NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

SOVIET CAPABILITIES FOR CLANDESTINE ATTACK AGAINST THE US WITH WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND THE VULNERABILITY OF THE US TO SUCH ATTACK (mid-1951 to mid-1952)

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The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, the Joint Staff, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Atomic Energy Commission, and representatives of the Coast Guard, the Department of Agriculture, the Bureau of Customs, and the Public Health Service participated in the preparation of this estimate. All members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee concurred in this estimate on 30 August.
SOVIET CAPABILITIES FOR CLANDESTINE ATTACK AGAINST
THE US WITH WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND
THE VULNERABILITY OF THE US TO SUCH ATTACK
(MID-1951 TO MID-1952)

THE PROBLEM

To estimate for the period mid-1951 to mid-1952 the vulnerability of the US to
Soviet clandestine attack\(^1\) with weapons of mass destruction\(^2\) prior to or concurrent
with the outbreak of hostilities on the basis of Soviet capabilities for such attack and
US capabilities\(^3\) for detecting and preventing an attack.

CONCLUSIONS

1. The Soviets have substantial capabilities for the employment of atomic, chemical,
and biological weapons for clandestine attack upon the continental US.

2. The US is vulnerable to such clandestine attack because existing and presently
planned security measures do not provide adequate assurance that certain methods
of clandestine attack would be detected and prevented.

3. In a clandestine attack on the US the USSR would probably attempt simulta-
neous delivery of a number of atomic weapons, possibly by several methods.

   a. The most likely method of attack, because the most feasible and potentially
      most effective, would be the use of disguised TU-4 aircraft to deliver atomic
      weapons to a number of targets simultaneously as the initial act of general hos-
      tilities.

   b. The delivery of atomic weapons into key harbors by merchant ships is feasible
      and therefore constitutes a serious threat.

   c. Smuggling of atomic weapons into the US under cover of diplomatic immu-
      nity, or in the guise of commercial shipments, or by landing at some secluded
      spot is also feasible. However, such operations are relatively unlikely because of
      their complexity and the number of individuals involved.

   d. The launching of guided missiles with atomic warheads from merchant

\(^1\) For the purpose of this estimate, the term "clan-
destine attack" does not include either surprise
attack by undisguised military forces or the em-
ployment of conventional sabotage.

\(^2\) The term "weapons of mass destruction" is lim-
ited to atomic, chemical, and biological weapons,
since the state of development of other conceivable
weapons of mass destruction is such that their em-
ployment during the next year is most unlikely.

\(^3\) In analyzing US defensive capabilities against
clandestine attack, this estimate considers only
those security measures that have been initiated
or are in prospect.
ships or submarines against near-coastal targets is a possibility.

4. The only method of clandestine attack with chemical warfare agents likely to be employed by the USSR is the smuggling of limited quantities of nerve gas into the US for dissemination against personnel in key installations. The possibility of small-scale nerve gas attacks cannot be overlooked.

5. The USSR might employ biological warfare (BW) agents against personnel in key installations well in advance of D-Day. Attacks against livestock and crops with dangerous diseases like foot and mouth disease and cereal rusts are a possibility at any time.

6. It is believed likely that in clandestine attack the USSR would employ those methods not requiring pre-D-Day preparations in the US, since such methods entail the least risk of loss of strategic surprise.

DISCUSSION

7. In its struggle with the non-Soviet world, the USSR will have no scruples about employing any weapon or tactic which promises success in terms of over-all Soviet objectives. Clandestine attack with atomic, chemical, and biological weapons offers a high potential of effectiveness against a limited number of targets, particularly if employed concurrently with, or just prior to, the initiation of general hostilities. Hence, in planning an attack upon the US, the USSR would undoubtedly consider clandestine employment of the various weapons of mass destruction available to them.\footnote{11}

8. Clandestine attack upon the US with weapons of mass destruction would be part of Soviet over-all war plans, and (with the possible exception of the use of BW agents) would be undertaken only after the USSR had decided it was prepared to become involved in a general war with the US.

9. Biological warfare probably, and chemical warfare possibly, could be employed without detection prior to open war, but if detected and identified as clandestine attack prior to D-Day they would cost the USSR loss of strategic surprise. It is doubtful whether the USSR would attempt any operations which might be detected and identified sufficiently in advance of H-Hour to cause a significant loss of strategic surprise.

10. To a considerable extent, the success with which the USSR could employ methods of attack requiring either the infiltration of personnel immediately prior to attack or the creation of a Soviet sabotage organization in the US is governed by the ability of American agencies, both abroad and in the US, to identify potential saboteurs and prevent their entry into the US, as well as to keep under surveillance and control such activities in the US. The chief obstacles to these security measures are:

a. The difficulty of identifying Soviet subversive personnel abroad.

b. The impossibility of preventing the entry of all such personnel into the US.

c. The difficulty of imposing complete surveillance on subversive personnel or preventing all clandestine operations.

d. The possible existence in the US of a Soviet "sleeper" organization, the members of which are unidentified.

11. In general, it would be more difficult to prevent Soviet employment of those methods of clandestine delivery which do not require the assistance of personnel within the US. Prevention requires not only detection and identification abroad and at home, but also instant and effective counteraction.

12. US capabilities for detection, identification, and prevention of clandestine delivery
will be short of satisfactory even in mid-1952. However, current capabilities are not insignificant and will continue to increase as presently anticipated internal security programs are implemented. In determining the methods of clandestine attack which the USSR would be most likely to employ, it must be assumed that the USSR is aware of US defensive measures against clandestine operations.

Clandestine Attack With Atomic Weapons

Atomic Weapons Available to the USSR

13. It is estimated that the USSR will have a stockpile of 45 atomic weapons in mid-1951 and 100 weapons in mid-1952. Part of this stockpile might be employed in a clandestine attack against the US.

14. Atomic weapons available to the USSR between now and mid-1952 can be expected to develop from 30 to 70 Kilotons TNT explosive power. Their weight would probably be between two and five tons; diameter three to five feet; and length four-and-a-half to seven-and-a-half feet (if a non-ballistic case is used the length is shortened to the diameter).

Methods of Clandestine Delivery Available to the USSR

15. The USSR is capable of the following methods of clandestine delivery of atomic weapons:
   a. by disguised aircraft;
   b. by merchant ships;
   c. by smuggling;
   d. by guided missiles.

Delivery by Disguised Aircraft

16. Because of its resemblance to the US B-29, the Soviet TU-4 could be disguised with US markings and employed for clandestine delivery of atomic bombs. Flying a one-way mission, the TU-4 has sufficient range to reach every important target in the US and the USSR has an adequate number of TU-4's and trained crews to perform such missions.

17. Present flight regulations of the Civil Aeronautics Administration and the military services require that both military and civilian aircraft follow a previously filed flight plan and enter the US by specified routes. Aircraft violating these requirements, if detected by our radar screen or other means, are intercepted in flight by USAF fighters. Our radar screen now covers Alaska and the northeastern portion of the US, and is being extended to cover significant gaps.

18. A small number of disguised TU-4's, by taking advantage of the gaps in our radar screen, might escape detection. This would greatly increase the probability of a successful attack on high priority targets, such as the Washington area, for the purpose of paralyzing the top military and civil command a few hours prior to the initiation of hostilities elsewhere.

19. The USSR also could undertake clandestine attack with civilian aircraft of a type used by US or foreign transoceanic airlines. Such aircraft would have a greater chance of escaping detection and identification instead of as much as civilian aircraft are not equipped with IFF. However, employment of civilian aircraft is less probable since, at present, neither the USSR nor any of the Satellites are known to possess suitable aircraft, and acquisition from either a US or foreign concern would increase the risk of compromising the operation.

Delivery into Key Harbors by Merchant Ships

20. Atomic weapons may be laid as underwater mines in key harbors by merchant ships or may be detonated in the hold of the ship. This method is inherently difficult, if not impossible, to detect.

21. Laying an atomic weapon as a mine would require the encasing of the weapon in a watertight container and might also require special laying equipment. The USSR is capable of meeting these requirements as well as providing accurate time-delay actuating mechanisms to permit laying the weapon several days, weeks, or months in advance of D-Day.

22. Detonation of an atomic weapon in the hold of a ship does not involve any special engineering problems; nor need the crew be aware of the presence of the weapon. While an atomic weapon exploded in the hold of a ship might not be as effective as a deeper underwater burst, the damage as well as the
contamination from radioactive mist would still be great with attendant disruption of normal port activities.

23. The Coast Guard, within the limits of its present resources, has established a port security and smuggling prevention program, which includes:
   a. Waterside patrols in major ports.
   b. Active surveillance and boarding of fishing vessels and other small craft, particularly at harbor entrances.
   c. Part time patrol at entrance to ten major ports.
   d. Close cooperation with Customs and local pilots in halting and searching Soviet and Satellites merchant vessels.

24. As an additional measure, the Coast Guard anticipates early approval by the Department of State of a plan whereby the master of a vessel departing for the US could, if he so desired, file with the US consular agent at the last foreign port of call a certificate which would expedite the ship's entry into the US. This certificate would indicate the expected date of arrival in the US, the port of origin and ports of call, and a declaration by the master that, to the best of his knowledge, the ship carried no cargo other than that permitted by US law. It has been proposed that the Central Intelligence Agency coordinate this information and advise the Coast Guard. This procedure would simplify to some extent the control of unexpected merchant vessel arrivals and focus the attention of the Coast Guard on suspicious vessels even prior to their arrival.

