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article's factual statements and interpretations.
The intelligence officer turns salesman to tap the potential of big business and the suspicious refugee.

TECHNIQUES OF DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION

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The process of getting intelligence information out of people is normally associated with overseas operations, but it was demonstrated during World War II that this clandestine activity can usefully be supplemented by collection in the analyst's own back yard. Potential sources of intelligence within the United States are myriad. US concerns have been active in various parts of the world for many decades and their records often contain information which a clandestine agent would have little hope of obtaining, especially in war-time. Representatives of industrial plants travel continually and compile expert reports and evaluations on foreign economic and financial affairs. The current increase in East-West contacts has sent thousands of US citizens as travellers to countries of the Soviet Bloc. Scientists and academicians attend international meetings and conferences, where they meet and exchange information with opposite numbers from all parts of the world. Refugees from the Soviet Union and its satellite nations continue to enter the United States for permanent residence.

For more than ten years the Contact Division of CIA's Office of Operations, with its network of field offices throughout the country, has been tapping this vast potential of information on behalf of the intelligence community. Since 1948 over forty thousand individuals and companies have supplied information ranging into every field of intelligence. Through this collection operation the community has at its disposal the expert analysis and commentary of the most knowledgeable people in the academic, scientific, professional and industrial fields.
Getting information from these individuals calls for techniques different from those employed in clandestine collection. The contact specialist, as the domestic field collector is known, has no control over his Source. The Source provides the information voluntarily, with no hint of pressure or threat, because he has been convinced that he can be of singular assistance to the US Government; but mere waving of the flag does not automatically trigger the cornucopia of intelligence plenty. US citizens, as a rule, know little of intelligence organizations and intelligence needs. A visit to a businessman by a government representative arouses instinctive fear that the company books are about to be examined for tax purposes, that an anti-trust suit is pending, or that an investigation is being conducted against a friend. Academicians and missionaries are apprehensive that their cooperation with US intelligence will become known and hinder their future activity in a foreign area. The alien, wise to the ways of intelligence and security services, distrusts the contact officer (credentials are easily forged, he claims) or fears for the safety of relatives still living behind the Curtain.

To convert the hesitant businessman or fearful alien into a cooperative Source, the contact officer must have a wide diversity of skills. He must be a salesman, selling his prospect on the importance of the intelligence function; he must be an intelligence officer, knowing the needs and the gaps in the community's information; he must play the practical psychologist, handling dissimilar personalities with dexterity; and finally he becomes a skilled reporter, putting the Source's information into a concise and readable intelligence report.

Locating and Contacting the New Source

Since the contact officer cannot hope to approach all the commercial, banking, educational, and scientific institutions, as well as all the aliens, in his area, he must learn to select from among his possible sources. He obtains leads from trade journals and directories, from established sources, from Agency headquarters, and from other government agencies. Matching these leads against his knowledge of current intelligence requirements, he tries to pinpoint those individuals and companies in his area which have the best potential for filling the requirements.
Once he decides or is directed by his field chief to “open up” a new company, institution, or individual, his first step is to brief himself on the company and if possible on the individual he is to contact. At the same time he reviews intelligence requirements in the prospective contact’s field, making preliminary exploration of its potential for his purposes. He will offer no pretensions to expertise in the Source’s field of specialty, but will be able to win confidence and rapport by recognizing the Source’s professional interests and understanding his terminology. He cannot walk in cold on a new Source and hope to establish the proper rapport for a continuing contact.

No security clearance is required for initial contact with a US citizen. The existence of the Central Intelligence organization and its general purposes are public knowledge, and no classified information is discussed in the initial interview. Contact with an alien, on the other hand, must first be cleared with the FBI as a matter of internal security.

In approaching a new company or institution, the contact officer always goes to the top man, to the president, the chairman of the board, or whoever determines broad policy for the company. Once cooperation is obtained at the highest level, it is assured at all subordinate levels. The president will not ordinarily have the information intelligence is seeking, but he will designate the official in the company who does have it and who will be the future contact. If a subordinate is contacted first, experience has shown, an embarrassing situation can arise when the president inquires why his company is being “penetrated” by the US Government.

To interview the executive an appointment is of course necessary, and executives have secretaries whose function it is to keep unwelcome visitors away and screen phone calls to the “boss.” The secretary wants to know who is calling and why. The contact officer gives her his name and identifies himself as a representative of the federal Government who wishes to speak to her boss on a confidential matter. Few secretaries dare to block such a call except in companies which have frequent contact with government agencies. The persistently inquisitive secretary is told that the caller will explain his purpose fully to the boss.
Once he has been put through to the executive, the contact officer identifies himself more fully by revealing his association with US intelligence or, if pressed, with CIA. He outlines briefly why he desires a personal interview. Most individuals, when first approached, associate a government official with one of the enforcement agencies, and the contact man therefore seeks an early appointment.

