Proving that Dean was Throat/Felt’s Source

I. INTRODUCTION

This paper summarizes the collected evidence that White House counsel John Dean provided FBI deputy director Mark Felt as “Deep Throat” (Throat/Felt) with the information that Felt in-turn provided to Washington Post reporter Bob Woodward. Felt and Dean provided Woodward information to manipulate Woodward’s reporting. Felt established extensive rules for Woodward that Woodward disregarded in identifying Throat/Felt’s provided information in the 1974 book All The President’s Men.

Figure 1: Diagram illustrating Dean as the source of the information that FBI deputy director Mark Felt as “Deep Throat” provided Washington Post reporter Bob Woodward.

II. IDENTIFICATION OF TRACEABLE THROAT/FELT INFORMATION

For the purpose of identifying traceable information, passages from All The President’s Men referencing Deep Throat were collected into an electronic document. About 18 pages of text from the book and eight short scenes from the movie wound up in this Deep Throat “database.” Some 57 book passages and one movie scene in the database appeared to contain “traceable” Deep Throat information—that is, information with sufficient specificity to allow its origins to be determined. If the information was too widely known, the source would be impossible to trace. Next, the book and movie passages were distilled into 46 subjects. All references to the same subject were combined, and each subject was assigned a name and number based on its earliest appearance in the book and subsequent movie.

The listing of Deep Throat passages with the traceable information highlighted and identified can be made available as necessary.
III. DETAILED REPORTS ON THE SOURCE OF THROAT/FELT INFORMATION

Each of the 46 traceable subjects was analyzed. Available sources of Watergate information were gathered—ideally those disclosed by or at least known to the sources of such information prior to the release of All the President’s Men. Watergate materials were searched for other references to each topic. Two evaluations were conducted for each of the 46 topics. First, the information Felt gave Woodward was compared with the information contained in FBI Watergate files. Second, Watergate testimony, books by Watergate participants, court records, and archives in an attempt to identify the origins of the information for each topic: Who knew the information prior to Felt passing it to Woodward? Detailed reports ranging in length from 5 to 20 pages were developed on each of the 46 subjects.

The first five detailed reports are provided at the end of this report. The detailed reports for each of the 46 subjects can be made available as necessary. Also, the applicable writings of Dean, Felt, and Woodward are available in keyword-searchable format.

IV. SYNOPSIS OF FINDINGS ON THE SOURCE OF THROAT/FELT INFORMATION

Next, a synopsis of the findings from each of the detailed reports was generated using the following format:

- **Felt told Woodward:** What is the specific subject information?
- **Who Knew?** Who knew the subject information? Did Dean possess the subject information prior to Throat/Felt passing it to Woodward? With the exception of Felt, did the FBI have the information prior to Throat/Felt passing it to Woodward? Did Felt pass the subject information to others in the FBI or later admit possessing the information?
- **Dean’s Muddling:** After the publication of the subject information that Throat/Felt passed Woodward, did Dean mislead others about the subject information?

An overview of the effort to trace Throat/Felt’s information is available online: [http://www.washingtonian.com/articles/people/deconstructing-deep-throat/](http://www.washingtonian.com/articles/people/deconstructing-deep-throat/)

A synopsis of findings for each of the 46 subjects is available online: [http://www.washingtonian.com/articles/people/findings-on-the-origins-of-deep-throats-information/](http://www.washingtonian.com/articles/people/findings-on-the-origins-of-deep-throats-information/)
V. SUMMARY OF THROAT/FELT SUBJECTS AND FINDINGS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CASE THROAT/FELT TOLD Woodward</th>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>DEAN’S PRIOR KNOWLEDGE</th>
<th>DEAN AMENDS(^1)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>#1 Hunt’s Watergate Involvement (2)</td>
<td>19Jun72</td>
<td>Liddy told Dean of Hunt’s involvement just hours prior.</td>
<td>Modified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#2 White House “High Stakes” View</td>
<td>16Sep72</td>
<td>Dean was in White House meeting with President day before.</td>
<td>Modified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#3 Use of CIA to Limit FBI Investigation (2)</td>
<td>16Sep72</td>
<td>Dean coordinated this secretive effort with CIA to limit FBI.</td>
<td>False</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#4 Strachan’s Wiretap Reports</td>
<td>16Sep72</td>
<td>Strachan described to Dean the destroyed wiretap reports.</td>
<td>Excluded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#5 Porter and Magruder Involved</td>
<td>17Sep72</td>
<td>Dean coached Magruder on his testimony concerning Porter.</td>
<td>Split/False</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#6 Sloan Was Not Involved</td>
<td>17Sep72</td>
<td>Dean spoke with Sloan and knew he was not involved.</td>
<td>Split</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#7 Hunt Contributors List Project</td>
<td>09Oct72</td>
<td>Dean obtained Hunt notebooks describing project.</td>
<td>False</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#8 Mitchell’s Investigation (2)</td>
<td>09Oct72</td>
<td>Maridan told Dean of Mitchell’s investigation.</td>
<td>False</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#9 Hunt Ordered to Leave (2)</td>
<td>09Oct72</td>
<td>Dean claimed Ehrlichman told him to tell Hunt to leave.</td>
<td>False</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#10 Maridans’s “Could Ruin” View</td>
<td>09Oct72</td>
<td>Maridan told Dean that Watergate could ruin administration.</td>
<td>Excluded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#11 Colson Was Getting Reports</td>
<td>09Oct72</td>
<td>Dean obtained Hunt reports for Colson from Hunt’s safe.</td>
<td>False</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#12 Martha Mitchell Knows Nothing</td>
<td>09Oct72</td>
<td>Dean overheard Martha issues at Mitchell apartment meeting.</td>
<td>Excluded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#13 Caulfield-Ulasewicz Operations</td>
<td>09Oct72</td>
<td>Caulfield told Dean of Caulfield-Ulasewicz operations.</td>
<td>Split/False</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#14 Hunt Manufactured Items for the Press</td>
<td>09Oct72</td>
<td>Dean obtained notebooks description and bogus cables.</td>
<td>False</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#15 Eagleton’s Health Records (2)</td>
<td>09Oct72</td>
<td>Dean was likely aware of these records as WH counsel.</td>
<td>Split/False/Excluded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#16 Sally Harmony’s Knowledge</td>
<td>09Oct72</td>
<td>Dean thought Harmony typed Strachan wiretap memos.</td>
<td>Modified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#17 Don’t Focus on the Break-in</td>
<td>09Oct72</td>
<td>Dean provided identical advice to Dash.</td>
<td>Excluded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#18 Clawson’s Canuck Letter</td>
<td>09Oct72</td>
<td>Dean knew Clawson claimed authorship of Canuck letter.</td>
<td>False</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#19 Segretti’s Fifty Operatives</td>
<td>09Oct72</td>
<td>Dean told prosecutors of Segretti’s fifty operatives.</td>
<td>False</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#20 Defendants “Taken Care of” (2)</td>
<td>25Jan73</td>
<td>Dean told Caulfield to tell McCord this.</td>
<td>Split/False</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#21 Hiring of Hunt and Liddy</td>
<td>25Jan73</td>
<td>Dean was involved in both the hiring of Hunt and Liddy.</td>
<td>False</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#22 Executive Privilege Strategy</td>
<td>25Jan73</td>
<td>Dean was responsible for drafting this strategy for President.</td>
<td>False</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#23 President on News Leaks</td>
<td>25Jan73</td>
<td>President told Dean of this on September 15, 1972 meeting.</td>
<td>Excluded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#24 Gray Pressured Nixon for Job (2)</td>
<td>25Jan73</td>
<td>Dean likely aware Gray pressured President for nomination.</td>
<td>False</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#25 Some Top People Against Gray</td>
<td>late-Feb73</td>
<td>Dean told Ehrlichman that he was against Gray nomination.</td>
<td>Merged/False</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#26 Mitchell Wiretaps Confirmation (3)</td>
<td>late-Feb73</td>
<td>FBI, Felt, and Dean were all aware of the Mitchell wiretaps.</td>
<td>Split/False</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#27 Haldeman Pushed Mitchell for Operation</td>
<td>late-Feb73</td>
<td>Haldeman told Dean who told Mitchell of need for operation.</td>
<td>False</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#28 Dean and Haldeman Will Resign</td>
<td>16Apr73</td>
<td>President told Dean only hours earlier of the resignations.</td>
<td>False</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#29 Gray’s Instructions on Files (2)</td>
<td>26Apr73</td>
<td>Dean and Ehrlichman told Gray what to do with files.</td>
<td>Merged</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#30 Dean Told to Dump Stuff in River</td>
<td>26Apr73</td>
<td>Dean claimed Ehrlichman told him to dump documents in river.</td>
<td>Merged</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#31 Gray Burned Files (not in FBI files)</td>
<td>26Apr73</td>
<td>FBI acting director Gray told Dean that he had burned files.</td>
<td>Merged</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#32 Secret Service Intelligence on Candidate</td>
<td>&lt;16May73</td>
<td>Secret Service told Dean of intelligence who gave to Colson.</td>
<td>Excluded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#33 FBI Told to Investigate Schorr</td>
<td>&lt;16May73</td>
<td>Only Dean / Higy knew Haldeman requested investigation.</td>
<td>Excluded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#34 Dual Warning—Bugging and Danger (2)</td>
<td>16May73</td>
<td>Dean independently got identical warnings one month prior.</td>
<td>False</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#35 Senator BakerWill Cooperate</td>
<td>16May73</td>
<td>Dean arranged for Baker’s secret meeting with President.</td>
<td>False</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#36 President to Dean on National Security</td>
<td>16May73</td>
<td>President told Dean not to discuss National Security.</td>
<td>False</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#37 Caulfield Offers Clemency</td>
<td>16May73</td>
<td>Dean told Caulfield to offer McCord clemency.</td>
<td>Excluded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#38 Caulfield Threatened McCord</td>
<td>16May73</td>
<td>Caulfield advised Dean of his interactions with McCord.</td>
<td>False</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#39 President’s Been Blackmailed</td>
<td>16May73</td>
<td>Dean advised President of the blackmail.</td>
<td>False</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#40 Dean’s Estimate of $1 Million</td>
<td>16May73</td>
<td>Dean responded to President that cover-up would cost $1M.</td>
<td>False</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#41 Dean as a Go-between</td>
<td>16May73</td>
<td>Dean described himself as an intermediary.</td>
<td>False</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#42 Dean’s Detailed Documents</td>
<td>16May73</td>
<td>Dean locked White House documents in safe deposit box.</td>
<td>False</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#43 Liddy’s Offer to Dean to be Shot</td>
<td>16May73</td>
<td>Liddy offered himself to Dean to be shot on June 19, 1972.</td>
<td>Excluded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#44 The President’s Depression</td>
<td>16May73</td>
<td>Dean described Nixon as depressed at April 15, 1973 meeting.</td>
<td>False</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#45 Deliberate Erasures (2)</td>
<td>~04Nov73</td>
<td>Dean admitted to notebook destruction upon erasing of tape.</td>
<td>Excluded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#46 Liddy’s Burnt Hand</td>
<td>Undated</td>
<td>Liddy told Dean that Liddy burned his hand with a candle.</td>
<td>Excluded (movie)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**KEY:** RX traced to White House, not Dean; X contained in FBI files; XX Throat/Felt names Dean; X FBI acting director; RX Dean tell-tale action.