25. There are certain factors which would seriously hamper the Coast Guard in detecting clandestine delivery:
   a. There is no device for detecting an atomic weapon within the hold of a merchant ship. The only certain method is complete unloading of the cargo followed by detailed inspection of the vessel and cargo.
   b. The USSR possesses a number of ocean-going fishing trawlers similar in type to US vessels and capable of transporting atomic weapons.
   c. During the first quarter of 1951, the Soviet orbit (including China, but excluding Finland) had under charter more than 140 Western ships.* In addition, the chartering of Western ships often leads to their sale to Soviet-Satellite countries. Examination of a ship's papers is not always a reliable method of determining whether a ship is actually under Soviet control. Such control can be determined with reasonable certainty only with accurate and timely intelligence support.

   (1) The Soviets enforce secrecy for their ship chartering by maintaining their own charter and insurance agencies which enable them to by-pass the usual commercial channels.

   (2) In many instances, intelligence information indicating Soviet charter or purchase has not been received until more than sixty days after the transaction occurred. Therefore, it is within Soviet capabilities to obtain and employ a foreign ship for clandestine delivery before the US could learn that the ship was under Soviet control.

   d. Finland is not included in the Coast Guard list of countries whose ships are to be inspected. However, a substantial part of Finnish shipping is thought to be under Communist control.

26. Because of the above factors, the USSR must be considered capable of utilizing a merchant ship for delivering an atomic weapon into a key US harbor with a relatively good chance of escaping detection.

Smuggling of Atomic Weapons

27. An atomic bomb, including the fissionable material, can be broken down into relatively small components which could be smuggled separately over a period of time into the US. The various components could be so packaged that unusual handling precautions would not be required and radiation detection would be most improbable. Assembly of the bomb would present certain difficulties but none of an insuperable character.

28. Although it would be theoretically possible to manufacture clandestinely within the

* These figures do not include the additional Western ships engaged in trade with the Soviet orbit but not under direct charter to the Soviet orbit.
US all the components of an atomic weapon with the exception of the fissionable material, it would be difficult to procure and process the necessary material. Therefore, it is unlikely that the USSR would attempt the manufacture of an atomic weapon within the US.

Smuggling under the Cover of Diplomatic Immunity

29. Under the cover of diplomatic immunity, components for an atomic bomb or, less probable, even an assembled bomb could be consigned to Soviet diplomatic representatives in the US as household effects or supplies without fear of official inspection by the Bureau of Customs. In addition, no government agency is specifically charged with the responsibility for observing the off-loading, processing, and disposition of such shipments.

30. This method would require the closely coordinated effort of several individuals in the US to receive the weapon and deliver it to the target area. It is unlikely that such an operation would be detected even by constant surveillance of official Soviet representatives in this country.

Smuggling as Commercial Shipments

31. It is feasible to smuggle an atomic bomb through customs as a commercial shipment, and many types of imports from the Satellites could be used as a “cover” for such an act. Furthermore, the number of importing firms in the US is so large that the appearance of a new firm or a change in the imports of an old firm would not automatically arouse the suspicion of the Customs authorities.

32. The Bureau of Customs is well aware of the possibility of attempted smuggling of a complete atomic bomb or its components. Customs inspectors have been alerted to watch for shipments of the weight and size characteristic of a bomb, and such shipments from countries within the Soviet orbit are particularly suspect. Although the Bureau of Customs is capable of detecting shipments of this type it would have considerable difficulty detecting bomb components.

33. Theoretically, there are numerous methods by which the USSR could circumvent customs inspection. For example, commercial shipments from abroad received at American ports and consigned to points other than the port of entry, are usually transshipped, without customs inspection, to a bonded carrier for transportation to destination. Customs inspection is made just prior to final delivery to the consignee, but “hijacking” or “switching” en route is possible. However, such methods would involve elaborate arrangements as well as the existence within the US of an efficient organization to establish dummy corporations, subvert employees of bonded carriers, etc. These requirements greatly increase the risk of detection.

34. While it would be feasible for the USSR to ship an atomic bomb as part of a shipment from a neutral country, the USSR would have to resort to one or more transshipment operations, thereby increasing the number of individuals involved and the risk of detection.

35. Because of the complexity of the smuggling operations, the risk of detection, and the availability of simpler and more secure methods, it is considered relatively improbable that the USSR would endeavor to smuggle an atomic weapon into the US under the guise of a commercial shipment.

Smuggling into Secluded Coastal and Border Areas

36. A more serious threat, well within Soviet capabilities, is the smuggling of an atomic bomb, especially if disassembled, from a Soviet port into an isolated section of the US. Complete security coverage of all coastal and border areas is practically impossible. Such a smuggling operation could involve the transfer of a bomb from a Soviet-controlled merchant vessel or submarine to a small boat which would bring it ashore. Here it could be loaded into a truck for assembly and subsequent delivery to the target area and possible detonation in the parked vehicle.

37. This would be the most difficult to detect of those methods which require the assistance of Soviet-controlled personnel within the US. The weapon would be in the hands of Soviet-controlled personnel at all times and would not come under the direct scrutiny of govern-
ment authorities. However, the requirement for several completely reliable individuals within the US, some of whom must possess special qualifications, might be a partial deterrent to the use of this method.

38. The capabilities of the Coast Guard, Navy and Air Force for air and sea patrols will remain limited until these services are operating on an expanded wartime basis. Coast Guard shore patrols are very limited in scope. However, the Coast Guard has:
   a. Alerted all lifeboat stations and lighthouses to the threat of smuggling unconventional weapons across beaches and into isolated areas and inlets; and has solicited civilian intelligence in this regard.
   b. Placed emphasis on active surveillance and boarding of small craft at inlet entrances.

39. No coordinated over-all plan has yet been completed for the detection and prevention of the smuggling of atomic weapons into the US at secluded points. Until such a plan is completed and put into effect, the US will remain vulnerable to this threat.

Guided Missiles Launched from Merchant Ships

40. It is estimated that the USSR has V-1 type missiles with ranges of at least 100 miles which could be launched from merchant ships or submarines. Such missiles could operate at low altitudes and could have considerably better accuracy than the German operational missiles of World War II. While there is no conclusive evidence that the USSR has an atomic warhead suitable for use in a ship-launched guided missile, the construction of such a warhead is estimated to be within Soviet capabilities.

41. A Soviet merchant ship or submarine could reach its launching position with little chance of detection by maintaining radio silence and avoiding normal shipping lanes. Therefore, this method of clandestine attack appears well suited for employment of atomic weapons against critical near-coastal targets, including key harbors. Intense air and sea patrols would be required to minimize this danger.

Clandestine Attack With Chemical Warfare (CW) Agents

42. The term “CW agents” as used herein refers to those toxic chemical agents suitable for employment in mass quantities for chemical warfare. These agents are to be distinguished from the almost countless number of poisonous chemical compounds which are readily available to Soviet personnel from commercial sources and are suitable for contaminating food and water supplies and for poisoning key individuals. Employment of such commercial chemicals is considered to be conventional sabotage and is not included in this estimate.

43. Although the Soviets have large stockpiles of standard CW agents, these agents are not well suited for clandestine attack and their employment for that purpose is highly improbable. The CW agents most likely to be used for clandestine attack are the nerve gases, GA and GB, primarily because of their extreme high toxicity which is considerably greater than that of other known CW agents. The USSR probably has sufficient quantities of nerve gas for fairly extensive clandestine attacks. In common with atomic weapons, nerve gases are not suited for employment prior to D-Day inasmuch as their characteristic physiological effects would make their identification as enemy action relatively easy.

44. GA and GB are odorless, colorless liquids which become effective anti-personnel agents when dispersed as a fog or an invisible vapor. GB is approximately three times more toxic than GA. The initial characteristic physiological effects of GA and GB are contraction of the pupil of the eye, twitching eyelids, blurring of vision, tightness of the chest and difficulty in breathing. Exposure to a lethal concentration usually causes death within an hour. About one-fifth of a lethal concentration is sufficient to cause incapacitation for several days. In general, the persistence of nerve gases is a matter of hours rather than days.

45. In clandestine attack, it would not be feasible to build up the concentrations required for employment against population centers or
other targets of a sizable area. However, clandestine attack is well suited for employment against personnel in key installations when the objective is immediate incapacitation of a high percentage of the personnel, and physical destruction of the installation by an atomic weapon is not paramount.

46. Effective clandestine attack against personnel in key installations would require precise timing and positioning in disseminating relatively small quantities of nerve gas. Nerve gas may be disseminated effectively either in a building or in its immediate vicinity.

47. The most likely method of dissemination within a building would be by means of an aerosol bomb similar to those used for insecticides and equipped with a time mechanism. When disseminated throughout a confined space of 100,000 cubic feet, about 1/10 pound of GB would produce a concentration lethal to about 50 percent of the people exposed for 10 minutes.

48. If released in the vicinity, nerve gases will easily penetrate most buildings under proper weather conditions. A medium size building could be successfully attacked with one ton (250 gallons) of GB disseminated from a parked vehicle equipped with a compressed air source and adequate spray nozzles.

49. The only method of clandestine attack likely to be employed by the USSR would be the smuggling of nerve gas into the US for dissemination by saboteurs. While under present internal security measures the US is vulnerable to this method of attack, the necessity of relying upon Soviet-controlled personnel in the US might deter the USSR from smuggling nerve gas into the US.

50. The methods available to the USSR for smuggling nerve gas into the US correspond with those already discussed in connection with clandestine atomic attack, vis., diplomatic immunity, smuggling through Customs, or introduction at a point outside Customs surveillance. In all instances, the successful smuggling of nerve gas or the complete aerosol dispensers would be considerably easier. Nerve gas could be easily disguised as one of any number of commercial exports from the Soviet orbit or transmitted in a diplomatic pouch.

51. Both the Coast Guard and the Bureau of Customs are well aware of this threat, but admit that it is practically impossible to insure detection of such a small-scale-activity.

52. The most important phase of protection against clandestine attack with nerve gases is the local security of key governmental installations as provided by special guards, police, and military personnel. Except at a very few installations, present inspection of entering personnel and patrolling of adjacent areas is inadequate to prevent clandestine attack with nerve gas.