The First Interview

Since the contact officer's objective is to convert the prospect into a continuing and cooperative Source, he must take especial care to make the best initial impression. Temperaments and social customs vary in different parts of the country, and the officer must comport himself according to the Source's taste. Whereas a ten-gallon hat and a string tie may be acceptable in Texas or in Arizona, they cause raised eyebrows in Boston and New York. It has become axiomatic that the contact man should dress as conservatively as the most conservative of his contacts for that day. Religious or fraternal pins are better not worn. In calling on a missionary or religious source discussion of religion is avoided. The intelligence officer cannot allow himself the liberty of drawing racial, color, or religious lines.

When, promptly at the time of his appointment, the contact officer arrives and is ushered into the Source's office, he immediately shows his credentials and underscores his association with CIA to emphasize that he does not represent the FBI or any other federal agency. The Source is naturally curious about the visit, and may even have been troubled since the first phone call. The officer tries to put him at ease immediately. The approach will vary, depending on circumstance, on the personality of the Source, and even on the area. In the North and West, and to some extent on the West Coast, the typical Source is a busy man who has sandwiched this appointment into a tight schedule. The contact officer must talk fast and convincingly, in a business-like manner, to win his cooperation. In the South and the mid-West a certain amount of pleasantries or chit-chat may be in order before getting down to the issue at hand.

Whatever approach he uses, the contact man must accomplish three things during his initial visit—explain the intelli-
intelligence mission, assess the potential of the company for his purposes, and show the Source how he or his company can be of assistance to the cause of national security.

Private citizens have varying amounts of knowledge about intelligence, and the first task is to orient the Source on Central Intelligence purposes and its place in the federal Government. The contact officer brings out the Director’s advisory function to the National Security Council headed by the President, stressing how necessary it is for policy makers to be well informed on conditions and events throughout the world. He also explains that he represents all the intelligence agencies in the Government, so that needless duplication in visits by other intelligence representatives can be avoided. The Source can contribute to the welfare of the country, he says, by making available whatever information on foreign plants, research and development, or other matters he may possess or acquire.

The assessment of the company’s potential then follows naturally. The Source is usually willing to cooperate but may fail to see how any information he has will be of value to the intelligence effort. The contact man then introduces questions on the company’s foreign branches or affiliates, the extent of its foreign business, and the degree to which the home office is kept aware of conditions in areas in which the company operates.

At this point the Source may become apprehensive that any information he provides may boomerang against his interests, through punitive action by another federal agency, through revelation of proprietary information to a competitor, or through embarrassment of his future dealings with foreign companies or governments. The contact man convincingly reassures him that a guiding principle of all relations with informants is Source protection. The name of the Source is never connected with his information. Nor is data provided by a Source ever turned over to another federal agency for any regulatory or punitive action. Information given by the Source is circulated only in intelligence channels within the United States, and the Source need not have any apprehension that his name or his information will get into unauthorized hands. His cooperation with intelligence, as well as the information provided by him, is kept classified.
Conversely, the Source is requested to treat the contact as classified and not to reveal to anyone the purpose of the visit. It is pointed out that the need for security is mutual. Further, since this confidential contact may be followed by other visits in which classified requirements may be used, biographic information on the Source for security assessment is requested. Ordinarily, if the contact officer has laid the proper basis for a continuing contact with the Source, whether the top executive or one of his subordinates, he has no difficulty in securing biographic data.

The officer cannot rely on his memory to retain the information divulged during the interview. He inquires whether the Source has any objection to note-taking—an inquiry which is generally academic, for it adds to the Source's feeling that he is doing something important if his words are taken down. On biographic and technical data note-taking is naturally a matter of course.

The length of the first interview is governed by the time available to the Source and the contact officer's estimate of the Source's intelligence potential. The experienced contact man can assess the company's potential in a short time, and if his assessment is negative he arranges for a graceful exit as soon as possible. If he believes that the company does have access to useful information, he explores the possibilities as completely as time and circumstance allow. In this case, the length of interview must be gauged by the Source's attitude and his appointment book. It sometimes happens, on the other hand, that the Source has time on his hands and relishes having the ear of a government representative into which to pour all his ideas on what he thinks is "wrong with Washington." Here the contact officer politely steers the conversation to the purpose of his visit, creating the impression that he himself is a busy man.

