18 April 2012
Nuclear Power Plant Onsite Emergency Response Capabilities
[Federal Register Volume 77, Number 75 (Wednesday, April 18, 2012)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 23161-23166]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2012-9336]
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Proposed Rules
Federal Register
________________________________________________________________________
This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER contains notices to the public of
the proposed issuance of rules and regulations. The purpose of these
notices is to give interested persons an opportunity to participate in
the rule making prior to the adoption of the final rules.
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Federal Register / Vol. 77, No. 75 / Wednesday, April 18, 2012 /
Proposed Rules
[[Page 23161]]
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
10 CFR Parts 50 and 52
[NRC-2012-0031]
RIN 3150-AJ11
Onsite Emergency Response Capabilities
AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
ACTION: Advance notice of proposed rulemaking.
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SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or the Commission)
is issuing this Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPR) to begin
the process of potentially amending its regulations to strengthen and
integrate onsite emergency response capabilities. The NRC seeks public
comment on specific questions and issues with respect to possible
revision to the NRC's requirements for onsite emergency response
capabilities, and development of both new requirements and the
supporting regulatory basis. This regulatory action is one of the
actions stemming from the NRC's lessons-learned efforts associated with
the March 2011 Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant accident in
Japan.
DATES: Submit comments by June 18, 2012. Comments received after this
date will be considered if it is practical to do so, but the NRC is
only able to ensure consideration of comments received on or before
this date.
ADDRESSES: You may access information and comment submissions related
to this document, which the NRC possesses and is publicly available, by
searching on http://www.regulations.gov under Docket ID NRC-2012-0031.
You may submit comments by any of the following methods:
Federal Rulemaking Web Site: Go to http://www.regulations.gov and
search for Docket ID NRC-2012-0031. Address
questions about NRC dockets to Carol Gallagher; telephone: 301-492-
3668; email: Carol.Gallagher@nrc.gov.
Email comments to: Rulemaking.Comments@nrc.gov. If you do
not receive an automatic email reply confirming receipt, contact us
directly at 301-415-1677.
Fax comments to: Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission at 301-415-1101.
Mail comments to: Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, Attn: Rulemakings and
Adjudications Staff.
Hand deliver comments to: 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville,
Maryland 20852, between 7:30 a.m. and 4:15 p.m. (Eastern time) Federal
workdays; telephone: 301-415-1677.
For additional direction on accessing information and submitting
comments, see ``Accessing Information and Submitting Comments'' in the
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section of this document.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Robert H. Beall, Office of Nuclear
Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC
20555-0001; telephone: 301-415-3874; email: Robert.Beall@nrc.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Accessing Information and Submitting Comments
II. Background: Fukushima Dai-ichi and the NRC Regulatory Response
III. Background: Onsite Emergency Response Capabilities
A. Emergency Operating Procedures
B. Severe Accident Management Guidelines
C. Extensive Damage Mitigation Guidelines
D. Onsite Emergency Response Capabilities Versus Emergency
Preparedness
IV. Discussion and Request for Public Comment
A. ANPR Purpose
B. Rulemaking Objectives/Success Criteria
C. Applicability to NRC Licenses and Approvals
D. Relationship Between Recommendation 8 and Other Near-Term
Task Force Recommendations
E. Interim Regulatory Actions
V. Public Meeting
VI. Rulemaking Process and Schedule
VII. Related Petition for Rulemaking Actions
VIII. Available Supporting Documents
I. Accessing Information and Submitting Comments
A. Accessing Information
Please refer to Docket ID NRC-2012-0031 when contacting the NRC
about the availability of information for this notice. You may access
information related to this ANPR, which the NRC possesses and is
publicly available, by the following methods:
Federal Rulemaking Web Site: Go to http://www.regulations.gov and
search for Docket ID NRC-2012-0031.
NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System
(ADAMS): You may access publicly available documents online in the NRC
Library at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To begin the
search, select ``ADAMS Public Documents'' and then select ``Begin Web-
based ADAMS Search.'' For problems with ADAMS, please contact the NRC's
Public Document Room (PDR) reference staff at 1-800-397-4209, 301-415-
4737, or by email to PDR.Resource@nrc.gov. The ADAMS accession number
for each document referenced in this notice (if that document is
available in ADAMS) is provided the first time that a document is
referenced. A table listing documents that provide additional
background and supporting information is in Section VIII of this
document.
NRC's PDR: You may examine and purchase copies of public
documents at the NRC's PDR, Room O1-F21, One White Flint North, 11555
Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852.
B. Submitting Comments
Please include Docket ID NRC-2012-0031 in the subject line of your
comment submission, in order to ensure that the NRC is able to make
your comment submission available to the public in this docket.
The NRC cautions you not to include identifying or contact
information in comment submissions that you do not want to be publicly
disclosed. The NRC posts all comment submissions at http://www.
regulations.gov as well as enters the comment submissions into
ADAMS. The NRC does not edit comment submissions to remove identifying
or contact information.
If you are requesting or aggregating comments from other persons
for submission to the NRC, then you should inform those persons not to
include identifying or contact information in their comment submissions
that they do not want to be publicly disclosed. Your request should
state that the NRC will not edit comment submissions to remove such
information before making the comment submissions available to the
public or entering the comment submissions into ADAMS.
[[Page 23162]]
II. Background: Fukushima Dai-ichi and the NRC Regulatory Response
On March 11, 2011, a magnitude 9.0 earthquake struck off the coast
of the Japanese island of Honshu. The earthquake precipitated a large
tsunami that is estimated to have exceeded 14 meters (45 feet) in
height at the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant site (hereinafter
referred to as the site or the facility). The earthquake and tsunami
produced widespread devastation across northeastern Japan, resulting in
approximately 25,000 people dead or missing, displacing tens of
thousands of people, and significantly impacting the infrastructure and
industry in the northeastern coastal areas of Japan. At the time of the
earthquake, Fukushima Dai-ichi Units 1, 2, and 3 were in operation.
Units 4, 5, and 6 had been shut down for routine refueling and
maintenance activities, and the Unit 4 reactor fuel had been offloaded
to the Unit 4 spent fuel pool.
As a result of the earthquake, the three operating units at the
site automatically shut down, and offsite power was lost to the entire
facility. The emergency diesel generators started at all six units,
providing alternating current (AC) electrical power to critical
systems; overall, the facility response to the seismic event appears to
have been normal.
Approximately 40 minutes after shutdown of the operating units, the
first large tsunami wave inundated the site, followed by multiple
additional waves. The tsunami resulted in extensive damage to site
facilities and a complete loss of AC electrical power at Units 1
through 5, a condition known as station blackout (SBO). One diesel
generator remained functional on Unit 6.
Despite the actions of the operators following the earthquake and
tsunami, cooling was lost to the fuel in the Unit 1 reactor after
several hours, in the Unit 2 reactor after about 70 hours, and in the
Unit 3 reactor after about 36 hours, resulting in damage to the nuclear
fuel shortly after the loss of cooling.
In the days following the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear accident, the
NRC Chairman directed the NRC staff to establish a senior-level agency
task force to conduct a methodical and systematic review of the NRC's
processes and regulations to determine whether, in light of the events
in Japan, the agency should make additional improvements to its
regulatory system, and to make recommendations to the Commission for
its policy direction. This direction was provided in a tasking
memorandum dated March 23, 2011, from the NRC Chairman to the NRC
Executive Director for Operations (COMGBJ-11-0002) (ADAMS Accession No.
ML110950110).
In SECY-11-0093, ``Near-Term Report and Recommendations for Agency
Actions Following the Events in Japan'' (ADAMS Accession No.
ML11186A959), dated July 12, 2011, the Near-Term Task Force (NTTF)
provided its recommendations to the Commission. The staff requirements
memorandum (SRM) for SECY-11-0093 (ADAMS Accession No. ML112310021),
dated August 19, 2011, directed the NRC staff to identify and make
``recommendations regarding any Task Force recommendations that can,
and in the staff's judgment, should be implemented, in part or in
whole, without unnecessary delay.''
