be loosely structured, procedurally and organisationally, between main role-players who have more or less autonomy, which will hamper the execution of traditional C&C. Internal structures of role-players may differ greatly w.r.t. to central and decentralised C&C. A conceptual framework for network-centric operations by DS Alberts and RE Hayes [1] is provided in Figure 3.

A network-centric approach favours...
autonomous decentralised C&C as opposed to the central unitary C&C of the traditional approach. This implies the movement of C&C functions as far as possible to the outer reaches of the network facilitating force agility. Technology permits the interoperability at the JI2M level to share integrated information and establish relevant shared SA amongst role-players. The success of such an approach will depend on the maturity of the JI2M organisation role-players. Cultural differences will be challenging irrespective of approach. Network-centric structures can actually help solve issues as a result of autonomous C&C. Considerable cross cultural awareness training may be required at all levels, certainly at the higher command levels where personal communication takes place. Mutually agreed strategies and processes shall facilitate interoperability between JI2M role-players.

COMMON COGNITION
Irrespective of agreements between the JI2M organisations the concept of a “common cognition” within the JI2M role-players is of key importance to give effect to any objective. The concept implies a high degree of common understanding between individuals and groups of objectives and how these are going to be achieved, and the role of each individual. Only once this state is achieved is effective collaborative action possible as the collective energy of the role-players can be successfully focused. Figure 4 highlights this relationship and its intangible human complexities. The effectiveness will depend enormously on the skill and maturity of individual role-players and the extent to which they are able to collaborate.

CONCLUSION
The network-centric approach offers many advantages for Homeland Defence in a multicultural and international environment as it offers a means to manage complex mutual defence efforts on a collaboration basis. The involvement of neighbouring states on a common intent base permits the displacement of threats away from physical, political and socio-economic borders by means of a larger co-ordinated defence effort to the benefit of collaborating role-players. The visible beneficiation to the respective economies as a result of the effort will strengthen the collaboration efforts. The undermining of the collaborated efforts would no doubt constitute the most serious threat to Homeland Defence.
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The Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) have threatened South African companies operating in the delta region, and potentially throughout Nigeria. Justified as a reaction to the arrest in South Africa of Henry Okah, MEND have threatened to target South African assets with terrorist attacks, while accusing President Zuma of having “reduced himself to the position of a hired thug for Goodluck Jonathan.” MEND have been remarkably silent in preceding months, but a resurgence in their terrorist attacks appears likely.

Tuareg rebels have threatened almost 10,000 Malian civilians, who are now fleeing en masse into Niger. The Tuareg rebellion comprises insurgents and mercenaries who fought for pro-Gaddafi loyalists during the Libyan revolution. Authorities are concerned over atrocities committed in and around Aguelhok, with over 100 estimated killed, with the rebels reportedly performing summary executions and cutting of throats as a standard course of execution.
In your opinion, how was 2011 in terms of lessons learned and achievements made for the CSIR’s DPSS unit?
We experienced a strong growth in capabilities, and now have a base of approximately 300 R&D engineers. We have also started improving our identification of technologies that will have most impact.

In terms of 2012, what are you anticipating from CSIR DPSS in terms of projects or research?
We will develop new technologies and capabilities in radar, optronics, cyber security, command and control, aeronautics, landwards and special operations.

Can you elaborate on one specific project that will be prominent in 2012?
A flagship project for us will be an evolution of the Awarenet concept, airborne, wide-area surveillance system that will help our security forces to identify and recognise threats and criminal intent.

What major partnerships is CSIR DPSS hoping to broaden and showcase for this year?
We are increasing the scope of our partnership with and support to the Department of Defence (DoD) as their strategic science and technology advisor and support base in many areas. We also intend to broaden our international involvement in areas which are of strategic importance for the DoD and strengthen our capabilities.

What other major events are the DPSS participating in or hoping to launch?
Our focus will be on evaluating and validating promising new technologies in field trials many of them jointly with the SANDF.