53. During the next year, at least, there will be no self-operating test to provide automatic warning of the presence of nerve gases. The standard military gas mask provides protection against GA or GB in vapor form except in concentrations higher than those likely to be encountered. Equipping key installations with specialized air filters offers little promise as a source of additional protection. These filters are prohibitive in size and cost and are not completely effective. The effects of nerve gas may be reduced by prompt recognition of the unique symptoms, injections of atropine sulphate within a few minutes of exposure, and artificial respiration combined with oxygen.

Clandestine Attack With Biological Warfare (BW) Agents

54. Biological warfare is the employment of living microorganisms, their toxic products, or chemical plant growth regulators to produce death or casualties among personnel, livestock, or crops.

55. On the basis of available information on Soviet interest and activities in BW, Soviet scientific and technical potential and US experience in the development of BW, it is estimated that:

a. The Soviets are capable of producing a variety of BW agents in sufficient quantities for extensive clandestine employment against man, animals, and plants.
b. The level of knowledge of the Soviets and their capabilities for disseminating BW agents are at least equal to those of the US.

56. BW agents are a new and untried weapon, and evidence of their effectiveness is based solely on limited experience and research. In general, biological warfare involves a larger degree of uncertainty than any other weapon of mass destruction. This might be a deterrent to Soviet employment of BW, particularly against personnel. On the other hand, the USSR might consider that this deterrent would be outweighed by our limited defensive experience and by the isolated geographic location of the US which would offer an excellent BW target.

57. Many types of BW agents are well-suited for clandestine attack, and could be employed by the USSR even well in advance of D-Day as part of an over-all plan to impair the military effectiveness of the US. In contrast to clandestine attack with atomic and chemical weapons, clandestine employment of certain BW agents would entail much less risk of identification as enemy action.

a. Very small amounts of these agents would be required initially. Such amounts would be almost impossible to detect when being brought into this country under the cover of diplomatic immunity or through smuggling operations. In addition, it would not be difficult to have some BW agents procured and cultured locally by a trained bacteriologist who was immunized against and simply equipped to handle dangerous pathogens.

b. BW agents do not produce immediate symptoms and their effects are not apparent until hours or days after dissemination.

c. The results of some BW agents resemble natural outbreaks of disease, and it would be difficult to connect clandestine employment of such agents with a hostile act.

Clandestine BW Attack against Personnel

58. It is likely that the only anti-personnel BW agents which the USSR would employ prior to D-Day would be those causing diseases common to the US since the outbreak of an unusual disease would probably arouse suspicion as to its source. The statistics of the Public Health Service on the incidence of various diseases in the US are made public and undoubtedly are known to the USSR.

59. In clandestine attack, it probably would not be feasible to build up sufficient concentrations of BW agents to produce large numbers of casualties in urban areas. However, BW agents might be employed clandestinely to incapacitate key individuals and personnel in vital installations.

60. Tests in the US with simulated airborne BW agents have demonstrated that a limited air space can be contaminated by dissemination of relatively small quantities of BW agents. Little is yet known regarding the likelihood of disease among personnel who are exposed to airborne BW agents, and scientific opinion in the US disagrees as to the incidence of disease likely to result from such contamination. However, dissemination of some airborne BW agents within a building probably would cause casualties among a large portion of the personnel. Similar results probably could be obtained from agents disseminated outside of a building and carried into the building by air currents soon after dissemination.

61. Detection and identification of a BW attack against the civilian population is dependent upon the alertness of health authorities having responsibilities for the control of epidemic diseases, assisted by practicing physicians and diagnostic laboratories. The Public Health Service is supporting these efforts by improving the reporting of unusual outbreaks of diseases, training medical officers to investigate epidemics, encouraging research on improved methods of diagnosis and immunization, and strengthening relationships between the medical and allied professions and official health agencies. In addition, the Federal Civil Defense Administration is conducting a program of public education in biological warfare.

62. Because of US medical and public health capabilities, it is believed that there is relatively little risk of a widespread self-perpetuating epidemic resulting from clandestine BW attack. However, under present internal se-
curity measures, personnel in most vital installations would be vulnerable to such attack.

Clandestine BW Attack against Livestock

63. The USSR could smuggle viruses of animal diseases into the US or might possibly obtain them in this country. In the former case, the virus could originate in the USSR or could be prepared by Soviet-controlled personnel from infected animals in South or Central America.

64. Diseases could be spread among livestock by contaminating their food, smearing their muzzles with the virus or spreading contagious material on the ground where it would be kicked up with dust. Individual herds could easily be attacked, but more widespread dissemination could be initiated by infecting animals in "feeder" stockyards, or at livestock auctions. The Department of Agriculture has indicated that widespread outbreaks of disease could also be brought about by contaminating the antitoxins, vaccines, and other biologicals manufactured in the US for the inoculation of animals. In the manufacture of these biologicals, production processes are continued over a long period of time and government supervision and physical security of production and processing operations are insufficient.

65. In a clandestine attack against animals, foot and mouth disease constitutes the most serious threat to this country. The disease is highly contagious. Furthermore, there is a relatively long period during which a diseased animal is capable of infecting other animals before the symptoms become apparent to anyone but an expert.

66. The occurrence of a BW attack against animals would be extremely difficult to prevent, or even identify as enemy action. The Department of Agriculture is aware of this threat and special instructions have been disseminated to its 3,000 county agents and other field representatives. The Department of Agriculture can be expected to isolate and eradicate resultant outbreaks of any known animal diseases, with the possible exception of foot and mouth disease.

67. It is estimated that the USSR might employ clandestine BW attack against US livestock, even well in advance of any planned D-Day. Although such attacks could be carried out with relative ease and could result in a sizable economic loss over a period of several years, they would not create a serious food shortage in the US.

Clandestine BW Attack against Crops

68. Certain fungi, known as "rusts," attack cereal plants and may reduce the yield in a given locality 40 percent or more. From time to time, a new variety of rust appears in the US, to which our cereals are not resistant. The principal remedy is to develop and plant varieties of cereals which will resist the new rust. This requires several years.

69. It would be feasible for the Soviets to smuggle into the US a small quantity of rust spores to which our cereals are not resistant and disseminate them over wheat fields under cover of darkness with a hand-operated blower. Depending on especially favorable weather conditions and other unpredictable factors, this rust might continue to spread and attack both winter and spring wheat over a large area.

70. Other possible BW agents which might be effective against US crops to a lesser degree include viruses causing tomato blight, potato blight, etc. However, it is considered that the results of an attack with these agents would not be serious. Blights of this kind are difficult to distribute widely, and can be successfully combatted by spraying the infected plants.

71. A variety of chemical growth regulators could be employed against crops as BW agents, e.g., weed killers, etc. These chemicals are disseminated by spraying them on the area under cultivation. While the results are disastrous to the area sprayed, the effect does not spread. It would be impractical to employ these agents in a clandestine attack against a large area since the amount of chemicals required averages 1/10 pound to 5 pounds per acre.

72. It would be possible to employ as BW agents insects which are in themselves harmful or which spread crop diseases. However,
there is no indication that the use of insects as BW agents has been developed and such employment is considered unlikely.

73. It would be extremely difficult to prevent or identify a clandestine BW attack against crops. As in the case of BW attack against livestock, the Department of Agriculture is well aware of possible clandestine BW attack against crops, and can be expected to bring any plant disease under control or provide suitable replacement crops within a few years. The Department of Commerce has recommended a program which, if implemented, would restrict the opportunities which exist for the use of small civilian planes by saboteurs for spray dissemination, etc.

74. It is estimated that the USSR might possibly employ some form of cereal rust in a clandestine BW attack against US crops. However, such attack is unlikely because of the uncertainty that this disease would spread over a wide area. In the event of an attack of this type, there would be no risk of starvation or a direct adverse effect upon the war effort, because of the abundance and diversification of domestic food production.
SPECIAL NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
NUMBER 11-9-55

CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS UNDER DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY

Submitted by the
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, The Joint Staff, the Atomic Energy Commission and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Concurred in by the
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

on 26 June 1955. Concurring were the Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Department of the Army; the Director of Intelligence, USAF; the Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff; and the Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the IAC. The Assistant to the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, dissents from the conclusion of this estimate, and has been joined in part by the Director of Naval Intelligence. (See FBI and ONI footnotes to paragraph 7.)
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CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS UNDER DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY

THE PROBLEM

To estimate the likelihood of a Soviet attempt to introduce nuclear weapons or their components into the US clandestinely under diplomatic immunity before an all-out attack on the US.¹

ASSUMPTION

That the USSR decides to launch an all-out attack on the US.

THE ESTIMATE

1. The USSR is capable of producing nuclear weapons which could be introduced into the US either as complete assemblies or as component parts or subassemblies. Such weapons could range from one kiloton to one megaton in yield, and in the present state of the art could be designed to break down into components weighing from a few pounds up to approximately 25 pounds in the case of small-yield weapons and up to approximately 200 pounds in the case of large-yield weapons.

2. If the USSR intended to launch an all-out attack on the US, the major Soviet objectives would be (a) to destroy or neutralize as quickly as possible US capabilities for nuclear attack, and (b) to inflict such physical and psychological damage on the US as would prevent, or at least hinder, the mobilization of US war potential. Accordingly, the initial Soviet attack would have to be planned not only to achieve surprise but also to be of sufficient weight to accomplish those objectives. Insofar as the USSR considered the clandestine introduction of nuclear weapons into the US, it would plan to use these weapons either (a) as the principal means of inflicting maximum damage on the US or (b) as an auxiliary means of inflicting damage, the main effort of its all-out attack being made by other methods of delivery (aircraft, guided missiles, etc.).