\(^1\)Evaluation of appendix to Dean’s June 3, 2005, FindLaw article titled “Why the Revelation of the Identity of Deep Throat Has Only Created another Mystery.”
VI. GENERAL FINDINGS ON THE SOURCE OF THROAT/FELT’S INFORMATION

Finding #1: Dean had demonstrated prior access to the information that Throat/Felt passed Woodward for 43 of the 46 (93.4%) subjects analyzed and likely had prior access to all 46 subjects. No one except Dean had demonstrated access to more than a handful of the 46 subjects analyzed.

In two of the 46 subject cases (#15 and #24), though it could not be demonstrated that Dean had access to the subject information, the subject information could be traced to the White House and it was likely that Dean acting as White House counsel gained access to it. In a third case, though it could not be demonstrated that Dean had access to the subject (#45), Dean’s unusual and timely actions indicated that he likely also knew this subject.

Finding #2: The FBI did not organizationally possess information for 45 of the 46 (97.8%) subjects prior to Felt passing it to Woodward.

In one case (#31), the acting FBI director advised Dean that he had destroyed files but had not notified any others in the FBI of his actions. Therefore, though this subject information came from the acting FBI director, the FBI did not organizationally possess it prior to Throat/Felt passing it to Woodward. In a second case (#26), though the FBI, Felt, and Dean all had possession of the subject information prior to Throat/Felt passing it to Woodward, Throat/Felt only confirmed to Woodward the subject information that another FBI agent had already passed. Therefore, the FBI did possess the subject information but Felt only confirmed previously leaked FBI information and did not pass it. [Curiously, a former FBI agent impersonated the reporter and phoned the acting FBI director to accuse Felt of being the leaker and Felt retired the day after being confronted.]

Finding #3: Throat/Felt passed the subject information to Woodward but did not pass the same subject information to others in the FBI.

There is no evidence that Felt passed to others in the FBI the same subject information that he passed to Woodward.

Finding #4: Felt did not later admit having any of the subject information that Throat/Felt passed to Woodward.

In his 1979 book *The FBI Pyramid*, published five years after *All The President’s Men*, Felt does not admit possessing any of the subject information that Throat/Felt passed to Woodward.
Finding #5: Felt hid Dean’s involvement from Woodward for ten months. Despite Dean’s direct involvement in much of the information that Throat/Felt passed to Woodward, Throat/Felt did not name Dean to Woodward until April 16, 1973. After that date, Felt frequently mentioned Dean to Woodward (#X).

Finding #6: After the 1974 publication of All The President’s Men, Dean misled others in an attempt to obfuscate his involvement with Throat/Felt. To mislead others, Dean published phony Deep Throat analysis, (e.g., his 1982 book Lost Honor, his 2002 book Unmasking Deep Throat, and his 2005 FindLaw “Revelation” article) claiming much of Throat/Felt’s information was false and “of questionable value.” In these analyses, Dean tainted Deep Throat information to decease its traceability by modifying, paraphrasing, excluding, merging, splitting, and declaring it wrong.

A specific example of Dean’s manipulation is the appendix to his 2005 “Revelation” article¹ that listed and evaluated the truthfulness of Throat/Felt passages in All The President’s Men. In reference to the 46 subjects, in one way or another Dean modified or excluded 40 of the 46 of the subject passages (see DEAN AMENDS in table). In addition, Dean included a wide variety of Deep Throat passages that contained no useful information. Further, Dean identified many of the subject information passages as containing false information without explanation. Dean also failed to recognize any patterns in the Throat/Felt subject information as it related to himself. For example, Dean fails to point out that although Dean was involved in the first 27 subjects prior to his being named in the 28th, Throat/Felt never identified Dean’s involvement to Woodward. Dean failed to identify this pattern of Deep Throat not identifying Dean’s involvement.

In a second effort to mislead others, Dean fed the media a steady diet of erroneous Deep Throat candidates (e.g., Silbert, Gergen, Haig, etc.) and theories (e.g., Deep Throat is a composite).

Finally, Dean, again via the media, undermined and blunted the impact of other useful Throat/Felt leads and hints. As examples, Dean countered Haldeman’s naming of Felt as Deep Throat with an article questioning Haldeman’s honesty, countered professor William Gaines Deep Throat analysis with his own, countered Woodward’s release of Deep Throat meeting notes with fictitious stories, and panned Felt’s revised book in a review.

¹ http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dean/20050603.appendix.html

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VII. USING FORENSIC LINGUISTICS TO VALIDATE THE FINDING

In 2002, Dr. Roger Depue, a forensic psychologist formerly with the FBI, used psycholinguistics to analyze Deep Throat’s quotes in *All the President’s Men*. Based on wording and phraseology, Depue estimated Deep Throat’s age, education, and type of work and concluded that Mark Felt was likely Deep Throat—three years before Felt admitted being the secret source.

But if Deep Throat’s words sounded like Felt, the previous analysis shows that the information contained in Felt’s words appears to originate from White House counsel John Dean. Put Felt’s words together with Dean’s information and Throat/Felt appears to be transmitting Dean’s information in Felt’s own words.

Authorship attribution analysis with a known author (in this case Dean) is often used to validate the source of information. Can forensic linguistics or psycholinguistics validate the finding that Dean was the source of the information that Throat/Felt passed to Woodward? Does the prior analysis support validating the finding of expert forensic linguists?

*Figure 2*: Diagram illustrating Dean as the source of the information that FBI deputy director Mark Felt as “Deep Throat” provided *Washington Post* reporter Bob Woodward.
IX. USING FORENSIC LINGUISTICS TO VALIDATE THE FINDING

The following linguistic samples compare the subject information in Dean’s possession with the information that Throat/Felt passed to Woodward.

Synopsis of Subject #4: Wiretap Reports
First discussed: Sept. 16, 1972 • Origin: Dean

Felt told Woodward: On September 16, 1972, Felt mentioned “wiretap logs” to Woodward. (ATPM, p. 73)

Who knew? Woodward’s description of the “wiretap logs” in ATPM is less detailed than the description that Woodward first documented in his original newspaper article. Strachan described the “wiretap reports” to Dean on June 19, 1972, in words strikingly similar to those Felt used to describe the reports, as documented in Woodward’s September 20, 1972, news article. Strachan told Dean on June 19, 1972, about his destroying “confidential source memos which could . . . have been wiretap reports with the sources carefully camouflaged. . . .” Felt told Woodward on September 16, 1972, about “memos describing wiretapped telephone conversations of Democratic Party officials at the Watergate. The memos each began with the phrase ‘Confidential informant says,’ thereby making it possible that those that read them did not necessarily realize the contents had come from wiretapping.” Few besides Strachan and Dean knew of the wiretap reports before Felt provided Woodward nearly the identical description of the wiretap memos that Strachan earlier provided Dean.

Dean’s muddling: After publication of ATPM in 1974, Dean misled others into believing this Felt information about the wiretap memos “was right out of the CRP.” Dean failed to list this excerpt in his analysis.
Linguistic Comparison of Subject #4 – Strachan’s Wiretap Memos

Dean’s Prior Knowledge: Strachan in his Senate testimony described the wiretap memos to Dean on June 19, 1972.

Felt told Woodward: Felt described the wiretap memos to Woodward on September 16, 1972, as documented in the Washington Post article on September 20, 1972.