In SECY-11-0124, ``Recommended Actions To Be Taken Without Delay
from the Near-Term Task Force Report'' (ADAMS Accession No.
ML11245A127), the NRC staff provided recommendations to the Commission
on actions that, in the staff's judgment, should be initiated without
unnecessary delay, and requested that the Commission provide direction
for moving forward on these recommendation (subsequently referred to as
``Tier 1'' recommendations). The Commission approved the staff's
proposed actions in the SRM for SECY-11-0124 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML112911571), dated October 18, 2011. In SECY-11-0137, ``Prioritization
of Recommended Actions to Be Taken in Response to Fukushima Lessons
Learned'' (ADAMS Accession No. ML11269A204), the NRC staff requested
that the Commission approve the staff's prioritization of the NTTF
recommendations. In the SRM for SECY-11-0137 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML113490055), dated December 15, 2011, the Commission approved the
staff's proposed prioritization of the NTTF recommendations and
supported action on the Tier 1 recommendations, subject to the
direction in the SRM.
With respect to regulatory action regarding onsite emergency
response capabilities, the Commission directed the NRC staff to
initiate a rulemaking on NTTF Recommendation 8, in the form of an ANPR.
This document responds to that Commission direction.
In November 2011, the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO)
issued INPO-11-005, ``Special Report on the Nuclear Accident at the
Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Station'' (ADAMS Accession No.
ML11347A454). In the SRM for SECY-11-0137, the Commission directed NRC
staff to consider INPO-11-005 in its development of the technical bases
for any proposed regulatory changes.
III. Background: Onsite Emergency Response Capabilities
A. Emergency Operating Procedures
Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs) are required procedures
designed to mitigate the effects of a design basis accident and place
the plant in a safe shutdown condition. The EOPs are required by Title
10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 50, Appendix B,
Criterion V, ``Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings,'' and are
included in the administrative control sections of licensee's technical
specifications. Licensed operators are trained and evaluated in the
implementation of EOPs through initial license training. The NRC
evaluates licensed operator candidates' knowledge of EOPs during an
initial written examination, as required by 10 CFR 55.41 and 55.43, and
an initial operating test, as required by 10 CFR 55.45. For
proficiency, licensed operator requalification training programs,
required by 10 CFR 55.59, routinely train and evaluate licensed
operators on their knowledge and ability to implement the EOPs.
B. Severe Accident Management Guidelines
During the 1990s, the nuclear industry developed Severe Accident
Management Guidelines (SAMGs) as a voluntary industry initiative in
response to Generic Letter 88-20, Supplement 2, ``Accident Management
Strategies for Consideration in the Individual Plant Examination
Process,'' dated April 4, 1990 (ADAMS Accession No. ML031200551). SAMGs
provide guidance to operators and Technical Support Center (TSC) staff
in the event of an accident that progresses beyond a plant's design
basis (and therefore beyond the scope of the EOPs). The nuclear power
industry owners' groups (i.e., industry organizations with
representatives from the various nuclear plant owners that provide
industry oversight for various plant designs) developed generic
guidelines specific to the individual plant designs. Given the
voluntary nature of the initiative for SAMGs, their implementation
throughout the industry has been varied, as noted by NRC inspection
results for Temporary Instruction 2515/184, ``Availability and
Readiness Inspection of Severe Accident Management Guidelines (SAMGs)''
(ADAMS Accession No. ML11115A053). The guidelines themselves were
implemented by individual licensees,
[[Page 23163]]
but because the NRC has not developed a regulatory requirement for
SAMGs, the training, evaluation, and procedure control requirements for
SAMGs vary from plant to plant.