CLANDESTINE ATTACK AS THE PRINCIPAL MEANS OF INFLECTING DAMAGE

3. Soviet military planners are unlikely to consider that nuclear weapons could be clan-

¹This estimate is in response to a specific request which confines itself to the narrow limits of clandestine introduction of nuclear weapons under diplomatic immunity. For a more extensive discussion of Soviet capabilities for clandestine introduction by any means, see NIE 11-7-55, "Soviet Gross Capabilities for Attacks on the US and Key Overseas Installations and Forces through 1 July 1958."
destinely introduced and put into position on
a scale large enough to obviate the need for
an all-out attack by other means. The suc-
cess of a clandestine nuclear attack on such
a scale would depend not only upon the initial
introduction of substantial numbers of nu-
clear weapons, but also upon subsequent op-
erations which would be much more difficult
to organize and keep secret. To achieve its
objectives, the USSR would have to organize
a complex clandestine operation involving the
storage of weapons components, transporta-
tion of assembled weapons or component parts
over considerable distances, emplacement of
weapons, and accurate timing and coordina-
tion of attacks at the target sites. A clandes-
tine operation of this magnitude would in-
volve grave risks of premature disclosure be-
cause of: (a) the large numbers of targets to
be attacked; (b) the distances of such targets
from Soviet installations having diplomatic
immunity; (c) the amount of time the devices
would have to be held secretly prior to use;
and (d) the numbers of personnel involved in
the operation.

4. We believe, therefore, that in order to ob-
tain the optimum combination of weight and
surprise, the USSR would probably place chief
reliance on nuclear attack by aircraft, at least
until the aircraft delivery system is replaced
by intercontinental missiles. It would prob-
ably consider clandestine employment only as
an auxiliary method to attack certain selected
targets.

CLANDESTINE ATTACK AS AN
AUXILIARY MEANS

5. In estimating the advisability of using clan-
destine delivery as an auxiliary method of
attack, the USSR would have to balance the
probable results to be obtained against the
risks of detection with consequent loss of sur-
prise and possible US counteraction. While
the justification for its employment would in-
xcrease in proportion to the contemplated scale
of clandestine attack, the risks of detection
would also increase substantially. Conse-
quently, we believe that, in considering such
an attack, the USSR would limit its operations
to those targets the destruction or damage of
which (a) is sufficiently important to warrant
incuring the risks involved, (b) could be
accomplished by clandestine means more
easily or more certainly than by other means,
and (c) could be accomplished with minimum
risks of premature disclosure.

6. The USSR could minimize the risk of pre-
matre disclosure by limiting the clandestine
operation to placement of nuclear weapons at
Soviet diplomatic establishments in Washing-
ton and New York. In this way it could vir-
tually insure successful attack on two major
targets without using a large number of per-
sonnel and without incurring the risks in-
volved in transporting nuclear weapons to
areas which do not enjoy diplomatic immuni-
ties. On the other hand, the USSR could attac-
g New York and Washington by air and
therefore would not have to rely on clandes-
tine attack. In addition, even a very limited
clandestine effort would still not entirely eli-
minate the possibility of disclosure as a result
of unpredictable events.

7. Although the possibilit of limited Soviet
use of this method of clandestine attack can
by no means be excluded, we believe that, since
the adverse consequences of premature dis-
closure would remain and since the chances of
detection could not be entirely eliminated, the
chances are now slightly better than even
that the USSR would not undertake even this
more restricted operation.3

* The Assistant to the Director, Federal Bureau
of Investigation, believes that this paragraph
should read as follows:

"It is impossible to predict whether the USSR
would or would not attempt to utilize the dip-
loomatic pouch to clandestinely introduce nu-
clear weapons into the US. However, since the
USSR is capable of producing nuclear weapons
for introduction by this method, a risk will
continue to exist."

The Director of Naval Intelligence concurs in
general with the views of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation and would stress that the danger
would rise in direct proportion to the ease with
which nuclear weapons could be introduced into
the US without risk of detection.

-TOP-SECRET-
SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND INTENTIONS
WITH RESPECT TO THE CLANDESTINE
INTRODUCTION OF WEAPONS OF MASS
DESTRUCTION INTO THE US

Submitted by the
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
The following intelligence organizations participated in the
preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency;
the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State,
the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff; and
the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Concurred in by the
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
on 17 May 1960. Concurring were the Director of Intelligence
and Research, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of
Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Assistant
Chief of Naval Operations for Intelligence, Department of the
Navy; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF; the
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff; The Atomic Energy
Commission Representative to the USIB; the Assistant to the
Secretary of Defense, Special Operations; and the Director
of the National Security Agency. For the position of the
Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, see his
footnote on page 2.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND INTENTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE US

THE PROBLEM

To assess Soviet capabilities for the clandestine introduction and delivery of weapons of mass destruction in the US; and to estimate the likelihood of Soviet resort to this mode of attack.¹

CONCLUSIONS

1. The USSR is capable of attacking selected important targets in the US by means of the clandestine introduction and delivery of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons of mass destruction.

2. The USSR would be most unlikely to undertake the delivery of such attacks except as a subsidiary operation in conjunction with a deliberate Soviet initiation of general war. Elsewhere we have estimated this latter contingency to be unlikely during the next few years.² Even in that case, a decision to deliver such attacks would depend not only on Soviet ability to attack specific targets, but also on the Soviet estimate of the strategic importance of their destruction, the risk of detection prior to delivery of the attack, the possible consequences of such detection, and the feasibility of destroying the target by other means. No matter how slight the risk of detection, we believe that the USSR, considering the consequences of possible detection in forfeiting surprise, compromising the Soviet main effort, and possibly provoking a US military reaction disastrous for the USSR, would not undertake clandestine attacks in the US with weapons of mass destruction. However, if the USSR regarded such attacks as the only feasible means of achieving a potentially decisive strategic effect, it might accept the risks involved.

³ See paragraph 131 of NIE 11–4–59, dated 9 February 1960, including the footnote of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, thereto.

¹ Herein we are concerned only with the clandestine introduction of weapons of mass destruction into the US prior to the open initiation of hostilities. This estimate does not deal with either (a) surreptitious attacks by military units such as missile launching submarines, or (b) clandestine operations initiated after the outbreak of war.

³ See paragraph 131 of NIE 11–4–59, dated 9 February 1960, including the footnote of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, thereto.
no warning time. In particular, clandestine nuclear attack will be the most reliable means of destroying or immobilizing substantial numbers of SAC aircraft prior to warning. For this purpose, the USSR might accept the risks involved.

4. When the USSR has acquired a sufficient ICBM capability, there will be no strategic purpose served by clandestine attack that could not be accomplished by ICBM attack without incurring the risk of detection inherent in clandestine attack—unless the US had meanwhile developed an effective defense against ICBMs, or had at least developed a capability to launch a substantial proportion of its retaliatory force prior to the arrival of Soviet ICBMs at target. In these eventualities, the USSR might still regard clandestine attack on SAC bases as strategically justifiable. Otherwise, the USSR would almost certainly not undertake the clandestine introduction and delivery of weapons of mass destruct-

tion in the US after it had acquired a substantial ICBM capability.\(^3\)

\(^3\) The Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, believes that this paragraph should read as follows:

“Since the USSR is capable of attacking selected important targets in the US by means of the clandestine introduction and detonation of nuclear weapons, the US cannot afford to say that the USSR will not exercise this capability. Even though the USSR acquired a substantial ICBM capability, if the US had meanwhile developed an effective defense against ICBMs or had at least developed a capability to launch a substantial proportion of its retaliatory force prior to the arrival of Soviet ICBMs at target, the USSR might still regard clandestine attack on US retaliatory forces as strategically justifiable. If, at some unspecified time in the future, the USSR should acquire a sufficient ICBM capability which would permit it to plan attacks on Western retaliatory forces with the degree and certainty of success required to insure that the USSR could win a general war without itself incurring unacceptable damage, there would be no strategic purpose served by clandestine attack. However, the majority of the US Intelligence Board does not believe the USSR will attempt to acquire a sufficient ICBM capability prior to 1964 (NIE 11-4-59, dated 9 February 1960, paragraph 10). For the present then, the USSR has not only the capability of clandestine attack, particularly with nuclear weapons, but has strategic justification for employing this type of attack on selected targets until some unspecified time in the future.”

DISCUSSION

5. The clandestine introduction of men and material into the US is not now a matter of insuperable difficulty and could not readily be made so. No estimate is available as to the number of persons in the US and neighboring countries who could actually be relied upon as technically and psychologically capable of executing dangerous missions in behalf of the USSR, but the number required for the clandestine operations herein considered would not be large.

Weapons Suitable for Clandestine Use

6. **Nuclear.** The USSR could produce a variety of nuclear devices suitable for clandestine introduction and delivery. Such devices could range in yield from about one kiloton to about seven megatons—the range of presently tested Soviet devices. To facilitate clandestine introduction, any device within this range could be designed to break down into a number of relatively simple and transportable components. Not much technical skill would be required to reassemble a low-yield device. When assembled, it would be transportable in the luggage compartment of an automobile. Greater skill would be required to reassemble a high-yield device and, once assembled, it would be difficult to handle. The size and weight of any multimegaton de-
vice would preclude its use except as a fixed installation in the hold of a ship, in a truck-trailer, or in a building.

7. Biological. Certain biological warfare agents are peculiarly suited for clandestine use because they could be produced in the US without great difficulty or risk (obviating any need for their clandestine introduction) and because their actual delivery on target would not be immediately detected. However, the delayed action of biological agents renders them unsuitable for use in situations requiring an immediate or precisely timed effect.

8. Chemical. Chemical warfare agents would be difficult to introduce and deliver in quantities sufficient to obtain effective concentrations on extensive target areas. Moreover, their effective delivery with precise timing would be subject to unpredictable conditions of wind and weather. However, chemical agents could be effectively used on a small scale against personnel in key installations. A supply of V-agents ample for this purpose could be clandestinely produced in the US without great difficulty or great risk of detection, obviating the necessity of clandestine introduction.