• Memos describing wiretapped telephone conversations of Democratic Party officials at the Watergate. The memos each began with the phrase “Confidential informant says,” thereby making it possible that those who read them did not necessarily realize the contents had come from wiretapping.
Synopsis of Subject #7: Hunt Contributors List Project
First discussed: Oct. 9, 1972 • Origin: Dean

Felt told Woodward: On October 9, 1972, Felt told Woodward of Hunt’s “contributors list” project. (ATPM, p. 131)

Who knew? Hunt kept notebooks that described his various White House projects and operations locked in his office safe. Hunt’s description of this project in his later Watergate book matched the description Felt gave Woodward. Dean gained access to the contents of Hunt’s office safe, including the notebooks, on the evening of June 19, 1972, but Dean denied having seen the notebooks until November 2, 1973, when Dean suddenly admitted to prosecutors that he had destroyed the Hunt notebooks. Few besides Dean knew of this Hunt project. Dean had access to the Hunt notebooks that described the project.

Dean’s muddling: After the publication of ATPM in 1974, Dean refuted this Felt information about Hunt’s “contributors list” project but does not mention his own access to and destruction of Hunt’s notebooks. Dean identifies Felt’s information about Hunt’s “contributors’ list” project as “not true” and lists references that failed to identify the project. Dean is technically correct for the limited references he cites that do not mention the project; however, Hunt did describe the project on p. 213 of his 1974 book Undercover.
Linguistic Comparison of Subject #7 – Hunt Contributor List Project

Dean’s Prior Knowledge: Hunt described the “contributors’ list” project in notebooks that Dean gained access to on June 19, 1972, and first admitted destroying on November 2, 1973. Hunt later described this project in his book.

“...The idea,” I told him, “is to photograph the list of contributors the Democrats are required to keep. Once we have those lists, we can have them checked to determine whether the contributors are bona fide or merely fronts for Castro or Hanoi money...”

Felt told Woodward: Felt described the contributors’ list project to Woodward on October 9, 1972.

“...Much of the intelligence-gathering was on their own campaign contributors, and some to check on the Democratic contributors—to check people out and sort of semi-blackmail them if something was found... a very heavy-handed operation...”

Dean’s Post-ATPM Muddling: After the publication of All The President’s Men, Dean denied such a project existed. Dean in his book Lost Honor identifies Felt’s information about Hunt’s “contributors’ list” project as “not true” and lists references that fail to identify the project. Dean is technically correct for the limited references he cites; however, Hunt did describe the project on p.213 of his 1974 book Undercover.

“...On October 9, 1972, Deep Throat told Woodward that “much of the [Nixon forces-inspired] intelligence gathering was on their own campaign contributors, and some to check on the Democratic contributors—to check people out and sort of semi-blackmail them if something was found... a very heavy-handed operation.” This is not true, and never have I seen any evidence from all the hearings, investigations, and reports to support it.
Synopsis of Subject #17: Don’t Focus on the Break-in
First discussed: Oct. 9, 1972 • Origin: Dean

Felt told Woodward: On October 9, 1972, Felt told Woodward to “concentrate on other activities, not the break-in at the Democratic Headquarters.” (ATPM, p. 134)

Who knew? Felt’s advice to Woodward was not published until the 1974 release of All The President’s Men. Dean gave Chief Counsel Sam Dash nearly the identical advice in their initial secret meeting on May 12, 1973, when Dean told Dash that Dash was “making the mistake of concentrating on the break-in of the Democratic National Committee headquarters.” No one besides Dean and Felt were directing those investigating Watergate to other activities besides the break-in at the Democratic headquarters.

Dean’s muddling: Dean failed to include this topic in his analysis.
Linguistic Comparison of Subject #17 – Don’t Focus on the Break-in

Dean’s Prior Knowledge: Dean secretly advised Dash on May 12, 1973, that he was making a mistake in concentrating on the break-in of the Democratic National Committee headquarters. Dash first described his meeting with Dean in his book.

Felt told Woodward: Felt advised Woodward on October 9, 1972, to concentrate on “other games” and not the break-in at Democratic headquarters. This advice wasn’t published until it appeared in All The President’s Men in April 1973.
Synopsis of Subject #19. Segretti’s Fifty Operatives
First discussed: Oct. 9, 1972 • Origin: Dean

Felt told Woodward: On October 9, 1972, Felt told Woodward that there were 50 White House operatives without mention of either Segretti or Dean. (ATPM, p. 135)

Who knew? After the Watergate arrests, Dean alone met directly with Segretti and reviewed his activities. Besides Segretti, only Dean knew the extent of Segretti’s activities. On May 2, 1973, Dean told prosecutors that, “Segretti had a network of 50 operatives and kept records of all the people and movements.” Even Segretti himself disagreed with both Dean and Felt’s characterization about the size and scope of his operation. Felt did not mention Segretti to Woodward but Dean’s statement to prosecutors added Segretti involvement in the version he told prosecutors.

Dean’s muddling: After the publication of ATPM in 1974, Dean claimed this Felt information was “bad information” and “absolutely false.”
Linguistic Comparison of Subject #19 – Segretti’s Fifty Operatives

Dean’s Prior Knowledge: Dean told prosecutors of Segretti’s 50 operatives on May 2, 1973, prior to the publication of All The President’s Men.

- Deviations in Jackson and Humphrey. Segretti had a network of 50 operatives and kept records of all the people and movements. Segretti obtained bogus stationery from a

Felt told Woodward: Woodward’s notes on October 9, 1972, for his Felt meeting documenting “more than 50” intelligence gatherers.”

- Felt told Woodward of Segretti’s 50 operatives on October 9, 1972. This article appeared in the Washington Post on October 10, 1972.

- in a big pond.” According to FBI reports, at least 50 undercover Nixon operatives traveled throughout the country trying to disrupt and spy on Democratic campaigns.

Dean’s Post-ATPM Muddling: The appendix to Dean’s June 3, 2005, FindLaw article, highlights Felt’s “50 people” information in red to designate it as false.

- "You can safely say that fifty people worked for the White House and CRP to play games and spy and sabotage and gather intelligence. Some of it is beyond belief, kicking at the opposition in every imaginable way. You already know some of it." (134–35)
Synopsis of Subject #21: Defendants “Taken Care of”
First discussed: Jan. 25, 1973 • Origin: Dean

Felt told Woodward: On January 25, 1973, Felt told Woodward that the Watergate defendants believe they are going to be taken care of” and that it was “done convincingly by someone high up.” (ATPM, p. 244)

Who knew? Dean admitted he told Caulfield to pass messages to McCord on January 13, 1973, that “your wife and family will be taken care of.” Caulfield stated that he only disclosed the business of Executive clemency for McCord with Dean at the White House. Dean directly managed Caulfield’s meetings with McCord and Caulfield and provided Dean with status reports after each meeting. Few besides Dean and McCord knew this information before Felt told Woodward.

Dean’s muddling: Dean failed to list this topic in his analysis.
Linguistic Comparison of Subject #21 – Defendant’s “Taken Care Of”

**Dean’s Prior Knowledge:** From p.254 of Caulfield’s Senate testimony, Dean told Caulfield to pass messages to McCord that “your wife and family will be taken care of” in early-January 1973

“In early January of 1973…I received a telephone call…from Mr. John Dean. He asked that I go outside the hotel and call him back from a public telephone, which I did. He told me that he had a very important message, which he wanted me to deliver to James McCord, that Mr. McCord was expecting to hear from me and McCord would understand what the message referred to. He said the message consisted of three things:

1. “A year is a long time;”
2. “…your wife and family will be taken care of.”
3. “you will be rehabilitated with employment when this is all over.”

From p.1089 of Dean’s Senate testimony:

**MR. DEAN.** Yes, sir.

**Senator Montoya.** Then, did you call Mr. Caulfield in January of 1972 when you authorized him to deliver a message to McCord, and did you ask him at the time to say to McCord, and I quote “A year is a long time. Your wife and family will be taken care of. You will be rehabilitated with employment when this is all over.” Did you say that?

**Mr. Dean.** Yes, I did. That was the result of a conversation in which I—he was on the west coast and I was in my office. I called him and transcribed the gist of what I was saying, read it back to me later, that is virtually what it was, that I said to him, and I told him “Fine,” and that is what he should report.

**Senator Montoya.** Now when you discussed the coverup with respect

**Felt told Woodward:**

and erasers. Four, there is the indisputable fact that the seven defendants believe they are going to be taken care of. That could only be done convincingly by someone high up, and somehow it has been done convincingly.”

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Synopsis of Subject #25: Some Top People against Gray
First discussed: late Feb. 1973 • Origin: Dean

Felt told Woodward: In late February 1973, Felt told Woodward that “some of the top people in the White House were dead set against” Gray’s nomination as permanent FBI director. (ATPM, p. 270)

Who knew? Dean told Ehrlichman that he was against Gray’s nomination as permanent FBI Director because of Gray’s destruction of documents. Ehrlichman indicated to Dean that the destruction was not a problem. Felt did not tell Woodward that the person opposing Gray’s nomination was Dean. Only Dean and Ehrlichman participated in this discussion. Few besides Dean both knew of Gray’s destruction of documents and opposed Gray’s nomination.