C. Extensive Damage Mitigation Guidelines
Following the terrorist events of September 11, 2001, the NRC
ordered licensees to develop and implement specific guidance and
strategies to maintain or restore core cooling, containment, and spent
fuel pool cooling capabilities using existing or readily available
resources that can be effectively implemented under the circumstances
associated with loss of large areas of the plant due to explosions or
fire. These requirements were subsequently imposed as license
conditions for individual licensees and formalized in the Power Reactor
Security Requirements final rule (74 FR 13926; March 27, 2009) in 10
CFR 50.54(hh)(2). As a result, Extensive Damage Mitigation Guidelines
(EDMGs) were developed in order to provide guidance to operating crews
and TSC personnel on the implementation of the strategies developed to
address these large area events. The events at the Fukushima Dai-ichi
Nuclear Power Station following the March 11, 2011, earthquake and
tsunami highlighted the continued potential benefits of these
strategies in mitigating the effects of prolonged SBOs and other events
that challenge key safety functions. The NRC has not developed a
specific regulatory requirement for training on EDMGs.
D. Onsite Emergency Response Capabilities Versus Emergency Preparedness
This ANPR focuses on the effectiveness of accident mitigating
procedures and the training and exercises associated with these
procedures. When using the term ``accident mitigating procedures'' in
this document, the NRC is referring to EOPs, SAMGs, and EDMGs. The
licensee's emergency preparedness plan and implementing procedures,
which are required by 10 CFR 50.47 and 50.54(q) and Appendix E to 10
CFR part 50, are being evaluated through other NTTF recommendations,
and the associated efforts are referred to in the questions in Section
IV.D. However, the licensee's emergency preparedness plan and
implementing procedures are not the subject of this ANPR.
IV. Discussion and Request for Public Comment
A. ANPR Purpose
In SECY-11-0124, the NRC staff recommended that the agency engage
stakeholders during rulemaking activities ``so that the regulatory
action and licensee actions taken effectively resolve the identified
issues and implementation challenges are identified in advance.'' The
NRC staff proposed interaction with stakeholders to support development
of the regulatory basis, a proposed rule, and implementing guidance for
strengthening and integrating the onsite emergency response
capabilities. In the SRM for SECY-11-0124, the Commission directed the
NRC staff to issue an ANPR prior to developing the regulatory basis for
a proposed rule. Accordingly, the NRC's objective in this ANPR is to
solicit external stakeholder feedback to inform the NRC staff's efforts
to evaluate regulatory approaches for strengthening the current onsite
emergency response capability requirements.
In the SRM for SECY-11-0124, the Commission also encouraged NRC
staff to develop recommendations that continue to realize the strengths
of a performance-based system as a guiding principle. The Commission
indicated that, to be effective, approaches should be flexible and able
to accommodate a diverse range of circumstances and conditions. The
Commission stated that for ``consideration of events beyond the design
basis, a regulatory approach founded on performance-based requirements
will foster development of the most effective and efficient, site-
specific mitigation strategies, similar to how the agency approached
the approval of licensee response strategies for the `loss of large
area' event'' addressed in 10 CFR 50.54(hh)(2).
Consistent with the Commission's direction in the SRM for SECY-11-
0124, the NRC is open to flexible, performance-based strategies to
address onsite emergency response capability requirements. This ANPR is
structured around questions intended to solicit information that (1)
supports development of such a framework and (2) supports assembling a
complete and adequate regulatory basis that enables rulemaking to be
successful. In this context, commenters should feel free to provide
feedback on any aspects of onsite emergency response capability that
would support this ANPR's regulatory objective, whether or not in
response to a stated ANPR question.
B. Rulemaking Objectives/Success Criteria
The NRC is considering development of a proposed rule that would
amend the current onsite emergency response capability requirements.
Currently, the regulatory and industry approaches to onsite emergency
response capability are fragmented into the separate strategies that
were discussed in Section III of this document. By promulgation of an
onsite emergency response capability rule, the NRC would be able to
establish regulations that, when implemented by licensees, would
strengthen and integrate the various onsite emergency response
strategies. Specifically, the proposed requirements for onsite
emergency response capability would strive to accomplish the following
goals:
1. Ensure that effective transitions are developed between the
various accident mitigating procedures (EOPs, SAMGs, and EDMGs) so that
overall strategies are coherent and comprehensive.