Do you have any further comments or insights into CSIR DPSS or wider industry?
I see CSIR DPSS as a major national asset that is contributing to RSA in many ways such as technology and decision support to the DoD, new technologies and innovations, development of high-tech industrial capability, high tech exports and above all development of a formidable advanced engineering capability base in South Africa.
2012 WRITING COMPETITION

The AAF 2012 writing competition will provide a valuable platform for writing and insight into all aspects of African Military Affairs.

The 14th Military Writing Competition hosted by the African Armed Forces Journal and a key sponsor is a project aimed at displaying the wealth of military writing on African military affairs. Creating a collection of professionally-written articles will help exemplify the significance of military thought on African affairs. This purpose is best-served in a competition format, allowing for the most insightful and original written pieces to be sourced and disseminated through the AAFJ publication.

MORE INFORMATION COMING SOON!
GLOBAL ISSUES AFFECTING AFRICA

CONFLICT IN THE HORMUZ STRAIT AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR AFRICA

By Derek L. Fleming

Iranian conflict in the Straits of Hormuz with the United States (US) would be a one-sided string of engagements if it were to happen this year, and would have significant implications for Africa’s energy security needs. An Israeli air strike against Iranian nuclear facilities as intimated by Tel Aviv press reports over a three month period starting in April 2012, would trigger an Iranian response in halting mercantile shipping in the Persian Gulf. Iranian naval and air doctrine (Ashura suicide bombers) emphasizes asymmetric offensive and defense engagement and not conventional naval surface deployment.

Other triggers of conflict are possible, including extended European oil boycotts, United Nations (UN) sanctions and even unilateral action by Iran itself. In the event of an American or European vessel being crippled or exploded by sea-skimming missiles (Silkworm 300km range) or by acoustics mines, an armed response by the US Navy (USN) from deployed units in its Kenyan Mombasa portage, the Red Sea and Bahrain allows for an immediate sustained response. Targeting however has become more complicated since 1988 and the interplay of the belligerents will be longer than past encounters. African interests would be affected almost immediately at the level of the economic and the political both at the African Union (AU) and the United Nations (UN). However, besides Kenya and Djibouti no African state would be at risk of being drawn directly into the conflict.

IRANIAN BATTLE STRATEGY

Iranian weapons deployment of its area denial capability has been significantly upgraded and includes a network of land-based cruise missiles (Chinese-supplied C-801 and C-802 with 170 km range) and over one thousand swarm small boats which constitute an improvement over their performance in the Gulf Tanker War (1987-88). Missile upgrades and the crucial use of mines beyond the moored types in that period would be significant. Iran therefore has an improved military capability to shut down sea lanes and destroy shipping for a protracted period of time.

First acts of denial of area/access would be Iranian mine deployment into the straits especially the navigation channels at the 45km narrows south of the low-lying coast just to the east of Bandar Abbas, Kish and both Tunba islands. The first surface fleet of the coalition naval force (CNF) under USN command & control would be susceptible to land-based missiles. The initial CNF response would be ship/submarine-launched cruise missile attacks on port and harbour facilities along the Iranian shores of the Persian Gulf: Bandar Abbas, Jask and Asaluyeh with simultaneous air attacks on mobile launches in south eastern sector and south of the Zaboga mountains. The calculus of attrition depends on how many launches Iran makes a day and hence detections that are made. Hus-
up a blockade. Sea trials in 2011 tested this scenario for IRGCN. Hormuz strait mining and swarm surface attacks with missile capability will constitute the main Iranian effort, with the former being the last to be resolved once the Iranian surface fleet is destroyed in the Omani Sea. Mine lift of the EM-53 bottom-tethered mines can be laboriously slow and difficult.

THE END GAME

Accordingly for the United States, a drawn-out campaign is to be avoided and scale of conflict limited in a drive to re-open the Strait as soon as safe passage can be re-established. For Iran, short of a land invasion, extended though inconclusive hostilities that deny outright defeat are the best hoped for goal in its contest with the US Navy and Air force and the likely British and French anti-mine campaign.