Dean’s muddling: After the publication of ATPM in 1974, Dean designated Felt’s information that “some of the top people” opposed Gray’s nomination as being false without explanation. It appears Dean alone opposed Gray’s nomination.
Linguistic Comparison of Subject #25 – Some Top People Against Gray

Dean’s Prior Knowledge: On p.949 of Dean’s Senate testimony, Dean was against Gray’s nomination as permanent FBI Director because of Gray’s destruction of documents.

I recall that shortly after this meeting in Petersen’s office, where I disclosed these facts to Petersen, I talked with Gray at a Department of Justice luncheon. After the luncheon he came up to me and told me that I must “hang tight” on not disclosing his receipt of the documents. He also informed me that he had destroyed the documents. I told Ehrlichman about this shortly after Gray told me he had destroyed the documents, and when Ehrlichman called me just before the President selected Gray as his nominee for Director of the FBI, Ehrlichman asked me if I had any problems with Gray and I reminded him of the destruction of the documents. He indicated that this was not a problem.

Felt told Woodward:
From p.271 of Woodward’s 1974 book All The President’s Men, Felt told Woodward some in the White House were against Gray’s nomination as permanent FBI director.

away. Some of the top people in the White House were dead set against it, but they couldn’t talk him out of it.”

From p.306 of Woodward’s 1974 book All The President’s Men, Felt reveals his awareness that Gray had burned the documents that Ehrlichman and Dean gave him from Hunt’s safe.

you drop the goddamn fucking things in the river?” Gray kept the files for about a week and then he says he threw them in a burn bag in his office. He says that he was not exactly told to destroy the files, but

Dean’s Post-ATPM Muddling: From appendix to Dean’s June 3, 2005, FindLaw article, Dean designates the information that Felt gave Woodward about Gray’s nomination as false by using red text.

Senate right away. Some of the top people in the White House were dead set against it, but they couldn’t talk him out of it.” (270) Note: This is one of the rare instances where
Synopsis of Subject #32: Secret Service Intelligence on Candidate
First discussed: Apr. 26, 1973 • Origin: Dean

Felt told Woodward: Felt told Woodward in the week before May 16, 1973, that the Secret Service forwarded information on the private life of a Democratic presidential candidate to the White House. (ATPM, p. 316)

Who knew? Felt does not mention that Dean was the White House recipient of the Secret Service information. However, Dean’s testimony precisely matched the information that Felt told Woodward. Dean in his Senate testimony stated that in the spring of 1972 a Secret Service agent brought him information on Senator McGovern that Dean gave to Colson, who had it published.

Dean’s muddling: Dean failed to list this item in his analysis.
Linguistic Comparison of Subject #32 – Secret Service Intelligence on Candidate

Dean’s Prior Knowledge: On p.923 of John Dean’s Senate testimony, Dean stated that in the spring of 1972 a Secret Service agent brought him information on Senator McGovern that Dean gave to Colson, who had it published.

| Mr. Dean. Political intelligence often came from unexpected sources. For example, during this last spring of 1972, a top man at the Secret Service brought me information regarding Senator McGovern. I asked Mr. Colson if he were interested. He was very interested and had the information published. |

Felt told Woodward: On p.316 of Woodward’s 1974 book All The President’s Men, Felt told Woodward that the Secret Service “forwarded information on the private life of a Democratic presidential candidate to the White House.” Felt does not mention that Dean was the White House recipient of the Secret Service information. However, Dean’s testimony precisely matched the information that Felt told Woodward.

| The undercover work went back to 1969, and included these operations: the Secret Service had forwarded information on the private life of a Democratic presidential candidate to the White House; Senator |
Synopsis of Subject #33: Haldeman Told FBI to Investigate Schorr
First discussed: May 16, 1973 • Origin: Dean

Felt told Woodward: In the week prior to May 16, 1973, Felt told Woodward that Haldeman ordered the Schorr investigation. (ATPM, p. 316)

Who knew? Dean testified that Haldeman ordered the FBI to investigate Schorr. Higby passed the order to Hoover. Hoover knew only that Higby ordered the Schorr investigation and passed Higby’s order to Felt. Neither Hoover nor Felt directly knew that Haldeman ultimately ordered the Schorr investigation. Felt does not admit that Haldeman personally ordered the investigation in his later book. Only Haldeman, Higby, and Dean knew that Haldeman personally ordered the FBI to investigate Schorr before Felt told Woodward this.

Dean’s muddling: Dean failed to list this topic in his analysis.
Linguistic Comparison of Subject #33 – FBI Told To Investigate Schorr

Dean’s Prior Knowledge: On p.1071 of Dean’s Senate testimony, Dean testified that Haldeman ordered the FBI investigation of Schorr.

Senator Weicker. All right. Is there any other use that you made of the White House made of the FBI on matters that come to your recollection now?

Mr. Dean. I can recall again, after the fact, getting involved in a situation that involved an FBI investigation that was made of Mr. Daniel Schorr, and when I learned about that after the fact I was told that what had happened is that Mr. Higby, who was Mr. Haldeman’s assistant, had received a request from Mr. Haldeman when he was traveling with the President, to direct the FBI to do an investigation of Mr. Schorr. Mr. Hoover proceeded with the investigation but, to the dismay of the White House, he did a sort of a full field wide-open investigation, and this became very apparent. So this put the White House in a rather scrambling position to explain what had happened. The long and short of the explanation was that Mr. Malik, who at the time knew nothing about this said that Mr. Schorr was being considered for a post and that this was a part of a preliminary investigation in consideration of Mr. Schorr for a Presidential appointment in. I believe, the environmental field.


fore they were leaked to the press; Haldeman personally ordered an FBI investigation of CBS news correspondent Daniel Schorr in 1971.
Synopsis of Subject #43: Liddy’s Offer to be Shot
First Discussed: May 16, 1973 • Origin: Dean

Felt told Woodward: On May 16, 1973, Felt told Woodward that “Liddy told Dean that they could shoot him and/or that he would shoot himself, but that he would never talk and always be a good soldier.” (ATPM, p. 319)

Who knew? According to Dean, Liddy told Dean at 11:15 AM on June 19, 1972, that “he was a soldier and would never talk” and that “if anyone wished to shoot him on the street, he was ready.” Only Dean and Liddy attended this meeting. Dean told prosecutors that, “Liddy also said he was a good soldier and volunteered to go to any street corner to be shot.” The FBI did not have this information at the time Felt gave the information to Woodward. Felt did not give the information to the FBI.

Dean’s muddling: Dean failed to list this topic in his own analysis.
Linguistic Comparison of Subject #43 – Liddy’s Offer to Dean to Be Shot

Dean’s Prior Knowledge: On p.1266 of Dean’s Senate testimony, Dean’s recollection of Liddy telling him that he was willing to be shot.

As the conversation ended he again expressed his apology and his concern about the men in jail. I told him I couldn’t help and he said he understood. He also told me that he was a soldier and would never talk. He said if anyone wished to shoot him on the street, he was ready. As we parted I said I would be unable to discuss this with him further. He said he understood and I returned to my office.

On p.7 of special prosecutor memo detailing Dean’s information, Dean told prosecutors of Liddy’s willingness to be shot.

better information. Liddy also said he was a good soldier and volunteered to go to any street corner to be shot.

Felt told Woodward: On p.319 of Woodward’s 1974 book All The President’s Men, Felt tells Woodward that Liddy is willing to be shot.

Liddy told Dean that they could shoot him and/or that he would shoot himself, but that he would never talk and always be a good soldier.
SAMPLES OF DETAILED REPORTS
REPORTS ON SUBJECTS #1 TO #5
CASE #1 Hunt Was Involved (June 19, 1972)

How did FBI deputy director Mark Felt (Deep Throat) learn of Howard Hunt’s Watergate involvement before Felt told Washington Post reporter Bob Woodward of it prior to 3 PM on June 19, 1972?

Liddy told Dean of Hunt’s Watergate involvement at 11:15 AM on June 19, 1972, and Felt told Woodward of it before 3 PM that same afternoon. Few besides Dean knew of Hunt’s Watergate involvement before Felt told Woodward of it. Dean later misled others into believing that Hunt’s Watergate involvement was “widely known.”

Assertions:
1) The FBI did not know this information.
2) Dean and few others knew this information before Felt told Woodward it.
3) Felt had this information within hours of Dean receiving it.
4) Felt did not share this information with others at the FBI.
5) Dean later misled others about this information.
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CASE #1  Hunt Was Involved (June 19, 1972)

Excerpts from All The President's Men (1974)

#1-A p.25 [before 3 PM on June 19, 1972]

nervous. On an off-the-record basis he told Woodward that the FBI regarded Hunt as a prime suspect in the Watergate investigation for many reasons aside from the address-book entries and the unmailed check. Woodward was bound not to use the information in a story.

#1-B p.72

tive. He had never told Woodward anything that was incorrect. It was he who had advised Woodward on June 19 that Howard Hunt was definitely involved in Watergate. During the summer, he had told Wood-

Analytic Findings

Did the FBI know this before Felt told Woodward it?
No. Contrary to Felt’s assertion that Hunt was a “prime suspect,” the FBI did not yet know of Hunt’s Watergate involvement. [1, 2]

Did Dean know this before Felt told Woodward it?
Yes. Liddy told Dean of Hunt’s Watergate involvement at their 11:15 AM meeting on June 19, 1972. [3, 4] Felt told Woodward of Hunt’s Watergate involvement before 3 PM that same afternoon. [5, 6, 7]

Did Felt mention Dean’s involvement to Woodward?
No. Liddy told Dean that Hunt was involved in Watergate but Felt does not mention Dean’s involvement to Woodward.