The first interview is terminated with the understanding that the officer will probably return to explore the company's information further. If a return is actually contemplated, he leaves a personal card which bears his name, his field office's postoffice box number, and his (unlisted) office telephone number. The name of the Agency does not appear on this card. About a week or ten days later he writes the Source to thank
him for his cooperation, mentioning that he is looking forward to another visit. The letter serves to remind the Source of intelligence interests and gives him again the officer's name and phone number, should he have misplaced the calling-card.

After the initial interview the contact officer must estimate the future usefulness of the Source and his company. Should he follow up or not? If after consultation with his field office chief he decides that the company has insufficient potential to warrant further expenditure of time and effort, he sends a complete account of his visit, plus the biographic data he has obtained on the Source, to Division Headquarters, with a notation that further contact is not contemplated. A copy is of course retained in the field office, for the guidance of other contact officers who may some day obtain a lead on the same company. If, on the other hand, he decides that the company and the Source can and will supply intelligence information of value, he submits to Headquarters not only an account of his visit but also a request for security clearance on the individuals with whom he will be dealing. The secretary, if she is willing to the intelligence contact, may also have to be cleared.

Continuing Contact

How often the contact officer calls on a company depends on several factors—the amount and type of information it has available, its distance from his field office, his own work-load, the Source's own preferences and schedule. If the contact officer has determined that a company has information periodically, he makes it a point to pay it several visits a year, even though each visit may not produce intelligence. An ideal Source is one who has been "trained" to such a point that he will telephone when he has information of interest or when a company official has returned from a trip abroad. But the contact man is well aware that a company official thinks in terms of his own daily business needs and tends to forget intelligence needs. Like the salesman, the contact specialist must periodically revive interest in his product.

Subsequent visits to a company are relatively easy to handle. In a large company the contact officer utilizes as principal Source the person designated by the president, but also continually attempts to become acquainted with the
head of every department in which foreign intelligence may be found. This intelligence may take the form of reports from managers of overseas branches or affiliates, contracts or negotiations with foreign companies or countries, or interviews with returning officials. Travellers abroad are an important font of intelligence, and the officer tries to arrange for regular immediate notification when such travel takes place.

When the contact officer learns that a cleared company official is about to travel on company business abroad, he is faced with the often difficult question of whether to brief him, that is, to instruct him beforehand in specific intelligence interests in the areas to be visited. The decision to brief, involving security and psychological hazards, is an infrequent one. Sometimes the business traveller is outraged at an attempt to recruit him as a “spy.” But if the officer has worked with a Source for some time, considers him reliable, and is confident that he will not interpret the briefing as a mandate to engage in cloak-and-dagger activity, then he requests the entire intelligence community, through his headquarters channels, to provide questions for which the Source may be able to obtain answers. If he decides that a specific outlining of intelligence gaps is not desirable, he reminds the prospective traveller of the general needs of the community and suggests that whatever is of interest to him as a specialist in his field will be of interest to intelligence as well. In either case the Source must be discreet enough—and not all business travellers have been—to avoid advertising abroad that he is out to get “inside dope for CIA.”

After the traveller has returned, the contact officer seeks an interview as soon as mutually convenient. If there was a briefing, the same questions may be used in debriefing. If the Source was not specifically primed with requirements for the trip, community requirements may be obtained for the debriefing. Formal requirements, however, are only guides to the interview rather than limitations on it. The contact officer tries to get as much detail as possible on all items of interest the Source may have encountered. Since a detailed interview takes time and the returned traveller is generally preoccupied with business matters that have piled up during his absence, a copy of the trip report which he must usually write for his company may be helpful. This report, however,
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will deal exclusively with his company's business, and interviews will still be necessary to explore any other subjects or areas on which the Source may be competent to report.

Mechanical aids are occasionally used to expedite the interview process. Although the modern businessman is well acquainted with the tape recorder or dictaphone and generally has no objection to their use, the contact man makes it a point to get advance permission for them. Some Sources, suggesting that an outline of the type of information desired be left with them, offer to dictate the answers as time permits into a tape recorder. Under this procedure the Source must be reminded to specify which questions he is answering and to spell out proper names.

Intelligence collected is not limited to the spoken and written word, but often includes maps, flow charts, photographs, graphics, floor plans, etc. These items are of most use to intelligence analysts when they are obtained for permanent retention, preferably in the original copy; but the Source usually has only a few copies and may balk at providing any for retention. Here the persuasiveness of the contact man must again prove itself. If he cannot talk the Source out of a copy, he tries at least to obtain the item on loan for 30 days so he can send it to Washington for reproduction.

