MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Karamessines

SUBJECT: Congressional Watchdog Committee on CIA

1. With the exception of one or two specific points, which I will deal with below, this paper is an eloquent expression of a defensible point of view on the subject. My main problem is that I do not altogether subscribe to the point of view, as you may have gathered at our meeting a few weeks ago.

2. In balance, I feel that the Agency would be better off without a Joint Committee. I agree with your statement that the creation of such a committee would not in itself eliminate the Director's problem of having to appear repeatedly before a wide variety of Congressional groups. I do feel, however, that such a committee could be helpful in reducing the number of appearances before different groups, particularly if it included within its membership representatives of the Armed Forces, Appropriations, and Foreign Affairs and Foreign Relations Committees.

3. My main point is that I do not foresee all the dire consequences you point out in the formation of a committee. You assume, in Paragraph 11, that such a committee would have a large staff. I don't believe that this would necessarily be the case, and in fact when the point was raised not long ago with Mike Mansfield, the principal proponent of a Joint Committee in the Senate, he readily agreed that the staff should be small and very select. Actually, under the present system, there are a large number of staff people on various committees who have a fairly intimate knowledge of the workings and activities of the Agency. It seems to me that this current problem would be easier to control if a single committee and its staff were primarily responsible to the Congressional leadership.

4. I think your observations in Paragraph 7 on the Atomic Energy Committee are only partially valid. It
is true that the Commission as an agency is not comparable to our own, but I believe that you understare the jurisdiction of the Joint Committee, which deals with matters of the greatest sensitivity, and which far transcend the specific responsibilities and problems of the Atomic Energy Commission.

5. In sum, I feel that it would be a mistake for the Agency or the White House to get involved in a lobbying campaign against a Joint Committee if the Congressional winds are clearly blowing in that direction (a fact which should be easily ascertainable). The Agency’s good friends on the Hill are fully aware of the security and other problems involved in such a committee. They are also aware of the fact that the Agency lacks a voice in the Congress created by the Congress, and that this situation makes it almost impossible to defend our interests in that body. If, therefore, it appears that it is the clear intent of Congress to create a Joint Committee, I think we would be well advised to work with the leadership in seeing that the Committee properly represents the standing committees with a legitimate interest in American intelligence, and that its staff and activities be kept down to secure proportions.
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**Remarks:**

Dick:

I believe the attached are the papers you wish. Kindly return them to me after they have served their purpose.

JSE
SUBJECT: Congressional Watchdog Committee on CIA

1. The question of a Congressional watchdog committee on CIA has relevance to the primary mission of the Clandestine Services, the creation of an effective world-wide clandestine mechanism. This memorandum examines the impact which such a Congressional committee could have upon the future of the Clandestine Services and of the Agency.

2. Friends of the Agency argue that the Agency needs such a committee to protect it against too frequent Congressional calls. It is proper to ask whether a joint committee can indeed protect the interests of the Agency by relieving it of the necessity for responding to frequent Congressional requests, and whether the price paid for this in reduced security would be worthwhile, as against our present expenditure of time and effort to keep the CIA sub-committees informed.

3. The Agency has been keeping several Congressional sub-committees informed on its programs and costs, and even on some of its actual operations. This has apparently tended to whet rather than lessen Congressional interest in the Agency. There is no assurance that this additional committee will, in the long run, be effective in warding off multiple inquisitions when matters of
underlying domestic political significance, such as the current inquiry into our missiles program, are being hotly debated. The McCarthy era with its attendant spectacle of committees and subcommittees jostling for headlines is too recent an example.

4. The shield available to the Agency in those days still exists. It was forged on the principle that the Director is responsible only to the President and the NSC, as the confidential intelligence arm of the Executive. There were no chinks in that shield, and the Director could face the Congress and stand on this principle, and he did it successfully. The creation of a joint committee, with the powers and authorities to inquire into the last detail of Agency personnel, funds, activities and policies, would breach the shield and render it useless once and for all. As the DD/P, Mr. Bissell, recently put it in addressing the current JOT class, although in another context: "Our Agency is the last refuge of organizational privacy available to the U.S. Government." The compromise of this refuge should not be undertaken lightly, nor acquiesced in for reasons of current or other expediency.