General Considerations Affecting Soviet Intentions

9. Many important targets in the US are vulnerable to clandestine nuclear, biological, or chemical attack. Whether the USSR would undertake to deliver such attacks at the outset of a nuclear general war would depend not only on its ability to attack specific targets, but also on the Soviet estimate of the strategic importance of their destruction, the risk of detection prior to delivery of the attack, the possible consequences of such detection, and the feasibility of destroying the target by other means.

10. Specific US security measures on land and sea frontiers and at potential targets cannot guarantee the detection of a clandestine attack prior to final delivery, but they pose an element of risk which the USSR cannot ignore. In addition to the specific risk in particular cases, there is a general risk of discovery through a US penetration of the clandestine apparatus, or through the detection of an agent, or by sheer accident. The USSR could never be sure that none of these mishances would occur.

11. The USSR would almost certainly anticipate that the delivery of a clandestine attack in the US with weapons of mass destruction would precipitate general war—except that biological agents might be disseminated without detection or possibility of attribution. We believe that the USSR would be most unlikely to undertake clandestine attacks in the US with weapons of mass destruction except as a subsidiary operation in conjunction with a deliberate Soviet initiation of general war. Elsewhere we have estimated this latter contingency to be unlikely during the next few years. Almost certainly the USSR would not accept the risks inherent in maintaining stocks of such materials in the US for use on a contingency basis. By definition, the circumstances of a Soviet pre-emptive attack would not allow sufficient time for the introduction and delivery of such weapons. Moreover, in such circumstances, the intensification of US security precautions would greatly increase the risk that subsidiary clandestine operations would compromise the Soviet main effort.

12. No matter how slight the risk of detection, we believe that the USSR, considering the consequences of possible detection in forfeiting surprise, compromising the Soviet main effort, and possibly provoking a US military reaction disastrous for the USSR, would not undertake clandestine attacks in the US with weapons of mass destruction. However, if the USSR regarded such attacks as the only

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*See paragraph 131 of NIE 11-4-58, dated 9 February 1960, including the footnote of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAP, thereto.

*In Soviet military literature, pre-emptive attack is defined as an attack with immediately available forces designed to seize the strategic initiative from an enemy who is himself preparing imminently to attack. The USSR would not be likely to conclude that a US attack was imminent unless the situation were so tene that the US, on its part, would be taking extraordinary security precautions.
feasible means of achieving a potentially decisive strategic effect, it might accept the risks involved.

Particular Forms of Clandestine Attack

13. Below we evaluate several particular forms of clandestine attack from a Soviet point of view in accordance with the criteria set forth above.

14. **Biological and Chemical.** Biological agents are unsuited for use in situations requiring precise timing. The use of chemical agents is dependent on unpredictable conditions of wind and weather. Neither of these weapons is well suited for use in a clandestine attack designed to have a precisely timed effect upon the initial operations of a nuclear general war. Regarded in the context of a massive nuclear attack with consequent fallout, subsidiary clandestine biological and chemical attacks would be redundant.

15. **Nuclear Detonations in Diplomatic Premises.** Under existing practices with respect to diplomatic immunity, the USSR would incur no appreciable risk of detection in assembling multimegaton devices in secure areas in the Soviet Embassy in Washington and the offices of the Soviet UN Delegation in New York, for detonation at H-hour. The outstanding advantage of such an attack over attack by bombers would be its denial of warning time. Considering the minimal risk involved and the advantages to be derived from the destruction of Washington and New York without warning, the USSR might undertake such an operation. With the advent of ICBMs, however, the same effect could be accomplished by missile attack without incurring even the slight risk of a US search in violation of Soviet diplomatic immunity.

16. **Nuclear Detonations on Shipboard in Major Ports.** As compared with bomber attack, the outstanding advantage of the detonation of multimegaton nuclear devices on shipboard in major ports at H-hour would be the denial of warning time. Existing port security measures would probably deter the use of merchant ships for this purpose, but could not prevent the delivery of such an attack by fishing boats or similar small craft to which nuclear weapons had been transferred at sea. Under alert conditions, the additional countermeasures likely to be in effect would probably deter the delivery of such an attack by any means. With the advent of ICBMs, the same effect could be accomplished by missile attack without incurring the risk of detection inherent in clandestine introduction.

17. **Clandestine Attack on SAC Bases.** So long as Soviet strategic attack capabilities remain substantially limited to attack by bombers, clandestine nuclear attack on selected SAC bases at H-hour will remain the most reliable means by which the USSR could attempt to destroy or immobilize substantial numbers of SAC aircraft prior to warning. Chemical attack would also be effective for this purpose, but might be regarded as less reliable on account of uncertainties regarding wind and weather conditions at H-hour. The specific security measures in effect at SAC bases would not preclude the effective delivery of such attacks. The general risks involved in undertaking such operations would be considerable, but, if the USSR had already decided to accept the risks inherent in a deliberate initiation of general war, it might regard the risks involved in this form of clandestine attack as warranted by the potentially decisive effect to be achieved, which could be accomplished by no other means. However, when the USSR has acquired a substantial number of ICBMs, the same effect could be accomplished by ICBM attack without incurring any risk of detection prior to launch—unless the US had meanwhile developed an effective defense against ICBMs, or had at least developed a capability to launch a substantial proportion of its land-based retaliatory force prior to the arrival of Soviet ICBMs at target. In these eventualities, the USSR might still regard clandestine attack on SAC bases as strategically justifiable.

18. **Clandestine Attack on Hardened Sites.** As a means of delivering nuclear weapons without providing the warning time derived from the approach of bombers, the ICBM will in general supersede clandestine attack. For some time, however, the number of ICBMs required to destroy a hardened site will be
excessive. Consequently, consideration must be given to the feasibility of clandestine attack on such targets. It appears that a clandestine operation could not deliver a nuclear device of sufficient yield near enough to a hardened site to disable it. Chemical attack against site personnel might be suitable for this purpose.
The Clandestine Introduction of Weapons of Mass Destruction into the US

Submitted by the
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Concurred in by the
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
As indicated overleaf
13 MARCH 1963
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate:

The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, AEC, FBI, and NSA.

Concurring:

Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence), Department of the Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF
Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff
The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the USIS
The Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Director of the National Security Agency

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

NUMBER 11-7-63

The Clandestine Introduction of Weapons of Mass Destruction into the US
THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE US

THE PROBLEM

To assess Soviet capabilities for the clandestine introduction and delivery of weapons of mass destruction in the US; and to estimate the likelihood of Soviet resort to this method of attack over the next few years.¹

CONCLUSIONS

A. We have no evidence of Soviet plans or intentions regarding the clandestine introduction of weapons of mass destruction. The Soviets are, however, capable of introducing such weapons into the US. Because clandestine production of biological and chemical agents in the US is both feasible and less risky than their clandestine introduction, we conclude that the Soviets probably would consider only nuclear weapons for clandestine introduction. (Paras. 1–5)

B. We believe that the Soviets almost certainly would not contemplate the use of clandestinely delivered nuclear weapons except as a supplement to other weapons in the context of general war. We have estimated elsewhere ² that the Soviets do not plan deliberately to initiate such a war. Although they might see certain advantages in the clandestine use of nuclear weapons if they decided deliberately to initiate an attack in a period of low tension, they probably would not wish to prejudice

¹ Herein we are concerned only with the clandestine introduction of weapons of mass destruction into the US prior to the initiation of hostilities.
the element of surprise on which this course of action relies. In the case of pre-emptive attack, introduction concurrent with a decision to pre-empt would be very difficult. Introduction on a contingent basis would run the risk of discovery and this risk would multiply with the number of weapons and the length of time that they were in the US. (Paras. 7–8)

C. Even as the Soviets build larger missile forces capable of attacking the US, they may see a continued requirement for clandestine nuclear attack in conjunction with long-range attack. Although a wide variety of US targets would be vulnerable to clandestine nuclear attack, we believe that the Soviets probably would focus on the feasibility of attacking targets for which their missile systems are inappropriate because of a requirement for extreme accuracy or the desire to deny warning time. Targets in this category might be key command and control facilities and possibly some manned alert forces. We believe that the Soviets would consider that only a small number of US targets could be attacked with greater advantage by clandestinely placed nuclear weapons than by nuclear weapons delivered by other means. But in view of the growing number and dispersal of US delivery vehicles, the Soviets probably recognize that it would be impracticable for them to mount a clandestine nuclear attack on a sufficient number of them to reduce substantially the weight of a US strike. (Paras. 9–10)

D. Although the Soviets are capable of introducing nuclear weapons clandestinely into the US, we believe that the limited advantages of this course of action, when weighed against the consequences of possible detection, make it unlikely that the Soviets will do so. However, there cannot be complete assurance that the USSR will not attempt the clandestine introduction of nuclear weapons into the US.³ (Para. 12)

³The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF; the Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff; the Assistant to the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation; and the Director of the National Security Agency, do not concur in this paragraph.

They feel that as long as the Soviets have the capability for clandestine nuclear attack against selected important targets in the US, with minimal risk, there is not enough evidence to make the judgment that such an attack is unlikely.
DISCUSSION

I. INTRODUCTION

1. We have no evidence of Soviet plans or intentions regarding the clandestine introduction of mass destruction weapons into the US. Our estimate of the likelihood that the USSR would resort to this form of attack is based upon considerations of Soviet capabilities for clandestine attacks, probable Soviet views regarding the relationship of such attacks to other Soviet capabilities for general war, the types of targets that could be clandestinely attacked with advantage, and the risks attendant upon clandestine attack.