Did Dean mislead others about this after All The President’s Men?
Yes. Dean claimed Hunt’s Watergate involvement was “widely known by persons at CRP and at the White House” prior to Felt telling Woodward of it. [8] Dean removed the details of this Felt information from his list of Felt’s information. [9]

Besides Dean, who else knew this before Felt told Woodward it?
Liddy, Hunt, and the jailed burglars knew of Hunt’s Watergate involvement before Felt told Woodward. However, Liddy and Hunt were trying to avoid going to jail. The burglars were already in jail and did not place any phone calls before Felt told Woodward of Hunt’s Watergate involvement. The burglars’ lookout Baldwin did not know Liddy or Hunt’s real names as both had given Baldwin aliases.

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How did FBI deputy director Mark Felt (Deep Throat) learn of Howard Hunt’s Watergate involvement before Felt told Washington Post reporter Bob Woodward of it prior to 3 PM on June 19, 1972?

Liddy told Dean of Hunt’s Watergate involvement at 11:15 AM on June 19, 1972, and Felt told Woodward of it before 3 PM that same afternoon. Few besides Dean knew of Hunt’s Watergate involvement before Felt told Woodward of it. Dean later misled others into believing that Hunt’s Watergate involvement was “widely known.”

Overview of Chronologically-sequenced References

Dean states that the FBI did not know that Hunt was definitely involved in the Watergate break-in.

Dean again states that the FBI did not know of Hunt’s Watergate involvement.

[3] p.933 of Dean’s Senate testimony
Dean describes the June 19, 1972, meeting at which Liddy told him of Hunt’s Watergate involvement.

Dean specifies that his meeting with Gordon Liddy occurred at 11:15 AM on June 19, 1972.

Woodward states he had a 3 PM deadline for submitting his story.

Woodward states that Felt told him, apparently before 3 PM on June 19, 1972, that the FBI regarded Hunt as a prime suspect in Watergate.

Woodward affirms that Felt was the one who told him of Hunt’s Watergate involvement.

Dean thrice claims that Hunt’s Watergate involvement was known within the White House and CRP. In fact, only Dean had learned of Hunt’s Watergate involvement from Liddy.

[9] appendix to Dean’s June 3, 2005 FindLaw article
Dean removed two phrases from Felt’s information, i.e., the phrase “for many reasons aside from the address-book entries and the unmailed check,” and the phrase “on June 19” from his list of Felt’s information.
Chronologically-sequenced References


Dean states that the FBI did not know that Hunt was definitely involved in the Watergate break-in.

Contrary to Deep Throat’s statement to Woodward, the FBI actually did not have information on June 19 that Howard Hunt was definitely involved in the Watergate break-in. All the FBI had was a suspicion based on the incriminating address-book entries and the Hunt check, which had been found in the hotel room of the arrested Watergate burglars. The only people


Dean affirms that the FBI did not know of Hunt’s Watergate involvement.

the White House — but, to my knowledge, only at those two places. Most interesting is that two places that didn’t know about Hunt’s involvement were the FBI, which Woodward says that Throat told him did know, and the Department of Justice — more specifically, the U.S. Attorney’s office, which was supervising the investigation. This appears a calculated deflection away from his White House source. It was a first story, and Bob was being very careful. This information about Hunt was so widely known

that it is not a particularly revealing clue for identifying Throat. Yet he must be someone who could pick information from the White House grapevine.
Dean describes the June 19, 1972, meeting at which Liddy told him of Hunt’s Watergate involvement.

I next contacted Liddy and asked him to meet with me. He said he would come to my office. As he came into the office I was on my way out. I suggested we take a walk. It was shortly before noon and we walked down 17th Street toward the Corcoran Gallery.

I will try to reconstruct the conversation to the best of my memory. While I cannot recall every detail, I do indeed recall the major items we discussed.

Mr. Liddy told me that the men who had been arrested in the DNC were his men and he expressed concern about them. I asked him why he had men in the DNC and he told me that Magruder had pushed him into doing it. He told me that he had not wanted to do it, but Magruder had complained about the fact that they were not getting good information from a bug they had placed in the DNC sometime earlier. He then explained something about the steel structure of the Watergate Office Building that was inhibiting transmission of the bug and that they had gone into the building to correct this problem. He said that he had reported to Magruder that during the earlier entry of the DNC offices they had seen documents—which I believe he told me were either Government documents or classified documents—and Magruder had told him to make copies of those documents.

Liddy was very apologetic for the fact that they had been caught and that Mr. McCord was involved. He told me that he had used Mr. McCord only because Magruder had cut his budget so badly. I asked him why one of the men had a check from Mr. Howard Hunt and he told me that these men were friends of Hunt and Hunt had put him in touch with them. I do not recall Liddy discussing any further involvement of Hunt, other than Hunt’s putting him in touch with the Cubans. I asked him if anyone from the White House was involved and he told me no.

As the conversation ended he again expressed his apology and his concern about the men in jail. I told him I couldn’t help and he said he understood. He also told me that he was a soldier and would never talk. He said if anyone wished to shoot him on the street, he was ready. As we parted I said I would be unable to discuss this with him further. He said he understood and I returned to my office.
Jane buzzed. It was Liddy.

“Gordon,” I said, “I’d like to meet with you.”

“I’ll be right over,” he replied instantly, words clicking. I detected relief. “Have me cleared.” He signed off in a hurry.

I buzzed Jane and told her to clear Liddy past the guards downstairs. I sat back to compose myself, and then another wave of self-recrimination washed over me. Another dumb move, John. You’re not thinking straight. Liddy has just been involved in a crime, and now you’ve built a record of meeting with him. I grimly pictured the Executive Protection Service clearance log: “Mr. Gordon Liddy; June 19, 1972; 11:15 a.m.; Northwest Basement Entrance, EOB; cleared by Miss Thomas for Mr. Dean; official business.” There was nothing I could do about it now. I finally decided, rather irrationally, that I would intercept Liddy in the hall to lessen the number of people in my own office who would see him with me. I hurried out to the bathroom and then paced slowly in the hallway, trying to look as if I were going somewhere. Just as I was heading for the water fountain, I saw Liddy coming toward me.
Woodward states he had a 3 PM deadline for submitting his story.

It was approaching 3:00 p.m., the hour when the Post's editors list in a “news budget” the stories they expect for the next day's paper. Woodward, who had been assigned to write Tuesday's Watergate story, picked up the telephone and dialed 456-1414—the White House. He

Woodward states that Felt told him, apparently before 3 PM on June 19, 1972, that the FBI regarded Hunt as a prime suspect in Watergate.

nervous. On an off-the-record basis he told Woodward that the FBI regarded Hunt as a prime suspect in the Watergate investigation for many reasons aside from the address-book entries and the unmailed check. Woodward was bound not to use the information in a story

tive. He had never told Woodward anything that was incorrect. It was he who had advised Woodward on June 19 that Howard Hunt was definitely involved in Watergate. During the summer, he had told Wood-
Dean thrice claims that Hunt's Watergate involvement was known within the White House and CRP. In fact, only Dean learned of Hunt's Watergate involvement from Liddy.

p.35

- On June 19, 1972, Deep Throat says that Hunt is involved in Watergate, a fact only known within the White House and CRP, but not by the FBI or Justice Department (according to investigative records).

p.56

In the meantime, the address book entries and the Hunt check, which had been found in the hotel room of the arrested Watergate burglars. The only people who knew that Hunt was definitely involved in the Watergate break-in were at the White House and the CRP. As for the CRP, only deputy director Jeb Magruder — who had returned from California, where all the senior CRP officials had been visiting — could have known about Hunt’s role, having been told by Watergate’s master planner, G. Gordon Liddy. But Jeb was a bit of a chatterbox, so he likely shared it with one or more of his CRP intimates, like Rob Odle or Bart Porter. The White House learned on June 19 of Hunt’s involvement when Liddy told me this fact, around noon. In turn, I told Ehrlichman.

p.57

In short, Hunt’s involvement was widely known by persons at the CRP and the White House — but, to my knowledge, only at those two places. Most
appendix to Dean’s June 3, 2005 FindLaw article

Dean removed two phrases from Felt’s information, i.e., the phrase “for many reasons aside from the address-book entries and the unmailed check,” and the phrase “on June 19” from his listing of Felt’s information.

| June 19, 1972 | Howard Hunt was "a prime suspect in the Watergate investigation for many reasons." (25). Later, the authors characterize Hunt as "definitely involved in Watergate." (72) |
CASE #2 White House “High-Stakes” View (September 16, 1972)

How did FBI deputy director Mark Felt (Deep Throat) learn of the September 15, 1972, White House meeting on Watergate before Felt told Washington Post reporter Bob Woodward of it on September 16, 1972?

Dean’s first Watergate meeting with the President and Haldeman was at 5:27 PM meeting on September 15, 1972. Only those present knew Watergate was discussed. Afterwards Dean was sure of the President’s involvement in Watergate. Felt told Woodward the following day that the White House “at the last meeting, regarded the stakes in Watergate as much higher than anyone outside perceived.” Dean later modified Felt’s information to remove Felt’s reference to the White House meeting.