For Iran, the original cause of the conflict would determine in large measure the type of end game that is acceptable. If it is an Israeli airstrike a subsistence level. Humanitarian assistance then becomes the priority.

The problem is Israel, with reliable reports indicating that on a number of occasions both during the Bush and Obama administration’s, Israel has put pressure on Washington to take out Iran’s nuclear capability. An Israeli nuclear strike is unlikely as a three-pronged aerial strike would mean radioactive contaminants (wind direction is north and north westerly) spreading over Saudi Arabia, Oman, Somalia, The Seychelles, Pakistan, India and parts of Kenya. While a remote prospect, Israel has in the past rolled out its Jericho III nuclear missiles from their bunkers for the benefit of space-based reconnaissance to which Iran currently has private commercial access.

Iran has its own strategic deterrence. Its Shahab 4,5,6 MRBM (the latter with a range of 6200km) is certainly a threat but their long-range rocketry guidance systems are not widely tested outside of home bases and they need high accuracy to strike Israeli industrial and urban targets. Despite the possibilities of enough fissionable material for Tehran to produce four detonable devices at present, delivery systems are a harder engineering step to attain within this year, so missile attack on Israel would be conventional warheads only or at best radiological.

Africa would not be a target of such an attack, accept possibly the USN fleet at Mombasa and CNF bases in Djibouti well within range of the Shahab rocket systems with conventional warheads - potentially disruptive but not devastating.

“In Indian Ocean Rim (IOR) states like South Africa who use Iran sour crudes for 29% of its Natref refinery supply (98 000 barrels a day) and Sasol 12 000 bpd will most likely see a significant supply disruptions in spite of the treaty with Tehran allowing for reciprocal storage.”

on nuclear facilities with attendant contaminant zones that wreck economic recovery or its potential, surrender may be more productive than protracted resistance. Iranian tanker fleet itself would have been blocked in the Sea of Oman by CNF and its economy reduced to subsistence level. Humanitarian assistance then becomes the priority.

The problem is Israel, with reliable reports indicating that on a number of occasions both during the Bush and Obama administration’s, Israel has put pressure on Washington to take out Iran’s nuclear capability. An Israeli nuclear strike is unlikely as a three-pronged aerial strike would mean radioactive contaminants (wind direction is north and north westerly) spreading over Saudi Arabia, Oman, Somalia, The Seychelles, Pakistan, India and parts of Kenya. While a remote prospect, Israel has in the past rolled out its Jericho III nuclear missiles from their bunkers for the benefit of space-based reconnaissance to which Iran currently has private commercial access.

Iran has its own strategic deterrence. Its Shahab 4,5,6 MRBM (the latter with a range of 6200km) is certainly a threat but their long-range rocketry guidance systems are not widely tested outside of home bases and they need high accuracy to strike Israeli industrial and urban targets. Despite the possibilities of enough fissionable material for Tehran to produce four detonable devices at present, delivery systems are a harder engineering step to attain within this year, so missile attack on Israel would be conventional warheads only or at best radiological.

Africa would not be a target of such an attack, accept possibly the USN fleet at Mombasa and CNF bases in Djibouti well within range of the Shahab rocket systems with conventional warheads - potentially disruptive but not devastating.

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levels. The economic consequences will be disruptive to the global economy by shutting off 38% of global crude oil world supplies from the Persian Gulf and 15% of Liquid Natural Gas (LNG) supplies. Hostilities could entrap over 9% of the world’s tanker fleets within the Persian Gulf. Indian Ocean Rim (IOR) states like South Africa who use Iran sour crudes for 29% of its Natref refinery supply (98 000 barrels a day) and Sasol 12 000 bpd will most likely see a significant supply disruptions in spite of the treaty with Tehran allowing for reciprocal storage. Refinery compatibility makes source substitution difficult and would cost SA refiners US$38 million alone and take months to switch.

Kenya imports 80 000 bpd of Iranian crude.