5. It is wise to weigh what we would lose with the creation of such a joint committee against the price we pay currently in the absence of such a committee. A fully empowered joint committee could rapidly become a mistress impossible to satisfy. Our complicated and sensitive political action programs, psychological programs and radio
programs would be subjected to the ad hoc and uninformed scrutiny of self-styled staff experts with resultant comments and criticisms which would make our current tribulations with the Bureau of the Budget seem trivial by comparison. Inquiries into the qualifications and backgrounds, security and trustworthiness, political and social views of our personnel, without exception, could easily become one of the committee's principal preoccupations and pastimes. The political interplay and interaction of the parochial interests of one or more members of such a joint committee, let loose among the delicate and finely woven fabric which constitutes the structure of the Clandestine Services liaison and other operational relationships abroad, could do incalculable and irreparable damage.

6. Unique among the intelligence services of the world, we would no longer be in a position to guarantee in good faith to any of our foreign liaisons that we could provide the kind of inviolability of their confidences which we now resolutely affirm. The experience of the Federal Bureau of Investigation with its Canadian liaison following careless Congressional handling of Canadian security information is a case in point.

7. It cannot be argued plausibly that the joint committee on Atomic Energy is a good example of the advantages which would accrue to the Agency if a CIA committee were to be established. The joint
committee on Atomic Energy deals almost exclusively with matters of
domestic control, and with policies, funds, activities and programs
having pre-eminently and fundamentally domestic implications. Only
in a secondary sense and in a limited way does the work of the
Atomic Energy Commission acquire sensitive foreign implications. Its
secrets are similar to those of any giant U.S. industrial enterprise.
They are the secrets of nuts and bolts, production statistics and
technical formulae. They do not have any of the direct relevance to
day-by-day and hour-by-hour conduct of foreign activities which
informs the daily work of this Agency. Unlike those of the CIA, the
secrets of the Atomic Energy Commission are of a fixed and absolute
nature, allowing little or no scope for domestic political exploitation.

8. As we now stand, we are still dedicated to the principle which
protected the Agency in the days of McCarthy and which could protect us
again when there is a re-occurrence of those days as there must
inevitably be in a democracy such as ours. By feeling secure behind
this shield of principle, we feel free to go to the Congress repre-
sented by its special committees on our affairs, and to discuss with
them within a framework of ground rules which we have had a large
hand in establishing, those matters of genuine and admitted Congressional
interest such as our main budgetary provisions and the general course
of our programs. It is true that, from time to time, the Director is
summoned to testify before other committees inquiring into current problems. It is also true, however, that he feels confident in the knowledge that he enjoys the fundamental protection of the shield if and as he needs to resort to it. We are therefore better off in this respect under our present arrangements than we would be with the establishment of a joint Congressional committee and its inevitable consequences.

9. Perhaps the most compelling practical argument in favor of the Agency acquiescing in the proposals to establish such a committee is that, by so doing, the Agency may enjoy a greater hand in the formulation of the terms of reference within which such a committee will function. If Congressional committees functioned under procedural rules similar to those of our courts of law, this might be an acceptable risk but they do not. Once such a committee has been established it will be morally difficult if not impossible for any representative of the Agency to refuse to provide data on the grounds that the committee's agreed upon terms of reference precluded it. As a practical matter, such a refusal would place that representative and the Agency immediately in a difficult position. It is true that our present Director of Central Intelligence owing to his personal stature and reputation, would have little or no
difficulty with this problem, particularly in view of his good friendships among members of the Congress. However, this would not necessarily be the case with those who will follow the present Director, and once this door has been opened to the Congress, especially if it should be done with the Agency's and the Executive's acquiescence, it will be practically impossible to close it again.