Intelligence collection is essentially a one-way street, with the Sources giving and the collector receiving, but occasionally a Source requests reciprocity. The contact officer does have such unclassified items as the FBIS daily report on foreign broadcasts and translations of Soviet scientific abstracts at his disposal for distribution to selected Sources, and this quid pro quo helps to cement a cordial relationship. A greater strain on the relationship with a firm occurs when the Source requests specific information in return. A company may be opening a new branch overseas and desire information as to whether its proposed indigenous branch manager is pro-Communist or unreliable in some other way. Or a firm may request assistance in arranging for the immigration of a skilled worker. Such requests are especially embarrassing when they come from a company which has been thoroughly cooperative and which may itself have provided covert support to the Agency. The contact man extricates himself from such situations by referring the requestor whenever possible
to the appropriate federal agency. If that does not work, he agrees to take the matter up with his Washington headquarters and throws on Washington the blame for inability to comply with the company's request.

The many foreign specialists who visit US firms and institutions also have information of intelligence interest. These, however, the collector cannot talk to directly; intelligence policy forbids interviewing aliens in the United States on temporary visits. If time and occasion permit, the contact officer enlists the aid of an established Source within the firm visited to act as a cut-out or middleman. He briefs the cut-out on intelligence interests and encourages him to intertwine intelligence questions into his conversations with the visitor. The cut-out is also in a good position to assess the visitor's technical competence and personal idiosyncrasies. Interviewing through a cut-out, even more than interviewing through an interpreter, is less satisfactory than a direct encounter, but is preferable to creating an impression that visitors are invited to the United States only for intelligence exploitation.

University Exploitation

Thus far we have dealt almost exclusively with commercial or industrial firms as sources of intelligence. Other fruitful Sources are found in universities, research institutes and hospitals, pharmaceutical houses, etc. The contact officer often finds that he must approach these Sources somewhat differently than he approaches industrial ones. In the industrial firm he deals with Sources as officials of the company. In universities and similar institutions he deals with professors and researchers as individuals.

The basic approach is nevertheless the same. The president of the university is the initial point of contact; the contacter needs his blessing for the exploitation of university personnel and records. Lesser officials and faculty members also tend to be more cooperative when they know that the president is aware of the intelligence collection activity and approves of it. The deans of the schools, the dean of students, and department chairmen are worth cultivating, for most of the day-to-day activity of the university filters through their offices. They can, for instance, provide information on special
research projects, foreign travel of faculty members, visiting foreign scholars, foreign graduate students, and other points of intelligence interest.

But the best Source is usually the individual professor who has just travelled abroad, attended an international conference, or entertained a foreign visitor. Like the businessman, the professor must be convinced that his information will receive the highest degree of protection.

The contact officer finds it rewarding to consult a Who's Who or some other reference work to obtain personal data and to determine the Source's professional stature and specific field of research interest. The Source is usually flattered that his professional competence is known to a layman. At the same time the officer must not pretend to knowledge he does not have on a technical subject, for such a sham is easily and quickly detected by the Source. Every man, and especially a professor, likes to talk about his work; and the interviewer's manifested interest in learning more about a subject of which he knows little usually kindles the academic spark. As a novice in the subject, the contact officer has ample excuse to ask for explanation and detail on each point made, even though the information may appear elementary to the Source. The officer must, however, take especial care to record faithfully this kind of data, for technical information has little value unless it is accurate. This may require another visit to the Source to verify the accuracy of the officer's report after he has finished writing it.

A problem the contact officer may encounter in his visits to a university is the lack of privacy. Few universities have individual offices for all members of the faculty. Doubling-up is frequent, and in some schools general faculty rooms or departmental offices are used in common. The officer makes every effort to arrange a meeting in private, soliciting the aid of the professor himself in trying to find a private spot. Even a quiet corner of the cafeteria or a meeting in the officer's automobile is preferable to one in a room where the interview can be overheard by other individuals. The professor is usually impressed by the officer's insistence on a secure meeting, and the confidential nature of the relationship is thus underlined.
The Alien

Getting information from the alien involves techniques vastly different from those used in dealing with US citizens. For collection purposes an alien is defined as a recent arrival for permanent residence in this country, as opposed to the visitor or foreign student. In practice, alien Sources have been refugees from eastern Europe, with a small sprinkling of immigrants from the Far East. Initially the displaced persons of World War II, driven or escaping from lands occupied by the German military forces, were exploited for their knowledge of areas which were under Communist rule after 1945. The influx of Hungarians after the events of October 1956 presented another golden opportunity to collect current intelligence on an inaccessible area. More recently the increased travel between the Soviet Bloc and the United States and the greater emigration of Satellite nationals to visit or rejoin relatives here have given impetus to the alien exploitation program.