Spot oil prices will certainly rise rapidly. The extent of economic dislocation around the Indian Ocean and Asia (comprising 85 percent of Iranian crude exports) would depend on the duration of the blockade that in turn hinges on the course of the conflict itself. Assessments put a Hormuz naval denial of the area by Tehran at between two weeks and two months. Total global oil reserves can last around 130 days. However, African coastal depot reserves are reportedly calculated in mere days’ duration and economic slowdowns would take effect within the first week of the conflict even were diplomatic solutions immediately attempted. Projected prices of US$250 per barrel may be realistically reached within a month of hostilities commencing. At two months’ interdiction of Persian crudes a severe global recession, effectively a double dip since 2008, can be expected.

Moving forward, critical issues that need to be factored into African planning scenarios include the following:

- High maritime insurance rates and crewing costs on tankering from the Gulf before and after the conflict;
- The need to stockpile as much Iranian crude once the scenario indicators mentioned above play out. Indeed analysts have warned that SA, for example, should be stocking up now with crude to offset the threat of interdicted supplies.
- Prepare for the possible need for IMF and World Bank assistance in energy subsidies.
- Inflationary pressures with rocketing fuel prices for kerosene and petrol. Crude oil prices could at least double.
- Growing social instability. Peoples protests against rising energy costs are becoming a feature of African countries i.e. Mozambique (2010) and Nigeria (2011).
- A rapid increase in Somali piracy attacks once CNF fleets depart the Red and Arabian Seas for combat in the Northern Arabian and Omani Seas.
- An intermittent and slow return to pre-conflict Iranian crude supply levels.
- Developing multiple sourcing of crude compatible or adjusted compatibility to crudes other than Iranian such as Nigerian Bonny Light and Angolan heavy crudes.
- Building storage capacity on seaboard accesses near refineries.

In the hiatus, Africa eastern continental seaboard, including Sudan, Djibouti, Kenya, Tanzania, Mozambique and South Africa will bear the brunt of sea lane disruptions, fuel scarcity and rising costly maritime insurance rates till all mines are lifted. Iran crude could well be non-existent for up to eighteen months as a result of CNF bombing of well heads, pipelines and bunkering. On the other hand, oil producers such as Angola, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Algeria, Libya and Sudan would benefit in the short term from higher oil prices. Politically Africa, as with Libya will be divided on the appropriate response to take should conflict break out in the Persian Gulf.

Derek Fleming holds degrees in law, math, African Politics and Military Science and was formerly with the International Organisation of Journalists and a correspondent for Jane’s Defence. He is currently an elected public representative on the Tshwane Metro Council.
Commander, U.S. Africa Command
General Carter F. Ham

Appointment
The United States’ Department of Defense, appointed General Carter F. Ham as Commander of the U.S. Africa Command, which is based at Kelley Barracks Stuttgart, Germany on 09 March 2011. Gen Ham replaced Gen William E. “Kip” Ward.

Background
Ham graduated from Charles F. Brush High School, Ohio before serving as an enlisted Infantryman in the 82nd Airborne Division. After his service he attended John Carroll University in Cleveland, Ohio. In 1976, upon the completion of his tertiary education Ham, was commissioned as 2nd Lieutenant through the Army Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (Army ROTC) in the Infantry as a Distinguished Military Graduate. He later received his master’s degree in National Security and Strategic Studies from the U.S. Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island as well as graduating from several military schools including the Infantry Officer Basic Course, the Armor Officer Advanced Course, the College of Naval Command and Staff of the U.S. Naval War College and the U.S. Air Force Air War College.

Ham’s service at Fort Knox, Kentucky and tours of duty in Italy and Germany formed part of Ham’s early assignments. After graduating from the Armor Officers Advanced Course, he was appointed as a Recruiting Area Commander in Lima, Ohio. In 1984, he served with a joint service unit in support of the Olympic Games in Los Angeles.

After the Olympic Games Ham served as Assistant Inspector General, then as Battalion S-3 and Executive Officer with the Opposing Force at the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California until 1989. He attended the College of Naval Command and Staff, graduating with distinction in 1990, and was then assigned to the US Army Infantry School at Fort Benning, Georgia.