10. In this same sense, there is a collateral aspect that deserves the most careful attention. The activities of this Agency, in their foreign implications, cut across the interests of several of the government departments and agencies. In many respects, we are, in a sense, a composite mirror of many of their policies and activities. We hold, at the same time, the key which would unlock all kinds of doors into confidential matters affecting these other agencies. We would find it very difficult to protect the official confidences of our own sister agencies if we were to be exposed to a Congressional committee of the type contemplated.

11. Finally, for an Agency which seems already to spend a disproportionate share of its time and energies in reporting, briefing and being investigated or monitored, the creation of the joint committee contemplated, with a large and highly curious staff, would add one more serious detraction from the Agency's mission.
12. For the above reasons it is earnestly recommended that we stand firm against the imposition of direct and undesirable Congressional supervision and monitoring of our activities.
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Remarks: This is a draft of the paper we discussed at the meeting recently. I will be happy to change it, as you may wish. I have not circulated it to anyone else. Will discuss matters.

STAT

Also attached are...
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Executive Secretary of the National Security Council

SUBJECT: Proposed Legislation to Establish a Joint Committee on Foreign Intelligence

REFERENCE: Memorandum for the Director of Central Intelligence from the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council on the subject dated October 7, 1955.

This memorandum is submitted in compliance with the request in reference memorandum that the Director of Central Intelligence submit to the National Security Council for consideration a report containing (a) an analysis of the proposed legislation to establish a Joint Committee on Foreign Intelligence, and (b) recommendations as to an Administration position.

I.

Analysis of Proposed Legislation.

A large number of resolutions were introduced in the Senate and the House during the last session of Congress, all of which proposed the establishment of a Joint Congressional Committee on Foreign Intelligence. Certain of these bills referred to a Joint Committee 'on Central Intelligence', but the purposes and functions remain substantially the same.

Two basic resolutions were introduced in the Senate. One of these (S. 2614) was introduced on July 22, 1955 by Senator Smith of New Jersey. This bill (Annex 1) was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Chairman of which, Senator George, requested the views of the Central Intelligence Agency. These views were submitted to Senator George in a
letter from the Director dated August 18, 1955 (Annex 2). Senator Smith had introduced this bill in keeping with a general practice he has followed for introducing legislation to carry out the various recommendations of the Hoover Commission, and the Senator indicated to the Director that he had not committed himself as to the subject matter of the proposed legislation.

A further bill was S. Con. Res. 2 (Annex 3), which was introduced on January 14, 1955 by Senator Mansfield. This resolution was introduced not only for Senator Mansfield himself, but on behalf of 32 other Senators as well, including 6 members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and its Chairman, Senator George, and members of Senate Armed Services and Appropriations Committees as well. Two other Senators added their names to this resolution after its initial introduction by Senator Mansfield, bringing the total of co-signers of the Mansfield Resolution to 35. How far all 35 are really committed to the support of the Bill is not known.

Resolutions of this type must be introduced on an individual basis in the House, and 26 such resolutions were introduced during the last session.

Although the various resolutions differ as to details, such as the number and composition of membership, they all basically call for the establishment of a Joint Committee on Foreign (or Central) Intelligence, the principle function of which would be to make continuing studies of the foreign intelligence activities of the Government. Under all of them, the Central Intelligence Agency is required to keep the Committee fully and currently informed with respect to its activities, and all matters in the Senate or House relating primarily to the Agency or its activities are to be referred to the Joint Committee. All of the resolutions authorize the Joint Committee to hold hearings, subpoena witnesses and documents, etc., and all of them empower the Committee to appoint such staff as it may determine to be necessary in order to carry out its functions.

A list of Senate and House resolutions on a Joint Committee, together with names of sponsors and date of introduction, is attached hereto as Annex 4.
II.

The Present Congressional Review Mechanism.

