MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, Office of Security

ATTENTION: Deputy Director of Security (Investigations and Operational Support)

SUBJECT: Project HTLINGUAL

1. Reference is made to the Inspector General's survey of the Office of Security in December 1969 wherein a recommendation was made for the preparation of an emergency plan and cover story for the Project, HTLINGUAL. Reference is also made to memoranda dated 11 January 1962 addressed to Chief, GI Staff by the Deputy Director of Security (Investigations and Operational Support), wherein it is stated it is understood the GI Staff is engaged in the preparation of a cover story for the Project in the event it is compromised.

2. The above reference to the fact that the GI Staff is preparing a cover story for the Project in the event it is compromised may be a bit misleading. Oversimplification of the "flap potential" in this Project must be avoided, and on the other hand, unnecessary planning merely for the sake of having a record must also be avoided. Yet, to assist in clarifying the thinking in the event of "flap" the following is presented:

3. At the outset of this Project the calculated risk associated with participation in this type of activity was carefully considered, and the operational decision was made that the effort was worth the risk. Events are proving the validity of that decision despite our full knowledge that a "flap" will put us "out of business" immediately and may give rise to grave charges of criminal misuse of the mails by government agencies.

4. The analysis made by the Office of Security in their memorandum of 11 January 1962 is helpful, except that it fails to recognize the "flap potential" in a possible disgruntled Postal Department employee. With this addition to the comments of the Office of Security, it may be stated that in the opinion of the GI Staff this Project could
"Close" at any time for any one of the reasons stated by the Office of Security. It is quite possible that the compromise would be supported by documentary evidence in the form of items from the Project and by the naming of individuals participating in the Project. Recognising the possibility of compromise of the Project, it becomes important that the Project files contain a record of a coordinated opinion as to what action can and/or should be taken in the event of compromise. In arriving at such a determination, it is to be noted that the surfacing of the compromise will unavailing be in the form of a charge of violations of the mails. The charge may be levelled against Federal law enforcement agencies, U.S. Intelligence Agencies or against the Post Office Department itself. Whatever the charge, however, the burden of proving a reply falls immediately upon the Post Office Department, unless some other accused organization wants to admit the violation, because the mails are in the custody of the Post Office Department.

5. Since no good purpose can be served by an official admission of the violation, and existing Federal statutes preclude the concoction of any legal excuse for the violation, it must be recognized that no cover story is available to any Government Agency. Therefore, it is most important that all Federal law enforcement and U.S. Intelligence Agencies vigorously deny any association, direct or indirect, with any such activity as charged. In the event of compromise this position should be made known immediately to the Postmaster General. He is fully knowledgeable of the Project, and the preparation of correspondence before the fact to make known our position to the Postmaster General constitutes an unnecessary security hazard in connection with the mere existence of such correspondence.

6. As to the behavior of the Post Office Department after a compromise takes place, we are hardly in a position to dictate. It might be expected, however, that they will deny the abuse of mails charged and indicate the matter is being referred to the Postal Inspection Service for investigation. Unless the charge is supported by the presentation of interior items from the Project, it should be relatively easy to "push up" the entire affair, or to explain that it consists of legal mail cover activities conducted by the Post Office at the request of authorized Federal Agencies. Under the most unfavorable circumstances, including the support of charges with interior items from the Project, it might become necessary, after the matter has cooled off during an
extended period of investigation, to find a scapegoat to blame for un-
authorised tampering with the mails. Such cases by their very nature
do not have much appeal to the imagination of the public, and this would
be an effective way to resolve the initial charge of censorship of the
mails.

7. A determination as to whether the compromise has been such
as to preclude continuation of the Project would have to await the out-
come of the compromise, even though it would undoubtedly be necessary
to suspend the Project during the period of inquiry into the charges.

8. In conclusion, therefore, it is stated that in the event of com-
promise of the Project, HILINGUAL, in covert coordination
with the Postmaster General will enter a general denial to any and all
charges, as may be necessary, and will avoid comment in deference
to the Post Office Department if possible.

Prepared by:
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Deputy Chief
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