Following his assignment at Fort Benning he went on to serve as a tour advisor with a Saudi Arabian National Guard Brigade in Riyadh before returning to Fort Benning, where he was appointed as executive officer for the Infantry School.

Ham subsequently, commanded the 1st Battalion, 6th Infantry in Vilseck, Germany including a six-month tour with the United Nations Protection Forces in the Republic of Macedonia. Following battalion command, he served as the Senior Observer/Controller of the Timberwolf Team at the Combat Maneuver Training Center, Hohenfels, Germany.

In 1997, he graduated from the Air War College before returning to Germany where he served as G-3, then Chief of Staff, 1st Infantry Division. From 1999 to 2001 he commanded the 29th Infantry Regiment at Fort Benning, then served as Deputy Director, J-8, United States Central Command in Tampa, Florida and Qatar.

In August 2003 Ham was assigned as the Deputy Commanding General for Training and Readiness, I Corps at Fort Lewis, Washington. He went on to assume command of Multinational Brigade (Task Force Olympia) – North in Mosul, Iraq on 1 January 2001 serving there until February 2005.

Upon returning from Iraq in 2005, Ham served as the Deputy Director for Regional Operations, J-3, on The Joint Staff until August 2006 when he assumed command of the 1st Infantry Division at Fort Riley, Kansas. He served as the Commanding General until July 2007. He became the 34th Commander of the United States Army Europe
headquartered at Campbell Barracks, Heidelberg, Germany on 28 August 2008.

In November 2010, the United States Senate confirmed Ham's nomination to become the next Commander of U.S. Africa Command. His nomination was successful and he assumed the post on 9 March 2011.

Ham commanded the US forces enforcing the Libyan no-fly zone. Regarding the airstrikes against former Libyan Leader Muhammar Gaddafi, Ham on 21 March 2011 said:

“There would be coalition airstrikes on Colonel Gaddafi’s mobile air defenses and that some 80 sorties – only half of them by the United States – had been flown on Monday. Admiral Locklear, aboard the flagship Mount Whitney, has tactical command of the Operation Odyssey Dawn joint taskforce. Our mission is not to support any opposition forces.”

General Ham also indicated that he had “full authority” to attack the regime’s forces if they refused to comply with President Obama’s demands that they pull back from Ajdabiya, Misrata and Zawiya.

Ham’s awards and decorations include the Army Distinguished Service Medal, Defense Superior Service Medal with three oak leaf clusters, the Legion of Merit with two oak leaf clusters, Bronze Star, and the Joint Service Commendation Medal.

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**SOUTH AFRICAN SECRETARY OF DEFENCE: DR SAM MAKHUDU GULUBE**

**Appointment**

On 23 November 2011 the South African Cabinet approved the appointment of Dr Sam Makhudu Gulube as Secretary of Defence (Director-General) in the Department of Defence for five years. The Minister of Defence and Military Veterans, Ms Lindiwe Sisulu, announced the appointment of Dr Gulube as the new Secretary for Defence, with immediate effect, on 27 November 2011.

**Background**

He is a graduate of Morehouse School of Medicine, Atlanta, Georgia, in 1991. He did his General Surgery Residency Program at the University of South Florida in Tampa, Florida, from 1991 to 1996. In 1997 he was appointed as a Lieutenant Colonel in the South African Military Health Services, in the post of General Surgery Principal Medical Officer at 1 Military Hospital in Pretoria. He led the SA Military Health Services Telemedicine project.

Dr Gulube worked in tele-medicine and this stimulated his interest in Information Technology as a viable tool to improve quality and equity in healthcare services. From 2000 to 2003 he was Director of the National Telemedicine Research Centre at the Medical Research Council (MRC) of South Africa. He served as the Chief Executive Officer of the Universal Service Agency of South Africa from April 2003 to April 2006. Dr. Gulube was appointed the National Medical Director of the South African National Blood Services (SANBS) in May 2006.