II. CAPABILITIES

2. The USSR can produce a variety of nuclear, chemical, and probably biological weapons of mass destruction suitable for clandestine introduction into the US.

a. Nuclear. The USSR can produce nuclear devices ranging in yield from one kiloton or less to about 100 MT. To facilitate clandestine introduction, devices yielding up to about 100-300 KT could be designed to break down into a number of relatively simple and transportable components. Not much technical skill would be required to reassemble and maintain a low-yield device (10 KT or less). Greater skill would be required to reassemble a device yielding 100-300 KT; once assembled it could be transported in the luggage compartment of an automobile. The size, weight, and complexity of megaton devices would preclude their use except when transported by a vehicle such as a ship or a truck.

b. Chemical. The USSR has an extensive chemical warfare program which could produce a variety of chemical agents suitable for clandestine introduction into the US. However, large quantities would be required to obtain effective concentrations on most types of targets, and delivery with precise timing would be subject to unpredictable conditions of wind and weather. Nevertheless, chemical agents could be used effectively on a small scale against personnel in key installations. A supply of nerve gases ample for this purpose could be clandestinely produced in the US without great difficulty or great risk of detection. Psychogenic agents could not readily be produced in the US and would probably have to be introduced clandestinely. We believe, however, that the possible advantages of psychogenic agents over nerve agents would not be sufficient in the Soviet view to warrant the risk of clandestine introduction.

c. Biological. Although we know little of the Soviet biological warfare program, we believe that the USSR can produce biological agents
and introduce them clandestinely into the US without great difficulty or great risk of detection. Biological agents could be delivered without immediate detection and the source of attack would be difficult to identify. Such agents could be used to contaminate water and food supplies or key government buildings. However, the delayed action of biological agents renders them unsuitable for use in situations requiring an immediate or precisely timed effect. Appropriate agents can be produced in the US without great difficulty or risk.

3. In view of the relative ease of manufacturing biological warfare agents in the US, we think it unlikely that the Soviets would find it necessary to introduce such agents clandestinely. Chemical warfare agents would be difficult to introduce and deliver in quantities sufficient to obtain effective concentrations on extensive target areas, while the smaller amounts necessary for selective attacks could be produced in the US. For these reasons, the following discussion is limited to a consideration of the clandestine introduction of nuclear weapons.

4. We do not know how many people are available to the Soviets for the clandestine introduction of nuclear weapons into the US, but it is unlikely that this factor would limit Soviet capabilities. We know that the Soviet intelligence services have assigned a high priority to the development of sabotage capabilities in the US; should the Soviets undertake the clandestine introduction of nuclear weapons, they almost certainly would employ the highly trained and reliable agents of these services. They could also employ diplomatic personnel.

5. Nuclear weapons yielding up to 300 KT could be brought into the US by a variety of means such as by ground or air transport across land borders or at points along US seacoasts. The difficulties of introducing megaton weapons into the US, even in a disassembled state, are probably sufficiently great to seriously discourage such attempts. Moreover, megaton devices could be brought into US waters in submarines or merchant ships and detonated without removal from the ship. Such devices could also be carried in by fishing boats or similar small craft to which transfer had been made at sea.

III. CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING SOVIET INTENTIONS

6. The Soviets almost certainly recognize the serious consequences which would result from the detection of an attempt to introduce and deploy nuclear weapons in the US. Despite all Soviet precautions, there would always be some risk of detection, arising not only from specific US security measures but also from the chance of a US penetration of the clandestine apparatus, the defection of an agent, or sheer accident. The Soviets would expect detection to produce a political crisis of the first magnitude, and to preclude any chance of achieving surprise. In
their view it might even precipitate a US pre-emptive attack which would be disastrous for the USSR.

7. We believe that the USSR almost certainly would not contemplate the use of clandestinely delivered nuclear weapons except as a supplement to other weapons in the context of general war. We have estimated elsewhere that the Soviets do not plan deliberately to initiate such a war. While we cannot completely exclude the possibility that the USSR might deliberately launch a surprise attack, our evidence on forces being built and our judgment of general Soviet policy lead us to regard this as an extremely unlikely course of action over the next few years. To meet the requirements for pre-emptive and retaliatory attack, the Soviets are seeking to gear their capabilities against the US in such a way as to enable them to go into action on very short notice. In considering clandestine attack as a supplement to other weapons, therefore, the Soviets would weigh their ability to initiate such attack rapidly and with little preparation, and in close coordination with the main weight of attack.

8. We have examined the probable Soviet view of clandestine attack in the case of a deliberate Soviet initiation of general war and in the case of a Soviet pre-emptive attack.

a. Deliberate Initiation. The Soviets might see certain advantages in the clandestine use of nuclear weapons if they decided deliberately to initiate attack in a period of low tension. Weapons would be in the US a relatively short time before use, thereby minimizing the risk of discovery. In addition, the Soviets could expect that the levels of US security precautions and alertness would not have been raised. Nevertheless, we believe that the USSR would recognize that an attempt to introduce nuclear weapons clandestinely would inevitably involve the risk of jeopardizing the element of surprise on which this course of action relies.

b. Pre-emptive Attack. It would be very difficult for the USSR to introduce nuclear weapons into the US for use in a pre-emptive attack. By definition, the circumstances would not allow sufficient time for the introduction and delivery of such weapons after a decision to pre-empt. Moreover, the USSR would not be likely to conclude that a US attack was imminent unless the situation were so tense that the US, on its part, would be taking extraordinary security precautions which would greatly increase the risk that subsidiary clandestine operations would compromise the main Soviet effort. To be prepared to use clandestinely

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1 See, for example, paragraph 18 of NIE 11-9-62, "Trends in Soviet Foreign Policy," dated 2 May 1962.

2 Pre-emptive attack is defined as an attack with immediately available forces designed to seize the strategic initiative from an enemy who is himself preparing imminently to attack.
introduced nuclear weapons in this case, the USSR would therefore have to accept the risks of maintaining weapons in the US over a period of time. We believe that the Soviets would recognize that the risks of discovery would multiply with the number of weapons and the length of time that they were in the US. The USSR almost certainly would not attempt to maintain more than a small number of nuclear weapons, if any, in the US for an indefinite period.  

IV. EFFECTIVENESS AGAINST VARIOUS TARGETS

9. Even as the Soviets build larger missile forces capable of attacking the US, they may see a continued requirement for clandestine nuclear attack in conjunction with long-range attack. Although a wide variety of US targets would be vulnerable to clandestine nuclear attack, we believe that the Soviets probably would focus on the feasibility of attacking targets for which their missile systems are inappropriate because of a requirement for extreme accuracy or the desire to deny warning time. Targets in this category might be key command and control facilities and possibly some manned alert forces. We believe that the Soviets would consider that only a small number of US targets could be attacked with greater advantage by clandestinely placed nuclear weapons than by nuclear weapons delivered by other means.

10. The Soviets probably recognize that US security measures provide a considerably higher level of protection against penetration of strategic bases than against delivery of clandestine attacks at the perimeters of such installations. The detonation of a 300 KT nuclear device could cripple aircraft on the ground at a distance of several miles. A Minuteman launch control center (hardened to 1,000 psi) would be vulnerable to a surface burst of a 300 KT weapon at a distance of 950 feet. But in view of the growing number and dispersal of US delivery vehicles, the Soviets probably recognize that it would be impracticable for them to mount a clandestine nuclear attack on a sufficient number of them to reduce substantially the weight of a US strike.

11. The Soviets might believe that key US Government officials and command centers could be attacked by clandestinely introduced nuclear weapons with greater advantage than by missiles. Nuclear weapons in the 100–300 KT range could be used in such an attack. Under existing practices with respect to diplomatic immunity, the USSR would incur no appreciable risk of detection in assembling suitable nuclear

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1 The objection to advance clandestine introduction of nuclear weapons for a pre-emptive attack would also apply to preparation for a retaliatory attack.

2 The Soviets are almost certainly aware that Minuteman control mechanisms are such that the destruction of one launch center could not be counted upon to prevent the firing of the 10 missiles that it controls. Interconnecting controls are provided so that any one of the five launch control centers associated with a squadron of 50 Minuteman silos could launch the entire squadron.
devices in diplomatic premises such as the Soviet Embassy in Washington. The principal advantage of such an attack would be its denial of warning time and the minimal risk of discovery. However, the Soviets could never be sure that key US officials would be vulnerable at a predetermined time of detonation, or that a successful clandestine nuclear attack against Washington, for example, would significantly delay a US decision to release nuclear strike forces.

V. LIKELIHOOD OF CLANDESTINE NUCLEAR ATTACK

12. Although the Soviets are capable of introducing nuclear weapons clandestinely into the US, we believe that the limited advantages of this course of action, when weighed against the consequences of possible detection, make it unlikely that the Soviets will do so. However, there cannot be complete assurance that the USSR will not attempt the clandestine introduction of nuclear weapons into the US.8

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8 The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF; the Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff; the Assistant to the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation; and the Director of the National Security Agency, do not concur in this paragraph. They feel that as long as the Soviets have the capability for clandestine nuclear attack against selected important targets in the US, with minimal risk, there is not enough evidence to make the judgment that such an attack is unlikely.
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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
NUMBER 4-68

The Clandestine Introduction of Weapons of Mass Destruction into the US

Submitted by

DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Concurred in by the
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
As indicated overleaf
13 June 1968

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Concurring:

Vice Adm. Rufus Taylor, Deputy Director, Central Intelligence

Mr. Thomas L. Hughes, the Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State

Lt. Gen. Joseph F. Carroll, the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

Lt. Gen. Marshall S. Carter, the Director, National Security Agency

Dr. Charles H. Reichardt, for the Assistant General Manager, Atomic Energy Commission

Abstaining:

Mr. William O. Cregar, for the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, the subject being outside of his jurisdiction.