2. Ensure that command and control strategies for large scale
events are based on the best understanding of severe accident
progression and effective mitigation strategies, and well defined in
order to promote effective decision-making at all levels and develop
organizational flexibility to respond to unforeseen events.
3. Ensure that the key personnel relied upon to implement these
procedures and strategies are trained, qualified, and evaluated in
their accident mitigation roles.
4. Ensure that accident mitigating procedures, training, and
exercises are appropriately standardized throughout the industry and
are adequately documented and maintained.
The NRC is seeking stakeholders' views on the following specific
regulatory objectives:
1. What is the preferred regulatory approach to addressing NTTF
Recommendation 8?
For example:
a. Should the NRC develop a new rule, or could the requirements
that would provide for a more strengthened and integrated response
capability be accomplished by a method other than a rulemaking? Provide
a discussion that supports your position.
b. If a new rule is developed, what type of supporting document
would be most effective for providing guidance on the new requirements?
Provide a discussion that supports your position.
2. The NTTF recommendation for emergency response procedures
stressed that the EOP guidelines should be revised to establish
effective transitions between EOPs, SAMGs, and EDMGs in
[[Page 23164]]
an effort to promote a more integrated approach to onsite emergency
response. The NRC is interested in stakeholder opinions on the best
course of action for revising and maintaining these procedures to
accomplish this objective. For example:
a. Should the SAMGs be standardized throughout the industry? If so,
describe how the procedures should be developed, and discuss what level
of regulatory review would be appropriate. Should there be two sets of
standard SAMGs, one applicable to pressurized water reactors (PWRs) and
one applicable to boiling water reactors (BWRs), or should SAMGs be
developed for the various plant designs in a manner similar to EOPs?
Provide a discussion that supports your position.
b. What is the best approach to ensure that procedural guidance for
beyond design basis events is based on sound science, coherent, and
integrated? What is the most effective strategy for linking the EOPs
with the SAMGs and EDMGs? Should the transition from EOPs to SAMGs be
based on key safety functions, or should the SAMGs be developed in a
manner that addresses a series of events that are beyond a plant's
design basis? Provide a discussion that supports your position.
c. The NTTF Recommendation 8 strongly advised that the plant
owners' groups should undertake revision of the accident mitigating
procedures to avoid having each licensee develop its own approach. Is
this the best course of action? What additional scenarios or accident
plans should be considered for addition to SAMG technical guidelines as
a result of the lessons learned in Japan? Provide a discussion that
supports your position.
d. In the SRM for SECY-11-0137, the Commission directed the NRC
staff to consider the November 2011 INPO report, INPO-11-005, in the
development of the technical bases for Recommendation 8. How should
this document be used by industry in developing SAMGs and the NRC in
developing any proposed regulatory changes? Provide a discussion that
supports your position.
e. Should there be a requirement for the SAMGs and EDMGs to be
maintained as controlled procedures in accordance with licensee quality
assurance programs? Provide a discussion that supports your position.
f. Should the SAMGs and EDMGs be added to the ``Administrative
Controls'' section of licensee technical specifications? Provide a
discussion that supports your position.
g. In a letter dated October 13, 2011 (ML11284A136), the Advisory
Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) recommended that Recommendation
8 be expanded to include fire response procedures. In their letter,
ACRS stated that some plant-specific fire response procedures can
direct operators to perform actions that may be inconsistent with the
EOPs, and that experience has shown that parallel execution of fire
response procedures, abnormal operating procedures, and EOPs can be
difficult and complex. Should efforts to integrate the EOPs, SAMGs, and
EDMGs include fire response procedures? Are there other procedures that
should be included in the scope of this work? Provide a discussion that
supports your position.
h. What level of effort, in terms of time and financial commitment,
will be required by the industry to upgrade the accident mitigating
procedures? If possible, please include estimated milestones and PWR/
BWR cost estimates.