He has also been chairman of the Presidential Medical Team, a Trustee of the SA Red Cross Air Mercy Service, African National Congress (ANC) Deputy Representative to the United Nations, a member of the Business Advisory Council of the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) and chairman of Medical Education for South African Blacks (MESAB) South Africa Trustees. He has also acted as advisor to Minister of State Security Siyabonga Cwele and has been serving on Defence Minister Lindiwe Sisulu’s Defence Review Committee since August 2011.

Gulube was appointed chairman of the Resource Group within the DRC in August 2011.
African Armed Forces Journal | February 2012

DEAR AAF,

I was encouraged to see the improvements made at 21’s Doornkop headquarters. After the unit was shrouded in controversy and various pictures emerged of the condition of their facilities, I honestly suspected the disbandment of the battalion entirely. Thus seeing 21 Battalion not only emerging from this controversy intact, but actively preparing for deployment overseas is wonderful to see. It’s not very often the good aspects of government projects emerge, and I doubt the anniversary parade by 21 was as well-publicised as their protests.

ANONYMOUS

We are hoping to run further articles in the future on 21 Battalion. This unit is definitely on the up and up, and it is our intention to track their improvement right up until deployment overseas. – Ed

THUNDER RUNS

Reading the interview with SA Armour’s commander, I was struck by the importance of armour even now. In an asymmetrical environment – particularly in Africa – the ability to use armour in certain situations provides a capability of force and protection otherwise unavailable. I am curious to know whether anyone outside of the USA has considered the employment of “thunder runs” or armour columns moving rapidly through enemy territory to occupy strategic locations. It was used to great effect in Baghdad to secure the capital’s airport, and if measured as a calculated risk against poorly-trained enemy combatants or conscripts, the odds of defeat remain quite low.

With SA Army having many wheeled armoured vehicles armed with different turrets and weaponry, the consideration for thunder runs, or at least the theoretical consideration, should be thought of. While the airlift capability necessary to deploy armour abroad is not yet there, future planning by Armour commanders in Africa should incorporate the rapid use of armour in an offensive, rather than defensive, posture.

It was armour, after all, that aided greatly in extracting US Rangers and Special Forces from Mogadishu in October 1993, and it was armoured assets that helped in securing key locations within Iraq and Afghanistan. There is no question of armour’s utility, but its use remains highly underrated and under-emphasised in an African battlespace.

R. MOOREHEAD, UK

“In an asymmetrical environment – particularly in Africa – the ability to use armour in certain situations provides a capability of force and protection otherwise unavailable.”

Letters to the Editor

Letters to the journal are welcome. Please ensure that all letters are no longer than 350 words and contain the original author’s name.

All letters can be emailed to africanarmedforces@gmail.com.
BRIEFING ROOM

Defence events on Africa

**SADF Commemoration Service**
Where: Voortrekker Monument, Pretoria – South Africa
When: 3 June
Time: TBA
The annual South African Defence Force Commemoration day will include wreath laying and general activities surrounding the celebration of the SADF heritage. Included will be the re-burial of four SADF servicemen recovered from Angola.

**Global Aerospace Summit**
When: 16 to 17 April 2012
Where: Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates
Global Aerospace Summit is a strategic gathering of major players from aviation, aerospace and space to discuss future growth strategies.

**CSIR Defence Industry Day**
Where: CSIR, Pretoria – South Africa
When: 22 March
Time: TBC
Hosted by the CSIR, Department of Trade and Industry, and Department of Defence, the CSIR Defence Industry Day will bring together major South African defence manufacturers and interested parties in a showcase of practical, applicable and viable defence systems suited towards African and international markets.