Since the creation of the Central Intelligence Agency in 1947 Congress has devised various methods for maintaining its relations with the Agency and for securing the information necessary to provide the basis for necessary authorizations and appropriations. These methods also provide a means of keeping the appropriate Committees quite completely informed as to the activities of CIA and its general effectiveness and efficiency. During the initial period of the Agency's existence the Congress was inclined to leave it alone. As the work of the CIA increased in scope and magnitude, however, and attracted increased attention both at home and abroad, Congressional interest increased. Hearings before the House Appropriations Committee, for example, were general in nature during the early years of the Agency's existence, but became more extensive and more detailed, particularly in the 84th Congress. The House scrutiny of the CIA budget has never involved pressures to reveal information which the Director wished to withhold, and so far there have been no security breaches attributable to any Congressional hearing on CIA matters. Although the Senate Appropriations Committee did not conduct as extensive or detailed hearings as the House Committee on the CIA budget, it has also reviewed the work of the Agency in recent sessions.

A similar pattern has developed with respect to the authorizing committees, which have been the Committees on Armed Services of the House and the Senate. During the 84th Congress, the Senate Armed Services Committee formalized its interest in the CIA through the following "Arm ed Services Committee Standing Orders":

11. Within 30 days after the adoption of these standing orders there shall be appointed by the chairman, to serve for the duration of the Congress, the following subcommittees, each subcommittee to consist of not less than two members at least one of whom shall be from the minority party. The duties of each subcommittee shall be as indicated herein. A member of the professional staff of the committee shall be assigned by the chairman to assist each
subcommittee, such staff assignments to be in addition to the staff member's other duties.

(b) Subcommittee on Central Intelligence Agency:
Hold such meetings and briefings as are necessary to maintain familiarity with the operation of section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947 as amended and the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, and the policies and programs being carried out pursuant to those authorities, or being planned.

Provide a channel for liaison between the Central Intelligence Agency and the Senate Committee on Armed Services.

On January 28, 1955, Senators Russell (Chairman), Byrd, Johnson of Texas, Bridges, and Saltonstall were designated as members of this subcommittee. On March 4, 1955 a Secret briefing was held for the Committee, and two of its members, Senators Byrd and Saltonstall, were given specific CIA briefings in the field during recent trips abroad, as was General Verne Mudge, a staff member of the Armed Services Committee. Chairman Vines of the House Armed Services Committee has advised us that he proposes to establish promptly a subcommittee similar to the Senate subcommittee.

Apart from the formal relations with Armed Services and Appropriations Committees, CIA has had some dealings with other committees in the House and the Senate such as Government Operations, Post Office & Civil Service, Judiciary, Foreign Relations, and the Joint Committees on Atomic Energy and on Printing.

III.

The Desirability of Additional Congressional Review of Non-Intelligence Activities.

A basic fact which must be borne in mind in analyzing this problem is that the establishment of a separate Congressional Committee whose only functions relate to the conduct of foreign intelligence activities would inevitably mean a closer scrutiny by a much broader membership of the Congress of the activities of the
United States Government in this field. Although most of the resolutions introduced have referred to "intelligence activities," which might be construed as not relating to operational activities, they all further provide that the Director of Central Intelligence is to report to the Committee on "all" activities of CIA, which makes it likely that any aspect of CIA or related Government operations in this field would also come under scrutiny by the Committee. At the present time, intelligence activities are described to the Congress through formal or informal subcommittees of existing committees, the members of which and the staffs of which have additional duties to perform. If the membership, and particularly the staff, of a new Congressional committee has no functions other than those relating to foreign intelligence, it is inevitable that the demands upon the Executive Branch for information, operational and otherwise, will be considerably greater than under present arrangements. The actual needs of CIA for substantive legislation are neither frequent nor extensive enough to occupy a major amount of the time of a Congressional committee or staff, and requests for funds will still have to be reviewed by the Appropriations Committees themselves. The following analysis as to specific problems assumes the foregoing facts.