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19 June 1968

MEMORANDUM TO HOLDERS OF NIE 4-68, "THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE US," dated 13 June 1968, TOP SECRET, RESTRICTED DATA

ERRATUM

Inside of front cover: Insert FBI in the participating paragraph and Mr. William O. Cregar, for the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, in the concurring paragraph.

Delete abstaining paragraph entirely.
THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE US

THE PROBLEM

To assess the capabilities of foreign nations to introduce biological, chemical, or nuclear weapons clandestinely into the US, and to estimate the likelihood of such introduction over the next few years.

CONCLUSIONS

A. Virtually any industrial nation could produce biological warfare (BW) and chemical warfare (CW) agents and introduce them clandestinely into the US in relatively small quantities. We do not believe, however, that any potential enemy would plan the clandestine use of BW or CW on a scale sufficient to achieve strategic military objectives. We do not rule out the use of BW or CW for sabotage and other special purposes for which they could be very effective. The relatively small quantities required for these purposes could be covertly produced in the US without great difficulty or risk of detection. Therefore we consider that their clandestine introduction would be unnecessary, and unlikely in view of the risks involved.

B. The Soviets could introduce nuclear weapons clandestinely into the US, and might consider doing so if they planned a deliberate surprise attack on the US. Considering the large numbers of strategic weapons now in their arsenal, however, the Soviets would see the contribution of a clandestine emplacement effort as marginal and would consider any advantages it offered as outweighed by the risks of jeopardizing surprise and of precipitating a US preemptive attack.
C. Because the Chinese have no other means of attacking the US with nuclear weapons, they might consider a clandestine emplacement effort with the object of deterring the US from attack on Communist China. Their capabilities to carry out such an effort, however, are much less than those of the USSR. Moreover, they could not be sure that the US would be deterred and they would have to consider that detection might result in, rather than stave off, a devastating US strike. For these reasons, we think it unlikely that Communist China will attempt to introduce nuclear weapons clandestinely into the US.

D. We have considered the possibility that a third country (e.g., Cuba) might assist the USSR or China in the clandestine introduction of nuclear weapons into the US. We consider this unlikely. We doubt that either the Soviets or the Chinese would seek to enlist the aid of another nation in such a sensitive undertaking. If they should, that nation's leaders would almost certainly react unfavorably to a proposal that could jeopardize their national survival merely to support Soviet or Chinese policy.

DISCUSSION

1. INTRODUCTION

1. In considering the clandestine introduction of weapons of mass destruction into the US, enemy leaders would have to weigh any possible advantages against the grave consequences which would follow from discovery. Despite all precautions there would always be risk of detection arising not only from specific US security measures, but also from the chance of US penetration of the clandestine apparatus, the defection of an agent, or sheer accident. The enemy leaders would almost certainly judge that use of this tactic would be regarded by the US as a warlike act, if not as a cause for war, and that it would precipitate an international political crisis of the first magnitude.

2. We believe, therefore, that the range of circumstances in which weapons of mass destruction might be clandestinely introduced into the US is quite narrow—that an enemy nation would consider this course only in the context of planning an attack on the US or of deterring the US from an attack on itself. Smaller stakes would not be worth the risk. Such weapons could not be brought in secretly in sufficient quantities to have a decisive effect on the outcome of a war. Any plans for their use, we believe, would envision the use of limited quantities to achieve results unattainable by other means.
3. Virtually any industrial nation could produce biological warfare (BW) and chemical warfare (CW) agents and introduce them clandestinely into the US in relatively small quantities. Although small quantities of BW agents could be effective against large targets, the delayed action of such agents makes them unsuitable for use in situations requiring an immediate or precisely timed effect. Relatively large quantities of CW agents are required to obtain effective concentrations over extensive target areas, and it would be difficult to introduce them clandestinely in such quantities. Moreover, the effects of BW and CW agents cannot always be predicted accurately; adverse weather can limit or even prevent the effective use of BW and CW agents against some targets.

4. We do not rule out the use of BW and CW for sabotage and other special purposes for which they could be very effective. But because the relatively small quantities required for these purposes could be covertly produced in the US without great difficulty or risk of detection, we consider that their clandestine introduction would be unnecessary, and therefore unlikely in view of the risks involved. The following discussion, therefore, is limited to a consideration of the clandestine introduction of nuclear weapons.

5. Only four foreign nations—the USSR, the UK, France, and Communist China—have developed and tested nuclear weapons. Beyond these, only India is likely to undertake a nuclear weapons program in the next several years; Israel and Sweden might do so. We can foresee no changes in the world situation so radical as to motivate the UK, France, or any of the potential nuclear powers to attempt to clandestinely introduce nuclear weapons into the US. For this reason, the balance of this discussion will be concerned only with the remaining nuclear powers, the Soviet Union and Communist China.

II. SOVIET AND CHINESE CAPABILITIES

6. Both the USSR and Communist China can produce nuclear weapons which could be adapted for clandestine introduction into the US. We estimate that the Soviets have a broad spectrum of weapons.

Current Chinese weapons are probably fairly large and would probably require more detailed assembly and check out after being brought in than would Soviet designs.

7. Nuclear weapons with weights of up to 1,500-2,000 pounds could be brought across US borders by common means of transport without great difficulty. A Soviet weapon in this weight class could have a yield of
a Chinese weapon could yield[ ] The difficulties and risks of introducing higher yield or heavier weapons into the US, even in a disassembled state, are probably sufficiently great to seriously discourage such attempts. But higher yield weapons could be brought into US waters in merchant ships and detonated without removal from the ship. Such devices could also be carried in by fishing boats or similar small craft to which transfer had been made at sea.

8. Both the USSR and Communist China could make the physical arrangements necessary to bring nuclear weapons secretly into the US, but Soviet capabilities in this respect are much greater than Chinese. We believe that if either country undertook such a program, they would rely on their own agent organizations rather than on political sympathizers in the US. Soviet intelligence services have assigned a high priority to the development of espionage and sabotage capabilities in the US and presumably have formed an organization for the latter purpose. Should the Soviets undertake the clandestine introduction of nuclear weapons, they almost certainly would employ the highly trained and reliable agents of these services. They could also employ diplomatic personnel and could bring in weapons or weapon components under diplomatic cover. The large diplomatic establishments in Canada and Mexico could serve as bases for the operation.

9. There are no Chinese Communist diplomatic establishments in the US, Canada, or Mexico. The absence of such bases precludes the use of diplomatic pouches for the clandestine introduction of nuclear weapons or their components and the use of secure diplomatic communications for planning and control of such an operation; it also makes more difficult the introduction and control of agents. Nevertheless, the Chinese could introduce agents under the guise of bona fide immigrants.

10. In considering Soviet and Chinese capabilities, we have also considered the possibility that a third country (e.g., Cuba) might assist the USSR or China in the clandestine introduction of nuclear weapons into the US. We consider this unlikely on two counts. We doubt that either the Soviets or the Chinese would seek to enlist the aid of another nation in such a sensitive undertaking. And if they should, that nation's leaders would almost certainly react unfavorably to a proposal that could jeopardize their national survival merely to support Soviet or Chinese policy.

III. STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS

11. If the Soviets or Communist Chinese have considered the clandestine introduction of nuclear weapons into the US, they have almost certainly been influenced by the same general considerations: the element of risk, the opportunities for clandestine introduction, and the results that could be achieved. The two countries, however, occupy vastly different strategic positions vis-a-vis the US. Thus, while we believe that neither would consider the use of this
tactic except in the context of a possible general war, differing strategic consider-
ations might lead the Soviets and the Chinese to see the clandestine intro-
duction of nuclear weapons in a somewhat different light.

12. The USSR. The Soviet leaders, like those of the US, must take account
of the possibility of general war in their military planning. In such planning,
the Soviets would consider the clandestine introduction of nuclear weapons into
the US, if at all, only as a supplement to the main attack by their large strategic
attack forces. Because they have already achieved an assured retaliatory capa-
bility, they would probably consider a clandestine emplacement effort as po-
tentially useful only in support of a deliberate or preemptive Soviet attack and
directed toward delaying or reducing a US retaliatory attack. Possible targets
might include important government headquarters, key military command and
control facilities, missile detection and tracking radars, and possibly some manned
alert forces. The Soviets would recognize, however, that even if such an effort
were successful, it could not prevent US retaliation or reduce it to an acceptable
level.

13. In considering clandestine attack as a supplement to other weapons, the
Soviets would have to weigh their ability to initiate such attack rapidly, with
little preparation, and in close coordination with the main weight of attack.
Thus, clandestinely introduced weapons would have to be in position at the
time the attacks were launched. In the case of a preemptive attack, the cir-
cumstances would not allow sufficient time for the introduction and delivery
of such weapons after a decision to preempt. To prepare for this contingency,
beforehand, the Soviets would have to accept the risk of maintaining weapons
in the US for an indefinite period of time. These difficulties would not obtain
if the USSR decided deliberately to initiate general war in a period of low
pressure; weapons could be introduced into the US at a relatively short time before
use. But the Soviets would have to consider the risk of jeopardizing the element
of surprise on which this course of action relies, and that discovery might pre-
cipitate a US preemptive attack which would be disastrous for the USSR. For
these reasons, we think it unlikely that the USSR will attempt to introduce nuclear
weapons clandestinely into the US.