Assertions:
1) The FBI did not know this information.
2) Dean and few others knew this information before Felt told Woodward it.
3) Dean attended this White House meeting.
4) Felt did not mention that Dean attended the White House meeting.
5) Felt did not share this information with others at the FBI.
6) Felt had this information within a day of the White House meeting.
7) Dean later misled others about this information.
CASE #2 White House “High-stakes” View (September 16, 1972)

Excerpt from All The President’s Men (1974)
#2 p.72 [September 16, 1972]

Analytic Findings

Did the FBI know this before Felt told Woodward it?
No. The FBI did not have this information.

Did Dean know this before Felt told Woodward it?
Yes. By meeting with Dean on Watergate at 5:27 PM on September 15, 1972, the President signaled to Dean the high-stakes nature of Watergate. [1, 2, 3] Felt told Woodward the following day, September 16, 1972, that the White House “at the last meeting, regarded the stakes in Watergate as much higher than anyone outside perceived.” [4]

Did Felt mention Dean’s involvement to Woodward?
No. Dean attended this meeting with the President but Felt does not mention Dean’s attendance at the meeting to Woodward.

Did Dean mislead others about this after All The President’s Men?
Yes. Dean claimed that this Felt information was “too imprecise” to be useful. [5] Dean later removed the critical phrase “he had said at the last meeting” from his list of Felt’s information [6]

Besides Dean, who else knew this before Felt told Woodward it?
The President and Haldeman also attended this meeting and, therefore, also knew that Watergate was discussed.
How did FBI deputy director Mark Felt (Deep Throat) learn of the September 15, 1972, White House meeting on Watergate before Felt told Washington Post reporter Bob Woodward of it on September 16, 1972?

Dean’s first Watergate meeting with the President and Haldeman was at 5:27 PM meeting on September 15, 1972. Only those present knew Watergate was discussed. Afterwards Dean was sure of the President’s involvement in Watergate. Felt told Woodward the following day that the White House “at the last meeting, regarded the stakes in Watergate as much higher than anyone outside perceived.” Dean later modified Felt’s information to remove Felt’s reference to the White House meeting.

Overview of Chronologically-sequenced References

[1] President’s daily diary for September 15, 1972
   President Nixon met with Haldeman and Dean from 5:27 PM to 6:17 PM on September 15, 1972.

[2] p.957 in Dean’s Senate testimony
   Dean describes his September 15, 1972, Watergate meeting with the President and Haldeman.

[3] p.1029 of Dean’s Senate testimony
   Dean states that following his September 15, 1972, meeting with the President that he had no doubt about the President’s involvement in the cover-up — thus Dean realized the high-stakes involved, just as Felt related to Woodward the following day.

   Woodward states that Felt told him on September 16, 1972, of the White House view of the high-stakes nature of Watergate.

   Dean claims that the information that Felt gave Woodward “is too imprecise to make any accurate date determination…”

[6] appendix to Dean’s June 3, 2005, FindLaw article
   Dean replaced the phrase “he had said at the last meeting” with an ellipsis (“…”) to decouple Dean’s initial Watergate meeting with the President on Sept 15, 1972, from the information about the White House meeting Felt gave Woodward on September 16, 1972.
Chronologically-sequenced References

[1] President's daily diary for September 15, 1972

President Nixon met with Haldeman and Dean from 5:27 PM to 6:17 PM on September 15, 1972.

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The President met with:
Mr. Haldeman
Peter H. Dailey, President of the November Group, Inc.
White House photographer, in/out
Ronald L. Ziegler, Press Secretary
John W. Dean III, Counsel
Meeting With the President—September 15, 1972

On September 15 the Justice Department announced the handing down of the seven indictments by the Federal grand jury investigating the Watergate. Late that afternoon I received a call requesting me to come to the President’s Oval Office. When I arrived at the Oval Office I found Haldeman and the President. The President asked me to sit down. Both men appeared to be in very good spirits and my reception was very warm and cordial. The President then told me that Bob—referring to Haldeman—had kept him posted on my handling of the Watergate case. The President told me I had done a good job and he appreciated how difficult a task it had been and the President was pleased that the case had stopped with Liddy. I responded that I could not take credit because others had done much more difficult things than I had done. As the President discussed the present status of the situation I told him that all that I had been able to do was to contain the case and assist in keeping it out of the White House. I also told him that there was a long way to go before this matter would end and that I certainly could make no assurances that the day would not come when this matter would start to unravel.

Dean summarizes his meeting with the President and Haldeman.

I left the meeting with the impression that the President was well aware of what had been going on regarding the success of keeping the White House out of the Watergate scandal and I also had expressed to him my concern that I was not confident that the coverup could be maintained indefinitely.

[2] p.957 in Dean’s Senate testimony
Dean states that following his September 15, 1972, meeting with the President that he had no doubt about the President’s involvement in the cover-up — thus Dean realized the high-stakes involved, just as Felt told Woodward the following day.

**Mr. Dash. Therefore, Mr. Dean, whatever doubts you may have had prior to September 15 about the President’s involvement in the cover-up, did you have any doubts yourself about this after September 15? Mr. Dean. No, I did not.**
Woodward states that Felt told him on September 16, 1972, of the White House view of the high-stakes nature of Watergate.

and cautioned them to take care when using their telephones. The White House, he had said at the last meeting, regarded the stakes in Watergate as much higher than anyone outside perceived. Even the
Dean claims that the information that Felt gave Woodward “is too imprecise to make any accurate date determination…”

*All The President’s Men* refers to information given by Deep Throat to Woodward “during the summer.” Obviously, this contact is too imprecise to make any accurate date determination, nor does it reveal any information from which one can learn about Throat’s identity. Having said that, the fact

John Dean replaced the phrase “he had said at the last meeting” with an ellipsis (“…”) to decouple Dean’s initial Watergate meeting with the President on Sept 15, 1972, from the information about the White House meeting Felt gave Woodward on Sept 16, 1972.

The White House ... regarded the stakes in Watergate as much higher than anyone outside perceived. (72)
CASE #3 Use the CIA to Limit FBI Investigation

How did FBI deputy director Mark Felt (Deep Throat) learn of the President’s order to CIA managers to limit the FBI’s Watergate investigation before Felt told Washington Post reporter Bob Woodward of it on September 16, 1972?

Dean was among only a handful of people directly involved in and aware of the late-June 1972 White House effort to use the CIA to limit the FBI investigation before Felt first mentioned this to Woodward on September 16, 1972. Despite Dean’s direct involvement in this effort, Felt does not mention Dean. Dean later broke Felt’s information into unrecognizable pieces.

Assertions:

1) The FBI did not know this information.
2) Dean and few others knew this information before Felt told Woodward it.
3) Dean was directly involved in this White House effort.
4) Felt did not share this information with others at the FBI.
5) Felt does not mention Dean’s direct involvement in this effort.
6) Dean later misled others about this information.
CASE #3 Use CIA to Limit FBI Investigation (September 16, 1972)

Excerpts from All The President's Men (1974)

#3-A p.72 [September 16, 1972]

Watergate as much higher than anyone outside perceived. Even the FBI did not understand what was happening. The source had been deliberately vague about this, however, making veiled references to the CIA and national security which Woodward did not understand.

#3-B p.318 [May 16, 1973]

CIA people can testify that Haldeman and Ehrlichman said that the President orders you to carry this out, meaning the Watergate cover-up . . . Walters and Helms and maybe others.

Analytic Findings

Did the FBI know this before Felt told Woodward it?
No. The FBI did not have this information.

Did Dean know this before Felt told Woodward it?
Yes. Dean was directly involved in the late-June 1972 White House effort to use the CIA and national security to limit the FBI's Watergate investigation. [1, 2] On Sept 16, 1972, Felt made “veiled references” to this effort but on May 16, 1973, Felt told Woodward the President ordered Haldeman and Ehrlichman to tell CIA managers Walters and Helms to block the FBI Watergate investigation. [3, 4]

Did Felt mention Dean’s involvement to Woodward?
No. Dean directly participated in this White House effort but Felt does not mention Dean’s involvement to Woodward.

Did Dean mislead others about this after All The President’s Men?
Yes. Dean claimed the p.72 excerpt was not useful, divided the p.72 excerpt into two separate pieces, and failed to relate the p.72 and p.318 excerpts. [5, 6]

Besides Dean, who else knew this before Felt told Woodward it?
Nixon, Haldeman, Ehrlichman, and the involved CIA managers, Helms and Walters, would have also known of this effort.
How did FBI deputy director Mark Felt (Deep Throat) learn of the President’s order to CIA managers to limit the FBI’s Watergate investigation before Felt told Washington Post reporter Bob Woodward of it on September 16, 1972?

Dean was among only a handful of people directly involved in and aware of the late-June 1972 White House effort to use the CIA to limit the FBI investigation before Felt first mentioned this to Woodward on September 16, 1972. Despite Dean’s direct involvement in this effort, Felt never mentioned Dean. Dean later broke Felt’s information into unrecognizable pieces.

Overview of Chronologically-sequenced References

[1] p.948 in Dean’s Senate Hearings testimony
Dean was a direct participant in the failed White House effort to use the CIA and national security to limit the FBI’s Watergate investigation. Dean advised Haldeman and Ehrlichman that the President would have to order the CIA to get involved.