a. Security. It is inevitable that a more intensive and broader Congressional scrutiny of CIA would rapidly raise serious security considerations and tend to impair the effectiveness of operations. Countless examples could be given of instances where the unauthorized disclosure of information as to a planned operational activity (e.g., the overthrow of a foreign government and the many lesser activities) could have disastrous consequences. Witting representatives of the Executive Branch are frequently offended, morally or otherwise, by certain proposed operational activities, and their remarks or views are heard within the secure confines of the Executive Branch. No such security strictures, however, could be imposed upon members of Congress. Although individual members of Congress will vigorously and truthfully deny that their security is any less complete than that of the Executive Branch, experience has indicated that this cannot be relied upon across the board, and leaks are inevitable.
Apart from the implications insofar as the security of the United States is concerned, an intensive Congressional scrutiny of CIA is likely to impair intelligence relations with friendly foreign governments. Such relations, particularly with governments not formally allied with the United States, depend on the understanding that they will be held on the basis of absolute minimum access. Apart from the increased danger of leaks from more people knowing, creation of the proposed Committee, with staff and other facilities, would in itself tend to create doubt abroad as to the security of United States’ handling of material handed over by foreign sources, and would result in the inevitable stoppage of flow of certain sensitive information which by its very nature, is most important to the United States. In this respect, intelligence relationships are more sensitive than any foreign relationship of the Atomic Energy Commission and than almost any foreign relationship of the Department of State.

The staff for the Committee would present many problems. To do its job the staff would undoubtedly attempt a thorough and continuous review of all Agency activities and thus become involved in the most sensitive of clandestine activities. This is particularly true inasmuch as CIA has little legislation to concern a staff.

b. Relationship Between the Executive and the Congress. The creation of a Joint Committee would raise fundamental problems as to the basic constitutional relationship between the President and the Congress, particularly with regard to the President’s function of the conduct of foreign affairs. Although it is perhaps not generally understood in the Congress, CIA does not set policy, but carries on its activities only in accordance with policy set by the Department of State, the National Security Council, and, ultimately, the President. Hence, if operational activities under NSC 5412 become included in the Joint Committee’s charter, as is likely, the Committee would feel it necessary to know the policy basis for each activity, and the State Department, and in certain cases the White House itself, would become immediately and directly involved, with the resultant danger of incursion into the foreign policy prerogatives of the Executive.

It does not follow that the operational activities of CIA, as distinct from the intelligence activities, should be regarded as sacrosanct, and not subject to review or criticism. The proper location for such a review, however, is within the Executive Branch itself. The Director reports on such Agency activities semi-annually to the National Security Council, consults frequently with the Operations Coordinating Board, and obtains policy guidance from State, Defense and other interested policy agencies.
c. The Jurisdictional Problem. The "foreign intelligence activities of the Government" involve many departments and agencies in addition to CIA. In the IAC alone there are represented the Department of State, the three Services and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the AEC, the FBI, and on occasion, representatives of other agencies. This would mean that a Joint Congressional Committee on Intelligence would have to deal with activities of many agencies which presently fall within the jurisdiction of other Congressional committees, such as Armed Services, Foreign Relations and Foreign Affairs, Atomic Energy, Judiciary, etc.

The argument is often made that the "success" of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy is proof that a Joint Committee on Intelligence would be similarly successful. This argument, however, fails to take into account that in the case of Atomic Energy, at least in the field of operations which are the major Congressional concern, the Committee only deals with one agency of the Government. Moreover, they deal with an agency which has a wide variety of responsibilities requiring extensive legislation in many fields of activity, such as preemptive relationships in patents and property, civil defense, control of materials, manufacture of weapons, etc. Atomic Energy bills deal with construction of industrial facilities, housing facilities, taxation, research and development, and a number of activities which are of interest to large segments of the American people. No such factors relate to the conduct of foreign intelligence.