14. Communist China. The Chinese have no capability at present to attack
the US with nuclear weapons. They probably have an ICBM system in the
early stages of development, which could become operational several years from
now. But they may fear that when it does the US antiballistic missile deploy-
ment will have rendered it largely ineffective. In these circumstances, they
might see some advantages in clandestinely introducing and emplacing nuclear
weapons in the US. Inasmuch as they could not deliver such an attack on a
scale sufficient to achieve a decisive military objective, their object would pre-
sumably be to deter the US from a course of action that gravely threatened their
national security. Consequently, the most likely targets would be population
centers.
15. Clearly, the Chinese would also see grave disadvantages in such a move. So long as the US was unaware of their existence, the concealed weapons would have no effect upon its actions. Indeed, the risk of their discovery would be an ever-present, continuing danger to the Chinese themselves. Once the Chinese announced that nuclear weapons were emplaced in the US, the announcement would touch off an intensive search and extraordinary security measures. Moreover, the Chinese could not be sure that the US would in fact be deterred. On the one hand, the US might consider such an unverified announcement as a mere bluff. On the other it might take the clandestine introduction of such weapons as a casus belli and, having taken such action as it could to safeguard its population, launch a devastating nuclear attack on China. 

It is conceivable that some Chinese regime might be willing to accept such risks of national destruction, but we think it unlikely.
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NUMBER 4-70

The Clandestine Introduction of Nuclear Weapons into the US

Submitted by

Richard Helms
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Concurred in by the
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
As indicated overleaf
7 July 1970
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate:

The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, NSA, AEC, and the FBI.

Concurring:

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Mr. William C. Sullivan, the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

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THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS INTO THE US

THE PROBLEM

To assess the capabilities of foreign nations to introduce nuclear weapons clandestinely into the US, and to estimate the likelihood of such introduction over the next few years.¹

THE ESTIMATE

1. INTRODUCTION

1. In considering the clandestine introduction of nuclear weapons into the US, leaders of any nation would have to weigh any possible advantages against the grave consequences which would follow from discovery. Despite all precautions there would always be risk of detection arising not only from US security measures, but also from the chance of US penetration of the clandestine apparatus, the defection of an agent, or sheer accident. The enemy leaders would almost certainly judge that use of this tactic would be regarded by the US as a warlike act, if not as a cause for war, and that it would precipitate an international political crisis of the first magnitude.

2. We believe, therefore, that no nation would consider this course except possibly in the context of planning an attack on the US, of deterring the US from an attack on itself, or conceivably as an act of deception designed to embroil the US with a third power. It is inconceivable to us that any nation would plan an attack which relied on the clandestine introduction of sufficient quantities of nuclear weapons to have a decisive effect on the outcome of a war. Any plans for their use, we believe, would envision the use of limited quantities to achieve results unattainable by other means.

¹ This estimate supersedes only that portion of NIE 4-68, "The Clandestine Introduction of Weapons of Mass Destruction into the US," dated 13 June 1968, TOP SECRET, RESTRICTED DATA, which pertains to nuclear weapons. The judgments in NIE 4-68 regarding the clandestine introduction of other weapons of mass destruction are considered to be still valid.
3. Only four foreign nations—the USSR, the UK, France, and Communist China—have developed and tested nuclear weapons. Beyond these, only India and Israel may do so over the next several years. We can foresee no changes in the world situation so radical as to motivate the UK, France, or any of the potential nuclear powers to attempt to clandestinely introduce nuclear weapons into the US. For this reason, the balance of this discussion will be concerned only with the remaining nuclear powers, the Soviet Union and Communist China.

II. SOVIET AND CHINESE CAPABILITIES

4. Both the USSR and Communist China can produce nuclear weapons which could be adapted for clandestine introduction into the US. We estimate that the Soviets have a broad spectrum of weapons ranging from 150 pounds in weight and yielding 25-15 KT up to very large ones having yields of many megatons and weighing thousands of pounds. Current Chinese weapons are probably fairly large and would probably require more detailed assembly and check out after being brought in than would Soviet designs. The Chinese have introduced plutonium into their weapon design and could have a composite weapon weighing about 1,500 pounds with a yield of 50 KT; they could have a weapon in the megaton range weighing about 3,000 pounds. To date the Chinese have not to our knowledge tested a gun-assembly weapon. With their present technology they could develop one yielding about 20 KT and weighing 500-1,000 pounds but because of the heavy requirements of such weapons for U-235, they probably will not do so.

5. Nuclear weapons with weights of up to a few thousand pounds could be brought across US borders by common means of transport without great difficulty but not without some risk. The difficulties and risks of introducing larger weapons into the US, even in a disassembled state, are probably sufficiently great to seriously discourage such attempts. Such devices could be carried in by fishing boats or similar small craft to which transfer had been made at sea. Any weapon could be brought into US waters in merchant ships and detonated without removal from the ship.

6. Soviet capabilities to introduce nuclear weapons secretly are much greater than Chinese. We believe that if either country undertook such a program, they would rely on their own agent organizations rather than on political sympathizers in the US. Soviet intelligence services have assigned a high priority to the development of espionage and sabotage capabilities in the US and presumably have formed an organization for the latter purpose. Should the Soviets undertake the clandestine introduction of nuclear weapons, they almost certainly would employ the highly trained and reliable agents of these services. They could also employ diplomatic personnel and could bring in weapons or weapon components under diplomatic cover. The large diplomatic establishments in Canada and Mexico could serve as bases for the operation.
7. There are no Chinese Communist diplomatic establishments in the US, Canada, or Mexico. Their absence precludes the use of diplomatic cover for the clandestine introduction of nuclear weapons or their components and the use of secure diplomatic communications for planning and control of such an operation; it also makes more difficult the introduction and control of agents. Nevertheless, the Chinese could introduce agents under the guise of bona fide immigrants.

8. In considering Soviet and Chinese capabilities, we have also considered the possibility that a third country might assist the USSR or China in the clandestine introduction of nuclear weapons into the US. We consider this highly unlikely on two counts. We doubt that either the Soviets or the Chinese would seek to enlist the aid of another nation in such a sensitive undertaking. And if they should, that nation’s leaders would almost certainly react unfavorably to a proposal that could jeopardize their national survival merely to support Soviet or Chinese policy.

III. STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS

9. If the Soviets or Communist Chinese have considered the clandestine introduction of nuclear weapons into the US, they have almost certainly been influenced by the same general considerations: the element of risk, the opportunities for clandestine introduction, and the results that could be achieved. The two countries, however, occupy vastly different strategic positions vis-a-vis the US. The Soviets and Chinese, therefore, might see the clandestine introduction of nuclear weapons in a somewhat different light.

10. The USSR. The Soviet leaders, like those of the US, must take account of the possibility of general war in their military planning. In such planning, the Soviets would consider the clandestine introduction of nuclear weapons into the US, if at all, only as a supplement to the main attack by their large strategic attack forces. Because they have already achieved an assured retaliatory capability, they would probably consider a clandestine emplacement effort as potentially useful only in support of a deliberate or pre-emptive Soviet attack and directed toward delaying or reducing a US retaliatory attack. Possible targets might include important government headquarters, key military command and control facilities, missile detection and tracking radars, and possibly some alert forces. The Soviets would recognize, however, that even if such an effort were successful, it could not prevent US retaliation or reduce it to what they would consider an acceptable level.

11. In considering clandestine attack as a supplement to other weapons, the Soviets would have to weigh their ability to initiate such attack rapidly, with little preparation, and in close coordination with the main weight of attack. Thus, in a preplanned attack clandestinely introduced weapons would have to be in position at the time the attack was launched. In the case of a pre-emptive
attack the circumstances would not allow sufficient time for the introduction and delivery of such weapons after a decision to pre-empt. To prepare for this contingency beforehand, the Soviets would have to accept the risk of maintaining weapons in the US for an indefinite period of time. These difficulties would not obtain if the USSR decided deliberately to initiate general war in a period of low tension; weapons could be introduced into the US a relatively short time before use. But the Soviets would have to consider the risk of jeopardizing the element of surprise on which this course of action relies, and that discovery would have severe and unpredictable repercussions, possibly including a US pre-emptive attack which would be disastrous for the USSR. For these reasons, we think it highly unlikely that the USSR will attempt to introduce nuclear weapons clandestinely into the US.

12. Communist China. The Chinese have no capability at present to attack the US with nuclear weapons. They probably have an ICBM system in the early stages of development, which could become operational several years from now. In the interim, they might see some advantages in clandestinely introducing and emplacing nuclear weapons in the US. Inasmuch as they could not deliver such an attack on a scale sufficient to achieve a decisive military objective, their object would presumably be to deter the US from a course of action that gravely threatened their national security. Consequently, the most likely targets would be population centers.

13. Clearly, the Chinese would also see grave disadvantages in such a move. So long as the US was unaware of their existence, the concealed weapons would have no effect upon its actions. Indeed, the risk of their discovery would be an ever-present, continuing danger to the Chinese themselves. Once the Chinese announced that nuclear weapons were emplaced in the US, the announcement would touch off an intensive search and extraordinary security measures. Moreover, the Chinese could not be sure that the US would in fact be deterred. On the one hand, the US might consider such an unverified announcement as a mere bluff. On the other it might take the clandestine introduction of such weapons as a casus belli and, having taken such actions as it could to safeguard its population, launch a devastating nuclear attack on China. In any case, the US would almost certainly seek to render the clandestinely introduced weapons unusable by threatening and preparing to deliver a devastating retaliatory attack in the event of their use. It is conceivable that some Chinese regime might be willing to accept such risks of national destruction, but we think it highly unlikely.

14. Finally it is conceivable that the Chinese Communists might seek to introduce into the US a nuclear device with the intention of detonating it under certain circumstances—i.e., in a period of great tension between the US and the USSR—in hopes that it would lead US authorities to conclude that the action had been perpetrated by the Soviets. Alternatively, the Chinese Communists might think it worthwhile to introduce into the US a nuclear device so constructed as to
appear to be of Soviet origin, and intended not to be detonated but to be discovered by US authorities. In the first case, the purpose would be to touch off a war; in the second, it would be to produce a serious crisis between the US and the USSR—a crisis which could serve Chinese interests. But it is unlikely that either deception would succeed; the procedures would be subject to most of the other difficulties discussed above, and we consider it highly unlikely that the Chinese would attempt either.
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