**IFSEC South Africa**
Where: Gallagher Convention Centre, Johannesburg – South Africa
When: 19-21 June
IFSEC South Africa is the African security professional event for any African security looking to stay up-to-date with the latest product developments, industry knowledge and maintain relationships with suppliers and manufacturers.
Battle for Cassinga, the third volume of the Africa@War series launched recently by local publisher 30 Degrees South – in conjunction with its UK based partner Helion & Company Ltd – deals with arguably the most controversial operation of the entire Border War. Operation Reindeer, of which the airborne assault on the former Portuguese mining town of Cassinga was but a component, was the first major incursion into Angola since Operation Savannah (1975), South Africa’s initial attempt to fill the power vacuum left by Portugal’s hasty departure. The non-airborne component of Reindeer entailed simultaneous mechanised strikes, utilising Ratel Infantry Combat Vehicles (ICVs) for the first time, against two People’s Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN) bases in southern Angola, namely Chetequera and Dombondola.

There have been a number of publications dealing specifically with Operation Reindeer over the years, most concerned with portraying the event in a particular light. In the immediate aftermath of the operation, the South West African People’s Organisation (SWAPO) accused the SADF of attacking an innocent refugee camp at Cassinga and massacring its inhabitants. Due to the South African Defence Force’s (SADF) inability (or truculence) to put its side of the story into the public domain, SWAPO’s version of the event gained considerable traction within the broader International community.

The first South African attempt to address the avalanche of articles and pamphlets condemning the raid appeared only in 1983 when the journalist, Willem Steenkamp, published Border Strike (Butterworths 1983). With strict censorship laws in place, Steenkamp was able to produce only a watered down version of the event, mostly using nommes de guerre with the exception of the commander Jan Breytenbach. It was, however, the only printed matter available on the subject and, accordingly, for quite some time served as the definitive account. The next publication to appear on Cassinga was Namibian Annamarie Heywood’s The Cassinga Event (March 1994). (Interestingly, Heywood lists two of Steenkamp’s books including Borderstrike, among her sources.) Terming her booklet “an investigation into the records” Heywood’s account served to buttress the official SWAPO description of what occurred. Here it is important to pause and both remember and respect what Cassinga has come to mean to the Namibian people. Any criticism
of their interpretation of the event must not be viewed as a repudiation of the sacrifices they made to gain independence.

The next major contribution was an unpublished Master's thesis by McGill Alexander. A serving general officer in the SANDF, Alexander was able to shine an educated light on much of what occurred at Cassinga for the first time. It took some 5 years for the South African airborne community to wake up to its contents and what ensued was not their finest hour. Suffice to say, Alexander was heavily criticised for some of his conclusions. Showing remarkable restraint and losing none of his composure, he more than ably defended his viewpoints. The upshot of the fracas was that Col Jan Breytenbach, who had been given a copy of the thesis upon its completion by Alexander, decided to write an account of the operation. The result was Eagle Strike, the first book on either side to be written by a participant. As with all previous accounts, it has its admirers and detractors, depending largely on which side of the fence a person is sitting.

This brings us to the book under review, Battle for Cassinga, only the second account to have been written by a South African participant. (This excludes individual vignettes written by participants in other publications.) The author, Mike McWilliams - a paratrooper - is a veteran of Cassinga as well as the operation's official photographer. Prior to the airborne assault he had been identified as a photographer and, apart from his normal combat duties, was handed a camera and film in order to document the attack. At this point it must be noted that McWilliams contributed the foreword for Eagle Strike. Accordingly he identifies closely with Col Breytenbach's view of events.

Essentially Battle for Cassinga is a potted history of the operation covering the entire build up and execution in 62 pages with some of McWilliams own personal experiences providing colour and substance. From 1 Parachute Battalion's perspective (44 Para Brigade was not yet in existence as approval for its establishment had only been granted the month before) the operation was, and remained, the premier airborne assault of the entire war. Modest in size, limited to a composite battalion due to the South African Air Force's (SAAF) restricted ability to retrieve the paratroopers once dropped, it was conducted almost entirely by reservists and conscripts with a small permanent force element at the helm.