Because techniques in contacting and exploiting aliens are so different from those used in dealing with industrial or academic Sources, alien specialists with language ability and particular adaptability and perseverance have been assigned to field offices where alien concentrations are greatest. Adaptability is needed because of the varied types of alien with whom the contact officer must deal, ranging from a former minister in an exiled government to the janitor in a munitions factory. Perseverance is required to spend the time and effort needed to track an alien as he moves from one address to another. The interviews must usually be conducted in the evening or on weekends, since the alien in most cases cannot be interviewed at his place of employment.

In addition to the difficulty of locating the alien, and the odd hours involved, the contact officer faces the much greater problem of eliciting the cooperation of the Source. The greatest barrier is the alien's suspicion. He is likely to have lived by his wits almost continually since 1938, and to have been interrogated and reinterrogated by various intelligence and security services, not always in friendly fashion; his instinctive reaction is to have nothing to do with an intelligence agent. A second barrier is the language, for few
aliens speak enough English to carry on a detailed interview. The contact officer's language ability may overcome this handicap, but he should be aware of the danger that a native fluency may cause the Source to suspect him as the agent of a foreign security service. Frequently the alien has greater trust and confidence in a contact man whose crude working knowledge of the foreign languagebetrays him as obviously American. If there is no mutual language in which to converse an interpreter must be obtained. Field offices maintain lists of cleared Sources who can act as interpreters, but here again the alien may doubt the bona fides of the interpreter. He may trust the contact man but be suspicious of his co-national.

The contact officer tries to make an appointment with the alien, by telephone if any, or by letter. Often, though, he must knock on the door without previous appointment, hoping that his prospect is at home. The scene that greets him when he enters the alien's home is that of the entire family arrayed behind the man of the house, who, they fear, is in trouble. He realizes that he cannot possibly speak to the alien in private, for any attempt to lead him away from the family group confirms their suspicion that something is wrong. He is forced to present the purpose of his trip to the entire family in an effort to allay their fears. Most aliens are quick to grasp the needs of an intelligence service but they must still convince themselves that their caller is actually a representative of the US and not a foreign intelligence service. The officer tells them that if they have any doubt about the authenticity of his credentials they should call the local office of the FBI. He stresses very emphatically, however, that he is not an FBI agent, but represents an intelligence organization interested only in foreign intelligence.

Once the hard shell of suspicion and distrust is pierced, the alien becomes a most cooperative source. He is flattered that the US Government has sought him out and pleased that he can contribute to the fight against Communism. He is useful both in supplying information from his own knowledge and experience and in giving leads on co-nationals who may have additional information. Aliens also correspond and send pack-
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ages to relatives abroad and the correspondence may be of intelligence interest, but the contact officer must first overcome their fear that harm may come to a relative if they reveal too much.

The officer is very often the federal Government’s only contact with the alien, who therefore tends to look to him as a general father confessor, employment counsellor, psychiatrist and sounding board for pet ideas or pet peeves. His immigration and citizenship problems, obstacles to the immigration of his relatives, or his dissatisfaction with his employment he presents to the contact man for solution, since in his mind an intelligence service is above the laws and regulations established for ordinary citizens. The contact officer is careful not to make any commitments, referring the alien to the appropriate federal agency. He must also take care not to involve himself in the politics of ethnic groups, for most of them are split into hostile camps.

The matter of payment sometimes arises here. The vast majority of alien Sources are happy to make available whatever information they have as a contribution to their new country. Occasionally, however, having spent a considerable amount of time in preparing a detailed and important report, an alien may express a desire for compensation. The contact officer must obtain an evaluation from Headquarters before he can make such compensation; and even with Headquarters’ approval he is treading on dangerous ground, for there is an effective grapevine within the nationality groups, and his future requests for cooperation from others may be met with similar demands for payment. In general, an occasional lunch or dinner should constitute the extent of financial outlay on an alien.

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This discussion of domestic collection techniques has of necessity been cast in terms of averages and stereotypes. Every contact specialist in the field could point out many exceptions to the generalizations here drawn and show the peculiarities of dealing with Sources in his own area. The techniques which have been developed remain individual and flexible, varying with three variable factors, the collector,
the Source, and the material to be collected. Each collector applies those personal techniques, gained through experience, which are called for in a given situation to extract the greatest amount of raw intelligence from his Source; but his methods are likely to fall roughly into the patterns outlined above.