Dean telephoned Acting FBI Director Gray after the Haldeman-Ehrlichman Helms-Walters meeting to ensure the CIA had halted the FBI investigation.

Felt made “veiled references” to the White House efforts to use the CIA and national security to block the FBI Watergate investigation.

Felt’s knowledge of the White House efforts to use the CIA and national security to limit the FBI’s Watergate investigation is confirmed on May 16, 1973, when Felt identifies the specific CIA managers (Walters and Helms) entangled in these same White House efforts.

Dean states that the “veiled references” excerpt does not “reveal any information from which one can learn about Throat’s identity.”

[6] appendix to Dean’s June 3, 2005, FindLaw article
Dean separated the reference to the FBI statement from that of the “CIA and national security” to mask the FBI connection to the “CIA and national security,” thereby obscuring that this Felt information tied to Dean’s efforts to limit the FBI Watergate investigation. In addition to breaking the p.72 references into two pieces, Dean also failed to associate the p.72 reference to the p.318 reference.
Chronologically-sequenced References

[1] p.948 in Dean’s Senate Hearings testimony

Dean was a direct participant in the failed White House effort to use the CIA and national security to limit the FBI’s Watergate investigation. Dean advised Haldeman and Ehrlichman that the President would have to order the CIA to get involved.

I subsequently informed Ehrlichman and Haldeman that unless the President directly ordered the CIA to provide support for those involved that the CIA was not going to get involved. I told them I agreed with Walters that this would be a terrible mistake and they both told me they agreed.
Dean telephoned Acting FBI Director Gray after the Haldeman-Ehrlichman Helms-Walters meeting to ensure the CIA had halted the FBI investigation.

At 1:30 Dean called me back. “Pat,” he said, “General Vernon A. Walters, deputy director of the CIA, will be coming over to see you this afternoon. He has something to tell you.”

I said I would meet with him, and a short time later Walters’s secretary called to find out how soon he could come over.

While that call came in, a thirty-five-year-old White House fellow was sitting outside my office waiting for an interview to see whether or not he would be assigned to the FBI. He was Lieutenant Colonel Colin L. Powell. The job eventually went to another White House fellow, Major John C. Fryer, who became an important part of my personal staff. John went on to a distinguished air force career and became superintendent of schools in Jacksonville, Florida. Powell, of course, retired with four stars and became secretary of state.

At 2:15 a nervous-sounding Dean called me again, asking if the Walters meeting had been set up yet. When I told him it was about to take place, Dean asked that I call him immediately afterward. Fifteen minutes later, Walters came to my office.

Lieutenant General Vernon “Dick” Walters was a brilliant and charming fifty-five-year-old man. Fluent in many languages, he had been in the car with Nixon when it was stoned by a violent mob in Caracas, Venezuela, in 1958 and had been a close confidant and secret operative for Henry Kissinger in the Paris Peace Talks, but he was as new to his current job as I was to mine. Nixon had appointed him deputy director of the CIA on May 2, the day before I took over the FBI. Though I had not met him before, he and I got along well from the outset. After a few pleasantries, Dick got to the reason he was here.

“If the investigation gets pushed further south of the border,” he said, “it could trespass onto some of our covert projects. Since you’ve got these five men under arrest, it will be best to taper the matter off here.”

He then asked me if I was aware of the written agreement between our two agencies not to uncover each other’s sources. I was well aware of it and agreed with its logical premise, though I had not actually read the document itself. I told him we would abide by the agreement and proceed very cautiously.
Felt made “veiled references” to the White House efforts to use the CIA and national security to block the FBI Watergate investigation.

Felt’s knowledge of the White House efforts to use the CIA and national security to limit the FBI’s Watergate investigation is confirmed on May 16, 1973, when Felt identifies the specific CIA managers (Walters and Helms) entangled in these same White House efforts.

CIA people can testify that Haldeman and Ehrlichman said that the President orders you to carry this out, meaning the Watergate cover-up . . . Walters and Helms† and maybe others.
Dean states that the “veiled references” excerpt does not “reveal any information from which one can learn about Throat’s identity.”

All The President’s Men refers to information given by Deep Throat to Woodward “during the summer.” Obviously, this contact is too imprecise to make any accurate date determination, nor does it reveal any information from which one can learn about Throat’s identity. Having said that, the fact

Dean separated the reference to the FBI statement from that of the “CIA and national security” to mask the FBI connection to the “CIA and national security,” thereby obscuring that this Felt information tied to Dean’s efforts to limit the FBI Watergate investigation. In addition to breaking the p.72 references into two pieces, Dean also failed to associate the p.72 reference to the p.318 reference.

Even the FBI did not understand what was happening. (72)

Throat made ... veiled references to the CIA and national security which Woodward did not understand. (72)

CIA people can testify that Haldeman and Ehrlichman said that the President orders you to carry this out, meaning the Watergate cover up...Walters and Helms and maybe others. (318)
CASE #4

Strachan’s Wiretap Memos (September 16, 1972)

How did FBI deputy director Mark Felt (Deep Throat) learn of the description of the “wiretap memos” before Felt told Washington Post reporter Bob Woodward of it on September 16, 1972?

Woodward’s description in his book about the “wiretap logs” was found to be less accurate than the information that Woodward first documented in his original newspaper article. Strachan described the “wiretap reports” to Dean on June 19, 1972, in words strikingly similar to those Felt used to describe the reports to Woodward on September 16, 1973, as documented in his September 20, 1972, news article. Dean later misled others when he claimed this Felt information “was right out of the CRP.”

Assertions:
1) The FBI did not know this information.
2) Dean and few others knew this information before Felt told Woodward it.
3) Dean directly obtained the description of the memos from Strachan.
4) Felt did not share this information with others at the FBI.
5) Felt & Strachan’s descriptions of wiretap memos are strikingly similar.
6) Dean later misled others about this information.
The above description of the wiretap documents was found to be less accurate than the information in Woodward’s original newspaper article:

*Washington Post, September 20, 1972*

> Memos describing wiretapped telephone conversations of Democratic Party officials at the Watergate. The memos each began with the phrase “Confidential informant says,” thereby making it possible that those who read them did not necessarily realize the contents had come from wiretapping.

**Analytic Findings**

**Did the FBI know this before Felt told Woodward it?**
No. The FBI did not have this information.

**Did Dean know this before Felt told Woodward it?**
Yes. Strachan told Dean on June 19, 1972, about his destroying “confidential source memos which could...have been wiretap reports with the sources carefully camouflaged…” [1, 2] Felt told Woodward on September 16, 1972, about “memos describing wiretapped telephone conversations of Democratic Party officials at the Watergate.” [3, 4]

**Did Felt mention Dean’s involvement to Woodward?**
No. Strachan described the wiretap memos to Dean but Felt does not mention Dean’s involvement to Woodward.

**Did Dean mislead others about this after All The President’s Men?**
Yes. Dean claimed this “information was right out of the CRP” and failed to analyze Felt’s wiretap memos information. [5, 6]

**Besides Dean, who else knew this before Felt told Woodward it?**
Strachan showed Haldeman the “wiretap memos” and then destroyed them. Because he destroyed them, Strachan could only describe the “wiretap memos” to Dean.

Forensic Linguistics

Compare the description of the wiretap memos that Strachan gave Dean on June 19, 1972, with the description that Felt gave Woodward on September 16, 1973.

Strachan described the wiretap memos to Dean on June 19, 1972.

Felt described the wiretap memos to Woodward on September 16, 1972.

How did FBI deputy director Mark Felt (Deep Throat) learn of the description of the “wiretap memos” before Felt told Washington Post reporter Bob Woodward of it on September 16, 1972?

Woodward’s description in his book about the “wiretap logs” was found to be less accurate than the information that Woodward first documented in his newspaper article. Strachan described the “wiretap reports” to Dean on June 19, 1972, in words strikingly similar to those Felt used to describe the reports to Woodward on September 16, 1973, as documented in his September 20, 1972, news article. Dean later misled others when he claimed this Felt information “was right out of the CRP.”
Overview of Chronologically-sequenced References

[1] p.486 of Strachan’s Senate Watergate Hearings testimony

Strachan stated, “I also told Mr. Dean that I had destroyed…three confidential source memos which I said could possibly have been wiretap reports with the sources carefully camouflaged…”

[2] p.933 of Dean’s Senate testimony

Dean confirms that Strachan told him around noon on June 19, 1972, that Strachan had destroyed “documents relating to the wiretap information from the DNC.”


Woodward described the wiretap memos in words nearly identical to the description that Strachan gave Dean on June 19, 1972. Though not identified in the article, Woodward’s source was Mark Felt.


Mark Felt told Bob Woodward on September 16, 1972, about the recipients of the “wiretap logs.” Woodward did not include the more complete description of the wiretap memos he had previously written in his September 20, 1972, article. Woodward does not differentiate between “wiretap logs” and “wiretap memos.”


Dean claimed that the “information was right out of the CRP” but does not address Felt’s information about wiretap documentation.