McWilliam's narrative consists of ten short chapters accompanied by four appendices. Right from the start the author makes no bones concerning his thoughts on a number of controversial issues, nailing his colours firmly to the mast. If anything, this publication serves as a primer for the views of many SADF veterans on the matter. Those familiar with Eagle Strike should expect more of the same. An interesting aspect of McWilliam's account is the introduction for the first time of an exercise book purportedly picked up on the battlefield by another paratrooper, Jan Volschenk. Prior to publication, McWilliams was approached by Volschenk and presented with the hand-written book. In it are the professed names of a number of senior PLAN members present at Cassinga. Volschenk claims to have shown it to an officer at the time who dismissed it as unimportant. Unperturbed, Volschenk kept it as a souvenir. While only further research will be able to determine the authenticity of this latest “find” it is an intriguing step forward in possibly providing an irrefutable resolution as to the true nature of Cassinga.

While firmly of the opinion that no intentional civilian casualties occurred, this reviewer finds little of substance has been added, other than what was already known, to clarify the key controversies surrounding the operation. Readers should, however, approach it with an open mind and judge it on its merits.
were able to create a comparable reputation in just seven short years. Selous Scouts: Rhodesian Counter Insurgency Specialists is a concise, pithy account of just how the unit achieved this remarkable feat.

The fourth volume in local publisher, 30 Degrees South’s new Africa@War series and the first to deal with an elite unit as opposed to a battle or campaign, Selous Scouts examines the origins and operational history of one southern Africa’s more unique Special Force regiments. The Selous Scouts, a name originally associated with the Rhodesian Armoured Car Regiment, until it was relinquished in favour of Reid-Daly’s newly formed unit in 1973, was initially created to pioneer Rhodesia’s pseudo-operations (pseudo ops) concept, a concept first used by the British against the MRLA in Malaya and later, the Mau Mau in Kenya. The Regiment was named after Frederick Courteney Selous, the famous British naturalist and hunter.

Known as Counter Gangs in Kenya, pseudo-operations met with considerable success and showed both the British and Rhodesians how the concept might be developed in future counter-insurgency operations on the continent. Brought out of retirement to create and develop Rhodesia’s pseudo ops capability, Col Ronald Francis Reid-Daly, a former Malayan Scout, Rhodesian SAS operator and RSM of the Rhodesian Light Infantry, flourished in his new role. Within two years he had created an extremely professional unit from the ground up and endowed it with an enviable reputation for both success and military professionalism.

Peter Baxter’s book is a nice tight account of the nuts and bolts of the Regiment’s history and operational record. Broken up into eight chapters, each representing an important aspect of the unit’s evolution and history, he takes the reader through the complete odyssey of its existence and role, from creation to disbandment. Of particular interest is the broadening of the unit’s role to incorporate external operations and its pioneering work in small-team reconnaissance. As the success and reputation of the Selous Scouts grew, so did the tasks assigned to it.

Chapter five deals with the role of the Regiment in intelligence operations in neighbouring states while chapter six catalogues the events leading to General Hickman’s dismissal and Reid-Daly being charged and found guilty of insubordination. Operation Miracle forms the penultimate chapter with the final section dealing with the end of the conflict and the Regiment’s ignominious disbandment.

A problem encountered by this reviewer was Baxter’s disregarding of Dennis Croukamp’s Only my Friends Call me “Crouks”, a seminal autobiography by a leading personality within the unit, in compiling his manuscript. Croukamp’s account is all the more important in that he severely criticised certain aspects of Reid-Daly’s leadership while allowing Reid-Daly accesses to the manuscript prior to publication in order to include any response he might wish to make. The result was that Reid-Daly’s responses to Croukamp’s criticisms are included in the main text of Croukamp’s book.

An obvious sign of Baxter ignoring Croukamp’s account is the mistake Baxter makes in stating that Croukamp was picked up by Passaportis during Operation Mardon when in fact only his two team members, Paul French and Rob Wilson, were. Croukamp, in a feat inexplicably ignored by Reid-Daly, both in Top Secret War and Pamwe Chete, walked back to Rhodesia in an impressive display of physical endurance and mental resilience. It was the longest escape and evasion carried out by a member of the Regiment in the entire war.

All in all, despite certain limitations, Selous Scouts is a competent introduction to a unique Regiment and its proud place in Africa’s military history.
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