3. The NTTF established the identification of clear command and
control strategies as an essential aspect of Recommendation 8. What
methodology would be best for ensuring that command and control for
beyond design basis events is well defined? For example:
a. Should separate procedures be developed that clearly establish
the command and control structures for large-scale events? Should
defined roles and responsibilities be included in technical
specifications along with associated training and qualification
requirements? Provide a discussion that supports your position.
b. Should the command and control approach be standardized
throughout the industry or left for individual licensees to define?
Provide a discussion that supports your position.
c. What level of effort, in terms of time and financial commitment,
will be required by the industry to develop these command and control
strategies? If possible, please include estimated milestones and PWR/
BWR cost estimates.
4. As the guidelines for accident mitigating procedures are revised
and the command and control strategies are developed, personnel who
will be implementing these procedures must be adequately trained,
qualified, and evaluated. What would be the best approach for ensuring
that the personnel relied upon to implement the revised procedures are
proficient in the use of the procedures, maintain adequate knowledge of
the systems referenced in these procedures, and can effectively make
decisions, establish priorities, and direct actions in an emergency
situation? For example:
a. Should a systems approach to training be developed to identify
key tasks that would be performed by the various roles identified in
the new strategies? Provide a discussion that supports your position.
b. Should the current emergency drill and exercise requirements be
revised to ensure that the strategies developed as a result of this
ANPR will be evaluated in greater depth? Provide a discussion that
supports your position.
c. Should the revised accident mitigating procedures, specifically
SAMGs and EDMGs, be added to the knowledge and abilities catalogs for
initial reactor operator licenses? Provide a discussion that supports
your position.
d. What level of plant expertise should be demonstrated by the
personnel assigned to key positions outlined by the accident mitigation
guidelines and command and control strategy? Should these personnel be
required to be licensed or certified on the plant design? Provide a
discussion that supports your position.
e. What training requirements should be developed to ensure
emergency directors and other key decision-makers have the command and
control skills needed to effectively implement an accident mitigation
strategy? Provide a discussion that supports your position.
f. What should the qualification process entail for key personnel
identified in the new strategies? How would this qualification process
ensure proficiency? Provide a discussion that supports your position.
g. What level of effort, in terms of time and financial commitment,
will be required by the industry to develop and implement these
training, qualification, and evaluation requirements? If possible,
please include estimated milestones and PWR/BWR cost estimates.
C. Applicability to NRC Licenses and Approvals
The NRC would apply the new onsite emergency response capability
requirements to power reactors, both currently operating and new
reactors, and would like stakeholder feedback.
Accordingly, the NRC envisions that the requirements would apply to
the following:
Nuclear power plants currently licensed under 10 CFR part
50;
Nuclear power plants currently being constructed under
construction permits issued under 10 CFR part 50, or whose construction
permits may be reinstated;
[[Page 23165]]
Future nuclear power plants whose construction permits and
operating licenses are issued under 10 CFR part 50; and
Current and future nuclear power plants licensed under 10
CFR part 52.
D. Relationship Between Recommendation 8 and Other Near-Term Task Force
Recommendations
The NRC notes that there is a close relationship between the onsite
emergency response capability requirements under consideration in this
ANPR effort and several other near-term actions stemming from the NTTF
report (and identified in SECY-11-0124 and SECY-11-0137). Regulatory
actions taken in response to these other activities might impact
efforts to amend onsite accident mitigating procedures and training. In
this regard:
1. What is the best regulatory structure for integrating the onsite
emergency response capability requirements with other post-Fukushima
regulatory actions, such that there is a full, coherent integration of
the requirements?
2. Recommendations 4.1 and 4.2 address SBO regulatory actions and
mitigation strategies for beyond design basis external events,
respectively. The implementation strategies developed in response to
Recommendations 4.1 and 4.2 will require corresponding procedures. The
NRC recognizes the need for coordinating efforts under Recommendations
4.1, 4.2, and 8. What is the best way to integrate these three
regulatory efforts to ensure that they account for the others'
requirements, yet do not unduly overlap or inadvertently introduce
redundancy, inconsistency, or incoherency?
3. Recommendation 9.3 addresses staffing during a multiunit event
with an SBO. Should staffing levels change as a result of a revised
onsite emergency response capability or should these duties be assigned
to existing staff?