Even if a Joint Committee were to make a bona fide attempt to confine its attention to CIA's intelligence activities, it would address itself to only about 1/9 of the foreign intelligence activities of the Government in terms of personnel or budgetary problems. Moreover, the activities of CIA cannot be understood in isolation because its role is to contribute by its "services of common concern" to the work of each of the other intelligence services of the Government, and to draw together the work of all of them in the production of national intelligence. Thus, a thorough understanding of the intelligence structure of the Government as a whole would be essential to any effective review of the CIA intelligence role.

d. The Membership Problem. Although it obviously cannot be used as a formal argument, the problem of the membership of a Joint Committee on Foreign Intelligence is a very real one.
insofar as the Executive Branch is concerned. Senator Smith's resolution and other resolutions similar to his make no provision as to the source of membership of such a Committee. It simply provides that there will be nine members from each House, with the usual relationship between majority and minority parties. Under such a bill, seniority rules would probably apply, which would be a much more inflexible arrangement than the subcommittee arrangement which has now been established. Senator Mansfield's resolution deals with this problem to some degree by providing that the total membership of the Committee would be 12, 6 from each House, and by further providing that 3 members would be selected from each of the Armed Services and Appropriations Committees. Although this appears to lean in the direction of a more manageable solution to this problem, it is still much more inflexible than the present arrangement. It is perhaps unnecessary to point out that certain current members, reasonably senior, of Armed Services and Appropriations Committees, are outspoken opponents of some of the kinds of work done by CIA.

IV.

Recommendations for Administration Position.

In the light of the foregoing, it is recommended that the Administration take the following position regarding legislation for a Joint Committee on Foreign Intelligence (or on Central Intelligence):

a. That such a Committee would provide an unnecessary supplement to the review now being conducted by existing committees of the Congress;

b. That the present mechanisms of existing committees are adequate to carry on any further review which the Congress and the Executive may determine to be desirable in connection with foreign intelligence activities;

c. That such a Committee would create definite jurisdictional problems, due to the large and diverse number of Government agencies with responsibilities in the intelligence field, all of whom are now responsible to existing Congressional committees; and
d. That the creation of such a Committee could raise substantial security problems and hamper the conduct of foreign relations by the Executive.

SIGNED

Allen W. Dulles
Director

CONCUR:

Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Inspector General

IG:NSP:blc:fm (29 Dec 55)

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
2 - Signer
2 - Legislative Counsel

Enclosures:
Annex 1 - S. 2614
Annex 2 - Ltr to Senator George from the Director dated 18 Aug 55.
Annex 3 - S. Con. Res. 2
Annex 4 - List of Senate and House Resolutions on Joint Committee
Apart from the implications insofar as the security of the United States is concerned, an intensive Congressional scrutiny of CIA is likely to impair intelligence relations with friendly foreign governments. Such relations, particularly with governments not formally allied with the United States, depend on the understanding that they will be held on the basis of absolute minimum access. Apart from the increased danger of leaks from more people knowing, creation of the proposed Committee, with staff and other facilities, would in itself tend to create doubt abroad as to the security of United States' handling of material handed over by foreign sources, and would result in the inevitable stoppage of flow of certain sensitive information which by its very nature, is most important to the United States. In this respect, intelligence relationships are more sensitive than any foreign relationship of the Atomic Energy Commission and than almost any foreign relationship of the Department of State.

b. Relationship Between the Executive and the Congress. The creation of a Joint Committee would raise fundamental problems as to the basic constitutional relationship between the President and the Congress, particularly with regard to the President's function of the conduct of foreign affairs. Although it is perhaps not generally understood in the Congress, CIA does not set policy, but carries on its activities only in accordance with policy set by the Department of State, the National Security Council, and, ultimately, the President. Hence, if operational activities become included in the Joint Committee's charter, as is likely, the Committee would feel it necessary to know the policy basis for each activity, and the State Department, and in certain cases the White House itself, would become immediately and directly involved, with the resultant danger of incursion into the foreign policy prerogatives of the Executive.

It does not follow that the operational activities of CIA should be regarded as sacrosanct, and not subject to review or criticism. The proper location for such a review, however, is within the Executive Branch itself. The Director reports on the Agency's activities quarterly to the National Security Council, and at more frequent intervals to the Operations Coordinating Board, in addition to routine liaison with State, Defense and other interested agencies. Moreover, the President has in the past repeatedly designated outside groups, most recently that headed by General Doolittle, to look into the Agency's operational activities in detail.