[6] appendix to Dean’s June 3, 2005, FindLaw article

Dean does not identify the Felt’s wiretap information to avoid any connection to Dean’s June 19, 1972, interaction with Strachan about the wiretap documents.
Chronologically-sequenced References

[1] p.2442 of Strachan’s *Senate Watergate Hearings* testimony

Gordon Strachan stated that, “I also told Mr. Dean that I had destroyed…three confidential source memos which I said could possibly have been wiretap reports with the sources carefully camouflaged…”

[2] p.933 of Dean’s Senate testimony

John Dean confirms that Gordon Strachan told him around noon on June 19, 1972, that Strachan had destroyed “documents relating to the wiretap information from the DNC.”
Woodward’s September 20, 1972, *Washington Post* article

Bob Woodward described the wiretap memos in words nearly identical to the description that Strachan gave Dean on June 19, 1972. Though not identified in the article, Woodward’s source was Mark Felt.

> The destroyed records, according to law enforcement

> and Nixon committee sources, included the following:

> • Memos describing wiretapped telephone conversations of Democratic Party officials at the Watergate. The memos each began with the phrase “Confidential informant says,” thereby making it possible that those who read them did not necessarily realize the contents had come from wiretapping.

p.73 of Woodward’s 1974 book *All The President’s Men*

Mark Felt told Bob Woodward on September 16, 1972, about the recipients of the “wiretap logs.” Woodward did not include the more complete description of the wiretap memos he had previously written in his September 20, 1972, article. Woodward does not differentiate between “wiretap logs” and “wiretap memos.”

> The wiretap logs had reached some of the same Mitchell aides who had disbursed the spying funds, he said.
John Dean claimed that the “information was right out of the CRP” and does not specifically address Felt’s information about wiretap documentation.

John Dean does not identify the Felt’s wiretap memos information in a likely attempt to avoid any connection to Dean’s June 19, 1972, interaction with Strachan about the wiretap documents.
How did FBI deputy director Mark Felt (Deep Throat) learn of Porter and Magruder’s Watergate involvement before Felt told Washington Post reporter Bob Woodward of it on September 17, 1972?

Dean prepared Magruder to testify and thus knew Porter would commit perjury. On September 17, 1972, Felt told Woodward that Magruder and Porter were involved in Watergate. Dean was one of only a handful of people that knew Magruder and Porter committed perjury before Felt told Woodward that Magruder and Porter were involved in Watergate. Dean later interpreted this Felt information to make it appear wrong.

Assertions: 1) The FBI did not know this information.

2) Dean and few others knew this information before Felt told Woodward it.

3) Dean was directly involved in preparing Magruder to testify.

4) Felt did not share this information with others at the FBI.

5) Dean later misled others about this information.
Excerpt from *All The President's Men* (1974)

#5 p.76 [September 17, 1972]

Woodward told him what he and Bernstein had heard from the Bookkeeper about Magruder and Porter.

“They’re both deeply involved in Watergate,” Deep Throat responded. He sounded resigned, dejected.

Woodward asked him to be more exact.

“Watergate,” he repeated. Then he paused and added, “The whole thing.”

He confirmed that Magruder and Porter had received at least $50,000 from Stans’ safe. And Woodward could be damned sure that the money had not been used for legitimate purposes—that was fact, not allegation. That was all he would say. From there, Woodward and Bernstein would be on their own for a while.

**Analytic Findings**

Did the FBI know this before Felt told Woodward it?
No. The FBI did not have this information.

Did Dean know this before Felt told Woodward it?
Yes. Dean prepared Magruder for his grand jury testimony and, therefore, knew that Porter would commit perjury to backstop Magruder’s testimony. [1, 2, 3] On September 17, 1972, Felt told Woodward that Magruder and Porter were involved in Watergate. [4]

Did Felt mention Dean’s involvement to Woodward?
No. Dean prepared Magruder for his grand jury testimony but Felt does not mention Dean’s involvement to Woodward.

Did Dean mislead others about this after *All The President’s Men*?
Yes. Dean devalued Felt’s information on Porter and Magruder. [5, 6, 7]

Besides Dean, who else knew this before Felt told Woodward it?
Porter, Magruder, Mitchell, Haldeman, and Ehrlichman, knew of Porter and Magruder’s perjury before Felt told Woodward of it.
How did FBI deputy director Mark Felt (Deep Throat) learn of Porter and Magruder’s Watergate involvement before Felt told Washington Post reporter Bob Woodward of it on September 17, 1972?

Dean prepared Magruder to testify and thus knew Porter would commit perjury. On September 17, 1972, Felt told Woodward that Magruder and Porter were involved in Watergate. Dean was one of only a handful of people that knew Magruder and Porter committed perjury before Felt told Woodward that Magruder and Porter were involved in Watergate. Dean later interpreted this Felt information to make it appear wrong.

Summary of Chronologically-sequenced References

[1] p.952 of Dean’s Senate testimony
Dean played “devil’s advocate” to prepare Magruder for his grand jury appearance. Dean learned that Porter would corroborate Magruder’s perjury prior to Mitchell’s resigning from CRP at the end of June 1972.

[2] p.7 of prosecutor letter documenting meetings with Dean
Dean admitted that Magruder told Dean that Porter would back up Magruder’s story of the money.

Dean tells the President that Porter and Magruder committed perjury.

Felt informs Woodward that Magruder and Porter are deeply involved in Watergate.

Dean claims this Felt information is false because Porter and Magruder were not equally involved in Watergate. Felt never said Porter and Magruder were equally involved in Watergate.

Dean defines “deeply involved in Watergate” to only include involvement in the break-in. Dean’s definition excludes Porter’s committing perjury from being a part of the Watergate cover-up.

[7] appendix to Dean’s June 3, 2005, FindLaw article
Dean splits this Felt information into two separate pieces and declares that Felt’s information about Porter was false by highlighting the “and Porter” portion in red.
Chronologically-sequenced References

[1] p.952 of Dean’s Senate testimony

Dean played “devil’s advocate” to prepare Magruder for his grand jury appearance. Dean learned that Porter would corroborate Magruder’s perjury prior to Mitchell’s resigning from CRP at the end of June 1972.

I do not know when I first learned of Magruder’s proposed testimony, but I did not know that it had already been formulated when I first heard it. I informed Haldeman and Ehrlichman of the story. We discussed it and no one was sure it would hold up. This discussion did occur before Mitchell resigned. We, of course, knew that it was a fabricated story. When I later learned that Mr. Porter would corroborate Mr. Magruder’s testimony, I informed Haldeman and Ehrlichman of that. I had never heard Mr. Magruder’s story in full detail until just before his grand jury appearance, in mid-August 1972, when he asked me if I would be a devil’s advocate and question him before he went before the grand jury. Magruder came to my office, as I recall, the day before his second grand jury appearance. He told me he had made the decision himself as to how he was going to handle his testimony and wanted me to ask him any and all questions I could think of. I spent about an hour or more questioning him. Shortly after I had this session with Magruder, Higby called me to tell me that Magruder had been to see him, to let Haldeman know he was ready.

[2] p.7 of prosecutor letter documenting meetings with Dean

Dean admitted that Magruder told Dean that Porter would back up Magruder’s story of the money.

Dean admitted cross examining Magruder for his grand jury appearance and suggesting weaknesses in Magruder’s testimony. Magruder told Dean that Porter would back up Magruder on his story about the purpose for which the money was given to Liddy. Dean did not mention
Dean tells the President that Porter and Magruder committed perjury.

DEAN: All right, now, we've gone through the trial. We've—I don't know if Mitchell has perjured himself in the Grand Jury or not. I've never--

PRESIDENT: Who?

DEAN: Mitchell. I don't know how much knowledge he actually had. I know that Magruder has perjured himself in the Grand Jury. I know that Porter has perjured himself, uh, in the Grand Jury.

Felt informs Woodward that Magruder and Porter are deeply involved in Watergate.

Woodward told him what he and Bernstein had heard from the Bookkeeper about Magruder and Porter.

“They’re both deeply involved in Watergate,” Deep Throat responded. He sounded resigned, dejected.

Woodward asked him to be more exact.

“Watergate,” he repeated. Then he paused and added, “The whole thing.”

He confirmed that Magruder and Porter had received at least $50,000 from Stans’ safe. And Woodward could be damned sure that the money had not been used for legitimate purposes—that was fact, not allegation. That was all he would say. From there, Woodward and Bernstein would be on their own for a while.
Dean claims this Felt information is false because Porter and Magruder were not equally involved in Watergate. Felt never said Porter and Magruder were equally involved in Watergate.

—On September 17, 1972, Deep Throat told Woodward that Bart Porter was deeply involved in Watergate, equating Porter’s involvement with that of Jeb Magruder. This is not true.

Dean defines “deeply involved in Watergate” to only include involvement in the break-in. Dean’s definition excludes Porter’s committing perjury from being a part of the Watergate cover-up.

“Bart” Porter were somehow involved. And Deep Throat — incorrectly — confirmed that they’re both “deeply involved in Watergate.” Porter was not involved in the Watergate break-in (and only learned about it after the arrests on June 17, 1972). Deep Throat correctly reported, however, that Porter had received cash from the Stans safe, which Porter had used for dubious purposes. Porter had run other intelligence operations that were

Dean splits this Felt information into two separate pieces and declares that Felt’s information about Porter was false by highlighting the “and Porter” portion in red.

"They’re both [Magruder and Porter] deeply involved in Watergate." "The whole thing." (76)

Throat confirmed that Magruder and Porter had received at least $50,000 from Stans’ safe. And Woodward could be damned sure that money had not been used for legitimate purposes -- that was fact, not allegation.