4. Recommendation 10.2 addresses command and control structure and
qualifications for the licensee's decision-makers for beyond design
basis events. Should this recommendation be addressed concurrently with
Recommendation 8?
E. Interim Regulatory Actions
The NRC recognizes that implementation of multiple post-Fukushima
requirements could be a challenge for licensees and requests feedback
on how best to implement multiple requirements, specifically onsite
emergency response capability requirements, without adversely impacting
licensees' effectiveness and efficiency. It will take several years to
issue a final rule. Should the NRC use other regulatory vehicles (such
as commitment letters or confirmatory action letters) to put in place
interim coping strategies for onsite emergency response capabilities
while rulemaking proceeds?
V. Public Meeting
The NRC plans to hold a category 3 public meeting with stakeholders
during the ANPR public comment period. The public meeting is intended
as a forum to discuss the ANPR with external stakeholders and provide
information on the feedback requested in the ANPR to support
development of onsite emergency response capability requirements.
The meeting is not intended to solicit comment. Instead, the NRC
will encourage stakeholders at the meeting to provide feedback in
written form during the ANPR comment period. To support full
participation of stakeholders, the NRC staff plans to provide
teleconferencing and Webinar access for the public meeting. Since the
intent of the meeting is not to solicit or accept comments, the meeting
will not be transcribed. The NRC will issue the public meeting notice
10 calendar days before the public meeting.
Stakeholders should monitor the NRC's public meeting Web site for
information about the public meeting: http://www.nrc.gov/public
involve/public-meetings/index.cfm.
VI. Rulemaking Process and Schedule
Stakeholders should recognize that the NRC is not obligated to
provide detailed comment responses to feedback provided in response to
this ANPR. If the NRC develops a regulatory basis sufficient to support
a proposed rule, there will be an opportunity for additional public
comment when the regulatory basis and the proposed rule are published.
If supporting guidance is developed for the proposed rule, stakeholders
will have an opportunity to provide feedback on the implementing
guidance.
VII. Related Petition for Rulemaking Action
The NTTF report provided a specific proposal for onsite emergency
actions that was subsequently endorsed by the National Resources
Defense Council (NRDC) in a petition for rulemaking (PRM), PRM-50-102
(76 FR 58165; September 20, 2011), as a way to address licensee
training and exercises. In connection with NTTF Recommendation 8.4,
``Onsite emergency actions,'' the NRDC requested in its petition that
the NRC ``institute a rulemaking proceeding applicable to nuclear
facilities licensed under 10 CFR 50, 52, and other applicable
regulations to require more realistic, hands-on training and exercises
on Severe Accident Mitigation [sic] Guidelines (SAMGs) and Extreme
Damage Mitigation Guidelines (EDMGs) for licensee staff expected to
implement the strategies and those licensee staff expected to make
decisions during emergencies, including emergency coordinators and
emergency directors.'' The Commission has established a process for
addressing a number of the recommendations in the NTTF Report, and the
NRC determined that the issues raised in PRM-50-102 are appropriate for
consideration and will be considered in this Recommendation 8
rulemaking. Persons interested in the NRC's actions on PRM-50-102 may
follow the NRC's activities at www.regulations.gov by searching on
Docket ID NRC-2012-0031.
VIII. Available Supporting Documents
The following documents provide additional background and
supporting information regarding this activity and corresponding
technical basis. The documents can be found in ADAMS. Instructions for
accessing ADAMS are in the ADDRESSES section of this document.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
ADAMS Accession
Number/Federal
Date Document Register
Citation
------------------------------------------------------------------------
April 4, 1990................. Generic Letter 88-20, ML031200551
Supplement 2,
``Accident Management
Strategies for
Consideration in the
Individual Plant
Examination Process''.
August 28, 2007............... Appendix A to 10 CFR 72 FR 49505
part 50--General
Design Criteria for
Nuclear Power Plants.
August 28, 2007............... Final Rule: Licenses, 72 FR 49352
Certifications, and
Approvals for Nuclear
Power Plants.
March 27, 2009................ Final Rule: Power 74 FR 13926
Reactor Security
Requirements.
[[Page 23166]]
March 23, 2011................ Memorandum from ML110950110
Chairman Jaczko on
Tasking Memorandum-
COMGBJ-11-0002--NRC
Actions Following the
Events in Japan.
April 29, 2011................ Temporary Instruction ML11115A053
2515/184,
Availability and
Readiness Inspection
of Severe Accident
Management Guidelines
(SAMGs).
May 26, 2011.................. Completion of ML111470264
Temporary Instruction
2515/184,
Availability and
Readiness Inspection
of Severe Accident
Mitigation Guidelines
(SAMGs), at Region IV
Reactor Facilities.
May 27, 2011.................. Region I Completion of ML111470361
Temporary Instruction
(TI)-184,
Availability and
Readiness Inspection
of Severe Accident
Mitigation Guidelines
(SAMGs).
June 1, 2011.................. Completion of ML111520396
Temporary Instruction
(TI) 2515/184,
Availability and
Readiness Inspection
of Severe Accident
Management Guidelines
(SAMGs) at Region III
Sites--Revision.
June 2, 2011.................. Completion of ML111530328
Temporary Instruction
(TI) 184,
Availability and
Readiness Inspection
of Severe Accident
Mitigation Guidelines
(SAMGS) at Region II
Facilities--Revision.
July 12, 2011................. SECY-11-0093--``The ML11186A959
Near-Term Task Force ML111861807
Review of Insights (Enclosure)
from the Fukushima
Dai-ichi Accident''.
August 19, 2011............... SRM-SECY-11-0093--Near- ML112310021
Term Report and
Recommendations for
Agency Actions
Following the Events
in Japan.
September 9, 2011............. SECY-11-0124, ML11245A127
``Recommended Actions ML11245A144
to be Taken Without (Enclosure)
Delay from the Near-
Term Task Force
Report.''.
October 3, 2011............... SECY-11-0137, ML11269A204
``Prioritization of ML11272A203
Recommended Actions (Enclosure)
to be Taken in
Response to Fukushima
Lessons Learned.''.
October 18, 2011.............. Staff Requirements ML112911571
Memorandum--SECY-11-0
124--Recommended
Actions to be Taken
Without Delay From
The Near-Term Task
Force Report.
July 26, 2011................. NRDC's Petition for ML11216A242
Rulemaking to Require
More Realistic
Training on Severe
Accident Mitigation
Guidelines (PRM 50-
102).
September 14, 2011............ Letter to Geoffrey H. ML112700269
Fettus, Natural
Resources Defense
Council, Inc. from
Annette Vietti-Cook,
In Regards to the NRC
Will Not Be
Instituting a Public
Comment Period for
PRM-50-97, PRM-50-98,
PRM-50-99, PRM-50-
100, PRM-50-101, and
PRM-50-102.
October 13, 2011.............. Initial ACRS Review ML11284A136
of: (1) The NRC Near-
Term Task Force
Report on Fukushima
and (2) Staff's
Recommended Actions
to be Taken Without
Delay.
November 30, 2011............. INPO-11-005, Special ML11347A454
Report on the Nuclear
Accident at the
Fukushima Dai-ichi
Nuclear Power Station.
December 15, 2011............. Staff Requirements ML113490055
Memorandum--SECY-11-0
137--Prioritization
of Recommended
Actions to be Taken
in Response to the
Fukushima Lessons-
Learned.
March 14, 2012................ Summary of the Public ML12073A283
Meeting to Discuss
Implementation of
Near-Term Task Force
Recommendation 8,
Strengthening and
Integration of Onsite
Emergency Response
Capabilities Such As
EOPS, SAMGS, and
EDMGS, Related to the
Fukushima Dai-ichi
Power Plant Accident.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 4th day of April 2012.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Michael F. Weber,
Acting Executive Director for Operations.
[FR Doc. 2012-9336 Filed 4-17-12; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P
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